INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000600110006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 11, 1966
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Rele6~M/3I'IA-RDP82R00025R000600110006-2
25X1
11 January 1966
CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING
(MAQ11 LNDbN to
I. Indonesia is still reeling from the coup attempt
on October first and the army's response to it.
These events have virtually reversed the country's
political make-up, changing the prevailing domestic
atmosphere from pro-Communist to anti-Communist.
A. As the result of the abortive coup--which
clearly involved the Communist Party and was
directed against top army leaders--the army has
assumed the political ascendency in Indonesia.
1. It has stopped short, however, of moving
openly against President Sukarno, who had
championed the Communists and who has tried
to protect the party since the coup.
II. The twenty-year era of Sukarno's dominance is
finished, but he is maneuvering to retain what power
he,can, and-he remains a significant factor.
A. To the extent that he can, he obstructs the
army's anti-Communist program, and maneuvers to
reduce the army's political role and to restore
a leftist complexion to political life.
25X1
Approved For a eas~r - 82R00025R000600110006-2
 Approved For Reley/RIA-RDP82R00025R000600110006-2
..25X1
III. Army leaders show little disposition to depose
Sukarno. They believe that a move against the still
popular president would be a major political blunder
which could split the armed forces and demoralize
the country.
A. Army leaders are counting on Sukarno's poor
health to remove him from the scene in the not-
too-distant future. For the present, their
preference is to wait for his death rather than'
risk further domestic turmoil.
B. Western medical prognoses generally give
Sukarno at least another 12 months, but add
that he could go on for three years.
IV. The Communist Party's overt organization has been
virtually destroyed by the army, and the danger-of a
phased Communist takeover -so, real a few months
ago--is dissipated.
A. All members of the politburo now are reported
either dead or in prison, and the army hopes
to eliminate all central and district leader-
ship.
B. The army reportedly has kept no tally of the
number of Communist Party members killed by the
military and by Moslem civilian groups, but
25X1
Approved For Rele I IA-RDP82R00025R000600110006-2
 fi r~~r
Approved For Relea4i_6M LRET
. IA-RDP82R00025R000600110006-2
the estimates range from 50,000 to 150,000.
Chief areas of former Communist strength, and
of subsequent army and civilian anti-Communist
activity, have been East and Central Java,
North Sumatra, and Bali..
C. Although Sukarno has refused to ban the party
outright, army regional commanders have banned
Communist activity in more than half of the
nation, and repression has led to large-scale
defections from the party.
V. The party, to the extent that it functions at all,
has reverted to an underground cell structure.
A. For the time being, this clandestine appara-
tus is relatively inactive, It is waiting
for the army campaign to taper off.
B. It is believed, however, to retain the capac-
ityfor at least limited sabotage.
C. Prospects for a resurgence of an underground
organization probably are good; it is unlikely
that the army--if it retains its political
ascendancy--will permit overt Communist activity
to resume for several years.
25X1
Approved For ReI :CIA-RDP82R00025R000600110006-2
 Approved For Releanp 44 *:f4A-RDP82R00025R000600110006-2
25X1
VI. Indonesia's foreign relations reflect the changed
domestic scene to some extent. Indonesian relations with
the US have improved, and those with Communist China
have deteriorated greatly.
A. Communist China was Indonesia's principal ally
in the months before the coup attempt.
1. The army claims that China materially
assisted the Communists in launching the
coup.
2. Civilian groups--apparently with the army's
approval--have organized occasionally vio-
lent demonstrations at Chinese consulates.
They have seriously damaged Overseas Chinese
assets in Indonesia? and have persecuted
resident Chinese.
3. Peking has sent a series of sharp protests
to the Indonesian Government over the inci-
dents, but these have had little effect.
4. Sukarno continues to state publicly that
Indonesian-Chinese cooperation must continue,
but in practice, Indonesia's pro-Chinese
policy has been abandoned.
Approved F
 -Approved For Relea 20SI /GR.iE P82R00025R000600110006-2
FOREIGN DISSEM
B. Relations with the US--characterized by
mounting anti-Americanism before the coup--
have greatly changed, with indications of
further improvements to come.
1. The anti-American flavor of Indonesian
politics is generally gone. Indonesian
civilians are willing to talk freely again
with Americans.
2. The balance between the army leaders
and Sukarno, however, is still so delicate
that top army leaders have been careful
not to talk directly with US Embassy
officials. They do not want to give their
opponents an opening to start yelling about
"puppets of the imperialists."
The most immediate US problem--the
of American-owned oil companies in
Indonesia--shows signs of more favorable
treatment than earlier expected.
4. Latest indications are that the government
will not press for an actual takeover of
Stanvac and Caltex properties, as earlier
threatened, but will continue harassment
of the companies.
5. Negotiations continue for the sale of the
relatively small US-owned rubber plantations
t
Approved For ReleasM >Ft qA-RDP82R00025R000600110006-2
? nment.
 25X1
- Approved For Release 2 - P82R00025R000600110006-2
F7 I
C. Nobody appears to be doing anything to cope
with Indonesia's chronic economic problems.
1. The army has not come up with any remedies
and---to avoid being blamed--has announced
that Sukarno and the cabinet are still
responsible for the economy.
2. Sukarno, for his part, may be willing to
let things get worse so he can generate
demands that he resume full control and
straighten things out.
VII. The confrontation with Malaysia--both political
and military--continues, but activity is limited,
and confrontation is no longer a major national
issue.
A. The Malaysian campaign is useful to the army
leaders in a number of ways.
1. It gives them a chance to demonstrate that
they are as nationalistic and anti-imperialist
as Sukarno.
2. At the same time, it affords a theater
where the command. can deploy army battalions
which have been infiltrated by too many
Communists to risk keeping them in Java.
25X1
Approved For Release 2R00025R000600110006-2
,ffL lm~
 25X1
Oud"73 UV
Approved For Release2OUAA041IA-RDP82R00025R000600110006-2
B. Indonesia has not recognized Singapore, but
has resumed a limited 'barter trade, carried
on at sea in neutral waters.
VIII. Reports are circulating again in Djakarta that
Sukarno will leave the country soon for medical
treatment and a long-postponed vacation.
A. These reports are difficult to evaluate.
Sukarno's travel plans are usually closely
held and subject to improvisation. The cur-
rent situation is made-to-order for rumors
both planted and spontaneous.
B. Should he leave the country, his departure
would appear as a dramatic development, but
its practical political effect would not be
major. Rather, it would tend to confirm the
political trends which are already evident
in Indonesia.
Approved For Release -RDP82R00025R000600110006-2