IMPACT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12065 ON COMMUNITY SECURITY POLIICIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00591R000100050097-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 97
• Publication Date: September 6, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
SECOM-D-367
SEP 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Russell T. Newman
Chairman, Compartmentation Subcommittee
DCI Security Committee
FROM: Robert W. Gambino
Chairman, DCI Security Committee
SUBJECT: Impact of Executive Order 12065
on Community Security Policies
1. As noted at the 30 August 1978 Security Committee
meeting, Executive Order 12065 and its implementing directive
will have both actual and potential impact on Community
security practices. Prompt consideration of what the
Community should do to adapt to that impact is needed in
view of the 1 December 1978 effective date of those documents.
2. i ask that you convene the Compartmentation Sub-
committee to examine these two documents and recommend
what specific matters need to be addressed for purposes
of Community policy guidance. Candidate subjects that
readily come to mind include:
a. Paragraph marking - The Order makes the
classification marking of paragraphs mandatory.
Should we ask for relief for Community to require
paragraph marking of documents to show compart-
mented and/or DCID 1/7 controls?
b. Classification guides - The Order encourages
the use of such guides in the interests of better
and more uniform classification actions. In the
case of documents that should remain classified for
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more than six years (which will almost surely be
the case for SCI materials), the Order requires
the reason justifying the extended classification
to be stated either on the document or in a classifi-
cation guide or agency implementer which may be
simply referenced on the document. The administra-
tive (and security) advantages of the latter approach
are clear. What sort of classification guides should
the Community have for these purposes, particularly
for SCI? What Community guidance on their preparation
is needed? What depth of detail should be provided
to justify the extension of classification beyond
six years?
c. Declassification guidelines - The Order
requires the preparation of such guidelines covering
20-year old material, and specifies that information
not identified in such guidelines as requiring de-
classification review shall be automatically declassi-
fied as it becomes 20 years old. It is apparent that
SCI material must be covered by declassification
guidelines. What guidance should be provided the
Community for the preparation of such guidelines,
particularly for SCI material?
d. Identity of classifiers - Should the classifi-
cation authority for SCI material continue to be
cited as, for example, "TK-1" or "BYE-1", or should
some other citation be used (e.g., DCI, a classifica-
tion guide)?
e. Foreign Government Information - The Order's
implementing directive requires foreign government
information (FGI) to be identified in such manner
as to assure against inadvertent disclosure to a
third country or premature declassification. What
marking or other means should the Community use for
such purpose?
f. Warning Notice marking - The Order's imple-
menting directive deletes the qualifier "sensitive"
from the warning notice marking for sources and
methods information. What guidance should the Com-
munity be provided on when to use this marking and
on how to handle information so marked?
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g. Document accountability - The Order and its
implementer require certain accountability procedures
for Top Secret documents. No exemption from these
requirements is specified for SCI material. DCID
1/19 authorizes a much looser system of accountabil-
ity. Since the national level directives will pre-
vail over 1/19, what policy guidance should be pro-
vided the Community on accounting for Top Secret
SCI documents?
h. Standards for security equipment - The
Order's implementing directive authorizes the storage
of Secret and Confidential material in bar lock cabi-
nets. SCI rules forbid this. Should the standards
for SCI storage equipment be revised so as to more
closely conform to those in the directive?
i. Document transmittal - What new guidance,
if any, should be provided the Community on the
transmittal of intelligence documents (SCI and
collateral) or information?
3. Some of the matters identified above may be suf-
ficiently addressed in the scheduled or planned revisions
of
the TK and BYEMAN Manuals. Your recommendations on
those
or
any other matters dealt with in the Executive Order
and
its
implementing directive are solicited. They should
focus
on
those areas where early guidance to the Community is
re-
quired.
4. Please provide a report on the results of your
review at the 27 September 1978 Security Committee meeting.
Distribution:
Orig - Adse
1 - D/Sec
1 - OS Registry
1 - SECOM Subj
1 SECOM Chrono
SECOM/II:efn(5 Sept 78)
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