REPORT ON DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00311R000100470002-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 29, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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FOIV.
July 29, 1969
Report on Defense intelligence
OSD Dec lassification/Release Instructions on File
Introduction
In the months ahead it is likely that intelligence products which
are as timely and as accurate as our resources can conceivably make
them will be even more critical than they are today. There are serious
and severe problems within the Defense intelligence community. Many
of these problems stem from the methods we presently employ to
allocate intelligence resources against requirements. Others relate
to inadequacies in the collection and utilization of intelligence or to
difficulties in the estimating processes.
As a result of my investigation, I have concluded that:
-- In the area of resource allocation, a new line function
must be established.
-- In the other areas an improved staff element is
necessary in OSD rather than a line function.
This report therefore proposes that a Special Assistant be established
to perform the line resource allocation function and to improve OSD staff
.participation in the other areas.
Back rg ound
In 1953, the Secretary of Defense established the position of
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations). This
Assistant recommended policies and provided guidance on planning and
program development to DoD intelligence agencies and components,
reviewed plans and programs, developed DoD positions on intelligence
problems, and made recommendations to the Secretary on the actions
necessary to provide for more efficient and economical operations.
In practice the position, was almost exclusively concerned with super-
vision of NSA. It was seriously handicapped by the lack of a charter
to function as the focal point for DoD intelligence resource management:
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In 1960, a Presidential Task Force, chaired by Lyman Kirkpatrick,
was directed to study the organizational and management aspects of the
intelligence community. The Task Force recommended the establishment
of a focal point within OSD to exercise broad management review authority
over military intelligence programs, and to provide overall coordination
of all foreign intelligence activities conducted by various defense corn-
ponents. The report emphasized the operation and use of intelligence
rather than resource management. However, it was one input considered
when DIA was established in 1961.. The DoD press release of 2 August 1961,
announcing the establishment of DIA, stated that a "more efficient
allocation of critical. intelligence resources, more effective management
of all DoD intelligence activities, and the elimination of duplicating
facilities and organizations" was expected. The position of Assistant
for Special Operations was disestablished concurrently with the establish-
ment of DIA. His responsibilities vis-a-vis NSA were assigned to DDR&E.
Today, under the umbrella of the Consolidated Intelligence
Program (CIP), the DIA "manages" only about 25% of the DoD resources
devoted to satisfying both military and "national" intelligence requirements.
The bulk of the resources are found in a number of other programs such
as the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), or are treated outside
any formal program.
The Secretary of Defense is faced with the problem that there is
no review which compares the resources in one program targeted against
-a requirement with the resources committed against the same require-
ment in another program. Similarly, there is no arrangement for
evaluating information requirements in terms of intelligence objectives.
In addition, this situation has been complicated by excessive classification
and security compartmentation, which tend to isolate programs and
thwart comparisons.
Obi ectiv'es
The ultimate objective of a good intelligence program is to
provide a better intelligence product to the consumers; a product which
is as timely and as accurate as our resources can conceivably make
it., The attainment of this overall objective requires improvements in
(1) collection and utilization of intelligence; (2) the estimating processes;
and (3) allocation of resources. The functions of a Special Assistant
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are different with respect to the operational and estimating processes
of the intelligence community than they are with resource management.
Any organization or personnel changes resulting from this
report should be made to achieve the following objectives listed in
priority. (You will notice that these objectives are primarily aimed
at resource management and intelligence policies, and not management
of intelligence operations of a day-to-day nature. This does not imply
that the management of the intelligence operations is flawless. On the
contrary, there is substantial dissatisfaction with certain operations
of defense intelligence. However, improved management and operations
can better result through improved personnel and policies rather than a
radically new organization.) The objectives are:
Objective 1. To establish a resource review and decision-
making process for major intelligence activities. By
resource review I mean determining the appropriate level
and mix of significant resources for the satisfaction of
intelligence requirements. There are inseparable rein-
forcing objectives which are essential elements of this
overall Objective. These inherent objectives are: (1)
To establish a mechanism for making comparisons and
appropriate trade-offs between major intelligence activ-
ities and programs so that DoD decision-makers can select
the most efficient and effective systems for collecting,
processing, producing, and disseminating intelligence.
(What form this mechanism takes is relatively unimportant.
It should be simple and understandable. I'll refer to it,
whatever form it takes, as the Consolidated Defense
Intelligence Program (CDIP)); (2) to improve Defense
intelligence resources allocation planning for the mid-range
period by establishing a Five-Year Intelligence Resource
Plan updated annually; and (3) to focus attention on
decisive points in this program by developing major issue
studies on unresolved problems of intelligence resource
allocation and management.
Existing DoD intelligence resource programs (CIP,
CCP, and others) are institutionalized and are not
evaluated in relation to mutual target objectives or in
terms of mission-oriented information needs.
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The DoD intelligence community at the present time
does not know the minimum level of information that
will s atisfy a stated requirement. While there is no
upper boundary on intelligence requirements, there is
a limit on resources. Therefore, resource limitations
make it important to ascertain requirements as precisely
as possible. We need to insure that all valid require-
ments are met to some minimum level, without going to
higher levels on some requirements while ignoring other
valid requirements. In other words, the risks involved
in acceptance of reduced or alternate levels of efforts
must be known.
The focus of intelligence planning and programming
activities tends to be in the near term period (one or
two years ahead). Long lead times for modern technical
collection systems, automated processing systems and
automated analytic and production aids create the need
to develop a long term intelligence resource plan. With-
our such planning, intelligence decisions rely on short
term considerations. Further,. there is a tendency to
develop options made available by rapidly expanding
technology simply because they are available.
In the present programming process, recommendations
reaching the Secretary and Deputy Secretary show
fluctuations in manpower and money from previously
approved levels but more significant issues do not tend
to surface within DoD. Frequently, past decisions on
elements or systems having high dollar value or
significant ramifications in a functional area have been
reached through the mechanism of ad hoc groups con-
vened by the Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense to
study each problem whwi it arises -- generally in a time
frame which does not permit in-depth analysis.
Objective 2. To improve information flow and policy
transmission on intelligence matters between the DoD
and other government agencies concerned with intelli-
gence resources by functioning as DoD focal point for
inter agency relations.
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Currently, below the Secretary/Deputy Secretary
of Defense level, no single agency or individual has the
authority to participate across the board in an effective
dialogue at the highest levels with non-DoD agencies.
Representation today is fragmented among a number
of DoD intelligence officials none of whom possesses
the necessary responsibility for all DoD programs.
Since the Special 'Assistant will not be the sole DoD
representative in the intelligence community, it is
indispensable that senior DoD intelligence officials
do not operate independently of each other.
Objective 3. To obtain a more efficient distribution
of the functional responsibilities of the DoD intelli-
gence agencies and organizations through an evaluation
of their organizational relationships., roles, and missions,
The U. S. Congress, in the l-TACIT Report of 196?,
and other government agencies have been concerned
that the military Services are performing functions
specifically delegated to the DIA and vice versa.
Additionally, the relationship of the National Security
Agency (NSA) to counterpart agencies in the military
Services as well as to the Unified and Specified _
Commands, has been questioned. The institutional
structure of the Defense intelligence coinmun.ity is
the result of a piecemeal process which seldom
addressed the interrelationships of the elements in
the community as a whole.
Objective 4. To improve intelligence flow by insuring
that a realistic reappraisal of security policies and
procedures is undertaken with a view toward modifying
standards which lead to unnecessary classification
and over- compartmentation of intelligence information.
(Obviously any activity along this line would have to
be coordinated among all elements of the intelligence
community and with the DCI specifically. }
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Dialogue between the participants in DoD intelli-
gence programs is restricted. As a result, at times
officials charged with reviewing existing progranis are
denied information essential to the formulation of
recommendations.
pr,frization
I recommend that you name one individual to act as the Special
Assistant to the Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense for defense
intelligence. He would be responsible for intelligence resource
management. In addition, he would act as staff advisor to the
Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense for all other DoD intelligence
activities. The solution to our current problems in intelligence
management will not be found in the panacea of mass reorganization.
There are no clear cut solutions to the problems we face. The
Special Assistant will be feeling his way along a path that will require
the closest cooperation of all members of the intelligence community
to insure meaningful progress.
The Special Assistant will make the trade-offs among intelligence
programs competing for resources. Directors of DoD intelligence
agencies would of course have the right of .reclarna to the Secretary
or Deputy Secretary of Defense. In other matters, the Directors of
DoD intelligence agencies would report to the Secretary but the Special
Assistant would act as the Secretary's principal staff element.
On occasion the Special Assistant would undoubtedly direct
certain broad management activities other than resources. When
so doing, he would be acting for the Secretary /Deputy Secretary.
(It would serve little purpose to attempt to delineate to what extent
and when the Special Assistant would become involved in day-to-day
operations. Suffice that he will become involved at the pleasure
of the Secretary/Deputy Secretary and probably about as often as they
have in the past. ) For substantive intelligence matters this approach
will allow essential and healthy differences in intelligence judgments
within the community to continue to exist and to be presented to the
Secretary/Deputy Secretary.
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I recommend that the Special Assistant, as a management
technique, create a forum -,,he-re the leaders in the Defense intelligence
community can. discuss and communicate items of general interest..
In time it could become a decision making body. The exact make up
of the forum and its modus operandi should be left to the Special
Assistant. (This forum was labeled the Doll Intelligence Board in my
tentative report. )
I further recommend the establishment of an Executive Council
for Defense Intelligence. It can either supersede or serve in addition
to a similar committee. If it supersedes, the similar committee
should continue as a subcommittee of the Executive Council. In that
way, all. the understandings and agreements that were involved in
setting up the existing committee could be continued.
The Council should consist of the Deputy Secretary of Defense
as Chairman, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Presidents
Scientific Advisor, the Chairman of the JCS and the Director, Defense
Research and Engineering. The Special Assistant would sit ex officio.
The Council would be an advisory body (however with the
Deputy Secretary as its Chairman, its advice would certainly be
heeded). The primary purpose of setting the Council up would be
to have the benefit of this advice. An important fringe benefit would
be the communication. channel it would provide to and from the intelli-
gence community. Ideally, as time goes on, the Council should do
the following things-
1) Guide and participate in the formulation, of
resource programs.
2) Recommend to the Secretary of Defense an
appropriate level of effort for resource programs.
Recommend allocations of responsibility and
corresponding funds for R&D for appropriate
systems.
Recommend approval or modifications to the
resource programs.
5) Periodically review essential features of the
major programs.
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Staffing Alternatives
There are a series of staffing alternatives which provide
varying levels of capability to achieve the objectives outlined.
Three alternatives to provide staff support to the Special
Assistant have been considered:
Alternative 1. Provide a nucleus of intelligence expertise
for the Special Assistant, leaving currently assigned
responsibilities of OSD elements essentially as they are
now. It is estimated that it would require five professionals
and two clerical spaces for this staff.
Alternative 2. Transfer professional positions and the
necessary clerical support currently dealing with intelli-
gence resource management to the office of the Special
Assistant. The objective would be to consolidate a
number of existing intelligence management activities
in one office. The transfer of positions might be
accomplished as follows (This does not necessarily
mean incumbents would transfer with the position. ):
ASD(A)
DIA
DDR&E's Office of
Special Intelligence
ASD(SA)
2
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Alternative 3. Enlarge the proposed intelligence staff to
a level at which it would be capable of performing, on a
totally centralized basis, the full range of intelligence
resource management functions: development and ranking
of requirements, mid-range planning, program and budget
development, and review of intelligence issues. While a
detailed analysis of personnel requirements has not been
made, it is estimated that it would take about 150-200
professionals to accomplish these functions..
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In det:erming which staffing Alternative to recommend, I
considered each in light of the objectives listed earlier:
Objective 1. (Establish a resource review and decision
making process for intelligence resources management. )
The Special Assistant and his staff would have to: (1) Establish
and conduct an objective-oriented Consolidated Defense Intelligence
Program (CDIP) which would encompass all DoD managed intelligence
resources (Tactical intelligence resources -- once defined -- would
not be managed by the Special Assistant. However, he must be cognizant
of them to the extent that he can properly evaluate their impact on the
employment of resources allocated to the satisfaction of the highest
level military and national intelligence requirements); (2) Establish a
Five-Year Intelligence Resource Plan*to improve intelligence resource
allocation planning for the mid-range period; and (3) Formulate major
issues of intelligence resources allocation and management.
Initially, it will take a considerable number of man years to
achieve this objective. I do not think the staff should be set up for
the initial surge of personnel needs. This initial surge could be met
on an ad hoc basis from within DoD.
This is the highest priority Objective. Presently it is not being
met. Decision makers need a frames-.pork for selecting alternative.
options and corresponding .levels of effort. Establishing a CDIP to
provide this framework, and conducting an annual review has primary
claim on manpower assigned to the Special Assistant. An early goal
should be the reduction of detail that currently characterizes the
present intelligence reviews (GIP and CCP). There is unanimous
agreement that excessive detail makes these reviews unwieldy and
makes it necessary to devote manpower to these efforts to an
unwarranted level. (The Directors of the DoD intelligence agencies
will be directly responsible for the development of their respective
programs. )
The Five-Year Intelligence Resource Plan will strive: (1) to
permit resource allocation decisions to be made as early as possible,
especially for long lead-time items; (2) to explore tie adequacy of
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resources to meet future needs; (3) to present the costs and benefits
of satisfying various levels of intelligence needs, and (4) to understand
better the resource implications of satisfying various future require-.
ments.
A major factor in the development of the Plan is the pressing
need to establish a continuing system for review of intelligence collection
requirements against collection resources, taking into account costs
and risks. No means exist at present for accomplishing this, since there
is no measure of value for levels of information. No one knows how
much information is essential and we have only sketchy estimates of
what it costs to obtain the information. (There are a number of efforts
underway which, hopefully, will structure a solution to this problem. )
The formulation of major issues is closely tied to the preceding
objectives, and much of it can be accomplished in the process of
gaining those objectives, Formulating major issues has never been
attempted successfully in the Defense intelligence con-miunity. It is,
however, necessary in order to determine the proper courses to follow.,.
In theory Objective 1 could be accomplished by any of the three
staffing Alternatives. However, if Alternative 1 (the minimum staff)
were selected, the Special Assistant would operate principally as a
monitor, with the .major effort fragmented among DoD agencies. As a
practical matter, therefore, it is questionable whether Alternative 1
could do the job.
Objective 2. (Improve intelligence communications
among DoD and other agencies. )
It is envisioned that the Special Assistant would act as the DoD.
intelligence management contact with DCI, BOB, PFIAB, and other
non-DoD members of the intelligence community. One of the less
obvious responsibilities would be to keep communication channels
open at all times unimpeded by a lack of rapport and understanding.
Any one of the three staffing Alternatives could satisfy this
Objective.
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Obj ecti.ve 3. (Evaluate the intelligence organizational
relationship, roles and -missions.
)
It appears that this could best be accomplished by an Ad Hoc
study group. (The Defense Blue Ribbon Panel appears to be a likely
candidate. ) As a result, this could be accomplished under any of the
Alternatives.
Objective 4. (Reappraise security policies and eliminate
unnecessary classification and over- comparti-nentation. in
the intelligence field. )
This Objective Would necessitate a review, under the aegis
of the DCI, of current security policies and procedures. It is a
continuing effort because of the ever present tendency to over-:classify
and over-do cornpartmentation.
There is a distinct feeling in the community that over-classifica-
tion and over-compartmentation exist. It is a natural tendency and I
observed evidence of it. If it is present. in any significant degree, it
certainly is bad because over-classification impedes the flow of informa-
tion and over-cornpartmentatibn excludes agencies and individuals who
may have a legitimate need for the information.
Both A lternatives 2 and 3 (Lhe middle and maximum staffing
.Alternatives) could accomplish this Objective. Alternative i (the
minimum staffing Alternative) could not accomplish it unless the
function was farmed out to other OSD elements.
The primary advantage of Alternative I (minimumn staff) is
that it requires a minimum number of people under the Special Assistant.
Cosmetically, this is advantageous.
The primary disadvantage of Alternative I is that it would be
iirmpossible for the Special Assistant to achieve the stated Objectives
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without r elying almost entirely on a number of other elements in DoD.
This raises the distinct possibility of the Special Assistant having the
in-)age of responsibility but not the ability to carry it out.
Alternative 2 (the middle staff) has the advantage of providing
sufficient staff to meet all. of the objectives and establishing the Special
Assistant as the intelligence manager for the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Defense. All the staffing -,A-ould be under the supervision
of the Special Assistant. It also clearly reduces fragmentation of DoD
responsibilities for intelligence.
The disadvantage, if it really is one, is that this level of staffing
will not allow the Special Assitant to become involved in the day-to-day
operations of the intelligence agencies. Another disadvantage, if it is
one, is that the Special As sistant will spend a good deal of his time
dealing with DoD agencies and the rest of the intelligence community
because staff will not be available.
At this stage, it is impossible to say whether or not the Special
Assistant's duties will require his full--time attention: in other words,
will the workload prevent assigning the job to an ASD as additional
duty? From all my observations and conversations, I feel that it will
not be a full-time job, although getting the new system started will
certainly require a lot of attention. Once the new organization is
started and running, yoiLi may perceive that it is indeed a full-time job.
? At that time the billet can be so designated. The same reasoning
applies to the size of the staff: as more is learned about the workload,
you will be better able to determine the size of the Special Assistant's
staff. As of now, about 15 professionals appear to be adequate to get
the system started.
Alternative 3 (maximum staff) has. the advantage.of being able
to accomplish all objectives -- and then soiree. It not only allows the
Special Assistant to be primarily responsible for intelligence
r esource management but could permit him to become deeply in the
day-to-day intelligence operations. The primary disadvantages of
Alternatives 3 are the cosmetic one of added manpower and the
disruption caused by major reorganization. Both Congress and the
ixn.telii.gence community would react adversely to this.
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AlteL~native 3, because of the considerable additional OS])
manpovvc.c and disruption, does not make sense at this time.
Alternative 1 would be all improvement over the prosent but
the lack of sufficient staff supporting the Special Assistant would
probably leave responsibility diffused.
I recoxnrn end Alter native 2. It is a happy compromise. It
would accomplish the four stated objectives with a minimum of
reorganization and personnel.
Location of the Special Assistant
The number of options available for the location of a Special
Assistant for Intel.lige~ce narrows dog- n to live:
~tion.~1. "Norinalize" present intelligence resource
management and allocation with a Five-Year Intelligence
Resource Plan, Development Concept Papers (DCP' s )
from the Director, Defense Research and Engineering,
and Major Program Memoranda. (MPM's) from the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis),
with a minimum role.being played by the Special
Assista nt.
O?tion 2. Assign to an existing Assistant Secretary of
Defense the responsibilities described in this report
for the Special Assistant for Intelligence.
Oti.T.n,3. Establish the Special Assistant under the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Option 4. Establish a Special Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense as a separate office directly subordinate to
the Secretary. -
O ti.on 5. Establish an Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence).
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Analysis of the O ~tions
O ~tion J. does not: truly integrate the DoD intelligence effort,
and it puts siring and development. of intelligence forces under officials
who have an interest in intelligence products for use in developing
weapons or in setting force levels. It has the effect of placing tine
intelligence resource management responsibilities in the hands of
officials who are customers for various parts of the intelligence
product. (This Option actually lends itself only to staffing Alternative 1. }
Qpti.oi.! 2 furnishes the man charged with the job with the prestige
and authority, both inside DoD and with other government agencies,
possessed by an Assistant Secretary of Defense. Further, the intelligence
management function. envisioned should not require the full-time attention
of an ASD. IJowever, when. required, the authority of his office as an
ASP is available.
Option 3, The JCS are oriented primarily toward strategic
planning and dir ection and to thos e activities of the military Services
whi.clr supply these functions. The assignment of intelligence resource
management to the JCS would short-circuit those responsibilities for
resource allocation and ?management charged to the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments. The JCS
are also customers for major portions of the intelligence product.
Their responsibility in intelligence management is more properly
one of providing views based on the intelligence needs of the JCS and
the combat forces.
Option 4 would probably accomplish the objectives but is
handicapped by the lack of position. and authority normally associated
with an ASD. The Special Assistant in this Option is solely dependent
on his relationship to the Secretary to accomplish the objectives. As
a result, there is an aura of the "ad hoc" about a separate Special
Assistant.
Optiola5 would require redesignation of an existing ASD or
Congressional-action to acid an ASD because of the statutory limit
of seven. Assistant Secretaries. The magnitude of the intelligence
function suggested in staff Alternatives I and 2, in terms of manning
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levels and percentage of the total .DoD budget managed, is relatively
small and tJ.iex eforr, mi.)litates. against Option 5.
Recomm c7.ndations
I eliminate location Option l (normalize present practice) and
3 (JCS) because it appears to me that either could result in the Special
Assistant being unable to achieve the stated objectives.
I recommend Option 2 (assign to an. existing ASD).
If there is some reason that Option 2 is not selected, I would
recommend Option 4 (Special Assistant) and finally Option 5 (New ASD).
Respectfully submitted,
Robert F.. Froehl.ke
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