SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000400220019-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: February 5, 1965
• Content Type: BRIEF

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5 February 1965
DCI BRIEFING
FOR THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The latest change of governments in South Viet-
nam may now have brought this chronically un-
stable situation to an unusually critical level.
A. The political pot in Saigon is boiling;
Viet Cong main force units may have been re-
grouping for intensified new attacks after
the holiday; and we have evidence of a Com-
munist build-up in the northern provinces
which may include a headquarters element of
a regular North Vietnamese unit.
II. General Khanh, with the concurrence of the Armed
Forces Council, forced the Huong government out
of office on January 27 on grounds that it had
shown itself incapable of dealing with the Bud-
dhist demonstrations. (Actually it appears that
Huong would have dealt more firmly with the
demonstrations if the military had given him the
support he wanted.)
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A. Khanh now is engaged in putting together a
new regime. The outlines are not yet firm,
but they center on a joint military-civilian
council which is to represent all regions and
all four religions, and a national assembly
election tentatively set for March 21.
1. The elections--if they are held at all,
and there are hints of postponement--are
likely to be carefully controlled, especially
in insecure areas. The election law sug-
gests that they may be rigged to give the
military a strong voice in the new assembly.
2. The proposed national assembly will need
a two-thirds majority to oust a premier.
It could, however, provide at least the
semblance of a public mandate which recent
governments have lacked.
3. The exact role of the military-civilian
council is unclear. Catholic leaders,
suspicious of a possible alignment be-
tween Khanh and the Buddhists, are re-
served about participation.
4. In the interim, Suu has remained as
Chief of State, and Khanh has picked
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as acting Premier, Nguyen Xuan Oanh,
better known to Americans as "Jack
Owen"--an economist who has spent most
of the last two decades in the United
States.
III. Khanh seems to be determined to manipulate the
formation of the new regime to strengthen his
own power position, whether or not he actually
holds a title in the government.
A. He has more opponents now, however, than at
any time since he replaced General Minh.
There is a strong possibility that he will
overreach himself and, bring on new disorders.
1. His critics argue either that he aspires
to be a "De Gaulle" and run an authoritar-
ian regime, or wants to be Vietnam's
"Sihanouk" and neutralize the country.
2. They appear to be agreed, however, that
he must not be permitted to regain full
power,
B. Khanh claims to have a written agreement
with Buddhist leaders that they will refrain
from demonstrations against the new regime,
and that some of their more controversial
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F'"" __'_ 77
figures will leave the country. There is
already evidence, however, that the Buddhist
hierarchy will not honor any such commit-
ments.
1. Buddhist leaders have told us repeatedly
that they do not trust Khanh. They
touched off the disorders last August
which kept him from installing an authori-
tarian military regime.
2. The Buddhists have never made it clear
just what they do want, but they obviously
feel that their part in removing Presi-
dent Diem entitles them to at least a
veto over the composition of any govern-
ment.
3. Their public position consists of de-
mands that the government should not be
anti-Buddhist, and should not be tainted
by members associated with the Diem re-
gime. We have some reports that they
want at least two portfolios in the new
cabinet, including the Ministry of In-
terior.
C. Khanh's other opponents fear that there really
is a working agreement between Khanh and the
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Buddhists, and that it is aimed at neutral-
izing South Vietnam.
1. Some of the "Young Turk" generals who
saved Khanh from a coup last September
have told us they will eventually have
to dump Khanh as commander-in-chief, and
that this will be done immediately if he
makes an obvious move to resume personal
power. This sentiment also appears strong
among field-grade officers, one group of
whom reportedly was thwarted in a coup at-
tempt on 4 February.
2. The air force chief and the general com-
manding the Saigon Military District have
both said new Buddhist demonstrations
will not be tolerated.
3. Dai Viet and Catholic officers in the
military are showing increased readiness
to move against Khanh.
4. Some of the inveterate plotters like
Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao have been trying
to line up officers and troops for a
coup, or assassination attempt against
Khanh.
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IV. Ever since France pulled out of Indochina in
1954, the Communists have been waging a relent-
less and gradually mounting effort to get the
southern half of Vietnam.
(MAPS, SVN 1959, 1961, 1963)
(MAP, SVN 1964)
A. I have here two maps which measure the prog-
ress of that Communist effort. The red in
each case shows areas where the Viet Cong
predominate.
1. If you will look at the uppermost of
the three smaller maps on the right,
you can see that in 1959, five years
after Dien Bien Phu, the Communists were
established in only half a dozen isolated
and relatively small spots--Viet Minh
bases which the GVN never recovered.
2. In another five years, however--by the
end of 1964--the Viet Cong holdings had
mushroomed all over the map. Today the
Communists have the upper hand over a
greater area in South Vietnam than the
Saigon government does, although some
of this area is sparsely settled.
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V. In the period from July 1954 through 1959, the
Viet Cong simply were not strong enough to pose
a direct threat to the central government in
Saigon.
A. The Communists had left some 10,000 stay-
behind agents in the South, in violation of
the Geneva Agreements calling for the with-
drawal of all Viet Minh forces to the North.
B. Hanoi, preoccupied with building a Communist
state after eight years of fighting the
French, was counting on the total collapse
of central authority in Saigon within a
year or two.
C. Instead, the administration of Ngo Dinh Diem
successfully established its authority over
disruptive internal forces, and was able to
resist pressures from Hanoi. By 1959, des-
pite some Communist terrorism in outlying
areas, Diem had developed a considerable
nationwide support apparatus, although he
apparently did not have predominant public
support.
VI. In 1959, North Vietnam made a major reappraisal
and decided to embark on full-scale guerrilla
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warfare to undermine Diem's administrative
apparatus.
A. At the same time, resentment was growing in
South Vietnam over Diem's personal aloof-
ness and his authoritarian tendencies, in-
cluding the suppression of political oppo-
sition. The resentment came from urban
politicians and intellectuals, who were few
in number, but articulate. They gave rise
to echoes among the military, in the informa-
tion media, and among interested foreign
elements.
B. When trouble with the Buddhists broke out
in May 1963, the Ngo family's reliance on
increasingly harsh measures to save its
regime finally led six months later to
Diem's overthrow by military officers who
had long argued that the war against the
Viet Cong was being lost politically.
C. Since the fall of Diem, the picture has
been one of successive and overlapping
power struggles between and among civilian
politicians and military leaders, few of
them with any. appreciable public following,
few of them with any constructive alterna-
tive to the regime of the momenta The
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scramble for authority in Saigon persists
today to the detriment of provincial ad-
ministration, pacification, and the war
effort. The South Vietnamese, it appears,
have learned only how to unite against
something; they have not yet learned how to
unite for positive programs and goals.
VII. A few graphic statistics may underline the prog-
ress of the Viet Cong guerrilla effort.
(CHART, Viet Cong Main Forces)
A. In early 1960, the Viet Cong had an esti-
mated strength of 3,000 to 5,000 regulars,
backed up by an unknown number of partially
armed partisans. The largest units were
companies and platoons, operating locally
under direction of political committees.
(MAP, South Vietnam with Order of Battle overlay)
B. Today, they have an estimated 33,000 in
their main force units--this in the face of
Saigon's claims that the Viet Cong lose 20
to 30 thousand men a year.
C. They have regimental commands--five of them.
We know of 47 battalions, which are be-
ginning to engage in coordinated actions at
regimental strength,
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D. The main force is backed up by an estimated
60 to 80 thousand irregulars, some of them
farmers by day and guerrillas by night.
E. Weapons captured from the Viet Cong show
that they have increasing numbers of weap-
ons coming from the Bloc and from China
through North Vietnam, including machine-
guns for antiaircraft use, and some mortars
and recoilless rifles. Some of these weapons
come down the infiltration trails through
Laos, and we think some are shipped by sea
from North Vietnam to the delta.
1. Some weapons, medicine, and explosives
are smuggled in from Cambodia.
(CHART, Communist infiltration)
VIII. This chart shows the growth of infiltration from
North Vietnam. About 100,000 Vietnamese of
southern origin, about 80 thousand of them Viet
Minh troops, withdrew to North Vietnam in 1954.
We calculate that by 1960, 45,000 of them might
have remained fit for guerrilla warfare.
A. For the period from 1959 through last Octo-
ber, we have confirmed evidence of 19,000
infiltrations, and some evidence which
would account for as many as 34,000.
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B. most of the men known to have been
infiltrated in 1964 are northerners
by birth. This suggests firstly that
Hanoi may be running out of native
southerners fit for guerrilla warfare,
and secondly that Hanoi is no longer
very concerned about concealing its
direction and support of the supposedly
indigenous Viet Cong.
(CHART, SVN Armed Forces Manpower)
C. On the government side, the strength of
the armed forces is still below planned
levels, but it is climbing. This chart
shows that the regular forces have risen
from about 150,000 in 1957 to 227,000 at
the end of 1964. The paramilitary forces
in the same period have gone from about
100,000 to some 265,000, so that the
total strength is virtually doubled.
(CHART, SVN desertions)
D. There has been a fluctuating but persistent
desertion problem, which at the moment appears
to be under control. Last year there were
more than 66,000 desertions, nearly three-fourths
of them from the paramilitary forces.
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1. The desertion rate rises to some degree
in response to Viet Cong victories and
political crises in Saigon, but it also
reflects the seasons when the men feel
they are needed at home to help with the
farming.
IX. That may sound casual, but I want to emphasize that
the fighting in Vietnam is bloody. It is not just
a matter of one side firing a few shots in the
air, and the opponent withdrawing. It is a war
of raids and ambushes, but there are beginning
to be substantial pitched battles.
(CHART, SVN War Casualties)
A. On this chart, I call your attention to the
lower dotted lines--the killed in action,
the casualties that count when it comes to
putting a Viet Cong out of action permanently.
1. Government casualties have risen steadily
since the fighting began in 1960, and
amounted to nearly 75 hundred killed in
action last year.
2. In 1964, an estimated 17 thousand Viet
Cong were killed in action. The reason
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for the sharp drop after the 1962 and
1963 figures is that we have insisted
on stricter criteria in South Vietnamese
reporting.
3. The South Vietnamese argue that many
dead are carried away by the retreating
guerrillas. Under the former reporting
system, the ratio was better than three-
to-one in favor of the government forces.
Now, it is little more than two-to-one.
B. The guerrillas are stepping up their harass-
ment of district capitals, and we have some
reports that they have been ordered to seize
and hold selected areas or villages for several
days to dramatize their claimed change from
a guerrilla force to a "Liberation Army."
X. The sponsors of the Viet Cong in Hanoi and Peiping
are increasingly militant in their propaganda,
but it is also evident that they are concerned
about possible United States moves which might
expand the war, and have made defensive prepara-
tions.
A. After the US air strikes on North Vietnam
last August, the Chinese moved a regiment
of jet aircraft--MIG-15s and 17s--to Hanoi
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and recently increased the number again to 53.
The Chinese also more than doubled their own
jet fighter strength in South and Southwest
China, from 150 to more than 350. Some of
these are MIG-19s, and there are a few MIG-21s.
B. The Chinese have linked North Vietnam's air
defense system with their own, and there are
indications that the Chinese may assume de-
fense of North Vietnamese air space.
1. There has been a concomitant increase in
antiaircraft and radar installations, in-
cluding the latest Chinese types of early
warning equipment and ground-controlled
intercept radars.
2. At least one new airfield is being built
and several established fields enlarged
or improved in South China near the Viet-
namese and Laotian borders.
C. There has been no significant reinforcement
of Chinese ground forces in this area, but
there are already about 185,000 troops within
200 miles of the border which can move south
on short notice.
D. Peiping is in a position to turn up the heat
in Southeast Asia with little or no warning,
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but we believe that these Chinese moves--
and the militant propaganda accompanying
them--are primarily a bluff to deter the
United States from enlarging the war.
Peiping is determined, however, to continue
its support of the Communist insurgencies
in Vietnam and Laos, and is probably pre-
pared to meet limited escalation with mili-
tary countermoves.
E. Soviet Premier Kosygin is leading a delegation
of high military and economic officials to
Hanoi. The trip probably foreshadows an in-
crease in Soviet military assistance to North
Vietnam.
1. The new Soviet leaders apparently hope
that in return they can gain a greater
voice in the formulation of Communist
policy in Indochina. At any rate, the evi-
dence of renewed Soviet interest in the
area will be calculated to deter the US
in any thoughts of carrying the war di-
rectly to North Vietnam.
2. Any Soviet military aid will probably
be mainly of a defensive nature. Some
Soviet antiaircraft weapons of a type
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we have not yet observed in China have
already appeared in North Vietnam.
Moscow might also offer surface-to-
air missiles.
CONCLUSION
XI. About the only thing that can be said with cer-
tainty about the Vietnamese problem is that South
Vietnam must have a stable and effective govern-
ment, with the backing and confidence of the
people, if the Viet Cong are to be halted and
defeated.
A. The chronic political instability not only
preoccupies the military leaders, but under-
mines provincial administration and the
pacification effort. There are some able
administrators, but they are already tar-
gets for Viet Cong terrorism and atrocities.
In the first eight months of 1964, for in-
stance, the Viet Cong murdered 428 and
kidnapped 482 local administrative officials.
That is enough of a mental handicap without
the lack of direction and even purges
which accompany the successive coups in
Saigon
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A. The Viet Cong do not run and hide in the
jungle--they run and hide in the people,
B. Until the Vietnamese peasants are given
enough of a stake in the government,
enough belief and confidence in it so
that they will expose the guerrillas and
help defeat them, the problem of South
Vietnam is not going to show any improve-
ment.
C. Unless the negative political opportunists
and the rival confessions realize that
they must unite behind some government,
they will just be delivering themselves
into the hands of the Communists.
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