SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000400220002-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 5, 1965
• Content Type: BRIEF

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OCI No. 0'757/65
5 February 1965
DCI BRIEFING FOR
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS
I. Although we believe foreign policy was not a
principal cause of Khrushchev's d~awnfall, the
end of his highly personal rule does have im-
portant implications for the conduct of future
Soviet foreign relations.
A. A collective leadership tends to be more
conservative and less venturesome, though
-this does not mean inactivity or an in-
ability to make decisions.
B. Thus, the short-term outlook is far a cor}-
tinuation of the main lines of Soviet policy
toward the West since the Cuban misfile
crisis.
C. Soviet economic problems will also put same
check on an aggressive foreign ,policy, par-
titularly in Europe.
D. The on-going conflict with Communist China
will continue to have important consequences.
for Soviet policy.
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to On the one hands it is clear that the
Soviets are going to remain opposed to
the Chinese position of extreme revolu-
tionary militancy.
Z. On the other hands Chinese activity in
Africa and Asia calls .forth competitive
Soviet efforts which clash with US in-
terests,
E. An example of this competition is the un-
usually strong Soviet delegation headed by
Premier Kosygin now en route to North Vietnam.
1. We believe the main purposes of this mis-
sion are to regain influence in Hanoi at
Chinese expense and to strengthen the Com-
munist deterrent against any US acts which
might escalate host~tlities in Indochina.
2. We believe the Soviets may be ready to pro-
vide not only a substantial increase in
economic aids but also military equipment
which they can define as defensives
eluding surface-to-air
sibly jet fighters.
In a typical effort to
of the Kosygin mission
for the first time has
pos-
soften the impact
on the US s Pravda.
warmly welcomed
the President's remarks in his State of
the Unian message about expanding
-2-
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US-Soviet contacts, including a visit
to the US by the Soviet leaders.
F. Although the new Soviet leaders have reaf-
firmed Khrushchevts pledge to support
Castro, they clearly-wish to do what they
can to stabilize Cuban-US relations.
1. Castro was reported to have been shaken
by Khrushchev's downfall, possibly
because he has even less confidence
in the new Soviet leaders.
2. This probably will reinforce Castrofs
caution toward bringing on a direct
clash with the US.
G. The Chinese challenge is likely to spur the
Soviets to make more strenuous efforts to
exploit anti-US movements and political
developments in Latin .America.
1. However, this prospect of stronger
Soviet verbal support for anti-ITS move-
ments in Latin America probably does
not foreshadow important new Soviet po-
litical and economic commitments or
acceptance of new risks of a clash with
US power.
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