THE LONG RANGE PLAN OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00311R000100350001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 195
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 31, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR:
entral Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT The Long Range Plan
of the Central Intelligence Agency
1, I have the honor to present to you the Long Range Plan
of the Central Intelligence Agency which has been prepared under my
direction by representatives of the four Directorates and the Office of
Budget, Program Analysis and Manpower, While I undertook this
responsibility with apprehension, it is with pleasure that I now present
to you the first draft of a long range plan. While none of us who parti-
cipated in the preparation of this document would ascr' e to it infalli-
bility, we are nevertheless confident that we have charted a course for
the Agency which is in the best interests of the United States Govern-
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2. It gives me pleasure to inform you that I have received
the most unanimously enthusiastic cooperation in this effort that I have
ever experienced in the 18 years of the Agency. Each of the Directorates
assigned to this task senior officials of great ability and considerable
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J. J. Hitchcock from the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence;
experience:
from the Deputy Directorate for Plans;
from the
Deputy Directorate for Science and Technology;
from the Deputy Directorate for Support;
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from the Office of Budget, Program Analysis and
Manpower. The staff was headed by
who was assisted
of the Office of Budget, Program Analysis and
Manpower, and without their considerable expertise and assistance, the
report could not have been finished by its deadline. Perhaps even more
important for the future is the fact that all of the above named are con-
vinced that the preparation of an Agency plan and permanent planning is
long overdue, and thus the work of a permanent planning staff has
already gained considerable momentum. Finally, this effort has served
to develop an Agency viewpoint which has never before been so apparent,
3. After careful examination of the responsibilities and the
duties of the Central Intelligence Agency as established by law and the
National Security Council, the most profound conviction of the Planning
Group was of the importance of the Agency's work. It is national in
scope and outlook. It provides a centralized and coordinated intelligence
by
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viewpoint for the President. It is a strong, independent voice and should
always remain so even though at times its views are unpopular. It uses
what other intelligence organizations produce in compiling national intel-
ligence and it does not interfere with departmental activities. It is
essential to national security.
4. I was very mindful, in the preparation of this plan, of
your conversation with Congressman George Mahon and the injunction
that it should not simply serve as a justification for an expanding organi-
zation or a hunting license for empire building. The Planning Group
examined with great care and thoroughness each of the objectives pre-
sented by the various components, and you will find the individual
Directorate presentations available in the annexes to the basic docu-
ment, We also examined with great thoroughness the future implica-
tions of these programs. I must report to you that the Central Intel-
ligence Agency cannot continue to accept these responsibilities and to
perform them in a manner expected by the United States Government at
its present size. Thus, while for planning purposes we have assumed
that CIA will continue to have all of these responsibilities--and the pro-
posals presented reflect this--if the Government reaches a conscious
decision that the Agency should not expand to the degree that we propose,
then it must relieve the Agency of some of these responsibilities. This,
in fact, is the only way in which CIA could continue at its present strength.
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5. It would appear that the time is appropriate for the
highest level of the United States Government to decide what price it
wishes to pay for the information it needs to reach appropriate policy
decisions. If the U. S. Government wishes to have timely and accurate
intelligence on all areas of the world and to respond to each crisis
affecting the security interests of the nation with policy decisions based
upon the soundest information available that has been properly analyzed
by experts, then it cannot expect to obtain this inexpensively. The
Central Intelligence Agency must be allowed to grow to meet ever increas-
ing demands from the Government for intelligence on a world that be-
comes constantly more complex. It would not seem inappropriate to
suggest that the Bureau of the Budget study the proposition that a certain
proportion of the Federal budget--or even of the gross national product--
should properly be allocated to its intelligence system. The other alter-
native is one best not to contemplate in that with inadequate intelligence
not thoroughly analyzed and studied, the United States Government might
well find itself committed to the wrong war in the wrong place at the
wrong time.
6. While a superficial reading of this paper might give the
impression that we found much to criticize, this would not be a true
reflection of our views. We did find inadequacies and problems, but we
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found these because we were mindful of the President's injunction to you
that he wanted CIA to be the world's best intelligence service. For
example, the Agency's capability for intelligence analysis and production
has remained at a relatively constant level while there has been an infor-
mation explosion as a result of improved mass collection systems such
as photographic satellites with the result that the volume of reporting has
expanded vastly while the number of analysts remained constant. Simi-
larly, as the security interests of the United States have expanded to
include virtually every inhabited spot on earth, the requirements for
clandestine collection and covert action have greatly increased and have
proportionately inhibited the Agency's efforts to build a long range, truly
clandestine apparatus--an effort which is vitally important. Far more
important than the weaknesses we touch upon are the tremendous accom-
plishments of this organization over the years and the fact that it pro-
vides the soundest possible base for the future--a magnificent cadre of
highly trained and dedicated professional intelligence officers.
7. I would suggest that you consider this paper as the first
draft of the Agency's Long Range Plan. It presents projections and the
order of magnitude of major problems facing the Agency, with special
attention and treatment for those areas of critical importance. In a
world in which change is the principal common denominator of human
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activity, then a plan must be constantly revised, updated, and improved.
Your directive establishing a permanent Agency planning staff will
accomplish this.
8. What this plan says in broadest terms can be summar-
ized succintly:
a. The Agency must be prepared to fulfill its
responsibilities both for collection and production on a
world-wide basis in an atmosphere which for the foresee-
able future will be one of crisis, conflict, and confrontation.
b. Recognizing that in the past two decades
scientific progress has been proportionately greater than
in all previous recorded history, the Agency will be
operating in a universal arena where major break-throughs
affecting the relations between nations must be anticipated
as a matter of course.
c. To do the job of national intelligence produc-
tion which the United States Government has a right to expect,
the Agency must have considerably greater depth in analysts,
especially in the political intelligence field and that of strate-
gic warning, and must assist their work by leading in the field
of automatic data processing and analysis.
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d. Similarly, the Agency cannot provide a
world-wide clandestine intelligence and covert action
network with a capability for covert paramilitary opera-
tions where required unless its Clandestine Services,
which are presently stretched exceedingly taut by
world-wide commitments, are allowed to expand with a
developmental complement and:to create in depth capa-
city for operational research.
e. All of the foregoing points obviously to
the necessity for research in mission-oriented fields,
particularly those directly related to doing a better inter-
national job, and this must be nurtured and fostered by
the Agency.
f. Accompanying this expansion of the organi-
zation must be a proportionate increase in such areas as
security, communications, and training, to continue to
provide the same degree of support facilities for the
organization.
9. Internally, I suggest that this report be read and reviewed
by the Agency's Executive Committee and that upon consideration of their
views you refer it to the Executive Director-Comptroller for implementation,
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or for further study by the Agency's permanent Planning Staff, as
appropriate. By separate memorandum I am presenting a proposed
charter for the Agency's permanent Planning Staff.
10. I also recommend that you consider showing this report
to the most senior officials of the United States Government for their
personal perusal. It would be of major assistance to the national
security effort if the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense,
the Security Advisor to the President, the Chairman of the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the Director of the Budget
would take the time in their busy schedules to acquaint themselves with
the future of an organization which may well be the key to survival. I
feel so strongly that we have charted the right course toward the objec-
tive of the President to provide him with the world's best intelligence
service, that I would be happy to defend this plan before any forum at
any place at any time.
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Page
I. Over View of the CIA Long Range Plan 1-5
IL Long Range Planning Assumptions 6-13
III. The Present and Future Role of CIA 14-28
A. The Long Range Outlook for the 29-49
Clandestine Services
B. Production of Intelligence 50-61
C. Overt Collection and Reference Services 62-66
D. Support 67-73
IV. Special Problem Areas
A. The CIA Image 74-79
B. CIA's Role in Intelligence Coordination 80-91
C. Requirements for the Collection of 92-94
Intelligence Information
D. Early Warning of Strategic Attack 95-101
E. Automatic Data Processing and Analysis 102-107
F. Systems Analysis 108-116-
G. Scientific Research 117-122
H. Overhead Reconnaissance 123-133
I. National Photographic Interpretation 134-136
J. Personnel and Training 137-146
K. Medical Views on Planning and 147-152
Human Resources
L. Communications
M. Security
153-158
159-164
V. Consolidated Recommendations 165-174
VI. Index 175-185
VII, Annexes 186
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OVER VIEW OF THE CIA LONG RANGE PLAN
I. In a few short years the Central Intelligence Agency has devel-
oped the resources, techniques, and expertise which has enabled it to
carry out its uniques responsibilities rapidly and responsibly. This
has been affirmed and reaffirmed by four Presidents and the overwhelming
majority of responsible officials of Government. Nonetheless, the
Central Intelligence Agency is not immune to the technological revolu-
tion, the rapid explosion in communications, and the burgeoning unrest
which characterize the world today. These rapidly evolving changes
have special implications for intelligence which must be heeded if we
are to meet the challenges of the future.
II. The technological revolution has provided intelligence with a
wealth of new information largely pertaining to the capabilities of other
nations, and means have been and continue to be developed for its
exploitation and analysis. However, as yet adequate sources and tech-
niques have not been provided for determining the intentions of poten-
tially hostile nations. The numbers of intelligence consumers and their
demands for intelligence in greater detail have increased in a measure
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which was unforeseen when the concept of strategic intelligence was first
formulated. Over the years the range of intelligence has also broadened
to encompass the total spectrum of today's conflict--economic, social,
and psychological as well as military and political. Concurrently, there
has been an increased demand, which will not diminish, for "instant
intelligence" vital for early warning of all types. Perhaps the most
significant recent change in intelligence concerns the processing and
analysis of information. For many years and for good reason, intelli-
gence was primarily concerned with means of collecting information of
all kinds. It is abundantly clear at this time that our ability to process
and analyze raw information has not kept pace with our collection capability.
III. During the past few weeks the Planning Group has examined the
future of the Central Intelligence Agency and presents what it believes
to be a sound and rational direction for the future. The Planning Group
identified and developed those themes which are of utmost importance
to the future posture of the Agency. It is important to point out what this
plan is not. It is not a simple compilation of Directorate views.
IV. The Planning Group is deeply concerned by the difficulties facing
the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) which is faced
with an overload of photographic data without the resources for proper
analysis. However, the Planning Group recognizes the NPIC problem
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as a dramatic example of a general phenomenon within the community
which we call "information explosion. " Information explosion is also
apparent in many other analytical offices in the Agency and applies to
our early warning capability, signal analysis, and other basic intelli-
gence activities. Therefore, the plan highlights the critical need for
a high priority and aggressive program aimed at increased use of auto-
matic data processing and more sophisticated techniques for data analy-
sis. The annexes do, however, give indications of the programs which
might be undertaken to solve the NPIC as well as other related data
analysis problems.
V. The increased demands for national intelligence not only dictate
the need for more rapid communication of information collected by tech-
nical means but serve to underline the unique contribution which the
Clandestine Services provide with respect to intentions. Broader dis-
semination of clandestinely obtained information requires more rigor-
ous control of the source of this valuable information if the Clandestine
Services are to play an increasingly effective role in intelligence.
VI. The Planning Group found that there were certain common prob-
lems which could be identified. The commonality of problems became
more apparent in the course of our briefings and discussions.
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VII. A plan must consider existing resources and functions and in
recommending new programs must consider what can be removed from
current efforts in order to provide the resources necessary to meet
new challenges. There is no question that each and every office or
division within the Agency could find certain on-going activities which,
if curtailed or modified, would provide savings in funds and manpower.
However, such economies, no matter how rigorously instituted, would
not significantly reduce the budget and manpower requirements of the
Agency but would affect the responsibilities of the Agency.
VIII. We are in a paradoxical situation. There is no question that the
demands for intelligence will increase quantitatively and qualitatively.
There is also no question that simply adding manpower and personnel
under the misguided concept that we can do everything for everybody
will prove disastrous. What is clear from the deliberations of the group
is that major improvements in the effectiveness of the Agency will be
the result of better analysis of the operations of intelligence. Indeed,
minor changes in services performed, a decision to cut out certain
aspects of basic intelligence may serve to obscure the real nature of
the problem and prove costly in the long run.
Ix. Consideration was given to the role of national current intelli-
gence. Those responsible for national intelligence production are
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concerned about the gradual erosion of their basic capability for strate-
gic intelligence in their effort to serve tactical and current requirements.
If it is clear that we must serve both purposes, then it must also be
clear that it will cost us in resources. History shows that the over-
balance toward current intelligence without adequate support to the basic
in-depth research on the capabilities and intentions of our adversaries
could be the most dangerous and perhaps fatal error which we could
commit.
X. It should be apparent on reading the plan that the overwhelming
emphasis of the Planning Group has been on the substantive and opera-
tional aspects of intelligence with less discussion regarding organiza-
tional and legislative problems.
XI. It bears repeating that this plan, like any plan that is worthwhile,
is not an end but a beginning.
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LONG RANGE PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS
I. The Future
A. The intelligence responsibilities and obligations of the
Central Intelligence Agency have increased in number and grown apace
with the international involvements and national security considerations
of the U. S. over the past decade. The Agency's responsibilities and
programs are world-wide and it is certain that the upcoming ten or
fifteen years will see major increases in the needs of the highest levels
of the Government for the Agency's intelligence and operations.
B. In preparing a meaningful long range plan for CIA, it is
necessary as a first step to present a statement of probable future
world developments in order to understand the type and scope of
requirements to be met by intelligence and the general environment in
which intelligence will operate.
II. The Probable World Situation
A. In the broadest sense it can be assumed that within the
time span of this plan the world situation will continue along lines which
now seem apparent.
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1. General. Nuclear war involving the U. S.
will remain a possibility during the period of this plan.
Non-nuclear wars, limited wars, and armed insurrections
and rebellions will occur from time to time, often
simultaneously, and will involve U. S. interests. Some
of them will threaten U. S. security interests and some
of them will involve U. S. armed forces and/or CIA covert
paramilitary forces.
2. The Soviet Union, Communist China, and
Other Communist Countries. The principal antagonists
of the U. S. will be the USSR and Communist China. China
will acquire during this period the capability for nuclear
attack and the U. S. will be faced with two formidable
Communist power centers. Both the USSR and China will
continue and increase efforts to extend their influence into
Free World areas, sometimes in competition with each
other, through political, economic, and subversive means.
Sino-Soviet difficulties and the lessening of Soviet control
over Eastern European satellites may from time to time
offer opportunities for advancing U. S. interests. However,
there will be no real diminution of the threat these countries
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present to the U. S. Similarly, other Communist countries
will be generally hostile to U. S. and aligned, with varying
degrees of firmness, either to the USSR or Communist
China.
3. Far East and Southeast Asia. There will
be no lessening of Communist China's efforts to dominate
this area. Under the guise of supporting nationalism and
wars of liberation, it will work actively to foment and
covertly support dissidence in these countries whose
stability will remain precarious. Southeast Asia will
remain in the foreseeable future a major battlefield in
the Communist-Free World confrontation, although the
current conflict in Vietnam will be resolved politically
or militarily within the next five years. Japan will play
an increasingly independent and important role in world
affairs, and in particular, can be expected to expand its
relations with Communist China. Indonesia, Taiwan,
divided Korea, and India-Pakistan will pose major
problems.
4. Near East/South Asia. The Communist
Bloc through increased activity and an expanding presence
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in this area will continue attempts to reduce U. S. /
Western prestige. This area will be used by the Bloc
over the period of this plan as a bridgehead for the
neutralization of NATO and CENTO and for the penetration
of Black Africa through political, economic, military,
and subversive means. The Arab-Israeli dispute will
continue and will always present the possibility of starting
what could be a major conflagration. The countries in
this area will continue to be unstable domestically and in
their international alignment. Limited conflicts will
occur from time to time which will require U. S. inter -
vention either overtly or covertly.
5. Latin America. The governments of Latin
American countries are inherently unstable and the
causes of instability will continue in the foreseeable future.
However, the prospects for Communist Parties gaining
control of a Latin American country by revolutionary or
parliaxizertaxy means cannot be discounted. Within the next
ten-year period nationalism will continue to increase and
will be expressed in attitudes and actions against the U. S.
Communist China will show a growing interest and activity
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in stirring agitation and dissidence, while Cuba will con-
tinue to launch subversive efforts against countries in the
area. A Castro-type government will probably continue
in Cuba through -the - 19,70-s. The USSR will continue to pur-
sue, its objectives in Latin America by political means and
will support groups which are responsive to its direction.
subject to internal instability, rebellion, and international
conflict providing opportunities which the USSR and
Communist China will certainly endeavor to exploit. Wars
of liberation, armed rebellion, and frontier and racial con-
flict will occur with frequency, most of which will involve
basic U. S. interests to some degree, some will threaten
U. S. security interests, and some will require covert U. S.
paramilitary action. Former colonial powers will continue
to play a significant role in their areas of influence. The
UK and Belgium will remain basically friendly to the U. S.
and will cooperate. France will likely pursue an independ-
ent policy designed to contain U. S. influence while Portugal
will view the U. S. as a major threat to its African interest.
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7. Western Allies. It is expected that our
close allies (i. e., Western Europe, Australia, New
Zealand, and Canada) will remain basically friendly,
though there will be occasional conflicts of interest
with them. The transition periods in France, Spain,
and Portugal after the passing of their aged leaders will
be troublesome. It is likely that NATO will be signifi-
cantly altered within the next five years. European
industry will be strong in competition with the U. S. and
there will be an acceleration of trade ties between Europe
and East-Bloc countries which could modify existing
power relations. Within fifteen years Europe may become
increasingly independent of U. S. leadership- -economically,
politically, and militarily creating another force in world
affairs.
III. The Impact of Technology
A. In addition to the comprehensive requirements for national
intelligence which can be derived from the above, and in light of
unparalleled scientific progress over the past fifteen years, it is clear
that continued technological advances in the coming years will affect both
the capabilities of foreign countries, the relations and balance of power
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between nations, and thus the targets and operations of the Agency's
intelligence efforts. The competition in strategic weapons systems and
in the exploration of outer space has already effected enormous changes
in intelligence means and methods. The most obvious effect of techno-
logical progress will be Communist China's early acquisition of a
nuclear strike capability and the growth and proliferation of nuclear
weapons capabilities in several other countries. Additionally, however,
technical breakthroughs could occur which in other respects would
greatly modify the power of countries and which could, depending upon
circumstances, either be the reason for or the reason for not pursuing
aggressive courses. Examples would include means for controlling
weather, for producing cheap and abundant power, water, and food
(including the possibility of efficient exploitation of oceanic resources),
and other developments such as effective population control.
IV. The Impact on CIA
A. Over the next ten to fifteen years the U. S. Government
will probably see no lessening of problems in its international relations
and in the protection of its security interests. The requirements for
current and estimative intelligence in support of policy decisions and
actions will increase in both scope and intensity as will the need for
covert collection, counterintelligence, and covert political, economic,
and military actions.
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B, The spread of technical and other material advances
throughout the world may, within the span of this plan, equip several
countries with nuclear weapons and some sort of delivery capability,
although it be limited to a local area. The need will grow, therefore,
for improved clandestine collection and for technical programs capable
of sampling larger environments at greater distances from targets,
incorporating "real-time, " high-volume, discriminating techniques in
processing raw data. Similarly, the storage, retrieval, and preliminary
analysis of information prior to intelligence research and analysis will
present problems of increasing severity. Even in the basic intelligence
field, there will be a national requirement for more intensive intelligence
to predict more accurately the impact of technology on foreign social,
political, economic, and military environments and for more sophisti-
cated methods for intelligence in support of and in carrying out covert
actions and counterinsurgency intelligence operations.
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THE PRESENT AND FUTURE ROLE OF CIA
I. General
A. At the outset in long range planning for the Central
Intelligence Agency it is necessary to examine its present and future
responsibilities, bearing in mind that while the National Security Act
of 1947 which created the Agency describes certain functions for the
organization, the evolution of the intelligence community, the changing
roles and responsibilities of other departments and agencies, and the
creation of new agencies have all served to affect the activities of the
CIA. It is equally important to CIA's planning that there be clear under-
standing within the U. S. Government of the Agency's responsibility
and authority. It is therefore believed essential that the Agency
continue and intensify efforts to brief selected Congressmen and
Congressional staff members, taking into account their continuing
and special interests and including discussions of CIA's functions
and responsibilities in general. Such briefings should also be initiated
for the Executive Branch of the Government, including particularly
such policy groups as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
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Board. While it is realized that the DCI must carry the principal
burden in briefing U. S. Government officials, greater use of second
echelon officers of CIA, as feasible, would increase the scope of the
Agency's efforts in this area without increasing the Director's already
heavy schedule.
II. War Planning
A. The role of the CIA in wartime is not fully understood
or accepted by the member agencies of the United States Intelligence
Board (USIB). In 1957, the National Security Council instructed the
Director of Central Intelligence to proceed with the development of
war plans for the intelligence community. The Director took the
position that it would be necessary first to develop directives governing
peacetime arrangements. During the ensuing two years, various
National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID) defining
foreign intelligence responsibilities of the USIB member agencies were
published. In 1959 the Emergency Planning Steering Committee (never
formally constituted or recognized by the USIB) initiated a study which
was concerned largely with emergency relocation- -only one facet of
war planning. The Committee ceased to function when the Board
reached an impasse on the intelligence advisory role of the DCI to
the President during wartime.
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B. The CIA Act of 1947 makes no distinction between the
peacetime and the wartime roles of the DCI or the Agency. The Act
provides all of the authority needed by the Agency for the pursuit of
wartime activities. Positive assertion of existing statutory authority
in the form of a CIA war plan is needed. Subsequent planning should
integrate the wartime roles of the USIB member agencies.
C. Paragraph 8 of National Security Council Intelligence
Directive 5 and the Command Relationships Agreement (between the
DCI and the Secretary of Defense) place the Agency's forces operating
in or from an active theatre of war under the command of the Theatre
Commander. The Theatre Commander would be under the operational
control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
D. Relationships between CIA Headquarters and the military
command structure in time of war have not been defined. As matters
now stand, CIA would tend to lose its forces located in an active theatre
of war and would be without any plan of action for the wartime operation
of the remainder of the Agency. It is imperative that CIA clarify its
mission in war and its relations with the Department of Defense.
E. The Agency is small in size as compared to the military.
Its real worth is based upon qualitative characteristics and a quick
reaction capability. Being irregular and unorthodox by nature, its
16
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activities and capabilities are little understood by the military. Its
field components cannot operate effectively without the resources
and guidance of CIA Headquarters.
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III. The DCI and Warning
A. As Chairman of USIB, the DCI is the senior intelligence
officer concerned with warning. The USIB's formal intelligence warning
mechanism--the Watch Committee and its staff, the National Indications
Center--reports to USIB by the terms of Director of Central Intelligence
Directive (DCID) 1/5 and the Chairman of the Watch Committee is
designated by the DCI after consultation with USIB. We have dealt with
early warning in Section D of Part III.
IV. Intelligence Production
A. The Agency's role in the production of intelligence has
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been quite well established in most areas, both by law and by directive,
as being charged with the production of national intelligence. In some
areas of intelligence production this is more specifically established
than in others, and therefore in planning it is important that it be
firmly established in all areas where the Agency must make major
commitments. In this regard the National Security Act of 1947 states,
"(b) for the purpose of coordinating the
intelligence activities of the several Government
departments and agencies in the interest of nation.'_
security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under
the direction of the National Security Council--(3)
to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to
the national security, and provide for the appropriate
dissemination of such intelligence within the Govern-
ment using where appropriate existing agencies and
facilities. "
What this says in simplest modern-day terms is that the Agency is
charged with producing national intelligence.
B. The responsibility for the production of National Intel-
ligence Estimates has been clearly established by common practice
over the years and is spelled out in DCID 1/1. This is one of the most
important responsibilities of the Agency and has created for the United
States Government a document of incalculable value in which the greatest
objectivity of the intelligence system provides the policymaker with the
top intelligence viewpoint. Its integrity should be preserved at all costs
in the interests of national security, most particularly the responsibility
of an independent agency for its production.
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C. The responsibility for national current intelligence is
less clearly established by directive although it appears that there is
a clear understanding with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) as
to the division of responsibilities. In the negotiations conducted in
1962 and 1963 between the Agency and DIA, specifically the Executive
Director-Comptroller and Deputy Director for Intelligence of CIA and
the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Administration, and the Director
of DIA, a clear understanding was reached that DIA produced depart-
mental current intelligence while CIA produced national current intel-
ligence. However, this has not been inscribed in any directive and
this should be done at an early date in order to insure logical organi-
zational development both within the Agency and the Department of
Defense that will implement the agreement.
D. The Foreign Missiles and Space Analysis Center (FMSAC)
was established by the DCI as a means of meeting his statutory responsi-
bilities under the National Security Act of 1947 to correlate and evaluate
intelligence relating to national security and to provide appropriate
dissemination of such intelligence within the Government. The then
Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, expressed the view that
his authority to form such an organization was clear and he felt there
was no need for supporting documents--i. e. , NSCIDs and DCIDs. No
additional action is believed necessary at this time.
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E. The production of national economic intelligence on
specified areas of the world was established as a CIA responsibility
by letter from the DCI, General Walter Bedell Smith, to Secretary
of State, Dean Acheson. This was formally delineated in DCID 3/1
which assigns to CIA primary responsibility for the production of
economic intelligence on the Communist countries. The DCI in March
of this year advised the Secretary of State that he found it necessary to
develop within CIA a limited capability for economic analysis on non-
Communist countries as well. In the fields of military-economic
intelligence CIA has also undertaken to supplement intelligence produced
elsewhere in order to provide essential contributions to National
Intelligence Estimates on military questions and to provide the support
required by the Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out his
responsibilities to the President. Research relating to the cost and
resource impact of foreign military and space programs has been
recognized by the Department of Defense as a primary responsibility
of CIA. Finally, the coordination of economic intelligence is carried
out through the Economic Intelligence Committee, chaired by a
representative of the Central Intelligence Agency in accordance with
DCID 3/1.
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F. The responsibility for the production of national basic
intelligence as typified by the National Intelligence Surveys is clearly
established and is specified in NSCID 3, paragraph la, b, c, d, and e.
However, there is considerable duplication of effort in the broad area
of basic intelligence, since each community organization produces
intelligence for different purposes and can clearly establish that their
product is not identical with the National Intelligence Surveys and within
the military area basic intelligence is often produced under contract
from non-intelligence components. Basic intelligence research and
production is therefore an area in which there is considerable uncontrolled
and uncoordinated effort. It is recommended that in planning for the
future the entire area of basic intelligence, not just the production of
National Intelligence Surveys, be subjected to intensive scrutiny and
clearly delineated responsibilities be established in order to insure
orderly progress. While this is being done--it may take a matter of
years--the CIA should continue to carry the responsibility for the pro-
duction of the National Intelligence Surveys.
G. Present and future demands on the Director emphasize
the importance of completing the Agency's strategic base in research
by extending it in political intelligence. This is an area as critical as
it is difficult. It is a major challenge, but must be met if intelligence
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is to match its findings in hostile capabilities with correlative insight
into intentions. In recent years the State Department has more and
more withdrawn from this field and devoted its limited resources to
quick support of policy. The Agency does not have a "charter" for
political research and does not ask for one. There are gaps here
which must be filled in the national interest and CIA means to fill them.
H. Responsibility for the Agency's production of finished
intelligence on all foreign scientific and technical activities rests with
the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) under the authority of National
Security Council Intelligence Directive 3 and Director of Central Intel-
ligence Directives 3/3 for atomic energy, 3/4 for guided missiles and
astronautics, and 3/5 for other scientific and technical intelligence.
The pertinent citations in NSCID 3 are contained in paragraph 7c ("the
CIA shall prime .sciaiific and technical intelligence as a service of
common concern") and 7d on atomic energy intelligence. DCID 3/3
and 3/4 both state in paragraph 2 that the production of intelligence on
atomic energy and guided missiles and astronautics is the responsibility
of all departments and agencies represented on the USIB. Paragraph 2a
of DCID 3/5 reiterates paragraph 7c of NSCID 3 that the CIA shall produce
scientific and technical intelligence as a service of common concern "and
as required to fulfill the statutory responsibilities of the DCI. " Thus OSI
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produces intelligence in nearly every phase of foreign military research
and development consistent with its manpower capabilities and external
research facilities.
V. National Reference Services
A. Over the years CIA has developed certain national intel-
ligence reference services required for independent intelligence produc-
tion by the Agency in direct support of the DCI, to support assigned
intelligence responsibilities and to provide services of common support
to the community. The simultaneous development of reference services
by each of the USIB intelligence organizations would be costly, duplicative,
and unnecessary. This is an area where the attention of the DCI is needed
in order to reach agreement with the military agencies and the Department
of State as to the responsibility for the development and maintenance of
national intelligence reference services of common concern. It is also
clear that this Agency's ability to cope with its own immediate needs for
information handling, much less to move toward a more centralized
community effort, will depend heavily, if not entirely, upon the use of
automatic data processing techniques. The Agency's future need for
automatic data processing is, therefore, given special emphasis later
on in this plan.
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B. The Central Intelligence Agency now has firmly estab.-
lished its responsibility for the maintenance of a national reference
service in the field of biographic intelligence dealing with all foreign
personalities outside of the military field. This is an important service
and should be maintained. Its charter is DCID 1/9.
C. The CIA also has an established national intelligence
reference service responsibility in the field of the acquisition and
indexing of foreign documents. This is prescribed in DCID 2/4 and
is one of the better coordinated efforts in the Federal Government.
D. While CIA's library and substantive intelligence files
are at the present time used more extensively by other agencies than
by CIA--and this is as it should be--this is nevertheless one area
where centralization and coordination can achieve savings for the intel-
ligence community. With substantive intelligence documents entering
the system at a rate in excess of a million a month, it is obviously
wasteful for each agency to plan to file the identical documents. On
the other hand, each agency obviously has the right to be able to re-
trieve immediately documents on any subject which it may need. It
is therefore important that the DCI insist on the clear delineation of
responsibility in the intelligence system for the storage and retrieval
of substantive documents.
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25X1X
25X1 C
VI. Intelligence Collection
positive foreign intelligence
information as a service of common concern on behalf of the entire
intelligence system is a well established responsibility of the Agency
as prescribed in DCID 2/8,1
B. The Central Intelligence Agency by intent of Congress
is responsible for the conduct of Federally directed espionage and
counterespionage abroad. This has been directed in NSCID 5 which
also provides that the armed services may participate in clandestine
operations for departmental purposes provided that their efforts are
coordinated with the designated representatives of the DCI. This
requires especial attention to the necessity for the security implications
of clandestinity.
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D. NSCID 6, which covers the subject of Communications
Intelligence, establishes the DCI as the executive agent of USIB respon-
sible for relationships with other nations to gain the benefit of the
Communications Intelligence activities they perform.
25X1 D
F. The Central Intelligence Agency conducts covert overhead
reconnaissance as appropriate to the target and circumstances. The
Agency's research and development associated with overhead recon-
naissance is recognized and should be continued. NSCID 8 provides
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the authority for the DCI to provide a National Photographic Interpre-
tation Center (NPIC) as a service of common concern in consultation
with interested members of USIB. According to this directive, the
NPIC will produce and disseminate photo interpretation reports,
provide materials and services in support of the national intelligence
effort, and other such additional support to departments and agencies
as can be provided without degradation of the other services mentioned.
It should be noted that this directive provides that NPIC be transferred
to the Department of Defense in time of war. This should be reviewed
in the context of the Agency's wartime role referred to in paragraph
II above.
VII. Covert Action
A. CIA is responsible for the national effort in the field of
covert action, specifically political, psychological, and economic war-
fare. This is under NSC 5412 and is under the specific direction of the
303 Committee.
B. CIA is responsible for covert paramilitary activities as
prescribed by NSC 5412 and NSAM 57.
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D. In planning for the future, the Agency should assume
that it will continue to have all of these responsibilities and that it will
be held responsible for their fulfillment in the national interest.
VIII. Communications
A. National Security Action Memorandum No. 252, dated
11 July 1963, established the National Communications System to pro-
vide necessary communications for the Federal Government. This
NSAM formalized the role that CIA had played since its inception in
operating a combined communications system with State Department,
interfaced with Defense communications. Continuation of this national
role helps assure the availability of adequate secure communications
for the Agency.
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THE LONG RANGE 'OUTLOOK
FOR THE
CLANDESTINE SERVICES
A. The United States in the next five years and the following
decade faces the need for a vast increase in information vital to its
security. Clandestine collection by agents must obtain what SIGINT,
overhead reconnaissance and overt human resources fail to learn in
this period. Overhead reconnaissance supported by accelerated
scientific development is seeking significant breakthroughs to be applied
to intelligence needs and probably will achieve some of these. SIGINT,
striving for breakthroughs, is struggling against the growing security
barriers that increasingly prevent readout of wanted information from
signals. We rely on the Clandestine Services operation--on the agent--
to obtain the information in men's minds that reflects the shaping of
the plans and intentions of another nation. The collection of such
information is essential as another nation prepares the policies that
may be against U. S. interests, as it develops the plans to carry out
.. 25X1 A
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policy, and as it moves toward action against the U. S. - and therefore
has a most essential relationship to early warning.
B. The Directorate of Plans is the National Clandestine
Intelligence and Covert Action Service established by the National
Security Act of 1947 and given subsequent specific direction by the
National Security Council and Executive Action. As such, the Direc-
torate has responsibility for the conduct of espionage and counter-
intelligence activities abroad and for political, psychological, and para-
military activities in support of U. S. policy.
C. The world is undergoing profound political changes, and
U.S. national interests will face greater challenges in both the long and
short term, for which the Directorate must plan. Specifically, there
must be clandestine capabilities to accomplish more against the priority
Soviet and Chinese Communist targets and at the same time to react
to dramatic changes in the less developed countries on their periphery
in Southeast Asia, and the Near East, and in Africa and Latin America.
D. Planning for clandestine activities must also take into
account mounting political uncertainties in Western Europe evolving
from the assertiveness of General deGaulle, the inevitable transferals
of power following the deaths of Franco and Salazar, the continuing
instability of the Italian political situation, and the potential for
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serious imbalances around the Mediterranean and in the Near East.
Along with all these, in both the short and long term, we recognize
national policymakers must be served with a constant flow of clan-
destinely obtained information about capabilities, plans and intentions
of political enemies of the U. S. , as well as of troublesome neutrals,
and such information concerning other areas throughout the world
about which policymakers must be currently informed. Within the
above framework the Clandestine Service must prepare itself to be
ready for contingency action in suddenly critical areas.
E. The Directorate of Plans, by legislation and Executive
direction is the primary espionage, counterintelligence and covert
action arm of the U. S. abroad. In order to carry out its responsibilities,
it has established a functional concentration on those responsibilities
in senior staffs and in area divisions. Espionage, the generic term,
under which clandestine activity is conducted, is a basic responsibility.
25X1 C
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An equally important part of espionage is clandestine
counterintelligence (CI), through which we learn about the aims, plans,
modus operandi, and activities of the intelligence organizations of other
countries. CI manipulates persons and organizations in countering
espionage and counterintelligence actions directed against the United
States.
H. Covert action, likewise an established basic responsi-
bility of the Directorate of Plans, is, when diplomacy fails, the only
means short of conventional armed conflict by which the U. S. can
contain communism and its influence on the unstable, underdeveloped
countries. It encompasses various forms of political action as well
25X1 C as paramilitary action.
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problems must be examined if we are to cope with the challenges facing
the Clandestine Services in the next decade. Several fundamental con-
siderations are highlighted below:
Many fundamental
I. Operations
A. Our responsibility for the conduct of espionage and
counterintelligence is best expressed simply: The Clandestine Services
must, through agent operations, penetrate the policy cognizant elements
of our principal adversaries for purposes of determining intentions;
it must concurrently use similar penetrations, at the highest level of
decision making, as well as in opposition security services, to protect
our penetrations, to determine their bona fides, and to know the activities
of the opposition intelligence service against us. Herein is the inte-
grated concept of classical clandestine intelligence collection and
counterintelligence operation.
B. To enable increased agent operations directed against
significant penetrations, there must be an increase in operational
research to develop more detailed information in depth about targets,
especially Soviet and Chinese. Operational research in the sense
used here means a study in depth and detail of individuals and of
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environmental factors and must be carried on by officers trained and
experienced in operations to determine the potentially successful
approach, including susceptibilities of the individual. It means
demographic, economic, and basic scientific information will be
drawn on when and if available from other organizations.
C. CIA's covert action assets, both political and para-
military, will, in many developing areas of the world, become the
primary means, and at time the only means, through which the U. S.
Government will securely and in ways not directly attributable to it,
be able to blunt the Communist offensive. It appears certain that
during the late 1960's and on into the next decade the Soviets and
Chinese Communists will intensify their subversive efforts through-
out the world, but with principal emphasis on the developing areas
of the Far East, Africa, and Latin America. They will competitively
seek to strengthen the Communist Parties and to expand or develop
the spectrum of political action mechanisms through which the
parties operate. We anticipate, therefore, a steadily increasing
need to employ CIA covert action mechanisms now in existence and
a steadily, often sharply, rising demand for creation of better
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methods to meet communist challenges, which are gradually becoming
more sophisticated and therefore more difficult to counter. Inherent
in this is the need for more intensive training of a type that will draw
on and articulate our wide experience and for research necessary to
develop new and more effective techniques.
D. Paramilitary requirements, alone, will place a heavy
premium on personnel qualified for
I 25X1
operations and may, as rapidly developing critical situations
impinge on resources in being, sharply escalate our need to expand
them in certain areas. Predisposition of assets - human and hardware
is only a partial answer to preparedness in this sphere of contingency
operations. In the expanding framework of our civic action programs
in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, capable people must be available to
exploit the lessons learned in Laos and Vietnam. It is clear that a
larger cadre of talented and resourceful people will be required to
manage the expanded and more flexible covert action instrumentalities
which will be needed in the period ahead.
E. The combined covert political action and paramilitary
resources and assets of the Directorate of Plans enables CIA to
carry out its responsibilities,
25X1
overall counterinsurgency program of the United States.
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A. Agent and operational cover is essential to the accom-
plishment of the clandestine mission. In essence, cover is the pro-
vision of the appearance for an officer or agent to be in a position
required for access to the target persons and places necessary for
the acquisition of information, and for functioning in all necessary
covert action aspects.
25X1 C
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C. Deficiencies in the concept and in the modalities of
cover have long been recognized by the Clandestine ServiceEj and
serious efforts have been made over the years to remedy them.
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III. Clandestine Services Manpower Needs
A. The staff manpower capabilities of the Clandestine
Services are now at a point where additional crisis demands might
well find us without the necessary resiliency to react. A variety of
38 25X1A
CIA INTERNAL, USF ONL,Y
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temporary remedies are being initiated by the Clandestine Services
to cope with this problem, but it is clear, that whereas they may
ameliorate it for a time, there is need for the development of a con-
cept which, for want of a better description might be called "strength
in depth. " This concept encompasses the following:
1. An increase in Clandestine Services
ceilings of
to extend over the next five 25X1A
years. Recruits to fill these positions would receive
full clandestine training with emphasis on critical
language training. The larger number would be
acquired in the early part of the five year period.
These officers would also constitute a contingency
development cadre with the clear understanding
that they would be used in Headquarters and field
assignments and also earmarked for use in critical
areas on short notice.
B. Study of the implications of the Clandestine Services
personnel "hump" supplies another very important reason for recruit-
ing a "development cadre. " Losses of Clandestine Services personnel
during a five year period beginning about 1970 may reach serious pro-
portions as a result of early retirement and other attrition. A heavier
25X1A
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than usual infusion of new blood during the coming five years would
tend to offset these losses, provide the manpower in depth that is
needed to react to the crisis situations facing us in the late 1960's,
and avoid the debilitating strains on complements carrying out other
ongoing assigned responsibilities.
C. An additional
will also be needed over the
next five years to do the already mentioned operational research that
our currently over-extended complement of operations officers have
neither the time nor opportunity to do.
IV. Training
A. During the projected period career trainees destined for
duty with the Clandestine Services must receive more intensive and
longer periods of training, interspersed with desk indoctrination, than
is now possible. As the Clandestine Services increases its annual
requirement for career trainees in order to replace those officers
lost by death, retirement, or resignation, increased training facilities
in Office of Training and increased workload on the training elements
within the Clandestine Services will be necessary. The above cannot
be taken out of cadres currently committed to operations with present
manpower levels.
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B. It is essential. that officers destined for truly clan-
destine careers be trained separately from other trainees who are
not destined for such sensitive activities. This is feasible through
adjustments of present training practices, but these must be adjusted.
V. DD/P Planning
A. Planning requirements and problems confronting the
Clandestine Services are becoming increasingly numerous and complex,
both in terms of internal CIA planning and programming and of meshing
CIA planning with that of other United States agencies. DD/P capabili-
ties for planning to deal with future contingency situations anywhere in
the world need improvement. There is a need to enhance our capability
for (a) the development of contingency planning of resource requirements
for selected areas likely to require intensive DD/P involvement, and
(b) a continuing and probing analysis of DD/P programs to make them
more responsive to contingency situations. As a consequence of this
problem, we are reordering certain existing units and personnel into
a centrally organized planning element, This strengthening of a DD/P
centralized approach is essential to the support of planning in all area
divisions.
B. It is fully realized that to date ad hoc contingency
planning, usually concomitant with a crisis, has been done by the
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area divisions with varying degrees of success. Much of the stress
associated with this can be eliminated at the area division level where
resources have been over-taxed. The late 1960' s give promise of
further contingency crises which we must be prepared to meet.
VI. Management - Personnel
A. Transfer of the Clandestine Services Personnel Division
from the DD/S to the Clandestine Services will enable the DD/P to
possess the essential tool to help him carry out his management
responsibility with the maximum flexibility so necessary to his unique
mission. Early retirement and an out-placement mechanism will be
outgrowths of the impact of the new CIA Retirement System on this
Directorate, and emphasizes the need for the relocation of the
Clandestine Services Personnel Division. At the same time, DD/P
will remain fully responsive to the Director's needs for information
and review of the DD/P personnel management activities.
VII. Summary and Conclusions
A. It is clear that an urgent need exists for a carefully
ordered increase in all phases of this Directorate's work. This
judgment is based on the reasonable and prudent interpretation of
the broad assumptions underlying the overall DD/P Long Range 25X1A
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Plan, as well as the specific area by area assumptions spelled out by
the area divisions of this Directorate.
B. We must bend every effort to sharpen the disciplines
and dynamically improve the professional quality of Clandestine
Services in order to effect agent penetrations of hostile regimes,
particularly the Soviet Union and Communist China. We must, at the
same time, spare no effort to penetrate hostile regimes to establish
the bona fides of our agent penetrations and to protect them from
compromise.
C. Because the U. S. must be prepared to negate Cprnmu-
nist and other disruptive influences around the world, particularly
in areas where conventional diplomatic and related pressures are
not feasible, another important Directorate responsibility, i. e. , that
for conducting covert action operations, must be effectively exercised.
Covert Action will in the years ahead represent in many of the develop-
ing countries the only means, short of conventional armed conflict,
by which the U. S. may protect its interests.
D. The Clandestine Services has a unique and critical role
to play and must be allowed to function within CIA with that degree of
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isolation necessary to insure that the U. S, has a truly clandestine
service. At the same time, this Directorate recognizes that it
must remain fully responsive to the Director's needs for information
about its objectives, its capabilities, and its accomplishments so that
he may better judge its effectiveness and thus be in a better position
to exercise overall management of it.
E. The Clandestine Services projections for manpower and
funds, within this Long Range Plan, are, perhaps, conservative in the
light of inevitable increases in Clandestine Services responsibilities in
the coming years. We point out, however, in this regard that the one
basic resource most essential to the Clandestine Services is people -
not just numbers of people - but people with unusual and often unique
personal qualities, education, experience, and outlook who can live
and operate effectively in an atmosphere of espionage as agents and
as managers of agent operations and under circumstances which
severely test their inner resources. It takes time to find and select
them. Furthermore, it requires from three to five years to develop
in school situations and in on-the-job training here and abroad the
unique disciplines that people will need as Clandestine Services pro-
fessionals. In short, the "bank account" of the Clandestine Services
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is time and people
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F. In its Long Range Plan, this Directorate has identified
three kinds of manpower needs during the next five years:
1. Those increases during the five
year period required to meet a normal and very
gradual expansion of the complement and to take
into account normal attrition; the total increment
in this category is approximately
2. It has also projected a requirement
for an increase of
to be considered
as a contingency development cadre to be exposed
to all essential Clandestine Services disciplines
and to be integrated into regular Clandestine
Services assignments and yet to be available for
deployment quickly to critical areas such as
Vietnam
3. It has projected a requirement for
a third category of people representing an increase
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what was earlier defined as clandestine operations
research. These must also be operationally trained
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but will be assigned principally to intensified
research in support of penetrations operations
mounted against the Soviet Union and Communist
China and to a lesser extent against other impor-
tant targets.
G. The above projections, particularly those in (2) and (3)
represent a conscious and critically important effort to fill the gaps
in our complement: caused by the lack of enough personnel experienced
in operations and in the disciplines of clandestinity to do the research
that must now be done if we are to conduct the sustained, demanding,
highly sophisticated penetration operations against hostile regimes
that will yield national plans and intentions.
H. Because of ceiling limitations imposed during the past
few years, the "front line" of the DD/P has grown too thin; the little
strength in depth that it possesses has been dissipated in the interests
of meeting immediate operational needs. This loss must be recouped
if we are to enjoy any resiliency in contingencies and if we ale to
progress in the all-important penetration operations against our
adversaries.
I. It is essential for the DD/P to retain control of the
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dissemination of its agent-collected information if it is to protect
its agent from compromise. It must also retain such operational
and related machine
support mechanisms as
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processing and the technical support function of the Technical Service's
Division which are peculiarly related by reason of need and security,
to the Clandestine Services. Separate though these remain, they will
be related to the degree necessary to whatever centralization is helpful
to the office of the DCI. Likewise there will be the appropriate, secure
relationship with the other Directoreates to enable the DD/P to obtain
pertinent assistance.
J. The foregoing is an overview of the Directorate of Plans.
The specific plans by functions and geographic areas, for the next
five years and the general on-going view of the next decade, are
detailed in the bound volume of the DD/P Long Range Plan.
VIII, Recommendations
It.is recommended that:
A. In order to fulfill its unique and critical role, the
Clandestine Services function within CIA with that degree of isolation
necessary to insure that the U. S. has a truly clandestine and covert
action service. At the same time it must remain responsive to the
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Director's needs for information about its objectives, programs,
needs, and accomplishments.
B. The Clandestine Services concentrate on operations
to accomplish agent penetrations for acquisition of information
related as closely as possible to plans and intentions of hostile
regimes.
C. Officers who are destined for truly clandestine careers
should, in necessary instances, be trained separately from other
trainees who are not to follow a career of sensitive activity.
Clandestine Services manpower be increased in three
categories: (1) ongoin necessary normal expansion, (2) a contin-
gency development cadre for use on short notice in critical areas,
(3) clandestine operational research.
F. The Clandestine Services Personnel Division be tran-
ferred from the DD/S to the DD/P, to enable him to possess and direct
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the essential tool for fulfilling his management role. with the
maximum flexibility so necessary to his unique mission.
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PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE
I. Objectives
The major objectives in CIA's long range plan for the produc-
tion of intelligence are:
A. To strengthen the capability for assuring 24-hour
current and net tactical intelligence;
B. To strengthen the strategic base of research in
support of estimates - economic, economic-military, and scientific-
technical - and to complete the base by extending it in political
research.
These objectives must be realized concurrently.
II. Factors Bearing on Production
A. Research and analysis against Communist China must
be more than doubled during the next five years, without relaxing
effort against the USSR. By request of the Secretary of Defense the
Agency's work in military costing must be expanded to include all
Communist military establishments, especially the Chinese. It should
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be noted that the sharp increase against Communist China
B, At the same time, care is necessary to prevent
a weakening of capability directed to the instability and disorder
which threaten from the underdeveloped countries and regions
of the world,
D, The intelligence required during the period of
this plan will be more and more national in character, whether
it pertains to localized political turbulence in a less developed
or newly emerging nation; to the conflicting interests of great
powers in local nationalisms, racism, or populism in the
inciting crossfires of revolutionary social and political move-
ments; to the potential for confrontation with Communist China
and the USSR; or to Olympian competitions between the U. S.
the USSR, and possibly others such as China.
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III. Manpower Estimates
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A. Twenty-four Hour Current Intelligence.
From the time of the Korean War, when the Agency operated
on a shoe string, sending one or two analysts to the Pentagon
each morning to summarize the daily telecon for the President,
to the present war in Vietnam, there have been many alarms and
crises of widely differing kinds. The Agency knows from
experience that it must stay ahead of the changing tempos in
the development and progression of enduring crises, and that
it must not let new crises and untoward events take our Govern-
ment by surprise. In serving the President it serves the
entire foreign operations of the Government. The degree of
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the President's involvement in the direction of foreign operations
has varied with time, style, and situation. But over the years a
rising premium has attached to fast and accurate current
intelligence. The current intelligence front has increased in
importance, with corresponding demands upon the CIA Watch
system.
B. Operations Center and Current Intelligence Strength
For the duration of this plan the goal is maximum preparedness
for simultaneous crises of all kinds, from obscure and multi-
facious developments in the revoluntionary world of the back-
ward, to the actions and reactions of the Communist powers,
both in their internal and external policies and their relations
to new and old opportunities and contests. The perfecting of
means for alert involves not only the ability to concentrate
resources for quick response, but also advanced readiness
with the strength and quality of analysis required.
1. The Operations Center
It is an immediate objective to press
on to a proper locus in which to concentrate analytical
forces on critical situations, one equipped with the
best in supporting services and communications,
especially served by Clandestine Service reporting
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with proper protection by the DDP of its operations
and sources, The Operations Center must be a
nerve center in fact as well as in name.
2. Current Intelligence Strength
At the same time there is the
objective of strengthening the analytical roster
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This plan will-and should be subjected to
continuous review and reassessment. As now
seen the increase should provide the measure
needed to sustain task forces and analytical
support of the Operations Center.
3. This planned increase, however,
will not man a watch bill such as would be
required in general war. To plan now for a
full watch bill of analysts would multiply the
projected increase by a factor of four. This
would mean to plan now for a war-time scale of
operations by 1970, without regard to the
ambivalence of our position in external affairs.
It does not seem advisable to take this full
step in planning at this time, although with
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the possibility clearly in mind, the measure-
ment of on-duty and planned strength against
the degrees of war should be a continuing task
of a permanent planning group.
4. The expansion of current intelligence
should not take place at the expense of or as a
surrogate for the completion and the manning of
the Agency's strategic base in research.
C. Strategic Base in Research.
The next major
concern, then, is the strategic base in research. It is not second
in time or priority. Research here means research in support of
estimates. It seeks painstakingly for the most reliable answers
which all of the information will yield to the critical questions of
major import to our national security. While the emphasis falls
on support of estimates of hostile capabilities and intentions, the
research is directly pertinent to the evaluations needed in current
intelligence. Without anchorage in the depth of conclusions from
relevant research, current intelligence is always in danger of
drifting with a tide, imperceptible from one day to the next in
the preoccupation with the immediate and the immediately
following. Furthermore, the kind of research which constitutes
the strategic base must be done within the Government by
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specialists in their several fields who bring to the peculiarities
and sensitivities of classified information a knowledge not only
equal to that of their colleagues outside of Government but
already shaped by experience to the practical questions which
confront the Administration in its decisions of foreign policy.
1. There is an old controversy in the
intelligence community over CIA's role in research.
It stemmed from the question of jurisdictional
responsibility and authority for estimates. This
in turn reflected the thesis that each department
preempted the responsibility for research in the
field of its own operational authority. In research
lay the authority of superior knowledge, Depart-
mental authority for estimates in the field of depart-
mental operations and departmental jurisdiction in
research combined against CIA's earliest efforts to
do national intelligence.
2. Following the reorganization of 1950-
51, CIA was chartered to do research in economic
intelligence on the Bloc only, and the charter came
as much by default of State as by CIA's insistence on
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research in an area which was then unknown
territory. Research in the Soviet economy had
to turn its back on requests for current intelligence
in order first to establish base lines and norms.
In time, the CIA became authoritative in the
field of Soviet economic capabilities and performance.
3. From this base, by force of
circumstance- the Director's need in support of
the Department of Defense and the President - the
Agency moved into military economics, military
costing of the Soviet military establishment, research
and development, production of advanced weapons,
and the allocation of resources.
4. It is planned to strengthen this base
to meet the requirement of the Secretary of Defense
for military costing of the Chinese and satellite
military establishments. An increase is necessary
in any case to meet the menace of China - and the
anticipated increase in volume of information on
Chinese military capabilities, in research and
development as well as in production and allocation.
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5. In political research the problem
is to strengthen the small existing base and build
from it to the end of a diagnostic grasp and
improved capability for prognosis in the many
problems of Communist political capabilities
and intentions as they relate to the practical
dilemmas of their domestic and foreign policies.
The Agency has secured a small base of research
in special problems of political intelligence: Sino-
Soviet relations, Communist doctrine and practice,
Chinese policy and leadership. The international
base of political research should extend beyond
Sino-Soviet relations into the evolving relations
of the powers, both Communist and non-Communist,
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6. In terms of dollars and positions
relative to other efforts this expansion is not costly.
But it will be well to make haste slowly and therefore
surely. The analysts who can do the kind of work
required must be masters, not journeymen apprentices,
and they are hard to find - or hard to spare from other
pressing duties.
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7. As a unique subcategory, research
in support of clandestine operational needs requires
emphasis and recognition. It is necessary to bring
a variety of specialists together for this effort.
Long experience and experimentation point to the
conclusion that this kind of support to the Clandestine
Services must be carried out in and by, or under
the auspices of the Directorate of Plans because
of the considerations of security and the require-
ment for detailed knowledge of operations. This
is treated especially in Part III - Section A.
D. Balance of Programs. The review of initial
projections for the Agency's long range plan raises a fundamental
question about long range trends in the distribution of positions
and funds. In particular, the investment in the corps of analysts
seems to diminish relative to that in technical research and
development, collection, processing, and support. The
identification and investigation of imbalances in our system
should be an important part of the work of the permanent planning
group.
E. Organization for Production. The present organiza-
tion is not necessarily the best because it has grown the way it has.
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It is obviously essential to have functional as well as regional
specialists and a strong group of generalists. But there is always
the question of the most effective way in which to relate these
groups in order to keep flexibility without loss of organizational
discipline. There is no unchanging answer to the practical question
of the right organization, as between geographic and functional,
for example. Response to need by task forces will always be one
of our organizational answers, because no rigid alignment will
anticipate the overlapping complexities of substantive problems
as they change in their particular formulations with events.
F. The question of organization is a vital Agency concern.
It should be on the agenda of the permanent planning group. In
preparation, it is recommended that the directorates review their
organization in being or projected for production, and in collabora-
tion with the permanent planning group submit their review and
recommendations to the Director. The review should not be done
in haste. It should presuppose the findings of study groups
assigned by directorates to review our major substantive problems.
V. Recommendations
It is recommended that:
A. Long range objectives for the production of
intelligence be approved:
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1. To strengthen the Agency capability
for 24-hour current intelligence and the development
of the Operations Center in connection therewith;
2. To strengthen the CIA strategic base
in research and to extend it in political intelligence; and
3. To increase CIA's analytical strength
against Communist China during the next five years in
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The Directorates review their organizations for
the production of finished intelligence and, in collaboration with
the permanent planning staff submit their recommendations for
improvement.
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PART III m SECTION C
OVERT COLLECTION AND REFERENCE SERVICES
I. General
A. The information services referred to herein are:
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the Central Reference Service, including
the procurement and translation of foreign documents. Each service
is established by charter as a service of common concern. (See
Part III and Section B of Part IV. )
II. Objectives
The Agency's long range objectives are:
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3. to increase flexibility and readiness
for response to critical situations by development
of mobile resources.
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C. For the Central Reference Service
1. to complete as a matter of urgency
the conversion of document retrieval and the reference
service to an all source computer operation.
2. to apply the revolutionary advances
and the potential for the management of information
to the end of user controlled storage and retrieval.
3. to test the Automatic Language Processing
(ALP) system for machine-aided translations and steno-
type production, as part of the responsibility of the
Foreign. Documents Division.
III. Discussion
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The Central Reference Service is already launched in
a long range program of information management and is fully alert
to the necessity for electronic automation and the integration of its
service into the rapidly evolving means for satisfying the demands
of the intelligence analyst faced with the oncoming flood of data.
IV. Estimated Costs
65.
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I. Objectives. The long range plan for Support has the following
objectives:
A. Improved planning which will provide support properly
attuned to the Agency's increasingly sophisticated and growing
activities.
B. Redirection of the Agency's support programs in order
to assure the flexibility and competence required by rapidly evolving
technology, the continuing development of new major foreign
problems, and the "information explosion.
II. Personnel Strength
A. The projections submitted by the Directorates for
the next five years indicate sizeable increases in numbers of per-
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Increases in personnel strength are required,but
the order of magnitude for the Agency as a whole cannot be deter-
mined without further study.
III. Medical Views on Planning and Human Resources
A. Agency's medical services direct attention to the
increasing incidence of medical problems in Agency personnel
and the corresponding need to conserve manpower. A broader
application of increased diagnostic facilities and an educational
program to insure managerial awareness is required.
B. Selection procedures and performance evaluations
should be joined together in a system that contributes to better
personnel management. The subject is under studly,:~1~5;'The,refoire,
it is intended to provide educational opportunities for management
to gain increased understanding of human behavior.
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IV. Senior Officer Training
A. The present CIA senior officer group is comprised
of individuals of approximately the same age, many of whom will
become eligible for retirement at the same time. The succeeding
generation of ext rcutives will have insufficient chance to prepare
themselves for executive responsibilities unless corrective measures
are taken.
B. The Agency has made commendable progress in the
training of young professionals and mid-careerists. We need now
to take the next step--the inauguration of a Senior Officers' training
course designed to prepare mid-careerists for the assumption of
senior executive responsibilities. The creation of an Executive
Career Service, including all senior Agency officials other than
specialists, who possess executive qualifications of a flexible
character, would appear to be a logical out-growth of this program.
These individuals could be subject to rotational assignments through-
out the Agency and across Directorate lines. An Executive Career
Service could provide a source of talent trained in breadth. In
time, such executives could be rotated to senior positions throughout
the Intelligence Community as is the case on a limited scale today.
This would tend to promote better understanding.
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V. Training Policies and Methods
A. The demand for scarce categories of skills in photo
interpretation, science and technology, research, and automation
has been and will continue to be in excess of the available supply
from external sources. A considerable emphasis in the Agency's
training efforts must be made if we are to cope with this problem.
Our long range efforts, then, should focus on the following:
1. The establishment of a training reserve
so that the manpower to be trained can be spared from
the mounting pressures of today's work requirements.
2. The selection and reassignment of more
professionals from the Agency's senior ranks for the
purpose of training and developing younger personnel.
3. Development of new methods of instruction
(program learning) which will increase the training
effort and at the same time provide for uniformly
high quality.
4. Development of a greater language
capability tailored to cover increased emphasis on
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China, Africa, and Latin America. The Agency must
take steps now to develop a strong and meaningful
language training policy if its capability in this field
is to advance with the changing world situation.
VI. Development of Support Executives
A. Inherent in the Support Directorate long range program
is the development to the highest degree of management expertise
in all fields of support activity. The program already underway
contemplates a development cadre of young support professionals
who will be trained in all of the support functional fields, both
domestically and overseas, over a long range period. This effort
would be directed at official and nonofficial support requirements.
From this group, support executives, capable of the broad-gauge
judgment which will be required in years ahead, should emerge.
VII. Security
A. The Agency's long range security program will require
greater emphasis in the technical security field and in the industrial
security program in order to assure the protection of Agency
interests.
B. Automatic data processing techniques are now being
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developed to cope with the increasing volumes of security transactions
and the increased cohesiveness of security relationships in the
Intelligence Community. Elsewhere within our security structure
modern technology in the fields of physical security, polygraphing,
and technical security will upgrade our protective measures.
VIII. Communications. Planning for the Agency's future commu-
nications support includes:
A. The increased use of automated equipment to expedite
the flow of traffic and improve efficiency.
B. An expanded technical capability to improve Agency
posture in communications security and other technical fields.
C. An increased number of base radio stations designed
to ensure an increased Agency communications capability, including
alternate facilities for dealing with crisis situations.
D. Improved facilities for secure voice, data, and
facsimile communications.
E. Improved Agent communications gear offering greater
security, flexibility, and speed.
F. The increase in speed of Agency telecommunications
is somewhat negated by the Agency's outmoded system of handling
other forms of communications; i. e. , dispatches, memoranda, and
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messenger systems. In most cases the originator selects the means
of transmitting the message. The proliferation of registries through
which written communications wend their way negates the over-all
goal of faster communications. A thorough-going systems analysis
of Agency communications methods and practices is desirable.
IX. Recommendations
A. Recommendations pertinent to support are especially
contained in Sections J, K, L, and M of Part IV. Recommendations
in other sections will also affect the support base.
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PART IV - SECTION A
THE CIA IMAGE
I. The Central Intelligence Agency has been concerned about its
image to the world, and most particularly to the United States, ever
since its creation. Overseas, the Agency image is important to the
work of CIA operations. In fact, it may seriously affect the Agency's
ability to work with the non-committed and underdeveloped countries.
These are influenced to a considerable degree by what is said in the
American press and also by the world press, which in turn can be
affected by Communist propaganda and operations of the Disinformation
Bureau of the Soviet intelligence service. Therefore, in planning for
the future, the image of CIA plays an important role.
II. From a point of view of an organization containing a clandestine
service, it would be ideal if the name or the activities of the Central
Intelligence Agency were never mentioned in the public media. This,
however, is impractical, particularly in a free society with freedom of
speech, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to know what
their Government is doing. Therefore, the development of the image
of the Central Intelligence Agency must proceed on a practical basis,
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It may take many years before it even approximates what would be con-
sidered' a satisfactory image in a free society. It will take effort on the
part of the Agency, and this effort cannot be allocated or assigned to
any one unit but must be shared by all senior officers from the Director
down,
III. Relations with the press or representatives of the public media
is only one aspect of developing a correct image, although an important
one. The Agency has learned by sad experience that if information con-
cerning its work is available, publicity is inevitable. It would be a mis-
take if the Agency tried to fight this as the results in the past have
always indicated that the effort is counterproductive.
IV. Perhaps even more important in developing the public image are
the Agency's relations with the rest of the United States Government,
This obviously includes the Executive Branch of the Government, and
especially the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the
Security Advisor to the President, the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board, members of the Cabinet, and chiefs of independent
agencies with which CIA has dealings. We believe that the Agency should
have a concerted and carefully worked out briefing schedule for these
officials which should be designed to educate them as to both the capabili-
ties and limitations of the Agency and as to the utility of intelligence.
This has never been done in the past, and the Agency has suffered for it.
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V. Intelligence is only as good as the use which is made of it; and,
if the policymakers are not aware of the value of intelligence or how to
use it, the country will suffer. While it is hard to generalize in this
area, it can be said that policymakers' reaction to intelligence will
range all the way from those who ignore it completely to those who use
it effectively. The objective should be the development of a system
wherein the policymaker will know when to use intelligence and be
aware of the assistance which it can give him in his job. The goal should
be a system in which the President and his principal advisors periodically
receive directly from the Director of Central Intelligence- -and nobody
else--briefings on the world situation and on the critical areas of the
moment, If this could be arranged on a regular basis, the entire process
of Government in the field of American security affairs would prosper.
This is a process of education to achieve this objective, but it should be
one of the major objectives of the Agency for the future.
VI. Second only to the President and the principal policymakers of
the Executive Branch is the importance of a good CIA image with the
United States Congress. While it is probably true that CIA has as good
a reputation with the Congress today as any Government department or
agency, we believe it could still be better, and that it should not rely
exclusively on the efforts of the Director. There should be added
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emphasis on briefing members of both the House and the Senate at a
"secret" level on Agency activities, and we should take advantage of
the very large number of the members of the Congress who are per-
sonal friends of Agency officials. It should be an objective to have
most of the Senate and a good proportion of the House better acquainted
with the Agency and with the intelligence process.
VII. Another very important area for the development of the Agency
image is the academic world, for it is primarily in this field that we
recruit the bulk of the career trainees of the Agency and seek assistance
in research. The 100 Universities Program over recent years has made
considerable progress in developing a better understanding in the aca-
demic world of the Central Intelligence Agency, and we believe this can
be expanded and improved and would urge concentrated and systematic
efforts in this regard.
VIII. Finally, there is the business world in which the Agency's image
is important, and we have the mandate of the President to brief business-
men both on the work of the Agency and on areas abroad of interest to
their organizations. This program has progressed but is still on a very
modest scale and should be expanded.
IX. The Central Intelligence Agency should not overlook the fact that
it has considerable interface with the American public which affects its
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image ~
The recruiters of the Office of Personnel and the investigators
in the Office of Security (both DD/S) have likewise left favorable impres-
sions in their activities, and the same is true of Agency personnel dealing
with contractors. In all instances, however, these people need more
and more prompt guidance from Headquarters at times when the Agency
is in the headlines such as the Bay of Pigs, the U-2 incident, etc, Con-
structive, intelligent comment to a confidential contact is often better
than silence which is often interpreted as admission. Finally, Agency
personnel are often known as such in the communities where they live.
When these people are public spirited, participate in community affairs,
and are generally regarded as good citizens, the Agency benefits.
X. The CIA has already acquired a formidable body of alumni who
are active in the business and academic worlds. Several times the Agency
has studied making use of these people to assist it. Each time the formi-
dable security problems associated with a formal alumni association have
resulted in no action. Only with the creation of the outside board of the
Educational Aid Fund has specific action been taken to utilize the potential
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of alumni. Use should be made of hundreds of other prominent alumni
by periodic confidential briefings and indications that the Agency is still
interested in them.
XI. If all of the above activities are undertaken, and it is recom-
mended that they be undertaken, the image of the Agency will steadily
improve and it is demonstrable that, with the passage of time, it will
become a widely known and accepted organization to the American pub-
lic, and even to the world,
XII. Recommendations. It is recommended that:
A. The Agency intensify its briefings on its organization,
objectives, and mission to appropriate members of the Executive and
Legislative Branches of the Government;
B. A systematic program be instituted for developing better
understanding of the Agency in the academic and business world;
C. A program for better use of Agency alumni be developed.
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CIA'S ROLE IN INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION
Under the terms of the National Security Act of 1947,
as amended, the Central Intelligence Agency is responsible for
recommending to the National Security Council "the coordination of
such intelligence activities of the Government as relate to national
security" and "to perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence
agencies, such additional services of common concern as the
National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accom-
plished centrally. "
B. The Central Intelligence Agency has numerous assigned
responsibilities for coordination. These coordinating responsibilities
are almost all explicitly defined either in National Security Council
Intelligence Directives (NSCID), Director of Central Intelligence
Directives (DCID) (as more definitive expansions of the former), or
instructions from higher authority. In some cases they stem from
agreements not contained in such documents.
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Ii. Coordination of Intelligence Production
A. National Intelligence Estimates. Authority for the
production of National Intelligence Estimates is referred to in
NSCID 1 and NSCID 3 and specifically outlined in DCID 1 / 1. The
Deputy Director for Intelligence through the Office of National
Estimates (ONE) provides all services in support of the production
of NIEs. The Assistant Director, Office of National Estimates,
is Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (BNE). ONE
provides a staff of analysts which prepare and coordinate with USIB
agencies all terms of reference for proposed NIEs and review,
synthesize, and write final draft estimates for presentation to the
BNE. The Agency also provides all printing, binding, and distri-
bution services connected with the production of NIEs.
B. Current Intelligence. The basic authority for CIA's
role in current intelligence activities stems from para 2b of
NSCID 3. Beginning in the late 1950's, the Office of Current
Intelligence (OCI), pursuant to an IAC (later USIB) decision, initi-
ated a procedure whereby each daily publication of the Central
Intelligence Bulletin was coordinated by an IAC panel. The need for
this procedure was confirmed in CIA-DIA discussions of 1964 and
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was continued as a coordination mechanism for the Central Intelligence
Bulletin. OCI provides all services required for the production of
coordinated current intelligence which includes a large analytical
group, an Operations Center, and all necessary graphic art, repro-
duction, registry, and distribution facilities. This is a 24-hour,
7-day a week coordination job. It is desirable that the assignment
for this coordination be officially specified in a DCID.
C. Scientific and Technical Intelligence. In addition to
the responsibility stemming from NSCID 3 and DCIDs 3/3 and 3/4
for the production of scientific and technical intelligence, the CIA's
coordinating role principally stems from the Chairman of USIB's
appointment of CIA officers as the Chairmen of the Board's
committees on atomic energy, guided missiles, and scientific
intelligence. The Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence
Committee of USIB carries a specific responsibility for the disclosure
and control of initial information regarding foreign nuclear explosions,
an action which he normally takes after consultation with the
Board's committee on atomic energy. The Deputy Director for
Science and Technology provides services in support of these three
committees and all support services concerned with producing national
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scientific and technical intelligence.
D. Economic Intelligence. The Office of Research and
Reports (ORR), DD/I, produces economic intelligence on the Sino-
Soviet Bloc pursuant to NSCID 3 and DCID 3/1. The Assistant
Director, ORR, is Chairman of USIB's Economic Intelligence
Committee which coordinates community economic intelligence
programs related to DCID 3/1. Additionally, ORR produces essential
military-economic intelligence in support of National Estimates and
to meet intelligence needs of the Defense Department. ORR provides
the co-chairman of the CIA/DIA Soviet Ground Forces Panel. I 125X1 B
25X1 B
E. Basic Intelligence. The Agency has a major respon-
sibility in the coordination of basic intelligence activities through
the National Intelligence Survey program specified in NSCID 3. The
Office of Basic Intelligence (OBI), DD/I, coordinates the scheduling,
review, editing, production, and distribution of the NIS program for
the Intelligence Community.
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A. NSCID 5 establishes on the DCI the responsibility for
coordination of those clandestine activities of the armed services in
the interest of their departmental missions. The DD/P in general
is responsible through the station chiefs in the field and through the
Foreign Intelligence Staff (FI) in headquarters for carrying out this
responsibility in Washington. The coordination of clandestine
collection responsibilities in the Department of Defense has devolved
on the Defense Intelligence Agency, with the participation of the
Air Force, the Navy, and the Army in direct' relationship with
the Foreign Intelligence Staff of the DD/P.
B. The FI Staff is also responsible for such coordination
of clandestine intelligence activities abroad as is necessary with the
Office of the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
of the Department of State.
C. By direction of USIB, the Interagency Clandestine
Collection Priorities Committee (IPC), made up of representatives
of the intelligence community, establishes priorities for the CIA
Clandestine Services. Chief of the FI Staff, DD/P, is the chair-
man.
D. The Covert Action Staff (CA) of the DD/P is
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responsible for coordination of all matters growing out of NSCID
5412 with the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
of the Department of State. All DD/P area division chiefs are
responsible for coordination of covert political activities with the
various Assistant Secretaries of State for their pertinent areas.
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H. It should be held in mind that coordination with the
White House Staff, the 303 Committee and the Special Group-
Counter Insurgency, as well as with certain other concerned
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departments at responsible levels is carried on at multiple points
throughout the Agency.
IV. Coordination of Overt Collection Activities
A, In carrying out its responsibility for a selective
exploitation with the United States non-Governmental organizations
and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence under NSCID 2,
the Agency is responsible for providing coordination as necessary
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A. The Office of Central Reference (OCR), DD/I, carries
out several services in pursuance of directives. Under NSCID 1,
OCR provides reference facilities of common concern as appropriate.
Under DCID 1/9, OCR maintains a central file and reference service
for the community on biographic data relating to foreign political,
economic, scientific, technical, social, and cultural personalities.
Under NSCID 2, OCR provides for the central procurement and
exploitation of foreign language publications. Formal coordination
of the above activities is accomplished through the USIB Committee
on Documentation (CODIB), which is chaired by CIA. These central
reference services are a major element of CIA's coordination
responsibilities and involve the maintenance of large staffs to provide
the required registering, coding, indexing, evaluation, report
preparation,and distribution of materials to other intelligence
agencies.
VI. Security
A. The Office of Security (OS), DD/S, has several
coordinating responsibilities which derive from the National Security
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Act of 1947, as amended, and in support of the Central Intelligence
Agency. CIA provides the Chairman of the USIB Security Committee
which was established pursuant to DCID 1/11. The Security
Committee is responsible for recommending to USIB standards,
practices, and procedures for intelligence security and security
policy. The Committee also is responsible for damage assessments
of unauthorized disclosures of intelligence and intelligence sources
and methods and for coordinating with all USIB agencies and
committees having related security responsibilities.
Office of Security provides advice and support to
the National Reconnaissance Organizatioii ' security program and
a range of supporting security services.
C. Office of Security also is responsible for servicing
the requests of other Government agencies for information and
services connected with personnel security clearances and for
liaison and coordination with state and local police departments.
VII. Training
A. The Office of Training (OTR), DD/S, is not charged
(in NSCIDs or DCIDs) with responsibilities for providing services
of common concern or with coordinating the training programs of
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other agencies. In fact, however, the Office of Training and other
Agency elements frequently provide courses, instructors,and facilities
for the training of personnel from USIB and other agencies. OTR
also assists in the provision of materials, services, and advice
to other Government intelligence agencies and often develops intelli-
gence training programs applicable to several USIB agencies.
VIII. Communications
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IX. Other Specialized Coordination Services
A. Overhead Reconnaissance and Photo Interpretation
1. CIA provides the Chairman of the USIB
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR),
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established under DCID 2/7, and an extensive central
system for the control and referencing of all overhead
reconnaissance targets required for support of COMOR's
coordinating mission.
2, Under NSCID 8, CIA provides a National
Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) to provide
preliminary interpretations: of photographs to the
community, to provide and disseminate photographic
interpretation reports in support of the national
intelligence effort, and to furnish additional related
support to the community. The Agency through
the NPIC consults with other intelligence agencies
in the coordination of photographic interpretation
requirements and priorities and provides all material
support and services required to operate the NPIC.
By The Watch Committee. Pursuant to DCID 1/5, the
indications. and warning responsibilities of the Director and the Board
are coordinated through the Watch Committee of the Board chaired
by a senior Agency official. The staff of the Watch Committee,
known as the National Indications Center, is headed by a CIA
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C. Map Procurement. By virtue of agreements infor-
mally reached, CIA coordinates the Government's efforts on map
procurement through the interagency map procurement coordination
committee which is under the chairmanship of the Agency.
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REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COLLECTION
OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
I. A critical function in the intelligence process which has challenged
CIA over the years has been the establishment and levying of requirements
in a systematic and discriminating manner.
II. It cannot be said that the problem is yet solved; it probably never
will be. However, in the last fifteen years substantial progress has been
made in solving this problem. Interestingly enough, the most fruitful
attacks on the problem have been on requirements for those collection
systems which are most expensive, most hazardous (and therefore
sensitive), and most productive. These are in the fields of clandestine
collection, SIGINT collection, and collection by overhead reconnaissance.
III. In each of these cases there has been an increased concentration
of effort and discrimination to insure that the requirements levied on
them are susceptible of collection by the best means with a minimum of
duplication. History shows that the systems have been highly
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more promptly and completely met by photography.
complementary in their productivity, which has forced an examination
of all sources in determining specific requirements.
IV. The foregoing has had its effect upon the requirements levied on
other collection methods. Thus the emergence of the U-2 provoked a
redirection of the effort of the Clandestine Services, and the require-
ments to be levied on them since many requirements could be much
25X1 D
Of great importance is the effort of the Board to focus on critical
collection problems through one of its committees. The purpose has
been to define sharply what assets can be usefully energized to close
significant intelligence gaps on pressing intelligence estimates and
problems.
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VI. Coordination has greatly improved in insuring that the Agency's
needs are given proper attention in the community's determination of
requirements for major collection systems. The Collection Guidance
Staff, attached to the office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, has
provided a useful focus in this regard.
VII. The maintenance of strong requirements mechanisms of the USIB
for requirements is essential. The application of cost-effectiveness
techniques and systems evaluation will impinge upon the requirements
process. They will cause increasing discrimination in the definition of
requirements for collection. They will also have great impact upon the
selection of new collection devices within the three major systems--
human resources, SIGINT, and overhead reconnaissance.
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EARLY WARNING OF STRATEGIC ATTACK
(INTERCONTINENTAL WARFARE)
A. The warning problems of the next decade differ from
those of a decade ago. A devastating "continent-busting" attack is now
attainable, preparation time for enemy forces is greatly shortened, the
number and scale of necessary enemy preparations have diminished,
and real surprise is now possible.
B. Warning information in the next decade will probably
increase in volumes. Future advanced collection systems are likely to
generate more information, perhaps on new and heretofore unreachable
aspects of enemy preparation, but they are unlikely to be able to give
concrete proof of hostile enemy intentions.
C. The task of providing early warning of strategic enemy
attack has always been complicated by the lack of dependable, timely,
direct information on enemy intentions. While there may be some
improvement in determining intentions, warning for the period of this
plan will continue to be based primarily upon observable enemy
preparations for war.
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D. The production of warning intelligence requires, there-
fore, deep analytical familiarity with military doctrine, weapons
systems, training patterns, combat proficiency, logistical levels,
deployment rates, recuperation measures, active and passive defense
requirements, and the broad status of the enemy's economic, scientific,
political, and cultural life. These are dependent on the entire intelligence
process.
E. "Indicators" describe the way we expect the enemy to pose
himself for attack, and they constitute the highest priority requirements
upon all the collection systems available to the intelligence community.
The certainty with which warning can be given will depend upon the speed,`
sensitivity, and comprehensiveness of collection sources and on the
precision of analytical recognition of deviations from norms represented
by the collected and collated indications. Improvement in the warning
process in the future will lie in:
1. More accurately described indicators,
2. More diversified and more sharply targeted
collection,
3. The use of automated information processing
and analysis systems,
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4. Deeper knowledge through research on
enemy patterns of behavior, and
5. Intensive training in the recognition of
indications and their changing form and pattern.
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A996ANTLY
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NRO
A. Photographic
reconnaissance
satellites provide, after COMINT, the best source of warning evidence.
As resolutions improve, our ability to detect changes in the physical
aspects of the enemy's terrain and forces will permit increasingly
accurate assessments of the levels of readiness implied by enemy
motion. This will be particularly so when ways are found to correlate
COMINT and photography on an area or activity in virtual real-time.
Developing cross-feed between these two main sources on enemy forces
is one of the biggest challenges for warning intelligence.
B. Reconnaissance is uniquely useful in spotting movements
of enemy forces, dispersals, concentrations, occupation of emergency
facilities, changes in transportation facilities, and the assembly of
wartime-only transport and equipment over large areas of the enemy's
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territory virtually simultaneously. Daily coverage of even a small
sample of enemy submarine and air bases, nuclear storage sites,
missile and SAM complexes, rail yards, harbors, camps, and heli-
copter parks will provide continuity, norms, and early recognition of
abnormalities with a reliability the warning business has not had so far.
What remains to be done, however, is to compress the interval
25X1 B
between the photographing or sensing of the ground image and the receipt
25X1 B
and analysis of the images in the warning community.
The exploitation of the volumes of information thus acquired stagger
the imagination; only through the use of automated scanning and
discrimination will it be at all possible to reduce this flow to manageable
proportions. At that point radical revisions will be needed in the
organic relationships between warning organizations and those involved
in photo interpretation.
IV. Human Sources
A. Advances in human source collection for warning purposes
will be less dramatic and slower in coming. Clandestine sources are
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uniquely capable in detecting changes in morale, in expectations among
the troops and the populace, in tightening civil controls, and, by overt
observers in enemy country, in increased readiness among civil and
industrial populations. Improvement in this sort of collection lies in
growth in operational professionalism, more precise requirements, and
a more energetic and continuous dialogue between warning analysts and
collectors, sharpening and making more current and relevant the things
to watch for on the enemy's ground that would reflect readiness for or
fear of war.
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VI. Modernizing Data Processing and Analysis
1ff?1dINTLY
A. Improvements in warning sources must be accompanied
by radical steps toward modernizing and augmenting the community's
capabilities for exploiting and analyzing warning information. Present
volumes of warning information outstrip all but the most superficial
analysis efforts now. Ways must be found for a central warning analysis
staff to use the complex and occasionally overlapping computer pro-
grams which are now on the point of activation in a number of intelligence
organizations. At some time in the future, data-link transmissions and
remote readout from these scattered ADP systems can be used to provide
the broadest possible spectrum of information on the behavior of the enemy.
B. The staffs of the National Indications Center and of
supporting sections in the community's current intelligence shops are
concentrating on the current flow of information- -essentially current
military intelligence. More research is necessary into the enemy's
behavior and war readiness to insure that indicators, or warning
collection requirements, are up to date, accurately reflect current
enemy practice, and represent activities truly required to bring the
enemy to combat readiness.
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AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS
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degree possible by automatic data processing.
A. There is an urgent need for greater employment of
automatic data processing techniques- in intelligence processing.
Achievements in photographic reconnaissance, both in the quantity of
photography acquired and in the resolution of the product, have created
a crisis in image processing and analysis which must be met to the
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B. The allocation of additional personnel and additional
money will no longer suffice. The highly skilled people required are
not available in sufficient numbers to satisfy the needs of CIA alone,
much less the anticipated needs of the intelligence community. The
CIA can no longer afford the expense of employing brute force tech-
niques for the resolution of problems which may be amenable to the
application of advanced technology.
C. The examples we have cited above for the photographic
and SIGINT fields are typical of what we have come to know as the
"information explosion. " The problems have been created by pre-
occupation with collection programs. The "information explosion, " in
turn, has created an "analysis gap. " The clearest evidence that such
a gap may exist can be obtained from an examination of the Agency
budget. We estimate that whereas approximately 1will be
allocated to technical collection programs in FY 1966, only
will be devoted to automatic data processing (ADP), which appears to
be the most likely tool for solving some of the critical processing
problems which we anticipate.
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D. Considerable effort by the Agency has been devoted to
the study and analysis of computer applications within CIA. The use
of computers in Agency accounting activities and specialized support
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collection systems engineering and operations,
and photographic mensuration) have been going on for some time and
plans exist for the implementation of advanced computer programs to
intelligence processes. Nevertheless, the effective application of ADP
to the intelligence processes has not made sufficient progress due to
some misconceptions. It is not true that to employ effectively auto-
matic data processing techniques an analyst must be a computer
programmer, or that a successful programmer must acquire significant
analytical skills. It is not true that the effective utilization of ADP
equipment will require organizational adjustment of a disruptive
character. While it is advisable to have centralized control of technical
knowledge in ADP programs, it is not necessary to centralize control
over component computer systems. Yet these contentions and more
appear to have rather wide currency. The man-machine relationship,
as it will develop through the application of ADP programs to the intel-
ligence process, will be its own best denial of the misconception and
organizational anxieties arising from them can best be relieved by
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training and indoctrination of our personnel in the principles and
applications of ADP.
E. The past five years of study, debate, and the limited
application of ADP have effectively paved the way for a more aggressive
application of ADP techniques to Agency programs. The program which
has been described for the logical and progressive application of ADP is
basically valid. However, the schedule should be accelerated and, unless
the CIA undertakes to do so on its own initiative, a program may well be
imposed upon us by external elements which will exacerbate those very
problems which our conservatism has heretofore sought to minimize.
F. With regard to specific applications, the equipment and
techniques now exist for the rapid application of ADP to many manage-
ment tasks including budget, inventory control, personnel records
(with due care for the security of DD/P personnel in all categories),
contract data, etc.. Planning for the application of machine processing
to information filing and retrieval is well advanced and its implemen-
tation probably can be accelerated. These applications will develop
into a capability for data manipulation and then evolve into true
analytical programs from which relationships among various types of
events and data through the application of correlation techniques can be
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derived. There will be a necessity for greater utilization of large
data bases in analytical programs and for experimentation to develop
new processes having direct application to the substantive intelligence
activities of the Agency. Hopefully, predictive processes will evolve
with time and experience.
H. The application of machine processing techniques to
Agency managerial, operational, and intelligence programs probably
will develop a momentum which will tend to compress the schedules
now envisioned. Such a program must be supported, however, by
adequate research programs in intelligence processes, if the program
is not to become prohibitively expensive because of false applications
and false starts. We believe that, in addition to the investment in
qualified personnel and equipment, provision should be made to fund
and staff research programs of the following magnitude:
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Research Funding and
Manpower Requirements FY' 66 FY' 67 FY' 68 FY' 69 FY' 70
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Technical Staff
II, Recommendations: It is recommended that:
A. The DCI direct each Deputy Director to assign two or three
individuals to work full time on the ADP problem, and to review the
application of ADP to his operations and processes as a matter of high
priority, and to submit within 90 days a phased and costed program.
B. The CIA Planning Staff prepare within 120 days a phased
and costed Agency program for ADP, based on Directorate submissions,
for review by the Executive Director-Comptroller and approval by the
DCI.
C. The Deputy Director for Science and Technology (DD/S&T)
be directed by the DCI to implement the approved Agency ADP program
as executive agent and to act as Chairman of an ADP executive coordi-
nation committee consisting of the Deputy Directors concerned. The
committee should report to the DCI quarterly.
D. The DD/S&T establish and staff an intelligence sciences
laboratory to study and apply on an experimental basis new techniques
in ADP and analysis to Agency programs as a service of common concern.
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I. Introduction
A. For the purposes of this paper, systems analysis is
defined to include three elements:
1. A systematic investigation of the objectives
to be achieved by a particular program including, for
example, programs or systems involving new collection
devices;
2. A comparison of the cost, effectiveness,
and risks of alternative programs or systems for
achieving these objectives, considering all aspects
of the intelligence process related to the programs
in question; and
3. The selection of an alternative which
will permit the system as a whole (collection, processing,
and analysis) to best approximate the achievements of
the intelligence objectives with a minimal expenditure
of resources.
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II. Background
A. Over the past five to ten years the development of
increasingly expensive and complex intelligence systems,
involving many critical inter-relationships within the field of
collection, information processing and intelligence production,
has made systems analysis imperative for top level CIA manage-
ment. New collection programs involving expensive vehicles and
equipment as well as elaborate requirements for processing and
analyzing masses of data make systems analysis most compelling
both for CIA and for the intelligence community.
B. There is already a growing awareness of the need for
employing this analytic method in the Agency. The DDCI and the
Executive Director-Comptroller have recently authorized establish-
ment of a systems analysis capability in the*l.,itter's office. Moreover,
a number of components of the Agency have undertaken program
analysis in varying degrees, although for the most part this
has not been done with sufficient rigor and comprehensiveness.
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III. Problems Arising From the Absence of Systems Analysis
A. The Agency has already suffered from the absence
of this kind of thorough-going program evaluation for overhead
reconnaissance systems. Good judgment and intuition were applied
to the development of the collection vehicles and to many of the
arrangements for formulating priority requirements, for informa-
tion processing and for final use in intelligence production.
However, serious problems have arisen which were predictable
and could have been substantially mitigated through some form
of systems analysis at the outset. Such analysis would have
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included consideration of the role of other means of collection
and the various trade-off possibilities; the problems of developing
a processing capability which would keep pace with the volume
of information collected; and, the need for an analytic capability
able to effectively exploit this material. For example:
1. Other collection activities continued
much too long, in some cases for reasons of security,
to acquire some of the very same material which was
being obtained more effectively by these reconnaissance
vehicles.
2. The interpretation and analysis capa-
bility was at times inadequate to keep pace with the
flow of film and tapes and, over a period of time, the
backlog became intolerably large.
3. An analytical capability to exploit
this material effectively for intelligence production
was not adequately considered during the research
and development phase of this program.
IV. Immediate Need for Systems Analysis
A. Whatever the losses suffered by intelligence because
of the failure to analyze systematically the entire spectrum of
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intelligence in relation to these programs they will be small
in comparison with the waste and confusion which could occur
if we fail to analyze properly--at the outset--the more expensive
and complex systems that are already on the drawing boards or
in more advanced stages of development. There will be numerous
decisions during the R&D phases of development which will affect
not only the program under consideration but many other related
activities for collection, processing, and analysis as well.
B. Systems analysis of certain Agency programs is
needed in part for the same reasons that have prompted its use
in the Pentagon today, namely, for decisions related to the develop-
ment of hardware programs. This would involve decisions as to
what information is critical for intelligence, the alternatives for
acquiring it, the kinds of equipment to be employed, the selection
from among alternatives in terms of effectiveness, costs, time
of delivery, etc. There are related decisions and considerations which
will have a bearing on the functions we want the equipment to perform
and the kind of equipment we select to perform it. As two examples:
1. An expensive new collection device may and
probably will have several capabilities for acquiring
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which of these functions should be performed, to what
extent, and in what combination. Answers to these
questions should depend to a significant degree on
the information which the offices responsible for
intelligence production and intelligence operations
believe would be of greatest importance and on
the prospects we have for processing the infor-
mation. This in turn hinges on read-out, collation,
and indexing capability. These are dependent on pro-
cessing equipment, ADP application, and the ability to
obtain the funds and qualified personnel for all phases
of the process. Decisions relating to the develop-
ment of these capabilities must take into account
the need for reasonable synchronization in the
phasing and the possibility of trade-offs between all
of these developments.
2. Decisions of this kind regarding new
devices and new programs must take into account the
relationship to and their impact on existing activities.
For example, what is the relationship of a particular
new collection device to programs of the clandestine
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services--programs which are also employing new
sophisticated collection equipment? Are they
unnecessarily duplicative or usefully supplementary?
Are there trade-offs involved in the sense that
the existence of one program may obviate or reduce
the necessity for the other?
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C. The foregoing emphasizes that the need for systems
analysis in CIA--and in the intelligence community as well--is now
a matter of urgency. Many important decisions of the Agency
regarding major programs--particularly programs centered
on expensive new collection devices--could gain substantially
in savings and effectiveness through the application of this
analytic approach.
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D. Finally, it would not be the responsibility of a
planning staff to perform the entire analysis functions. The
principal job of the staff would be to make certain that such
analysis is carried out. This would mean, of course, there should
be members of the staff who are trained and experienced in
systems analysis. The staff would provide the professional
and technical guidance for the analysis and whatever support
is required to ensure appropriate coordination with interested
components of the Agency and their external research contractors.
V. Recommendations
A. That CIA employ systems analysis in the selection
and evaluation of major intelligence programs.
B. That the responsibility for ensuring that systems
analysis is applied to selected programs and for providing technical
assistance and guidance be assigned to a planning staff. Further,
it is recommended that this function be integrated with the
responsibilities for planning, scheduling and monitoring
selected programs as we gain experience with the application
of this technique; and that these functions be administered
in close consultation with the Office of Budget, Program
Analysis and Manpower (BPAM) but separate from BPAM.
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The functions of systems analysis would overlap and duplicate
some functions currently being carried out by BPAM and the
Inspector General. There should be a delineation of these
functions at the time a planning staff is established.
C. That several projects be selected for trial of
systems analysis sometime within the next six months, including
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for example,
In its present stage of develop-
ment it would be particularly useful to analyze the requirements
and the exploitation aspects of this Project. In undertaking this
initial effort great care should be exercised to avoid overly
detailed analysis requiring elaborate mathematical models.
Moreover, since certain of these p-: 'jects will have been under
consideration for some time, this an..1;rsis should not be permitted
to delay critical decisions. As we gain experience with this technique,
our analysis can become more comprehensive and penetrating
and perhaps more mathematical.
D. That a program be established for iraining;seiected
CIA managerial personnel in systems analysis,
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A. "Mission-oriented" means to carry out research
efforts along functional lines to meet Agency need's, rather than
by academic discipline. Research onthe process of human
perception of a visual image or auditory signal, although
basic in nature, provides the building blocks for development
of systems to support the National Photographic Interpretation
Center, DD/P, and other groups and in this sense is mission
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oriented.
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A, The most difficult part of research is proper
identification of the problem. Government, industry, and university
research groups cannot provide us with the kind of assistance we
need until we are prepared to study in depth the nature of our
problems and assist in the translation of these problems into
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technically feasible solutions. This will undoubtedly require
some in-house research but should not imply the establishment
of a number of laboratories or indeed any laboratories until
it is abundantly clear that it is necessary and that it will be
necessary for many years (See Part IV, Section E. )
III. External Research
A. The keystone of our research philosophy should be
that we use the resources of other federal agencies, industries,
and universities and that we "piggy-back" on their research
to the greatest extent possible. To this end we have devoted
a major part of our time for the purpose of establishing a network
which connects us with national research and development. This
includes access to Department of Defense, Defense Documenta-
tion Center, Scientific Information Exchange, National Institutes
of Health, National Science Foundation, Atomic Energy Commission,
and other government research programs. The products of this
network include research, reports, and periodic meetings with
key research and development personnel. The university research
community is linked in primarily through personal contacts,
and the various scientific advisory
committees throughout the government. There are hundreds of
leafing scientists in the university environment who are in direct
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and often frequent contact with us. Expanded contacts with
industrial research groups are at an early stage but are
accelerating rapidly as industry becomes increasingly aware
of the Agency's research and development mission. Security
restrictions in some cases prevent us from disseminating re-
quests for proposals in the usual sense, but we have asked
industrial organizations to submit informal ideas to us for
consideration and discussion before the submission of formal
proposals. This has led to many fruitful discussions with
industrial research groups without the necessity of their
spending large sums of money for proposals which might not
be of interest to this Agency. This is not to say that our
contacts should not be broader nor is it to suggest that we
have our fingers on all research under way in the United
States. It should be pointed out, however, that a certain de-
gree of discrimination is necessary as in other fields and
that it is possible to select and maintain contact with key
individuals in a given field who, in turn, can guide and direct
us to the appropriate research activities in their general
area of knowledge.
IV. Research Versus Development
A. This Agency, like Department of Defense,
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and
others, tends to lump research and development together.
In most cases the funds for development far outweigh those for
research. There is a distinct danger that the pressures to
produce quick solutions to complex problems lead to the
impoverishment of research. It is often accompanied by a
reluctance to terminate a development program (Russian
proverb: "The better is the enemy of the good. "). This
Agency must establish and protect a small percentage of
its budget for research which is not to be diverted to the day-
to-day technical requirements.
B. At this time very little research is being sup-
ported by this Agency, probably well under l percent of the
total operating budget of the Agency. Indeed the present budget
breakdown by programs and projects does not distinguish
between research and development currently under way in
such organizations as the Office of Communications, Office
of ELINT, Office of Research and Development, National
Photographic Interpretation Center, and Technical Services
Division of DD/P. The time has come when the Agency must
focus attention in a more organized way on those key research
problems necessary for the achievement of the Agency's
objectives.
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V. Key Areas for Research
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A. A few of the critical areas for research in
behalf of the Agency's objectives have been identified.
These include models and other methods for data analysis,
studies of human perception and the man-machine interface,
new methods for communication, new sensor emplacement
techniques, and advanced concepts of "black box'' systems
with associated sensors.
VI. Control of Research
A. Research by its nature requires long term
support and continuity and should be undertaken only in
high priority areas where results are applicable to several
components of the Agency. Research funds should be
budgeted for and allocated centrally within the Agency to
ensure that research programs are viable, coordinated, not
competitive, and are responsive. Research funds should be
allocated to those components best able to carry out the
programs.
VII. Level of Research
A. Experience in private industry and government
reasonable investment for research, The Agency's lack of
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experience or criteria necessary to determine the level of
research dictates that our research program be re-examined
frequently in the light of future needs as well as results of
research undertaken by other government and private or-
ganizations.
VIII. Recommendations
It is recommended that:
A. Budget submissions and records must
identify funds allocated to research as distinct from develop-
ment;
B. Research funds be budgeted and allocated
centrally; and
C. The Agency should set aside
percent of its operating budget for scientific research in areas
critical to the accomplishment of Agency objectives. The
level of research effort should be re-examined at frequent
intervals .
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PART IV - SECTION H
OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE
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I. Requirements and Systems Integration
A. The Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and
assistance of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) has the respon-
sibility to establish requirements for present systems operationally
employed and for future systems, including the timing of their collec-
tion to be responsive to intelligence. These requirements must reflect
our needs not only for strategic intelligence but also for early warning,
Perhaps because of the nature of the collection devices, the DCI and
the Board have a notable record of effective control over the last ten
years. This has been true because this collection system lends itself
to very direct guidance. But it is also unquestionably true that the
participation of the DCI and the Board in this matter has been because
of the sizeable costs involved, political and physical risks, and the very
high productivity with its impressive impact on intelligence research
and estimates of major concern to the policymakers. Whatever the
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reasons, this control must be continued and strengthened, being adapted
to meet the ever changing demands of more sophisticated collection
mechanisms,
B. The Board's concern, however, has lagged in taking into
account the full impact once the results of the collection are available.
True, the DCI and the Board did agree to establish a National Photo-
graphic Interpretation Center under NSCID 8, making what was previ-
ously an Agency facility more directly responsive to the needs of the
community. Individually some agencies of the Government have engaged
in extensive construction and development of photographic interpretation
centers to meet their departmental needs and individual agencies have
expanded their efforts in the field of SIGINT processing. But our pro-
jections for the future clearly show there must be a more vigorous effort
toward resolving the various factors which contribute to our predicted
inability to handle the massive amount of information which is portended
for the future. These factors include the formating of the information
at the time of collection so that it may be integrated with previous
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materials and exploited by available hardware, the development and
application of automatic data processing and other automation techniques
to readout functions, and the coordination of the output of processing and
exploitation for maximum efficient use by analysts. In the future, cost-
effectiveness studies will have to be employed to aid the Board in dis-
charging its responsibilities with full impact at the appropriate time.
II. Operations
A. The U-2 experience especially from 1955 to 1960, the
first contemporary project of this Government in the overflight of denied
areas of major and comprehensive significance, was a joint CIA-U. S.
Air Force project under the executive direction of the CIA. All factors
seem to point to the management relationship which was developed at
that time by individuals in control in CIA (Mr. Dulles, General Cabell,
and Mr. Bissell) whose background, experience, and talents were an
important element in making that arrangement work.
B. We have tended to generalize this experience to all over-
head reconnaissance without taking proper account of the unique factors
at work.
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C. Again, the transfer of CORONA responsibility to the
Agency at the termination of SAMOS was an extension of the manage-
ment arrangements functioning in the U-2 case, a very heavy factor
being the necessity to conduct the CORONA program as covertly as
possible. However, the need was seen at that time to establish a
national reconnaissance organization because of the obvious expansion
of the Government's efforts in space fields bearing on reconnaissance.
The plan extended the jointness then existing between CIA and the USAF,
and therefore was still hydraheaded. Apart from the Air Force's his-
toric role in the air, DoD assets were essential and the largest sums
of money involved were directly related to installations and hardware
normally their province.
D. If there is to be a national reconnaissance organization,
it must be subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence. The latter must be in a position to
exercise an influence in the operational circumstances of the NRO and
this can be achieved, under his direction, without CIA operating all of
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the overflight programs. In this he gains additional strength from his
responsibilities to the President and as Chairman of the Board in defining
requirements and in exercising influence in the selection and use of
reconnaissance capabilities. In the latter regard, it is a fair conclusion
that the U-2 has been under the collection control of the Board except for
the brief period in late 1962 and the recent situation in Southeast Asia.
However, it is to be noted that even when SAC (not CIA) has been over-
flying Cuba it has been subject to the Board's control to the degree nec-
essary. It is quite clear that the control of KH-4 since the 25X1A
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early stages of the operational status lIhas been directly controlled 25X1
by the Board.
E. The OXCART research and developmental stages seem
in retrospect at those times and in those conditions to have been entirely
a proper assignment to CIA.
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And it may well be that there is no good rea-
son why in those instances it needs to be operated by CIA.
F. It is proper and highly desirable that the Agency took the
initiative in the development of ISINGLASS, but whether it needs to be
operated by the Agency, if indeed it is to become operational, is not
clear.
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II ISINGLASS/OXCART
I. The determination of operational responsibilities in the
field of overflight reconnaissance cannot bejudged from history alone
nor from the claims regarding the relative bureaucratic excellence of
the DoD or the CIA. In each case there will be required a reasoned
examination of the factors obtaining at the time and a decision based on
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this process. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central
Intelligence will always be confronted with claims of their respective
organizations. And these they will always have to resist in reaching a
conclusion which is most viable and profitable for the United States
Government. Their leadership and the climate of discussion which they
establish and which they insist must prevail, will go far to make it
possible for the DoD and the CIA to work closely together which is
obviously essential.
III. Research and Development (R&D)
A. In strategic overhead reconnaissance, experience since
1955 (the development of the U-2) has amply demonstrated that the
Director must maintain a capability in CIA for research and develop-
ment in sensors and associated platforms to provide him with a dependa-
ble source of new and advanced ideas, to evaluate new proposals from
any source, and to insure sufficient competition to permit choices. The
Agency has a good research and development record both in terms of
the fruitfulness of ideas and of the speed with which they have been
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brought to fruition. The research and development for the U-2, the
capability are examples. Another R&D project of striking potential is
CORONA,
the development of
It is interesting that one of the con-
cerns of the Land Panel (of the President's Scientific Advisory Com-
mittee) in reviewing ISINGLASS is the absence of any competing projects.
Apart from whatever determination is made on
quite clear that the initiative of the Agency in its exploration of new
as exerted a useful pres-
sure on the NRO to develop a better or comparable system.
B. The concept that the Director should have an R&D organi-
zation under his control involved in this area of research is generally
accepted. The present concept of funding for it, however, is not satis-
factory. Research and development of ideas up to the point where they
can be subjected to competitive examination or to cost-effectiveness
analysis should not be, as it is now, subject to exclusive funding con-
trol by an outside source such as the NRO. It is imperative either that
the funding for the Agency's R&D in this field should be established in
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its budget or that some greater flexibility in our relations with the NRO
must be achieved.
IV. Recommendations. It is recommended that the mission role of
the Central Intelligence Agency in strategic overhead reconnaissance
programs be as follows:
A. To support the Director of Central Intelligence and the
United States Intelligence Board
1. In establishing the requirements and the
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timing for on-going systems,
2. In selecting the systems which will pro-
vide maximum intelligence benefit with maximum economy,
ment where special considerations demand.
132
3. In insuring that the products of new systems
provide materials and information in a form and with a
timeliness which will permit effective use and integration
with the products of other sources.
B. To operate overhead reconnaissance systems by assign-
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C. To fund and engage in research and development in
sensors and associated platforms which can collect information from
overhead, whether from a manned or unmanned vehicle. (This is not
an exclusive assignment inasmuch as other agencies of the Government,
specifically DoD agencies, will also be so engaged. )
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NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION
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I. The problems of the National Photographic Interpretation Center
(NPIC) are among the most serious facing the Agency. They epitomize
the "information explosion" which is venting through technical advances
and which promises to burst upon the intelligence system when the
capabilities for satellite reconnaissance come into fuller use. The
accelerating technological revolution in its application to the
collection of data is the overshadowing problem for long range
planning. A correlative and urgent emphasis on the application
of the technological revolution is required to meet the problems and.
opportunities created by it, viz. , by research on the process of
intelligence itself, automatic data processing, and systems analysis
with its potential for control and balance, beginning at the all-
important point of requirements or intelligence objectives.
II. The projections for personnel submitted by NPIC for the
first five years of the long range plan accounted for approximately
of the increases projected for the Agency as a whole.
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Such increases for NPIC might well become mandatory if CIA's
leading role in this centralized service is to be held and if the problem
presented by NPIC is not met soon enough by the Agency's own
systems analysis and program control.
III. The development of overhead reconnaissance - the huge
investment in it and the incalculable value of the results from it -
together with the advancing potential of this kind and system of
collection warrant comparison with the development of communications
intelligence during and after World War II. By analogy, CIA through
NPIC should be thought of as having the opportunity now and for the
foreseeable future to become for satellite reconnaissance what
NSA belatedly became for communications intelligence. There are
differences, not the least of which is the content of the information.
Whereas at the moment satellite reconnaissance is more limited in
kind of information than communications intelligence, it is potentially
25X1 D more complete in?its kind than communications intelligence.
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may teach from the history of post-War communications intelligence
as well as because of the magnitude of the reconnaissance effort and
its importance for national intelligence.
IV. If the Agency is to maintain its proper role and if a prolifer-
ation of duplicating centers for interpretation is to be prevented,
then CIA must provide a Center which is responsive and satisfactory
to the military services as well as to its own needs. A key lies in
superior research and development for successful automation, given
the funds to make this possible on a basis of advancing technology.
V. Recommendations. It is recommended that:
A. The DCI give urgent attention to the imbalance between
requirements for collection by overhead photography, particularly
satellite, and the capacity of NPIC to provide effective photo
interpretation;
B. Urgent attention be given to the application of research
and development to meet the critical problems facing NPIC;
C. The Agency intensify efforts in recruitment and in
the training of photo interpreters.
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PART IV - SECTION J
PERSONNEL AND TRAINING
I. Introduction
A. In the years ahead the Agency must undertake new,
diverse, and distinctly more demanding responsibilities if it is to
serve adequately the increasingly critical security interests of the U. S.
How well it will be able to respond to these challenges depends in large
part on how well we manage our human resources. In planning for the
future, therefore, the CIA should recognize that its most valuable asset
is its trained professional cadre of career personnel. These people
provide the cutting edge for everything we do. Evolved over time, and
conditioned by exposure to the disciplines and pressures of a demanding
environment, they represent a unique body of talent. It behooves us to
make certain that we sustain it and conserve it.
II. Discussion
A. We can be proud of the cadre of career personnel that
conducts the business of this Agency today. As one senior Bureau of
the Budget officer recently put it, "The CIA has the largest reservoir
of highly trained and competent personnel in the Government." Key
elements of this cadre began their professional careers during and
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after World War II and constitute the "first generation" of CIA personnel.
Others of this cadre were developed over later years with considerable
efforts by top management, the career service boards, and the Offices
of Personnel and Training. We have been particularly successful in the
recruitment of young people for CIA. The establishment in 1951 of a
Junior Officer Trainee (JOT) program has assured a regular input of
highly qualified junior officers. Many of these young officers have ful-
filled their high promise and form an increasingly large percentage of
those officers selected for the mid-career training program. This
program has been recognized as one of the finest of its type in the U. S.
Government. It currently produces
each year as of
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September 1965. This output should be expanded if we are to meet our
needs in the years just ahead. Its program content likewise must be
continually reviewed to assess possible changes for improvement.
B. The mid-career program has been used as a vehicle
for identifying those with a potential to become senior executives and
for providing further training for them. This program has worked well
but now needs increased emphasis and closer attention.
C. While at the senior levels the Agency has made creditable
attempts to improve its managerial capacities, including executive
training programs, this will not suffice for the future. The Agency
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should therefore plan also for the early creation of an executive career
service and a senior training program to sustain it.
D. In order to preserve the top-flight quality of its personnel
cadre well into the "second generation" and to assure a vital continuity
of leadership, we must, in addition to sustaining a regular input of
young officers through the Career Trainee Program (formerly JOT)
on which we have largely depended for officer recruitment since 1957, also
encourage lateral entry at various levels of specialists and generalists.
This practice would provide the new ideas and new blood that the Agency
needs. A program of lateral entry cannot be haphazard but must be
scheduled on a regular basis with stated goals and objectives. We must
also recognize that certain needed disciplines and skills will remain in
short supply. We should, for example, train our own photo interpreters
if none can be recruited from the market.
E. It must also be recognized that the acquisition of many
of the skills that the Agency requires need not involve long-term career
employment. This is particularly true of the technical and scientific
field where the "state-of-the-art" is moving so quickly and where, after
several years, the scientist or technician hired on short-term arrange-
ments by the Agency does well to return to his particular discipline in
order to maintain his professional credentials and standing. Rather than
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resist the efforts of persons with rare skills to return to academic or
scientific discipline, the Agency should, where appropriate, accommo-
date them. In those circumstances where the Agency feels its interests
are best served by retaining people with special skills on a long-term
career basis who are desirous of remaining loyal to and retaining status
in their particular disciplines, then it must take steps in the future to
help them to do so. Specifically, the Agency must adopt a more flexible
policy than it now has, in which academic sabbaticals, external training,
acceptance of grants, and publication of works is not just allowed, but
actually encouraged.
F. The Agency, in order to sustain the continued input of
high caliber personnel, must plan for a more aggressive recruitment
program and make use of the considerable latitude of its authorities to
insure that CIA remains competitive in the increasingly tight professional
labor market. The Agency should more clearly enunciate the fact that
it is its policy to encourage the use of qualified senior personnel from
the various directorates to assist directly and on a continuous basis in
identifying and recruiting individuals of the same skills and disciplines.
Managers of operating components should therefore take greater
initiative to provide opportunities for them to do so, underwriting
necessary travel and arranging work schedules to accommodate it.
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We should note most particularly in planning for the future that the
Agency's image and reputation will continue to have a very direct effect
on the ability to recruit people.
G. Training in the Agency has not been and should not be
restricted to formalized courses of instruction. Significant training
consists of the in-house on-the-job variety throughout the directorates.
This is so because many of the skills required by the Agency are either
unique to it or must be developed to respond quickly to new requirements.
Much that we have done in this field has been distinctly innovative, has
reflected the "can do" philosophy of the Agency, and has spelled the
difference between success or failure in many critical areas of our
operations.
H. While the Agency has achieved commendable progress in
the development of professional personnel, it must plan for an increased
emphasis and a broader recognition of the need for it as well as a more
systematic approach to professional training, particularly at the mid-
career and senior levels. To be successful in this endeavor the Agency
must more sharply define its needs. In any event, there should certainly
be brought into being some form of rotation in executive positions within
directorates and where appropriate between directorates in order to
develop professionals with broader bases of experience. Such rotations
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would open up new perspectives and provide new insights essential to
an executive development concept. Extension of rotation to include
other departments of the Government, particularly the Departments
of Defense and State, pose significant collateral benefits for CIA.
I. Any executive development concept should include the
creation of an executive career service under the DCI. This service
should be created as soon as possible and should include senior echelons
of the Agency, except specialists so uniquely qualified that they can and
should be excluded from a general executive program. This executive
cadre should have a regular inflow of officers identified as having
executive potential. The latter, by assignment to the executive career
service, automatically would be assured of opportunities for rotational
assignments, executive training, and appropriate consideration for
senior executive jobs within their own and other directorates. A senior
training program should also include, as it has to a limited degree in
the past, exposure to certain of the disciplines found in the Senior
Seminar in Foreign Policy of the Foreign Service Institute and in the
National War College.
J. We recognize that there are organizational difficulties
that would hamper the development of an executive career service
particularly as it applies to the concept of rotation, but recommend,
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nonetheless, that immediate attention be given to it. Inherent in any
executive career service would be the understanding that training would
be more mandatory than permissive and that promotion to certain levels
would depend on successful completion of prescribed training.
K. In light of the retirement exodus from the ranks of the
present executive group of CIA which will start in just a few years, the
Agency must address itself to the challenges of professional-cadre
development with a certain sense of urgency. This task lies primarily
in the years immediately ahead. It cannot be postponed, or attacked,
in a leisurely sequence without risk of serious adverse impact in the
decade beyond.
L. Hand-in-hand with the recruitment of qualified personnel
and the institution of realistic and well ordered training mechanisms goes
the equally important task of selection-out and retirement. The Agency
must, beginning immediately, recognize that it cannot maintain a
regular input of professionals into the Agency and expect to keep them
unless it takes steps to assure the orderly and timely promotions that
are inhibited by stagnation at higher levels. There should therefore be
a much greater emphasis on selection-out of individuals who fail to
meet standards or who are otherwise inadequate. There should be an
efficient and thereby attractive out-placement system for those eligible
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for retirement or for those who must change their careers. Serious
consideration should be given to CIA-sponsored external training to
encourage such persons to leave the Agency in a manner beneficial
to them and to the Agency.
M. The Agency should, finally, seek authority for the
establishment of a training complement. In doing so, it would be
following a practice routinely found in the military establishments. Any
such complement that CIA possessed at one time has long since been
dissipated because of the need to respond to mounting responsibilities
and mounting demands on its human resources. The reinstitution of a
training complement would assure a slender but vitally important
reserve that we do not now enjoy. It would not only assure more orderly
and planned training but would also, in effect, create a strength in depth
to sustain us as we meet crises that will further strain our resources.
These crises and their drain on manpower have inhibited the training and
rotation that good management requires.
N. Prudence dictates that a large proportion of the manpower
required over the next five years be acquired early in the period. The
training establishment in being must be readied to expand; at the same
time, early critical attention must be given to the creation of professional
career development mechanisms of the type recommended above if the
Agency is to get and keep the skilled careerists that it must have.
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III. Recommendations. It is recommended that:
A. The Career Trainee Program be immediately expanded
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to meet new requirements.
B. The Director authorize (1) the creation of an Executive
Career Service which would include a system of rotation, and (2) the
inauguration of a senior officer training program geared to the require-
ments of this Service.
C. Lateral entry of persons with wanted skills and disciplines
in short supply into the Agency be given much greater emphasis by
individual directorates to provide new blood the Agency needs.
D. Selection-out and retirement be given much greater
emphasis in the near future and that strong efforts be made to create
attractive and efficient out-placement mechanisms to include Agency-
sponsored external training.
E. The Agency participate in the development of new methods
of instruction (program learning) which give promise of great efficiency
and economy in the future, particularly in language training.
F. The Agency clarify its language training needs and reorder
its training facility to accommodate the anticipated increased require-
ments for training.
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G. The Agency seek authority to establish a training comple-
ment to assure a slender but vital reserve of manpower without *hich
the career development mission of the Agency cannot be adequately
accomplished.
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MEDICAL VIEWS ON PLANNING AND HUMAN RESOURCES
1. Conservation of Manpower
The Agency is still in its first generation. Its founders are more
than likely its planners. Twenty years have passed since the original
founding. It must be conceded that the final phases of a long range plan
will be left to others to accomplish.
While the second generation eagerly awaits its destiny, the
Agency's best interests would be served if it could conserve its existing
manpower.
It is not too soon to begin such action. The early effects of
aging and stress are becoming evident in our people. The private
awareness of physical change is a matter of daily discussion and com-
munication. Medical findings confirm these observations.
At the same time, the Agency is subject to new and increasing
pressures. The Agency is no longer in a rapidly expanding phase. The
need to do more with less involves abrasive decisions. However, the
climate of intelligence activities has become even more competitive
and the risk of activities more threatening.
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The continuing size of the burden and the limitations of our
human resources, both imposed and acquired, indicate a strong need for
the conservation of manpower. This may be accomplished in many ways.
A significant contribution can be made by the Office of Medical
Services. The current trend to refine and increase the scope of
diagnostic capabilities will result in the earlier detection of disease.
The current slow expansion of examination capabilities can be accelerated
to provide for a greater percentage of executive evaluations. Either or
both of these developments will result in earlier referrals to specialists
and private physicians.
In a major sense, however, the conservation of manpower is
everyone's business. It is certainly the business of the employee and
it is certainly in the interest of the supervisor. Hopefully, both super-
visor and employee can become increasingly conscious of the need to
conserve manpower.
Practical expressions of such attitudes could be expressed in the
taking of needed annual leave, the avoidance of unrealistic deadlines,
the use of sick leave when illness so dictates, and the avoidance of
questionable overtime. There are other more complex manifestations
that go beyond the scope of this paper. The Office of Medical Services
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plans to contribute to increasing the managerial awareness of the needs
for conservation of manpower through appropriate educational efforts.
II. Contributions to Personnel Management
The quality of performance of the Agency's first generation is
fairly well known. The evidence is present in history and in the current
status of the Agency and its accomplishments.
It is worthy of note that the bulk of Agency staffing has come about
in response to exigencies. Original staffing stemmed from predecessor
organizations born of war. The subsequent growth of the Agency for
many years reflected the periodic threats and eruptions of international
tensions. Even the pattern of recent growth, while technological in
nature, is in response to exigencies representing threats of the greatest
destruction.
The Agency was formed by people not necessarily born into the
craft of intelligence or the atmosphere of clandestinity. Rather, the
Agency obtained people from many walks of life and from many services.
Their common attribute seemed to be the motivation to accomplish the
Agency's mission.
The second generation has been acquired in different fashion.
The Agency has gone about seeking deliberately for the young candidates
of future leadership. Such individuals have been selected after the most
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careful screening and evaluation. They experience prolonged periods
of training and apprenticeship. It is only after extensive indoctrination
that responsibilities of service are required.
How effective these methods are remains to be seen. The
history of the second generation is yet to be written. In the ordinary
course of events, the evidence will only become available after the
heritage of responsibility has passed from present hands.
While it seems that the Agency is on the right track in its
restaffing methods, the contrast between early and recent patterns of
staffing remains evident. Perhaps the difference makes no difference;
perhaps it is an advantage. We would be more comfortable if we
actually knew.
To be sure the quality of on-duty performance is recorded
periodically and evaluations are obtained in relationship to personnel
actions. These measures are helpful and provide a degree of estimate
and guidance for the future. Additional measures are possible, however,
and worthy of exploration.
One such measure would be to link performance evaluations
and selection procedures. At the present time, selection procedures
have no organized or programed method available to compare the
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qualities of actual performances with the findings of selection. There
is no feed-back system. Such a system is needed to correct and
improve selection methods. A second measure would be to use the
linkage between selection procedures and performance evaluations
to assist in guidance systems. The wealth of information that is obtained
and is available as a result of selection mechanisms could make a
significant contribution to measuring the quality of current performances
and in suggesting some avenues and techniques for improvement.
A third measure could be to provide for the periodicity of
application of these newer procedures. This periodicity might well
vary in time and application according to the needs of career develop-
ment systems. In general, such procedures would be applied only on
those occasions and in those instances when total scrutiny would profit
a career service or assist in the management of individuals.
At the present time, the Office of Medical Services is considering
the implications of linking selection and evaluation procedures and will
be presenting the subject with recommendations to the Deputy Director
for Support.
There is a second major area of possible development that is
worthy of mention. It seems feasible for behavioral disciplines to
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provide managers and supervisors with insights into human behavior.
While good managers are generally good students of human nature,
their natural abilities could be augmented by technical understandings.
This is by no means a new idea. Many management courses
provide for such experiences in their curriculum. The effects are
generally short-lived due to the isolated nature of the experience.
More recently, the idea has found expression in universities where
the faculty has been joined by behavioral disciplines to assist in the
formative process that results in education.
In this Agency, with its needs to know about human nature, it
seems desirable that a similar relationship be attempted.
The Office of Medical Services will be taking the initiative to
provide training and consultative opportunities to management within
reasonable limitations.
The foregoing concepts and plans provide one approach to the
subject of improving personnel maintenance and development systems.
There is a great deal of interest and energy available in the Agency in
regard to the subject. It is possible that this approach may link up with
other efforts and contribute to the goal of building a system of personnel
management that equals and relates to the system of personnel selection.
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I. Discussion
A. The Agency operates and should continue to operate its
own world-wide communications network not only because it is a function
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continuing large effort in the communications field. This is not to say
that commercial, defense, and other governmental circuits, equipments,
and techniques cannot be utilized in the Agency's world-wide system,
but that every message containing Agency-obtained intelligence or that
can be attributed to the Agency's operations must be handled by CIA
personnel while it is in the clear text form. This need for maximum
communications security is obvious when applied to the actual transmission
of reports by an agent to his Clandestine Services case officer, but not
so obvious in its applicability to staff communications and to messages
or data collected by "black boxes" of the future.
B. Any discussion of the Agency's communications program
must recognize the fact that for economic, cover, and transmission
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security reasons our communications network must continue to be
responsive also to outside-the-Agency requirements in addition to our
own requirements.
in the Critical Intelligence Communications Network will continue and
expand, and our continued participation in the National Communications
System (NCS) will be required. These outside factors are not all "give"
on the part of the Agency--there's a lot of "take" involved too. F_
Via the NCS we obtain the benefits of vast
amounts of effort and moneys spent on development of, and operation of,
new circuits--e. g. , transoceanic cables now and satellites in the near
future.
II. Plans For The Future
The technology to permit the Agency to communicate in a secure,
reliable, high speed, high volume fashion is presently available or is
on the near horizon. These requirements can be met by the Agency
provided they are identified sufficiently far in advance so that equipment
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and manpower can be programmed. Planning for the future includes
these major items:
Increase the use of automated equipment
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to speed the flow of traffic and reduce
the workload impact of higher volumes.
B. Continue efforts to improve the security of communications
centers, transmission systems, cryptographic devices, and terminal
equipments
Expand the technical training program to maintain harmony
with increased automation.
continue the development of a decentralized telecommunications plan
which minimizes the dependence on any single facility and insures a
capability of meeting agent communications requirements of the Clan-
destine Services.
E. Expand the CIA communications system to provide voice
quality circuitry for the transmission and reception of secure voice,
data, and facsimile communications in addition to the teletypewriter
service now provided.
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A. No look at the Agency's long range communications
program can ignore the interdependent problems of volumes and speed
of service. Everyone knows that volumes of message traffic have
increased year by year and that the demands for more and more detailed
intelligence reporting will increase these volumes. Demands for
"real-time" service from collection to consumer will force our com-
munications system to expand greatly in order to transport, electrically,
much of the material that is today transmitted from one point to
another by plane, train or boat. Currently, real-time communications
are centered around the demand for secure voice and facsimile systems
in the Washington area and a few computer-to-computer data links. The
future holds forth the possibility for and probable requirements for
secure voice, data, facsimile, and even television with the intelligence
community and with our own posts on a world-wide basis. The control
of this persistent increase in requirements for higher volumes cannot
be accomplished by the Agency's Support mechanism other than by the
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inherent restrictions on manpower and money. The Support elements
have, and should have, a "you call--we haul" posture toward the rest
of the Agency. Control of traffic volumes must be exercised by those
Agency components which are responsible for the substantive side of
CIA's mission.
B. Another critical area that can be classified as a
communications problem is right here in the headquarters building and
is probably more rightfully classified as a reproduction and distribution
problem. We have a multiplicity of registries, secretariats, etc.
for handling the many varieties of correspondence that flow in and out
of the building. There is no uniformity even within the one category of
overseas correspondence; cables are handled one way and dispatches
another. If, as we believe, much of the material that is presently
pouched is destined to be handled electrically in the future, the
reproduction and distribution systems should certainly be paralleled
if not combined with due regard to the security requirements of the
Clandestine Services. The State Department is far ahead of us in this
field, with a central method of distributing its Telegrams and Airgrams.
Also, the distribution of correspondence within the building must be
automated, and the need for interfacing our electrical communications
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system with automatic data handling is, of course, obvious. It now
takes longer to get cables from the message center to headquarters
elements than it does to get them from halfway around the world to
the message center.
IV. Recommendations. It is recommended that studies be undertaken
immediately to develop measures for:
A. Controlling the constantly increasing volume of com-
munications originated by Agency elements, and,
B. Faster and more efficient handling of correspondence
and communications within CIA headquarters.
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SECURITY PROBLEMS - LONG RANGE PLANNING
I. The Office of Security is constantly striving to improve
security in all of its fields. Technical developments, sociological
change, and possible realignment of international forces will
require changes in our security techniques and procedures.
These unique problems must be met with a high degree of
sophistication in the security field. Some of the future problems
can be identified by manifestations appearing at this time. Others
cannot. Accordingly, this paper will address itself to future
security problems which are either with us at the present time
and will continue to be problems, or those which can be anticipat-
ed with some degree of certainty.
II? Investigations and Operational Support
A. The conduct of inter-agency name checks will, in
the future, be made through the medium of automatic data process-
ing equipment. This anticipated development will require long
range planning on the part of the Office of Security in order that
we may reap the benefits from such automated developments, but
at the same time protect the security of Agency information and
sources.
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III. Physical Security
A. The physical protection of CIA installations and
personnel abroad will be a continuing problem. The prominent
power position of the U. S. will continue to subject its overseas
personnel to increased numbers of demonstrations, riots, or
acts of violence together with their attendant security problems.
Long range planning must take this into account in order to
provide additional security on a continuing basis.
B. The ever increasing cost of guard protection of
Agency buildings should be reduced through the use of technological
advances in the field of personal identification. It is anticipated
that by continuing effort, the state of the art in this field can be
advanced so as to yield the desired security results. Automatic
and instantaneous fingerprint processing is one of possibilities
toward the achievement of this security goal.
IV. Counterintelligence
A. Within the framework of the present world power
structure, considerable emphasis in the security field has been
given to the threats presented by the currently identified --
Communist oriented -- opposition. Security techniques, practices,
and procedures must be sensitive to any new penetration efforts on
the part of other nations which may affect the security of the Agency.
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Necessary security measures must be developed on a timely
basis in order to meet any new, developing threats. In coopera-
tion with the Counterintelligence Staff, DIYP, necessary security
measures must be developed on a timely basis in order to meet
any new developing threats.
V. Polygraph
A. There has been much congressional interest in
connection with the use of the polygraph. In this connection, the
validity of the polygraph has been challenged and is being carefully
evaluated.
B. Appropriate research will be necessary in order to
improve the security benefits which can be derived by stress
measurements. It is felt that considerable advancement in the
state of the art of the polygraph technique is possible.
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VI, Industrial Security
A. Until the present time there has been little
evidence of concerted opposition efforts to penetrate industrial
facilities performing classified Government contracts. With
the increased importance of technology in the intelligence field
and with increased dependence by the intelligence community
on industrial assistance, it is anticipated that opposition efforts
in this connection will be materially increased. Future se-
curity policies, procedures, and techniques must address them-
selves to this problem and produce the necessary security
protection.
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VIII. Personnel Security
A. In order for the Agency to stay abreast of new
developments in the intelligence field it will be necessary to
process security clearances in large numbers on a continuing
basis. Increased efforts on the part of the opposition to
penetrate CIA will require a continuing vast expenditure of
manpower in order to yield the necessary degree of personnel
security. Additional emphasis will be required to carry out a
current reinvestigation program of staff employees, consultants,
and contractor personnel.
IX. Automatic Data Processing
.A. All Office of Security programs must be geared so
as to accrue the greatest benefits from automation. The most
serious problem is the development of systems for the easy and
effective in-put of security data into a format which can be
automated and retrieved at a later date, compatible with the
needs of all Agency components involved.
X.. Protection of Intelligence
A. "Leaks of information" will continue to pose a
threat to the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
Efforts to combat such disclosures must continue to be exercised
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through the USIB, with continued emphasis upon the realization
that the cooperation of all departments and agencies will be
required to produce the necessary degree of success in this
security effort.
B. The degree of protection afforded classified infor-
mation is only as strong as the lowest standards maintained with-
in the recipient agencies. Recent revelations of espionage have
shown that all agencies are affected by the penetration of any one
community agency. CIA is, therefore, continually striving through
the Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board to
develop uniform security criteria and standards for use by all
member agencies in the intelligence community.
XI. Recommendations:
A. CIA increase research and development for improve-
ment of the polygraph instrument and its utilization in order to
obtain the utmost benefits through this security aid in support of
intelligence operations and activities.
B. The Security Committee of USIB promulgate uniform
personnel and physical security practices and procedures in all
areas wherein community intelligence activities and personnel are
affected.
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CONSOLIDATED RECOMMENDATIONS
In the following consolidated recommendations of the report
reference is made to those sections to which the recommendations
relate.
I. Clandestine Services (Part III, Section A)
It is recommended that:
A. In order to fulfill its unique and critical role, the
Clandestine Services function within CIA with that degree of isolation
necessary to insure that the U. S. has a truly clandestine and covert
action service. At the same time, it must remain responsive to the
Director's needs for information about its objectives, programs,
needs, and accomplishments.
B. The Clandestine Services concentrate on operations to
accomplish agent penetrations for acquisition of information related
as closely as possible to plans and intentions of hostile regimes.
C, Officers who are destined for truly clandestine careers
should, in necessary instances, be trained separately from other
trainees who are not to follow a career of sensitive activity.
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E. Clandestine Services manpower be increased in three
categories: (a) ongoing necessary normal expansion, (b) a contingency
development cadre for use on short notice in critical areas, (c) clan-
destine operational research.
F. The DD/P, in order to protect its agents and operations
from compromise, retain control of its agent-collected information and
25X1A such operational support mechanisms) land related machine
data processing, as well as the function of its Technical Services
Division.
G, The Clandestine Services Personnel Division be trans-
ferred from the DD/S to the DD/P, to enable him to possess and direct
the essential tool for fulfilling his management role with the maximum
flexibility so necessary to his unique mission.
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II. Intelligence Production (Part III, Section B)
It is recommended that:
A. Long range objectives for the production of intelligence
be approved:
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1. To strengthen the Agency capability for
24-hour current intelligence and the development of the
Operations Center in connection therewith;
2. To strengthen the CIA strategic base in
research and extend it in political intelligence; and
3. To increase CIA's analytical strength
against Communist China during the next five years in
B. The Directorates review their organizations for the
production of finished intelligence and, in collaboration with the perma-
nent planning staff submit their recommendations for improvement.
III. Overt Collection and Reference Services (Part III, Section C)
It is recommended that:
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IV. The CIA Image (Part IV, Section A)
It is recommended that:
A. The Agency intensify its briefings on its organization,
objectives, and mission to appropriate members of the Executive and
Legislative Branches of the Government;
B. A systematic program be instituted for better under-
standing of the Agency in the academic and business world; and
C. A program for better use of Agency alumni be developed.
V. Automatic Data Processing and Analysis (Part IV, Section E)
It is recommended that:
A. The DCI direct each Deputy Director to assign two or
three individuals to work full time on the ADP problem, and to review
the application of ADP to his operations and processes as a matter of
high priority, and to submit within 90 days a phased and costed program.
B. The CIA Planning Staff prepare within 120 days a phased
and costed Agency program for ADP, based on Directorate submissions,
for review by the Executive Director-Comptroller and approval by the
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C. The Deputy Director for Science and Technology be
directed by the DCI to implement the approved Agency ADP program
as executive agent and to act as Chairman of an ADP executive
coordination committee consisting of the Deputy Directors concerned.
The committee should report to the DCI quarterly.
D. The DD/S&T establish and staff an intelligence sciences
laboratory to study and apply on an experimental basis new techniques
in ADP and analysis to Agency programs as a service of common
concern.
VI Systems Analysis (Part IV, Section F)
It is recommended that:
A. CIA employ systems analysis in the selection and
evaluation of major intelligence programs.
B. Responsibility for ensuring that systems analysis is
applied to selected programs and for providing technical assistance
and guidance be assigned to a planning staff, separate from but in
close consultation with BPAM.
C. Several projects be selected for trial of systems analysis
sometime within the next six months
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D. A program be established for training selected CIA
managerial personnel in systems analysis.
VII. Scientific Research (Part IV, Section G)
It is recommended that:
A. Budget submissions and records identify funds allocated
to research as distinct from development;
B. Research funds be budgeted and allocated centrally; and
C. The Agency set aside
operating
budget for scientific research in areas critical to the accomplishment
of Agency objectives and the level of research re-examined at frequent
intervals.
VIII. Overhead Reconnaissance (Part IV, Section H)
It is recommended that:
A. The mission role of the Central Intelligence Agency in
strategic overhead reconnaissance programs be as follows:
1. To support the Director of Central Intel-
ligence and the United States Intelligence Board
a. In establishing the require-
ments and timing for on-going systems,
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b. In selecting the systems
which will provide maximum intelligence
benefit with maximum economy, and
c. In insuring that the prod-
ucts of new systems provide materials
and information in a form and with a
timeliness which will permit effective
use and integration with the products of
other sources.
2. To operate overhead reconnaissance
systems by assignment where special considerations
demand.
3. To fund and engage in research and devel-
opment in sensors and associated platforms which can
collect information from overhead, whether from a
manned or unmanned vehicle. (This is not an exclusive
assignment inasmuch as other agencies of the Government,
specifically DoD agencies, will also be so engaged. )
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IX. National Photographic Interpretation (Part IV, Section I)
It.is recommended that:
A. The DCI give urgent attention to the imbalance between
requirements for collection of overhead photography, particularly
satellite, and the capacity of NPIC to provide effective photographic
interpretation.
B. Urgent attention be given to the application of research
and development to meet the critical problems facing NPIC.
C. The Agency intensify efforts in the recruitment and in
the training of photo interpreters.
X, Personnel and Training (Part IV, Section J)
It is recommended that:
A. The Career Trainee Program be expanded immediately
from its current annual
to meet new requirements. 25X1 A
B. The Director authorize (a) the creation of an Executive
Career Service which would include a system of rotation, and (b) the
inauguration of a senior officer training program geared to the require-
ments of this service.
C. Lateral entry of persons with wanted skills and disciplines
in short supply into the Agency be given much greater emphasis by
individual Directorates.
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D. Selection-out and retirement be given much greater
emphasis in the near future and that strong efforts be made to create
attractive and efficient out-placement mechanisms to include Agency-
sponsored external training.
E. The Agency participate in the development of new methods
of instruction (program learning) which give promise of great efficiency
and economy in the future, particularly in language training.
F. The Agency clarify its language training needs and reorder
its training facility to accommodate anticipated requirements for train-
ing reflected in the Long Range Plan.
G. The Agency seek authority to establish a training comple-
ment to assure a slender but vital reserve of manpower without which
the career development mission of the Agency cannot be adequately
accomplished.
XI, Communications (Part IV, Section L)
It is recommended that:
A. Studies be undertaken immediately to develop means for:
1. Controlling the constantly increasing
volume of communications originated by Agency
elements, and
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2. Faster and more efficient handling of
correspondence and communications within CIA
Headquarters.
XII. Security (Part IV, Section M)
It is recommended that:
A. Research and development be increased for improvement
of the polygraph instrument and its utilization in order to obtain the
utmost benefits through this security aid in support of intelligence
operations and activities.
B. The Security Committee of USIB promulgate uniform
personnel and physical security practices and procedures in all areas
wherein community intelligence activities and personnel are affected.
174 25X1A
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Page
A
Assumptions, Long Range Planning 6
Automatic Data Processing 102
Research Funding and Manpower Requirements 107
Balance of Programs
Career Training Program
Central Reference Service
CIA Image
CIA, Impact on
CIA, Present and Future Role
CIA Watch System
Clandestine Services
Close Support (Role)
Cover
Manpower Needs
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25X1 D
Clandestine Services cont.
Operations
Planning
Training
Collection, Intelligence
Page
Coordination, Clandestine Services and Functions 84
Coordination, Intelligence 80
Coordination, Intelligence Production 81
Coordination, Overt Collection Activities 86
Coordinating Role, DCI 80
CORONA 126
Communications
Future Plans
Problem Areas
Conservation of Manpower
Control of Research
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Page
Counterintelligence
160
Cover
36
Covert Action
27
Critical Intelligence Communications Network
154
Current Intelligence
52
Twenty-four Hour
Strength
52
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DCI Coordinating Role
DCIDs
Development of Support Executives
Development, versus Research
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Early Warning of Strategic Attack
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Estimates, National Intelligence
Executive Career Service
External Research
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Foreign Missiles and Space Analysis Center
Human Sources, Indicators
25X1 D
Image, CIA
Image Forming Sensors
Impact on CIA
Impact of Technology
Indicators
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Industrial Security
Information Explosion
In-House Research
Intelligence Collection
Intelligence Coordination
Intelligence, National Basic
Intelligence, National Current'.
Intelligence, National Economic
Intelligence Production
Manpower Estimates
Investigations and Operational Support
ISING LASS
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Junior Officer Trainee (JOT)
Key Areas, Research
Page
162
3
KH-4 127
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Page
Level of Research
Long Range Planning Assumptions
6
M
Manpower, Conservation of
147
Manpower Estimates, Intelligence Production
52
Manpower Needs, Clandestine Services
38
Medical Views on Planning and Human Resources
147
Mid-Career Program
138
Mission Oriented Research
117
National Basic Intelligence
National Communications System
National Current Intelligence
National Economic Intelligence
National Indications Center
National Intelligence Estimates
National Photographic Interpretation Center
National Reconnaissance Organization
National Reference Services
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National Security Act of 1947
Operations Center
Operations, Clandestine Services
Organization for Production
Overhead Reconnaissance
Operations
Requirements and Systems Integration
Research and Development
Overt Collection and Reference Services
Over View of the CIA Long Range Plan
OXCART
Personnel and Training
Personnel Management, Contributions to
Personnel Strength, Support Directorate
Planning, Clandestine Services
Planning, War
Political Intelligence
Page
14
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Page
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Polygraph
Present and Future Role of CIA
14
Production, Intelligence
17,
50
Program, 100 Universities
Protection of Intelligence
R
Recommendations, Consolidated
165
Reference Services
87
Reference Services, National
23
Requirements, Intelligence Collection
92
Requirements and Systems Integration
123
Research, Scientific
117
Control of
121
External
118
In-House
117
Key Areas
121
Level of
121
Mission Oriented
117
Research and Development, Overhead Reconnaissance
130
Research, Development versus
119
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25X1A
Revolution, Technological
Page
SAMOS
Scientific Research
Control of
External Contracts
In-House
Key Areas
Level of
Mission Oriented
Second Generation
Security
Counterintelligence
Industrial
Investigations and Operational Support
Personnel
Physical
Polygraph
Protection of Intelligence
Technical
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117
121
121
117
147
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Senior Officer Training
Page
69
29
Clandestine Collection
Strategic Attack
Strategic Base in Research
Support
Communications
Development of Support Executives
71
Medical Views on Planning and Human Resources
68
Objectives
67
Personnel Strength
67
Security
Senior Officer Training
69
Systems Analysis
Need for
Problems
25X1 D T
Technological Revolution
Technology, Impact of
Training
25X1 D
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Training, Clandestine Services
Training, Senior Officer
Travel Folder Program
Twenty-four Hour Current Intelligence
Page
40
69
W
25XA&
War Planning
Warning
Watch Committee
Watch System, CIA
World Situation, Probable
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VII. ANNEXES (Under separate cover)
A. DD/P Long Range Plan
B. DD/I Long Range Plan
C. DD/S&T Long Range Plan
D. Minutes of the Planning Group
E. Working Papers of the Planning Group
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