ZERO BASE REVIEW OF CLEARANCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00591R000200060024-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: July 17, 1980
• Content Type: MF

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
17 July 1980
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman,
Steerin Group
25X1A FROM:
SECOM Member
SUBJECT: Zero Base Review of Clearances
1. At the 15 July 1.980 meeting of the 0 Steering
Group, there were discussions related to the advisability of
doing a Zero Based Review of current SCI access approvals.
Some comments indicated an element of confusion. This
memorandum is presented to document some DCI directions that
may have a bearing on whether and when a Zero Base Review
should be conducted. My observations are supported with
copies of source material.
a. There is no question that the DCI elected
to have a Zero Based approach to clearances in all
agencies and industrial contractors. H told
Director, NSA this in May 1978. Tab A:
b. In his Notes from the Director of 11 October
1978 the DCI mentions that at i.s js intention that
Zero Based Reviews become a long range and structured
aspect of our security program and that they be carried
out throughout the Intelligence Community. Tab B.
c. The DCI tasked the Security Committee in
early November 1978 to start, a Zero Based Review
throughout the Executive Branch and in Industry. The
Chairman, SECOM tasked his Chairman of the Compart-.
mentation Subcommittee accordingly on 15 November 1978.
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CIA's Special. Security Center, whic i had initiated
trial Zero Based Reviews, was noted as offering a
service of common concern in collecting information
from contractors to be transmitted. to sponsoring
agencies for their action. Tab C .
d . The Chairman, Compartmentation Subcommittee
of SECOM issued implementing orders to members on
15 December 1.978. Tab P.
e., The. NFIB Working Groua on Compartme,entation
net on 19 December 1978 and raised the question of
the Zero Base Review. Noting that the proposal for
the 0 Control System includes a recommendation that
ra Zero Based Review take place at the beginning of the
implementation phase in order to better define and
limit the population which will be given access within
the system, it seemed to be redundant, if not
burdensome to conduct two such reviews within such a
short period of time. I SA to the DCI wrote
and informed him of the observaPorr. argued
that -the ground rules for justifying product access
under the present ground rules are mucT looser than the
ground. rules under the0 system so that the Zero
Base Review conducted at that time would not be of much
value when we go to implement 0. On the other hand,
it was noted that the system for operational compartments
is essentially the same in both worlds so that a Zero
Base Review of operational clearances conducted at that
time would be highly useful and give us a leg tip when
the new system starts. The DCI approved
recommendation to defer the Zero Base Revic=ta product
clearances until. the impiemen.tati.on phase of the
program but to complete the review for holders of
operational clearances. Tab P .
f. On 8 Jan 1979 the Chairman, SITCOM .n.structed
the Compartmentation Subcommittee accordingly. Tab F.
2. The CIA elected to have the Special Security Center
proceed with. the Zero Base Review of both product and operational
accesses in industry facilities with CIA contractors. Offers
were made and rejected by many members of the Cormtm.unit . It
was accepted by Program A and C. Only SI, TK accesses
were reviewed..
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3. From March to the end of FY 1.979,
industrial contractors holdings were reviewed. The net
result of the review was a reduction of 7.2% in the number
of personnel with any access and a reduction of 13.2% in the
number of accesses hold. (Some people lost some of their
tickets but held others - hence the difference between figures
for people and accesses). The Zero Base Review has continued
through the third quarter of FY 1980 with almost similar
results; reduction of 7.20 of people and 13.4% of access
approvals.
4. These facts combined with the numbers recently
developed in the recent in-house survey, support the
contention that there is merit in a Zero Base Review.
.,. There is no question of the DCI's intention in, this
regard and lie anticipates th ero Base Review will he
,!wade at the beginning of thei_mplementation phase.
Note should be made of the argument presented to
him in petition for postponement of his call - "the ground
rules for Justifying product access under the present
ompartnented s stems are ncuc-hi looser than the ground
rules under the system." This seems to imply that a
different criteria. or access will he applied, one that
will be tighter. Accordingly, your caution against members
;Manning for a one-for-one substitution without review is
well taken and should be underscored at subsequent meetings
of the Steering Group.
Distribution:
Orig - Adse
SECOM Subject
- SECOM Chrono
25X1A SECOM/ (18 July 80)
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MEMO"ANDUUM FOR: Vice Admira-"rl H. P. Inman, t1Sh!
f)lre.c:t;ur, tiationa Security ,clercy
`11UL, C I: Cl ctar?ances
1 . Congressman Rose approached me the other day about problems of
cr Vplo(jraphic security and prevention of bats in r)ceneral. He indicated
he hid had many very fruitful and hel pi u? discussions vri th you.
He is most concerned at the number of SI clearances extant in
the ;)epartment of Lriergy, which, he said w c attc,ut /100. 1 irid]cated
i th ;u?: lit most of those ,teim.ied Iruil the old [.t.'-.uric f.rw-gy Coii.mission
ci e?aa d ices Evert in conS i derat ion c i l._rIQ rqy S respons i i i't i es , I
ttiir e ~i00 s;,_inds like an inordinate number for that Department. I would
ap, =c: ate :or view on this and how to approach a reduction.
1=or Lf, ur information, I am about to start a zero-based epproar.h
to c11 e:ran.es in ao i agencies and -industrial r?cnuraactnrs. Perhaps DM-
is tlu? i; ace to Start wlt..tiin CtIP_ COVE"t'Ci-1~-:''3L.(YId tir'.Li. i1irip who lf'r
these numbers are ac re(lon r`nm onivio S refill omerit'; or whet;her Lhey
in fact are ti_~?itiriuinc; needs.
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SIANSF [U', TURNER
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-' Notes from the Director
NIO FOR WAR z`ING
One of the major reasons why this Agency and my office were created was the
determination of the Executive and of Congress that this country not have another
Pearl Harbor. Obviously, strategic warning must be my highest priority. Every one of
Us in fact, no matter what his job, is responsible in some way for ensuring that the
nation never again suffers a surprise attack. No less important is warning in the
broader sense --warning of any devetupnrent serious enough to concern the President
and the National Security Council.
It is apparent that we need a ~trongcr national structure for warning than that
Vi hich now exists. I have therefore asked Dick Lehman to step aside from his position
as Associate Director of NFAC to devote himself exclusively to establishing new
national warning procedures as a matter of highest priority. I am establishing for him
r special position as National Intelligence Officer for Warning.
In this capacity as NIO/ 'arising, he will be my senior staff officer for all
warning matters. On the policy and management side, he will chair an interagency
"Warning Working Group,"" and will serve as Executive Secretary of an NFIB-level
warning committee chaired by the DI>('l. On the substantive side, that is, in deciding
of what to warn and when to do it, he will work through and direct the other National
Intelligence Officers, among whom he will be first among equals. Ile will also be my
nainbudsman for warning" in the Community, available, should anyone believe a
`.crious threat is being overlooked, to listen and if necessary to take action in my
naive.
In the establishment. of new warning procedures and disciplines, we will he asking
-,puny of you to give greater attention to warning matters. This will not be just
another bureaucratic exercise-, it ~s a serious 0t?fort to meet it critical requirement. The
!O/Warning will have my strong personal backings.
CHANNELS FOR DISSENT
The principal method for the expression of dissent within the Agency involves the
various avenues available within cici. Directorate for challenging or testing analysis,
policy and procedure. This is it process which must take place in a routine yet
vigorous fashion if our products and activities are to be maintained at a level of
high quality. The squelching of divergent views on significant issues can lead to
intellectual stagnation and second-rite ncrformance. It is important, therefore, that
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employees be made to feel that presentation of well-reasoned dissenting views on
significant substantive issues in the normal course of their work is not only tolerated
but is welcomed by enlightened line managers. It is also important that each
I )irectorate publicize its philosophy on dissent, as well as its methods for processing it.
F1iere are {occasions when employees may feel that valid views on matters of
particular significance have not received adequate consideration by line management.
in such cases, an employee may bciicve-----rightly or wrongly-_-that the Director or
Deputy Director should be informed of divergent opinion which could have an
important impact on significant analytical, operational, or managerial issues. The
Deputy Director and I encourage the submission of such disscrfiing views directly to
us in writing and have asked SA/DCI, to make certain that
such papers are given expeditious nan ing anu made available promptly.
It is important that dissent not be confused with personal grievances or
:omplaints, for which a different procedure exists. While dissent can be defined as an
expression of significant substantive opinion at variance with formally accepted
positions within the Agency on analytical, operational, or managerial matters, a
grievance is a request by an employe: for relief from dissatisfaction with career
matters, working conditions or burdensome administrative decisions which affect the
employee personally.
While there may be special circumstances in which a dissent should be registered
confidentially, the real value of dissent lies in the open airing of an issue and the
intellectual debate it stimulates within a Directorate.
Dissent should, of course, be confined to matters within the Agency's field of
competence and authority. While there may be foreign policy decisions, for example,
with which some of our people disagree, this Agency does not make foreign policy. It
would therefore be neither profitable to use our forums to air such disagreements nor
appropriate to encourage dissent on natters which are the-proper province of other
agencies or departments.
Employees are assured that submissions of dissent Will be seriously reviewed and
responded to appropriately. The Deputy Director and I consider dissent by employees
to he expressions of legitimate and healthy concern for the achievement of superior
performance by this Agency. It can play a vital role in maintaining the intellectual
integrity and validity of Agency products and practices.
ZERO-BASED REVIEW OF COMPARTMENTED APPROVALS
At my direction, the Office of Security recently completed a zero-based review of
cornpartmented approvals as held by one Agency contractor and one Agency
component. Under the methodology of such a review, each and every compartmented
approval must be rejustified or canceled. As I suspected it would, our pilot study
reflected that a significant percentage of the individuals concerned had no current
valid need for such approvals.. These people, accordingly, have been debriefed. While
I recognize that such zero-based reviews involve significant effort on the part of the
Office of Security, the Agency components involved, and contractors, it is my
intention that they become a long-range and structured ispect of our security
program and that they be carried out not only in the Agency but throughout the
Intelligence Community.
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DIRECTOR OF ( 10;14L I TE: '.. IGE:NCE
Security Committee
?ir i~It~1;;A l)IJ~1 I=C11~: h ir:.;;rn, ,~~ n . i Lsa. i~~.;l? ; .,;~ Si.~l~c;~rnrli.i t tee
rt ~~'~ ~I.rs~~I ri(}
Cha i nan
SUM-' 'i'. Iows
1 . In April of this year , on insi r:rct ions f ror:i the DCI,
i had the Special Security (.'en, er, CIA (",C/CIA) , initiate
pilot program 70 rc !) sed 1e r:rtt~ c` ro iow of Special .ccess
Approvals held by one CIA ch=it i ctor ai;,1 one C i -\ cornpc i,ent .
The review required that e;:t:h mar,J ever,' campartm entcd access
be either rejustified or c..rrr~'i'Iled. in the contractor reviei.,
approximately one fourth of 'h. personnel cleared were deter--
mined to have no current val i.l need for ;uch approvals. In
the CIA component review, it :-: det.(,rminod that almost l0
of the personnel held appro)v:il no lon ;cr Tully justifiable.
Accordingly, debriefings ha v:: Peon ;rrnLiertrt1 ona.
2. Based upon these re-,ul.t s, the DCI has decided
to expand this program thro;rs;lh.eeurt i ndu t i:.. and the Executive
Branch. Also, his i,e i iat z t _` Counsel is currently conduct Iup
,i review of all extant Leg i 1:i t i ve 1FFranch approvals
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee 15 DEC 1978
COMPARTMENTATION SUBCO`SN1ITTE
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECO4 Compartmentation Subcoc.mittee Members
SUBJECT: Zero-Based Clearance Review
1. The DCI has directed that each NF'IB agency and department
conduct a zero-based review of all SCI accesses held by its
personnel. CIA will also conduct a review of SCI accesses held
by non-NFIB agencies. The Compartmentation Subcommittee, SECOa
has been designated as the Executive Agent for conducting the
review..
2. This review will require each NFIB agency and department
to conduct an internal examination of all individual and/or
billet positions currently authorized SCI access. A written
justification (short paragraph) outlining the "need-to-know"
requirement for each SCI access, the individual name and/or
SCI billet number, and title will be submitted to the SIO of the
NFIB agency or department for final validation and retention.
In order to streamline the review, authority is granted to
submit one justification for an entire branch, group, section,
or unit if all assigned personnel require SCI access for the
same reason; e .g . , communicators working in a SCI communications
center, analysts or other support personnel working in support
of an SCI project. The single justification will also list the
names of each individual or, in the case of DOD agencies,.the
SCI billet number and title.
3. The Special Security Center (SSC), CIA will also conduct a
review of industrial contractors, many of whom hold SCI contracts
with a number of Intelligence Community sponsors. Contractor
monitors will be required to provide justification for all SCI
indoctrinated contractors as well as the identity of their
sponsor. CIA will collect the approval justification data and
forward it to the sponsoring agency or program office -for valida-
tion. CIA will not make access determinations for individuals
sponsored by other agencies. Each member agency and department
is requested to advise their SCI contractor monitors to cooperate
fully with the SSC/CIA review.
This letter
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.The' t_ :c:_1L~ alora.
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4. The DCI has requested that the SCI zero-based review be
completed by 30 September 1979. On 15 February, 15 May and
1 August 1979, Compartnentation Subcommittee members will
submit interim reports to the Subcommi tt~!e Chairman indicating
the
number
of accesses/billets authorize(', the number reviewed,
the
number
of personnel debriefed or SCI billets deleted, and
the
number
of billets/accesses remaining after the review.
The
final
report should be submitted no later than 1 October 1979.
Please submit interim and final reports in the attached format.
Please also include a brief resume of your review in terms of
overall results, recommendations, or other comments.
Chairman, Compartmentation
Subcommittee
DCI Security Committee
1 Atch
Report Format
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DIRECTOR OF CEN41 RAL Ni IELLIGENCE
Security Committee
SFCCM-1)_12
8 JAN 1979
FOR: Chairman, CompartmentatI n Slu!bcommittee
i x~tt"9: Robert W. Cambino
Chn i rmcan
;;11}3?ti; C1': Zero-Based Clearance Pevicwss.
lffl l" .tiNCE :
Same subject.
dated 15 Novicentber 1777
1. The reference asked that all NIb i l; Agencies and Depart_-
mcn1 conduct a zero-hased review of all their Special Access
11rpr vrlls. As we a reed, this wieild he a review of
-Ill 1:-t i.ve Si, ckets and was to be completed
"v September 19"93.
upon the IS liecemlher 1978 reaction of the
' Ba ed
_
t,,ialrtmcntation Stlhcomntittec a:; to t11e isdorrt of~ conducting
an all -out review in the t er rC a ,t? itchover to t.helI 25X1A
trttrcll System conccept, the matter wa< re- referred to the
He ; :'reed to forego a review of the product`approvals at this
tiirnc, but felt that we should still proceed with review of the
oDc r,rtional compartments. r'i ether, it is.,-now clear that his
des re is that this review be expanded to include all 5X1A
I I