SUGGESTED AGENDA FOR WEEKEND AT(Sanitized) 30 APRIL - 2 MAY 1971

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00531R000800060001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 70
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 2, 1971
• Content Type: AG

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Suggested Agenda for Weekend .......................
Organization Charts ... ..............................
One Proposal......... ..............................
Deputy Directors' Responses ........................
Interagency Committees .............................
Background Reading ("Intelligence and Foreign
Policy: Dilemmas of a Democracy") ...............
Soviet-U.S. Relations. ..............................
Clandestine Servics Paper ...........................
Resources Mgm't. & Activity Approval System ........
Community Resources ..............................
N.RO Program .......................................
CIA/NRO Reconnaissance Program ...................
Comparison of Appropriations 1972/1971 .............. .
Contributor Sheets 1970-1972 ........................
Funds/Personnel Spread Sheets ......................
Tab A
Tab B
Tab C
Tab D
Tab E
Tab F
Tab G
Tab H
Tab I
Tab J
Tab K
Tab L
TabiM
Tab N
Tab O
Tab P
Tab Q
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SUGGESTED AGENDA FOR WEEKEND
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Friday, 30 April
Depart Washington
Those who would prefer
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to drive should leave earlier in order to arrive for cocktails and dinner
by 1830. No formal program after dinner;"p' erhaps a movie.
Saturday, 1 May
There seems to be general agreement that the most important
question to which we should address ourselves is: How can the Director
exercise control over resources of the intelligence community comparable
to that which he already has over substance? There is a consensus that
this therefore should be the subject which we tackle first and that we
should spend as much time on it as is necessary. I suggest, therefore,
that we spend the entire morning of 1 May, and as much of the afternoon
as seems desirable, on this subject. I would envisage a general dis-
cussion of the proposition. This general discussion should address itself
specifically to the product: How can we improve intelligence collection
and production? -- regardless of what the Administration decides to do
about reorganization or investing the DCI with more control over re-
sources. We could then go to alternative actions which the Director
ULw
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might take to discharge his responsibility, assuming that he is given
a strong hand in the coordination and control of resources. In the
broadest sense there are at least three alternatives:
(1) Use the Deputy Directors of the CIA as his principal
staff officers to coordinate functional activities in the com-
munity (maybe necouuitating some reorganization of the Agency);
(2) Beef up the existing DCI staff (NIPE, NIRB, etc.) to dis-
charge these responsibilities and delegate to the DDCI or others
some increase of responsibility for the day-to-day management
of the CIA; or
(3) Some combination of (1) and (2) above.
With this in mind, our discussion should include two presentations in
support of alternatives (1) and (2) above. PPB has developed a presenta-
tion which could form the basis of discussion in support of alternative
(1). D/DCI/NIPE, ,with help from D/PPB, could develop a second pre-
sentation in support of alternative (2).
1200 Lunch
1400 Continue with the morning discussion or proceed to individual
presentations by each Deputy Director. These don't need to be an hour
in length, but for planning purposes and allowing for slippage, I suggest
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we plan on two presentations in the afternoon and two presentations in
the evening. I suggest we break at about 1600, allowing everyone until
1830 to take a swim, play tennis, ride a bike, catch a fish, or what-.
ever your pleasure dictates.
Sundays 2 May
I would assume that our discussion of 1 May would warrant a wrap-
up session on the morning of 2 May. We should also be prepared, how-
ever, to discuss other subjects if this is not the case. Some in which
there is common interest and which we should be prepared to discuss are:
(1) R&D activities -- not only the coordinating process within
CIA but our whole attitude about R&D activities. DD/S&T will be
prepared to lead this discussion.
(2) NIRB. What has it done since our last meeting, and what
does its future look like? -- whether or not the Director is given
greater authority to coordinate resources. I would suggest that
DDCI or D/DCI/NIPE lead this discussion.
(3 Should they remain under
separate Deputies as at present, or is there something to be
gained by consolidating them under one Deputy? As a minimum,
is there some merit in having a central coordinating facility which
~1v.VW Mw~..
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could keep track of most, if not all, of the Agency's
I suggest that DD/P and DD/I be prepared to lead
thin diricust3ion.
(4) Agency resources -- status and trends. ExDir-Comp
and D/PPB will be prepared to lead this discussion.
1200 Lunch
1300 Depart for Washington.
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of copies
9 April 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller
SUBJECT : 1971 Planning Conference
1. A brief discussion of the interrelation ?of the issues
submitted by the various Deputies and those covered in the draft
which I am forwarding is in order.
2. The DDP raised three issues:
a. Allocation of R&D monies.
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c. The Agency's image and possible steps to
popularize it.
All three of these issues are addressed in my paper: The R&D
problem, through the disestablishment of R&D as a separate
program and its subordination to each functional Directorate's
control; the reorganization suggested places the
the steps proposed and new perceptions gained hold prospect for
improvement of the Agency's public image.
3. The DDS&T raised the following issues and concerns:
a. Size of the Agency and scope of its mission in the
next decade.
b. Elimination of "weak sister" projects.
c. Means of handling our budget,
d. Nature and future of R&D activities.
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All these issues are implicitly or explicitly treated in this paper,
except for c. which is on the program board of O/PPB now.
Point a. is in a sense what the paper is all about. Concern b.
will be more easily dealt with when reorganization has occurred.
Issues d. and e. are explicit subjects of the paper, expecially
paragraphs 18-22.
4. The DDS raised a single issue: Management of Informa-
tion. Any fuller disscussion of the proposed new Directorate for
Processing and Communications must necessarily deal with this
problem in depth. Additionally establishment of this new Directorate
should encompass solution of present Management of Information
concerns.
5. Chief theme of the DDI's paper is seeking means to put
the Agency in the best possible posture to meet probable diminishing
support for the Agency in Congress and Administration in the next
few years. The reorganization I propose is one means to bolster
the Agency's posture in face of such a challenge. This point is
specifically addressed in paragraphs 6-7 and paragraph 17. The DDI
goes on to make a series of intentionally provocative suggestions
for discussion topics.
Director of Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting
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MEMORANDUM IF'Oft: Executive Director-'Comptroller
SUBJECT : Thoughts on the A.genda for the Director's
Planning Session at
1. It seems to me that this year's planning session should
address itself to the possibility of diminishing support for CIA
in Congress and the Administration over the next few years. I
believe that it would be useful. for us to decide in advance how
we can put the Agency in the best possible posture to meet this
contingency. To accomplish this, we should focus the session
onthe scope of CIA's activities. I suggest that we orient our
discussions toward a. highly provocative, anti-bureaucratic
examination of whether all that the Agency does is really
necessary so that we can identify those activities which are
primary and should be retained and those activities that are
peripheral, outdated, or particularly vulnerable to domestic
criticism for possible deletion.
2. I would propose that each of the Agency's programs
be attacked by a highly provocative.....presE;ntation by a person
not directly responsible for the program., This presentation
would address the following points:
-? Presumed purpose of the program or activity.
Mb Full costs: people, funds, overhead.
In what important way would the elimination
of the activity really affect the ability of the
USG to make policy, enhance its national
security, or influence world a_ffa.i_rs ?
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Po What would happen if the Agency eliminated
the activity? Would anybody outside really
notice it? Would some other agency pick
it up?
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3. I suggest that all concerned contribute to a list of specifics~provocative propositions. A few such propositions are:
c. ' Withdraw from the NIS Program?.because it is
designed to meet the needs of middle- and lower-
level military planners and educational institutions
rather than for the formulation or implementation.
of national military or foreign. policy.
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e. Abolish- the separae.Of ce.cf Research, nd
Development and make each component responsible
for that l~D&E which relates to its own mission.
Intercomponent coordination should eliminate
duplication and unnecessary overlap.
f. Now that the Agency's manpower levels are
stabilized.or shrinking, there is no longer the
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need for massive general recruiting.
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h. Reduce the size of the ONE Staff to approximately
a dozen professionals by using substantive officers
from the DDI and DDS&T to draft NIEs for the
hoard's consideration.
4. Even if this approach does not lead to the elimination
of any of the programs attacked, it should give us all a better
understanding and rationale for their retention.
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R. J. SMITH
Deputy Director for Intelligence
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c
14 January 1371
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MEMORANDUM FOR Executive Director-Comptroller
SUBJECT Trip to
1. Before. departing on m trip I thought a good deal
about the proposed meeting at and although I
have no strong views as to a precise agenda, I do have
some comments on the general nature and tone-of the meeting
which I hope will be useful.
2. I believe the scheme we followed last year where
each deputy had a block of time to review his own shop
and his problems was effective and should be repeated.
Recognizing that this could tend to be just a rehash of
last year, I think the guidance should be that each should
spend 5 to 10 minutes reviewing what he covered last year
and spend the remainder on a fresh look emphasing changes
that have occurred and new problems that have been identified.,
3. The next item is no doubt controversial and even
rather touchy, but I still. feel we should spend some time
objectively discussing what the size of the agency and the
cgpe,.o mission should be during the next decade. I
am well aware of the Director's strong views on no growth
and hopefully continued reductions, but would also hope that
he is prepared to listen to arguments as to why that might
not be a wise policy. Let me emphasize that I am not
proposing that we debate a 21?Jo cut in 1972 or any other
specific numbers, but would focus on long term questions
as to what kind of CIA the US Government is likely to need
in the next 10 years and whether there is any clear
indication as to whether our scope and mission should in
fact change.
4. Somewhat related would be of discussion along the
lines we had in a couple of deputy meetings over the last
year where we listed projects which..we considered to be
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y nthe,r and might be eliminated if we do
continue a reduction in people and money. -It is not clear
to me how much of that information was ever passed to
the Director, but a discussion of that list or a revised
one in his presence might be useful.
5. Another item which I 'think would deserve some
discussion time is that of the method of handling our
budf, ct.,._..__.I am aware that you were present when that subject
was discussed with and of the fact
that this matter cannot be dealt with unilaterally, but
must take full cognizance of the concerns of our
.-Congressional Committees. Nonetheless, I think it would
be educational as a minimum and new ideas as to alternative
ways to handle our budget might be developed.
6. Another subject which is more .specifically a DD-S&T
item, but I would believe of general interest is our whole
attitude about our R&D activities. I do not mean this from a
purely budgetary point-of view, but one of my'major concerns
is still the fact that we are unwilling to spend the money
needed to develop highly sophisticated and reliable gear.
We still tend to nickel and dime that part of our work in
a way that assures something short of complete success..
If you would like, I would be happy to prepare a paper on
that subject as a means of stimulating discussion. I
think this would also be a good opportunity to discuss the
whole R&D coordination process along the lines that you
and I reviewed a couple of weeks ago.
8. As I tried to explain. at the lunch meeting with the
Director, I feel the most important thing that happens in
these meetings is the creation of an atmosphere wherein
people will freely discuss their views on the agency and
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would urge that the agenda allow ample time for discussing
things that may emerge after arriving at
rather than trying to carefully allocate the entire
time period.
Carl E. -?DDuckett
Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology
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D/S 71-?03. I
26 ,JAf 1971
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I:?1 w OR jjvI ~O : ?~',,?xec tlve nircetor-co"lln oiler
Director's g Session
1. In Peeping w ch the idea of a. limited n nber of items for
Con ideratio in aan plannir L'J q, session9 ~ ~;] we su gest Ci.1S~ ?~ r ~,t 4.i1
.f..
subject "Mrtra ;s~Za. en of In or mation in Uzi Forms from Creation to
I ispo;. -1 or I'erxiia.n nt Archival Rettertion". This is of particular
importance to our Director_a.te I's: a~tse ?' oSkllatic,k;&~ woc!icing
hi rcasikhg (' mand3 onn fipacc, ai co'7ditio njn ar id other utilities,
eommunict tiok,s i' Clii ` s~caD I aliti: tyr records st(:ora.C9e sysw` ms ndt
areas, while our people and dollar x esources to meet thorn a: i at
fix; d or a _e decreasin:''. Discuoaion at i? `?si give all
opportunity to elaborate ti1.ese points from parochial and A ency
v:iev.points.
2. If you l ~l,e ve tizat tihih iter z merits c?=nom ideratio 1 for the
DCI Planning session agenda we will. be pleased to pr`ovicde sulpplem entary
lr lterials to fv ctlLtc je VI-- t ar't .r
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eputy Director
for Suppot
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INTELLIGENCE " 1\! ~C l IGN 'FOLIC ~':
DILEMMAS OL A D'EMOC'RACY
By William J. Barnds
ITH the obvious exception of Viet Nara, nothing the
U.S. Government has done in recent years in the field
of foreign policy has created so much controversy as its
intelligence operations, especially the secret subsidizing of private
American institutions. The sinking of the Liberty with the loss of
34 American lives during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the
capture of the Pueblo by North Korea in 1968 brought home to
the American public the dangers involved in one type of intelli-
gence collection and embarrassed an already beleaguered Ad-
ministration. Of all the U.S. intelligence organizations, the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency has been the most vociferously attacked.
It has been accused of perpetrating the 1967 Greek coup, ar-
rangin; the death of Che' Guevara and even fanning the flames
of the recent student riots in Mexico as a means of infiuencing
the Mexican Government to adopt an anti-Castro stance in
hemispheric affairs.
Some Critics OT CIA View it as omnipotent and evil; others
attack it as bumbling and incompetent. Although only a mi-
nority accepts either of these extreme characterizations, many
Americans and foreigners are concerned about CIA's activities,
and they are far from reassured by repeated official statements
that it is an efficient and fully controlled instrument of the U. S.
1
Government. The CIA has undoubtedly contributed more than
other agencies to the alienation from the U. S. Government of
an important segment of the academic-intellectual community
and of young people; the arrival of its recruiters on a college
r
campus is more likely to start a student riot tl-._n those of any
other institution-with the possible exception of talent scouts.,
from the Dow Chemical Company.
'resent attitudes toward CIA represent a sharp departure
from the situation a decade ago. Yet in the immediate postwar
years there was considerable uneasiness about establishing such
an organization. T o do so seemed undemocratic and out of
k,c,,, r' 'it, n '
_.ping with American tra~.c,o~.5. :Nang Americans regarded
spying as a dirty business, and looked on interfering in the inter-
nal affairs of other nations as inconsistent with our professed
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that if the United States was to protect its interests and fulfill
its international responsibilities in a harsh environment it had
little choice but to engage in such activities.
This consensus, like so many others, has now vanished. There-
fore it is appropriate to consider why CIA was created, how an
intelligence agency operates, the relationship of intelligence ac-
tivities to foreign policy, and the difficulties and dilemmas (as
well as the capabilities) such an institution creates for a democ-
racy which is also a major power.
The collapse of Soviet-American cooperation late in World
War II gradually convinced most Americans that Soviet com-
munism posed a critical challenge to U. S. security. The develop-
ment of the cold war and the withdrawal of the European colonial
powers from Asia made it clear that this country could not escape
P. much deeper involvement in world politics than had formerly
been the case in peacetime. Complex and difficult decisions had
to be made on a bewildering variety of issues in a rapidly chang-
ing international environment. The United. States was becoih:-
ing involved in areas of the world about which it knew next to
nothing. It was uncertain about the capabilities and intentions
of both friendly and unfriendly nations-and sometimes not
sure which was which. The implicat-ons of the scicnti is revolu-
tion for world politics and military affairs were (liflcult to discern
with any clarity, and the relationships between American in-
terests in different parts of the world were obscure.
It soon became apparent that the United States lacked not
only a foreign policy adequate to cope with this new situation'
but even the institutions within the U. S. Government necessary
to develop and carry out an effective policy. Institutions and
procedures had to be established which would enable the Presi-
dent to bring together the key U. S. officials who dealt with the
various aspects of foreign policy to consider the relevant facts,
weigh the alternative courses of a ction, make the necessary policy
decisions and see that they were carried out. The result was the
National Security Act of xgq.7, which create(! the National Secu-
rity Council to help the President formulate foreign policy and
established the Department of Defense as a step toward unifica-
tion of the armed forces. This Act also created the Central ln-
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1NTELL1GLNCE AND FOl: ?1C\ POLICY 283
tcUi ence Agency; it was the nation's first separate peacetime
inic':ilgence organti atiOn.
Those responsible for U. S. foreign policy in this period felt
keenly the need for more and better information on many un-
familiar areas and problems, and they decided that the t.~ k of
providing much of this information should rest with men who
had no direct policy responsibilities and thus no position to sup-
port, no interest to defend. American leaders also concluded
that the United States needed an organization able to perform
certain tasks in the execution of policy that fell between the
traditional instruments of foreign policy and the open use of
armed force. Thus CIA was given three general functions: (i )
to gather information by covert as welt as overt means; (a) to
r ,
combine the information it collects with that of other agencies,
to evaluate it and to present it in useful form to the policy-
makers; and (j) to be prepared to intervene covertly in the
aff irs of other nations when so directed.'
The communist seizure of power in China and Peating's in-
volvement in the Korean War greatly intensified the cold war.
This led to a major ex pansi)n of J.S. railirary forces and of C' _1'A
and other U. S. intelligence Gr~