CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000400220004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 5, 1965
• Content Type: BRIEF

ApprovedJFoleag-o85/R2 T
5 February 1965
DCI BRIEFING
FOR THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
CUBA
(Military)
I. There are now only about 2,000 Soviet military
technicians and advisors still in Cuba.
A. Soviet advisors, instructors, and techni-
cians are present in virtually all elements
of the Cuban armed forces.
B. Most of the Soviets are probably associated
with the surface-to-air missile (SAM) sys-
tem and the ground forces, although a few
are training Cuban naval and air force per-
sonnel.
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SAM readi-
ness and radar tracking deteriorated sharply
after the Cuban takeover of the air defense
system.
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TI. The Cubans appear to be in full control of all
the weapons in Cuba, including the SAMs, al-
though they are almost wholly dependent on the
Soviets for instruction, maintenance, and spare
parts.
III. The issue of control is important, because we
continue to fly U-2 photo-reconnaissance mis-
sions over Cuba despite both Cuban and Soviet
protests.
A,
forecast that the Cubans were going to
make a big issue of overflights after the
US elections.
B. They were going to use the UN General Assem-
bly as a forum to press for an end to over-
flights.
C. So far, the anticipated propaganda campaign
hasn't materialized. The Cubans may have
decided to go slow in their anti-U-2 cam-
paign after the change of command in the
Kremlin or as the result of our own reac-
tion to Cuban and Soviet threats. In this
connection, the Cubans may have been im-
pressed by the US actions following a North
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Vietnamese attack on one of our destroyers
in the Tonkin Gulf.
IV. Soviet military shipments to Cuba have been de-
clining lately and appear to be consistent with
routine maintenance support.
A. There were five full shiploads in the first
half of 1964, and only two full shiploads
in the second half. In contrast, there were
10 full shiploads in 1963,
B. The major items delivered this past year--
in addition to spare parts, ammunition, and
supplies--were about 20 MIG-17s, a few small
subchasers, and six torpedo boats.
V. The Cuban Army is increasing its combat profi-
ciency and training, and has largely assimilated
the relatively modern Soviet equipment trans-
ferred to it in late 1963.
A. Cuban units are conducting more maneuvers,
but still are not capable of large coordi-
nated operations.
B. They still have serious deficiencies in
logistics and quality of personnel, and
much of their time is taken up with counter-
insurgent activity, harvesting, and other
such duties.
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C. As more draftees are trained under the com-
pulsory military service law which started
last March, however, the quality of the
Cuban Army should rise.
IV. The Cuban Air Force has been conducting more
advanced training, but is still short of pilots.
More pilots may be training in the USSR.
A. The Cuban Air Force now has 138 MIGs, in-
cluding 86 MIG-15s and --17s (Fagots and
Frescos), 12 supersonic MIG-19s (Farmers),
and 40 Mach-2 MIG?21s (Fishbeds). Ten of
the MIG-19s have an all-weather capability,
but the rest of the fighters are limited to
daylight and clear weather for effective
air defense intercepts.
B. The Cubans are making increasing use of
their IL-14 transports in coastal patrols
and flare dropping. These planes have a
much greater range and longer endurance
than the Cuban fighters.
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5 February 1965
DCI BRIEFING
FOR THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
CUBA (Non-Military)
1. The Cubans are optimistic that the 1965 sugar
harvest will be significantly above last year's
total of about 4 million tons. Better organiza-
tion this year, the use of more experienced cane
cutters, good rainfall, technological and some
manpower assistance from the USSR, and more ex-
tensive use of mechanization will probably put
this year's harvest over 405 million tons,
II. The Cuban political situation has been clouded
the last couple of months by persistent rumors,
sions have increased among elements of the
Cuban leadership.
A. There is no indication whatever that the re-
gime's military or security forces--whose
key leaders are loyal to Castro--have split
away, or that Castro's personal position is
in any way threatened,
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B. The trouble seems to have stemmed from the
continuing differences between the regime's
"old" and "new" Communists, probably'ag-
gravated by efforts on the'part of Cuba's
leaders to cope with their pressing eco-
nomic problems.
C. An abortive plot by "old-line" Communists
to overthrow the Castro government is rumored
to have come to a head in mid-November. Some
Cuban Army and government officials are
said to have been arrested and recent re-
ports state several prominent old-line Com-
munists are slated for removal..
old-Communist Joaquin Ordoqui--who was "sus-
pended" from his high party and government
posts in mid-November--will be publicly
tried for treason soon. Should this occur,
the old-new Communist problem will be fanned
anew, and another irritant in Havana's re-
lations with Moscow could develop,
III. Cuban leaders are
upset by Khrushchev's removal, and uncertain
about their future relationship with Moscow.
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A. In his 2 January speech, Castro was more
emphatic than in any previous public ap-
pearance in asserting his refusal to ac-
cept dictation from abroad and affirming
Cuba's autonomy within the "socialist
camp."
B. The Soviets are known to be urging Havana
to get its financial house in order and
make greater efforts to become less of an
economic burden on the USSR.
V. Castro is said to be intrigued with the idea
of participating in the "liberation struggles"
in Africa and is said to be awaiting the return
of Che Guevara in order to have a first-hand re-
port on the revolutionary potential there.
A. Guevara's trip took him to Algeria, Mali,
Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Ghana, and
Dahomey.
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B. He offered Cuba's "moral support" to the
Congo rebels, as well as scholarships and
training to some African nationalist
groups, notably a leftist-oriented Angolan
faction.
C. Guevara arrived in Peiping on 3 February
via Paris from Algiers.
reports Che will attempt
to resolve Havana-.Peiping "policy differ-
ences" on Latin America. The Chinese
Communists are said to be disgusted that
the Cubans did not support the extremist
demands of some pro-Peiping Latin American
Communists at a hemisphere meeting of
Communists held in Havana last November.
statements of Cuban leaders strongly indicate
that export of the revolution continues to be
a key policy of the Castro regime.
A. On 13 December, while in New York to address
the UN General Assembly session, Che Guevara
said that "bullets not ballots" will bring
revolution in Latin America. He candidly
admitted that Cuba has given military train-
ing to Venezuelan "freedom fighters."
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B. Cuban aid to Latin American revolutionaries
is channeled through the General Directorate
of Intelligence, a highly professional organ-
ization advised by Soviet experts.
C. Nevertheless, Castro probably no longer ex-
pects "new Cubas" to spring up soon in Latin
America. Havana seems to be focusing on
those countries--'Venezuela, Guatemala, and
Colombia--where it believes prospects over
the long run are brightest and where the in-
surgents have demonstrated a willingness to
undertake anti-government terrorist activity.
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