REVISION OF DCID 1/7

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00591R000400020002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 16, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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0002U-5 SR
FILE
16AUG1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Special Security Center
un% member, security Committee
SUBJECT: Revision of DCID 1/7"
REFERENCE: Memo from CIA Member, DCI Security Committee,
dated 2-July 1979, same subject (OS 9 1623)
1. As stated in subparagraph a of reference (copy attached),
certain components within CIA have voiced strong concerns
regarding the disappearance of the NOFORN caveat from the pro-
posed draft revision of DCID 1/7. The DCI Security Committee
has been alerted to these concerns and verbally advised that
the CIA was attempting to coordinate, with the concerned CIA
components, a proposed NOFORN draft paragraph to be reinstated
in the revised DCID 1/7. Coordination has been completed and
you will find our proposed draft NOFORN paragraph attached.
As you will note, this proposal represents, in essence, a
return to the format: and language of the current (18 May 1976)
DCID 1/7 NOFORN paragraph, but, at the same time, incorporates
and expands on the DIA proposed draft NOFORN paragraph.
Further, the NSA proposal for the return of the NOFORN caveat
to cover intelligence controlled under DCID 6/2 is incorporated
in the attached draft.
2. It is noted that revitalization, in any form, of NOFORN
as a sensitivity marking in the revised version of DCID 1/7 will
require a corresponding elimination of "NO FOREIGN DISSEM" as an
obsolete marking as set forth on page 8, paragraph 9, the last
sentence, of the proposed revision of DCID 1/7.
3. In addition to the NOFOR' issue, additional CIA
recommendations and concerns regarding the revision of DCID 1/7
are contained in the referenced memorandum to SECOM, As set
forth in subparagraph d of the attached reference, one of the
areas of concern, now shared by the Office of General Counsel
(OGC), regards the 0 control marking. 0GC has advised
~/r
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that they are pursuing with the U. S. Department of Justice
the legal ramifications of the use of II on an un-
classified document. A final legal opinion regarding this
matter will be forwarded as soon as received from OGC, and
will hopefully be available to you prior to 23 August 1979
(the next scheduled meeting of the SECOM Compartmentation
Subcommittee).
4. During the coordination process regarding the NOFOR,N
paragraph, additional concerns were brought out regarding the
ORCON and REL (--) control markings and the proposed wording
of certain sections of the draft revision of DCID 1/7. These
concerns/suggestions and the rationale for them are set forth
as follows (changes/additions in wording are underlined):
a. Experience has indicated that even though
the "primary referent" mechanism is supposedly
operative and a provision of the current DCID 1/7,
it has, in fact, not been put into effect. Individ-
ua-~ Intelligence Community organizations have not
designated "primary referents" to expedite the flow
of intelligence to the appropriate end-user or con-
sumer. This failure has occasionally resulted in
the waste or misdirection of large amounts of RFD
funds. In an effort to rectify this problem, the
following change is proposed for paragraph 2, sub-
paragraph b, page 2, sentence 5: . . will
designate a primary referent to ensure that these
procedures are available and un erstoo con-
sumers within eac or anization. The referent
will, in turn, serve as a channel through which
intelligence consumers can seek relief from certain
controls (the unction o the re erent will in no
way impinge on existing regulations for the ha 1 iota ,
securit sseminnatz n and use o intelligence in
corn artrne ntod or restricted c annels Originators
prompt y.
Rationale: The above wording will place added
emphasis on the necessity to designate a "primary
referent" and clarify the primary referent's role
in securely facilitating the orderly flow of
intelligence to the appropriate end-recipient.
b. The primary concern regarding the AUTHORIZED
FOR RELEASE TO, (country(ies)) control marking is
that the marking itself provides no instruction
or warning to the foreign recipient of the material.
It is recognized that the currently proposed DCID 1/7
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(paragraph 6e) stipulates that material
predetermined to be releasable to a foreign
country(ies) may not be disseminated further
without approval of the originator. This
restriction presupposes that the foreign
recipient is fa*~-liar with DCID 1/7 or more
likely any "third party" constraint agreement
between the United States and the recipient
foreign country(ies). To. address this con-
cern and allow for the possible lack of aware-
ness on the part of foreign recipients, it is
recommended that the word ONLY be added to
this control marking after the (country(ies))
designator. Therefore,_the control marking -?
would read: AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE TO
(country(ies)) ONLY. This control marking
may be abbreviated REL (country(ies)) ONLY.
Rationale: The rationale for this change is
set forth above, but concisely put, it is to
add a visual "flag" to the REL ( ) ONLY
control marking to alert the recipient for ie gn
government(s) that the material is not to be
disseminated further without the approval of
the originator.
c. It is suggested that the clauses be
inverted in the sentence beginning on line 4,
paragraph 6, subparagraph a(2), page 5, to
read as follows: "In making such assessment,
consideration should be given to reducin__g_ the
risk to the int,elli ence sources or or methods
which provided the intelligence by sanitizing
or ara rT assn tie information so as to permit
its wide dissemination."
Rationale: This change would place the emphasis
on the purpose of reducing risk and subordinate
the means by which this purpose would be achieved.
d. It is suggested that paragraph 6, sub-
paragraph b(2), the first sentence, be changed
to read as follows: "Information bearing this
marking may not be disseminated beyond the Head-
quarters elements5 of the recipient organizations
and may not be incorporated in all or in part into
other reports or briefings without . . . originator."
Footnote 5 would, in turn, be revised to read:
"At the discretion of the originator, the term
'Headquarters elements' may include subordinate
intelligence-producing components."
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Rationale: It is felt that occasionally an
overly strict interpretation of the phrase
"headquarters of the recipient organization,"
coupled with intelligence distribution system
deficiencies outside the CIA, have inhibited
the flow of Directorate of Operations intelli-
gence to intelligence-producing components and
end-users (with a clear need-to-know) which
are subordinate to recipient organizations.
This suggested change is designed to encourage
recipient organizations (specifically, primary
referents) to work closely with intelligence-
originators/collecting agencies to ensure that
consumers with a clear need-to-know receive
information relevant to their tasking. The
added phrase "or briefings" is designed to
provide additional protection to information
bearing ORCON control.
e. Paragraph 6, subparagraph b(2), page 6,
with the sentence beginning on line 2, should
be changed to read: ". . . and that timely
procedures, per paragraph 2b above, are estab-
lished . . . marking."
Rationale: This change will link.the procedures
,for the release from ORCON control with the role
of the primary referent (see recommendation a
above) in facilitating such relief.
Attachments (.2)
Distribution:
Orig - Adse
1 - DD/SEC
PPG Chrono
1- OS Registry
OS/P&M/PPG/cbt
13 August 1
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PROPOSED DRAFT NOFORN
PARAGRAPH TO DCID 1/7
"f. NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS (NOFORN)"
(1) Classified intelligence so marked means that the
originator has predetermined that the release of the material
in any form to foreign governments , fo i_ ng nationals or non-
U. S. citizens is not appropriate. Originators may be requested
to waive their determination.
(2) Examples of when this control marking may be applied
are as follows:
(a) jVhen there would be a possible compromise
of the status of relations with collaborating.
foreign governments or officials.
(b) When intelligence controlled under DCID 6/2
would be jeopardized..
(c) When intelligence has been officially or
unofficially obtained from a foreign government
or national with the implied or explicit under-
stgnding that it not be given to any other country.
(d).When the continuin viabilit of vital,
technical collection programs would be jeopar ized.
(3) This marking may be abbreviated NOFORN.
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