DCI'S BRIEFINGS: CIA SUBCOMMITTEE OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 16, 1965
• Content Type: BRIEF

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CIA SUBCOMMITTEE OF HOUSE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE
ON ATOMIC ENERGY
I. VIETNAM
II, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
III. SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY (TKH)
IV. TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT
V. EUROPE
VI. CYPRUS
VII. THE MIDDLE EAST
VIII. BOLIVIA
IX. VENEZUELA
PERU
XI. ARGENTINA
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VIETNAM
I. In North Vietnam, we are beginning to see some of
the dimensions of the Soviet assistance program.
A. We have found three surface-to-air missile
sites so far, all of them generally about
15 miles or so from Hanoi to the south. At
least two of them are still under construction.
Only one of the sites has any equipment in
evidence, and our reconnaissance has detected
no missiles yet.
1. A Soviet diplomat recently said that there
are also sites around the port city of
Haiphong. We have no evidence to substan-
tiate this remark, but weather has pre-
vented good photography of the Haiphong
area for about a month.
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B. The latest photography shows eight IL-28 BEAGLE
light jet bombers in North Vietnam, all if them
flown in across China from the Soviet Union.
There are also 63 MIG-15 or MIG-17 jet fighters,
and a few more being assembled. The first 44
of these were flown in from China; the rest have
apparently been shipped in crates from the Soviet
Union.
1. Another Soviet diplomat has hinted that some
of the jet fighters are being flown by Soviet
pilots. We have no evidence of this, and
believe that there are enough trained North
Vietnamese pilots to handle the aircraft they
have on hand.
2. On June 4, Communist jet fighters over North
Vietnam made their first attempt in two
months to engage US aircraft. Four MIG
fighters jumped two US Navy fighters flying
a protective patrol about 30 miles south of
Hanoi. They fired unguided air-to-air mis-
siles which missed. One of our pilots ob-
tained a lock-on with his radar on one of
the Communist jets, but his missile failed
to fire. Before any further action could be
taken, the MIGs broke contact and took off
for the North.
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C. The Soviets are apparently also providing the
North Vietnamese with more effective radars,
and possibly antiaircraft guns.
D. The latest phase of our air attacks on North
Vietnam involves some economic targets, such as
thermal power plants and port facilities, and
A few of the targets are north of the 20th par-
allel. The major emphasis continues to be on
military targets and transportation facilities.
1. The North Vietnamese are using ferries to
replace destroyed bridges. This requires
lighter loads, and more trucks.
housands of workers
from the northern part of the country are
being moved south to repair roads and bridges.
E. In early June we received additional indications
that the North Vietnamese, for the present at
least, are completely uninterested in negotiations.
The North Vietnamese Foreign Minister, talking to
the chief of the Canadian ICC delegation, simply
repeated the Standard Hanoi "Four Points," which
center on the complete withdrawal of the US mili-
tary presence in South Vietnam.
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II. Peiping is probably quite optimistic about Communist
prospects in South Vietnam, and the Chinese are al-
most certainly encouraging the DRV and Viet Cong to
keep the pressure on--and possibly to step up the
pace of the war.
A. Peiping's recent actions suggest that the Chinese
believe this course has increased the chances of
a US escalation which might involve air strikes
against targets inside China. In the past few
weeks Peiping has made a concerted effort to
deter the US by a series of new warnings concern-
ing the possible consequences.
1. Chinese propaganda, and private statements
by leaders in Peiping, have apparently been
calculated to underscore earlier threats
that Communist China might become more di-
rectly involved, and would respond to blows
against China by launching a Korean-type war
in Southeast Asia.
2. There is, however, no evidence that the Chi-
nese are making active preparations for in-
tervention of this sort at the present time.
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B. These warnings have been accompanied by increased
civil defense preparations, which probably reflect
genuine Chinese fears that the warnings may have
no effect.
2. Plans to evacuate nonessential citizens to the
countryside have been reported from half a dozen
cities. A number of cities are known to be
holding air raid drills and building air raid
shelters.
3. The Civil Defense preparations we have noted so
far should not be taken as signs that the Chinese
intend to initiate a major new military action in
Southeast Asia. No unusual troop deployments have
been detected in South China, and the Chinese mil-
itary posture in general appears defensive.
4. The continuing rail disruptions in South China prob-
ably reflect priority shipment of military freight
to North Vietnam from China and the USSR. They are not
of a magnitude which would suggest any major Chi-
nese troop movement.
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III. In South Vietnam, the expected summer offensive by
the Viet Cong is clearly under way. So far, the ma-
jor focus is shifting back and forth between the
provinces in the north of the country and those
just north and northeast of Saigon. There are still
large Viet Cong units or concentrations which have
not been committed.
A. The major Viet Cong action at present is taking
place around the district capital of Dong Xoai,
about 60 miles north of Saigon in Phuoc Long
Province.
1. On June 9th, a Viet Cong regiment--believed
to be the same one which briefly overran the
provincial capital at Song Be a month ago--
attacked and overran Dong Xoai, as well as
a nearby Special Forces camp where 20 Ameri-
cans were based.
The Communists were finally dislodged from
the town on June 11th by a Ranger battalion
flown into the area, but only after the Viet
Cong had destroyed one government relief
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battalion and had received a major pound-
ing from US and Vietnamese air strikes.
3. We now know
L__F that the Communists had learned
where the first relief battalion would
land and were waiting for it.
4. On June 12th, a South Vietnamese airborne
battalion sent to help pursue the Viet Cong
was ambushed in a rubber plantation near
Dong Xoai, losing about two-thirds of its
complement.
5. It will be some time before we can-have ac-
curate casualty totals. In one area, for
instance, 400 bodies have been found, but
not
it hasnyet been possible to determine how
many were Viet Cong and how many were govern-
ment soldiers. US losses are seven killed,
15 wounded, and 12 missing.
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B. US officials believe the Communists may be trying
to seize local plantations to establish a major
base in Phuoc Long Province. On June 15th--
yesterday--a district capital about 25 miles to
the northwest in Binh Long Province was attacked.
1. With only three understrength government bat-
talions at Dong Xoa~, and with at least one
additional Viet Cong regiment potentially
available from their Zone D base just to
the south, the situation is still critical.
2. Because at least five of the government's
11-battalion general reserve have either
been crippled or are needed in Saigon, and
most of the rest are committed in the north,
one US airborne battalion has been moved to
a nearby staging airfield for possible use.
C. Earlier, at the beginning of June, at least
three government battalions, one of them a
marine reserve unit, were rendered combat in-
effective during a major Viet Cong regimental
assault around Ba Gia, a government outpost in
Quang Ngai Province in the north.
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1. This battle came on the heels of wide-
ranging attacks on major land-communica-
tions, marking a sudden shift of Viet
Cong action to the northern provinces.
2. It was followed up, in the first week of
June, by a series of 12 successful Viet
Cong ambushes, primarily in the highlands
bordering Laos and Cambodia,
3. A Viet Cong who defected on June 3rd in
the highlands province of Phu Bon claimed
to be from North Vietnam's 325th Division,
and alleged that all three of the division's
infantry regiments are now in Kontum,
Pleiku, and Phu Bon provinces. His state-
ments are not confirmed, but sizeable
forces were clearly involved in recent
ambushes in all three provinces.
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D. While we cannot yet be sure how extensive the
Viet Cong offensive will be this summer, we
are inclined to believe that the Viet Cong will
stick to--but intensify--their existing patterns
of classic guerrilla activity designed to isolate
and erode government forces. They are, however,
showing increased willingness to engage in oc-
casional set-piece battles despite the govern-
ment's ability to counter with air power.
E. US strength in South Vietnam now amounts to about
53,500 men. About 21,000 of these are listed
as combat forces. An Australian infantry bat-
talion has arrived, and the South Koreans are
talking of sending a division to South Vietnam.
IV. The resignation of the Quat government in Saigon on
June 11th and the resumption of authority by the
military confronts South Vietnam with another in-
ternal shakeup at a time when the generals have
their hands full militarily.
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A. This time, the generals stepped back in at the
request of the civilian leadership. Premier
Quat was attempting to reshuffle his cabinet,
and the Chief of State, Suu, refused on constitu-
tional grounds to let Quat dismiss two ministers
who had refused to resign.
B. The opposition to Quat was led by militant
Catholics who accused Quat of favoring the Bud-
dhists and leaning to neutralism, and by southern
regionalists who felt they were not given an
adequate share of the government, They were
agitating for Quat's removal, and Quat himself,
feeling that he did not have enough support to
govern, asked the military to step in and
mediate the impasse.
C. The generals had been showing growing impatience
with the government stalemate, and they responded
to Quat's request by resuming control. There
is little assurance, however, that the military,
with a war on their hands and little interest
in day-to-day administration, will be able to
resolve the deep divisions among the South Viet-
namese, even with a more dictatorial regime.
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There are already indications that the Catholics
who were working for Quat's ouster are just as
concerned over military rule.
V. Although Quat and his colleagues are still acting
as caretakers, our information is that the mili-
tary plan to replace Quat with a military premier
and a small mixed wartime cabinet.
A. The generals have already announced the forma-
tion of a supreme military committee to set up
and supervise the government; the chairman of
this committee and prospective new chief of
state is a Catholic, General Nguyen Van Thieu,
Quat's defense minister, and an apparent com-
promise choice to cope with the ambitions of
younger more radical officers.
B. Possibly in line as the new premier, or at least
the key voice in "directing the government," is
General Nguyen Cao Ky, the flamboyant air force
chief and a self-styled reformer.
C. There are signs in public statements by Thieu,
and in clandestinely reported remarks of Ky and
others of the inner military circle, that the
generals incline toward a tightly-run, tough
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regime which will sweep out corrupt or entrenched
elements of earlier regimes and perhaps nationalize
certain economic interests of the local French
and Chinese communities.
D. Some of the younger generals, along with the Tri
Quang wing of the Buddhist leadership, have long
argued that some sur4i re o:tut ionary approach to
government is essential if the war is to be won.
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SECRET
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
I. In the Dominican Republic, heavy fighting broke
out in downtown Santo Domingo, the capital,
yesterday. At least two US soldiers were wounded,
and there are press reports that one was killed.
Early reports indicated that the fighting began
when the rebels fired on US forces.
A. The crisis now is nearly eight weeks old, but
there is no early prospect for a political
solution, and a military solution appears
unlikely.
1. The loyalist troops mounted a successful
drive in late May to clean out rebel pockets
in the northern part of the capital, but
this initative ended when they reached the
corridor stretching across. the town from
the international safety zone.
B. Imbert has continued his attempt to mobilize
mass support through rallies and demonstrations
but has largely been unsuccessful. He has
gained the support of some conservative parties
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and politidians who give a right-wing cast to
his regime.
B. In a sudden move to gain support, Imbert on
June first offered to let the OAS set the date
for elections that would be open to all non-
extremist candidates, and supervised by the OAS.
The rebels rejected the initiative as t'another
Imbert farce." Imbert later retreated from his
proposal, saying that the "Caamano problem"
must be solved before any solution can be found.
C. Imbert appears to be under some pressure from
his military leaders to avoid concessions to
the rebels. They disapproved of his transfer
of the National Palace to OAS control and may
have been behind his refusal to allow the OAS,
to control Radio Santo Domingo. Some of the
loyalist military commanders are probably toying
with the idea of taking direct action against
the rebels.
D. On June 12 Imbert held a rally that attracted
8 to 10 thousand listeners, The overwhelming
proportion of them were from the working classes.
Many were brought in by the loyalist government
from the surrounding countryside.
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II. The rebels appear to be increasingly tense as the
stalemate continues. This is indicated by tightened
security measures in the rebel sector of Santo
Domingo, and by possible dissension between Caamano's
Communist backers and his supporters in Juan Bosch's
Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD).
A. Caamano appears to remain intransigent towards
a political solution. He is demanding a five-
point program as the basis for a settlement.
These include: retention of the 1963 Bosch
Constitution; maintenance of the Bosch-dominated
Congress; incorporation of rebel.military leaders
into the military forces; a government of "Dem-
ocratic personalities" (probably excluding Im-
bert); and the immediate departure of the in-
terventionist forces. Imbert and his supporters
find the first four of these points unacceptable.
B. Communist influence among the rebels remains
strong. They are particularly active in rebel
paramilitary units and in propaganda activities.
In fact, one adviser to the Communists recommended
that they tone down their propaganda because its
Communist origin was too obvious.
C. The rebels have been increasing their propaganda
against the US, probably because they feel that
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the US is preventing a settlement favorable
to them. The large (6-10,000) rebel rally
on June 5th vociferously stressed an anti-US
theme.
D. The rebels held a demonstration on June 14th
that was in effect co-sponsored by the
pro-Castro Fourteenth of June group (APCJ)
and Caamano's government. Several Communists
spoke, including one who advocated taking
the revolution into the interior. The fact
that the rebel government co-sponsored this
demonstration indicates the degree to which
they are responsive to Communists and other
extremists, who, it is estimated, make up
about 65% of the rebel paramilitary units.
III. Exiled President Juan Bosch has continued, from
his haven in Puerto Rico, to guide rebel leaders
and to boost the morale of rebel forces through
recorded speeches urging the people to maintain
the struggle.
A. Bosch has advised the rebels to exploit the
charges of loyalist atrocities.
B. He has also instructed the rebel leaders not
to rush into negotiations. He says that the
stalemate is not their problem but that of
the US and OAS.
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IV. The OAS has been increasingly active and may be-
come a major force.
A. A special three-man committee composed of
representatives of the US (Ellsworth Bunker),
Brazil, and El Salvador who are charged with
helping OAS Secretary General Mora find a
solution to the problem. This group, since
the withdrawal of the Bundy mission, is now
the main hope in this regard.
B. The OAS Commission has met with a group of
Dominican professionals and businessmen in
an attempt to find a third force that might
be the core of a new government. It is un-
likely that Imbert would accept such a gov-
ernment and even less likely that Caamano
would approve it.
V. The Latin American contingents in the Inter-
American Peace Force are playing a more important
role. They now patrol much of the International
Security Zone. The Brazilian troops in particular
seem to be very effective. There are now 1,200
Brazilians, 250 Hondurans, 160 Nicaraguans, 21
Costa Ricans and 3 El Salvadorans under the
command of Brazilian General Hugo Panasco Alvim.
A company of Paraguayans is coming soon.
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VI. There have been sporadic outbreaks of violence
in the Dominican interior. These have.included
attacks on police stations and army posts.
A. The outlook is for more violence, but rebel
capabilities may be more limited than we
believed. Monday, June 14, was the anni-
versary of the abortive 1959 Castro-backed
invasion against Trujillo, from which the
Fourteenth of June Political Group, a major
supporter of Caamano, takes its name. The
APCJ was expected to attempt to celebrate
with demonstrations throughout the country,
but Monday, except for the rally in the capital,
was fairly quiet.
B. Some rebel leaders evidently feel that the
stimulation of manifestations of militant
support in the interior is the last card
they may be able to play. There are con-
tinued reports of planned widespread dis-
turbances and even of forthcoming attempts
by rebel supporters to seize certain key
interior cities.
C. US Forces in the Dominican Republic now
total 12,400 men. The Marine Brigade has
been withdrawn. Our casualties to date
have been 19 dead and 119 wounded.
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16 June 1965
DCI Briefing
SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY
I. We are watching the activities of Soviet military
forces even more closely than usual, because of the
Vietnam situation.
A. Generally, the activities of Soviet strategic
strike forces, as well as ground and air defense
forces, appear to be at normal levels for this
time of year.
B. Soviet forces in East Germany and western USSR
have been conducting exercises, and as many as
18 submarines have been active outside their
home waters. (This is a high level of out-of-
area sub activity, but it is occurring in areas
used before during the past year). We do not see
any activity which is ominous in relation to the
international situation.
II. Soviet missile testing and space programs are very
active.
A. At least four ICBM development and modification
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programs are under way at the Tyuratam flight
test rangehead. We have identified the launch
complex for some of these new programs and obtained
particularly fine satellite photography of this
area on May 28th. Here is a photograph showing
one of the launch sites and a missile which is
ready for firing.
B. Recent satellite photography also has shown continued
construction progress on big space booster launch
facilities at Tyuratam. Some of these may be for
a manned lunar landing program.
C. Soviet attempts to reconnoiter the moon continue
to be frustrated by failures. Lunik-6, launched
on June 8th, was the ninth straight failure since
the beginning of 1963. It was the fourth attempt
this year, and its timing also reflected a feeling
of urgency behind the Soviet effort.
D. The Soviets' own satellite reconnaissance program
is in full swing for this year. It resumed active
operations in March following a near standdown
during the poor lighting and weather conditions
of the winter months. Currently, they are launching
one about every 20 days
Cosmos 68, launched yesterday morning, was the
seventh reconnaissance satellite this year.
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SOVIET TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT
strides since World War II in aircraft propulsion,
aerodynamics, and in the capacity and technological
level of its aircraft industry.
A. Wartime damage was overcome by 1950 through use
of German prisoners of war and a high priority
for reconstruction. Since 1950, plants connected
with the aviation industry have been expanded
greatly, and that expansion continues.
1. Many of the plants have the large, high-bay
structures necessary for the design and
quantity production of modern aircraft.
2. There are now 24 airframe and 12 aircraft
engine plants, totaling about 77 million
square feet of space.
B. In the mid-1950's, the USSR began to emphasize
development and production of turbojet; and turboprop
transport aircraft. The outcome is highlighted in
the present Paris Air Show, which includes all the
major Soviet transport and cargo aircraft and
helicopters currently in production or under
development.
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C. The Soviets are not only supplying the civil
air fleets for themselves, and their satellites,
but are making a concerted effort to sell their
transports in the free world.
1. They are even entered in the intense
international rivalry to develop, build,
and sell a supersonic transport, and are
very probably trying to get their prototype
airborne ahead of the competing Anglo-French
CONCORDE SST.
D. Soviet aircraft design has emphasized simplicity
anffl economy of construction, at the expense of
performance, economy of operation, economy of
maintenance, passenger comfort, and safety
requirements. The airframes have extremely long
life, but the engine life of Soviet transports
has been extremely short in comparison to that of
comparable western aircraft.
IT. The Soviet aircraft display in Paris includes the TU-124
and AN-24 passenger transports, the AN-12 cargo plane,
and the MI-6 helicopter, all of which are in series
production and have been for some years. The long-range
IL--18D probably did not enter production until late 1964,
at which time the standard IL-18V was still being produced
for export.
A. They are also displaying four prototypes and one
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B. The IL-62 prototype, a passenger transport, may enter
production late this year or early next year. We
already have some sales literature for it, in both
Russian and English. It will be placed on long-
distance national and international routes.
C. The TU-134, also being shown in prototype, will
probably replace the TU-124 in production this
year, and may enter scheduled service with AEROFLOT
in 1966.
D. The MI-10 FLYING CRANE helicopter was seen for the
first time in July, 1961, and since then minor
modifications have been incorporated into the design.
If the Soviets put the MI 10 into series production,
they will probably do so only in limited numbers.
notices, is the giant cargo version of the AN-22 transport,
designed by Antonov, which made a surprise appearance in
Paris yesterday. (15 June)
A. The intelligence community has been aware of the
development of this aircraft since 1961, but the
Soviets have been conspicuously silent about it
until this week.
A Soviet military officer claimed
that the AN-22 would considerably increase the
future airlift capability of the airborne forces.
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3. We found a new runway and a large final assembly
building under construction at Tashkent,
obviously for the giant aircraft--and the first
prototype was probably completed just after
midyear of 1964. Photography of Kiev in September
showed that the AN-22 had been sent to Antonov's
design bureau there for testing.
4. Other than that stray distant snapshot, the AN-22
up to yesterday had not posed for pictures,-and
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still did not have the pictures which this
morning's papers have from Paris.
B. The AN-22, the world's largest aircraft, has four
turboprop engines of 15,000 horsepower, fitted with
counter-rotating propellors. The wing is mounted on
top of the fuselage. The tail assembly consists of
two huge rudders mounted on a horizontal stabilizer.
C. The six big dual landing-gears fold into pod-like
structures on the sides of the fuselage. The design
permits landings on dirt runways, and thecaircraft
requires a landing run of slightly more than 3,000 feet.
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D. The maximum range of the AN-22 is 6,600 miles non-stop
with a payload of 45 tons, or 3,100 miles with the
maximum payload of 80 tons at 420 miles per hour and
an altitude of 36,000 feet.
E. The mentions you may have read of 720 passengers
refer to a civil transport version which has not yet
been built, which is to have a double-decked fuselage
somewhat longer than the cargo version. The cargo
version has a fuselage 190 feet long and 19 to 22
feet in diameter, and a wingspan of about 210 feet.
F. The Soviets claim the AN-22 will be ready for export
in 1967, but we believe this unlikely. The aircraft
is still undergoing flight tests, and apparently only
the one prototype has been built so far. Production
probably will not begin until next year.
IV. An even newer aircraft, the TU-144 SST, or supersonic
transport, was unveiled in the form of a model at the
Paris Air Show. Here again the only photographs available
as of yesterday were newspaper photographs cabled from
Paris.
A. The TU-144 is a delta-wing aircraft similar in
appearance to the CONCORDE SST being developed by
the British and French. Four engines are to be mounted
under the wing. The aircraft is to have a capacity of
121 passengers, a speed of 1,550 m.p.h., range of
4,000 miles, and cruising altitude of 65,000 feet.
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B. TASS says the TU-144 is to enter service in 1971,
which appears to be a reasonable target date.
C. A sign on the model in Paris says the prototype is
to fly in 1968. We think the Soviets will probably
try to beat the first flight of the CONCORDE,
scheduled for early 1968 but probably subject to
some slippage. The Soviets may make some effort
to put their SST over Moscow by November, 1967,
for the 56th anniversary of the October Revolution.
V. Efforts to sell Soviet transport aircraft in the Free World
have heretofore been directed primarily at the underdeveloped
countries, but with the Paris Air Show, they are apparently
shifting to the larger market in the industrialized West.
A. The main vehicle for the immediate future will probably
be the 186-seat IL-62, a four-engine jet transport
being offered for export next year, at a price which
the Soviets claim will be lower than that of the
British Super VC-l0. (The British price is about $8 million
B. Moscow says it will offer discount prices for cash, and
accept payments in commodities from the underdeveloped
countries.
C. Aside from sales to Communist nations, the USSR has been
able to sell commercial transports (IL-14, IL-18, AN-24,
and TU-124) to the UAR, Lebanon, Iraq, Indonesia, Ghana,
Guinea, and Mali. Ghana and Guinea are both dissatisfied
with the cost and maintenance problems of the IL-18, and
are trying to get their money back.
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D. As part of its effort to increase Soviet prestige
through aviation, the USSR has not only given
the leaders of a number of newly independent
countries plush IL-14 and IL-18 transports for
personal use---also MI-4 helicopters, but is
also working hard to get international air routes
to Tree World countries.
1. AEROFLOT now offers service to 27 countries,
and has applications filed for permission to
open a number of new routes, particularly in
Africa.
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1 -1
THE CONCORDE SST PROGRAM
I. Development of the Concorde Supersonic Transport
(SST), the most significant of a number of joint
British-French programs, is well under way. The
goal for the test flights of the first prototype
is early 1968, with hopes of putting the planes in
service in 1971.
A. These goals--which represent a slippage of two
years from the original 1962 plans--still look
too optimistic.
B. Thus the Europeans may lose one of their main
advantages--the lead-time they had over the US
program.
II. The tremendous costs are worrying the British; this
caused Wilson's new government to decide to pull out
of the program last fall. Labor later reversed this
decision after an uproar from Paris, but Wilson will
still have an eagle eye out for rising development
costs--which may force both countries to stretch the
program out over a longer period of time.
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A. Other slowdowns in Concorde might result from
unexpectedly long research on the sonic boom
problem, where the Europeans are trailing the
US.
III. Up to now, the orders for the US SST are out-running
those for the Concorde by about 2-1; there are ten-
tative orders for 96 US planes and 47 for the Concorde.
A. Foreign airlines are still holding back until they'
know more about the respective planes; the market
is estimated to be for about 400 planes, of which
one-quarter to one-third would be ordered by
European airlines.
A. In coming months, there is likely to be much pres-
sure on European airlines to "buy European" and
take the Concorde. There is currently some pres-
sure on West Germany and Italy to play some part
in development.
C. Up to now, the European airlines have placed tech-
nical performance first. With SST's costing over
$20 million each, they are likely to continue to
put quality ahead of politics.
SEC
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I. Greek-Turkish negotiations are under way in an at-
tempt to find a solution for the Cyprus problem.
J.Jttle progress has been made but the talks are
,Nroceeding in a. cooperative atmosphere.
A. The talks have dealt with a solution based on
"enosis"--the union of Cyprus with Greece--
with concessions -- presumably territorial --
for Turkey.
1. According to one report, the Turks are
asbi.ng for territorial compensation either
on Cyprus or in Greece proper; The Greeks
are talking about minor border rectifica-
tions in Thrace, or a leased base on Cyprus.
2. The Turks are talking in terms of an area
equivalent to about 20% of Cyprus, where the
ethnic Turks amount to about 20% of the
population. This works out to about 715
square miles, which may not appear substan-
tial to us, but it is more a question of
principle than of acerage.
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C. Opposition elements in Greece -- both right and
far left -- are ready to attack the government
if significant concessions are made.
II. The Greek Cypriots view the Greek-Turkish talks
with apprehension, fearing a sell-out of Cypriot
territory in exchange for enosis.
A. The island has been relatively peaceful for
several weeks but tension between the com-
munities remains high.
B. The Greek Cypriots could torpedo the Greek-
Turkish negotiations at any time by mounting
attacks against the Turkish Cypriots -- thus
provoking a probable Turkish military response,
possibly aimed at Greece rather than Cyprus.
C. Greece has an estimated 10,000 troops on Cyprus
but apparently cannot control Archbishop Makarios.
III. The Greek Cypriots are continuing to build up their
military capabilities.
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A. Equipment associated with Soviet-built surface-
to-air missiles is on the island, but there
is no confirmation that missiles themselves have
yet arrived.
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MIDDLE EAST
I. In the Middle East factionalism and rivalry in
the Arab camp have given rise to a new crop of
coup rumors, just at the time when Israel is
taking a harder line against border incursions
and the Arab plans to divert Jordan waters.
A. Syria has been demanding a more aggressive
Arab reaction to the Israelis. The May 31
speech by Egyptian President Nasir was a weak
--but accurate--apology for the inability of
the Arab camp to challenge the Israelis mili-
tarily at this time.
B. There is substantial evidence that the Egyp~-
tians and Iraqis are again plotting to over-
throw the Baathist military regime in Syria.
The Syrians are aware of these efforts, and
can probably forestall them..
C. Iraq itself is in poor position to take part
in coups against another government. Presi-
dent Arif, who holds the shaky regime to-
gether, is ill and rumored to have cancer.
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The costly military campaign against the Kurds
is on again, with little promise of success.
1. There are coup rumors again in Baghdad.
Moves toward unity with Egypt have antag-
onized those who oppose Nasir, while at
the same time they have been so minimal
that they have not satisfied those who de-
mand union.
II. Arab terrorist raiding parties are striking into
Israel from Lebanon and Jordan. The two govern-
ments are probably not directly involved, but
have been unable to stop the raids and are afraid
that they will either provoke further Israeli
reprisals or raise tension to such a pitch that
they cannot successfully resist Egyptian sugges-
tions that other Arab forces be stationed in Leb-
anon and Jordan,
III. In Yemen, Egyptian troop strength has been in-
creased steadily ever since October, 1962. It
now amounts to some 53,000 to 58,000 men.
A. Despite this heavy Egyptian commitment, there
is a military stalemate with the royalists,
who are supported by Saudi Arabia.
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B. The new head of the Yemeni republican gov-
ernment, Prime Minister Numan, has been
urging the withdrawal of Egyptian troops.
He feels that if the UAR presence were re-
moved, he could find enough commom ground
with the Yemeni tribes and the Saudis to end
the civil war. Nasir, however, is trying to
undermine Numan's government and replace it
with pro-Egyptian ministers.
C. Nasir would certainly like to extricate him-
self from this mess. His military commander
in Yemen admits that Egypt can?t win. It is
not only costly and showing no signs of suc-
cess, but ties up about one third of his
ground forces at a time when other Arabs are
challenging him to take a more defiant pos-
ture against Israel.
1. Nasir cannot afford to pull out of Yemen,
however, unless he can leave a friendly
republican government in reasonably se-
cure control there. He sees no early
prospect for such a solution, and without
it, he would not only give up any influence
in Yemen, but would lose considerable pres-
tige in the Arab world.
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2. Algerian President Ben Bella has initiated
diplomatic contacts between Nasir and Faysal,
hoping that they will reach an understanding
about Yemen
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DCI BRIEFING 16 June 1965
1. In Bolivia, military occupation of all nationalized
mines was completed late last week without resistance,
thus bringing at least a temporary respite in the
month-old political crisis.
A. Military occupation of the mines is the first
step in the junta's rehabilitation program for
Bolivia's all-important mining industry.
1. The miners, undisciplined and led by extremists,
have resisted effective government authority
since the 1952 revolution.
2. The Bolivian government, finally faced up to
this, realizing that it cannot begin to cope
with its economic problems before it estab-
lishes sound management of the nationalized
mines.
3. The deportation or arrest of extremist mine
leaders, and a military show of force has
apparently overcome miner resistance to the
reform program.
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B. The junta now faces the important task of prov-
ing to the miners that conditions will improve
under the new program.
1. The miners will tolerate peaceful occupation
of the mines for a while, but resistance
will stiffen and another crisis will loom
if the junta does not provide tangible re-
suits to back up its promises.
II. The power struggle between the co-presidents of the
junta, Barrientos and Ovando, remains a disturbing
element in the political picture.
A. It stems from the ambitious character of the
two generals. Each wants to be president, and
both have significant military support, but only
Barrientos has popular political support.
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C. Relations between the two men came dangerously
close to the breaking point on May 24.
1. At that time Barrientos, then sole head of
the junta, had begun deporting the principal
extreme leftists and was moving the army
against the armed workers' militias and
striking workers.
2. Ovando, who was commander of the armed forces,
signed a cease-fire pact with the workers
without consulting the rest of the junta.
The agreement in effect gave the workers al-
most everything they demanded, and would have
denied the government the necessary means of
controlling the mines.
D. Barrientos moved Ovando up to the co-presidency
and took over joint command of the armed forces,
in order to keep an eye on him, to neutralize
his power, and, most importantly, to maintain
unity in the armed forces. A split in the mili-
tary would probably have plunged the country into
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civil war, and still could. So far this maneuver
by Barrientos has succeeded. Ovando is lying
low, and unity of the armed forces has been pre-
served, but a final showdown between the two
seems inevitable.
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DCI BRIEFING
II. The Venezuelan Communist Party was disappointed
over the meager propaganda impact of terrorist
actions last month.
A. The party hopes to change this by giving the
FALN?s new campaign clearly defined objectives
calculated to produce maximum propaganda ef-
fect.
III. Guerrilla activity continues about.100 miles east
of Caracas.
A. The army has stepped up its antiguerrilla cam-
paign in the region.
Approv
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16 June 1965
DCI BRIEFING
PERU)
I. In Peru, the MIR, or Movement of the Revolutionary
Left, which is pro-Cuban and pro-Peiping, appears
to have begun guerrilla activity.
II. The MIR has about 1,000 members, at least 150 of
whom have received extensive guerrilla training
in Cuba, Communist China, and North Korea. It
has been preparing for guerrilla warfare now for
two years.
A. The MIR has three guerrilla camps near the
location of last week's attacks.
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
have stated that
guerrillas at these camps planned to begin
raids on mines to obtain dynamite beginning in
mid-June.
B. MIR also has a guerrilla camp near Cuzco in
Southern Peru and three in the northern part,
of the country. Guerrillas in the southern
camp reportedly will soon begin small-scale
attacks there.
III. The MIR is not an immediate threat to the Peruvian
Government.
A. Government security forces are now in pursuit
of the guerrillas, but are hampered by the
rugged terrain, the hostility of the peasants,
and the concealment tactics of the guerrillas.
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