DCI BRIEFING FOR RIVER'S CIA SUBCOMMITTEE OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000500220002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 1, 1965
• Content Type: BRIEF

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DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS' CIA SUBCOMMITTEE
OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE
CONTENTS
1 July 1965
Pages
A. VIETNAM A1-15
B. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 81-5
C. SOVIET MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS C1-9
D. ALGERIA 1)1-6
E. INDONESIA E1-6
F. OTHER HIGHLIGHTS
Venezuela F-1
Bolivia F-3
Peru F-7
Ecuador F-9
Cuba F-10
Berlin F-12
Bulgaria F-13
Yemen F-14
Cyprus F-15
Congo F-17
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NORTH VIETNAM
1 July 1965
I. There has been some further evidence of con-
tinuing Soviet aid in the build-up of North
Vietnam's defense.
A. There are now four SAM sites in the Hanoi
area. Three to the South and Southeast
and the latest one to the Northwest. We
still have no evidence of missiles or any
information which indicates that any of
the sites is fully operational.
B.
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C. Our aircraft have shot-down three MIGs. Two
were shot down on 17 June by two US jet
fighters using Sparrow air-to-air missiles.
On 20 June two MIGs jumped two US piston-
engine attack planes but the US planes
shot down one of the MIGs with automatic
weapons fire.
D. We have been hitting targets in northwest
North Vietnam which include major bar-
racks areas at Son La and ammunition dumps.
II. North Vietnam is still showing no interest in
the subject of negotiating rather than fight-
ing in Vietnam.
A. Both Hanoi and the Liberation Front have
criticized the Commonwealth Peace Mission
in harsh terms, reserving particular invec-
tive for Prime Minister Wilson,
1. While Hanoi has thus far avoided a for-
mal refusal to accept the Commonwealth
Mission, it has made clear in its propa-
ganda that it considers the current mis-
sion effort useless.
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B. Hanoi's confidence in ultimate Communist
victory in spite of stepped-up US air at-
tacks on the north was reaffirmed recently
by top-level North Vietnamese leaders.
1. On 18 June Ho Chi Minh in an interview
with Pravda stated flatly that "the
American imperialists are in for an in-
evitable defeat. The Vietnamese people
are bound to win a full victory."
2. On the 19th Premier Pham Van Dong told
a Peiping TV interviewer that "The
Vietnamese people will win; the US im-
perialists will be defeated--this is
the unalterable trend."
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1 July 1965
III. All evidence indicates that Peiping is encouraging the
DRV and Viet Cong to reject any settlement in Vietnam
short of a complete Communist victory and to keep the
pressure on--and possibly to step up the pace of the
war.
A. The Chinese have contemptuously rejected the latest
effort to promote talks leading to a peaceful settle-
ment--calling the Commonwealth Peace Mission proposal
a scheme worked out by a "nitwit" in collusion with
the US.
1. They have also reiterated their position that
there is no possibility of a UN role in solving
the Vietnam problem.
B. Peiping's recent actions suggest that the Chinese
believe this hard line has increased the chances
of a US escalation which might lead to Chinese
involvement in the war. However, the Chinese appear
determined to continue this policy rather than to
accept a compromise solution and in the past few
weeks Peiping has made a concerted effort to deter
the US by a series of warnings over the possible
consequences.
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1. While not increasing Peiping's present condi-
tional commitment to send men "if needed,"
recent Chinese propaganda statements appear
designed to give the impression that China has
moved closer to direct military involvement in
Vietnam.
2. Peiping has at the same time been putting out
the word through a variety of channels that
although the Chinese do not want war with the
US but are prepared for it if necessary and
will intervene directly as they did in Korea
if the US bombs China or if a collapse of the
DRV appears imminent.
3. Both in their propaganda and in private state-
ments by top leaders the Chinese have been ex-
pressing arrogant confidence in eventual victory
over the US in the event of a larger war in-
volving an attack on China. Chou En-lai has
even claimed that Peiping would prefer to have
the Soviet Union stand clear in such a case.
C. The Chinese warnings have been accompanied by in-
creased civil defense preparations, which probably
reflect genuine fears that the warnings may have
no effect.
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1. The authorities in South China appear to be
deliberately fanning fears that China will be-
come directly involved in the Vietnam war,
apparently to stimulate greater compliance with
civil defense and other related policies.
2.
3. One heavily publicized type of "preparation"
is militia training, which apparently was fur-
ther intensified in early June.
D. There have, however, been no major troop movements
or other significant military developments which
would be expected if Peiping were about to launch
a Korean-type mass intervention.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
002-5
1 July 1965
IV. After slackening off following the major battle
in mid-June around Dong Xoai, a district town
about 55 miles north of saigon in Phuoc Long
Province, the Viet Cong have resumed their sum-
mer offensive with what seems to be a major
thrust in the central highlands.
A. Over the weekend, on 25 June, a force of
two to three Communist battalions attacked
and overran a district capital in the north-
eastern part of Kontum Province, which borders
southern Laos.
1. This town, Tou Morong, is still in Viet
Cong hands, and no effort may be made to
recover it.
a. Most of the town's population, the
district chief, and some 75 defend-
ing troops, escaped to a nearby
district town, Dak To, on the road
to the province capital, Kontum town;
the fate of another 100 troops is
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unknown. Air reconnaissance, first
hampered by bad weather, now suggests
that Tou Morong is deserted.
2. There is good evidence that the attack
on Tou Morong was mounted by one of the
three regiments of the North Vietnamese
325th Division now believed to be in
South Vietnam's highlands provinces.
a. Unusual silences, interrupted only
by sporadic exchanges, have been
maintained on communications serv-
ing the 325th elements in Kontum since
mid-June, suggesting tactical deploy-
ment; at the same time the Viet Cong
tactical command headquarters station
in Kontum became more active.
b. A defector, who claimed to be from
the 101st Regiment of the 325th,
previously reported in the province,
turned himself in to government troops
the day of the attack on Tou Morong,
and reported that the regiment would
attack the town that night.
B. We cannot tell whether the Communists are now mak-
ing a full-scale attempt to seize Kontum
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Province, or the entire highlands areas;
however, two other isolated district towns
in Kontum--Dak To and Dak Sut closer to
Laos, have been mortared since the attack on
Tou Morong.
C. Moreover, the Communists now seem to be
launching a major operation that we have
been expecting farther to the south in the
highlands province of Phu Bon.
1. A district town in Phu Bon called Thuan
Man, just south of the province capital
of Cheo Reo, was overrun 30 June, trap-
ping a government battalion. Two re-
lieving South Vietnamese marine battalions,
moving to evacuate Thuan Man garrison,
have been engaged in heavy fighting with
forces of possible regimental size.
2. US authorities have calculated that there
are some four Communist battalions in
Phu Bon; they could threaten the province
capital at Cheo Reo.
3. A second regiment of the PAVN 325th
Division has been reported by a defector
to be in the Phu Bon - Pleiku Province area
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4. In addition, recent communications
developments showed the redeployment into Phu
Bon.- Pleiku Of a regular VietCong regiment;: the
third, from the coastal province of Phu Yen to the
east.
5. Moreover, a Viet Cong tactical com-
mand headquarters,
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the Quang Ngai area in late May when a major battle
took place at Ba Gia, recently turned up in Phu Bon.
D. This activity in the highlands could
threaten the towns of Kontum, Pleiku, capital of
Pleiku Province and headquarters of South Vietnam's
II Corps command, and even the area as far south
as Ban Me Thout, capital of Darlac Province,
1. The third infantry regiment of the
North Vietnamese 325th Division has been reported
by a defector to be in Pleiku. Earlier in June,
when a series of large Communist ambushes occurred
in Pleiku Province, a district town near the Cambodian
border was attacked and lost; it remains in Communist
hands and gives them control of Route 19 running
west of Pleiku town to the Cambodian border.
IV. The Communist offensive this summer has been
characterized primarily by a number of large attacks,
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in regimental or greater strength, centered
generally in isolated areas where they have
been able to harass, ambush, and inflict major
damage on South Vietnamese forces, including the
government's 11-battalion general reserve and
the Ranger reserves of the corps areas.
A. Last week, US advisers reported a total
of five South Vietnamese regiments and nine
battalions--the equivalent of two and one-half
divisions?combat ineffective; this is the result
primarily of heavy losses in combat since late May.
B. In addition, much of the Viet Cong offensive
has been conducted in rugged terrain along South
Vietnam's borders from Cambodia north of Saigon to
southern Laos, and they may end up in virtual con-
trol of this entire border strip.
C. Another significant feature of present
Viet Cong activity is the high rate of sabotage
which is having the effect of blocking major land
communications northward from Saigon into the high-
lands, alo g the coastal plain leading to the
northern provinces, and from the northern coast into
the highlands.
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1. For the first time, this sabotage effort
seems aimed at permanent denial of these routes, forcing
complete government reliance on air and sea for re-
supply and rescue, and imposing an economic squeeze
on Saigon and populated centers in these provinces.
D. The effect of this sabotage and of Viet Cong
intervention elsewhere in the economic picture is
growing inflationary pressures in Saigon and the
provinces, increased hoarding, and some local shortages.
1. Some truckers are now refusing to carry
POL and other goods from Saigon and the coast into
the interior; four rubber plantations have closed
down, and others are threatening to do so.
V. US troop strength in South Vietnam remains at
about 53,500 and is expected to total 75,000 to
80,000 by the end of July, with about 22,000-25,000
combat troops.
A. US Marine and Airborne troops already in
place have begun aggressive patrolling and some
combined search-and-destroy operations with the
South Vietnamese forces and the Australian battalion.
1. It is hoped that they will be able to
serve as a back-up to the now hard-pressed South
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Vietnamese general reserve, as well as to undertake,
in conjunction with air strikes, such as the B-52
raid on 18 June, combined operations to find and
destroy hard-core Communist units so that the Viet
Cong monsoon offensive will not have the result of
depleting government units until their will to fight
collapses.
VI. Saigon's new military government has now
organized its machinery, at least formally, and seems
determined to carry out a drastic program of harsh
controls together with radical political, economic,
and social reform in an effort to mobilize the
country's resources behind the war effort.
A. The country is actually being run by a
ten-man Directory of generals, which is under
chairman, and simultaneous chief of state,General
Nguyen Van Thieu.
1. The day to day government is a wartime
cabinet, headed by vigorous but politically inexperienced
air force chief General Nguyen Cao Ky; Ky has set up a
government formed primarily of youthful but technically
competent civilians equally imbued with a desire for
social change.
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2. The government has already declared a
state of war, under which it has laid down tighter
curfews and controls in Saigon; it intends a major
program involving youth, both in the military services
and organized in vanguard groups to hold economic
speculators, and hopes to force a more equitable
distribution of economic benefits through wide-
ranging government intervention.
B. So far, both Buddhist and Catholic leaders
appear willing to give the government's program a
chance and are reluctant to provoke serious opposi-
tion, even though leaders on both sides have strong
reservations about certain government leaders.
1. The government's ambitious programs
and harsh controls, however, may well overstrain
its limited administrative capabilities and result,
not only in serious political opposition or infight-
ing, but severe economic dislocation.
2. Already, the government is showing signs
of retreating on its crackdown on the undisciplined
Saigon press, and is currying voluntary cooperation
by the press in regulating itself.
3. The hasty execution of a Viet Cong
terrorist by the new regime led the Viet Cong to
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retaliate by shooting a US sergeant who was their
prisoner; Communist propaganda suggests that the
Viet Cong intend to step up terrorism and try to
drive a wedge between the US and Vietnamese by
further retaliation if terrorism is punished.
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*DCI BRIEFING
1 July 1965
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
I. Communists and extremists are protesting
Caamano's decision to negotiate with the OAS,
and the outbreak of fighting in San Francisco
de Macoris indicates that they are attempting
to take the struggle into the interior.
A. Elements in the extremist camp are divided
in their response to Caamano's decision to
negotiate with the OAS and accept many of
its
I.
proposals.
The orthodox Domincan Popular Socialist
(Communist) Party generally approves
Caamano's actions, as does part of the
pro-Castro Fourteenth of June Political
Group (APCJ).
2. Opposition to the Caamano response is
centered in the pro-Chinese Dominican
Popular Movement (MPD) and a section of
the APCJ. The MPD went so far as
to mobilize 150-200 youths to demon-
strate against Caamano in front of rebel
headquarters. Caamano was reportedly
planning a meeting with MPD leaders on
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29 June, probably in an attempt to gain
their support for his position.
3. Available evidence indicates that the MPD
and part of the APCJ were involved in the
violence which broke out in the interior
town of San Francisco de Macoris on
Friday. Loyalist police and army forces
repulsed an 80-man group led by Com-
munists and pro-Castro extremists.
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time that the rebels were sending arms
and men into the interior and pointed to
San Francisco as a likely target for at-
tack. A few days after the attack, a
small rebel band unsuccessfully tried to
storm a police post in the nearby town
of Pimentel.
B. There are many reports and rumors of future
violence in the interior.
1. The town of Moca is mentioned frequently
as a possible target.
2. The police and army are nervOusly on the
alert and have tended to overreact to
any provocation. This, in turn, has led
to charges of brutality.
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3. However, one indication of a possible
lessening of tension in the interior is
the fact that strict curfews are no
longer being enforced in some towns.
II. The extremists' actions have strengthened the
Imbert government's desire to
and heightened its resistance
OAS proposals.
A. Uprisings in the interior
Imbert's criticism of the
wipe out the rebels
to accepting the
have heightened
US for not allowing
him to "clean up" the rebel zone in Santo
Domingo. He has hardened his attitude toward
the US and the OAS, and initially refused to
allow the Inter.American Human Rights Com-
mission to investigate conditions in San
Francisco. Some elements in the loyalist
military, who are distressed over alleged
police atrocities, hold Imbert responsible
for them and would like to see him step down
when a provisional government is formed.
III. Meanwhile, the return of ex-President Joaquin
Balaguer has focused attention on his possible
role in any political settlement.
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A. Balaguer returned to Santo Domingo on Monday
to visit his dying mother, and his supporters
are flocking to see him. It is not known how
long he will stay, as Imbert has reportedly
stated that he cannot assure Balaguer's per-
sonal security.
B. Balaguer is a widely-known political figure
In the country and has considerable support
from a broad spectrum of Dominican society.
He announced on his arrival that he endorsed
the OAS proposals but would not take a post
in a provisional government because he wanted
to run for president in free elections.
IV. The OAS committee is continuing its discussions
with leading Dominicans, representing a wide
range of political thinking, aimed at acceptance
of the committee's proposed solution to the ten-
week-old crisis.
A. Although the Caamano regime and, to a lesser
extent, Imbert's government of National
Reconstruction have at times appeared amenable
to negotiations, both sides have also remained
firmly committed to demands which the other
side unequivocably rejects.
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B. It now appears that the OAS committee is
making progress on the formation of an
acceptable provisional government. .The
leading contender to head the provisional
government is Hector Garcia Godoy, a career
diplomat and member of Balaguer's Reform-
ist Party.
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DCI BRIEFING
SOVIET MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
30 June 1965
I. As for military developments in the Soviet Union, we
are continuing a very close watch but so far there is
nothing to indicate any repositioning of forces in
reaction to the Vietnam situation.
A. Thus the Soviet military posture is not becoming
any more belligerent, even if Soviet statements
are. On June 27 a Soviet official in Moscow
reportedly said that the Vietnam situation is
confronting the Soviet leadership with
increasingly "painful" policy choices.
B. The Soviet official went on to say that this
problem might compel the Soviets, as he put it,
"to counterattack the other side where it is
most vulnerable--that is, Germany."
II. All elements of the Soviet armed forces have been
active in exercises this spring, but the pattern
generally follows what we have seen over recent years.
A, For instance, in the Norwegian Sea the Soviet Navy
is conducting the largest exercise it has ever
held, ((MAP)) but the theme is the same defensive
pattern of previous years. The unusual number of
ships involved--some 30 submarines and 15 major
combat units--is consistent with the general
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expansion of Soviet naval operations observed
over the past year and a half.
III. The Soviet operational ICBM force remains constant
at 224 launchers, with construction continuing on
at least 150 single silos. None of these new silos
is operational yet, but some could be completed by fall.
IV. As I mentioned when I briefed you on June 16, the
Soviets are running a very active satellite reconaissance
program.
V.
Soviet military problems with their satellites are
apparently serious enough to be worth a mention.
Bucharest
has told the Soviets that the Rumanian armed forces
are no longer considered subordinate to the Warsaw
Pact command.
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the Rumanian Defense
Minister recently told Marshal Grechko, the Soviet
commander of the Pact forces, that Pact decisions
would have to be approved by the Rumanian govern-
ment before Rumanian military forces would comply.
EVIDENCE OF SOVIET BOMBER DEVELOPMENT
I. After I briefed you two weeks ago on the Soviet
development of transport aircraft, interest was
expressed in the perennial question of whether the
Soviets are or are not working to bring out a follow-on
heavy bomber.
A. First of all, I want to assure you that we are
1221 going to withhold or dismiss or downgrade
any evidence pointing in this direction simply
because the majority view in our estimate is
that the Soviets are not now engaged in
developmental work on a heavy bomber. We think
it is unlikely, but we do not feel it is impossible,
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any indication of such a development, especially
since this is a debated issue in the intelligence
community.
B. To review the evidence we have, and which we have
cranked into our reports and our existing estimates,
There has been some R&D work on a successor to
the aging BEARs and BISONS of Long Range Aviation.
3. In the summer of 1961 the Soviets flew a
modified version of this aircraft, BOUNDER-2,
in an air show. This aircraft had improved
engines, and was estimated to have a top speed
of about Mach 1.4. Its configuration clearly
suggested that it was initially designed as
a bomber.
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III. The initial stages of a heavy bomber development
program, under tight security wraps, might escape
our notice, but we would expect satellite reconnaissance
to detect a new prototype soon after it is rolled out.
A. There are only 10 Soviet airframe plants with final
assembly areas large enough for heavy bomber
production.
B. Two of them, both at Moscow, are unlikely candidates
because their runways are too short for supersonic
heavy bombers. The other eight are known to be
producing other aircraft at present.
C.
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F. It has been suggested that a highly publicized
program for development of a Super-Sonic Transport--
like the TU-144 shown in scale model at the Paris
Air Show--might be used to conceal the development
of a supersonic bomber in early stages, including
flight tests. Our technical analysts should be
able to determine the military potential of such
an aircraft fairly early in the game, and conversion
from an SST to a military bomber is by no means simple.
1. Complex subsystems, including advanced electronics
or possibly compatible stand-off missiles, would
have to be added, and we would expect a tip-off
from the testing of these systems.
Iv. In sum, we are quite certain that there is no flying
prototype of a new Soviet heavy bomber at this time.
If such an aircraft is in the early stages of development,
we feel confident that our intelligence resources will
reveal its existence early in the two-to-five year period
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between the initial flight testing and the final
operational deployment. I want to assure you again
that when and if we obtain any such evidence, you
will be informed.
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DCI BRIEFING
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1 July 1965
ALGERIA
I. Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella--who in 1964
was made a "Hero of the Soviet Union" and was
awarded the Lenin Peace Prize--was overthrown on
19 June by a well-organized military coup staged by
Defense Minister -Defense Minister Houari
Boumedienne.
A. Boumedienne was apparently motivated by ap-
prehension that he and several of his hench-
men were slated for early dismissal from the
government.
B. The Algerian people apparently accepted the
turnover, and the country remains calm.
However, the administration is paralyzed
awaiting the outcome of efforts to form a
new government, which seem to have bogged
down on selection of a respected chief of
state.
C. The only expressed opposition has been in
the form of student demonstrations--in the
larger Algerian cities and in foreign capi-
tals--and an emigrd organization which
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denounced the coup as a "fascist" plot.
11. Boumedienne is a former school teacher who was
educated in Cairo. The precise composition of
his ruling National Council of the Revolution
is still unknown.
A. Boumedienne is an ascetic, uncommunicative
individual. He is unlikely to want to head
a government, but will remain the real power.
III. Ben Bella achieved power in 1962 largely through
Boumedienne's support. Friction has long been
apparent. Boumedienne objected to Ben Bella's
leftward swing, his close relations with France,
his attempts to isolate Boumedienne's followers,
his recent "deal" with Berber dissidents in the
Kabylie, and ultimately a Ben Bella order to
arrest some 150 opponents.
IV. The Boumedienne clique has announced it will not
change Algeria's policies of nonalignment and
support for liberation groups. However, it is
likely to pay more attention to the faltering
Algerian economy than to foreign adventure. The
regime will be very touchy; Boumedienne has al-
ready reacted strongly and adversely to "foreign
meddling." Boumedienne reportedly brusquely re-
fused Egyptian Vice President Amir's demands
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to see Ben Bella; his foreign minister has sum-
moned most diplomats accredited to Algiers to
warn them against meddling in Algerian affairs.
V. Although the Boumedienne regime has said it did
not intend to solicit formal recognitions, it
seems concerned that few countries--so far only
Syria, Indonesia, Communist China, and Ethiopia--
have granted formal recognition.
A. It also is reported embarrassed by the
strong open support of the Chinese Commu-
nists.
B. It is proceeding with petroleum negotiations
with France, An accord in these was near-
ing the signature stage at the time of the
coup.
C. Morocco and Tunisia--who regard Boumedienne
as a determined, malevolent extremist--con-
tinue to be uneasy. Both backed Ben Bella
as the lesser of possible evils. Both can
be expected to press for increased US and
Western military assistance against the pos-
sibility of Algerian aggressions.
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D. Some small improvement in relations with the
US may be anticipated. The US ambassador
has been assured that Algeria wants "fruit-
ful cooperation with the US."
VI. The Afro-Asian Conference, which was slated
to open on 29 June in Algiers, was postponed
until 5 November,
A. Communist China--with Indonesia, the prime
mover for the conference--pushed hard to
hold it on schedule. Most other partici-
pants either favored postponement or dropping
the matter altogether.
B. Feverish diplomatic maneuvering, among 36
(out of possibly 50)delegations,preceded
the actual announcement of postponement.
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1. Several informal caucuses formulated
separate proposals for postponement
for presentation to the foreign minis-
ters' meeting, ultimately rescheduled
from 24 to 26 June. Morocco and Tunisia
led the Arab States; India and Japan
led moderate Asians. Algeria, after
meeting with ten African states, ap-
parently agreed to postpone.
2. The decision actually was made at a
special meeting of the 15-nation pre-
paratory committee even as the foreign
ministers were assembled at another
site.
C. Peiping had a large stake in the conference,
and the Chinese kept pressure on until the
last minute for some kind of meeting. Their
tactics appear to have backfired; the Chi-
nese are now accusing imperialists of sabo-
taging the conference.
1. Tanzania, Guinea, and Congo (Brazza-
ville) resented Chinese persistence.
They criticized the immediate Chinese
recognition of the Boumedienne regime.
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D. Indonesia originally took a hard line that
the conference proceed as scheduled, but
they privately hoped for postponement as
it became apparent Malaysia would most
likely be seated.
E. Although the Soviets remained largely in
the background in Algiers, they quietly
postered sentiment for postponement; un-
doubtedly they are pleased at the out-
come, which they regard as a setback for
Peiping.
F. Algeria suffered a further loss of prestige
when European Communist sources connected
with the forthcoming Ninth World Youth
Festival, scheduled to begin 28 July in
Algiers, indicated it would be moved to
Bulgaria.
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DCI BRIEFING
INDONESIA
1 July 1965
I. In Indonesia, President Sukarno has told us not
to expect any improvement in US-Indonesian rela-
tions during the immediate future.
A. No serious anti-American incidents have oc-
curred, however, in the last three months.
1. Presumably Sukarno felt he and the Com-
munists had pushed matters as far as
they should at this time. Last winter
and early spring, the Indonesian Gov-
ernment progressively closed the five
USIS installations and took over Ameri-
can-owned rubber estates, and oil proper-
ties.
2. Perhaps also contributing to the lack
of anti-American headlines has been
the preoccupation of both Sukarno and
the Communists in recent months with
various national and international con-
ferences.
B. The Communists appear eager to push anti-Ameri-
canism to greater lengths than does Sukarno.
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1. The Communists' anti-American program
is now relatively low-keyed, but they
are still calling for a break in Indo-
nesia-US relations and the seizure (as
compared with the previous "takeovers")
of US business holdings and the expul-
sion of remaining Americans.
C. We think it unlikely that Sukarno will seek
a break in relations unless severely pressed
by the Communists, but business probably
can expect further harassment.
1. The oil companies, although nominally
taken over in March, have so far en-
countered relatively little interference
from the government.
2. The reduced American staffs that remained
at the rubber estates, however, have not
been permitted to work.
II. The postponement of the Afro-Asian conference
in Algiers was a great piece of luck for the
Indonesians.
A. Sukarno probably faced defeat at the confer-
ence on the Malaysian issue. Chances were
good--despite Indonesia's intense opposition--
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for Malaysia's being seated at a conference
which Indonesia and later China had been
instrumental in scheduling.
B. Sukarno probably will now place major
emphasis on creating support for his Con-
ference of the New Emerging Forces (CONEFO)
scheduled to be held in Djakarta in mid-I966.
III. Isolated domestic opposition to the Communists
still occurs, but the prevailing trend continues
toward the left.
A. The army is carrying out a limited political
offensive in Sumatra to counter Communist
advances.
1. In North Sumatra, where the Communists
have made great progress toward control-
ling the province, the army has succeeded
in starting three non-Communist news-
papers.
2. It has also won the conviction of 23 mem-
bers of the Communist-front peasant
organization for the murder of an unarmed
army officer in mid-May.
B. Moslem peasant resistance to the Communists
continues in East Java, but it is at a
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greatly diminished rate to that which pre-
vailed earlier in the year.
IV. Indonesia has continued to press its military
confrontation of Malaysia.
A. There has been a recent spate of largely
ineffectual Indonesian guerrilla operations
against both peninsular Malaysia and Malaysian
Borneo.
1. This increase in small-scale Indonesian
activity apparently was in response to
Djakarta's recent order to create dis-
turbances in Malaysia before the convening
of the Algiers Afro-Asian Conference.
2. Djakarta, to gain support at the confer-
ence, had recently circulated fabricated
reports of an imminent large-scale
British attack against Indonesia.
B. In lieu of a settlement, which appears un-
likely, Sukarno probably intends to gradually
expand the scale and intensity of military
attacks against Malaysia.
1, In Borneo, Indonesian battalion-sized
attacks are a possibility. It is unlikely,
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however, that Indonesian bases directed
against the Malayan Peninsula and Singa-
pore will, in the near future, be able
to mount significantly larger infiltra-
tions than the 10-50-man missions of
the past year.
2. Meanwhile, Indonesia's large military
buildup around the periphery of Malaysia
Is nearing completion. The Borneo bor-
der area and Sumatra are each being re-
inforced by over 12,000 troops.
C. Malaysian and British authorities are con-
cerned over the possibility of an outbreak
of Communist Chinese insurgency in Malaysian
Borneo.
1. In a recent raid, Indonesian troops sup-
ported by local Chinese elements overran
a Malaysian Borneo police station. Four
pro-Government Chinese civilians were
assassinated.
2. The Chinese insurgents were probably
members of the anti-Malaysia, pro-Peiping,
Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO)
which in the past has refrained from
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armed opposition to the government.
Commonwealth and Malaysian security
forces would be hard pressed to cope
with widespread CCO terrorism and
active cooperation with Indonesian
infiltration efforts.
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Approv
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2-5
reaffirmed the need for intensifying terrorist
activity.
A. The party hopes to give the FALN s new
campaign clearly defined objectives cal-
culated to produce maximum propaganda ef-
fect.
III. Guerrilla activity continues about 100 miles
east of Caracas, and has been resumed in the
west.
A. The army has stepped up its antiguerrilla
campaign in both regions.
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DCI BRIEFING 1 July 1965
BOLIVIA
I. In Bolivia, military occupation of all nationalized
mines was completed in early June without resistance,
thus bringing at least a temporary respite in the
month-old political crisis.
A. Military occupation of the mines is the first
step in the junta's rehabilitation program for
Bolivia's all-important mining industry.
1. The miners, undisciplined and led by extremists,
have resisted effective government authority
since the 1952 revolution.
2. The Bolivian government, finally faced up to
this, realizing that it cannot begin to cope
with its economic problems before it estab-
lishes sound management of the nationalized
mines.
3. The deportation or arrest of extremist mine
leaders, and a military show of force has
apparently overcome miner resistance to the
reform program.
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B. The junta now faces the important task of prov-
ing to the miners that conditions will improve
under the new program.
1. The miners will tolerate peaceful occupation
of the mines for a while, but resistance
will stiffen and another crisis will loom
if the junta does not provide tangible re-
sults to back up its promises.
II. The power struggle between the co-presidents of the
junta, Barrientos and Ovando, remains a disturbing
element in the political picture.
A. It stens from the ambitious character of the
two generals. Each wants to be president, and
both have significant military support, but only
Barrientos has popular political support.
B.
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C. Relations between the two men came dangerously
close to the breaking point on May 24.
1. At that time Barrientos, then sole head of
the junta, had begun deporting the principal
extreme leftists and was moving the army
against the armed workers' militias and
striking workers.
2. Ovando, who was commander of the armed forces,
signed a cease-fire pact with the workers
without consulting the rest of the junta.
The agreement in effect gave the workers al-
most everything they demanded, and would have
denied the government the necessary means of
controlling the mines.
D. Barrientos moved Ovando up to the co-presidency
and took over joint command of the armed forces,
in order to keep an eye on him, to neutralize
his power, and, most importantly, to maintain
unity in the armed forces. A split in the mili-
tary would probably have plunged the country into
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civil war, and still could. So far this maneuver
by Barrientos has succeeded. Ovando is lying
low, and unity of the armed forces has been pre-
served, but a final showdown between the two
seems inevitable.
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005/01E:cM82R00025R000500220002-5
1 July 1965
PERU
I. In Peru, the MIR, or Movement of the Revolutionary
Left, which is pro-Cuban and pro-Peiping, ap-
pears to have begun guerrilla activity.
A. On June 9th a group of about 13 armed men
attacked two ranches and a mine near Huancayo
in the rugged mountainous jungle area of Cen-
tral Peru, stealing dynamite, clothing, money,
food,and other articles.
B. Another ranch was raided on 12 June and simi-
lar raids in the central region have continued
intermittently. Although reports of these
attacks are piecemeal, we do know that the
MIR had planned such raids as the first
steps in the "armed action" stage of the
MIR revolution.
II. The MIR has about 1,000 members, at least 150
of whom have received extensive guerrilla train-
ing in Cuba, Communist China, and North Korea.
Another group of foreign trainees reportedly will
return to Peru by early July. The MIR has been
preparing for guerrilla warfare now for two
years.
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A. Twenty-three foreign-trained guerrillas plus
several hundred partly trained collaborators
from nearby villages are located at three
camps near the general location of the June
attacks.
B. MIR also has a guerrilla camp near Cuzco in
Southern Peru and three in the northern part
of the country. Guerrillas in the southern
camp reportedly will begin small-scale at-
tacks there sometime in July.
III. The MIR is not an immediate threat to the Peru-
vian Government.
A. Government security forces are now in pur-
suit of the guerrillas, but are hampered
by the rugged terrain, the hostility of the
peasants, and the concealment tactics of
the guerrillas. The police have killed
three and captured or arrested at least
seven others. These,however, probably are
peasant collaborators and not any of the
foreign-trained guerrillas.
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1 July 1965
DCI BRIEFING
ECUADOR
I. Political critics of the ruling junta are plan-
ning large demonstrations in Quito and Guayaquil
on 9 July, two days before the second anniversay
of the junta's accession to power.
A. Permission to hold demonstrations has been
requested by the recently created National
Patriotic Junta (JPN), a relatively minor
group headed by an officer of the Conservative
Party, but the demonstrations would probably
draw the participation of students, labor
unions, and other critics of the junta.
B. The junta has not granted permission and
may not do so, but might find it very diffi-
cult to prevent demonstrations. Anti junta
elements would probably welcome repressive
government measures and the creation of
martyrs.
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R00025R000500220
CUBA
002-5
1 July 1965
I. The Cuban transport plane shot down by Cuban
forces on 19 June was hit by a surface-to-air
missile,
The missile was apparently fired on
the authority of the SAM site commander.
A. He may have regarded the plane as hostile
even though it was operating in the gen,-
eral area of a previously assigned training
flight route.
B. This was the first known SAM firing in Cuba
since October 1962.
This incident, and the possibility of another
live firing in a coming air defense exercise,
probably do not reflect a change in Cuba's at-
titude toward US overflights. There is no in-
dication of any modification of past orders
that Cuban SAM sites are not to fire unless
attacked or given permission by higher authority.
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III. Although the Cubans have begun to adopt a So-
viet system to improve the coordination of air
defense elements, they will probably not be
able to rule out the possibility of accidental
or uncoordinated SAM firings in the future.
A. Double-lock security systems are not feasi-
ble in SA-2 complexes, so it is al-
ways possible for individual site commanders
to give a unilateral order to fire on any
aircraft.
B. Firings on US reconnaissance aircraft would
more likely be intentional, not accidental,
because the high altitudes at which such
missions are flown reduces the possibility
that they could be confused with other air-
craft.
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SEPRRT
DCI BRIEFING
BERLIN
1 July 1965
The East Germans in recent weeks have been put-
ting pressure on West German rail and barge access to
West Berlin and also flaunting Allied regulations con-
cerning use of airspace over the city.
A. The East German actions are designed to
promote and give substance to the regime's
long-held claim of being a sovereign state.
B, Moscow has apparently given its consent
for this activity but is clearly exer-
cising careful control over the East
Germans.
C. Communists do not seem to have in mind
taking such extreme steps as to bring
on a firm Western response.
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D. Intermittent East German pressures are
likely to continue this summer but not,
we now believe, to such a degree as to
bring on a full-blown "Berlin Crisis."
BULGARIA
I. The crisis posed for the Bulgarian Government
this spring by an attempted coup against the rul-
ing Communist clique by dissident party members
was temporarily resolved with their arrest and
trial.
A. The underlying factors responsible for
the abortive coup remain, however.
B. The Bulgarian leadership is still faction-
ridden and, despite Soviet assurances of
backing for the leading members, remains
at best unstable.
C. While our limited information does not pro-
vide us with any clear indications of how
the situation may develop, we do feel that
matters are far from settled and the like-
lihood of further dramatic events, including
the ouster of regime leader Zhivkov, cannot
be ruled out.
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DCI BRIEFING
YEMEN
1 July 1965
I. The number of Egyptian troops in Yemen now
stands at between 53,000 and 58,000 men.
A. They have recently been withdrawn from
several outlying areas to help protect
the main population centers. In conse-
quence, the royalists have seized the mili-
tary initiative.
B. The Yemeni republican government of Prime
Minister Numan has been trying to follow
a course which would neither lose him
Egypt's support nor alienate the anti-
Egyptian republican tribes. Nasir is sus-
picious of Numan's government but appar-
ently intends to allow it to continue in
its present form while he continues to try
to get together with King Faysal on a face-
saving settlement.
C. Numan also hopes to improve his relations
with the British, but the Egyptians persist
in using Yemen as a base for operations
against Aden and the British-protected South
Arabian Federation. Numan admits that he
is powerless to stop them.
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1 July 1965
DCI BRIEFING
CYPRUS
I. Negotiations between Athens and Ankara are
stalled over Turkey's demand for territorial
compensation in exchange for agreeing to union
of Cyprus with Greece.
A. The Turks, whose ethnics amount to about
20 percent of the island's population,
want the equivalent of 20 percent of the
island's area--about 715 square miles,
either on Cyprus or in Thrace.
B. Greek Cypriot leaders view the Greek-Turk-
ish dialogue with deep suspicion and op-
pose any concessions by Cyprus to achieve
union.
C. Greek Premier Papandreou, facing increas-
ingly serious domestic political problems,
is reluctant to expose himself to new crit-
icism by agreeing to suggestions from his
subordinates that territorial compensation
could be granted using Greek rather than
Cypriot territory.
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1. Seeking "less painful" methods to
placate Turkey, the Greeks have ap-
proached the British regarding the
possibility of the latter sharing
control with Turkey of one of the
two British military bases on Cyprus.
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DCI BRIEFING
1 July 1965
I. The Congo is quieting down fitfully, although
some rebel resurgence has been reported from
the eastern Congo, and tension between Presi-
dent Kasavubu and Premier Tshombd seems to
have been increasing, especially since Tshombd
and his allies did very well in elections for
a new parliament.
A. Arms supply from Algeria and Egypt through
the Sudan has halted, and exile rebel lead-
ers continue to fight among themselves.
Rebels, probably aided by Nyerere's Tan-
zania, are mounting renewed operations
near the Uganda border and along Lake
Tanganyika but European mercenaries are
likely to rout them fairly easily.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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