THE USIB COMMITTEE SURVEY TASK GROUP REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00531R000100020006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 59
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 1, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
The USIB Committee
Survey Task Group Report
August 1973
NRO review(s) completed.
Top Secret
DM IC
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THE USIB COMMITTEE SURVEY TASK GROUP REPORT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
1. PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . 1
III. SURVEY TASK GROUP FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
IV. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
V. SURVEY TASK GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . 5
ANNEX A The Framework for Community Level Committee/Staff
Roles and Functions
ANNEX B Survey Task Group Individual Committee Highlights
ANNEX C Alternative USIB Committee Structures
ANNEX D Statistical Material and Miscellaneous Data
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THE USIB COMMITTEE SURVEY TASK GROUP REPORT
To survey USIB committees as a basis for recommendations to the DCI
on the role and functioning of the committees and the organizational
position of the committee chairmen, with a goal of optimizing committee
support for the USIB and the I RAC and for the DCI in both his community
program and his managerial responsibilities.
1. On 16 March 1973 the DCI authorized the D/DCI/IC to survey the
USIB committee structure and give his recommendations on the role,
functions, and organizational position of the committee chairmen.
2. A three-man task group of IC staff members was formed on 21
March to conduct the survey and report on its findings. The task group
examined the activities of the 15 USIB committees in terms of their
professional support to USIB in carrying out its duties as described in NSCID
No. 1 to advise and assist the DCI with respect to:
(1) The establishment of appropriate intelligence objectives,
requirements and priorities.
(2) The production of national intelligence.
(3) The supervision of the dissemination and security of
intelligence material.
(4) The protection of intelligence sources and methods.
(5) As appropriate, policies with respect to arrangements
with foreign governments on intelligence matters.
3. The task group also examined the capabilities of the present
committees to support the DCI and the I RAC in the areas of intelligence
production and resource management.
4. The task group used the concurrently developed DCI
memorandum for the President, "Objectives for the Intelligence
Community," and "The DCI's Perspective of the Intelligence Environment"
as input guidance for its efforts.
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5. A questionnaire was sent to each of the 15 committee chairmen
requesting basic data on committee functions, membership, staffing,
publications and activities. Each of the committee chairmen was interviewed,
and USI B members and observers (except for AEC and the FBI) were either
interviewed or provided their views in writing to the task group. A number
of other key officials of the intelligence community also were interviewed.
6. Highlights of the Survey Task Group's findings on the individual
committees are described in Annex B of this report.
7. The task group next addressed the following questions:
a. How does the community decision-making process operate?
b. What roles and functions are essential to support the DC l's
community program and his USI B and I RAC advisory group?
c. How should these roles and functions be structured to assure
the DCI and the community managers effective inputs to the
community decision-making process?
8. The processes by which the task group addressed these questions
are described in Annex A, which provides the framework for the findings
and recommendations.
III. SURVEY TASK GROUP FINDINGS
9. The present community committee structure is an historically
developed bureaucratic patchwork which lacks any systematic interactive
capability to support community level management and decision making.
10. Much of the committee output tends to be ad hoc, primarily
because of a lack of management direction. Self-generated activities and
make-work projects abound as the committees seek to interpret what they
consider to be current policy trends and decision needs.
11. The CIA directorates dominate the community committee
structure. CIA personnel chair nearly all community committees and almost
half of the sub-committees and working groups. CIA provides most of the
committee staff personnel and drafts nearly all of the committee outputs.
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12. The issuance of collection "requirements" and "guidance" by most
committees tends to be an ineffective use of committee time and resources
for the following reasons:
a. Such requirements are generally uncoordinated with respect
to any integrated collection guidance system or objective strategy.
b. Most substantive intelligence requirements lack a common
prioritization base and/or have no prioritization indication at all.
c. For the most part, these requirements do not actually drive
collection programs and are not structured for collector performance
evaluation.
d. They are often viewed as merely necessary outputs to show
that "collection requirements" exist, although it is unofficially
recognized that they have little or no operative impact upon collection
system decision behavior and actions.
13. Nearly all of the so-called collection and production committees
lay claim to providing collection guidance and making evaluations of the
collection effort. For the most part all of these efforts are uncoordinated
and devoid of any means of determining their own effectiveness. Only
COMIREX appears to have a systemmatic, closed-loop approach and
endeavors to provide feedback to both operators and management. It is
significant that COMIREX is the only committee in which the community is
paying the price of having such a job done; i.e., by provision of a full-time
management staff with a chairman who has appropriate contacts with the
program managers.
14. The community committee structure tends to neglect any
meaningful guidance and evaluation of processing and exploitation.
15. The use of community committees in the national intelligence
production area has been of limited value.
a. To date, few committees have had any involvement in
intelligence input to NSSMs and committee inputs to NIEs have in
recent years declined in importance as compared with organizational
contributions.
b. Inputs from one or another organization tend to dominate
most committee production output. The product is more often than
not oriented to a particular narrow field; e.g., nuclear energy, missiles,
etc.
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c. Specialization of this type tends to fragment individual
agency views on the larger consumer problems and issues to which
national intelligence products are intended to respond.
d. The primary rationale for such committee production activity
has been the coordination of subject matter. However, more often than
not the result is duplicative and without adequate consideration of the
interdisciplinary variables in the broader context of the basic issues.
16. The roles and functions essential to support the DCI's authoritative
leadership of the community and his USIB and IRAC advisory groups can be
accomplished with or without a community committee structure.
17. The choices are among: (a) a strong central community
management staff with participants detailed from community agencies; (b) a
community committee structure with appropriate full-time participants
detailed to each committee; or (c) some combination of a full-time staff with
committee assistance.
18. Whether staff or committee, the salient point is that full-time
personnel are necessary if the DCI is to accomplish community level
management control including an effective evaluation program; i.e., one that
closes the loop between input demand criteria and performance output.
19. The advantages of retaining some form of committee structure are
behavioral; i.e., avoidance of the appearance of a large management staff and
provision of a sense of participation to all major community elements.
However, the management need has been stated clearly and it is not a free
good. Disadvantages of a committee system include a lack of direct
control, greater inefficiency, and compromises which often result in softness
of judgments and recommendations.
20. The advantage of the staff approach is essentially one of direct
management control. Disadvantages include the requirement for more
personnel than have thus far been planned for the DCI staff and a greater
potential for line/staff confrontation.
21. If a DCI/USIB community committee system is to be retained, it
must be an interrelated group of committees tied to an evaluation strategy
in support of the community level decision and policy making process, and
to the output of an improved national intelligence product. To attain these
goals, several basic rules are essential:
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a. Management control must rest with the DCI and committee
chairmen should be responsible to him and detailed to his staff.
b. The DCI should invest in a small, full-time, coordinating and
monitoring capability to ensure that the committees perform effectively
and in coordination with USIB and with his Intelligence Community
staff.
c. Community coordination of national intelligence products
should be achieved through management controls emanating from the
DCI level. Committee responsibilities for provision of coordinated
intelligence community products must be clearly understood by all
production organizations, and arrangements made for objective
presentation of alternate views and interpretations, as appropriate.
d. The major program and product evaluation tasks must not be
placed in the hands of those being evaluated.
e. The role and functions of each committee should be stated
explicitly, with clear indication as to how the committees relate to each
other and to other community elements such as the I RAC and the
DC I's Intelligence Community staff.
22. Five alternative USI B committee structure options were considered
by the task group. Alternative A, which is being recommended, involves the
establishment of seven geographic and three topical committees, retention of
the Security Committee with expanded responsibilities, and the Watch
Committee. Four Support Groups also are recommended. Alternatives B,C,
D and E are described in Annex C.
A. The Geographic Committees
23. The task group recommends that the following USIB geographic
committees be established:
b. The USIB Committee on the People's Republic of China
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d. The USI B Committee on the Far East and South Asia
e. The USI B Committee on Southeast Asia
f. The USIB Committee on the Middle East and Africa
g. The USIB Committee on Latin America
24. Each of the above committees would be responsible for:
a. Evaluating the responsiveness of intelligence production,
processing, and collection to consumer needs and intelligence objectives
and priorities.
b. Responding to NSCIC and DCI guidance in the production of
estimates (NIEs, NIAMs, and NSSM inputs), assigning responsibilities
for inputs, and overseeing the coordination of products and reports.
c. Reviewing and evaluating on a quarterly basis the
performance of existing intelligence assets in terms of intelligence
objectives.
d. Reporting to USIB quarterly on its evaluation results with
recommendations for issuance of DCI guidance to program managers.
25. Each geographic committee would have a full-time chairman who
would be detailed to and responsible to the DCI. Each geographic committee
would have a full-time staff commensurate with its workload. Staff members
detailed to these committees would be from community agencies and
represent an equitable input on the part of USI B participants.
26. The geographic committees' quarterly reports to USIB would:
a. List the primary substantive priorities for the current quarter
and indicate changes from prior quarter objectives.
b. Show primary producer schedules of product output related
to objectives.
c. Provide an evaluation of current production capabilities in
meeting consumer needs.
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d. Provide an evaluation of progress made on gaps and
deficiencies in prior quarter performance by collection source.
e. Provide an evaluative projection of the ability of each
collection source to fill listed gaps and deficiencies in the coming
quarter.
B. Topical Committees
f. Recommend USIB guidance on tasking for management
centers of collection, processing, and production.
27. The organization of USIB committees along geographic lines would
enable the development of intelligence strategies that are oriented toward
policy needs as opposed to intelligence resource or topical subject
(disciplinary) interests. For example, policy issues involving the PRC would
be assigned to the PRC Committee to produce an evaluation of collection,
processing and production assets in terms of their performance and
capabilities in meeting the policy need.
28. The task group recommends the formation of two new topical
committees and the retention of one of the exisiting USIB
substantively-oriented committees:
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a. The USI B Committee on Strategic Weapons and SALT
b. The USIB Committee on General Purpose Forces and MBFR
c. The USIB Economic Intelligence Committee
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29. The subject matter of some problems of very high USIB and DCI
interest involves more than one geographic area, or is of such significance as
to call for a particular focus of attention. Intelligence relating to strategic
arms limitation agreements falls in the latter category and is considered of
sufficient importance to warrant the establishment of a committee devoted
to strategic weapons/SALT matters.
30. The MBFR problem might be handled jointly by the USIB
aw Pact
I I but in view o pen cling negotiations it
is c nsi ere a' e potential importance of this topic is sufficient to call
for establishment of a committee specifically charged with intelligence
relating to MBFR.
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31. Some economic intelligence undoubtedly will come within the
cognizance of individual geographic committees, but the interregional, even
worldwide, importance of a considerable number of economic intelligence
problems is considered to justify retention of the existing EIC. Economic
intelligence involves a considerable number of non-USI B organizations which
now participate in the work of the EIC and its sub-committees. A
government-wide economic intelligence mechanism is considered desirable,
and the EIC can provide such. Another option for the handling of USIB
economic intelligence functions would be the establishment of an Economic
Intelligence Support Group (see paragraph 37).
32. The provisions set forth in paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 for the
geographic committees also would apply to the three topical committees.
C. The USIB Security Committee
33. Recognizing that such community level security problems as
compartmentation and foreign release require the responsible attention of
corporate intelligence management on a full-time basis, the task group
recommends that a USIB Security Committee be retained with provision
made for a full-time chairman and staff.
34. The task group further recommends that responsibilities of the
Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee be assigned to the new
Security Committee.
D. Disposition of Existing USIB Committees and Their Functions
35. The task group recommends that the seven geographic committees,
the three topical committees, and the Security Committee be recognized as
the primary USIB committees, and that four support groups be established.
These support groups would absorb the functions of eight existing USIB
Committees. The groups would be tasked by the USIB or, under guidelines
approved by the DCI, directly by the primary committees. The chairman of
each support group would function as action officer for all USIB-related
actions. The support provided by the collection-oriented support groups
would be essentially in the area of advice on collection strategies, on the
consolidation of requirements, on the application of priorities by collection
system, and on specific security problems.
36. The recommended support groups are as follows:
a. The I REX Support Group: This group would be composed of
the current COMIREX permanent chairman and staff and would
continue to carry out present COMIREX responsibilities related to the
guidance, tasking, and evaluation of the reconnaissance imagery
program.
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b. The SIGINT Support Group: This group would be under the
chairmanship of a representative of NSA in recognition of the DI RNSA
responsibility for SIGINT asset tasking and the USIB responsibility to
provide adequate guidance to such tasking. The group would replace the
SIGINT Committee.
c. The Human Sources Support Group: This group would be
composed of a chairman from CIA/DDO and re re en
from all agencies with human source assets
The group would replace three present US committees -- the Human
Sources Committee, and
Interagency Clandestine Collection riorities Committee
d. The Foreign Science and Technology Group: This group
would provide foreign scientific and technical support to the primary
committees and would absorb the functions of the Guided Missile and
Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC), the Joint Atomic
Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), and the Scientific Intelligence
Committee (SIC). The primary focus of this group would be on direct
support of the Strategic Weapons/SALT Committee. Functions of the
group would include monitoring the adequacy of technical information
on the capabilities and characteristics of strategic nuclear weapons and
weapons systems, and participating in the formulation of collection
strategies to meet the needs for intelligence on such weapons and
weapons systems. The chairman would be selected by the DCI and the
group would include representatives of all organizations now having
membership on GMAIC, JAEIC or SIC.
37. Optionally, rather than continue the present Economic Intelligence
Committee as one of the topical committees, an Economic Support Group
could be established, composed of a chairman from CIA/DDI and members
representing all of the agencies involved in the production of economic
intelligence. This group would provide support on economic intelligence
matters to each of the geographic committees.
a. The current Watch Committee be continued pending a USIB
and DCI decision on the warning and crisis management issue;
b. The Intelligence Handling Committee (I HQ be disestablished
and its functions and permanent personnel transferred to the DCI's
Intelligence Community staff;
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c. The Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC) be
disestablished;
d. The Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee
(TSCC) be disestablished and its functions assumed by the USIB
Security Committee;
e. The National Intelligence Survey Committee (NIS) be
disestablished and any remaining functions, such as publication of the
Basic Intelligence Factbook, be made the responsibility of the
CIA/DDI; and
f. Appropriate DCI Ds be prepared to implement the
recommended changes in the USIB committee structure and action be
initiated to make such changes as may be required in current NSCIDs.
E. Major Reasons for the Recommended Selection
39. Considerations which led the Survey Task Group to recommend a
USI B committee structure which is basically geographic and topical in nature
are:
a. Such a structure is target and product oriented in terms of
consumer needs and approved intelligence objectives to a greater extent
than are the other alternatives examined.
b. Geographic committees facilitate cross program/function
evaluation and objective issue identification and resolution.
c. This structure supports focus of attention on primary
management evaluation problems at the community level: e.g., the
assessment of the relative worth of major collection/exploitation
systems in terms of approved objectives and cost/benefit considerations.
d. The recommended committee structure requires an
interdisciplinary approach to problems.
e. With the DCI having reported the plans to replace the Board
and Office of National Estimates, a geographic and topical committee
structure is more adaptable than the existing pattern of committees for
use in the development of NIEs, NIAMs and intelligence inputs to
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I. Overall, a geographic committee structure is considered to be
better suited to the behavioral patterns required by the evolving new
DCI community-level evaluation and management review procedures
than are the existing committee structure and existing committee
bureaucratic practices.
40. While each of the other alternatives (described in Annex C)
possesses some advantages unique to its structure and to the institutional
environment of the intelligence community, no other alternative is
considered to match the geographic/ topical committees with respect to the
above-listed set of interactive considerations.
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The Framework for Community Level Committee/Staff
Roles and Functions
1. The purpose of this general statement is to provide an overview
and framework for the objectives and findings of the Survey Task Group
report.
2. After having looked at the functions and operations of each of the
committees, the Survey Task Group addressed the following questions:
process?
a. What is our understanding of the community decision-making
b. What roles and functions are essential to support the DCI's
community program and his USI B and I RAC advisory groups?
c. How should these roles and functions be structured to assure
the DCI and community managers effective inputs to the community deci-
sion-making process?
3. A number of key assumptions regarding concept were rriade.
a. If USIB is to carry out its primary responsibilities as listed in
NSCID No. 1 (Revised February 1972), it must have a mechanism for the
continuous review and evaluation of existing intelligence assets in terms of
consumer needs and substantive objectives. This mechanism and its output is
essential not only to allow USIB to provide meaningful guidance to collec-
tion and production assets, but also is a vital USIB input to the IRAC
resource allocation consideration.
b. IRAC's concern is primarily one of future assets and the
resource allocations required to provide them. The I RAC view of the relative
value of existing resources must essentially be derived from USIB and
integrated in its evaluations and studies for future resource allocations.
C. The relation of the IC staff to the NSCIC, USIB, and IRAC
activities is one of coordinating and monitoring these activities to assure that
DCI corporate community management actions and decisions result in a
compatible community program which meets stated DCI policies and objec-
tives.
4. As a point of departure, the problem was addressed in terms of the
fundamental divisions or sub-systems of the intelligence process; namely (a)
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collection, (b) processing and exploitation, and (c) production. The support
functions, such as security and information handling, were each handled as
separate problems.
5. At the outset it was recognized that a large part of the problem of
discussing roles and functions at the community level was one of language
and reducing ambiguity to a point where usage was effective.
6. In this context, the Survey Task Group found it essential to
explicity define and clarify many terms which, although often in common
community usage, were far too ambiguous for effective use in the survey. In
one sense, they are more than definitions, they are the foundation and
framework of the survey's findings, alternatives, and recommendations.
Intelligence Objectives
7. One of the primary functions of the USIB is to advise and assist
the DCI in the establishment of appropriate intelligence objectives. However,
the NSCIC has been charged by the President to provide direction and
guidance on national substantive intelligence needs upon which national
intelligence objectives are to be based.
Current Intelligence Objectives
8. In operative form, current intelligence objectives are expressed by
consumers at the national level through requests for NSSM inputs, for NIEs
or for special intelligence estimates. In the absence of specific requests for
intelligence, elements of the national intelligence community exercise initia-
tives in an attempt to anticipate consumer needs. The development of "key
intelligence questions for FY 1974" which the DCI has initiated is a new
aspect of the community effort to develop formal expression of intelligence
objectives.
Projecting Intelligence Objectives for Planning
9. A primary issue involved in projecting substantive intelligence
objectives for planning purposes is determining the relative value or priority
applicable to each topic. Another issue or problem relates to the method of
arriving at an expression of such objectives. The current method of preparing
the Attachment to DCID 1/2, "US Intelligence Objectives and Priorities,"
uses an ad hoc committee process involving representatives from community
organizations. The NSCIC and its Working Group are not thus far involved in
the process, although guidance in this area is a NSCIC function.
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10. A third issue related to such objectives is their use and impact
upon decision making at the various levels of intelligence management.
Inasmuch as no systemmatic evaluation at either the community manage-
ment or lower levels takes place using the objectives and their relative values
as a criteria, there is some reason to suspect the effectiveness of the objective
statement and their priorities as a form of guidance, especially in the case of
collection programs.
11. From an operative decision and management standpoint, the ob-
jectives and their relative values are essential to one important form of
management evaluation; this is the evaluation of the performance of each of
the existing collection systems over a given period related to given objectives
(i.e., cross program or inter-program). The net evaluation of a collection
system is a function of both its performance relative to a given objective as
well as the relative value of the objective in the objective universe. (See
Collection Systems Relative Evaluation below.)
12. The Survey Group divided collection into the following basic
groups:
a. Imagery
b. COM I NT
c. Telemetr
d. ELINT E
e. Human sources (including open sources)
13. These basic groups were then looked at in terms of the following
functional tasks or variables, and their relation to the community level
management and decision problem.
14. Collection Operational Tasking: This function is wholly within the
province of the collection operator/manager. There is no community level
management role required. (Collection Tasking Guidance is considered to be
apart from Collection Operational Tasking and is noted below.)
15. Collection Tasking Guidance: This is current guidance for a given
collection type (i.e., imagery, COMINT, etc.) which is based upon and stated
in terms of:
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a. Substantive guidance derived from intelligence objectives and
reduced to specifics by the production function.
b. The technical and operational environment and its
constraints.
16. The community level management problem in the case of
collection tasking guidance is one of determining the degree of guidance
required by the specific collection operator. The problem is complicated by
the variation of substantive capabilities found in the collection organizations
and the managerial arrangements under which each operates.
17. For example, NSA possesses a high degree of substantive
knowledge resulting from the fact of its integrated exploitation and
production activities. Behaviorally, NSA believes it has the necessary
knowledge and expertise to provide tasking guidance to the CSS collection
effort. As a result, NSA tends to regard tasking guidance from the
community level as an intrusion.
18. It is in this same sense that the collection programs closely related
to CIA, DIA, and State/INR tend to regard efforts to influence their
operational activities through tasking guidance.
19. In the case of NRO, the fact is that it is institutionally isolated
from the primary exploitation of its imagery collection effort (i.e., NPIC)),
as well as from the substantive concerns of intelligence production. As a
result, the external provision of collection tasking guidance is essential,
hence the large permanent COMI REX staff.
20. Both collection planning and programming guidance and tasking
guidance require a high degree of cooperation from the production,
collection and management staff personnel involved. All three require a
sharing of collection, production, and management information.
21. Collection Planning and Programming Guidance: This is basic
mid-range community level guidance for a given collection type (i.e.,
imagery, COMINT, etc.) which is based upon and stated in terms of:
a. Substantive guidance derived from intelligence objectives and
reduced to specifics by the production function.
b. The technical, operational, and budget environments and their
constraints.
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c. The evaluation by community level management of the
relative value of collection systems in reaching specific intelligence
objectives. (This is primarily an IRAC concern with evaluations of current
performance from USIB.)
22. Collection Program Evaluation: The purpose of collection program
evaluation at the community level is primarily to aid decision making in
resource tasking and allocations. It also functions as feedback guidance to
collection development, collection tasking, and production analysis.
Collection Program Evaluation has two basic forms, collection system pro-
gram evaluation and collection systems relative evaluation.
23. Collection System Program Evaluation: This is evaluation of the
performance of a given collection system (i.e., imagery, COMINT, etc. and
divisions thereof) expressed in terms of its effectiveness (including costs) in
meeting collection planning and programming guidance and collection task-
ing guidance. The key to this type of evaluation is that the performance
effectiveness criteria must be directly related to the substantive guidance. It
is the point at which substantive, technical, operation, and cost factors must
be joined. The best example of this type of evaluation in the community
today is in the COMIREX effort.
24. Individual collection system program evaluation is primarily the
task of the collection manager as opposed to the corporate community level
management (which should be more concerned with collection system
relative evaluation.)
25. During the past 25 years of incremental budgeting, the tendency of
community level management has been to orient its decision making and
program review forums toward functional and institutional, as opposed to
objective concerns. Recognition of the need for cross program evaluation
and review is primarily a function of decrement budget decisions which
emphasize the need for corporate community level management to
implement the decrement policy effectively.
26. The point is that community level management structures (i.e., the
IC staff and USIB committee structure) require revision to ensure
productivity on agreed targets and objectives. Community level management
needs to impress upon collection system managers the requirement for better
individual collection program evaluation to be undertaken by the operating
manager, while community level management emphasizes cross program
(inter-program) evaluation.
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27. Collection Systems Relative Evaluation: The purpose of this type
of evaluation is to provide the relative value of the performance of each of
the existing collection systems as they relate to a given intelligence objective.
The burden for this type of evaluation must fall predominantly upon the
production function because only the production function integrates all
sensor inputs in producing intelligence for consumers. However, where such
evaluations are projective in nature, collection as well as processing and
exploitation expertise are required.
28. There is no integrated or systematic plan for this type of
evaluation in the current committee structure; however, individual
committees have made approaches to the problem (i.e., IGCP under the
SIGINT Committee and JAEIC. An example of this tendency can also be
found in a CIA program in DDI/IRS.)
29. The need for collections system relative evaluation played a key
role in the survey group consideration of alternative structures and functions
of USI B committees.
Processing and Exploitation
30. Processing and Exploitation (P&E) is the turning of the raw form
of sensor-derived information into forms suitable for use by the production
function. Examples are imagery interpretation, telemetry tape analysis and
interpretation, COMINT traffic analysis, etc.
31. The Survey Group divided processing and exploitation into the
same grouping as collection:
a. Imagery P&E
b. COMINT P&E
c. Telemetry P&E
d. ELI NT and other technical sensor P&E
e. Human Sources P&E
32. Again, as in the case of collection, these basic groups were looked
at in terms of the following functional tasks and their relation to community
level management and decision problems.
33. Processing and Exploitation Tasking: This is direct operational
tasking and wholly within the province of the P&E operator/manager.
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34. Processing and Exploitation Planning and Programming Guidance:
This is basic planning and programming guidance from the community level
for a given P&E type (i.e., imagery, etc.). As indicated in paragraph 21,
above.
35. Processing and Exploitation Tasking Guidance: This is current P&E
tasking guidance for a given P&E type (i.e., COMINT, etc.) which is based
upon and stated in terms of:
a. Production function substantive, analytical and format needs
and priorities.
b. Collection feedback needs.
c. Technical, operational and cost factors of the P&E process
36. Processing and Exploitation Program Evaluation: The purpose of
P&E Program Evaluation at the community level is primarily to aid decision
makers in resource tasking and allocation. It also functions as feedback
guidance to P&E management.
37. At the present time, there is a need for two basic forms of P&E
program evaluation. One is the evaluation of a given P&E system (i.e.,
imagery, etc.) expressed in terms planning and programming guidance and
tasking guidance. The second, is the evaluation of allocation of, and
opportunities for allocation of, P&E responsibilities for the maintenance of
designated content reference files and data bases.
38. There is too little attention given to either of these evaluations in
the current committee system. The main point is that there is no strategy of
systematic arrangement of P&E program evaluation on the community level.
39. The community level problem with the actual production of
national intelligence involves:
a. Allocation of production responsibilities among producers in
the community, some of a planned redundant basis and others on a unique
basis.
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b. Tasking arrangements with the community production
organizations in terms of their interests and capabilities.
c. Assembling the community production organization inputs
and providing a single national intelligence product which meets specific
consumer needs and identifies divergent community producer views and
measured uncertainties.
40. Production Tasking: Because the national intelligence product is
not the result of any single producer, the tasking of community producers
for national intelligence products must be the responsibility of DCI level
management. To date such tasking for national level production has not been
centralized. For example, the NIE and NSSM tasking arrangements are today
separate and essentially uncoordinated. The DCI is currently reviewing the
problem in a context apart from this survey. The DCI also has presented to
USIB a plan for establishment on his staff of National Intelligence Officers
having geographic or topical responsibilities.
41. Production Planning and Programming Guidance: Under current
planning, this function will essentially be achieved through the following:
a. DCI guidance to the community
b. NSCIC guidance
c. Consumer research projects
d. Guidance from D/DCI/IC Product Review Group
42. Production Tasking Guidance: This is de facto the terms of
reference for any given national intelligence product. Here again, the subject
is currently a part of another D/DCI/IC review.
43. Production Evaluation: This evaluation has two aspects: (a) pro-
duction evaluation, and (b) evaluation of production process factors, i.e.,
qualitative and quantitative manpower needs, machine support needs, train-
ing needs, methods and techniques, etc.
44. Production Evaluation: The most effective form of product
evaluation is that done directly by the consumer. This area is also the
concern of another D/DCI/IC review.
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45. Evaluation of Production Process Factors: This function is the long
term concern of the D/DCI/IC program for product improvement. It is also
the concern of every production manager.
46. It is recognized that there are many miscellaneous activities coord-
inated within the present committee structure related to such items as
sanitization, release to foreign governments, etc. Under a revised USIB
committee structure such items would flow through the D/DCI/IC and
action officers assigned accordingly within the staff, the USIB Committee
structure, or departments and agencies as appropriate.
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ANNEX B
Survey Task Group Individual Committee Highlights
Introduction
1. The problem of presenting comprehensive statements on the 15
USI B Committees and their 54 subcommittees and working groups is not the
purpose of this annex. What is attempted is to provide highlights of Survey
Group findings as they relate to each of the committees.
2. Annex D, Tab 1 lists all of the committees and their subcom-
mittees and working groups and shows the distribution of chairmen by
government agency or department for the subcommittees and working
groups. Tab 2 of Annex C is designed to give the reader a feeling for the
number of people involved in the effort and the activity engendered.
3. Annex D, Tab 3 shows the distribution of full-time personnel
assigned to USIB committees and represents another way of looking at the
effort being devoted to community management through the committee
structure. The purpose of Tab 4, Annex C which lists the papers submitted
to USI B by each of the committees over the past fifteen months is again, to
provide the reader with some insight to committee activities.
4. The order in which the committees are covered in this annex is not
particularly significant.
I lAs the Survey Group found, this distinction is
not a very useful one in terms of the actual roles and functions performed by
these committees. The customary classification suggests a good deal more
order and systematic nature in the committee system than was found to
exist.
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COMMITTEE ON IMAGERY REQUIREMENTS AND
EXPLOITATION (COMIREX)
5. COMIREX is the largest community committee with a full-time
chairman and staff which includes 22 professionals and five clericals.
6. The primary difference between COM I R EX and the other USIB
"collection" committees such as SIGINT and IPC, is that COMIREX has
evolved a systematic and closed loop procedure for imagery collection
involving requirements guidance, system tasking guidance, and collection
performance evaluation in terms of individual systems.
7. The COMIREX Standing Collection Guidance is tailored to the
collection system demands making it directly usable by the collection system
management in system planning and programming.
B. The COMIREX collection tasking guidance is a part of a collection
strategy oriented toward the operational and system environment as well as
consumer needs. The Tasking Guidance is fed directly to system operating
management.
9. COMIREX collection evaluation procedures are designed for im-
mediate feedback for mission planning and periodic evaluation of the entire
collection program for higher level management purposes.
10. The COMIREX-NRO relationship has resulted in one primary
channel to the operator from his consumming community. The effort is
dynamic and continuously being refined. The system operates with a well
organized data handling system which is focused upon the evaluation objec-
tives.
11. Evaluation- of the imagery exploitation effort is not organized as
well as the collection evaluation. This is particularly true in the instance of
the "Phase 3 Basic" monitoring and maintenance effort. An in-depth in-
vestigation of the exploitation effort with recommendations for correction is
required.
12. COM I R EX has attempted to function as a "program project of-
fice" for the planning and programming
This includes, (1) processing and exploitation, (2) dissemination to
users, and (3) feedback guidance to the collection system. COM I REX lacks
adequate authority and manpower to carry out this task. It does not seem
reasonable that a system costing E_ I should lack
adequate management and organization ot its pay-ott sub-system.
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13, Decision lines from the Chairman, COMIREX to the national level
for which he works are blurred. He currently reports to the CIA/DDI on
substantive matters, the CIA/DDS&T on technical matters, and the
D/DCI/IC on matters of community policy,
14. COMIREX-NRO frictions are at reasonable levels considering the
fact that any intelligence guidance/tasking/evaluation system which attempts
to address itself to the collection, technical and operational environment is
going to result in points of contention between the consumer-oriented input
and operational factors.
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15. The primary functions of the SIGINT Committee are to provide
coordinated guidance to the cryptologic community and to evaluate the
responsiveness of SIGINT resources to US needs for intelligence. The com-
mittee has no full-time personnel assigned despite the fact that its area of
concern is larger and more complex in many ways than that of COMIREX.
16. The Committee, with the assistance of its SIGINT Overhead
Reconnaissance Subcommittee (SOBS), provides five-year guidance for satel-
lite systems. This guidance provides a substantive rationale for planning and
programming, but does not actually resolve or control technical options or
costs, respectively, by fiscal year. Also, with SORS assistance, the Com-
mittee provides collection tasking guidance in an attempt to optimize the
application of particular SIGINT payloads, but actual operational tasking is
accomplished by NRO components with NSA assistance.
17. SORS does not routinely attempt to provide exploitation guidance
to community components such as NSA, CIA, FTD and their supporting
contractors, nor does the SIGINT Committee attempt to provide practical
evaluations of the performance of overhead systems.
19. COMINT collection and reporting guidance exists as
Intelligence ui ance for COMINT Programming (IGCP). Suchguidance,
completed and issued in 1970 at the insistence of OSD (DDR&E), has not
been kept up-to-date or refined because of NSA intransigence and past
chairmens' unwillingness to become involved in programs/budgets/-
management issues. The Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee (IGS), sponsor
of this type of programming and reporting guidance, met only three times
during 1972, and then only at the insistence of DIA and CIA.
20. The SIGINT Evaluation Subcommittee (SES) has never met since
it was chartered in about 1970.
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22. The SIGINT Committee does not have an orderly and systematic
program for the evaluation of COMINT, ELINT, and Telemetry collection
and exploitation programs based upon national intelligence objectives and
priorities and the system oriented guidance derived from those objectives.
23. There is a tendency to regard the SIGINT Committee task and
responsibility as being similar to that of COMI REX. It is not, nor can it be so
under the current institutional arrangements and responsibilities assigned to
the Director of NSA and CCS. The fact is that NSA's capabilities in the
substantive, technical, and operational areas of SIGINT make detailed task-
ing guidance from without unnecessary and behaviorally unacceptable.
24. The real problem area is evaluation of the types of SIGINT and of
the systems within each type in terms of substantive intelligence objectives.
25. The Director of NSA is responsible, for example, for making
technical evaluations of competing COMINT, ELINT, and Telemetry sys-
tems. However, the Director of NSA should not be asked to provide relative
evaluations of the performance of such systems in meeting intelligence
objectives. This should be a function of corporate community management.
The information input needs to accomplish such relative evaluations require
a degree of explicit SIGINT system information which has heretofore neither
been available to, nor organized by corporate community management.
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INTERAGENCY CLANDESTINE COLLECTION PRIORITIES
COMMITTEES (IPC)
26. The sole function of the IPC is to provide a community-agreed
listing of intelligence needs "whose fulfillment necessitates clandestine col-
lection operations by the Directorate of Operations of CIA." One full-time
professional is assigned to the Committee by CIA/DDO.
27. Unlike the other so-called collection committees of USIB, the IPC
has no responsibility for evaluation of the effort it is charged with guiding.
The IPC list is a compendium of broad intelligence needs which has little or
no relationship to the necessity for clandestine collection or to the capa-
bilities of clandestine collection.
28. The sole function of the IPC appears to be one of giving the
community a sense of participation in guiding the clandestine collection
program.
29. The Survey Group could only conclude that this committee serves
little more than a bureaucratic behavioral need and is useless to the com-
munity-level management and decision making process, to USI B, and to any
meaningful driving of the CIA Clandestine Service.
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HUMAN SOURCES COMMITTEE
30. The Human Sources Committee with no full -time staff support has
been in existence since the first of the year. Its terms of reference limit it
almost exclusively to matters pertaining to requirements processing.
31. Its Chairman, its staff support and its location within the Intelli-
gence Directorate of CIA will almost certainly cause the committee to be
viewed by other members of the intelligence community as something less
than a truly community organ.
32. Although functioning in the human source area, the committee's
future appears almost fatally flawed by the exclusion of the CIA clandestine
collection effort. Under present USIB committee structure, requirements for
clandestine collection are considered by the IPC Committee.
33. The Survey Task Group conclusion was that this committee has
little or no chance of making a meaningful contribution to the evaluation of
human sources as an input to community-level management or in effectively
guiding human source collection.
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JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (JAEIC)
38. JAEIC is the oldest of the committees and is the only USIB
committee named in the NSCIDs and given a specific mission.*
39. JAEIC is chaired by the Chief, Nuclear Energy Division, OSI/
DDS&T/CIA. The committee has a permanent staff of one professional and
one clerical, both provided by NED/OSI.
40. According to the Chairman, JAEIC spends Ilof its time con-
cerned with collection matters, most of it on the evaluation of collection
performance and collection R&D programs. Another JAEIC's time is
spent on production, three quarters of which is devoted to current intel-
ligence (near) all of which relates to reporting nuclear events). Of the
remaining II half is spent on processing and exploitation concerns and
nearly all of the remainder on other miscellaneous matters. of
JAEIC's time is attributed to "Identification of Consumer Needs."
43. In view of the DCI's expressed views of production needs, the
JAEIC production for NIEs appears to be outmoded. The nuclear produc-
tion organs of each community production center provide an essential
ingredient to the individual position of those centers on key consumer policy
matters. Under the circumstances the JAEIC arrangement tends to reduce
key uncertainties and differences before they are related to larger considera-
tions, such as in a strategic force estimate for particular policy concerns.
44. Thl f JAEIC time devoted to event reporting appears exces-
sive. In addition, there is reason to question the need for the degree of
coordination which exists in current intelligence nuclear event reporting.
*NSCID No. 3, p. 3, para. 7,d. "The production of intelligence on atomic energy is a
responsibility of all departments and agencies represented on the US Intelligence Board
with responsibilities for production of finished intelligence to be coordinated through the
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee structure.
(Underscoring added.)
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GUIDED MISSILE AND ASTRONAUTICS INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEE (GMAIC)
45. GMAIC is chaired by the Chief, Systems Division, FMSAC/
DDS&T/CIA. It has an office and permanent staff (one professional and two
secretaries) in the Pentagon.
46. GMAIC attributes 0of its effort to Production to Collec-
tion, nto Processing and Exploitation and,Qto Identification of Con-
sumer``(e'eds.
47. GMAIC's activities in the co 11 area are concerned with
collection re uirements and tasking
evalua ion of collection per-
I
formance and evaluation of co ec ,,,on R&D II All of these
activities ten to be ad hoc in nature. For example, there is little systematic
evaluation in terms of the relative value of each collection effort perform-
ance in terms of Soviet missile objectives.
48. GMAIC, like the other committees which coordinate particular
production inputs for N I Es , tends to reduce individual producer views to a
common denominator before they are related to larger concerns, such as
strategic force estimates or NSSMs.
49. Although GMAIC provides a forum for the exchange of informa-
tion in its subject area, the Survey Task Group found that its input to
community-level management and decision making was marginal. In the
fifteen month period from January 1972 through March 1973, GMAIC
submitted four actions for USIB consideration, only one of which required a
USIB decision,
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY COMMITTEE (NIS)
50, The NIS Committee is the USIB body responsible for management
of the National Intelligence Survey Program as directed and described in
NSCID No. 3
51. Its USIB Committee status provides a useful means for reflecting
community participation in the management of the program as well as
effective means for applying community pressure to achieve production
deadlines and assuring consistency of content and format.
52. The Chairman, the Director of OBGI, devotes aboutf his
time to committee affairs. About of all NIS inputs are contributed by
CIA (OBGI, OCI, OER) and CIA tun s the entire production program 0
Other substantive contributors to the
program are DIA and the Department of Commerce. State Department,
although not a substantive contributor, provides a useful review function.
53, The Committee does not prepare requirements nor does it task any
collectors. The Committee periodically conducts user surveys to determine
the value of its product.
54. The Survey Task Group concluded that the NIS program did not
require any formal committee structure. Since completion of the survey, the
DCI, with USIB concurrence, has decided to terminate the NIS program.
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SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (SIC)
55. SIC has no permanent staff but has eight subcommittees and/or
working groups.
56. The Chairman and Vice Chairman are from CIA/DDI
F___of the working group chairmen.
57. SIC has coordinated and published two publications since 1 Jan-
uary 1972, one on science and technology in PRC, and the other on Soviet
Military R&D.
58. SIC does not perform any explicit evaluation of collection or
exploitation programs relative to its subject areas,
59. There is no way of ascertaining whether its guidance to collection
programs is effective or ineffective.
60. Probably its most important function is as a forum for the ex-
change of information.
61. The Survey Group could not find any intrinsic rationale for the
continuance of the committee without a major redirection to support the
community management program.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (EIC)
62. The Economic Intelligence Committee has no permanent staff and
is essential) run /DDI
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time appears to be its ability to bring together the wider US economic
community in an exchange discussion of the issues and problems.
63. Coordination of production does not require such a committee.
The encyclopaedic nature of the Combined Economic Reporting Program
(CERP), its lack of prioritization or focus upon policy problems, and its lack
of adaptation to the technical and operational constraints of the sensor
systems it is supposed to be guiding, suggest that it is of questionable value.
In fact, the complete lack of any closed loop evaluation process in the
system does not allow for any measurement of the success of the guidance or
the performance of the collectors.
64. If this committee activity is to provide meaningful support to
community-level management, a major transformation is required.
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CRITICAL COLLECTION PROBLEMS COMMITTEE (CCPC)
65. The primary difference between the Critical Collection Problems
Committee (CCPC) and other USIB committees is that the CCPC has no
continuing responsibilities. The CCPC is a standing committee, available to
take on ad hoc assignments in the collection area as assigned by the DCI
or USIB, or at the request of one of the USIB agencies.
66. Tasks assigned to the committee usually concern the adequacy of
collection capabilities in a geographic area, the adequacy of collection
response for a substantive matter of interest such as narcotics, or an identifi-
cation of the impact of changing substantive priorities on collection.
67. CCPC studies frequently involve the consideration of substantive
production matters as well as collection matters. As a result, the committee
has been criticized by managers in the community for getting too far into
their responsibilities in both the collection and production areas. Similarly,
chairmen of committees such as SIGINT and COMIREX have been con-
cerned about the scope of CCPC findings and recommendations.
68. The conclusions and recommendations of the CCPC frequently
have only a subjective basis. The committee and its one-man secretariat have
no rigorous or systems-analytic capability.
69. Previous suggestions that it undertake post-mortem evaluations of
N I Es and SN I Es for the purpose of identifying collection gaps and deficien-
cies have been denied.
70. Follow-on collection tasking guidance for new resources recom-
mended by the committee has been left to appropriate collection managers.
71. The Survey Group could find no rationale for continuing this
committee except as a vehicle for study exploitation by the Chief, Planning
and Evaluation Group, IC staff, in support of community-level review
efforts.
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TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES COMMITTEE
(TSCC)
72. The TSCC has had a permanent staff of two professional and one
clerical and has reported to the D/DCI/IC.
73. The primary function which TSCC claims is the promotion and
coordination of the development and use of the means to defend US
personnel and facilities against penetration by technical surveillance.
74. Upon review, the real value of the committee appears to be the
knowledgeability and energy of its chairman in seeking out and finding
problem areas upon which he can bring to bear the force of a coordinated
community position or a reasonable arbitration.
75. Although the efforts of the present chairman of the TSCC have
been in retrospect essential to the effectiveness of many sensitive problem
areas which often transcended the explicit concerns of the TSCC mission, it
is doubtful that succeeding chairmen could operate in this manner.
76. The Survey Group found that normal TSCC concerns tend to
overlap considerably with the activities of the Security Committee and
concluded that the TSCC functions could best be handled in a reorganized
effort of the Security Committee.
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77. The Security Committee has two full time personnel, one profes-
sional and one clerical. The Chairman is the Director of Security, CIA.
78. Aside from its activities in the investigation of "leaks," the
Security Committee appears to be a rather inactive organ.
79. With respect to the Computer Security Subcommittee, the Chair-
man of the Security Committee suggested that this problem was a com-
munity issue more closely related to the IHC Committee concerns and
communication issues.
80. The principal problem of the current community Security Com-
mittee is that an attempt has been made to place the responsibility for com-
munity security problems upon a security manager (e.g., the Director of
Security, CIA) who already has a full-time job. Major community security
problems such as compartmentation, sanitization, release to foreign govern-
ments, etc., require continuing full-time attention and should be the respon-
sibility of a full-time chairman and supporting staff.
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81. The Survey Group concluded that any meaningful review of the
Watch Committee and the National Indications Center must be done in the
larger context of the strategic and tactical warning problem.
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THE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION HANDLING COMMITTEE (IHC)
82. The Information Handling Committee (IHC) of USIB is responsible
for facilitating the timely exchange of intelligence information and
promoting the continuous improvement of community information handling
resources. The chairman has been assigned to the D/DCI/IC Staff and is
supported by six full-time personnel.
83. The IHC membership has consisted largely of hardware-oriented
personnel. Accordingly, it has focused on questions of systems compati-
bility, data element and code standardization, description and inventory of
systems, training, sponsorship of symposia for exchange of information on
systems and techniques including secure handling of information, and the
development of a Community On-line Intelligence System (COINS) to deter-
mine the feasibility of making selected files in the community available to
multi-access from remote locations.
84. COINS has been a limited technical success but a substantive
failure because "cooperating agencies" have withheld support and current
data from the system, notably CIA.
85. While the IHC staff claimsiof the committee's time has
been concerned with soliciting community requirements for centralized data
bases, types of files, follow-on systems to COINS, computer security and
standards, it is fair to say that the committee actually has been dependent
upon other sources to identify and allocate responsibilities for the main-
tenance of centralized files in the community. For example, USI B approved
Intelligence Guidance for COMINT
86. The committee has not attempted the task of providing informa-
tion handling objectives and providing program guidance in functional and
resource terms. Similarly, the committee has not attempted rigorous survey
and evaluation of present information handling techniques, and corres-
pondingly has not identified hardware and software options available for
specific applications.
87. The committee has only recently begun the examination of the
interface between communications and information handling needs in the
community. The ever-growing information and data exchange in the com-
munity is a legitimate concern of major importance.
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88. The charter of the present Committee and composition (or-
ganization and membership) of the supporting secretariat and subcommittees
are simply not designed to have a real impact on information handling within
the community.
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1. The Recommendations presented in the basic study represent
Alternative A of the five alternative committee structures considered by the
Survey Task Group. The other four alternatives which were examined are
described in this Annex.
2. General: The primary committees would be designed to
concentrate functionally upon the collection and exploitation of basic sensor
system groups. Thus, emphasis would be placed upon individual system
evaluation and guidance as opposed to cross function/program evaluation.
Relative evaluation of collection systems (i.e., cross function/program
evaluation) would have to be accomplished either by a USIB committee
established for this purpose or by the Intelligence Community staff.
a. USIB Committee for Imagery Collection and Exploitation
Guidance and Evaluation.
b. USIB Committee for COMINT, ELINT, and Telemetry
Collection and Exploitation Guidance and Evaluation.
c. USIB Committee for Other Colle nd Exploitation
Guidance and Evaluation
Exploitation Guidance and Evaluation
I
e. USIB Committee for Collection Systems Relative Evaluation.
f. USIB Watch Committee.
g. USIB Committee for Security.
h. USIB Committee for Intelligence Information Handling.
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a. An Intelligence Objectives and Priorities Subcommittee would
be organized under the NSCIC Working Group.
b. CIA/DDI would be made executive agent for any actions
related to the National Intelligence Survey program as it is phased out.
5. General: The primary committees would be designed to
concentrate upon topical or subject areas worldwide. Emphasis would be
placed upon cross program/function evaluation within a topical or subject
area. Integration of topical or subject evaluations would be handled within
the DCI/IC staff.
6. The USIB Committees:
a. USIB Committee for Military Intelligence
b. USIB Committee for Political Intelligence
c. USIB Committee for Economic Intelligence
d. USIB Committee for Scientific and Technical Intelligence
e. USIB Committee for Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
f. USI B Committee for Terrorist Activities
g. USIB Committee for Security
h. USIB Watch Committee
7. Related actions for Alternative C would be the same as those in
Alternative B, plus the appending of the permanent COMIREX staff to the
DCI/IC staff.
8. General: This alternative would retain the existent committee
structure with minor changes. The primary change would be to emphasize
the evaluation function of the committees as opposed to other functions. All
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committees except JAEIC would be relieved of all intelligence production
coordination functions. All committee chairmen would be responsible to the
DCI.
9. The USIB Committees:
a. USIB Comirex Committee
b. USIB SIG INT Committee
d. USIB Committee for Human Resources
e. USIB Committee for Clandestine Collection
f. USIB Committee for Missiles and Space
g. USIB Committee for Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence
h. USIB Committee for Security and Countermeasures
i. USIB Watch Committee
j. USIB Committee for Information Handling
k. USIB Committee for Economic Affairs
1. USIB Committee for Science and Technology
10. Related actions for Alternative D:
a. The functions of the Critical Collection Priorities Committee
would be absorbed by the DCI/IC staff.
b. Functions of the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures
Committee and the Security Committee would be combined in the
USIB Committee for Security and Countermeasures.
c. Responsibilities of the National Intelligence Survey
Committee would be assumed by the CIA/DDI
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11. General: This alternative recognizes that a committee structure at
the community level is not essential. Those functions currently the
responsibility of USIB committees would be: (a) returned to operational
channels where applicable; (b) undertaken by the DCI/IC staff; and/or (c)
dealt with through the establishment of ad hoc interagency task groups as
and when necessary.
12. Other actions and concepts:
a. The COMIREX chairman and staff would become part of the
DCI/IC staff.
b. CIA/DDI would be made executive agent for any actions
related to the National Intelligence Survey program as it is phased out.
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d. All cross program evaluations would be handled through the
DCI/IC staff and interagency task groups.
e. Specific guidance for collection managers beyond that
contained in such documents as the Attachment to DCID 1/2 and DCI
community planning documents would be obtained through the DCI/IC
staff.
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ANNEX D: STATISTICAL MATERIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS DATA
Tab 1: Distribution of USIB Sub-Committee and Working Group
Chairmen by Government Agency or Department
Tab 2: USIB Committees, Subcommittees, and Working Groups:
Meetings, People, and Time
Tab 3: Distribution of Full-Time Personnel Assigned to USIB Com-
mittees
Tab 4: Committee Papers Submitted to USI B: January 1972 to
March 1973
Tab 5: USIB Committee Survey Task Group: Initiating Memoranda
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ANNEX D-Tab5
USIB COMMITTEE SURVEY TASK GROUP
INITIATING MEMORANDA
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23 M
arch 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
USIB Committee Chairmen
SUBJECT .
DCI Survey of USIB Committee Structure
REFERENCES .
a. D/DCI/IC Memo to DCI, "
USIB Committee
Structure," dated 16 Ma
rch 1973
b. General Graham Memo to
Group for Survey of USI
dated 21 March 1973
D/DCI/IC, "IC Task
B Committee Structure,"
1. The DCI has directed that his Intelligence Community Staff
conduct a survey of the role and functions of the USIB Committee
structure (Reference a.).
2. Each USIB Committee Chairman will be contacted during the
week of 26 March by the Survey Task Group Chairman to arrange an
interview with members of the Task Group (Reference b. lists these
members).
3. The following information also is required:
a. The name and organizational title of the current
member of each Committee, Subcommittees and Working Groups.
b. The number of meetings held since 1 January 1972
by each Committee, Subcommittee and Working Group.
c. A listing of all publications disseminated by the
Committee since 1 January 1972, along with a brief state-
ment of the purpose of each publication and its primary
customers. (Minutes of meetings, briefings and administrative
documents should not be listed.)
4. In addition, a separate response is requested to the following
question: What percentage of the Committee effort has been devoted
since 1 January 1972 to the following:
a. Collection
1) Evaluation and Preparation of Collection Requirements
2) Preparation of Collection Tasking (by Type Sensor)
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3) Evaluation of Collection Performance
4) Evaluation of Collection R&D Programs
5) Other (Identify)
b. Processing and Exploitation
1) Evaluation and Preparation of Processing and
Exploitation Requirements
2) Preparation of Processing and Exploitation Tasking
3) Evaluation of Processing and Exploitation Programs
4) Evaluation of Processing and Exploitation R&D Programs
5) Other (Identify)
c. Production
1) Preparation of Substantive Inputs to other Intelligence
Products (NIEs, etc.)
2) Preparation of Substantive Products for Direct Dissemination
to Non-intelligence Consumers
3) Evaluation of Intelligence Analyses and Products
4) Improving Production Techniques
5) Other (Identify)
d. Identification of Consumer Needs
1) Solicitation of Consumer Needs
2) Evaluation and Analyses of Consumer Requests
3) Preparation of Projections of Consumer Interest
4) Other (Identify)
e. Other
1) (Specifically Identify)
2
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5. It is requested the information described in paragraphs
3 and 4 be forwarded to the Survey Grou Chairman
Room 6E2914, CIA Headquarters Building within three
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Daniel 0. Graham
Major General, USA
ATTACHMENT:
Reference a & b
23 Mar 73)
Distribution:
Original - PRG Projects: C - Unnumbered projects
1 - each USIB Committee Chairman
1 - each Survey Task Group member
1 PR ono
1 -IChrono
NOTE: Copies for Chairmen were distributed by USIB Secretariat.
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21 March 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Allen
SUBJECT: IC Task Group for Survey of USIB
Committee structure
REFERENCE: Memo dated 16 March 1973, to DCI from you,
Subj: USIB Committee Structure
1. In accordance with the Director's approval of your
memorandum of 16 March (reference), I propose using a task
group of IC staff members to conduct a survey of the USIB
committee structure. This task group survey will provide
recommendations on the role and functioning of the committees
and the organizational position of the committee chairmen.
2. The survey will involve interviews with all of the
committee chairmen and the documentation of such data on the role
and functioning of the committees as may be necessary. Findings
and recommendations will be prepared by the task group for your
consideration.
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will supervise
Daniel 0. Graham
Major General, USA
2 3 TSAR 1973
DJDCIJI
3. Members of the task group will be:
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16 MA 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: The DCI
SUBJECT: USIB Committee Structure
1. You have expressed an interest in examining the
role of the USIB committees.
committee chairmen.
2. With your permission, my staff will conduct a
survey of the USIB committee structure as a basis for
recommendations to you on the role and functioning of
the committees and the organizational position of the
DCI/IC-7? o, s2. I
/.~ s6 !
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Lew en, Jr.
Major General, USAF
D/DCI/IC
James K. Schlesinger, DCI
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