SENATOR MCCARTHY'S PROPOSALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000700050003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

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SENATOR MCCARTHY'S PROPOSALS
Since 1959, Senator Eugene J. McCarthy has been interested
in the establishment of a Joint "watchdog" Committee on intelligence
matters and has introduced resolutions to this effect in each Congress
except the current one. Early this year, Senator McCarthy decided
on another tactic and introduced a somewhat different resolution which
would authorize the Foreign Relations Committee to conduct "... a full
and complete study with respect to the effects of the operations and
activities of the Central Intelligence Agency upon the foreign relations
of the United States." Under the resolution, the Committee would report
the findings of its study and investigation and such recommendations as
it deems advisable to the Senate not later than 31 January 1967.
Senator McCarthy has made no secret of the fact that he believes
his current resolution has a better chance of receiving favorable reaction
than his earlier Joint Committee proposals, feeling that a sufficient number
of Senators would see no harm in having an existing committee review the
need for the establishment of a Joint Committee. Senator McCarthy has
stated publicly his belief that the Agency's "highly secret role in the
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Vietnam, Cuba and other crisis areas..." raises
serious questions about the relationship of the Agency to the process of
making and directing foreign policy. He feels that "...undercover and
paramilitary operations have a direct bearing on foreign policy and
indirectly on the constitutional responsibility of Congress for defense
and war."
Senator McCarthyts current resolution has not been officially
acted upon by the Foreign Relations Committee although it has been
discussed in the Committee's executive sessions. As a result of these
discussions, Chairman Fulbright, as reported in a Washington Post article
on 26 April 1966, suggested that several members of the Foreign Relations
Committee be permitted to attend Agency meetings with the combined
Armed Services and Appropriations CIA Subcommittees. The Post
article indicates that the CIA Subcommittee discussed this proposal at
a meeting this past Monday. I am aware that this proposal was discussed.
While I have not been officially advised, it is my understanding that the
members were unanimously opposed to this proposition.
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THE WASHINGTON POS 26 APRIL 1966
Senate Seen Near
Stiffer CIA Control
By Don Irwin
Los Angeles Times
A secret meeting of seven tions Chairman J. William
senior , Senators heightened Fulbright (D-Ark.) that the
speculation yesterday that an senior Congressional commit-
agreement to broaden Senate tee in the foreign policy field
supervision over the Central
be given at least equal access
Intelligence Agency is in the
making.
The meeting lins one of the
rare business sessions of a
special subcommittee that has two developments of the past
been the. Senate's only link
with the affairs of the govern- week. One was a vain effort
ment's super-secret global in. by CIA to halt the slander
telligence agency.
Headed by Sen. Richard B.
Russell (D-Ga.), chairman of
the Armed Services Commit-
tee, the subcommittee con-
sists. of the highest-ranking
Republicans and Democrats
on the Armed Services and
Appropriations committees.
136nding before Russell is a
request from Foreign Rela-
to data on CIA:
Fulbright's request takes on
added point in the light of
?
trial in Baltimore of an East-
onian-born agent who had
linked another emigre to the
Soviet secret police, apparent-
ly under orders from the CIA.
The other is a report that at
least five CIA . agents were
among Michigan State Univer-
sity specialists who carried
out a foreign aid project insr.
Vietnam.
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Reins Weighed
By E. W. RENWORTHY
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, April 25?
A small group of Senators re-
sponsible for monitoring the
Central Intelligence Agency met
today to discuss whether their
"watchdog" committee should
be enlarged and its surveillance
thightened:
The bipartisan group is made
up of ranking members of the
Armed Services Committee and
the Appropriations subcommit-
tee dealing with funds for the
armed services.
For many years the Senate
group and a comparable grouP
in the House, also drawn from
the Armed Services and Ap-
propriations Committees, have,
constituted the only "legislative,
oversight" of the secret opera-
tions and the secret funds of the
C.I.A.
For many years also a large
hum.ber of Senators and Repre-
sentatives have urged that these
two groups be expanded to in-
clude members of the Senate
Foreign Relations and House
Foreign Affairs Committees
so that the activities of the
agency would be subjected more
closely to political considera-
tions.
? Although Senator Richard B.
Russell, chairman of the Armed
Services Committee and thb
watchdog committee,. has
'resisted these suggestions, in-
continued on Page 30, Column 6
THE NEW YORK TIMES, Tuesday, 26 April 1966
SENTHORS WEIGH
EON C.I.A. REIM,
Continued From rage 1, Col. 5
-----
formed sources said he called
today's meeting precisely to
consider such an expansion:
These sources said also that
two recent disclosures of C.I.A.
activities had apparently
brought the whole issue to a
head in the Senate watchdog
group.
The first of these was the
revelation that at least five
C.I.A. agents operated in South
Vietnam during the late 1950's
under the cover of a multi-mil-
lion dollar technical assistance
program conducted for the gov-
ernment of the late President
Ngo Dinh Diem by Michigan
?State University.
Intercedes in Suit
The second was the disclosure
that the C.I.A. interceded in the
slander trial of one of its agents,
Juni Raus, an Estonian refugee,
who was being sued by Eerik
Heine., another Estonian emi-
gre. Mr. Heine charged that Mr.
Raus had publicly called him
an agent of the K.G.B., the
Soviet intelligence agency.
In a public memorandum ad-
dressed to the Federal Court in
Baltimore, the C.I.A. said it
had ordered Mr. Raus to cease
testifying in order to protect
the United States foreign intel-
ligence apparatus. Mr. Raus
claimed immunity on the ground
that the alleged slander had
been committed in the course
of his C.I.A. duties.
Several days ago Senator J. W.
Fulbright, chairman of the For-
eign Relations Committee, wrote
to Senator Russell suggesting
that they discuss the possibility
of having representatives from
his committee on the watchdog
group. It could not be learned
whether Mr. Russell has replied
to this letter.
Senator Eugene J. McCarthy,
Democrat of Minnesota, and a
member of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, has expressed
concern that the C.I.A. "is mak-
ing foreign policy and in so
doing is Assuming the roles of
President and Congress."
Mr. McCarthy has introduced
a resolution calling for a "full
and complete" study of the ef-
fect of C.I.A. operations on
policymaking by a special sub-
Pommittee of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee. He also favors
expanding the present oversight
group to include members of the
Foreign Relations Committee.
Responsibility Cited
Today Mr. McCarthy said that,'
In view of the Michigan State
and Rens cases, Congress would
be rejecting "a very basic con-,
stitutional responsibility" if it
did not begin 'to exercise some
degree of jurisdiction beyond
what it is exercising now," ?
"Either the special group
doesn't know about these
things and it should, or it does
know and tolerates them," Mr.
McCarthy said.
Senator Mike Mansfield of
Montana, the Majority Leader,
said with a smile that the pro-
posal to widen the watchdog
committee was "not a bad
idea."
In 1954 Mr. Mansfield intro-
duced a resolution to create a
12-man; joint committee?SIX
from each house?to maintain
'scrutiny on ;the C.I.A.,
The resolution had 34 co-
sponsors. However, ranch of the
support evaporated under the
, opposition of Senator Russell
and Senator Leverett Salton-
stall, Republican of Massazsm-
setts, who agreed with the then
C.I.A. director, Allen W. Dulles,
that the joint committee might
jeopardize security.
When the Mansfield resolu-
tion finally came to a vote in
1956, 11 sponsors reversed
themselves, and it was defeat-
ed, 59 to 27.
Besides Mr. Russell and
Saltonstall, the present watch-
dog committee is made up of
Democrats John Stennis of Mis-
sissippi, Carl Hayden of Ari-
zona, Stuart Symington of Mis-
souri, and Republicans Milton R.
Young of North Dakota and
Margaret Chase Smith of Maine.
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GOLD COAST ITEM
There has been some interest in the press in the past few days
in "American spies" being permitted to rest and relax after assignments
at hardship posts on the Gold Coast of Africa. The UPI ticker item said,
"American spies may soon be able to come in from the cold--or heat,
as the case may be."
The reference to the Gold Coast of Africa relates to a legislative
proposal which members of this Subcommittee will recall as having been
included in proposed legislation as far back as three years ago when some
consideration was given to the introduction of omnibus type administrative
amendments for the Agency. It was determined at that time to drop all
administrative items in order to concentrate on our early retirement bill.
Included in the Explanation and Justification of the rest and
rehabilitation legislation, was a statement in support of this provision.
The legislation would authorize the travel of employees and their dependents,
at Government expense, from designated hardship posts to areas where
the employees and their families might relax and obtain needed freedom
from climatic and other conditions which caused their post of assignment
to be designated as a hardship post. As an example, a hardship post
on the Gold Coast of Africa was used to illustrate how this authority might
be utilized. There was no indication, as implied in recent press statements
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on this subject, that the Agency did in fact have employees stationed
in this area. The Explanation and Justification was originally prepared
late last year and was in Bureau of the Budget processing until transmittal
to this Congress on 7 April 1966.
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1Nroor'
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Comment:
These comments represent the initial and tentative reaction of the Office
of Current Intelligence to the attachgd Lival imacilligoa6vi services.
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COMMERCIAL AVIATION COMPANIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
In 1950 the Agency acquired the assets of the airline which
had been created by General Chennault in China at the end of the
war and which had evacuated with the Nationalist Chinese to Taiwan.
The original purpose of the acquisition was to deny this valuable
aviation facility to the Red Chinese, but through the years events
have time and again demonstrated the need for such a controlled
aviation facility in the Far East. In recent years CINCPAC
particularly has noted the very valuable contribution this commercial
air facility has made to the U. S. interests in Southeast Asia. This
facility meets all normal business requirements and is recognized
in. the airline industry as a member in good standing.
The commercial aviation complex has two main activities:
a. The scheduled international Chinese flag airline
which operates modern jet equipment as far north as Tokyo
and Seoul and as far south as Manila and Bangkok. This is
operated by a Chinese company known as Civil Air Transport
Company, Limited, or CATCL, which does nothing but the
international scheduled activity.
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b. A large contract activity providing airlift in
support of U. S. programs in Southeast Asia. This is
conducted by Air America, a Delaware corporation
authorized to engage in contract airlift and to contract
with U. S. Government entities, and Air Asia, a Chinese
corporation wholly owned by Air America, which owns
the majority of the equipment and operates a large,
modern maintenance base in the south end of Taiwan
Island,
Southeast Asia operations are divided between those in
South Vietnam and those in Thailand and Laos. Most of the
operations are under AID contracts;
The AID work is primarily carriage of food
and other supplies in support of AID programs,
In addition, in Laos facilities have been
called on for emergency search and rescur of downed American
military pilots, and because of the familiarization with the
terrain these have been effective. The equipment is varied and
tends to be specialized because of the particular requirements.
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Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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E. Missiles in Cuba
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SECRET
26 April 1966
DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE
MISSILES IN CUBA
I. Mister Chairman, you asked me in a letter of
April 6 to comment on a lengthy article which
appeared on March 3 in the Coral Gables Times
in Florida. This article alleged that there
are still strategic Soviet missiles in Cuba.
II. The article is a mish-mash of conjecture,
speculation, rumor, and outright misinformation
It contains no information that had not been
previously reported and checked out in exhaustive
detail.
A. I want you to know, however, that no reports
of this nature are dismissed out of hand.
We could not afford to do so--and indeed would
be guilty of gross negligence--as long as we
can not have on-site inspection of any possible
missile sites in Cuba.
B. The day after the article appeared, our domestic
field officers were in touch with the author to
determine his sources of information and the
nature of their evidence.
?
CU/MIS-1
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1. At the same time, our field station in
Miami responsible for Cuban refugee matters
was checking out any Cubans cited in the
article as sources for the allegation.
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III. The
A.
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4. The conclusion of the investigation was
that all of the information on which the
article was based came from missile and
rocket publications, talks with Cuban
refugees, and the Interim Report published
by the Subcommittee of the Senate Armed
Services Committee on May 9, 1963, entitled
"The Cuban Military Buildup"--a report
relating to the 1962 buildup which led to
the
article
crisis
itself,
One photograph,
in October, 1962.
as I said, is full of misinformation
for example, shows a missile on
a tracked vehicle , and describes it as "similar
to the US Pershing." Mr. Labelle showed this
picture tp Dr. Werner von Braun, and drew from
him the statement that if it were indeed similar
to the Pershing, the Cuban weapon could deliver
a nuclear warhead to ranges in excess of 700 miles.
1.
On this foundation, the article asserts that
Cuba has a nuclear weapon which can reach
"Cape Canaveral, Huntsville, and many lower
southern military installations and cities."
2. In point of fact, the weapon shown in the
photograph is a Soviet tactical missile, the
FROG, with a range of 29 nautical miles.
. CU/MIS-3
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3. I wonder, for that matter, whether Mr. Labelle
quoted Dr. von Braun accurately. The
PERSHING's range, with an 800-pound warhead,
is 400, rather than 700 nautical miles.
B. Another photograph is described as showing a
"naval-type cruise missile with a reported
range of 150 to 200 miles," which again, of
course, would bring Florida within range.
1. The missile shown in the photograph is
what we call the KENNEL. As a coastal
defense cruise missile, it actually has
a range of 25 to 50 nautical miles,
depending on the elevation of the launch
site. The ground forces version, mounted
on a transporter-launcher, is credited
with a range of 60 to 70 nautical miles
2. The article, however, goes on to speak of
a cruise-type missile of medium or inter-
mediate range. This is supposed to have
been shown in the January, 1964,parade in
Havana. We had complete coverage of this
parade, and no such missile appeared.
C. The article also brings up the ancient stories
about a secret Soviet weapon called the "GOLEM,"
which fires strategic missiles from fixed underwater
installations presumably planted by ship or by
submarine.
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1. This one is straight out of science
fiction. We have never obtained any
credible evidence that the Soviet Union
has, or is even working on, such a weapons
system.
D. I have given these examples, not for the
purpose of arguing that two or three mistakes
are enough to discredit the entire article,
but as examples of how every single statement
in an article of this kind is checked out
carefully against all available information
from all of our sources.
IV. There is a joint team of CIA and DIA intelligence
experts, representing both military and Cuban
expertise, which meets once a month, and more often
if necessary, to assess the military posture of Cuba
with special attention to the possibility that
strategic weapons might still be on the island.
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A. The latest joint CIA-DIA report on this
problem, dated April 19, concludes that:
"Cuba's present missile inventory is
confined to defensive and tactical weapons..
There are no strategic weapons or foreign
troop units in Cuba at this time. While we
recognize that some strategic weapons could
be deliberately concealed or clandestinely
reintroduced on the island, it is our
judgment that this has not taken place."
CU/MIS-6
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DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE
VIETNAM
26 April 1966
North Vietnam
I. The air war over North Vietnam has heated up con-
siderably during the past several weeks. North
Vietnamese jet fighters are showing increasing
aggressiveness and willingness to mix it up with
US jets.
A. This new aggressiveness on the part of Hanoi's
limited number of jets is probably due in
part to the fact that US air strikes in the
Hanoi-Haiphong area have been stepped up
during April, and have gone after targets in
the sensitive northeastern area.
B. There have been six dOgfights between US
and North Vietnamese jets since April 17.
Yesterday two MIG-21s jumped two F-4C
Phantoms escorting a reconnaissance mission
60 miles northeast of Hanoi. The net result
was one MIG-21 shot down by Sidewinder mis-
siles.
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1. Altogether, the enemy has lost two MIG-21s
and two MIG-17s in these encounters. A
North Vietnamese pilot last week claimed
to have shot down an F-105 Thunderchief;
one missing aircraft which we attributed
to ground fire could possibly have been
shot down in air-to-air combat.
2. Our pilots report Chinese Communist mark-
ings on the enemy aircraft in some of
these dogfights. This has gotten into the
press and caused quite a bit of specula-
tion. Actually, the North Vietnamese and
Chinese Communist aircraft insignia are
virtually identical--the only difference
is two Chinese characters which are pretty
hard to make out at Mach 2 speeds in com-
bat. We have no evidence
to suggest that the
pilots are anything but North Vietnamese.
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C.
C. North Vietnam's jet fighter strength now
stands at approxinately 70 aircraft, 15
MIG-21's, and 55 MIG-15's or 17's.
1. To render these aircraft less vulner-
able. to US air strikes against their
airfields, North Vietnam has recently
deployed some of the aircraft from
Phuc Yen to two newly activated air-
fields in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.
2. Some five additional jet-capable air-
fields in this area are being worked
on now to prepare then for handling
jets.
D. The chances are that the North Vietnamese
will .dontinue their aggressive tactics as
long as US air strikes in the "heartland"
of the country continue.
1. A return to their former, more cau-
tious policy may result only if they
sustain heavy losses without a reasona-
bly high score of US planes.
2. They are probably willing to accept a
higher loss rate for at least a short
period of time if they can significantly
increase US air losses. So far, they do
not, appear to be
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II. There appears to have been no change recently
in the North Vietnamese terms for negotiations.
A. Earlier this week there was some interest
in a report from Miss Pauline Frederick,
the NBC correspondent at the United Nations.
She told our delegation that an assistant
Soviet press attache had told her Hanoi
would negotiate if there were a permanent
stop in our bombing of North Vietnam.
1. Yesterday the Soviet mission at the
UN put out an official release re-
ferring to Miss Frederick's report as
a "complete fiction,"
2. The Soviet official may in fact have
made that statement to her, but it
does not agree with our more direct
evidence on the Soviet and the North
Vietnamese position.
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C. Meanwhile the North Vietnamese continue
to assert--as recently as this week--
that their so-called "Four Points" form
the only basis for a settlement of the
war.
1. As you probably recall, these
four points include our recogni-
tion of the National Liberation
Front--the Communist political
front for the Viet Cong--as the
sole representative of the South
Vietnamese people, and the complete
withdrawal of the United States from
South Vietnam.
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South Vietnamese Political Situation
III. In South Vietnam, the decree issued by the Ky
government on April 14, promising elections for
a constituent assembly in three to five months,
has satisfied Buddhist leaders for the moment
and persuaded them to call off their demon-
strations.
A. The "struggle movement" apparatus, set up
by Buddhist sympathizers in the northern
provinces, remains generally intact, how-
ever, and the persuasive tactics of the new
I Corps commander, General Dinh, have not
yet restored full government authority to
the northern cities of Hue and Da Nang.
B. Now that antigovernment groups are quieting
down, the Catholics, the politico-religious
sects in the delta, the Nationalist (VNQDD)
and Dai Viet political parties, and other
conservative groups are beginning to make
their voices heard.
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1. These elements tend to fear neutralist
or Communist inroads as a result of a
Buddhist victory in any election, and
may therefore hope to have the election
postponed.
IV. For the present, the Buddhists appear content
.to leave ,the Ky government and the military
Directorate in power until elections are held
about mid-August, but there are still numerous
pitfalls which may yet endanger government sur-
vival.
A. Chief of these is Buddhist suspicion of the
government's intentions; the monks suspect
that the regime may be fostering the opposi-
tion to the elections.
B. Another danger derives from the divisions
now apparent within the military--from ?the
Directorate on down--over how to deal with
the unrest.
C. Over the longer run, differences are sure
to arise over the purpose of the elections.
The government considers the assembly will
be elected solely to draft a constitution.
The Buddhists look on it as a qua?i-
parliament, with power to confirm or replace
the present regime.
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V. Although it is too early to speculate on the
election itself, most Vietnamese believe that
the Buddhists will be able to dominate an
elected assembly, if not as a majority, by
being the only disciplined element amid a col-
lection of squabbling factions.
A. The opportunities for Communist infiltration
will depend in part on candidate screening,
but evidence of at least some Viet Cong pene-
tration of the "struggle movement" gives
grounds for concern.
Military Situation
VI. Aggressive large search-and-destroy operations
mounted by US and other allied forces, and
coupled with almost daily bombing from B-52s
and locally based aircraft, have continued to
prevent the Communists from mounting any major
offensives.
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A. The Communists appear further to have re-
frained from significant military actions
at the height of the recent political cri-
sis, probably to avoid any move which would
unify the Ky government and its critics.
B. In the past few weeks, however, the Viet
Cong appear to be stepping up sporadic at-
tacks, particularly against US airfields,
isolated South Vietnamese units, and hamlets
and outposts in the delta; these actions
seem to be accompanied by increased terrorism
in the Saigon area.
C. The Communists are expected to continue hit-
and-run tactics, while positioning larger
forces for possible offensives in the northern-
most provinces, the highlands bordering
Cambodia, and north of Saigon as the summer
monsoon period arises.
D. The enemy continues to increase his main
force strength by infiltration and internal
recruitment; strength of the main force units
now amounts to about 80,000 men, including
11 confirmed North Vietnamese regiments.
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1. Our order of battle also now has
identified at least five divisional head-
quarters, which can coordinate operations
by several assigned regiments.
2. The allied forces appear to be in a bet-
ter posture this year than last--both in
terms of strength and intelligence--to
blunt any major Communist attacks.
There may, however, be some setbacks in
store for government troops.
3. There are no signs that the Viet Cong
have been measurably weakened by the
constant allied pressure, but they do
appear to be concerned about lower
morale, growing food and supply problems,
defection, and in some localized instances
ammunition shortages, disease, and serious
losses.
Infiltration
VII. The Communists, in spite of increasing US aerial
interdiction, are continuing to move supplies
south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
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first
A. The/US B-52 strike against the key Mu Gia
Pass chokepoint appears to have had only
limited success; guerrilla teams and aerial
observers observed new truck movement in the
Pass area only a few days after the massive
att A second strike was made yesterday
ack .
but no assessment is in yet.
B. US pilots claim to have destroyed or damaged
more than 600 trucks since 1 March, first in
strikes against roads in south Laos, but
despite such losses the Communists are
managing to move substantial quantities of
supplies south through the Laotian Panhandle
toward South Vietnam.
C. The Communists also have been improving
their road net in southeastern Laos.
1. They have completed a second supply
route into the Laos Panhandle from North
Vietnam, south of and roughly parallel
to the Mu Gia artery. This new road
will facilitate Communist supply move-
ment into Laos while at the same time
making the US interdiction task more
difficult.
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2. In south Laos, the Communists--apparently
with at least the acquiescence of the
Cambodians--have completed a road leading
from northeastern Cambodia through the
southeastern tip of Laos to the South
Vietnamese border. Reports indicate
that moderate amounts of rice and other
foodstuffs are moving from Cambodia to
South Vietnam along this route.
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