CUBA - - POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000300020002-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 6, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000300020002-9
SECRET
6 February 1963
CUBA -- POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
1. Cuban Subversion in Latin America
The most significant discernible change in Cuban
policy since the missile crisis has been greatly in-
creased attention to subversion in other Latin American
countries. While this has always been an element in
Castro's program, indications are multiplying that it
is now a high priority Cuban objective.
Keynoted in Castro's two January speeches, the
present Cuban position is to stress the necessity of
revolutionary action in the hemisphere, the importance
of guerrilla warfare, and to.ridicule all thought that
the "people's liberation" can be accomplished except
through violence. Leading veteran Cuban Communists
have fallen into line with public speeches mirroring
Castro's. All make clear that Venezuela is the leading
Cuban target. Veteran Communist leader Blas Roca was
most explicit. In his speech of 23 January he stated
frankly that "we shall continue to give our support,
each day in greater proportions, to the Venezuelan
people" in their struggle for "liberation from imperi-
alism." He added that victory in Venezuela "will be a
tremendous boost for Cuba ...we will have a nation on
the continent to back us."
Approved For Release 2005fV&GP& RDP82R00025R000300020002-9
 Approved For Release 2005/(SY,",P82R00025R000300020002-9
One of the most effective methods of Cuban sub-
version is the training and indoctrination of Latin
American students in Cuba. We estimate that between
1,000 and 1,500 people from other countries received
guerrilla warfare training in Cuba during 1962.
II. Anti-Castro Activity
There has been an increase in hit-and-run attacks
by anti-Castro resistance fighters since early this
year. The attacks generally involve small bands of
guerrillas, usually under 20 men, who ambush militiamen,
burn buildings and canefields. These activities are
more of a harassment than a threat to the regime and
Castro's all-pervasive security network inhibits major
resistance.
III. The Cuban Economy
The economy continues to deteriorate and there are
no signs of significant improvement in the foreseeable
future. Present indications are that this year's sugar
crop--the mainstay of the economy--will be less than
last year's poor crop of 4.8 million tons, possibly con-
siderably less. Though world prices are now at a 40
year record high (5.90 per pound now compared with 2.40
a year ago), Cuba is unlikely to benefit much. Most Cu-
ban sugar is bartered to the bloc for needed imports.
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000300020002-9
SECRET
 Approved For Release 200,'ee"DP82R00025R000300020002-9
Extensive Cuban-Soviet negotiations this year
on trade and aid have been followed only by vaguely
worded public statements to the effect that trade
will increase. If it does, it will mean an increase
in Soviet credits to Cuba. In return for continued
Soviet help the Cubans are probably being asked to
work harder and use the support they are now getting
more efficiently.
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000300020002-9
SECRET