SOVIET FORCES IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000300170004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 29, 1963
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release T095t03Q`I'RD
29 October 1963
BRIEFING FOR SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE
OF SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SOVIET FORCES IN CUBA
1. More than two thirds of the Soviet military per-
sonnel who were in Cuba at the time of the mis-
sile crisis a year ago now have been withdrawn.
A. We estimate that at least 13,000--and prob-
ably closer to 16,000--have left Cuba. Most
of these have been withdrawn since mid-Feb-
ruary.
B. We continue to find no verifiable evidence
that more than a few hundred military per-
sonnel have arrived since last October.
C. We believe that 5,000 to 7,000 Soviets re-
main in Cuba.
1. The Soviets still control and operate
the surface-to-air missile system. Al-
together there may be 3,000 to 4,000
Soviets in the air defense system.
2. Most of the remainder are advisers and
technicians, training Cubans, and super-
vising the use and maintenance of the
equipment the Soviets have turned over
.to Castro.
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3. No identifiable Soviet ground combat
units remain on the island.
II. All the Soviet weapons introduced into Cuba
during the military buildup in the summer of
1962 have been withdrawn or turned over to
the Cubans, with the exception of the sur-
face-to-air missile system, and perhaps the
cruise missiles and the FROGS. (Free Rocket
Over Ground)
A. This adds up to a continuing Soviet ef-
fort to improve Castro's independent
military capabilities, putting him in
shape to deal with internal dissidence
and any threats from outside short of full-
scale invasion.
1. Cubans have taken over the 42 MIG-
21 fighters, and 12 KOMAR-class
guided missile boats, and the more
than 100 T-54 heavy tanks from the
former Soviet armored camps.
2. They received six more fast torpedo
patrol boats last summer, particularly
useful for dealing with hit-and-run
commando raids.
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B. By the middle of next year, the Cubans
probably will be trained to operate all
the remaining Soviet weapons, including
the surface-to-air missiles.
1. Enough Cubans to operate'the whole
SAM missile system are completing
their classroom training now. They
are to begin six months of operational
field training in November.
2. Cubans began training with the coastal
defense cruise missiles some months
ago. There are some indications that
this weapon system may already have
been transferred to Cuban control.
3. The FROG tactical rockets have been
moved from the former Soviet armored
camps at Artemisa and Remedios to the
camp at Santiago de las Vegas.
(a) This could be preparation either
for training Cuban. crews, or for
shipping the FROGS back to the
USSR--we dontt know.
C. Some 6ommunieatlons and radar equipment
has been shipped back to the USSR.
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1. In particular, some of the most modern
radar equipment at the SAM sites has
been sent home and replaced by an older
model--another sign that the Soviets
plan to turn the system over to the
Cubans,
2. We have seen no.evidence of the re-
turn of any combat weapons to the USSR
since the strategic missiles and bomb
ers were palled out a year ago.
III.. Only seven shiploads of general military sup-
plies and equipment have been delivered from
the USSR to Cuba since the October crisis.
A. This-oompares with 125 shiploads during
the three-month military buildup in the
summer of 1962,
B. The volume is about what would be expected
for maintenance and resupply.
C. We have seen no types of weapons or equip-
ment that were.-not present a year ago, ex-
cept for some helicopters and these P-4
torpedo boats,
IV. As Cuban proficiency increases, there will
probably be further withdrawals of Soviet per-
sonnel.
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A. Some Soviet SAM personnel might leave to
make room for Cubans beginning their
operational field training next month.
B. Additional naval personnel possibly from
the coastal defense cruise missile system--
are scheduled to leave this week.
C. Ultimately there may be nothing left but
a Soviet military assistance and technical
advisory establishment.
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