CUBAN POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00786R000104800001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 21, 1981
• Content Type: NIE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/16: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104800001-6
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Cub: n Policy Toward
Lati America
National Intelligence limate
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IN" ??????? ???
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
_ The Centrol intelligence Agency, the Defense intelligence Agency, the Notional Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Treasury, and
Energy.
Also Participating;
The Assistant Chielof Staff for Intelligence, Deportment of the Army
The Director of Naval intelligence, Deportment of the Novy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, IntAligence, Deportment of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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NIE 85/80/90-81
CUBAN POLICY TOWARD
LATIN AMERICA
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Inform/km as of 24 Fine JU81 was
used ln the paparalion ot this Estimate.
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THE ESTIMATE
Two years ago, Cuba reverted to much more militant support of
revolutionary insurgents, especially in Central America. Castro
promising opportunities through the promotion of insurgency to--ad-
vance the cause of revolution in the region, restore a sense of re lotion-
ary momentum at home, and enhance Cuba's security .4' helping
sympathetic regimes come to power in the area and by pursuing policies
to justify and possibly increase Soviet aid and support for Cuba. Serious
domestic economic and political problems and other adversities have
made Castro more rather than less militant on behalf of regional insur-
gents, a reflection of his frustrations over these problems and of the
increased influence of his hardline advisers. Despite Castro's signals of
an interest in reducing bilateral tensions with the United States (par for
the course with new US administrations), he almost certainly will not
make any significant foreign policy concessions to improve relations.
Under most circumstances?certainly much short of a danger of
impending US military action threatening his survival?Castro probably
will continue and even expand his support of regional revolutionaries.
Soviet perception of the opportunities in Latin America created by
the revolution in Nicaragua appears to have lagged Castro's. Subse-
quently, however, Moscow not only has backed Castro's return to mili-
tancy in Central America but has stepped up its own efforts to exploit
I nstability and support Cuban activities in support of insurgents. Ntos-
cow almost certainly will continue to encourage and to mulerwrite Cu-
1 art assistance to insurgents?to maintain a degree of revolutionary'
momentum and to wick-mine ilw US position in the region. It also
hopes to keep the United States embroiled in Latin America and with its
allies in Western Europe over how to respond, and to exploit any res-
urrection of the Vietnam syndrome here. Only lithe United States were
to raise substantially the costs and risks to the Soviets of their
I roublemaking in the region won Id the Soviets poll back?and that
could lw only temporary?fnun their support for the insurgents, al-
though US political pressures could lead NI(6cov., to lw inure cir-
cumspect tactically. Soviet circumspection ss ith respect to Latin Ameri-
can insurgencies, however, would not imply any redoction iii NitIsc(iw's
determination to retain its stake in Cuba. Any US military challenge to
Sow A silloseiithrial 4111t44,fl 44 llii IS111114t1 iiI Indlide ,kimh%ls
1
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the Castro regime almost certainly would bring a major crisis in US-
Soviet relations.'
The Soviet-supported Cuban challenge to US regional interests will
continue to be formidable. Cuba is supported by the revolutionary gov-
ernments in Nicaragua and Grenada, and usually by Mexico. Prominent
out-of-office leaders in a few other countries have close ties with Ha-
vana. Cuba has strong clandestine networks and sources of support
among a spectrum of nationalists, leftists, and radicals; and social and
economic pressures in many countries will present new opportunities
for the growth of pro-Cuban radical movements.
Nationalism and suspicion of US intentions run high in Latin
America, even in the more conservative countries, and have reduced
the ability of the United States to direct events or to mobilize anti-
Castro measures. However, greater US political, economic, and security
involvement in the region?while not likely in the near term to alleviate
substantially the root causes of instability?could shore up beleaguered
governments, help bring about nonviolent change, and thus reduce
Cuba's ab!lity to gain the advantage.
' A forthenniing intenigenci, inly1/41.1Keil.iper iosess ticnici I.atin American ia iiliivrrater
including ine..ns aid I risli I/1111 lit I hat %Cisco% usci lo enwurage. and stipsti,rt lie%aria.1 resobitionart
vita In
2
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Latin America always has had high priority in Cu-
ban foreign policy under Castro, despite substantial
and active Cuban involvement in Africa and else-
where in the Third World. Castro's persistent objective
regarding Latin America and the Caribbean has been
to undercut US influence and enhance his own, ulti-
mately through the promotion of revolutionary gov-
ernments that look to Ifavana for guidance. In addi-
tion to his commitment to revolutionary causes, Castro
is influenced by his close ties with and dependence on
the USSR, and is driven by his hostility toward and
fear of the United States; he sees US and Cuban in-
terests in the region as irreconcilable. In effect, there-
lore, he sees a compelling need to expand Cuba's in-
fluence in order to curb Washington's freedom of
action to isolate and bring pressure on I lava flu.
The USSR holds similar objectives toward the re-
gion, though Sloscow sees it as a less immediately
important theater of its overall connyvtition with tine
United States than does Ifavana, Because Castro sup
-
pats lb!. USSR's foreign policy goals generally and
shares its objectives in Latin America specifically, it is
difficult to assess the extent to ss Inch the USSR influ-
ences Cuba's regional txdicy. Cuba's extensive activi-
ties and the surviVal of Castro's regime itself ulti-
mately depend on massive Soviet economic and
military a;t1, and dots on Soviet approyal. Because of
the scope of shared objectives, as well as diew consulta-
tions ss tin S itt ifticials and awareness of the limits
of Moscow's tolerance, Cuba generally has had consid-
erable latitude in implementing its policies. As a rule,
Castro ads essentiallyon his own initiatise in his home
region, us contrasted with greater Sos itt cmitrols ()%41
ill Africa and the Middle East In Ow
1960s, this led to sh.rp tactical differences ssith Mos-
cow me; the utility. of Cuban support for weak insur-
gent groups as ovposed to colds ating good relations
with moderate and (Anise:\ atise gos eminent,
During most of the 1970s. ss hilt. Castro followed the
timid line of emohasiiing diplomatic and cornmerdal
relations, he never renounced resolution Two years
ago?this thine with Sot let approsal-----Culta reserted
SUpplat flf rexiihntionary insur?
gents, especialls in Central America At the same !inn%
Castro has show in greater belligerence toward a 1111111-
1/41 other countries, especially Colombia and View
ezuela. This sharp change in Cuban priorities reflects
Castro's sense of greater potential for revolutionary
victories through military force than he had
envisioned before the success of the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua in mid-1979.
Castro's emphasis on support of insurgencies also re-
flects his frustration over domestic problems, including
a stagnant economy and sero nts deficiencies in hous-
ing, transportation, public serv ices, food, and con.
stover goods. Popular frustration and widespread
bardiiip have led the leadership?hardline elements
of which have been strengthened by Cuban
setbacks?to look to outside issues such as revolution-
ary duty, the threat to Cuban security, and solidarity
with Third World compatriots as a diversion. Ness'
sum)ort for insurgencies also grows out of Castro's
limited gains from cultivating regional governments,
and from setbacks to his international prestige gen-
erally as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
In short, Castro sees promising opportunities
through promotion of insurgency to advance Cuban
objectives in the region and to restore a sense of revo-
lutionary momentum at home ss lien little else seems to
be ss orking to his regime's adsantage.
Despite the USSR's traditional caution regarding di-
rect involvement in insurgency in Latin America, the
SO1 ill s to t sass greater opporitmies for ails-ancing
their interests in the region as a resul.., of the Sandinista
victory in Nicaragua. Beginning in 19SO, Shscow not
only backed Castro's return to militancy in Central
Ann?rica but also stepped up its own efforts to exploit
instability and support Cuban efforts in support of
insurgents?particularly. through arranging for war
supplies for Salvadoran leftist extremists. lithe' United
States %s ere substantial's to raise the costs and risks to
the Sosiets of their troublemaking in the region, they
ssould lx' likely to display for a tune' greater tactical
prudence. Slostow would be likely to recommend tac-
tical caution to flavana as well, and to underscore its
strong desire to axon! a US-Cubar military cUll?
frgintatilln
Sue it a shift in Sits let tactics would not imply a
change in long-term objet is is to undercut and sup-
plant IS influence in I atin America, bin simply a
recognition of the obstacles to their ambitions under
3
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present power realities in the region. Thus, Moscow
almost certainly will continue to encourage and under-
write some measure of Cuban asjstance to insur-
gents?to maintain a degree of revolutionary momen-
tum, and also to keep the United States embroiled in
Latin America and with its allies in Western Europe
over how to respond, and to exploit any resurrection of
the Vietnam syndrome here. Nor will tactical pru-
dence on the part of the USSR necesfarily imply any
reduction in its determination to retain its stake in
Cuba. In fact, Moscow is likely to sec any serious
threat to Cuba as a major 'crisis in US-Soviet relations.
The recent sharp increase in Soviet military shipments
to Cuba probably is intended to make this point, as
well as provide for Cuban retransfer of arms to the
Nicaraguan regime and to regional insurgents.
For their part, Cuban leaders are now more con-
cerned about US countermeasures than at any time
since the early 1960s. Castro is not convinced that the
USSR would defend him against US military actions,
especially in the absence of a formal defense treaty
with the Soviets despite his efforts to get one. De sees
Cuba as the vulnerable, expcssed edge of the Corn-
munist world and a prime target for a US counter-
move against Soviet activities elsewhere. Ills expres-
sions of concern during the invasion of Afghanistan
and the Polish crisis bear witness to his worry. Thus,
since late 1950, the Cubans have given signals of an
Interest in reducing bilateral tensions, primarily to
avail punitive US actions and secondarily to obtain
economic benefits?a tactic they have employed early
in preceding US administrations. Because of current
heightened concern about US intentions, Castro has
temporarily reduced the actual level of his supixat to
Salvadoran insurgents and wight do so to other re-
gional revolutionaries. But his deepseated antagonism
toward the United States has not diminished; and, as to
the past, he almost certainly would not make any
significant :oreign rxdicy ctmcessions?ineloding
Cuba's right to support revolutionaries?to improve
US relations. In fact, his most likely response to open
US pressure would be to step up his troublemaking
activities, to throw the United States onto the
defensive.
Outlook
cloro, %% bile mindful of US warnings and So% let
concern that he asoid actions that would prosoke a US
military respmse toward Cuba or a inaj