NOTE FOR CIA OFFICIALS ATTENDING (Sanitized)THURSDAY, 5 OCTOBER 1978 BRIEFING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00591R000100050044-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 44
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Reuse 2005/08/22: CIA-RDP82M00591 R~100050044-9
.NOTE FOR: CIA Officials Attending STAT
Thursday, 5 October 197 rle ing
plan to .reorganize the Compartmentation
Structures proposes and raises the following questions:
a. Collectors can make the decision an what
is to be compartmented if it passes a test definition
of compartmentation. Policing this act-ion is the
responsibility of men of good will and honest in-
tention and The Security Committee.
uestions:
1. Will the collectors be able to retain any form of com-
partmentation about the RFD and operational aspects of collection?
For example, will the NRO still com artment knowled
operational features of STAT
2. If so will they make the determination of who has the
need-to-know authority.
3. Who will certify operational compartmentatian clearances
between NSA and the NRO.
4. In the case of NSA, which now sets all policy and.
puts everything that is associated with collection in a compart-
ment, will they be able to continue to do this?
5. In the case of will they 25X1
continue to have unquestione out ority to compartment operations
and require all members of the community to get approval for
clearances?
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STAT
STAT
6. Does this grogram (as it relates to compartmentation
of operations - not product) eliminate the need for a central
index of people who are cleared for know tional.
projects such as SI STAT
7, Does this system do away with t}ie SI and STAT
.e _ .... ,~ .. ~. .-..... ,,... ~ ~ _ i _ y _ _ n
b. Per plan, collectors are to view
all product o t e operations and do two things:
(1) Put as much product out under rules
of CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, TOP SECRET.
(2) Compartment under generic codewords
material that passes the definition for
compartmentation.
uestions:
1. Is there any day-to-day check on what the collectors
decide goes into compartmentation?
2. Will there be any compartmentation of product while
people look at it to see if it should be compartmented? If
so, what clearances will they have?
3. Do you see potential for two different groups, CIA
and. DIA, looking at the same photograph and arriving at different
determinations whether to compartment? If sa, does your proposal
address a solution?
~. Ts there any recourse in your proposal for the consumer
to appeal the callectors decision to campartment or not to
compartment? If so, what?
5. Your plan ca11s for the generic compartmentation under S
codewords of product that does not reveal sources.
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G, To what extent wall need for analyst access to
source data for purposes of weighing items of product against
one another increase the number of accesses to operational
compartment above present levels?
7,. Will system be structured so that product may not
be compartmented unless collector makes specific burden of
proof determination to do so? If so, what records will co"1lectors
be required to maintain far review under a policing system?
8. Who will balance competing claims by collectors for
protection versus consumers for non-compartmented wide
dissemination.?
9. What place does your plan have for dissemination and
use restrictions (e.g., ORCON, WNINTEL, NOCONTR~.CT) as an
intermediate level of protection between classification per se
and compartmentation? If none, wouldn't such decrease pro-
tectiail of moderately sensitive information increase admire-
istration burdens through added compartmentation, or both?
10. E.O. 12065 (Section 4-Z) permits special access pro-
grams (i.e., compartments) for intelligence to be used only
with DCI approval following satisfaction of tests stated in
the Order. Under your plan, who would advise the DCI on
whether a proposed compartment meets those tests? If each
collector is to do so, how would the DCI be assured that the
advice he gets is of uniform character?
11. How would your plan operate to '?purify" operational
compartments of essentially administrative information not
bearing directly on extremely sensitive compartmentation (e.g.,
fact of thereby reducing spillover
sensitivity considerations or product and permitting reduction
in number of accesses to residual operational data'?
12. To what extent do you expect your plan will result
in material now held in internal privacy channels (e.g.,
t.o be released to other agencies even subject to
procuct compartmentation controls?
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