CASTRO'S PLANS FOR SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000300170005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 29, 1963
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 2005/03/&Efi82R00025R000300170005-0
29 October 1963
BRIEFING FOR SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE
OF SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
CASTRO?S PLANS FOR SUBVERSION
IN LATIN AMERICA .
3
1. Growing evidence has recently led us to conclude
that Fidel Castro has decided he must instigate
revolutionary action in other. Latin American
countries in the near future.
A. He seems to feel with increasing urgency
the need for some dramatic new develop-
ment to maintain the momentum of his own
revolution in Cuba.
point
to a new aggressive policy.
1. In the first few months of Castro?s
regime, the Cubans tried several in-
vasions in Central America and failed
ignominiously.
2. Since that time, the Cubans have been
telling the militant leftists of the
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hemisphere that Cuba will provide
training, funds, and propaganda sup-
port, but not weapons or leaders.
(Guerrilla movements are expected to
buy, steal or capture their own weap-
ons and ammunition.)
3. Castro probably would still prefer to
keep Cuba's helping hand concealed in
any revolutionary outbreak, at least
at the start.
(a) Obvious Cuban involvement might
cost local revolutionaries a good
deal of public sympathy and sup-
port.
(b) It would also make it easier for
the United States to rally OAS
support for countermoves.
4. Cuban leaders apparently have decided,
however, that in their own interests
the so-called "anti-imperialist. strug-
gle" must be launched now, whatever the
risk to their revolutionary assets.
While many revolutionaries may be lost
in the initial struggle, they believe,
it is necessary to make a start to create
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the conditions for ultimate success.
II. From Castro's viewpoint, things have been going
badly for him since last June, shortly after he
came back from the Soviet Union.
A. At home, even before Hurricane Flora, pros-
pects were increasingly dim for any signifi-
cant economic progress in the near future.
B. US pressures are increasingly effective,
and the exile raids, stepped up since Au-
gust, are not only maddening to Castro, but
boost the morale of the internal opposition.
C. Castro is also concerned about Soviet moves
to improve relations with the US. Like the
Chinese Communists, Castro may look on
revolutionary militancy as a means of re-
minding the Kremlin that his interests
must not be sacrificed.
D. At Soviet urging, Castro went through half-
hearted motions of seeking "peaceful co-
existence" with the US when he came back
from Moscow.
1. By 26 July, however, he recaptured much
of the militant tone of his speeches
last fall and winter.
2. He said "fighting revolutionaries" in
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Latin America must take advantage of
conditions favoring revolution and
"open the breach."
E. A September magazine article by Che Guevara
argued at length that guerrilla warfare is
the basic instrument for a Communist take-
over in Latin America.
1. Guevara said the revolution must be
continent wide. He said much blood will
be spilled over a long time.
2. He repeated Castro's old line that the
Andes would be the "Sierra Maestra of
America."
III. Castro's assets vary greatly from couaitry to coun-
try.
A. Venezuela remains his principal target.
1. It seem to be the only country where he
now can call on significant elements in
an active revolutionary movement to step
up terrorism when it suits his purposes.
1 -7 the Cubans may be planning to
smuggle arms to the Venezuelans, or even
fly them to remote jungle air strips.
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Until now Cuban guerrilla doctrine had
been that this sort of help would be
forthcoming only when guerrillas are
ready to confront the security units
and regular armed forces in open battle.
Castro may be ready to relax this caution.
B. In most other countries, Castro has little
control over the militant revolutionary groups
and parties. Nevertheless, there are a grow-
ing number of alumni of Cuban guerrilla train-
ing who can probably be considered under Cu-
ban control.
IV. The itimediate Cuban goal appears to be to organize
and commit to action such cadres.-as will follow
Castro?s call to action. The aim will be, using
these and any other appropriate Cuban assets, to
mobilize all available opposition in order to cause
the disruption and disorganization of public order,
economy, and other established institutions wherever
possible.
V. Castro's best chances appear to lie in Panama, Bra-
zil, Bolivia, and Peru.
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