MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000400060006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 10, 1964
• Content Type: BRIEF

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VINSCN SUBCOMMITTEr. BFI ":FINS,
ILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA
1. There has been little change in the status of ovie
forces in Cuba since the beginning of this year.
A. Four to seven thousand Soviet military personr
ernain on the island, most of them advisers,
technicians, and instructors. We expect this
number to remain fairly constant until the
Cubans comp.;?te their training with surfa(e-
to-air missiles in April. At that time there
will probably be further withdrawals of Sov et
personnel.
B. We believe that all Soviet weapons now in Cuba
have been transferred to Cuban control, e.?,cep
the surface-to-air missiles.
11. The Soviets are still shipping supplies and eauipre:-
but we believe the shipments are primariy for
maintenance and re-supply. There have be
such shipments to Cuba this year,
since the October 1962 missile crisis. On ;
ship carried 12 MIG jet fighters as neck rarL.
`hese aircraft may be trainers, or replacem.r.l.
aircraft ios; during the past two years,
tion, tnree subchasers have been de
since _.: _- ecember, t bolster Cuban
ins o~:. al raiders.
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III. Cubans began six months of operational SAM training
in November. The evidence to date suggests that the
Soviets do intend to transfer the SAM system to Cuban
control, possibly in late April or early May.
A. The original SAM guidance radars have been replaced
with older equipment.
B. The air defense system has been reorganized to
match the three-sector structure of the Cuban
army and navy.
C. Complete Cuban units now are training at all 24
SAM sites on the island.
1. We first detected Cubans engaged in a target
tracking exercise at a SAM site on January 23.
Since mid-February this has been observed
almost every day.
2. Cubans have already assumed control of several
early-warning radar sites.
D. At the same time, Soviet pprticipation in the air
defense system has been declining steadily.
1. Soviet SAM tracking activity and broadcast
schedules for air surveillance have been
sharply reduced.
2. Early last month, Soviet radio-printer scrambler
was apparently removed from air defense
communications facilities.
3. Even more significantly, the chatter of Soviet
radio operators has contain(bd increasingly
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4. We also have indications that a number of Soviet
ships are scheduled to carry passengers from
Cuba to the USSR in April, May and June.
E. This evidence, and the precedent of transferring
other Soviet weapons to the Cubans, suggests that
The Soviets will turn the operation and control
of the SAM system over to the Cubans when the
present training program is completed.
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VINSON SUBC(W3ITTEE BRIEFING
CUBAN {IOLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
I. Recent public statements by Fidel Castro and other
high-level officials apparently have been designed
to try to effect a minimization of frictions with
the US--on Cuban terms, however.
A. Castro continues to stress that Cuba is not
pressing for an immediate return of the Guantana,vo
Bay naval base. He says that "at the right
moment" Cuba will appeal to an international
organization---apparently the UN or World Court--to
recover the base. An 8 March propaganda broadcast
by Havana radio was aimed at building up iavana' y
legal case against the base in the expectation of
presenting it some day before an internatio-.a ? fo!---.
B. Castro has wade no concessions, ho.l;ever, and c^ 4 :e
to reiterate his "5 points", which were initi
raised during the October 1:)62 missile crisis.
C. Castro appears to be preoccupied with internal
economic considerations such as the sugar harvest,
which is now under way,
II. There is considerable optimism in Cuban official circle"
over the prospects for economic improvement, resulting-
from increased trade with Free v"orld count ?ies. 1%,0,ot1"er
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important factor in Havana's optimism is the recentl?,---
concluded USSR-Cuban sugar agreement.
A.
Cuban officials boast that recent commercial deals
concluded with Western countries have "broken the
back" of the US economic denial effort.
1. Since the 7 January announcement of the
purchase of busses from the British Leyland
Motors Company, Cuban trade delegations have
made repeated trips to ''r'est European capita is
to negotiate for a wide variety of goods.
2. In addition, Cuba's accumulation of some $ 100
million in convertible foreign exchanges during
1963 has made it a much more attractive market
for non-bloc countries.
B. The USSR-Cuban sugar agreement is planned to guarantee
Cuba a reasonable price for half its presumed !?47n
crop of 10 million tons. Cuba will have to t_rinje
its 1963 sugar production by that date, however, to
get the full economic benefit of this agreement.
1. Under the terms of the agreement Cuba is guara:t
6 cents per pound of sugar for half its crop
by the Soviet Union, and would be free to sell
the remainder to the rest of the world at the
prevailing world price.
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2. By the time the agreement becomes fulls
operative--if Cuba can meet its production
goal--the world sugar price may well be
below 6 cents per pound and considerably below
the 10 cents per pound average for the first
two months of 1964.
III. Public morale is low in Cuba, with much passive resent-
anent against the regime. A general feeling of pe ssismis;r
and apathy prevails among the people in Havana, according
to reliable clandestine reports. ?'chile probably no r:ore
than 15 percent of the population enthusiastically support
the regime, the remainder see little chance for an earl-;
change in V political and economic conditions in the
country.
IV. Cuba has supplied a good deal of organizational direczii;.'a
and financial backing for the Latin American Youth
which is now meeting in Santiago, Chile.
A. Plans for this conference were finalized durinrr
25-29 January meetings in Havana attended by eight
Latin American Communist youth organizations.
L. The meeting's organizers claim it will attract ,or,-,e
500 Latin American delegates; it will serve as a
forum for the widespread dissemination of pro-Ca;; :'o,
anti--/'American propaganda throughout the seer;;:
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A. Brazil and Mexico are continuing their efforts
to prevent the OAS from taking strong action
against Cuba. Chile, Uruguay, and perhaps Bolivia
also will be reluctant to back strong sanctions.
B. It seems unlikely that early tS action on Caracas'
charges will be forthcoming, or that when the Meeting
of Foreign Ministers is held that strong economic
or diplomatic sanctions will be invoked against Cuba.
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