DCI BRIEFING FOR MAHON CIA SUBCOMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000600200004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 2, 1966
• Content Type: BRIEF

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DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON CIA SUBCOMMITTEE
CONTENTS
Introduction
2 March 1966
Page
1
Current Intelligence Briefing:
Soviet Military Developments
16
Ghana
21
Syria
26
Indonesia
29
Dominican Republic
32
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DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON CIA SUBCOMMITTEE
2 March 1966
INTRODUCTION
I. Mr. Chairman, I sent you a letter last week informing you
that the Bureau of the Budget had recently approved three
items to be funded by releases from our Reserve for Con-
tingencies. These items were not anticipated at the time
of the 1966 budget submission to Congress and they all
represent urgent items which cannot be absorbed within the
program levels approved by this committee in the 1966
appropriations.
A.
B.
C. After that I have a few current intelligence notes
for you.
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2 March 1966
DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON CIA SUBCOMMITTEE
SOVIET MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
Soviet Space Program
I. The Soviets are carrying on a very vigorous space
program. We expect more space spectaculars dur-
ing the coming months.
A. The Soviets have already tried--unsuccessfully--
to follow up the soft-landing of Luna 9 which
sent back the moon pictures early in Febru-
ary.
1. They launched another lunar probe on March
first. It failed to eject from its park-
ing orbit, and Moscow is passing it off
as a scientific satellite.
B. Two Soviet Venus probes reached the planet
around the end of February.
1. The Soviets report that one crashed onto
the surface and planted a flag. It may
have been intended to fly by the planet.
2. The other probe passed within 13,000
miles of Venus and has transmitted
scientific data back to earth.
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C. On 22 February the USSR put a satellite carry-
ing two dogs into an earth orbit. A major
feature of the flight appears to be collection
of data on the effects of radiation We ex-
pect the dogs to remain in space about a month
before being recovered.
D. The USSR is continuing the stepped-up satel-
lite reconnaissance program. Thus far in
1966, four vehicles have been put up and
014,:
successfully recovered.
(PHOTOGRAPHY, TYURATAM COMPLEX "j") IX: Cs b )
E. Recent high-resolution photography has given
us our best look yet at Complex J of the
Tyuratam missile test center. Each of the
twin pads under construction at Complex J
appears capable of launching space boosters
with thrusts up to 10 million pounds. Judg-
ing from the rate of construction, flight
tests could begin in early 1967.
1. The first photograph shows you--in the
inset at upper right--the big assembly
check-out building.
2. The second photograph, which is a 10-
power enlargement of the first, shows
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the big blast deflectors under construction
at the two launch pads. The third picture
is an artist's sketch of the blast deflector.
ICBM Deployment
II. Early 1966 satellite photography has increased
our count of ICBM dispersed single silos under
construction.
A. We have now found more than 80 of the large
type--for the SS-9 missile--and more than
140 of the small type--for the SS-11 missile.
B. The coverage also shows that some of both
types of silos are very near operational
status. Externally, they appear to be com-
plete with silo doors installed. A possi-
ble missile transporter has been seen at one
large silo.
C. We estimate that about 17 of the large silos
and 60 of the small will become operational
around mid-April.
D. By mid-1966, 26 large and 100 small single
silos are expected to be operational, in-
creasing the Soviet ICBM force from the
present 224 to 350 operational launchers.
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Soviet Defensive Systems
III. The Soviets are also continuing to extend the
deployment of the new defensive missile sys-
tem which was first detected in the northwest-
ern USSR and more recently near
Sverdlovsk in the Ural mountains.
A. The latest launch complex, about 60 miles
north of Moscow, may be the first of sev-
eral to form a local-area defense of the
city.
B. We still feel that these complexes are for
defense against bombers and cruise missiles,
though we cannot eliminate the possibility
that they are antimissile installations.
C. Seven of the 12 complexes we have identified
so far have some launchers and radar, so
that they already have an operational cap-
ability.
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DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON CIA SUBCOMMITTEE
GHANA
2 March 1966
(MAP, GHANA)
I. In Ghana, where the regime of President Kwame Nkrumah
fell apart last week while he was in Peking, the new
leaders are Western-oriented political moderates.
A. The senior army and police officers who staged
the coup have long been disaffected with Nkrumah's
arbitrary rule, his ties with Communist countries,
and his economic follies.
B. They seem likely to be particularly friendly to
the United States,
II. From all indications, the coup forces have been in
complete control since shortly after they initiated
the action on February 24th,
A. Significant resistance came only from Nkrumah's
Soviet-trained civilian security detail, which
tried to defend his Flagstaff House office.
1. A number of Soviet advisers--perhaps five--
who were in liaison with this security guard
evidently were killed then, suggesting they
were actively supporting the resistance.
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B. All regular army units and the special presidential
guard apparently rallied quickly to the coup ele-
ments.
C. The police, disarmed by Nkrumah two years ago
after an attempt on his life by a policeman, are
being armed, adding additional muscle.
D. All available political officials of the Nkrumah
regime and the leading members of his now dis-
solved political party are being detained.
III. There has been widespread--and evidently genuine--
popular enthusiasm for the change in Ghana. Nkrumah
had alienated virtually all segments of society since
he led the country to independence nine years ago.
A. One of the most significant factors in the erosion
of his once massive popularity was the tightening
economic squeeze felt at all levels in recent years
as Ghana's economy had deteriorated.
IV. The coup leaders have moved quickly to set up an
interim regime which seems to have begun to function
effectively already.
A. At the top is a National Liberation Council (NLC)
of seven army and police leaders.
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1. It is headed by reinstated General Ankrah,
who was fired by. Nkrumah last year. It in-
cludes the two prime movers of the coup
(Police Chief Harlley and 2nd Brigade com-
mander Kotoka).
B. The new leadership, inexperienced in civil ad-
ministration, is backed up by several subordinate
committees of senior civil servants and special-
ists to deal with such matters as foreign affairs,
the economy, and so forth, The U.S. Embassy is
particularly favorably impressed with the economic
committee.
1. As a group, Ghanaian civil servants were the
best prepared for independence by Britain in
Africa. Most have remained Western-oriented
and were critical of many Nkrumah policies.
C. For the present all the former politicians are
out of the picture.
V. Since coming to power, the new leaders have repeatedly
emphasized their lack of political ambitions and de-
sire to return Ghana to representative civilian gov-
ernment as soon as possible.
A. Although they have specified no timetable for
this, they are publicly committed to sponsoring
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a new constitution, holding a referendum, and
then to turning over power to whatever political
force emerges from free elections.
VI. The new regime has also moved against the large Soviet
presence in Ghana. There are several hundred per-
sonnel including various intelligence types.
A. Some elements were immediately confined to quarters.
Others have been placed under close surveillance
B. On February 28 reliable reports indicated that
the Soviet ambassador had been told that all So-
viet personnel must leave Ghana promptly, except
for a small embassy staff.
1. Two plane-loads of Soviet personnel were seen
at the airport Tuesday, ready to leave,
2. The new regime has revoked the landing rights
with AEROFLOT, the Soviet air line, because
an AEROFLOT aircraft brought Nkrumah back. to
Moscow from Peking.
3. There are about 50 to 60 Chinese Communist
technicians who probably will also be expelled,
The camp where Chinese instructors were teach-
ing guerrilla warfare and sabotage to Africans
from other countries has been closed. The in-
structors may already have left the country.
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VII. Nkrumah does not appear to have much prospect for re-
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versing the coup in the near future, but he has
evidently not given up.
A. Even before he left Peking, he announced his
intention to return, and tried to rally Ghanaians
abroad to his side.
B. The diplomatic missions in Peking and Moscow have
both announced their allegiance to the new regime
in Accra. No Ghanaian mission anywhere is known
to have come out for Nkrumah.
C. Nkrumah may plan to move on soon to Cairo, where
his family fled immediately after the coup. (His
wife is Egyptian.) From there, he may make early
visits to radical African capitals such as
Conakry (Guinea) seeking support.
1. Radical African leaders, including EgyptYs
Nasir, have denounced the Ghana coup, but
seem unlikely to give Nkrumah any significant
material support.
2. Madagascar has recognized the new regime in
Accra, and other moderate African states will
follow suit soon. The current meeting of the
Organization of African Unity, meeting in Addis
Ababa, accepted a delegation representing the
new leaders in Accra, and turned down representa-
tives of Nkrumah.
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DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON CIA SUBCOMMITTEE
SYRIA
2 March 1966
(MAP, SYRIA)
I. In Syria, a radical military clique of the Baath
party seized power in Damascus on February 23. The
move met with some opposition from army units loyal
to the ousted regime of Amin al-Hafiz and Salah al-
Din Bitar--more moderate Baathis--and the situation
remains unstable.
A. On March 1 a new cabinet was announced. At least
one known member of the Communist Party of Syria,
or CPS, was included. This is the first cabinet
in three years of Baathist rule to contain CPS
members, although the regime which was thrown out
last week had named several party members or
sympathizers to the Syrian legislative body last
August.
B. A countermove by army units who have adopted a
neutral posture for the time being could occur at
any time. There is no evidence as yet that
leaders of the 16,500 troops on the Israeli border,
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to the southwest of Damascus, have affirmed sup-
port for the new regime. The attitude of the
northern command in Aleppo is also unclear, Some
move might be attempted on March 8th, the third
anniversary of the 1963 Baath takeover.
II. The conflict has been building up since December. At
that time, the comparatively moderate regime dissolved
the organization of the Baath in Syria, which had come
under the domination of the radical military clique.
Salah Jadid, who
sional Secretary
in Damascus, was
tion force.
A. The new regime has announced the arrest of Presi-
dential Chairman Hafiz and the party's key civilian
leaders,
is now reportedly acting as
provi-
general of the Baathist organization
considered the leader of the opposi-
III. The known leaders of the coup are considered radicals,
but how far to the left of the socialist Bitar regime
they would shift is still uncertain. They will prob-
ably intensify anti-US propaganda, already vitriolic
under previous Baath governments.
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A. In Amman, King Husayn has expressed his concern
that Syria will move drastically to the left. The
Jordanian Army has prepared a contingency plan for
intervention, but would almost certainly take no
action without US approval.
B. Both the Iraqis and the Egyptians, long-time enemies
of the Baath, have been broadcasting inflammatory
reports concerning the unsettled situation. Presi-
dent Arif in Baghdad claims that the coup was in-
spired by the Chinese Communists, and has put his
army on alert. He has also been in touch with
Husayn on the matter.
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DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON CIA SUBCOMMITTEE
INDONESIA
(MAP, INDONESIA)
2 March 1966
I. In Indonesia, President Sukarno appears to be moving
with increasing confidence to regain total authority
and swing the nation back to its leftist course.
At present, only anti-Communist students are offering
open resistance to his downgrading of the military
leaders and his reshuffle of the cabinet.
A. On February 24th, about 20,000 students conducted
a demonstration in front of Sukarno's palace in
a futile attempt to prevent the installation of
the new cabinet.
1. At one point, palace guards fired into the
crowd, killing several students.
2. The demonstration was held without the con-
nivance of the army, which for the present
at least, is withholding overt support from
its student backers.
B. Two days later Sukarno banned the anti-Communist
student group responsible for the demonstration.
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PH IPPINES
OLITH
TOP SECRET
TOTAL ARMED FORCES TOP SECRET
INDONESIA
MALAYSIA
NINIMMEIN
NAVY I ARMY!
PERSONNEL 263,000
Battalions 171
(124 Inf., 9 Armd., 15 FA, 13 AA)
PERSONNEL 65,726
(35,000 Commonwealth
+50,700 Malaysian)
Bottalions 41
(30 W., 6 Arty., 3 Arrmi.)
PERSONNEL
Cmisers
Destroyers
Destroyer Escorts
Submarines
Komer (guided missile
patrol croft)
41,600
I
8
10
10
10
PERSONNEL
(all Commonwealth)
Corrie?
pesiroyers
Submarines
Gaided missil frigates
15,000
2
13
5
2
rAl 11111M12!rilll
PERSONNEL
Sq uadrons
Medium Bombers
Light Bombers
Fighters
24,000
13
25 Jet
35 (piston)
69 Jet
PERSONNEL
(all Commonwealth)
Tactical Squadrons
Medium Bombers
Light Bombers
Fighters
10,000
13
8 Jet, 8 Piston
41 Jet
151 Jet (Inc. 40
Comics Jets)
Jnbonc8ia
0 MILES 400
TOP SECRET
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1 In an effort to head off any further student
agitation, the Djakarta military commander
has extended the nightly curfew in the
capital area.
II. Now that Sukarno appears to have gotten away with
his bold move against the anti-Communist military
leadershipt he is likely to resume the leftist pol-
icies he had pursued prior to 1 October.
A. At the installation of his new cabinet, Sukarno
announced that Indonesia would now concentrate
on destroying the "remnants of feudalism" within
the country and on crushing "imperialism," with
an emphasis on Malaysia
III. Although army leaders still seem unwilling to risk
a direct confrontation with Sukarno, they are said
to be considering various ways to retrieve their
political position.
A. The most immediate plan under discussion appears
to be a demand that Sukarno remove his leftist
foreign minister and first deputy premier,
Subandrio.
1. The army considers Subandrio responsible for
many of Sukarno's pro-Communist policies.
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2. Sukarno, who considers Subandrio indispensible,
refused earlier army demands for Subandrio's
ouster, and can be expected to do so again.
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DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON CIA SUBCOMMITTEE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
R000600200004-4
2 March 1966
I. Garcia Godoy is under bitter leftist criticism for the
compromise formula resolving the prolonged civil-
military impasse and it remains to be seen whether he
will abide by it.
A. On 16 February, under the pressure of a success-
ful leftist general strike, Garcia Godoy reiterated
his intention to implement his 6 January decree
assigning the air force and army chiefs of staff
overseas.
B. The 2-resident did this despite having given
written assurances to the military that he would
seek no more command changes after Rivera, the
former Defense Minister, took up his Washington
attache job on 11 February.
C. Immediately after Garcia Godoy's 16 February speech,
labor leaders affiliated with Juan Bosch imple-
mented an apparently pre-arranged plan they had
with the President, and called off the strike.
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II A compromise decision was reached in which the two
service chiefs took higher ranking jobs that have no
responsibility.
A. Martinez, the army chief and De los Santos, the
air force chief originally refused to step down.
B. The new Minister of Defense, General Enrique
Perez y perez, and other moderate military leaders
helped persuade then that it was in the military's
best interest for them to take their new posts.
C. The new air force and army chief t were selected
by Garcia Godoy from candidates presented by the
in
1. The new chiefs are well thought of by our
attaches, but being traditional military
conservatives are as much disliked by the left
as their predecessors.
D. Garcia Godoy is probably unhappy with the solution
but he did not want to call on the Inter-American
:0eace Force to oust the generals by force, because
he said he wanted a "Dominican solution".
III. On 28 February, Juan Bosch bitterly attackad the
President's decision, saying that he failed to keep his
promise to assign the military leaders overseas.
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A. Bosch said that Garcia Godoy, instead of leading the
nation, "bobbed like a cork." He added that while the
government "crowed like a rooster," it "laid eggs like
a hen."
B. While he did not call for a renewal of the general
strike, Bosch clearly implied that one could occur
and told his audience to keep 'ready".
C. Bosch said the President had established a
precedent and the military would continue to
disobey civilian authority, thus making the
election of a new government on 1 June "useless".
D. Bosch also stressed a theme he has privately
advanced to US officials, that conditions are not
right for elections.
1. Privately Bosch has reportedly urged a post-
ponement of 4 months.
2. Nevertheless, Bosch will probably run if he
thinks he can win and assume office. Tnis is a judg-
ment he probably will not make for 1 or 2
months.
3. In the meantime, the former President will
probably threaten to boycott the race unless
his demands are met.
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