REVIEW OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00311R000200090001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Review of
National
Intelligence
August 1976
Published by the Intelligence Community Staff
for the Director of Central Intelligence
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DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
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NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/ Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
NFIBONLY- NFIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL. . . - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 013182
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
?511(11J, (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
date impossible to determine
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Review of
National
Intelligence
Vol. 2 No. i
Prepared by the Product Assessment and Improvement Division,
Intelligence Community Staff, for the
Director of Central Intelligence
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PREFACE
This will be the last issue of the RONI. The recent establishment of the
Committee on Foreign Intelligence and the steadily increasing emphasis of
the Director of Central Intelligence on his Community responsibilities have
placed heavy new burdens on the Deputy to the Director of Central
Intelligence for the Intelligence Community and upon the intelligence
Community Staff. These burdens are concentrated in supporting the DCI,
the D/DCI/IC, and the CFI in identifying, analyzing, and resolving critical
issues relating to the allocation and management of resources within the
Community.
Assessing the quality and relevance of Intelligence Community
production will continue to be a most vital part of this job. It will continue
to be performed by the Production Assessment and Improvement Division of
the Intelligence Community Staff, now lodged along with divisions
concerned with collection, in the Office of Performance Evaluation and
Improvement. But we shall have to place greater emphasis on performance
assessment that comprehends the entire intelligence process, from program
inception through requirements definition, collection, information
processing, analysis, and production, to impact on national policy. To do
this job well even on selected major issues will be an enormous task. It does
not appear that our manpower will allow substantive review of national
intelligence for these purposes to be efficiently accomplished and effectively
communicated through a journal like the RONI. The reader will note that
this issue of the RONI itself displays much more attention to matters of
Community activity and process than have previous issues.
The RONI helped to cultivate a self-critical spirit within the
Intelligence Community. Its many authors and contributors are to be
commended for their efforts. This office will enlarge on those efforts in
future product and performance assessment projects.
Director, Office of Performance
Evaluation and Improvement,
Intelligence Community Staff
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1. MATTERS OF GENERAL INTEREST .................... 1
Community Principles ..................................
The Practice of Intelligence Analysis .....................
A National Sitrep .....................................
DIA's Experiment with Uncertainty ......................
II. SPECIFIC COMMENTARIES ............................ 5
Military Intelligence ................................... 5
The Warsaw Pact NIE: Critics, Consumers, and ICS
Conclusions ..................................... 5
The results of a survey of consumer reactions to an
important National Intelligence Estimate
S&T Intelligence ...................................... 9
Recent Studies from STIC ....... . .................... 9
A review of three papers concerning matters of
concern in the world of scientific intelligence
Political Intelligence ................................... 12
Presenting Political Research: A Case Study ............. 12
Interesting aspects of a recent paper on nationalism
in the Soviet Ukraine, including the readers'
response
The Collection Community ............................. 14
FOCUS: Intelligence Community Review of Reporting
by Human Resources ............................ 14
A description of this pioneering enterprise, with
illustrations from several recent FOCUS studies
The Warning Problem ................................. 17
Mayaguez Revisited ................................. 17
A summary of actions taken by the Community to
remedy some of the shortcomings revealed during the
Mayaguez incident of May 1975
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III. STAFF STUDY ......................................... 21
A Survey of the Community's Use of New Analytical
Methods ......................................... 21
Concerning the development, adaptation, and use of
advanced analytical methods by CIA, DIA, and
State/INR
IV. SPECIAL ARTICLE ..................................... 27
CIA Intelligence Support for Foreign and National Security
Policy Making .................................... 27
A synopsis of the findings and principal recommendations
of a report from CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence
V. CORRESPONDENCE ................................... 31
A communication concerning problems associated with
the production of intelligence on friendly forces
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1. Matters of
General Interest
Community Principles
The Director of Central Intelligence has set
forth a number of principles intended to guide
the activities of all elements of the US Foreign
Intelligence Community, As presented in a
memorandum he sent to the National Foreign
Intelligence Board in May, these principles are:
1. Total objectivity is the hallmark of all
intelligence reports and estimates,
2. Strongly held dissents and differing
judgments within the Intelligence Community
will be carefully noted in Community-
coordinated products forwarded to policymaking
levels of the Government.
3. Representatives of every Community
organization must have the right to be heard and
to have their ideas and views given serious
consideration.
4. The freest possible flow of information,
both within and among the organizations of the
Community, and with the users of intelligence is
the constant goal. To assure that the fullest data
is available, cooperative arrangements must be
maintained with all Government agencies
working in the foreign affairs field.
5. We have an obligation to provide as much
information as possible on an unclassified basis,
but without derogation of the necessity to protect
sensitive sources and methods and to protect
information which truly requires sensitive
treatment.
6. Dependable intelligence is an essential base
for the formulation of national policy so
intelligence collection and production must give
priority to topics of major policy concern. Our
role is to provide information and professional
judgments on foreign developments, without
coloration by policy considerations,
7. The concept of an Intelligence Community
must be strengthened. We will be judged on
Community accomplishments and on the
effectiveness of our interaction in Community
problems as well as on our substantive end
products.
8. Continuing attention will be given to
improving the interface between national and
tactical intelligence capabilities, seeking to
capitalize on the potentiality of inputs to
national intelligence needs from tactical
resources in peacetime and the capabilities of
national resources to provide intelligence of
import to both peacetime force readiness and
wartime operations.
9. The Community must be action oriented
and responsive. Papers must move quickly,
deadlines must be met, decisions must be
reached and results must be demonstrated.
10. The limitations and restrictions on
intelligence activities already set by the President
will be rigidly observed and have the full support
of all intelligence personnel, in spirit as well as
act.
11. Improvement of the public perception of
U.S. intelligence will be given continuing
attention. Intelligence is a profession in which
pride can be taken and that pride should be
demonstrated. Within the constraints of
legitimate security requirements, the Intelligence
Community should strive to better public
understanding of our mission and of our product.
12, The Intelligence Community should be as
responsive as possible to Congressional inquiries.
Congressional support is essential to sustain the
effectiveness of the US intelligence effort, and
our cooperation is essential to such support.
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The Practice of Intelligence Analysis
CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence last
year invited intelligence officers to a seminar on
the practice of intelligence analysis. This session
led to some challenging observations and, at
least from the point of view of working analysts,
some real wisdom as well. Those at the seminar,
for example, generally agreed that:
? The "management" of analysis is a key
element in the intelligence process; it needs
additional consideration and effort at
improvement.
? The Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) and
the KIQ Evaluation Process (KEP) is too
cumbersome, static, and time-consuming to
be of much help in the effort to improve the
analytic product.
? Intelligence analysis has been the stepchild
over the years in CIA's budget, but this is
now changing.
And one cf the principal. speakers at the
seminar observed that:
? The role of the analyst has important
aspects apart from the analytic process
itself: living with the bureaucracy,
consultation with fellow professionals, and
repetitive presentations of analysis in the
form of briefings, NSSM inputs, and the
like. It is in part the burden imposed by
duties such as these that set up a problem
facing the analytic staffs: that of providing
a suitable environment for analysts,
including sufficient working time (away,
from the meeting and consultation circuit)
for the conduct of real analysis.
? In the area of estimative intelligence,
analysts in the main proceed by
extrapolation from present trends. The
trouble with this is not that such
extrapolation is mostly wrong. On the
contrary, it is mostly right. Analysts thus
tend to become its prisoner, and this
sometimes leads to gross and damaging
misjudgments (cf., those made in September
1973 concerning the likelihood of war in the
Middle East). Any really expert analysis
must devote a disproportionately large
amount of attention to the prospect for
change and to the offbeat theory, so as to
maximize the ability to capture
discontinuity and change.
For more on the work of the Center for the
Study of Intelligence, see the article in Part IV,
"Intelligence Support for Foreign and National
Security Policy Making," which begins on p. 27.
A National Sitrep
Representatives of the principal producing
agencies in the Community recently agreed on
general procedures for the issuance of a national
intelligence situation report during crises, this to
be delivered to very high-level consumers in lieu
of the three or four discrete sitreps that reached
these consumers in the past. Specifically, under
the auspices of the DCI, the Community's
principal producing agencies (CIA, DIA,
State/INR, and NSA) will, when international
events and the needs of the NSC and its staff so
demand, cooperate in the preparation of an all-
source national intelligence sitrep which will
reflect Community views and clarify any
important Community disagreements over
substance.
The DCI will assume responsibility within the
Community for deciding when and by whom a
national sitrep should be produced. Normally, he
will designate one Community component to act
as his executive agent and assume primary
responsibility for production and, more often
than not, this is likely to be CIA. There will be
times, however, when the nature of a particular
crisis-e.g., the Mayaguez incident-may
prompt him to name some other agency, such as
DIA.
In any event, each of the major producing
agencies will offer various forms of assistance to
the task force assembled by the producer: the
provision of analysts to be incorporated into the
task force and/or officers serving with the task
force in a liaison role, the submission of written
contributions to the publication itself, and the
extension of special support in the area of
collection tasking and response.
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DIA's Experiment with Uncertainty
Last January DIA initiated an experiment
designed to achieve more precise statements of
the confidence and probability of intelligence
judgments. This experiment received its initial
impulse from high-level DOD con-
sumers-principally Deputy Secretary
Ellsworth-who have repeatedly indicated
dissatisfaction with vague language of the
"it is believed . . ." or "hostilities possibly
will ..." character.
The trial run involved the incorporation of
both percentages (e.g., 30%, 50%, 90%) and
letters (A, B and C) in the texts of selected
Defense Intelligence Notices (DINs) and Defense
Intelligence Appraisals. The percentages
reflected the probability that a given judgment
was valid; the letters represented the analyst's
confidence in the source material: A =high
confidence; B =medium; C =low.
At the end of the trial period 750 readers of the
DINs were asked about the usefulness of the
experiment; 128 responses were received from a
broad spectrum of DOD consumers. A majority
favored the use of quantified expressions of
probability, believing that they helped to
increase their confidence in the information
provided and in DIA's judgment and, in
particular, helped to give greater credibility to
briefings based on the DIA material.* There was,
however, little enthusiasm for the alphabetized
expressions of confidence in sources. There were
a few votes for putting the numerical and
alphabetical statements at the end of an article
so that the text would read more smoothly. The
respondents as a group indicated that the
expressions of uncertainty would be most useful
in current intelligence, somewhat less so in
estimative intelligence, and of least value in
basic intelligence.
DIA recently decided on the basis of this
survey to quantify the probability (in
percentages) of all major judgments and
projections in the DINs but to drop the
alphabetized evaluation of sources. It also
decided to experiment with similar procedures
for selected order of battle products and Defense
Intelligence Estimates.
Courses for DIA personnel in the assessment
and expression of uncertainty are now being
initiated by both the Defense Intelligence School
and the Intelligence Community's Information
Science Center, located in CIA's Office of
Training. This training, covering both theory
and practice, is intended to provide analysts and
supervisors with greater confidence and
*Several analysts involved in the experiment, however,
have warned that the statement of percentages could convey
to at least some readers a degree of precision not justified by
the data at hand or the subjective nature of an analyst's
"hunch" regarding future events,
consistency in the use of expressions
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II. Specific
Commentaries
Military Intelligence
The Warsaw Pact NIE: Critics, Consumers, and
ICS Conclusions
There has been considerable discussion
generated about the substance and format of
National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-75,
"Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO," since its
publication in September 1975. Several elements
in offices of Assistant Secretaries of Defense
(OASD) have been the most vocal critics of the
NIE. This article will summarize the basic issues
involved in the discussion, outline the results of
an informal survey of the reactions to the NIE by
principal consumers outside of OASD and,
finally, discuss some "lessons learned" as they
might apply to future military estimates.
Controversy
NIE 11-14-75 concerns itself with the Warsaw
Pact forces-primarily ground and tactical air
forces-located in the European USSR and
Eastern Europe opposite NATO-and updates
its predecessor estimate, which was issued in
1971. The criticisms of the current NIE raise
issues in four general categories:
-Scope and Format. Is the Estimate too
narrow in scope and too sparing in the detail
it provides?
-Omissions. Does the NIE talk around, or fail
completely to address, a number of major
issues?
-Evidence and Supporting Rationale. Are
suitable rationales for its principal
judgments lacking, and are some judgments
offered without any supporting evidence?
-Uncertainties and Data Limitations. Does
the NIE make uncritical use of Soviet
exercise data which are susceptible to
misinterpretation? Does it fail to express the
uncertainties inherent in exercises which
form the basis of many of its key judgments?
With regard to scope and format, it was agreed
by the NIO and the other representatives of the
agencies participating in the NIE's development
that it would highlight those major issues on
which either significant new information
indicated that previous judgments should be
modified or on which substantial new work had
been accomplished by the Community, but that
the NIE should not devote much space to other
issues. Based on a recommendation by the
Director, DIA, the decision was also made to
limit severely the length of the Estimate and rely
on other coordinated intelligence publications
(e.g., MC-161-76 and Defense Intelligence
Projections for Planning) to provide more
comprehensive documentation relevant to the
NIE's analyses.* The rationale for producing
such a "short and to-the-point" Estimate was
that the paper's intended audience was primarily
the most senior governmental policymakers.
There has been no argument about the need
for detailed force data tables/ projections or
extensive treatment of such significant topics as
Warsaw Pact combat effectiveness, warning
(surprise attack) in Europe, the role of tactical
air, developments in the Western Military
Districts, Warsaw Pact command and control,
Pact buildup and logistics capabilities, etc. The
question is to what degree these subjects should
have been thoroughly examined in the NIE, or
Annexes thereto, rather than in other intelligence
issuances. From the OASD standpoint, the
answer now seems to be: "to the maximum
degree."
The second related area of general concern is
the question of whether NIE 11-14-75 failed
completely to address, or "papered over" a
number of major issues. On this point, a
comparative reading of the 1971 and 1975
*The current estimate contains, therefore, only four tables
of supporting data and nine figures, whereas the 1971 version
had over 30 tables, plus numerous figures and maps.
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Estimates shows that only two major substantive
topics were discussed in 1971 that do not appear
in the current paper. (These topics-general
purpose naval forces and forces on the Soviet-
SINO border-are now the subject of other NIEs
and are so referenced in NIE 11-14-75.) As noted
earlier, however, the limited treatment some of
these subjects receive in this particular NIE is the
essential point at issue.
Additionally, the fact that only one major
dissenting footnote appears in the document has
been used to characterize the NIE as a
"consensus" Estimate which has allegedly
skirted contentious issues. This has been
vigorously denied by the participants, who assert
that no serious disagreements were encountered
during the preparation of the NIE and in no case
were any disagreements papered over.
The third general charge, that the Estimate
offers too little in the way of supporting
rationales and evidence for its analyses and
judgments, turns on the question of how much
source information should properly be included
in an NIE. In the case of NIE 11-14-75, the level
of supporting detail varied because it was
determined by considerations of length and,
more important, security classification. Certain
users-particularly in OASD-strongly believe
that all supporting rationale and evidence should
be presented in as much detail as possible,
particularly when significant new judgments
about shifts in Warsaw Pact concepts, plans, and
capabilities are being discussed.
The final, closely related area of controversy
concerns the extent to which the NIE's analysis
(1) reflects an uncritical or even superficial use of
Soviet exercise data which are susceptible to
misinterpretation, and (2) fails to express the
uncertainties inherent in exercise data
exploitation. Critics have called for clarification
of the evidence for the Estimate's major
judgments pertaining to Soviet concepts for the
initial employment of Pact forces and the
question of the timing of reinforcements from the
USSR. The critics have implied that these
judgments are based exclusively on Pact exercise
activities (which can be used simply to test new
concepts and do not necessarily reflect current
plans or the private perceptions of Soviet
leaders). *
A Consumer Survey
These, then, are the basic issues pertaining to
NIE 11-14-75 which have developed from the
dialogue between the drafters of the Estimate
and consumers (and critics) in OASD. In order to
assess the reaction to this Estimate of other major
consumers, an informal survey was conducted in
March 1976 by members of the Intelligence
Community Staff. Contact was made with some
thirty consumers in the NSC Staff, Department
of State, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Chairman's Staff Group; Office of Director,
Joint Staff; J-5; and SAGA), OMB, DDR&E,
and ACDA. Again, in order of the identified
issues, the reactions of these readers can be
summarized as follows:
-Users at the NSC Staff, State and DDR&E
felt that NIE 11-14-75 suffered from
insufficient documentaiton of force data
and supporting analyses and considered its
predecessor Estimate vastly superior in
scope and format, On the other hand,
certain consumers in OJCS and OMB found
the compactness of the current Estimate to
their liking and thought that detailed
annexes were neither required nor desired.
-Those contacted were apparently not
bothered by the lack of more dissenting
footnotes in NIE .11-14-75. There was,
however, general agreement among most
consumers that the Estimate should have
covered in somewhat greater detail (or with
more clarity) certain major issues. The three
*In this regard, the NIE states that "we do not have access
to the Soviets' war plans but we can infer the general nature
of their military contingency plans from the information
available from Warsaw Pact military exercises, from Pact
writings on military strategy and tactics for war with NATO,
and from the current disposition of Pact forces." Moreover, to
the degree that exercise data were used in the NIE's analysis,
the activities in question are asserted to be "recurring
themes" that have been "consistently exhibited" in exercises
"since the late 60's," Finally, the NIE explicitly
acknowledges that what is seen in exercises may differ
substantially from the private perceptions of Soviet leaders.
Since these private perceptions cannot be divined, the NIE
tries simply to identify the Soviet military's planning
perspectives for the contingency which the military regards as
most likely in the event of war in Central Europe.
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most frequently named were: force
effectiveness, warning, and the Pact tactical
air offensive scenario. There was also some
expression of the viewpoint that the current
Estimate's treatment of force trends was
weak and poorly presented.
-The issue of whether the Estimate's
principal judgments were suitably
supported was not a particularly
bothersome one to most of the consumers
contacted, with the notable exception of
OMB representatives who argued that more
evidence should have been cited and
discussed.
-The NIE's use of source data and the degree
to which it expressed uncertainties did not
pose any significant problems or raise any
serious questions for most of the consumers
contacted, although OMB representatives
suggested that a section containing
"Comments on Intelligence Sources and
Gaps" would have been helpful.
-Some of those interviewed at the NSC Staff
and OMB lamented the lack of their
organizations' participation in the early
stages of an estimate's development. They
felt that direct, systematic involvement by
more users in the Terms of Reference process
would be desirable; they also suggested the
creation of regular means for user responses
following the estimate's publication.
The reaction to, and use of NIE 11-14-75 in
the OJCS arena calls for additional comment. It
is clear that the Estimate has received exposure
at the most senior military levels (as well as at
OSD, State, and the NSC).* It is also apparent
that no significant problems were raised at OJCS
by the Estimate's scope, format, or whatever.
Among those who read it, the NIE was
characterized as "good, short, and to the point";
a "useful background document for concepts
papers"; a "helpful addition to the general body
of knowledge" on the subject; and a "fine
starting point for establishing perspectives on
future studies."
*On this point, while the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of
State, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently did not
read NIE 11-14-75, they were made fully aware of the issues
and policy implications therein.
The degree to which the "national
intelligence" contained in the Estimate has
actually been "used" in the JCS arena is,
however, another issue. There is, for example, the
nagging question of whether NIE 11-14 would
have received high-level exposure at OJCS had it
not previously generated controversy among
OASD elements. Moreover, several senior officers
in the Strategy Division (J-5) stated that the NIE
was, in fact, not used at all in their routine
business because they had to rely on the joint
Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP)* or
used only what DIA provided. Others in
pertinent branches of the European Division (J-
5) stated that they had not seen the Estimate
before they specifically requested it (in response
to this survey). As it turned out, several of these
officers said the Estimate could have been useful
for projects they had earlier completed.
A related factor that affects the degree to
which NIE 11-14-75 was exposed and used at
OJCS (and elsewhere) is the document's security
classification. While this Estimate has been
universally complimented for its incorporation of
all-source data and its dissemination at a level of
classification which permitted wider distribution
than certain previous estimates, some consumers
urge that the Estimate (or a sanitized
supplement, as per NIE 11-14-71) be issued at
the SECRET/TOP SECRET level to facilitate its
accessibility still further.
Conclusions and Recommendations
What are the principal "lessons learned" from
the foregoing as they may apply to future NIEs?
The first seems to be to reaffirm that no single
NIE can be all things to all people. Certain
consumers expect an estimate to serve both the
policy maker and his staff by containing (as did
NIE 11-14-71) an easy-to-read narrative
summary of highlights, plus detailed annexes
with force data tables/charts/projections and
supporting analyses. These consumers look for a
single publication (i.e., a "handbook") that can,
to the maximum possible extent, answer all their
questions on a given subject, be the agreed
*The JIEP is an annual JCS publication which, insofar as
it addresses material presented in NIEs, must agree with the
NIEs. It need not, however, cover all the same issues or limit
itself to issues raised in the NIEs.
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reference for all pertinent force statistics, and,
accordingly, minimize the problems involved in
acquiring and researching other source
documents for related information.. On the other
hand, some consumers prefer an. NIE that is
short, to-the-point, deals primarily with
significant new issues and limits itself to an
exposition of the Community's best judgments
on a given subject area (as did NIE 11-14-75).
Similarly, with regard to citing evidence and
supporting rationales and detailing uncertainties
and data limitations in an estimate's judgments,
certain consumers expect an exhaustive
accounting of these factors, while others seem
content simply to receive the judgments
themselves.
Based on the consumer reactions to NIE 11-
14-75 outlined above, however, the experience
with this particular paper did uncover several
points of some consequence that could be of
relevance to any future military NIE:
-Many consumers outside of the Intelligence
Community have, for a variety of reasons,
considerable difficulty (and display some
reluctance?) in acquiring and using other
intelligence source publications to answer
questions or gain force data information not
answered or reflected in the NIE itself.
Hence, if the Estimate is not to be
formatted as a full-blown "handbook" of
all relevant data and analyses, it perhaps
should provide an annotated bibliography
of source documents (keyed to the various
paragraphs of the NIE) where the consumer
could readily find in-depth treatment of the
issues in question.
-Moreover, if the Estimate is to include only
a minimum amount of force data tables and
supporting analyses-relying on the
availability of this information in other
coordinated intelligence publications-con-
certed efforts should be made to insure
the timely completion by the Community
of all such documentation necessary to
support fully the Estimate's principal judg-
ments. (Analyses on certain major topics
related to NIE 11-14-75 were to have
been contained in a coordinated US version
of MC-161-76. However, this document has
not yet been completed.)
-A format which incorporated the following
two suggestions would, in our view and in
the view of several of those we consulted,
enhance the value of a military NIE to the
principal consumers: (1) A short "Summary
and Conclusions" section with each major
paragraph annotated with the paragraph
number(s) in the main body of the Estimate
where the summarized point/issue is
discussed; and (2) a well-developed "Force
Trends" section that cogently summarizes
at the outset of the Estimate "what's new"
regarding the pertinent force's doctrine,
posture, capabilities, etc. since the
preceding Estimate.
-Consideration should also be given to
producing a sanitized supplement to the
NIE at the non-codeword security
classification level in order to
broaden/ facilitate consumer access to the
Estimate's major themes.
As a final point, we would urge that, following
the completion of major military papers, an NIE
"Briefing Team" be organized to "get the
message" of the Estimate out to as many
consumers as possible. Such a procedure might,
in addition, stimulate a timely and continuing
exchange of informed views on the subject
throughout the producer-user Community.
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S&T Intelligence
Recent Studies from STIC
During 1975, the Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Committee (STIC) of USIB
published three studies which were particularly
well received by a wide range of consumers.
These three dealt with issues associated with the
transfer of Western technology to the USSR;
matters of current priorities for the producers of
S&T intelligence; and areas of science and
technology which may be of comparable concern
in the future. The discussion below suggests why
these studies were made, provides a summary of
the more important findings, describes the
overall reactions of consumers, and, where
appropriate, identifies the actions STIC has
undertaken in response.
Technology Transfer
Military Implications of Technology Transfer
to the Soviet Union examines specific areas of
Western technology which, if acquired by the
USSR, might benefit Soviet military
capabilities.* STIC set up an interagency
working group (consisting of members from CIA,
DIA, NSA, State, the three Services, ERDA, and
Commerce) to draw together and assess
information available within the Intelligence
Community on this topic. This group focused its
attention on four advanced technology
areas-transport aircraft, semiconductors, digital
computers, and air traffic control sys_ems-of
special interest to the Soviets. Unrestricted
technology transfer in these particular arr is
offers the Soviets a potential for significant
military gains.
By the end of March 1975, the working group
completed its study. The overall conclusion, not
suprisingly, was that the cumulative effect of
growing technology transfer from the West (US,
Canada, Japan, and Western Europe) will result
in some selective improvements in the Soviet
*Military Implications of Technology Transfer to the
Soviet Union, SIC-75/1, April 1975, S/NFD.
military posture over the next five to ten years.
The rate and degree of improvement, however,
could not be determined confidently because of
the multiplicity of countries which could supply
the technology and the uncertainty about Soviet
capabilities and intentions to adopt the
technology for military purposes.
The main value of the report comes from the
side-by-side comparisons of US and Soviet
technology in the areas selected for study. For
example, in the transport aircraft section of the
report, the discussion includes the relative
standings of the US and USSR in many aspects
of engine, avionics, and airframe producton
technology; an assessment of Soviet deficiencies
and the factors causing them; and Soviet
attempts to acquire foreign technology and the
potential gains to the Soviet military from such
acquisition. This type of discussion, relatively
thorough in detail, provides useful insights into
Soviet shortcomings in production and
management techniques.
The report has been disseminated to a wide
audience within the Intelligence Community
and to high-level consumers in the Departments
of Commerce, State, and Defense, and the
National Science Foundation. Comments from
many consumers have been uniformly
complimentary, attesting to the value of two
significant features-the high quality of the
report itself and the appetite among certain
consumers for technology-by-technology
assessments by the Intelligence Community.
STIC has organized a working group to follow
up with more of these studies, The four
technologies discussed in this paper are being
updated to reflect current Soviet capabilities
and activities, Also, four additional areas-
superconducting technology, signal processing
technology, precision machine tools, and micro-
circuitry manufacturing and testing technol-
ogy-are being reviewed for their military
implications.
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Intelligence Prliorities
STIC's second report, Intelligence Priorities
for the Sciences and Technologies, is a display
list which identifies those areas of most
significance to national intelligence.* STIC
hopes that the highlighting of these areas will be
helpful to management in its deliberations over
the apportionment of resources for collection and
production.
The display itself consists of three priority
groupings, each containing a list of S&T areas
and sub-areas felt by STIC to be of greatest
significance within the groups. A majority of
STIC member agencies agreed upon the relative
ordering of the priority groups and issues. The
selection and ranking criteria attempted to
transcend individual organizational interests so
that truly national concerns were represented.
Various national intelligence guidance
documents, including DCID 1/2-US
Intelligence Objectives and Priorities-and the
KIQ program, were taken into account.
This STIC document, too, was distributed
fairly widely, but primarily to various
organizations and individuals within the
Intelligence Community (or closely related to it).
The response has been highly favorable, STIC's
identification of areas in S&T intelligence which
are of highest significance serves a twofold
purpose. First, such a listing gives consumers who
do not follow S&T matters daily an idea of what
issues currently enjoy national level interest.
Second, and mare important, the interagency
exercise of determining relative prior-
ities--always a fun game-forces S&T intel-
ligence elements to look critically at the
balance of effort between national and
organizational priorities. This in itself increases
communications among the S&T intelligence
collectors, producers, and consumers.
As can be expected, there was some dis-
satisfaction with the final groupings of
priorities. Certain agencies felt that particular
areas or sub-areas in the lower priority groupings
deserved a higher ranking (especially if the
agencies concerned were expending considerable
*Intelligence Priorities for the Sciences and Technologies,
STIC 75-3, September 1975, C.
time and effort on the so-called lower priority
items).
When STIC decided to coordinate and
publish this study, there was agreement that the
priority groupings would be updated when
necessary to reflect changes in national S&T
priorities, Although the priority areas are not so
dynamic as to require an annual revision, the
discussion engendered by the publication of this
document has pointed out the necessity for a
refined priority list. A STIC subcommittee has
taken the initial steps to update the priority
display. We recommend that the revised display
include a short explanation of why particular
S&T areas or sub-areas are placed in one or
another priority grouping.
Following up on the priorities display, STIC
has completed a preliminary study of the relative
resource expenditures by various agencies for the
production of finished intelligence on the
sciences and technologies listed in all three
priority groups. Despite serious difficulties
attending the effort, STIC found that for the
most part those areas enjoying Priority Group I
ranking also enjoyed the expenditure of a higher
percentage of production effort by the
Intelligence Community. STIC is also preparing
an analogous study of the utility and adequacy
of collection assets being applied to the higher
priority groupings.
Emerging Technologies
The publication on the priorities for the
sciences and technologies discussed above
identified those areas of significance to national
intelligence today. A third STIC publication,
Views on Emerging Areas of Science and
Technology Potentially Important to National
Security, concerns the early recognition of
advances in those sciences and technologies
which are now emerging but whose full impact
on the military and economic security of the US
may not be appreciated for several years. *
Two main factors underline this concern for
our ability to identify S&T areas of particular
significance in the future. One is that if these
*Views on Emerging Areas of Science and Technology
Potentially Important to National Security, STIC 75-4,
December 1975, C.
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areas are recognized early enough, the
Intelligence Community will find it easier to
collect and analyze useful information while
such information is still relatively easy to obtain.
The other simply reflects everyone's awareness of
the need to keep a close eye on developments in
science and technology which hold the promise
of surprising us in the future, if exploited by
other countries.
STIC's part in adding to the useful literature
on future technologies has been a major project
whose goal is to stimulate early planning for
future collection and analysis of new and
unusual intelligence targets. The "Emerging
Areas" report is the result of the first phase of the
project. Between 15 and 20 scientists and
engineers-all renowned figures in their
respective fields, including two Nobel Prize
winners and some former and current Defense
and Intelligence Community contractors-were
interviewed for their views on areas of science
and technology particularly important to the
military or economic security of the US in the
1980's. Care was taken during the interviews and
the interpretations of results to minimize possible
biases which could distort the results.
Specific areas which received considerable
attention from the respondents included the
biological sciences, computer sciences (especially
inexpensive, but complex computer systems),
novel energy sources, and laser technology. The
interviews also revealed a concern for more
general threats, such as economic warfare,
weather/climate control, and nuclear
proliferation. And one of the more fascinating
overall results of the study was the weight of
opinion that tomorrow's surprises will come in
the life sciences, in such areas as genetic
engineering and understanding the brain and the
nature of thought. The potential importance of
the life sciences to national security apparently
transcended the individual specialties of those
interviewed, few of whom specialize in any of
the biological fields.
This STIC product, too, has been well received
by the Intelligence Community and its
consumers. Like the report on S&T intelligence
priorities, it is both informative and thought-
provoking. The results represent the subjective
judgments of those interviewed as well as those
interpreting the responses. Thus, areas of and
opportunities for disagreement abound. Once
again, consumer comments have included the
general concern that, "Yes, that area is
important, but this one can be even more so."
STIC is following up this part of the project
with a second set of interviews. During the
second phase, additional scientists and engineers,
those whose backgrounds represent an even
broader spectrum of skills and expertise, are
being contacted. The results of both sets of
interviews will be combined, and STIC expects
to be able to make some additional
recommendations which will deserve scrutiny in
the future.
The importance of many of these areas of
concern is now only beginning to emerge.
Persuading the Intelligence Community to
expend time, money, and effort on areas which
are not of immediate or near-term interest has,
historically, been difficult. Some of these
concerns may seem to be "way out," the
consequence of an overactive scientific
imagination. But so were thoughts of ICBMs
and lasers not too many years ago.
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Political Intelligence
Presenting Political Research:
A Case Study
CIA's Office of Political Research has
produced a study on Ukrainian nationalism
which deserves attention both for its format and
its substance,
"Nationalism in the Soviet Ukraine"-The
Intelligence Contribution
This study was issued in two versions: a TOP
SECRET Codeword, 45-page, single-space
published edition with specific citations to
supporting documents; and a much shorter
version-a 16-page, double-space executive
summary-at the CONFIDENTIAL level.* The
former was clearly aimed at those policy staffers
and intelligence analysts with time for and
interest in the ;particulars of the subject. The
latter was addressed to senior level officials, but
presumably would also serve those with only
peripheral interest in the subject and those
without exotic clearances.
There is no consistent Community policy
regarding the use of footnotes in finished
intelligence, but there are at least three
arguments favoriing the practice. First, it helps to
maintain substantive continuity and an analytic
memory. Second, it reassures readers that there is
indeed some basis for the analyst's judgments
other than whim or intuition. Some readers, even
at the highest levels, occasionally feel the need
for that kind of reassurance.**
"Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine" OPR III
,,
and PR 75-III, August 1975.
V
**For example, in the case of a recent joint
OPR/OSR/SALT Support Staff paper ("SALT and Soviet
Decision- king: Institutions and Actors," OPR 114,=
ecember 1975, TOP SECRET CODEWORD)
pu is a without footnotes, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
and Deputy Secretary Ellsworth requested the CIA authors to
provide as much as possible of the raw data and other
finished intelligence used in pre aring the paper. The authors
I I accordingly forwarded
annotated copies of t e study with attachments containing
excerpts from the sources used. The requesters formally
commended them for their timely and effective response.
Another reason for listing source citations is
that it helps to measure (and demonstrate) the
contribution of intelligence information, A piece
of conventional wisdom among critics of the
Intelligence Community has it that a clever
journalist or a diligent academician can track all
important political developments on, say, the
Soviet scene as well as or better than an
intelligence analyst. But the source citations in
this OPR study suggest that the journalist or
academician operates at a disadvantage. Of the
137 footnotes to the study, 28 consist of
references solely to classified intelligence
information (e.g., clandestine reports) and
another 14 to unclassified information from
Intelligence Community sources (FBIS-type
information or analysis); 12 other footnotes are a
mix of intelligence and open (academic or
journalistic) sources. The other 83 reflect
information presumably available to any
academician or journalist-but of course also
available to the intelligence analyst.
Moreover, in the present instance the
information collected by the Community
imparts a special quality to the study by showing
more "cutting edges" to the issue itself,
Ukrainian nationalism, than would otherwise be
apparent. Because of intelligence information we
have several singular illustrations of the
nationalistic behavior of the former Republic
Party leader, Petr Shelest. We learn, for example,
that Shelest and his subordinates protected some
Ukrainian dissidents on various occasions, that
Shelest tolerated his own son's association with
Ukrainian dissident intellectuals, that Shelest
instructed Ukrainian media to play up
Ukrainian economic achievements and
downgrade those of the USSR as a whole. We
also learn that Shelest's own book glorified the
Ukraine, and that the book apparently played a
key role in the CPSU Politburo's decision to
remove him in 1972.
Intelligence information used in this study also
provides unique testimony to the broad
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connections of the Ukrainian dissidents. It
shows, inter alia, the existence of inter-city links
and the close collaboration of the influential
Russian dissident Andrey Sakharov with the
Ukrainian dissident Ivan Svitlichny. And it
shows that most of the dissidents recognized
allies in the Ukrainian Communist Party
organization. Indeed, many gave Shelest strong
moral support in his confrontation with Moscow
because he seemed in their eyes to be upholding
Ukrainian nationalism.
At the same time, the intelligence information
illustrates the depth of concern felt by the
authorities at this upsurge of national feeling in
the Ukraine. There seemed to be genuine
apprehension among some Soviet leaders that
the Ukraine was vulnerable to separatist
propaganda, even that emanating from Peking.
And CPSU leaders apparently went to such pains
to discredit Shelest after his removal that they
circulated stories heaping all the blame upon
him for the 1968 decision to invade
Czechoslovakia-a deliberate distortion of
Shelest's complex and ambivalent motivations
during that crisis.
The paper concludes that nationalism in the
Ukraine is "growing," or at least becoming
"more vocal." Contrary to the initial judgments
of the Intelligence Community (but even more
contrary to the judgments of Western media),
the study indicates that Shelest's Ukrainian
nationalism was at least as important a factor in
his removal as his opposition to detente. And
contrary to what is inferred in open, non-
intelligence sources about Shelest's successor,
Vladimir Shcherbitsky, who otherwise seems to
be a vigorous foe of Ukrainian nationalism, this
study indicates that under certain circumstances
(but only after Brezhnev's departure), he too
might find it desirable or expedient to cater to
local interests in an effort to strengthen his own
power. *
The author of the study reports that she has
received no reaction from policy-level
consumers, but that several analysts have
*Some of these indications appear in this August 1975
report. More are addressed and analyzed in greater detail in a
subsequent study by the same author, The Political
Prospects of Vladimir Shcherbitsky," PR 76 10019, February
1976, SECRET.
commented on it. One can speculate about
possible reasons for the lack of high level
response. First, the study was self-initiated,
rather than aimed at meeting a specific request.
Second, many high level policy makers feel they
do not have the time to read even an executive
summary unless the subject is directly and
explicitly related to their current concerns. In the
case of another recent OPR paper, "Changing
Soviet Perceptions of World Politics and the
USSR's International Role," also issued in two
versions, we have learned that some high-level
recipients of both versions did not find time to
read either, even though the subject was of great
importance and the DCI addressed a cover note
to these particular recipients. Perhaps they felt,
on the basis of its broad title, that the study was
unlikely to serve their immediate needs.*
At the October 1975 meeting of the NSCIC
Working Group, one high-level consumer
commented on the difficulty of inducing those in
his position to read more intelligence products.
His remarks were offered in the context of a
discussion of two intelligence papers which he
had read in preparation for the Working Group
meeting and which he described as excellent.
He said he normally preferred to read material
rather than have it briefed to him, because he
believed he could absorb information about
three times as rapidly in this way. But, clearly,
many consumers would rather be briefed. He
then implied that he expected this circumstance
to persist, almost regardless of how concisely and
artfully intelligence papers were packaged.
*The paper, written bylI was published in
October 1975 as OPR 113, SECRET
nd PR-75-113
live summary), CONFIDENTIAL. The cover note
from the DCI, with the full study attached, was sent to
selected recipients on 30 December. The paper was brought
up for discussion (and generated some controversy) at USIB
in January 1976. At least partly due to the discussion at
USIB, the paper attracted numerous comments from other
analysts and consumers below the top echelons.
**The papers were: Lt. Col. Robert Fuller, USAF, "Soviet
Support for Wars of Liberation," DIANM 2-75, 15
September 1975, SECRETChinese Politics and the mo- ovic -
riang e, 404, SC 03846/75, August 1975, TOP
SECRET
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The Collection Community
A Program for intelligence Community Review
of Reporting By Human Resources From United
States Overseas Missions
Since late 1974, the young NFIB Human
Sources Committee has conducted a program of
assessing reporting from US overseas misisons.
This enterprise, which came to be called the
FOCUS Review Program, has made a number of
contributions to the improvement of reporting
from US representatives abroad.
Procedures
From the outset, the Human Sources
Committee recognized the need for major
assistance from the substantive side of the
Community. An approach was made to the
National Intelligence Officers to assist in the
effort. Although there were a few misgivings
about value versus effort required for this
program, the NIOs recommended a slate of
countries for FOCUS reviews and then chaired a
series of assessment seminars. These assessment
seminars varied greatly in form and, often,
content.
It was Mr. Colby who first advanced the
notion that the Community should develop a
means of systematically evaluating the quality of
human source reporting. In his initial Letter of
Instruction to the Chairman of the Human
Sources Committee (since renamed the Human
Resources Committee), he expressed his objective
of providing Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions "a
regular and candid appraisal of the performance
of his mission, viewed from (the DCI)
perspective, and with appropriate comments as
to the future." The HSC was thus given the task
of developing an assessment mechanism to
provide frank appraisals of overseas reporting on
a regular basis.
Mr. Colby saw the program as permitting a
constructive dialogue between himself, or other
Community principals, and senior foreign affairs
representatives overseas. Generally, the
Intelligence Community leadership recognized
the advantages of providing "feedback" to
collectors and other information gatherers in
embassies; but, nearly all agencies entered the
program with institutional reservations about
having outsiders evaluate the reporting of "their
man in Calcutta." The major participants (State,
DIA, CIA, Treasury, ERDA and the military
services) now seem reasonably comfortable with
the FOCUS program and regard it as a useful
Community activity.
Differing perceptions caused procedures to
develop slowly. Clearly, assessments would
define reporting problems, but how should the
Community address these problems and then set
about to solve them?
Gradually, the FOCUS Review developed into
a two-phase process. Part I assesses the substance
of reporting from a diplomatic mission, i.e., its
adequacy and timeliness and its responsiveness
to the needs of consumers within and without the
Intelligence Community. Reporting Assessments
are written by the appropriate National
Intelligence Officer on the basis of interagency
seminars in which both policy and intelligence
officers participate. All human source reporting
is examined, usually by category (political,
military, economic, etc.), though emphasis is on
overt collection. Provision is made for dissenting
views to be recorded.
Part II, the Action Review, examines reporting
problems and opportunities arising out of the
Reporting Assessment and recommends follow-
up action. Its objective is to suggest ways of
improving coordination at the Washington level
and to provide information designed to assist
Ambassadors in their supervision of field
reporting programs and resources under NSCID
2. The Action Review is based on the
Committee's discussion of written comments
provided by Washington reporting managers
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and an examination of the Reporting,
Assessment.
Some Highlights
The first FOCUS assessment was conducted
on Peru in the fall of 1974. Since then, there have
been FOCU ortin from
embassies in
With 13
reviews completed, four more are underway:
Current
planning calls for a continuing program of 12 to
15 assessments per year.
More people initially involved in the FOCUS
program in Washington considered it
worthwhile. Analysts, especially, were quick to
see merit in meeting to review the adequacy of
reporting.
A fringe benefit of the FOCUS process was
the interaction that occurred between analysts
working on Ethiopia .... Ideas were shared,
references to specific reporting exchanged, and
a better understanding of individual interest
and responsibilities noted ... similar meetings
on a yearly or semiannual basis would be
productive (from the FOCUS Ethiopia report,
7 January 1975).
FOCUS October 1975, was more
complex than most and required two assessment
reports, one on economics and technology,
another on political and military reporting.
Findings and judgments expressed in Reporting
Assessments can be both general and specific.
Typical of general findings is this comment on
political reporting:
There is general consenus that the embassy
is performing well in meeting its
responsibilities for reporting on political
affairs, despite a reduction of some^percent
in the number of reporting officers over the
past 12 years. This reduction has, nonetheless,
imposed constraints on the embassy's ability to
collect and report, Reporting on
foreign policy, in particular, has suffered
somewhat because of these constraints, and
there are signs that domestic reporting may be
starting to suffer as well.
A specific finding from the same study is also
illustrative:
Gaps remain in our knowledge of
military matters. These include specs c
information on defense expenditures, logistic
capabilities, stockpiles for conventional war,
and plans to restructure the
The DCI frequently sends a letter to the
appropriate Chief of Mission after a FOCUS
Review is completed. Mr. Colby liked to
highlight excellent performance as well as to
address difficulties. In his letter accompanying
FOCUS IJ for example, Mr. Colby
commented to
Analysts are nearly unanimous in their hunger
for special reporting from representatives of all
government departments abroad. Mr. Colby
highlighted this in FOCUSIby saying it
could be most helpful if some suitable way could
be found to provide Washington useful
information that may be accumulated by AID
and USIA officers in Often these
officers have unique insight regarding a country;
reports from field trips into the provinces would
be especially useful.
FOCUS identified the possibilities of
security assistance organizations (MAAGs and
Military Missions) in providing special insights
in host country military establishments.
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In the follow-up to FOCUS Da number
of steps were taken by various parts of the
Defense Department to encourage better use of
these opportunities.
Occasionally, a FOCUS judgment may
simplify the task of collectors in the field. The
CIA station in I~Mvas happy to have the
following view expressed in FOCUS
Accomplishments and Problems
These extracts provide some of the flavor of the
FOCUS Review Program. It seems fairly well
established that FOCUS has provided a number
of benefits to the intelligence Community in.
Washington and. to its representatives overseas.
Among these are:
? Information gatherers and intelligence
collectors in the field are learning that "the
people in Washington" depend on them
and take their reporting seriously,
? A number of guidance, collection, and
communications problems have been
identified for improvement.
? National intelligence officers, analysts, and
collection managers have reinforced their
efforts to improve interdepartmental
relationships and facilitate cooperative
actions,
? Washington policy officers and major
consumers are becoming more involved in
important aspects of the intelligence
function. They are meeting with
intelligence representatives, analysts, and
collection managers to discuss their
intelligence needs.
On the other hand, the FOCUS Review
process has some deficiencies:
? The selection of overseas missions for
FOCUS Review seems to have been guided
to a degree by convenience rather than
need. Understandably, the less complex
overseas missions were examined in the first
series of reviews as a learning experience. It
seems desirable now to focus on those
missions where particular problems exist
and those missions whose reporting is most
vital to national intelligence.
? The evaluation of human resource reporting
under FOCUS is sometimes incomplete, For
many diplomatic posts, other collectors,
such as third-country reporting and
SIGINT, are a factor affecting reporting by
the mission.
? It is difficult to move from problem
identification to problem solving. This is
true of FOCUS: the follow-up phase of the
FOCUS Review procedure is its weakest
aspect.
Recent guidance from the President contained
in Executive Order 11905, 18 February 1976,
identified evaluation as a key function for the
Intelligence Community:
The National Security Council shall
conduct a semi-annual review . . . . These
reviews shall consider the needs of users of
intelligence and the timeliness and quality of
intelligence products . , . .
The Director of Central Intelligence shall ...
Consult with users and producers of
intelligence, including the Departments of
State, Treasury, and Defense, the military
services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the Energy Resources and Development
Administration, and the Council of Economic
Advisors, to ensure the timeliness, relevancy,
and quality of the intelligence product.
FOCUS is a new program. But it promises to
provide an increasingly useful means for
evaluating human resources reporting, and it
could serve as a model' for reviewing the
effectiveness of other national collection efforts
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op secret
The Warning Problem
Mayaguez Revisited
In its post-mortem examination of the
Mayaguez crisis, the intelligence Community
Staff identified certain problems and deficiencies
adversely affecting the Community's
performance during that crisis and made specific
recommendations to correct them. * Actions
taken since then-either in direct response to
those recommendations or, indirectly, as a result
of the impetus provided by the Mayaguez
incident-are summarized below.
Post-Mortem Recommendation. The
Community should establish effective
communications channels with all elements of
the Government that are from time to time
involved in crisis monitoring and management.
Specifically, it should maintain contacts with
systems that issue warning to merchant marine
vessels and commercial aircraft.
Actions Taken:
-Under the direction of an interagency ad
hoc group, a number of special and
improved procedures and systems were
developed for providing warnings to U.S.
flag ships and aircraft. These include the
development of a U.S. Flag Merchant
Vessel Locator Filing System, maintained
by the Naval Ocean Surveillance
Information Center, to provide reporting of
port arrivals /departures and the at-sea
positions of all US flag merchant ships
engaged in international trade; and
implementation of new procedures to ensure
that upon issuance by the Defense Mapping
Agency of a special warning to U.S. ships,
the Maritime Administration also notifies
shipping owners and operators so that these
companies may issue alerts on their
communications facilities. These and other
measures constitute the first effective means
*Post-Mortem Report, "An Examination of the Intelligence
Community's Performance Before and During the Mayaguez
Incident of May 1975" (TOP SECRET,
published August 1975.
of linking the Intelligence Community's
warning apparatus with those other U.S.
departments and agencies, such as the Coast
Guard, the Maritime Administration, the
Defense Mapping Agency's Hydrographic
Center, and State Department's Office of
Maritime Affairs, which share responsibility
for air and marine safety.
-At the request of the IC Staff, the NSC Staff
asked each government agency to furnish
information on the functions of any
watch/ operations centers it maintains here
and abroad. The results of this survey are
now being compiled into a directory which
should improve communications between
all concerned government elements,
including those which normally have no
need to communicate with each other but
which might have to do so under crisis
conditions.
Post-Mortem Recommendation. Existing
procedures for handling critical intelligence
should be revised and clarified so as to ensure
appropriate action on the part of the various
watch and operations centers, to make certain
that individual messages are
disseminated simultaneously to appropriate
addressees, and, in general, to clarify other
aspects of the system's procedures.
Actions Taken:
-A revised and expanded version of Director
of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID
7/1) concerning the "Handling of Critical
Information" was prepared by the
Intelligence Community Staff and
approved by USIB in December 1975. This
Directive defines critical information as
information concerning foreign situations or
developments which affect the security or
national interests of the US to such an
extent that it may require the immediate
attention of the President or other members
of the NSC. The DCID clarified and
improved the procedures governing the
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recognition of critical developments abroad,
the transmiission of information on those
developments to appropriate operations
centers in the Washington area, and the
passage of that information to senior officers
of the Government.
--A new document-the "Handbook of
Standard Operating Procedures for the
Reporting of Critical Information"-was
developed by the Intelligence Community
Staff in conjunction with the Departments
of Defense and State and the principal
USIB member agencies, This document
expands on the material presented in DCID
7/1, spells out in some detail the proper
procedures for handling so-called
messages (those messages which contain
critical information and which are handled
on a highest-priority basis), and provides
guidelines and instructions applicable to all
elements of the government concerned. The
Handbook was approved by USIB and
has been published as an Attachment to
DCID 7/1. A condensed, unclassified
version of these procedures has also
been prepared an given wide dissemination
throughout the U.S. Government.
Post-Mortem Recommendation. Certain stand-
ard operating procedures of the various
Washington area watch and operations centers
should be revised to establish a set of common.
Community-wide standards.
Actions Taken:
-USIB has approved revised operating
procedures for the National Operations and.
Intelligence Watch Officers Network
(NOIWON), the system designed to provide
for simultaneous conferencing and
exchange of information among the seven
key watch centers in the Washington area.
The new procedures now require that the
NOIWON be activated upon receipt of a
r other alert advisory.
-CONTEXT (Conference Text Editing)-.a
unique computerized system combining
secure voice and a visual text capability in a
remote conferrencing mode-is expected to
become operational in 1976 with terminals
at CIA, NSA, DIA, and State. The system
will facilitate the analysts' preparation of
time-critical intelligence products, such as
crisis situation reports, and will also permit
emergency meetings (including those at the
NFIB, formerly USIB, level) to be
convened in a remote conferencing mode.
CONTEXT will eventually be enhanced
by a remote display capability that will
allow presentation of maps and other visual
displays at each location.
Post-Mortem Recommendation. The
flexibility of technical collection systems, such as
satellite photography, should be increased so as
to permit more rapid and more effective ways of
acquiring information during rapidly breaking
crises.
Actions 'Taken:
-Planning has largely been completed to
make maximum use during crises of new
technical collection systems. For example,
under the direction of the NFIB Committee
for Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
(COMIREX), a new staff (manned on a 24-
hour basis by DOD and CIA personnel) will
provide the means for rapidly tasking new
imagery collection systems and
disseminating the results.
-Similarly, special new procedures were
implemented by the SIGINT Overhead
Reconnaissance Subcommittee of the
SIGINT Committee of NFIB to ensure rapid
redirection of SIGINT satellites during crisis
situations. The new procedures permit any
NFIB agency to task the SIGINT satellite
operators directly via high precedence
message in times of crisis.
-The Defense Department's Collection
Coordination Facility, which is expected to
become operational late this year, will
permit consolidation of DOD time-sensitive
requirements and more efficient tasking of
technical collection systems.
Post-Mortem Recommendation. Contacts
between the operational and intelligence
communities should become more frequent and
open, especially at the working level. The
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responsibility for developing a better way of
exchanging appropriate information should rest
in the first instance with the Intelligence
Community, especially the Intelligence
Community Staff and the National Intelligence
Officers (NIOs).
-Other measures-such as the development
of the previously mentioned CONTEXT
and NOIWON systems-will also
contribute to effective exchanges of
information between the operational and
intelligence communities.
Actions Taken:
-The Intelligence Community Staff has
inaugurated semi-annual conferences of the
heads of Community and non-Community
operations/intelligence centers to encourage
closer cooperation among operational and
intelligence elements and to discuss and
resolve matters and problems of mutual
concern. Three such conferences have been
held since the Mayaguez incident and a
fourth is planned for late 1976.
-The National Intelligence Officers (NIOs)
convene frequent interagency meetings of
working-level analysts, collectors, and
policy or operationally oriented officers to
ensure that they all are familiar with current
problems and activities affecting their areas
of responsibility. These meetings provide an
opportunity for wide-ranging, frank
discussions of problems facing the policy
maker and the Intelligence Community and
serve to improve the Community's posture
in times of crisis.
-The Pacific Command has established in
Korea an all-source "fusion center"-which
seeks to combine both operations and
intelligence functions in one location-to
provide more effective support to
Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea, especially
during crises. This center collocates J2
(intelligence) and J3 (operations) personnel
and provides for the immediate use of
information on US and allied force
operational data in the intelligence and
warning process.
-Modernization of the National Military
Indications Center (NMIC) and the
National Military Command Center
(NMCC) facilities will, when completed,
allow for much closer coordination between
the operational and intelligence functions of
the military and permit them to provide
more effective support to national
authorities.
Post-Mortem Recommendation. The way in
which the Community issues warnings of
impending developments to NSC members and
other national consumers should be improved.
The Alert Memoranda system should be refined
and become the firmly established Community
vehicle for alerting top-level consumers to the
existence of potentially serious threats (other
than strategic threats) to US interests.
Actions Taken:
-At the DCI's request, the Intelligence
Community Staff prepared a
comprehensive study of intelligence Alert
Memoranda, which concluded, inter alia,
that these memoranda serve as effective
instruments of warning for decision makers.
-Revised procedures defining the
responsibilities of the National Intelligence
Officers and other elements of the
Community for the preparation,
coordination, and issuance of intelligence
Alert Memoranda were approved by USIB
on 15 December 1975.
-The NIOs are reviewing Alert Memoranda
procedures to ascertain what improvements
are feasible without inhibiting the vehicle's
flexibility and capacity for quick response.
One improvement (now implemented)
provides for the automatic notification of
appropriate US Ambassadors that an Alert
Memorandum is being prepared and asks
for their comments by a stated deadline.
-Within the Defense Department, Alert
Memorandum distribution procedures have
been revised to ensure more rapid delivery
to key policy makers.
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III. Staff Study
A Survey of the Community's Use of
New Analytical Methods
This paper, prepared by C
iscussions wit ana ys s
Community who are now
is based on
roughout the
involved in the
development of new methods, on written precis
of their work which some analysts provided, and
on a summary of its efforts in this field by CIA's
Directorate of Intelligence ("Progress on New
Methodologies in the DDI," 21 August 1974).
The Promise of New Techniques
New analytical methods should enhance
analysis in several ways.* When they are
appropriately used, they demand explicit
expression of subjective judgments, which are
then more readily weighed and amended. Where
information can, without distortion, be expressed
numerically, these methods permit greater
precision and the systematic consideration of a
great many more influences on an event than
would be possible without them.
New problems may require the revision of
previously useful approaches and the creation of
original ones. New sources of intelligence may
demand new methods of interpretation and
analysis, particularly if the sources are prolific
and are to be exploited fully. But perhaps the
most important, if not the most obvious, fruit of
the development of these new methods is the
New analytical methods" is a notoriously imprecise
term, one that has at times been applied without much
discrimination to techniques that are neither new nor,
strictly, analytical. This article compromises with that
imprecision. While indeed analytical, most of the methods
surveyed here have been used for some time by political
scientists, economists, and business managers. Thus their
novelty is confined, with a few important exceptions, to their
application to intelligence.
opportunity it provides to step away from the
actual work of analysis and examine the
assumptions which have guided it.
Still, the belief that all or even most of the
many new techniques developed for, say,
political analysis can be successfully adapted to
intelligence is unfounded. Many such methods
demand a great deal more information than is
normally accorded analysts. Moreover, while not
all new techniques are quantitative ones, many
are, and some issues simply do not lend
themselves to numerical treatment. And even
when a new analytical method might in
principle be applied to intelligence, it may be
that it is unnecessary or unwise to do so.
Unnecessary because, in many instances,
conventional forms of analysis will be quite
sufficient. Unwise, because the particular
method may require more time or more
specialized analytical skills than an office can be
expected to provide (and sometimes more
sophistication and more patience than readers
can be expected to bring to bear).
What follows is a survey of the development,
the adaptation and, in some instances, the
already routine use of new analytical methods by
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau of
Intelligence Research of the Department of
State. *
*Although the National Security Agency has devised
sophisticated methods for using computers in the analysis of
signals intelligence, it is not experimenting with the kinds of
analytical methods that are treated here. Further, since this is
a Community survey, no mention is made of the very
important work of the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency.
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 THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
The Office of Current Intelligence has charged
its Methods and Technology Staff with
acquainting analysts in OCI with new analytical
methods. The Staff encourages the use of those
qualitative and quantitative techniques which
its own studies suggest are applicable to
intelligence.
As part of its educational work, the Staff
publishes a newsletter, Notes on Methodology,
each issue of which describes the basic principles
and possible uses of a promising technique. Some
of the articles have treated specific analytical
problems for whose solution novel methods have
proven useful. The Staff has also published a
comprehensive Glossary of Terms and
Techniques for Political Analysis, a unique and
particularly helpful guide through the sometimes
obscure language of these methods.
The Methods and Technology Staff also assists
in applying new analytical methods to current
problems, The Staff's primary intention in this
respect is to tailor :new methods and new ways of
presenting analysis to the particular demands of
current intelligence. The Staff emphasizes
approaches which do not require lengthy
preparation, specialized data, or the extensive
use of computers. The fruits of this emphasis
include a multi-attribute utility analysis of the
Panama Canal negotiations, a comparative
analysis of the membership of the Chinese
Central Committee elected at the Tenth Party
Congress with the Central Committees elected at
the Ei hth and Ninth Congresses, a study of the
electoral system, a decision tree analysis
o evaluate the effects of the Philippine
insurgency on President Marcos' political
standing, and a model for predicting and
analyzing the results of elections.
Office of Political Research
The Analytical Techniques Group (ATG)
within the Office of Political Research is
responsible for the application of novel,
frequently statistical approaches to the analysis
of political intelligence. Its work includes the
adaptation of existing techniques used in
universities and private industry, as well as the
creation of new techniques and arrangements to
suit the unique needs of intelligence production.
The following list of projects illustrates the
scope of OPR's work in these new methods:
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Office of Strategic Research
The Office of Strategic Research has for some
time used quantitative techniques in describing
and estimating the size, quality, deployment and
costs of foreign military forces and weapons. Its
Resources and Requirements Staff is specifically
responsible for encouraging and supervising the
trial and adoption of new methods.
The Strategic Evaluation Center of OSR has
used statistical measures and quantitative
analyses in its comparison of US, Soviet and
Chinese strategic forces. The Center has also
made its studies of strategic conflict more
rigorous and comprehensive by employing
models of the interaction of forces; it would, in
fact, be difficult to estimate the course of such
engagements without the benefit of models. The
Center has drawn up a detailed program for the
refinement of existing methods and for the
development of new ones, a program in which
OSR will be assisted by ORD.
Other divisions in OSR have also bent new
methods to their work. The Theater Forces
Division, for example, is exploring new ways of
studying and predicting the results of an air
campaign in Central Europe. Working with the
Office of Joint Computer Support, the Division
has, in Project Tacos, prepared as part of this
exploration a model for assessing the capabilities
of Soviet air defense forces, With ORD, the
Division has obtained the assistance of the
in devising new approaches tot e
analysis o t 4e various influences on the course of
tactical air campaigns.
In addition, appraisals by the Theater Forces
and Eastern Forces Divisions of the conventional
forces of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact,
NATO, the Mideast, and China rely on order-of-
battle data which is stored in a data
management system called 0 This
system, which is still under evaluation, will
contain basic data on the number, location and
readiness of ground force units and may, at some
future time, be expanded to include data on air
and naval forces as well.
The Soviet Strategic Forces Division has
applied new techniques to its analysis of Soviet
strategic missile, naval and bomber forces. This
Division's Strategic Attack Branch is using
sophisticated statistical methods for drawing
inferences about the degree of certainty that can
be attributed to information gained from
photography. This Division is also investigating
the use of a model for assessing the effectiveness
of Soviet strategic air defenses.
The Programs Analysis Division has for years
used a complex data management model (SCAM
I, Strategic Cost Analysis Model) to produce
ruble and dollar estimates of Soviet defense
spending. To develop inputs for this system and
conduct related research, new analytical and
quantitative models have been applied to
produce better ruble and dollar weapon system
costs and to explore the direct costing of Soviet
research and development efforts. A second
generation, greatly expanded model-SCAM
II-is now being tested and should be
operational within one year. In addition, the
Eastern Forces Division has employed
quantitative techniques to assign costs in dollars
to certain pieces of Chinese equipment and has
conducted research on ratios of the dollar to the
yuan for various classes of military products.
Office of Economic Research
The Office of Economic Research has long
used a variety of quantitative techniques in its
analysis. Such methods are of course more
readily applied to economic data than to
information about, say, politics, and indeed
economists have made sophisticated statistical
descriptions and mathematical models an
expected feature of their work.
Still, such methods are often designed for the
study of problems on which a great deal more
information is available than is often true of
issues in economic intelligence. The Office must
accordingly evaluate these methods for their
usefulness to intelligence and then frequently
modify them. In 1968, the Office established the
Systems Development Staff (recently made part
of the Development and Analysis Center) to
oversee this modification and adaptation of
established methods to economic intelligence
and to experiment with new ones as well.
OER routinely uses established econometric
models in its work. In the last several years, the
Office has made effective use of models in its
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analysis of the international oil marker-of oil
prices, of the rates at which oil is produced, and
of the trade in oil and the payments for it.
Efforts by OER to develop its own new
approaches have also been fruitful. One project
employs econometric techniques to predict the
grain production in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. In another project, a model for
forecasting international trade flows has been
devised with the assistance of ORD. The Office
has developed new ways to approach a number
of other problems, such as the prospects for
Chinese industrial production and the possibility
of increases in Soviet defense spending.
Office of Geographic and Cartographic
Research
The Office of Geographic and Cartographic
Research (OGCRR) is pursuing a number of
programs in which new methods are being tested
and then applied to the Office's special
analytical concerns. Supervising the application
of new techniques is the responsibility of a
special assistant to the Director.
With the assistance of academic and industrial
consultants, the Office has developed new
methods for exploiting satellite photoeraphv.
The Cartography Division's accomplishments
in developing automated cartographic systems
should be noted for they do permit the
manipulation as well as the storage and
presentation of information. "Automap" is one
such system for producing maps that has become
an important analytical tool. It draws on
cartographic information stored in digital form
in "World Data Bank I and II," computer files
developed by OGCR.
Office of Research and Development
In 1973, the Office of Research and
Development established the Center for the
Development of Analytical Methodology
(CDAM). The Center is responsible for devising
new methods of analysis and adapting both these
original techniques and pertinent existing ones to
the purposes of intelligence. The members of the
Center's staff have backgrounds in various fields
and are thus able to work closely with analysts
throughout CIA.
Although most of CDAM's work is in the areas
of science and technology, it has also contributed
to the development of new methods for
economic and for political research. The Center
assisted, for example, in devising a method for
assessing the accuracy of statistics on the world's
petroleum resources. An econometric model of
international trade that deals with the trade
accounts, balance of payments and foreign
exchange rates was constructed in cooperation
with OER and is now in use in that office. The
Analytical Support Center
The Center for the Development of Analytical
Methodology also supervises the work of the
Analytical Support Center. Established in
November 1974 and sponsored by CIA, the
Intelligence Community Staff and ARPA, the
Analytical Support Center was created to permit
analysts to experiment with new analytical
methods which hold some promise of directly
assisting them in their work.
The Center has worked on: the development
and application of analytical techniques for the
study of foreign elites; the processes by which
foreign governments make and implement
decisions, especially during crises; the dynamics
of the arms race; international negotiations; and
the succession in various countries to national
leadership.
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THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
The Directorate of Intelligence uses several
mathematical models in its analysis of the forces
of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The
Navy Branch of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact Area
Division uses a model that aids in judging the
effectiveness of Soviet ballistic missile
submarines. Another office in this division, the
Military Geography and Movement Branch, is
using, a computer simulation model,
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Warsaw Pact to transport supplies. The model
can be applied to any transportation network for
which a study of the movement of, for instance,
munitions is sought. Analysts in DIA are now
combinin features of a file of logistical data
with the and are considering a
similar connection of the model with a file on
ground order of battle, Such improvements will
permit detailed analysis of the ability of the
Warsaw Pact to move men as well as supplies.
Directorate of Estimates
The Long Range Forecasting Division of this
Directorate has among its responsibilities that of
encouraging the application of new analytical
methods. To this end, the Division answers
specific requests for help from analysts in the
Directorate of Estimates, primarily by
demonstrating the methods, statistical programs,
and files that can, without unacceptable costs or
delay, be applied to the analysts' concerns.
The Directorate is presently using a number of
analytical methods and programs, developed in
some cases with the assistance of contractors, in
some cases independently.
investigations of the usefulness of ABMs; in
studies for use at the SALT negotiations; and in
analyses of target coverage, launch techniques,
and the probability of yiYa ender different
conditions, of SLBMs. Is a model with
many of the same features but is used in the
study of the effectiveness of foreign cruise
missiles. It has been applied to the analysis of
advanced air-to-surface missiles and to the study
of naval exercises.
Several arsenal exchange models are also in use
in the Directorate of Estimates. In one, known
simply as mathematical programming
techniques are used to determine. the most
effective allocation of strategic missiles against
targets. Also used in the Directorate of Estimates
is a specialized model of arsenal exchanges
designed by CIA, which employs the model as
well.
The Support Center of the National Military
Command System has designed a model for
estimating the immediate effects-fallout and
blast-of nuclear weapons, This,
has been
used extensively in war games, and in the
preparation of Defense Intelligence Estimates.
The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence
and Research has in the last few years
commissioned several studies to determine the
usefulness of quantitative techniques for research
in foreign affairs.
The most ambitious, Project Quest, was
conducted by PRINCE Analysis, Inc., under a
contract with the Bureau's Office of External
Research. The study attempts to offer a
systematic answer to the question of the
usefulness of new analytical methods.
The authors wished to discover whether it was
possible and desirable to use in the work of the
Department of State the frequently quantitative
methods employed by academic students of
comparative politics and international affairs.
els for
are m
studying the engagement of missiles with radars
and ABMs and for predicting the damage the
missiles would cause. The first model,'
and has been used in several ways: in
is designed for the study of ICBMs an
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 They concluded that analysts in the Department
use quantitative techniques infrequently and in
thoroughly traditional ways; that they make
predictions that are concerned with the
immediate future or which fail to specify the
period to which they apply; and that their
concerns are considerably broader and more
complex than those of their academic
counterparts.
While existing; quantitative research thus
appeared to offer little assistance to the
considerably more demanding work of INR's
analysts, it still seemed possible that particular
quantitative techniques might bring greater rigor
and precision to bear on specific analytical
problems. The authors devised six case studies to
see whether this was so, choosing topics which
were pertinent to the work of INR's analysts and
which lent themselves to treatment by one or
more quantitative methods.
The case studies suggested that certain
techniques could assist analysts in. some but by
no means all aspects of their work. For what the
authors called "information gathering," some
quantitative methods were found to be useful.
The quantitative methods used in the case
studies were less useful for explaining events-
for ''testing assumptions and hy-
potheses''-primarily because of the great
variety of influences that an analyst must
consider. The authors concluded that the final
activity into which they divided the work of an
analyst, forecasting, might at times benefit from
the use of such methods as correlation
techniques, trend analysis, and the Delphi
technique.
INR has commissioned other studies similarly
aimed not at applying an analytical method to a
particular issue but at determining more
generally whether new techniques will further
the Bureau's work and, if so, how they should be
used. One such paper written for INR by Lincoln
Bloomfield of MIT's Center for International
Studies, reviewed the recent literature of the
social sciences, particularly that concerning the
development of theoretical structures to guide
analysis, for the value of this work to the
improvement of the policy process.
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IV. Special Article
CIA Intelligence Support for Foreign and National Security Policy Making
The following is a synopsis of the findings and
principal recommendations of the January 1976
report of the CIA Center for the Study of
Intelligence (CSI) concerning intelligence
support of foreign policy. The CSI study team
perused relevant literature and discussed the
subject with numerous CIA and policy officials,
but the report is not intended as a definitive
statement of the Agency's position. Rather, it is
intended to stimulate thought and discussion,
both on the conclusions themselves and on their
broader implications for the role of intelligence
in the policy making process. Though dealing
specifically with the CIA's role, the paper's
conclusions in many instances apply to the
Intelligence Community as a whole., Readers'
comments are invited and may be addressed to
II Director, Center for the Study of
Intelligence, 1036 Chamber of Commerce
Building, Arlington, Va. (351-2193).
1. The dividing line that in traditional theory
separates intelligence and policy has become
obscure. Intelligence feeds into the policy
making process in a wide variety of forms and at
many different levels. A significant part of the
intelligence message conveyed to top policy
makers is unidentifiably imbedded in policy
papers or inextricably interwoven in sets of
options. The tendency of intelligence and policy
to become intertwined early in the decision-
making process has intensified in recent years.
Recommendations
To increase intelligence producers' specific
understanding of the policy making process:
summaries of theoretical work on decision
making, organizational dynamics, and
psychological factors should be distributed to
analysts and supervisors on a regular basis by an
individual with full-time responsibility for that
task; Agency training courses should place more
emphasis on the subject; Agency officers should
serve in policy-related slots whenever possible
and share their perspectives with other
intelligence producers in appropriate forums.
II. The widespread use of human filtering
mechanisms on the consumer side results in the
failure of much written intelligence meant for
high-level policy makers to reach them in its
original format and in the appropriate context.
CIA intelligence sometimes becomes just another
anonymous bit of information, and even when
particular intelligence documents are forwarded,
principals often read only summaries written and
attached by their aides. Policy makers, moreover,
take aboard copious quantities of so-called
unfinished intelligence. They prefer to get raw
items of current import immediately, rather than
to wait even a few hours for the raw factual
report to be accompanied by interpretation. The
problem here is that the policy staffers'
compilations of such data may not be sound or
consistent in their use of intelligence
information. And they may not accurately reflect
the originator's view of what should be brought
to the policy makers' attention.
Recommendations
To increase the impact of the Agency's
products and services on the policy making
readership: executive summaries should precede
all memoranda; a paper should identify the
implications of the issue' for the US; alternative
interpretations should be presented, as should be
speculation (clearly labelled as such); a new
product should be considered-a "Morning
Briefing Notes," electrically disseminated,
providing informal, non-coordinated summaries
and comments on significant overnight traffic,
such as State and Defense cables, DDO reports,
intercepts and press, not accounted for in the
NID.
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Ill. A great deal of important intelligence is
transmitted orally, through both formal,
prepared briefings and informal exchanges.
Discussions that DDO Division Chiefs have with
Assistant Secretaries of State arid NSC Staff
members should be widely recognized within the
CIA as constituting important, though informal,
avenues for the passing of substantive
intelligence and. feedback on policy needs for
intelligence. The strong natural linkages between
the DDO and certain policy makers probably
could be exploited in the overall intelligence
support process more effectively than at present.
Recommendation
To improve the substantive analyst's access to
informally exchanged intelligence information
and to the DDO officer's useful insights on the
policy milieu and the policy maker's
requirements, there should be regular meetings
for this purpose between DDO Division Chiefs,
representatives from DDI production offices, and
the NIOs.
IV. Policy makers value the Agency's products
and services, but they tend to like some kinds of
intelligence more than others. They most
appreciate receiving unique pieces of
information of-the kind only intelligence sources
can provide. Analysis of unfamiliar or
particularly complex material is also coveted; the
Agency's work on technical/scientific and
military/strategic subjects is highly regarded,
and economic analysis is enthusiastically
received by those who specialize in the economic
field. There is less admiration for the kinds of
intelligence that correspond to most policy
makers' own expertise, e.g., interpretive
reporting on foreign political developments. In
the areas of their own competence, policy makers
tend to look to intelligence for the "facts," and
they profess to regard much of the Agency's
interpretive work as of marginal utility. They do,
however, appreciate political analysis that
answers specific questions or performs a special
service by using new techniques, exploiting
unfamiliar materials, adopting an imaginative
approach, or developing an unusual insight.
Recommendations
To increase the policy maker's receptivity to
the Agency's political interpretation and
analysis, further study is needed of the efficacy of
various methods-e.g., team approaches, cross-
disciplinary training, structural
reorganizations-which seek to foster truly
integrated inter-disciplinary analysis. Political
analysts (not just NIOs who specialize in
political subjects) should be given the
opportunity, encouragement, and incentive to
take especially vigorous initiatives to develop
and sustain personal relationships with
consumers.
V. Policy makers genuinely desire probing, in-
depth analysis in all fields, and there is
recognition that CIA has been gaining ground on
this front. There is, however, little confidence in
most predictive intelligence-whether the
Agency's own or the formal estimates of the
Intelligence Community, Policy makers seem to
be less interested in estimative judgments per se
than in the basis for them; i.e., the laying out of
the forces at work, the possible turning points,
and the leverage-or lack of it-that the US
might have in determining the outcome.
Recommendation
To improve predictive intelligence, there is
need for serious study of just what a realistic
estimative mission ought to be and of what
resources should be devoted to it.
VI. The perennial-and probably intermin-
able-problems of insufficient feedback and
secretiveness concerning policy plans hinder
intelligence responsiveness and adversely affect
intelligence quality. Moreover, while most policy
makers are reasonably enthusiastic about
receiving intelligence, they are continually
distracted from even reading it, let alone
commenting on it, by the pressures of day-to-day
operational matters and the urgent demands that
non-intelligence people, paper, and problems
levy upon their time and energy. Since we take as
given that these problems will never disappear,
initiatives for improved relationships must come
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largely from the intelligence side. CIA must
improve its capabilities to independently assess
the questions the policy makers need answered
now and to independently anticipate the
problems they are likely to be faced with in the
future.
To increase communication with the policy
maker: intelligence products should, to the
extent feasible, be addressed to intended
recipients by name; more products should be
especially tailored for the mid-level
consumer-the policy staffer; producers in any
case must make a greater effort to determine the
intended audience before they begin to produce.
Beyond this, consideration should be given to the
establishment of broadly-based mechan-
isms-perhaps computer based for improving
intra-Agency awareness of ongoing policy
support activities and for helping to make policy
makers more aware of the full range of
potentially relevant intelligence products and
services; such mechanisms should serve as
supplements to, rather than competitors with,
the NIO system and the Key Intelligence
Questions function.
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V. Correspondence
The following letter was written in response to
an item appearing in the RONI of June 1975. It
addresses (eloquently, we think) a problem the
Community faced in Vietnam-and still faces
elsewhere-vis-a-vis the acquisition and
production of objective intelligence on friendly
forces and governments.
Sirs:
As a more-or-less close observer of the agony of
Indochina over the past 25 years, I feel
compelled to offer an early comment on the
"very preliminary look" at the Community's
coverage during the final months in the June
RONI (1975). Over the years, the Community
generally has done a credible job of analyzing
the capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, and likely
courses of action of the Communists in
Indochina than of the non-Communists. This
was true in the French war in the early 50's, as
well as in the 60's and 70's. Most of the "shock"
developments throughout these three decades
have been related to the unanticipated failures or
deficiencies of the non-Communists-political
and military-in coping with foreseen levels of
Communist capabilities and pressures.
The only "real" surprise of the Dieh Bien Phu
campaign was the paralysis of the French
command-and its loss of nerve-when
confronted with the reality of the onslaught by
Viet Minh forces whose strength and
preparations had been assessed accurately and in
detail by intelligence, The confident "let them
come" challenge by the French on the eve of
battle was replaced by shock and dismay when
their artillery and air support proved ineffective
in breaking up the expected Communist assaults.
The late 50's and early 60's were marked by
misplaced confidence in the anticipated
performance of Vietnamese military and security
forces against the well-defined and clearly
growing Viet Cong threat.
The real "shock" of the Tet offensive stemmed
primarily from exaggerated perceptions of the
cumulative effects of the application of U.S.
military power over the preceding two-and-a-
half years, rather than from a lack of indications
of an impending major enemy offensive.
In the final denounement, the surprise
factor-as noted in RONI-was the collapse of
ARVN (when the realization hit home at all
levels that ARVN would no longer be supported
in the manner to which it had become
accustomed, i.e., the B-52's would never return),
rather than the accurately assessed weight of
enemy pressure.
This record clearly highlights a long-standing
source of frustration to intelligence analysts and
their consumers-that of making net assessments
in "real-world" situations when inputs on one
side of the equation are influenced by the
subjective views and judgments of operating
officials committed to the successful execution of
policies, strategies and programs. Too often is the
net judgment subverted or dominated by the
overconfident and insistent views of operators
and policy-makers concerning the "progress"
achieved by friendly activities: The "success" of
Operations Atlante and the expansion of the
Vietnamese Army in 1953-54; the impact of U.S.
training for ARVN in 1956-62; the effectiveness
of U.S. search and destroy operations in 1965-67;
the "success" of Vietnamization in 1973-75, inter
alia.
Although the intelligence appraisals were
often less than perfect, they were generally more
pessimistic-or realistic-than the judgments of
the operating officials. But the impartial
intelligence appraisals were often discounted or
ignored, or in some cases simply watered down,
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by the more subjective, optimistic-and
influential-views of the operators.
Clearly, one lesson to be learned from our
Indochina experience is the need to evolve a
mechanism for providing the policy maker with
truly objective net assessments in situations
where the U.S. :is operationally committed--a
mechanism that will effectively blend, if not
balance, the voices. of the Pollyannas with those
of the Cassandras. The record of Indochina to
the end shows that the influence of the
Pollyannas was unduly prominent, to the
detriment of the national interests of the U.S.
and of the Vietnamese and American peoples.
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GEORGE; W, ALLEN
Director
Imagery Analysis Service
(DDI/CIA)
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