CONVERSATION WITH JIM TAYLOR, OMB, RE CONCEPT PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00531R000400220010-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: December 20, 1971
• Content Type: MFR

SECRET ~ - _4
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SUBJECT: Conversation with Jim Taylor, OMB, re Concept Paper
1. Conferred with Jim Taylor re the status of the OMB concept
paper. Jim went over its content to date and we discussed various
aspects of this "porcupine. " I urged that he outline objectives over a
phased schedule leading to FY 1975 budget and orienting the FY 1974
thrust to one of issues -- substantive but with cost overlays. He
agreed.
2. OMB draft will be run across my desk (informally).
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to confer with Taylor during the holidays as key point of contact on
this subject -- details of which at the moment should be considered
DCI proprietary.
Distribution:
orig - Comptroller files
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13 December 1971
The attached paper, while in the form of a Letter to those
receiving the President's memo, is intended to introduce a
vehicle to (a) advise the principals of what the Director has done
about the Presidential directive,, and (b) establish him in the
posture of suggesting significant program areas which need
careful attention.
It is possible that the content of this letter should be used
more as a talking paper by Mr. Tweedy rather than a formal
communication and that the substantive pushing of the memo could
therefore be eliminated entirely.
However, in order to ensure we hit several of the significant
areas addressed in the OMB study, the substantive section should
be acceptable to those production elements responsible for the
conclusions implied therein.
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DRAFT:
Dear
In addition to his memorandum of 5 November 1971 concerning
the Intelligence Community, the President also sent me a letter in
which he established three goals for the Intelligence Community:
-- A more efficient use of resources in the collection of
intelligence information.
-- A more effective assignment of functions within the Community.
-- Improvement in the quality and scope of the substantive
product.
To accomplish these goals he assigned to the Director of
Central Intelligence new responsibilities:
-- To assume leadership of the Community in planning, reviewing,
coordinating and evaluating all intelligence programs
and activities, and in the production of national intelligence;
-- To provide judgments on the efficiency and effectiveness of all
intelligence programs and activities;
-- To recommend the appropriate allocations of resources to
be devoted to intelligence.
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On December 3rd I responded to the President's request as
follows:
--Within the law and in the spirit of the President's request I
have delegated to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
the authorities necessary to manage and direct the day-to-
day operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.
-- To advise me on matters pertaining to the Intelligence
Community I have established the position of Deputy to the
Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence
Community (D/DCI/IC). His staff will be built around the small
group which has helped me with the Community responsibilities
in the past.
-- I have established a Community Comptroller's office within
D/DCI/IC to perform all the usual functions of planning,
programming, and budgeting for the overall program, to
draw up the Consolidated Intelligence Program Budget, and
to provide staff support to the Intelligence Resources Advisory
Committee. The office will be staffed with experienced
intelligence officers drawn from the Community. I shall
look to this staff, working with program managers, to review
program submissions and manpower needs, and to identify
redundancies, duplications, excessive investments in particular
systems, and the like.
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The D/DCI/IC will also conduct special planning and program
evaluations so as to insure that over the long term the US foreign
intelligence effort is sharply focused on consumer needs.
I will look to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
and to ExCom as the primary points of contact in all matters relating
to Defense intelligence programs.
Although I expect to make some special presentation to the
President and the Congress for Fiscal Year 1973, the first Consolidated
Intelligence Program Budget will be put together for FY 1974. If it is
to satisfy the President and the Congress, it cannot be a simple
aggregation of the budgets and programs of each intelligence component.
Rather, it must clearly show that intelligence activities relate to
national needs and consumer requirements. Cross-program analysis
will be essential, as will the presentation of resource options.
I do not propose becoming involved in the numbers aspect of the
fiscal guidance process. Rather, at the outset of these new duties,
I suggest the following considerations as directly applicable to FY 1974
intelligence programs:
-- It seems clear that the Intelligence Community will not receive
either more men or dollars to do its job -- indeed, it may
find its aggregate resources reduced.
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--The cost of technical collection systems dictates that their
application should be limited generally to problems related to
the strategic balance and to those which cannot be resolved
otherwise; e. g. by more thorough analysis of existing data
or by alternative and less expensive collection methods.
-- Clandestine collection is also an expensive way of gathering
information. It will have to be carefully coordinated as
provided by NSCID 5 and normally restricted to matters
which cannot be addressed by overt means.
-- The Intelligence Community may not be adequately exploiting
the data which it collects or which is available from open sources.
All agencies must make a special effort to insure that this
is clearly not the case.
-- The administrative procedures and security compartmentation
associated with the intelligence process are costly and they
inhibit the exchange of both substantive and managerial
information. Program managers must make a serious effort
to reduce this burden.
--Finally, there will develop in the coming years, many new
opportunities to improve the product and performance of
the Intelligence Community by maximizing inter-agency
cooperation. We must look for these new ways to make an
integrated intelligence process out of our individual activities.
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With respect to substantive matters, DCID 1/2 has been revised to
address national intelligence objectives and priorities. This should
be of assistance to program managers in their program development.
In developing the optimum combination of collection and analysis within
resource constraints, the pattern of resource use will be influenced by
current gaps and deficiences. Thus, the following are some of the
problems which face us:
-- While the Community has an improving ability to monitor
Soviet military capabilities and deployments, there is little
known about Soviet strategic intentions. What will Soviet
military objectives be now that there is approximate strategic
parity? Will they be more aggressive in their commitment
of conventional forces under the umbrella of strategic parity?
Will their R&D efforts be oriented toward technological
competition alone, or to the achievement of surpassing
military strength? Will they free resources for domestic
purposes?
-- With regard to China, over time we must develop means to
provide the same kinds of intelligence which we have for the
USSR. Some questions are: what strategic and conventional
military strength are the Chinese trying to achieve? What
are Chinese intentions toward the US, the USSR, South and
Southeast Asia, and Japan? What problems face the Chinese
in their domestic affairs, economic and political?
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-- There is a class of problems which is essentially scientific
or technical in nature but which is amenable to a broad mix
of analytical and collection efforts. For example, with
respect to Soviet strategic weaponry, it is now highly
important to emphasize the study of quality since the
question of quantity is more easily solved. With respect
to both the USSR and China the Community needs to know
more about the results of underground nuclear testing and about
the "drawing board" stages of foreign technological development,
especially for long lead-time weaponry, but also for non-
military R&D. Yet an understanding of what is going on
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-- International economic relations have assumed greater importance
and the potential difficulties for the US in this field are profound.
Economic issues seem to be sufficiently strong to cause the
separation of European interests from those of the US. In
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--Questions concerning Free World military forces are also
likely to take on greater importance. This is particularly
true if intelligence is to adequately advise policy makers
during negotiations for Mutual Balanced Force Reductions
and in the period following any agreements.
-- While many of the less developed countries of the world are
currently of little security interest to the US, their economic
and political problems can disrupt US access to important
natural resources. Over time, the growing imbalance in
quality of life between citizens in consumer nations and
those who live in countries which produce rminly raw
materials may increase the magnitude of this problem.
US intelligence mist be especially sensitive to such develop-
ments in their early stages.
--Finally, new initiatives must be taken in conceptualizing the
problems of intelligence. Every agency should expend some
effort on the development of new analytical methodologies -- in
the soft sciences as well as the hard. There should be general
improvement in the ability of the Community to forecast with
longer lead time developments elsewhere in the world, whether
coups or insurgencies, the likely impact on another country
of some US policy, or the probability that a new offensive
or defensive weapon capability will be developed by a hostile
country.
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I must be able to assure the President and the Congress that
the managerial and substantive concerns which I have outlined
above are being seriously addressed by the Community. Attention
to the quality of the intelligence effort and to its management should
increase the confidence of both primary consumers in the intelligence
product and in the reasonableness of its cost.
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