SEMIANNUAL NSC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW AN ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION VOLUME II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00311R000100280001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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NSC REVIEW COMPLETED, 6/26/03
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SEMIANNUAL NSC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
An Assessment o
National Foreign Intelligence'
Production
Volume 11
ANNEX
Prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff on behalf of the
Director of Central Intelligence for the National Security Council
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/ Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information
Involved
NFIBONLY- NFIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Infor-
motion Controlled by Originator
This Information has been Authorized
for Release to .. .
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SEMIANNUAL REVIEW OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
An Assessment of
National Foreign Intelligence
Production
Volume II
Volume II of the Semiannual Review of Intelligence, An Assessment of
Foreign Intelligence Production, provides supplementary data on the findings
of the IC Staff concerning the timeliness and quality of intelligence pertaining
to those areas and topics specifically examined in this initial Semiannual
Review. The findings are based primarily on the views of policy officials and
staff officers expressed in over 100 interviews conducted in September and
October, 1976. The scope and emphasis developed in these annexes varies
because of time limitation and the availability of interviewees.
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An Assessment of
National Foreign Intelligence
Production
Table of Contents
Page
A The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe .................... 1
B Far East ................................................ 13
C Middle East ............................................. 19
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E Intelligence Support to International Economic Actions
of the US Government ................................. 27
F Requirements for Intelligence Related to Warning, Crisis
and Wartime Operations ................................ 33
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ANNEX A
THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
Intelligence Resources and Products
More intelligence resources are allocated to the
USSR than to any other single country or group
of non-Communist foreign countries. This situa-
tion has not changed significantly in the past 30
years. In addition to the substantial proportion of
total resources devoted to collection and process-
ing (especially imagery and SIGINT), the pro-
duction effort concerned primarily or exclusively
with the USSR dominates the activities of
virtually all components of the Community.
The broad subject area that receives most
attention is Soviet and Warsaw Pact military
capabilities, including matters directly related
thereto such as intelligence support for
SALT/MBFR and military-economic and S&T
analyses. The IC current intelligence effort
emphasizes the impact of external events on US
foreign policy concerns of the moment, with
Soviet behavior receiving much greater attention
than the activities of other nations. Significant
resources are devoted to current reporting on
political, ideological, economic, and non-military
technological developments involving the USSR.
Relatively little attention is paid to non-military
aspects of East European nations.
Users have a general appreciation of the
characteristic emphasis on Soviet matters in the
total US intelligence effort, even though they
may not be familiar with the size and distribu-
tion (by agency, topic, function) of the resources
covered by the NFIP budget. Although some
users believe that more attention should be given
to other geographic areas and/or topics, they do
not fundamentally object to the priority accorded
to Soviet affairs in allocating intelligence r-
-sources.
In considering the quality and timeliness of
intelligence on Soviet and East European mat-
ters, two factors should be noted at the outset.
First, NFIB agencies have acquired a substantial
amount of knowledge about the USSR in the past
quarter century. Policymakers can draw upon a
relatively rich storehouse of information and
expect the Intelligence Community to produce
generally credible estimates and penetrating
analyses. However, user needs have become more
difficult for producers to meet, chiefly because of
the increasing number and complexity of user
demands on intelligence. The appetite for better
intelligence is insatiable, the limitations of
intelligence are not fully or widely appreciated,
and the intelligence producer's wares are often
regarded as "free goods"-indeed, analysts are
not only expected to satisfy users' requirements
promptly, but also to anticipate future needs
which policyrnakers themselves do not clearly
foresee.
The second factor is that US capabilities for
producing intelligence in depth on most aspects
of the Soviet and East European economies are
now largely concentrated in CIA, notably OER
and OSR. Other NFIB agencies (viz. State/INR,
DIA, and Treasury) and such departments as
Commerce and Agriculture have very limited
analytical capabilities in this field. Users are less
dependent upon CIA for intelligence on Soviet
S&T. Although CIA's Offices of Scientific Intelli-
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gence (OSI) and Weapons Intelligence (OWI)
have substantial capabilities, DIA and the
military services devote considerable effort to
intelligence on technology of potential military
significance, and ERDA plays an important role
in assessing Soviet atomic energy activities. For
obvious reasons, the bulk of intelligence resources
available for analyzing Soviet and East European
military capabilities and politico-military topics
is in DOD and CIA.
Soviet and East European Economy,
Technology and Politics
Current Intelligence Support
Most consumers rely heavily on daily cable
traffic, the press, and on CIA (DDO) and NSA
reports as the principal sources of their current
intelligence. Publications like the National Intel-
ligence Daily (NID) serve as another valuable
source of information. Timely classified accounts
of current developments are useful to policy-
makers as aids in keeping up-to-date on events
abroad, whether or not the same events are
reported in the public media; but the value of
this kind of intelligence depends upon the extent
to which the information supplements what is
already known from other sources or corrects
reporting by news services. Frequently users
complain about the lack of follow-up after an
item is no longer in the headlines. This criticism
may reflect, in part, unfamiliarity with other
intelligence publications (e.g., weeklies) which
are more appropriate vehicles for presenting
analyses of current events in a broader perspec-
tive; however, it may also reflect deficiencies in
IC performance-undue emphasis on reporting
new events, insufficient attention to trends and
implications, or failure to produce enough
follow-up reports to satisfy the interests of diverse
consumers.
More specialized periodicals (e.g., Economic
Intelligence Weekly, International Oil Develop-
ments, Weekly Surveyor) are widely circulated
among users concerned with Soviet and East
European affairs Users seem to be satisfied with
them. Such products help to bridge the gap
between cable-gisting, NID reporting, and'daily
oral briefings on the one hand, and in-depth
analyses and comprehensive studies on the other.
In general, users are not dissatisfied with the
timeliness and quality of current intelligence as
such, but they want something more than
accurate and perceptive reporting. There is a
particularly strong user plea, for example, for
more in-depth, integrated politico-economic re-
porting on internal East European matters. The
underlying problem for every NFIP agency, as
well as for the intelligence Community as a
whole, is how to provide users with both good
current intelligence and the ad hoc support,
policy-oriented research, credible estimates, fac-
tual compendia, and imaginative analyses that
users also want. There is probably no satisfactory
solution to this perennial problem as long as IC
resources are, at best, kept constant and policy-
making users themselves articulate no workable
limits on their needs.
Basic Data on the Soviet
Economy and Soviet Technology
As noted earlier, the Intelligence Community's
collective data base on the USSR is now much
richer than it was a decade or two ago. Statistical
and descriptive information on Soviet economic
and technological matters is sometimes analo-
gous to factual data on Western industrial
societies, but a significant portion of the IC data
base consists of estimates and inferences which
are subject to some-often large - uncertainty.
There is nothing unusual about this situation.
Experienced analysts are quite aware of the
difference between genuine facts and well-
founded estimates, as well as the difference
between both these and spongy estimates, dubi-
ous inferences, and plausible guesses. The princi-
pal difficulty is that intelligence producers
seldom detail their analytical assumptions or
indicate the range of uncertainty that applies to
the statistical and descriptive underpinnings of
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their analyses. As a result, users often do not
know how firmly producers know the facts on
which intelligence conclusions and inferences are
based.
Another aspect of the IC data base is worth
mentioning-namely, its effect on the timeliness
and quality of intelligence products produced in
response to user needs. In this instance, timeliness
refers to the promptness of the producers'
responses rather than the speed with which
information on current events is conveyed to
policy officers. Inadequacies in the data base
force the producer either to rely more heavily on
shaky "facts" in his analysis, thus sacrificing
quality in the interest of meeting the user's
deadline, or to take more time for basic research
and/or for making credible estimates, thus
sacrificing timeliness in the interest of producing
a better product. Hence,the extent to which IC
analytical products can be both timely and
qualitatively better depends largely on the
adequacy of the pre-existing data base for the
particular problem being analyzed.
In recent years, the IC has maintained its data
base on the USSR, Eastern Europe, and other
Communist countries chiefly as an adjunct to the
production of analytical reports on specific topics
(e.g., the typical OER, OSR, or OSI efforts
mentioned above). However, the reduction in
OER re urces allocated to Soviet economic
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the transfer of senior researc ers to other priority
areas have contributed to a general reduction of
systematic, basic work on the Soviet economy.
Whether there should be a comprehensive effort
to produce more basic economic intelligence is a
complicated question, especially since it would
put a heavy burden on IC resources and would
require very careful planning. Pending further
inquiry, we can only note that the present IC
data base is evidently adequate for some pur-
poses and inadequate for others
An example of the former situation is the
briefing material on the economies of Poland,
Romania, and Yugoslavia prepared by OER for
Treasury Secretary Simon's trip in June 1976.
These materials were an essential contribution to
the briefing books compiled by the Treasury
staff, which were an outstanding success. They
drew upon the intelligence data base, exclusive of
compartmented information. While they could
have been better if compartmented material had
been included, this material was excluded be-
cause of the lack of special intelligence clearances
in the Treasury offices that developed the
briefing books. This is an instance of how
classification and clearance problems adversely
affect the adequacy of the Community's prod-
ucts in satisfying the needs of policy officers. As a
general rule, however, the Community performs
well in responding to user requests for collations
of factual material.
In contrast, some users feel that the IC data
base on Soviet industry is still inadequate to
support the more detailed requirements of mili-
tary planners-e.g., targeting of US strategic
forces. Despite recent dramatic improvements in
DOD's processing and analysis of information
regarding Soviet industry, there remain gaps in
our knowledge of the location and identification
of industrial installations in the USSR. This
cient, detailed information also affects how we
intelligence serves other users. For example, gaps
in available data on non-military sectors of the
Soviet economy, particularly the interaction
between civilian facilities and military
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establishments, hamper analysis of the impact of
Soviet acquisition of Western technology. This
weakness in turn affects export control policy.
Intelligence on Technology Transfer
Policymakers are generally satisfied with much
of the research and analysis done by the
Community (notably OER, OSR, and OSI) on
various sectors of the Soviet economy and on
specific areas of technology. This impression
applies chiefly to analytical reports of limited
scope and less to studies of the interrelationships
of industrial sectors or multi-disciplinary assess-
ments of the political, economic, and military
impact of technology transfer. While consider-
able work has been done on input-output
analyses of the Soviet economy, more is needed
before the economic impact of new technology
(including new products and know-how obtained
from the West) can be confidently assessed.
Similarly, the IC has produced some broad-
gauged estimates that deal with the political,
economic, military, and social implications of
current or prospective developments in the USSR
(SNIE 11-6-76, Implications of the 1975 Soviet
Grain Harvest, is a recent example) but more
needs to be done to provide policymakers with
the kind of sophisticated intelligence support
they desire.
The PFIAB has mentioned this deficiency in
IC performance; in particular, it has stressed the
need for a comprehensive and integrated analysis
of technology transfer to the USSR. Three steps
are being taken toward meeting this requirement.
First, several case studies of individual industries
are being prepared to shed further light on the
impact of technology transfer on Soviet produc-
tion of machine tools, computers, instruments,
and construction and petroleum equipment.
Second, additional studies of the military impact
of technology transfer are underway. Third, a
major interagency reexamination of the Soviet
economy is planned. It will take account of the
larger defense burden implied by the revised
estimates of Soviet military expenditures, effects
on the total capital stock and labor force,
implications for future economic growth, and the
possibility of policy conflicts within the Soviet
leadership regarding resource allocations. It is
expected that these efforts will provide a frame-
work for undertaking a more comprehensive
study of technology transfer issues in 1977-78.
Intelligence on Military Economics
Soviet military economics is another area of
growing concern to policymakers and military
planners. The principal topics of interest to users
are: (1) the composition of Soviet defense
spending by military service (SRF, PVO, etc.)
and by resource category (RDT&E, procurement,
construction, personnel and 0 & M) as well as the
impact of these activities on the economy; (2)
comparative analysis of the aggregate military
outlays of the US and the dollar costs of USSR
military programs and activities in total and by
military mission and resource category; (3)
changes in these ruble and dollar aggregates over
time, together with future projections; (4) cost
effectiveness and detailed cost analyses of
selected Soviet weapon systems; and (5) cost
analyses of civil defense and other programs
designed to enhance post-attack national sur-
vival. Intelligence on these topics plays an
important role in estimating current and future
Soviet capabilities for waging war and in
preparing net assessments. Indirectly, it may also
shed light on Soviet policies and behavior outside
the military sphere since economic growth,
consumption, and investment are affected by the
size of the USSR's defense expenditures.
The IC's underlying research task in this area is
to determine the cost of the items included in
whatever military expenditure totals are
needed-e.g., totals that are intended to be all-
inclusive and those that are more restricted in
scope, figures in rubles and in dollars, and
statistics for one year or for several years. While
some reliable data are available, most of the
building blocks in this vast costing effort must be
estimated. There are difficult conceptual and
methodological problems at virtually every stage
of aggregation, and these problems are exacer-
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bated in constructing the time series and US-
USSR comparisons wanted by users.
The Intelligence Community has grappled
with these problems for many years. Since April
1973 the primary effort in the Community (viz.
research done by OSR) has been guided by
periodic reviews by the DCI's Military Economic
Advisory Panel (MEAP). Among other things,
MEAP has recommended that (1) the present
building block method of estimating Soviet
military expenditures should be continued, but
that alternative approaches should be explored;
(2) thorough documentation of all the inputs to
the direct costing work should be undertaken; (3)
greater efforts should be made to prevent misuse
of comparisons of US and USSR military
expenditure in dollars; and (4) a coordinated
agency-wide effort should be made to improve
our knowledge and estimates of Soviet R&D
programs and their resources. * Improvements in
dollar cost factors and in ruble price estimates are
being realized more or less continuously. They
will be reflected in revised OSR reports on Soviet
military expenditures in 1977, as well as in
several specialized OSR studies planned in
response to requests from the OSD Director of
Net Assessment.
Intelligence Support to
SALT and MBFR
In the view of most users, the Community does
an excellent job in supporting both SALT and
MBFR negotiations. Current intelligence report-
ing on these matters has been timely and of high
quality, and has been supplemented by rapid,
thorough responses to specific ad hoc requests for
information. The more detailed inputs to
SALT/MBFR policy papers are also well re-
ceived. The principal intelligence product used
by SALT's Standing Consultative Commission-
the periodic Monitoring Report-has been re-
markably consistent with Soviet-supplied infor-
mation, and has thus been an invaluable
negotiating tool. In MBFR, significant progress
* See MEAP, Second Annual Report to the Deputy Director for
Intelligence (22 January 1976), for further details.
has been made over the past three years in
developing agreed, credible Soviet/Warsaw Pact
force-level estimates in the NATO Guidelines
Area. Both SALT and MBFR processes have also
profited considerably from the substantial work
done by the Community in assessing near-term
national verification /monitoring capabilities and
problems.
The Community's notable success in support-
ing SALT/MBFR seems largely explained by the
fact that (1) user requirements have been clearly
defined and of relatively narrow scope, (2) the
user-producer dialogue has been close and
continuing, and (3) considerable collection and
analytical resources have been allocated to these
high-priority negotiating processes.
Nonetheless, certain users call for more longer-
range analyses related to SALT and MBFR,
particularly all-source studies of Soviet negotiat-
ing strategy and tactics and projections of future
verification capabilities as they pertain to US
arms control strategy in the 1980s. Such Commu-
nity undertakings have been impeded by both a
lack of sufficient analytical resources and major
uncertainties about the future course of the
negotiations.
A more pressing problem expressed by some
users concerns the Community's treatment of
uncertainty and dissent in its reporting on
Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces. For SALT negotia-
tors, for example, the questions surrounding
Backfire bomber performance have been of
extreme importance, but pose a dilemma. On the
one hand, the earliest possible notification of
changing Community views and emerging differ-
ences in this regard could enhance negotiating
flexibility. On the other hand, early notification
of preliminary reanalysis could create problems
for policymakers and negotiators who are left
with ambiguous intelligence or, even worse, with
lingering doubts over previously accepted posi-
tions derived primarily from intelligence. Such
uncertainty and revision is inherent in intelli-
gence, however, and users should be educated to
expect and tolerate it.
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The Community's handling of uncertainty is
also an increasingly important aspect of the data
base requirements for MBFR. With the Soviet's
June 1976 tabling of data on Pact forces which
were well below Western estimates, the confi-
dence of the US (and NATO) Intelligence
Community in its current estimates of Pact force
levels will be put to a severe test and will require
thorough exploration. The full, clear communi-
cation to MBFR negotiators and the Verification
Panel Working Group of the nature and sources
of our data base uncertainties-subaggregated to
the division/regiment level wherever feasible-is
perceived as a priority requirement for the
Community. *
The extent to which the West can fully exploit
the MBFR negotiating opportunities occasioned
by the Soviet's recent tabling of data will, of
course, also depend on the ability of the
Community to mobilize its resources toward
strengthening the informational and analytical
bases for its estimates of Eastern force levels in
the reductions area. Hence, users urge that
increased emphasis be placed on:
? Clandestine collection programs in Eastern
Europe.
? Data exploitation/analysis by NPIC and
NSA.
? Development of improved analytical meth-
odologies for order of battle problems.
? Full and timely analytical coordination of
emigre/defector and satellite-derived intelli-
gence.
* In this regard, however, corresponding efforts are being made
to persuade MBFR policymakers and negotiators that (1) the
discrepancies between Western estimates and the East's tabled
numbers probably result chiefly from different counting rules, not
intelligence error, and (2) the nature of the process for estimating
the manpower of conventional forces may preclude computation of
the sort of mathematical uncertainty statements for which the
consumers have asked.
Finally, it has been noted that CIA personnel
have traditionally served as the DCI's representa-
tive on Verification Panel Working Groups. This
has led to the suggestion that consideration be
given to expanding the membership to include a
DIA representative, rotating these assignments
between CIA and DIA personnel, or designating
an appropriate NIO to be the Community's
spokesman.
Soviet and Warsaw Pact Military
Capabilities
Current Products
Most Washington area consumers are satisfied
that the Community is doing an excellent job in
covering those traditional topics which are
comparatively easy to analyze and/or which
have enjoyed high visibility with policymakers
(e.g., strategic forces order of battle and number
of Soviet divisions). Indeed, the Community
continues to make significant progress in its
descriptions of overall Soviet/Warsaw Pact stra-
tegic and general purpose forces, weapons,
strengths, organizations, and dispositions.* Con-
sumers are also generally pleased with the
Community's ability to respond to specific, ad
hoc requests for information on these subjects
with timely, high-quality intelligence; to support
major continuing negotiations such as SALT and
MBFR; and to report on headline-worthy
changes in Soviet/Pact order of battle and
equipment.
New Analytical Demands
Paradoxically, critical comments from users
reflect these successes of the Community. Intelli-
gence is increasingly expected to go beyond the
quantitative measures of the past to the more
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difficult qualitative measures now perceived to
be nearer the heart of force effectiveness assess-
ments. The need for enhanced analytical sophis-
tication in treating Soviet/Pact military matters
is the logical outgrowth of the constantly
increasing sophistication of Soviet forces per se,
as well as Soviet/Pact progress toward achieving
strategic/conventional force parity with the
West. As a result, users want to see more
reporting on such diverse issues as training,
logistics, maintenance, and command, control,
and communications. Also, the demand has
increased markedly for analyses of Soviet/Pact
strategy, tactical doctrine, and concepts of
operation, and for integrative assessments of
overall Soviet/Pact warmaking potential and
their ability to project military power to distant
areas. These demands will assuredly increase in
the future. The recently completed Interagency
Intelligence Memorandum, Trends in Soviet
Military Programs, represents one attempt to
address certain aspects of the requirement for a
comprehensive analysis of these areas. The
difficulties encountered in this undertaking are
briefly outlined in pages 10 and 11 below.*
* This user demand for more sophisticated integrative analyses of
Soviet/Pact capabilities for waging war-analyses which involve
combining quantitative and qualitative data over a broad spectrum
of political, military, economic, scientific, and technological
concerns-is also frequently accompanied by a criticism of the IC in
general (but of S&T components in particular) that the Community
does not fully exploit the available expertise. Some major users feel
the IC tends to consult only within itself or with contractors well
known to it and with whom the IC feels "comfortable." Too much
ignored are the knowledge and special competence which reside in
government laboratories and in the operations staffs of the military
services. As a result, IC products often appear to some users to be
shallow (e.g., technical products on pulse power technology, Soviet
ultra-low frequency wave research and development, and general
East-West technology transfer issues).
The competitive analysis approach to NIE 11-3/8-76 (see page 9
below) is one response to this kind of criticism. Additionally, DOD's
DDR&E is prepared to lend material assistance to a program of
personnel exchanges between the IC and various laboratories to
increase the flow of communication between the military R&D
community and the IC. Certain elements of DIA and CIA are also
striving to develop a mutually beneficial relationship with the US
Army's Training and Doctrine Command to identify and fill gaps in
knowledge on both sides and to better identify the needs of major
intelligence users. Similar undertakings by other elements of
government should be encouraged.
Resource Allocation Problems
Such requirements for newer types of sophisti-
cated analyses are straining the Community's
capacity to redirect scarce analytical talent while,
at the same time, continuing to deliver a high
volume of good analysis of the traditional style
which is still in demand.
The Community's experience with MBFR is
instructive in this regard. The high-intensity
efforts to develop data bases for these negotia-
tions have had the attendant impact of siphoning
off Community resources from other significant
analytical/production matters, such as the more
qualitative, non-MBFR aspects of Warsaw Pact
forces, which are important for net assessments.
For example, from the time MBFR negotiations
began in earnest in 1972 until early 1976,
CIA/OSR's Theatre Forces Division was prevent-
ed from carrying through its research program on
trends in Soviet military doctrine and force
development, primarily because of the concen-
tration of its limited pool of analysts on MBFR
support. This illustrates the clear need to
establish a fuller understanding between users
and producers of the resource trade-offs required
to meet national-level priorities for intelligence
on Soviet/Pact military capabilities.
The Warsaw Pact NIE
Related to the foregoing, the user-producer
debate which followed the publication of NIE
11-14-75, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO,
4 September 1975, has had the salutary effect of
achieving better understanding of basic user
needs for general purpose forces intelligence. *
The debate has also served to illuminate several
significant issues regarding the NIE process that
seeks to address these needs.
The criticisms of NIE 11-14-75 were in four
general categories:
? Scope and Format. Some users at the NSC
Staff, State, and OSD believed that 11-14-75
* For a detailed treatment of the 11-14-75 debate, including a
summary of the producers' responses to the user criticisms noted
below, see Review of National Intelligence, Vol. 2, No. 1, August
1976, TOP SECRET/SI/NOFORN, TCS 890158-76.
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was too narrow in scope and lacked ade-
quate documentary detail. On the other
hand, some users in OJCS and OMB were
favorably impressed by the brevity and
compactness of the estimate.
? Omission. Some users felt that 11-14-75
failed to come to grips with a number of
major issues, either avoiding them complete-
ly or "papering" them over.
? Evidence and Supporting Rationale. Some
high-level users thought that 11-14-75 of-
fered inadequate rationale and evidence in
support of its analyses and judgments.
? Uncertainties and Data Limitations. Critics
contended that 11-14-75 failed to consider
fully the inherent uncertainties in the analy-
sis of data on Soviet exercises.
Nevertheless, there is widespread user recogni-
tion that this NIE has had a significant impact
on our understanding of Soviet concepts for the
initial employment of Pact forces and the timing
of reinforcements from the USSR. The NIE has
also directly affected DOD force planning and
programming deliberations regarding NATO's
posture and concepts of operation.
Several insights and suggestions were generated
by the NIE 11-14-75 experience which have
potential benefits to both users and producers of
major national military intelligence estimates.
First, users vary so much in both their needs for,
and access to, intelligence that no single NIE
format can satisfy them all. Nonetheless, greater
effort might be made to involve major users more
directly in at least the Terms of Reference stage
of an estimate's development. Further, a bibliog-
raphy of major contributing sources of intelli-
gence might be annexed to assist users inclined to
do additional reading. Another aid to enhancing
the usefulness of NIEs would be a summary
keyed to paragraph numbers to make the
contents of the estimate more accessible, and a
summary of the main trends of the estimate to
highlight the new or most significant findings of
the paper. Finally, once the estimate had been
published, its producers could form a briefing
team whose task would be to inform a wider
audience of the main points of the estimate and
answer questions directly. Giving the briefing
team exposure to user concerns and questions
would be a significant side benefit.
Net Assessments and Net Technical
Assessments
Senior officials were almost unanimous in
seeing a need for more national (vice depart-
mental) net assessments-particularly assess-
ments of such critical, complex matters as the
US-USSR strategic and naval balances and the
NATO/Pact central front balance-as a means
of gaining perspective on Soviet/Pact military
capabilities and clarifying the options available
to the US and the consequences of certain
choices. There is, however, much more diversity
of opinion as to the feasibility of "netting" these
major force balances, who should do it, and how
it should be done. Users and producers generally
agree that the IC should not be the primary net
assessor. The IC should certainly supply the
"Red" data. The DOD should supply the "Blue"
data, and some think a DOD agency should do
the actual assessment. However, most consumers
and producers consulted believe the US would be
best served with the least possibility of bias by an
independent interagency group established for
the purpose, including IC, OSD and/or JCS
representatives.
With regard to net technical assessments-
weapon system interaction analyses such as
Soviet ICBM capabilities to destroy Minuteman
silos-it is generally agreed that the Commu-
nity has an increasingly important responsibility
to perform these assessments and explore ways to
improve the attendant analytical methodologies
and techniques.
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The Competitive Analysis Experiment for
NIE 11-3/8-76 (Soviet Forces for Inter-
continental Conflict Through the
Mid-1980s)
At the recommendation of the PFIAB, the
Community is currently engaged in a substantial
effort to develop competing analyses of three
significant issues pertaining to NIE 11-3/8-76:
Soviet ICBM accuracy, Soviet low-altitude air
defense effectiveness, and Soviet strategic policy
and objectives. While the concept of the experi-
ment has been generally well received by users, it
is not yet possible to determine the extent to
which it will yield valuable new insights on the
major issues it is addressing, or whether this
approach should be applied to other military
estimates in the future. Both the A team (inside
Community) and B team (outside Comunity)
were scheduled to complete their drafts in
November 1976. In any event, the Community's
administrative, financial, security, and intelli-
gence support to the B team of outside experts
has been outstanding.
The competitive analysis experiment has suc-
ceeded so well thus far because it has had heavy
support from the top levels of the IC. If the
results of this experiment justify further efforts
along these lines, it will require much closer and
earlier attention to administrative and bureau-
cratic details. Moreover, a conscious effort will be
required to prevent the quality of future B teams
or their analyses from falling off once the glamor
of the experiment has diminished.
The Soviet Backfire Bomber
The widely publicized controversy regarding
the Backfire bomber that has raged both inside
and outside the Community over the past few
years has been of considerable concern to major
users. It has been cited as a specific example of
the more general problem wherein the various IC
agency positions on an issue often become "set in
concrete" too early-before all data can be
collected and analyzed-with a resultant inflexi-
bility that can complicate the national policy-
making process. In this case, the Backfire
controversy may mean that major US policy
decisions (e.g., those in relation to SALT) will
have to be made without benefit of an agreed,
high-confidence Community assessment of the
bomber's performance and mission. There is no
way to preclude in all cases seemingly disruptive
argument over vital but uncertain intelligence
issues that relate directly to contentious policy
issues. Suppression of argument would surely be
unacceptable. But cases such as the Backfire
indicate the desirability of
? Identifying potentially controversial issues
before they become highly "politicized,"
and
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? Developing agreed Community collection
and analytic strategies for minimizing uncer-
tainties and clarifying disagreements.
Broad Trends in Soviet Political-
Economic-Military Strategy
There has been no National Intelligence
Estimate on overall Soviet strategy since 1972.
Prior to that time, the United States Intelligence
Board made at least an annual effort to prepare
an estimate on Soviet objectives and strategies.
This effort often was accompanied closely by an
estimate of Soviet military goals, which
attempted to provide an understanding of the
interaction between Soviet national and military
strategies. With the demise of the Office of
National Estimates, the creation of the NIO
system, and a general trend toward IC resource
economy after 1972, the IC moved away in large
measure from the annual NIE on Soviet objec-
tives and strategy. The estimative focus became
narrower as the IC generally attempted to
provide shorter, crisper analyses of greater poten-
tial use to national decisionmakers.
Since 1972 the IC has undertaken several
assessments which touch on the broad topic of
Soviet policies and often are cited as substitutes
for a definitive NIE on Soviet policies and
strategies:
? National Intelligence Analytical Memoran-
dum 11-9-74, Soviet Detente Policy, 23 May
1974, is generally seen as an adequate
treatment of the evolution of the USSR's
detente policy and its durability as a broad
framework for Soviet international behavior.
NIAM 11-9-74, however, is often criticized
for failing to attempt a detailed analysis of
detente's impact on the USSR's major
foreign policies.
? NIE 11-5-75, The Soviet Assessment of the
US, 9 October 1975, was an examination of
the Soviet assessment of US strengths and
weaknesses as they affect the international
"correlation of forces" and US attitudes
toward the USSR in the context of detente.
Neither NIAM 11-9-74 nor NIE 11-5-75 was
intended to be a comprehensive assessment of
broad trends in Soviet strategy, although users
often have tried to use both products in the
broader context. Fed by dramatic domestic and
international developments, the growing desire,
particularly within DOD, for an "old-style"
National Estimate on Soviet objectives and
strategies surfaced at the highest levels of the IC
earlier this year.
In February 1976, the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, US Army, formally requested
that the national intelligence estimative commu-
nity take an up-to-date look at Soviet long-range
objectives and the role of military policy in
support of Soviet goals. In April 1976 the
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
expressed his concern over the lack of an NIE on
the full range of Soviet military capabilities. He
requested that such an estimate be undertaken
annually. The IC attempted to satisfy both DOD
requests by preparing a single estimate, NIE 11-
4-76: Trends in Soviet Military Policy and
Programs. This estimate was to focus on Soviet
military policy and deal with ideological, politi-
cal, economic, and other factors as they related
thereto.
It became apparent early in the formulation of
this estimate that there were at least two different
views of what it should be:
? A summary of key judgments and quantita-
tive data from other estimates of Soviet
military capabilities (11-3/8, 11-14, 11-15,
etc.).
? The above, plus an analysis of Soviet
military strategy vis-a-vis the US, particu-
larly whether the USSR is attempting to gain
`military superiority."
The IC's effort stalled in institutional haggling
and substantive debate over the need for an
analysis of Soviet objectives. The NFIB finally
decided:
? To eliminate from the paper any overall
assessment of Soviet national goals.
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? To publish the paper as an IIM.
? To defer until after completion of NIE 11-
3/8-76 the publishing of an estimate of
Soviet national goals and the role of military
power in achieving these goals.
In order to meet the requirements of NSSM 246,
this new NIE 11-4-76 was subsequently re-
scheduled and will be issued in mid-December
1976.
An additional consideration in this regard is
that there are sharply divergent consumer views
on the national need for such broad assessments
of trends in Soviet political-economic-military
strategy. Some high-level users, primarily within
the NSC Staff and State Department, see no
compelling requirement for such a product.
These users tend to view this sort of broad
assessment as estimative intelligence in the
"brandy and cigars" mold, contributing little
beyond the insights available from academic and
open source research or from the users' own range
of personal expertise. Other high-level intelli-
gence users, primarily within the Defense Depart-
ment, argue that domestic and international
developments since 1972 urgently dictate a new
definitive estimate on trends in Soviet strategies
and that it should include an assessment of the
impact of these trends on US interests and
objectives.
Beyond the issue of the national need for
assessments of broad trends in Soviet political-
economic-military strategy, the question of how
such analyses should be done also must be
addressed by high-level decisionmakers. As in the
debate over the conduct of national net assess-
ments, there is disagreement over whether these
efforts should be undertaken solely by the IC or
by an interagency group more capable of
examining the US policy implications of the
assessment.
IC Anticipation of User Needs
A frequent criticism voiced by users of intelli-
gence on the USSR/Eastern Europe is that the
Community should do a better job of anticipat-
ing user requirements in this area. While ac-
knowledging the difficulties of satisfactorily
responding to such a wide consumer audience
with such disparate (and inadequately communi-
cated) informational needs, users express some
concern over what they perceive to be a too-
passive role being played by elements of the
Community.
As an example, the question was asked why
SNIE 11-6-76, Implications of the 1975 Soviet
Grain Harvest, had to be initiated by a request
from the NSC. Further, there is the feeling that
the Community was somewhat deficient in
anticipating that Soviet civil defense would
become a major analytical issue by the end of
1975. Note was also taken of the developing need
to study the Soviet SS-X-16 and SS-X-20 missile
programs to determine what impact the similar-
ity of these two systems might have on the Soviet
ability to deceive the US concerning the deploy-
ment and capabilities of these missiles.
Clearly, IC agencies, singly or through various
coordination mechanisms, have a responsibility
to anticipate such specific user needs and more
generally attempt to predict Soviet actions in
contingencies and crisis situations which may
arise. A corollary to this, however, is that the
needs, contingencies or potential crises must be
defined with reasonable care, and there must be
sufficient time to do the requisite analysis. These
two desiderata depend primarily on the attitude,
perceptiveness, and skill of users. While produc-
ers can hypothesize numerous contingencies and
user needs, the range of possibilities must be
limited by the user to avoid wasting analytical
resources. Further, insofar as possible, users must
prioritize their needs, indicate what contingen-
cies they are really worried about, and recognize
the inherent limitations of intelligence in answer-
ing their questions.
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ANNEX B
General
For intelligence purposes, most of East Asia
does not receive the high priority associated with
other areas such as the Soviet Union and Warsaw
Pact. Nevertheless, high level users generally
agree that intelligence reporting and analysis on
East Asia has been adequate given the nature of
the collection problem in such closed societies as
Pyongyang and Peking. Most users recognize the
difficulty of obtaining good, reliable information
on Chinese affairs and the corresponding weak-
ness in the Community's ability to cover PRC
domestic political developments. Users encourage
the Community to continue working on the
problem and also express a need for greater
collection and analytical effort on North Korea
and Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam.
Intelligence Community resources have under-
standably shifted away from Vietnam, and the
result is a drought of information on Hanoi's
international intentions, likely courses of action,
and future negotiating strategies. State Depart-
ment users and the NSC Staff believe that such
political intelligence reporting and analysis will
be of considerable interest when and if the US
chooses to adjust its Vietnam policy. Such studies
probably will require improved information. All
users perceive a need for much more information
and analysis on North Korea's foreign policy,
intentions toward South Korea, and internal
political developments.
Minor areas of user dissatisfaction in this area
include: disappointment in the reporting related
to US negotiations for base rights with Thailand
(inaccurate data) and the Philippines (paucity of
information collected on Manila's intentions
related to US base rights), and the IC's slowness
in assessing the implications of some current
events such as the likely political impact of the
PRC military
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early summer of 1976. With respect to the US
On foreign policy matters, users give highest
marks to State Department cables and CIA
clandestine reports. Most higher-level users indi-
cate that they rely more heavily on raw political
reports related to East Asia than on finished
current intelligence or research studies. Covert
Users also note a troublesome lag between the
time that a development, such as the fall of PRC
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, was treated in
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current intelligence publications and the time
that in-depth analytical work appeared on the
same subject. Some characterize this problem as
the "OCI-OPR gap."
Major Regional Issues
North Korea-South Korea
The areas of priority interest concerning the
Koreas are (1) North Korean internal political
developments and foreign policy, and (2) the
military balance and possibility of hostilities. The
first concern is primarily a high-priority interest
for State Department officials and the NSC Staff,
while the military balance issue understandably
is of particularly high interest to the Department
of Defense.
In general, users are less than satisfied with
both the intelligence reporting and analysis on
North Korean domestic political developments,
diplomatic strategies, and international inten-
tions. Users profess to appreciate the difficulties
posed by the collection environment in North
Korea; nevertheless, they believe that the Com-
munity still has more to do in "pulling all the
pieces together" in analyzing intelligence infor-
mation on North Korea. Of all the East Asian
requirements, this is the one in which users feel
that more money and effort should be allocated
for collection and analysis. Of particular impor-
tance is the acquisition of a few key North
Korean intelligence experts of a quality as high as
some of the China and Soviet specialists. A
thorough and definitive assessment of North
Korea's foreign policy and activities is needed by
all users, with special focus on all the different
actors in Pyongyang-with their various institu-
tional perspectives. Treasury officials note the
need for more analysis of resource allocation in
North Korea and for more study of the economic
limitations imposed on major programs.
Users are more satisfied with the coverage of
North Korean military capabilities than with the
coverage of political and military developments.
The military balance issue, as well as the
indications and warning problem, have been the
focus of the Community's effort on Korea.
Important Community contributions noted by
several users included a memorandum on North
Korean military developments, a DIA net assess-
ment on the Korean military balance, and a
USIB study group's report on Korean indications
and warning.*
There was mixed reaction to the value of the
DIA net assessment. It was useful for providing a
comprehensive data base and answering a long-
standing need for a Korean military factbook. It
has been criticized for being a compilation of
data with little or no insight and for failing to
provide a real net assessment, merely listing
relative strengths and weaknesses. In fairness to
DIA, the study's shortcomings probably resulted
from so many subjects having to be treated in a
short period of time. The other two assessments
were well received and served to highlight North
Korean military developments and the difficulty
of warning against a North Korean surprise
military attack.
Assessments of intelligence support during the
Panmunjom incident during August 1976 varied
from adequate to excellent. NSC Staff and DOD
users, however, were concerned about the Com-
munity's differing assessments as to whether the
North Korean attack on the UN officers was
deliberate. A national task force was established
to produce National Intelligence Situation Re-
ports during this crisis, and NSC Staff and other
users were generally satisfied with these reports.
One of the recurring problems encountered by
the IC and the national task force during the
Panmunjom incident was the poor flow of State
Department and Joint Staff (DOD) information
into intelligence channels. Both were reluctant to
release information which was regarded privi-
leged-information which had been available
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only to the President or his designated representa-
tives. Some DOD users at the JCS level believed
that the Community could have done a better
job in determining whether the North Koreans
were dropping, increasing, or holding their
readiness posture.
Several users indicate that intelligence report-
ing on South Korea has improved within the past
year but that emphasis on collection and analysis
needs some modification. Users note that collec-
tion has increased somewhat, but analytical
results have not yet surfaced. There is an
abundance of information on the human rights
issue, What should be of analytic concern is
South Korea's morale-civilian and military. A
modest beginning was a DIA Intelligence Ap-
praisal on army morale.* On the other hand,
users consistently cite technical reporting and
analyses as being good, with data on South
Korea's nuclear intentions and its missile pro-
grams being particularly useful.
In sum, there is more the Community can do
in anticipation of users' needs. Meaningful
improvement, however, will be dependent on
breakthroughs on collecting intelligence against
North Korea. Increased analytical efforts should
be considered on political, military, and eco-
nomic developments in North Korea and their
affect on domestic and foreign policy. Users feel
that reporting on North Korea's military should
continue to enjoy high priority, with a closer look
given to trends and developments, intentions
toward South Korea, and what Pyongyang's
strategies are likely to be in achieving its
objectives. Of potential interest is the impact of
possible US force posture changes in South
Korea-what they would mean for the military
balance, for foreign and domestic Korean policy,
for proliferation of nuclear weapons in Northeast
Asia, and for key nations in East Asia. On South
Korea, additional reporting on major groups
(such as military leadership) and an assessment
* DIA Intelligence Armraisal- Korea Army Morale,
18 August 1975,
on South Korea's national morale would be
extremely helpful to many policymakers.
China and Taiwan
The priority interests concerning China are the
stability of the post-Mao succession, PRC inten-
tions toward Taiwan, and the attitude of Peking
toward Moscow and Washington since Mao's
death.
Most users rate the intelligence reporting and
analysis on the power struggle in Peking as good
given the nature of the problem. Despite
reporting on a power struggle in China and on
veiled attacks against Teng Hsiao-ping and Chou
En-lai, users and intelligence analysts were
was judged good, providing comprehensive and
informative "after-the-fact" studies.
The inability of the IC to foresee such an event
as the fall of Teng Hsiao-ping is a common
criticism of the Community. However, many
senior-level users (e.g., NSC Staff and Country
Directors at the Department of State), who
understand the limitations of intelligence, are not
especially critical. This, however, does not lessen
their desire for timely and quality intelligence
reporting on such difficult targets as the closed
societies in China and North Korea.
In sum, users judge intelligence reporting on
internal Chinese developments as generally satis-
factory. Users believe there are enough China
analysts, and they do not believe additional
analytical resources would improve the product.
The need is for better sources of information and
a carefully focused analytical effort on the
critical political, economic, and technical devel-
opments in the post-Mao era. Several users feel
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that the role of the military has not yet been
adequately addressed, and they cite an urgent
need to differentiate among military leaders to
better understand how individuals may line up.
(The IC has, however, recently published NIE
13-3-76, PRC Defense Policy and Armed Forces,
which addresses the role of the military in
politics.)
The question of PRC intentions toward
Taiwan, is still of high concern. A particularly
noteworthy Interagency Intelligence Memoran-
dum, PRC Military Options in the East and
South China Seas, dated December 1975, ad-
dressed this problem and provided an assessment
in advance of the unusual PRC military exercise
activity across from Taiwan during the early
summer of 1976. Several users (NSC Staff, State,
DOD) criticized the Community for not provid-
ing a timely assessment during the early stages of
those exercises as to whether they were exercises,
war preparations, or a "signal" involving
Taiwan. (However, it should be noted that the
data base was "soft" and to have adopted a
definitive interpretation would have ignored the
ambiguities.) Once the Community focused on
the PRC military activity, users noted that the
reporting improved and indicated that some of
the most comprehensive and best analysis came
from DIA. Users report that they still do not have
a thorough appreciation of what took place, but
the Community has followed up with another
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, The Im-
plications of the Recent PRC Military Activity in
the Taiwan Strait Area, which assesses the
meaning of the exercises in terms of PRC
intentions toward Taiwan.
Intelligence reporting and assessments on the
prospects for, impact and meaning of, Taiwan's
development of nuclear weapons and procure-
ment of advanced non-nuclear weapons from the
West is considered good by most users. They note
this information was helpful in supporting their
decision-making responsibilities.
Vietnam
Vietnam is still a priority issue for those who
will have to determine policy and negotiate with
Hanoi on economic issues and normalization of
relations. In the aftermath of the fall of Saigon,
intelligence resources probably were shifted away
too quickly with the result being little reporting
and analysis on Hanoi's goals in both Indochina
and the East Asia region. But policymakers have
expressed a growing need for a better grasp of
Hanoi's domestic and foreign policies that would
affect US interests in Southeast Asia and negotia-
tion strategies. This analytic need cannot be
filled with the present collection posture, and the
Community's resources devoted to Southeast Asia
may have to be reassessed to satisfy these
anticipated user requirements.
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The Community tends to examine problems in
East Asia on a country-by-country basis. Several
users (NSC Staff, State, and DOD) have cited the
need for a "regional" look, especially in the
economic and security fields. Key questions
which they believe would be useful research
topics include: How do the economies of East
Asian nations interact? How will Southeast Asia
developments affect US interests? How are US
interests affected by Northeast Asian develop-
ments? What is the meanin of Soviet force
developments in Asia? I
affect US policy interests?
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ANNEX C
MIDDLE EAST
General Comments
Of utmost importance in recent years has been
the need to focus intelligence efforts in the
Middle East: first, on issues related to a peace
settlement, giving major emphasis to the politico-
military dimensions of the complex Arab-Israeli
equation; second, on threats, both internal and
external, to the political stability of key countries
there; and third, on the activities of major oil
exporters, especially as they pertain to US
international economic policy decisions and
negotiations. The purpose of this focus was an
attempt to provide policymakers with reliable,
timely, and comprehensive information and
assessments on political and security situations or
crises significantly affecting US interests or
requiring US action.
Users generally agree that intelligence support
on the Middle East covers most issues in a
meaningful and effective manner and is received
on a timely basis. This support has improved
noticeably since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war,
providing the policymaker with intelligence
information and finished intelligence generally
responsive to his wide-ranging needs. Despite
overall user satisfaction with the Community's
performance, several problems have been identi-
fied which, if effectively addressed, would
significantly improve this performance: the need
for a better dialogue between user and producer,
the excessive volume of current intelligence, and
the need for more in-depth analyses.
Most users believe that the focus and relevance
of the intelligence output to policy could be
sharpened appreciably by improving contacts
and the dialogue between policymakers and the
IC.
Intelligence information and current intelli-
gence reporting concerning the Middle East is
more than ample-even voluminous. It covers
the gamut of political, military, and economic
subjects and generally is received in a timely
fashion. Coverage of the fast-moving and com-
plex Lebanon crisis has been rated especially
effective. However, a number of users believe
that the plethora of reports cannot be properly
digested. Others believe that disproportions exist
in current intelligence: (a) excessive reliance on
official rather than unofficial sources 25X6
raising the possibility that the 25X6
US is getting a distorted or partial view of long-
term developments; and (b) the tendency of field
reporting to focus on the Arab-Israeli confronta-
tion, at some expense to reporting on North
Africa and much of the Persian Gulf.
Most users believe that the data base, despite
gaps, is considerable and that there is a need for
integrated, in-depth analyses by the field (includ-
ing US diplomatic missions) and the Community
itself. Users express varied views as to the desired
format and content of such reporting: (a) trend
reports on a quarterly or some other periodic
basis, especially of fast-moving or highly complex
developments; (b) background papers; (c) issue-
oriented short-term and long-term analyses,
especially of political and economic questions;
and (d) NIEs and other interagency studies of a
broad scope.
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Interface with the Intelligence
Community
User evaluations of their interface with ele-
ments of the IC vary considerably-from fre-
quent contacts to none. Users generally assess
their relationships with the intelligence elements
within their own agencies as good to excellent.
Some users stated that the direct interface with
other elements of the Community is limited or
nonexistent. Many users have direct contacts
with CIA elements,
The prevailing view among most users is that
more frequent and direct contacts are desirable,
especially with the NIO, and that this would lead
to a clearer view of user requirements and a
better focus of the intelligence output on policy
issues. Most users have very little direct contact
with the NIO. While some users admit that they
themselves are remiss in improving relationships
with the Community, others believe that the
initiative should come primarily from the Com-
munity. Several users suggested periodic, infor-
mal discussions among senior policy and intelli-
gence officials. One user states that a formaliza-
tion or institutionalization of this process would
be preferable.
Current Intelligence
Most users believe that the high volume of
field reports-attache and agent reports, inter-
cepted communications, and Embassy cables-
and current intelligence products on the Middle
East more than cover their immediate needs. In
fact, it is widely acknowledged that current
intelligence is making a major contribution in
support of policy. Some of the specific areas cited
are: Soviet activities in the Middle East, despite
the difficulties in covering such areas as Iraq and
Syria; the Lebanon crisis; and arms transfers.
However, many users believe that the flow of
current intelligence, especially field reporting, is
so heavy that it cannot always be effectively
digested. Some recommend greater selectivity,
without necessarily impairing the quality and
timeliness of current intelligence. But most users
urge more analytical follow-up, particularly in
pointing out trends and implications.
Users regard CIA and INR current intelligence
analytical products as extremely useful, particu-
larly on political and economic issues, while DIA
products are helpful on military developments.
However, many users (including Deputy Assis-
tant Secretaries) acknowledge that they do not
read periodic publications regularly-e.g., the
Weekly Summary-although there is consider-
able interest on the part of economic users in
CIA's economic and oil publications. Some users
state that important items in these and other
publications are frequently condensed and
flagged for them by their staffs.
NIEs and Other Intelligence
Community Area Analyses
Several users believe that the latest NIE on the
Middle East (NIE 35/36-1-76, Middle East
Military Balance, 1976-1981) is vastly improved
over earlier estimates. This NIE was well
integrated, used a broader data base, and
covered pertinent issues comprehensively. Most
important, it made realistic judgments while
avoiding impossible predictions. While a number
of users in State did not read the estimate, they
reported that INR had advised them that the
Estimate was an overall improvement, despite
some weaknesses.
A number of users state that some basic
weaknesses still exist in interagency analyses.
Some complain that estimates still give the
appearance of too much "drafting by commit-
tee," resulting in excessive compromise or blur-
ring of issues and reluctance or inability to
articulate clearly areas of honest difference.
Others express strong interest in more extensive
IC treatment of the political, economic, and
sociological aspects of Middle East problems,
although they recognize that the immediate and
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overriding factor contributing to instability in the
region is the prospect of Arab-Israeli armed
conflict and that intelligence assessments focus-
ing primarily on military developments are
therefore needed.
Many users acknowledge that highly sensitive
information available only to a few high-level
policymakers can and does have a bearing, but
not a critical one, on intelligence assessments.
While recognizing that the problem created by
sensitive intelligence probably cannot be com-
pletely resolved, several users suggest that greater
direct contact between senior policymakers and
the Community could reduce the impact of
restricting dissemination of assessments involving
sensitive information.
Users generally feel that the production of
military intelligence has improved considerably,
both in terms of current and basic analyses.
Indeed, no major substantive gaps on purely
military issues have been indicated by the
policymakers.
Users generally believe that political and
especially economic analytical production have
ask for more economic, sociological, and man-
power data. Most users believe that this intelli-
gence information should be used to produce
more follow-up analyses, trend analyses, inte-
grated studies, and projections of political,
economic, and military trends. While it is
difficult to develop any clear order of priority,
given the diverse interests of the policymakers,
most users place high priority on integrated
analyses of political, military, economic, and
sociological dynamics and institutions
improved.
change in Treasury's reporting requirements.
As previously noted, users generally agree that
collection of intelligence information and pro-
duction of current intelligence on the Middle
East is ample and timely. However, some users
trends in t e ra world, CIA economic studies,
trade data on the less developed countries, and
CIA information on OPEC investments abroad.
For example, information developed by technical
means two years ago suggested that OPEC
investments in the US amounted to over $1
billion more than was indicated by the reports of
US banks to the US Treasury.* This resulted in a
ong- erm assessments of
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ANNEX E
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ACTIONS OF THE US GOVERNMENT
General Comments
Economic users are generally pleased with the
output of the Intelligence Community. The
timeliness, quality, and coverage of the economic
intelligence provided range from good to excel-
lent on most topics.
Most intelligence in the economic area has
consisted of current intelligence and ad hoc
analytic reports on subjects of near term interest
to policy officials. There has been relatively little
demand from economic policymakers for long
term studies. On the other hand, it is widely felt
that more multi-disciplinary, integrated analyses
of current political and economic developments
and trends are needed. Interface between users
and producers of economic intelligence has vastly
improved in recent years, but most users believe
further consultation at all levels would help
ensure that the limited analytical resources of the
Community are used to maximum advantage.
Unique Aspects of Intelligence
Support to International Economic
Policies
The success of the IC in producing economic
intelligence which meets the needs of users results
from a number of aspects unique to the
production of economic intelligence: the nature
of user demand, availability of data, the number
of organizations involved in production, senior-
level interest, and relations between Washington
and Foreign Service posts.
User Demand
First, user demands have been largely for ad
hoc analytic reports and field reporting on
current topics and for current intelligence-an
area where the IC has done reasonably well in
recent years. Second, there is a generally good
working relationship between the producers and
consumers of economic intelligence. The con-
sumers increasingly are alerting intelligence to
the policy and negotiating issues requiring
intelligence support and economic intelligence
and field reporters have been very responsive in
answering consumer requests. Third, while a
significant body of economic material required
by the policymakers must be acquired by the
aggressive collection activities of State, CIA and
NSA, much of the information required in this
area, by its very nature, tends to be more openly
available than in other fields, e.g., defense
intelligence. This is the case even with the
Communist countries, since dissemination of
economic data is essential to the centralized
planning process. The accurate and timely
economic information needed by economic
policymakers requires careful analysis of im-
mense volumes of data available from both open
and semi-overt sources throughout the world.
Users are very familiar with much of this
unclassified material and in many cases are
content to receive NSA, CIA/DDO, and embassy
reports with little analysis. They themselves are
willing to integrate intelligence reports with the
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information they already have at hand from
other sources.
Organizational Arrangements
Most departments and agencies with responsi-
bilities for international economic affairs have
their own analytic resources within their various
policy offices which provide them with the bulk
of their needs for analytic support. Within the
Intelligence Community, as strictly defined,
CIA's Office of Economic Research (OER) is the
principal producer of finished economic intelli-
gence. Other DDI offices (Current Intelligence,
Political Research, Geographic and Cartographic
Research) also produce some, as do many
embassies. State/INR produces a series of fin-
ished analytic reports on economic subjects
related to the needs of State policymakers but
also of interest to other elements of the economic
community. CIA/DDO, NSA, and embassy
reporting are often key sources for the production
of finished intelligence.
OER in particular has long established direct
contacts, formal and informal, with all the
economic departments and agencies of the
Government. These contacts are at various levels
and help ensure that output is relevant to
consumer needs. The Director of OER also chairs
the DCI's Economic Intelligence Committee,
which coordinates interdepartmental collection
guidance on economic subjects and participates
in the monitoring of economic intelligence
production.
The Treasury intelligence unit provides an
interface between producers and users. Members
of this unit, in cooperation with CIA and NSA,
provide briefings-daily in most cases and less
frequently in others-to top Treasury officials. A
senior OER analyst, detailed to Treasury's Office
of National Security, briefs other members of the
Economic Policy Board (EPB). These briefings
provide policymaking officials an opportunity to
request additional information or studies on
subjects of interest. Officers in the Office of
National Security-some of whom are on loan
from State, CIA and NSA-also provide inputs to
analytic work of other Treasury officials. These
arrangements, combined with OER's direct ties
to its users, result in rapid, relevant producer
responses to user needs and good feedback from
users to producers. The Department of Com-
merce is considering establishing a similar intelli-
gence liaison unit.
Senior-Level Interest
The Secretary of the Treasury in his role as
head of the Treasury Department, Chairman of
the Economic Policy Board (EPB), and as head of
other interagency committees plays a key role in
all US economic policy decisions, foreign as well
as domestic. He has taken a personal interest in
developing arrangements for ensuring more effec-
tive intelligence support. He has met with the
DCI and has exchanged views by phone and
correspondence. He has committed Treasury to
providing CIA with whatever Treasury materials
it needs to carry out its responsibilities (e.g.,
Treasury briefing books, memcons, Treasury
analytic reports, etc.). In November, 1976, the
DCI and the Chairman of the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) met with
the Secretary and the EPB to evaluate intelli-
gence support to the economic policymaking
community and to recommend means for im-
proving this support. A report based on these
discussions together with certain recommenda-
tions is in preparation.
The PFIAB has taken a strong interest in
intelligence support to economic activities and
has submitted various reports and recommenda-
tions on this subject to the President.
Relations Between Washington and
Posts Abroad
The quality of finished economic intelligence
depends to a considerable degree on the quality
of reporting from US embassies. Useful reporting
in turn requires that Washington make its needs
known to economic officers in the field. Basic
guidance is given by an instruction to each post
called the Comprehensive Economic Reporting
Program (CERP). This is supplemented by an
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Evaluation of Intelligence Support to
Economic Policyrnakers
Positive Reactions
Economic users are generally satisfied with the
output of the IC. For the most part, they find it a
useful and timely supplement to the mass of
economic information and reports available from
other sources. Most of the material that policy
consumers require is prepared by their own staffs.
Within the Intelligence Community, as strictly
defined, most of the finished economic intelli-
gence is provided by OER/CIA.
OER attempts to fulfill three major functions:
(1) to act as a research service, (2) to monitor
foreign economic trends, and (3) to provide a
source of independent foreign economic assess-
ment for policymakers. Its two principal periodic
publications are:
? Economic Intelligence Weekly. This widely
circulated secret publication usually includes
a half-dozen articles placing major economic
developments in perspective, plus shorter
notes on items of current interest. Attached
to this publication is "Economic Indica-
tors," an unclassified compilation of charts
and tables providing up-to-date information
on the domestic and external economic
activities of major non-Communist devel-
oped countries, as well as price trends for
major agricultural products and industrial
materials. This publication is generally well
regarded by consumers.
? International Oil Developments (IOD). This
bi-weekly publication is usually classified
"SECRET." It assesses price and production
policies of the OPEC countries, outlines
major energy developments in the rest of the
world, and often contains articles on nuclear
and other non-oil sources of energy. An
unclassified "Statistical Survey" attached to
the IOD provides the latest available data
on worldwide production, stocks, trade, and
prices of oil, as well as some data on natural
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gas. Many officials concerned with foreign
economic policy regard this as one of the
most useful publications in Washington.
OER also produces a wide variety of research
studies, memoranda, and notes, some of which
are unclassified, including some on Communist
countries. In the second quarter of 1976, for
example, OER completed 24 self-initiated stud-
ies, of which half were on Communist countries.
During this three-month period, it also responded
to 120 formal requests from 17 government
departments and agencies, as well as the Con-
gress. The requests came from all levels of the
bureaucracy, ranging from the Vice President to
desk officers in State, Treasury and Commerce.
Somewhat less than one-third of the requests
were for information on the Communist coun-
tries, with many on oil and the Middle East.
Users are generally pleased with the response to
their requests.
The National Intelligence Daily, a highly
classified roundup of major current developments
by OCI, in cooperation with other IC organiza-
tions, is considered useful by the relatively small
number of senior officials to whom it is distrib-
uted. Treasury has felt that its contents were not
always timely and sometimes omitted develop-
ments of interest to economic policymakers.
The Weekly Summary, another OCI product,
has been described as "not a busy man's
publication." On the other hand, the longer
articles now do include a brief summary. If not
generally required reading for top officials, the
Weekly does provide useful assessments to staff-
level officers of the political and economic scene
in individual countries. "Staff Notes," a group of
publications prepared for regional specialists of
the Washington community on current intelli-
gence subjects, performs a similar function.
CIA's response to requests for current economic
intelligence for the preparation of briefing and
background papers for top officials is generally
considered excellent. Specific examples cited by
users include support for the two economic
summit meetings (in France and Puerto Rico)
and for trips by Secretary Simon to the Middle
East, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. White
House staff personnel also state that they can
count on an independent, objective assessment
from OER to balance departmental bias on some
economic issues.
Some Problem Areas
Many users feel that the high classification of
some economic intelligence substantially restricts
its usefulness. Particularly in large depart-
ments-Treasury, Commerce, and to some extent
State-most staff personnel do not have special
intelligence clearances. The result is that they
occasionally write briefing papers for top officials
without being aware of certain important facts,
though senior supervisors usually have access to
much of the information that is missing. This
problem could be alleviated by (a) having more
people in the policymaking departments cleared
for access to compartmented intelligence and (b)
by having the producers in the Intelligence
Community sanitize certain of this information
and reduce its level of classification. *
Although the Community has done well in
meeting the needs for current economic intelli-
gence, policy decisions on economic matters must
also take political factors into account. More
integrated political-economic analyses of current
developments and short-term trends are needed.
Some NIEs provide an integration of economic
factors with political, technological and military
elements. Most NIEs, however, have little in the
way of economic content. One user has noted. for
* See page 17, Volume I, Some Systemic Problems in atisfying
user needs, for further discussion of compartmentation of intelli-
gence.
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Increasingly, it is difficult to gain an adequate
appreciation of critical situations abroad without
understanding the interplay between the princi-
pal economic and political forces. Some produc-
ers and users argue, however, that an economic
input is not essential to the purpose of every NIE
dealing with political developments.
Some users were concerned that summary NSA
reports may be misinterpreted. They often give
the appearance of being analytical even though
they rely essentially on a single source of
information; moreover, some users feel the
drafter of NSA reports is normally not an expert
in the field he is writing about. Despite this,
consumers value NSA reporting and find sum-
maries such as those on the Middle East and on
energy developments useful and timesaving.
Several users feel that the Community has not
given adequate support to the continuing series
of meetings related to North-South or Less
Developed Country (LDC) issues. Information
has often been lacking on the positions of
particular countries, the way in which the LDCs
reach a consensus, and the extent to which LDC
representatives are bound if at all - by
instructions of their governments. While ade-
quate information on some commodities pro-
duced by LDCs is available, additional analysis
of production, trade, and price trends of other
commodities would be helpful. One suggestion
which appears to have considerable support
among policy officials is for a periodic publica-
tion by OER of a commodity review similar to its
"International Oil Developments."
There is general agreement that the interface
between consumers and producers of economic
intelligence has greatly improved in recent years,
but a number of users felt there was need for
further improvement. Many consumers lack
knowledge of what they can and cannot expect
to obtain in support from the Intelligence
Community. Users acknowledge that they often
criticize the intelligence product without bother-
ing to convey their views to the Community.
More two-way communication continues to be
needed, with some careful thought given to the
development of procedures to avoid the increased
interchange from becoming unduly time-con-
suming for either side.
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ANNEX F
REQUIREMENTS FOR INTELLIGENCE RELATED TO WARNING,
CRISIS AND WARTIME OPERATIONS
As a crisis passes through various possible
phases, ranging from a minor isolated incident to
a nuclear war, the kind of intelligence required to
support the decisionmaking process varies. The
Community attemps to provide adequate infor-
mation about situations and developments so
that decisionmakers can take actions to prevent
crises. If the US is unsuccessful in preventing or
avoiding a crisis, the Community attempts to
provide timely, accurate information about cur-
rent or impending actions of foreign countries
which could affect the crisis, to support US
political, diplomatic, and military efforts to
contain the crisis and safeguard US interests.
Should the crisis escalate to armed conflict
involving US forces, national intelligence assets
must provide increased support to military
commanders. However, especially in a major US-
USSR war there are important national needs for
intelligence that must continue to be satisfied.
The President, NSC, and JCS must make
decisions, for example, on the strategic disposi-
tion of forces, the use of nuclear weapons,
political and possibly military actions regarding
countries not directly involved in the conflict,
and means of moving the conflict from the
battlefield to the negotiating table. Throughout
this spectrum of warning, crisis, and war,
intelligence organizations must be able to make
smooth transitions from one stage to the next,
balancing national and tactical needs and
maintaining flexibility to respond rapidly to
demands which are difficult to predict in
advance of a crisis or war.
To produce timely and complete intelligence
of greatest benefit to decisionmakers in a crisis or
war, the intelligence Community must also
receive information reflecting US decisions and
actions. Without such feedback, the Intelligence
Community cannot properly assess foreign ac-
tions in a rapidly developing situation, particu-
larly actions which respond to US actions or
diplomatic signals. Advance notice of US actions
or signals allows the Community to ensure that
collection assets are positioned and alerted for
immediate observation of foreign responses. Thus
it is clearly in the decisionmaker's interest to
inform the appropriate Community elements of
US intentions, decisions, and actions so that
intelligence support can be properly focused
during the deliberative phase of these evolutions,
as well as to improve the accuracy of intelligence
assessments in subsequent cycles of the crisis. The
Community much protect such information
concerning US operations and policy delibera-
tions as it does other highly classified informa-
tion.
To support this process of interaction, it is
necessary to establish effective communication
systems and procedures to provide the timely
exchange of information among all elements of
the government which have responsibilities bear-
ing on the crisis situation. Such communications
will facilitate the convergence of critical informa-
tion and its coherent analysis, including dissent-
ing views, for presentation to decisionmakers.
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Recent Improvements in Intelligence
Related to Warning
In recent years, the Community has taken
better advantage of advances in communications
and data processing techniques to improve
warning and crisis operations. New procedures
have also improved communications laterally,
across both the Community and other elements
of the government, as well as vertically with
those organizations responsible for crisis deci-
sions.
The accumulated experience gained over many
years and in many crisis situations has taught the
Intelligence Community some valuable, if costly,
lessons on ways to improve the efficiency and
performance of the warning process. Post mor-
tems and other reviews conducted following such
events as the October 1973 Mid East war, the
Cyprus Crisis of 1974, and the Mayaguez
Incident of 1975 have proved to be a most useful
mechanism for identifying specific problems and
deficiencies affecting the Community's perfor-
mance and for recommending steps to remedy
them. Following are some corrective actions
taken by the Community within the past year.
New or Improved Procedures and Systems
? A number of special and improved proce-
dures and systems were developed to provide
warnings to US flag ships. These measures
constitute the first effective means of linking
the Intelligence Community's warning ap-
paratus with those other US organizations
sharing responsibility for marine safety.
? A directory is being compiled of all US
Government watch and operations centers,
both here and abroad, to improve communi-
cations among concerned government ele-
ments during crises.
? A revised and expanded DCI Directive
(DCID 7/1), Handling of Critical Informa-
tion, clarifies and improves the procedures
governing the recognition and transmission
of this critical information, via appropriate
operations centers in the Washington area,
to senior government officers.
? A Handbook of Standard Operating Proce-
dures for the Reporting of Critical Informa-
tion has been developed. This expands on
DCID 7/1 and provides detailed procedures
for handling critical information (CRITIC)
messages. A condensed, unclassified version
of these CRITIC procedures has also been
prepared and given wide dissemination
throughout the US Government.
? A new computerized system, providing se-
cure voice and visual text for remote
conferencing, will become operational at the
principal intelligence agencies in the Wash-
ington area in late 1976. This system, called
CONTEXT (Conferenced Text Editing),
will facilitate analysts' preparation of time-
critical intelligence products, such as crisis
situation reports, and will also permit emer-
gency meetings (including those of the NFIB
to) be convened remotely.
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Improved Coordination and
Responsiveness of Technical
Collection Systems During Crises
? Planning has been completed to provide for
the rapid tasking and redirection during
crises of a new collection system which will
become operational in late 1976.
? The Defense Department's Collection Co-
ordination Facility, which is expected to
become operational late this year, will
permit consolidation of DOD time-sensitive
requirements and more efficient tasking of
technical collection systems.
Improved Interface Between
Policy/Operations Elements and the
Intelligence Community.
? Periodic conferences of the heads of Com-
munity and non-Community operations/in-
telligence centers are encouraging closer
cooperation among operational and intelli-
gence elements to discuss and resolve matters
and problems of mutual concern.
? National Intelligence Officers convene fre-
quent interagency meetings of working-level
analysts, collectors, and policy or operational
officers to ensure that they all are familiar
with current problems and activities affect-
ing their areas of responsibility.
? The Pacific Command has established in
Korea an all-source "fusion center," similar
to the integrated operations center being
established within NATO at Boerfink,
Germany. The Korean fusion center collo-
cates J-2 (intelligence) and J-3 (operations)
personnel and provides operational data on
US and allied forces for immediate use in the
intelligence and warning process, The center
provides more effective support to Com-
mander, US Forces, Korea, especially during
crises.
? Modernization of facilities of the National
Militay Intelligence Center (NMIC) and the
National Military Command Center
(NMCC) and their collocation will, when
completed, allow for closer coordination
between the operational and intelligence
functions of the military and permit more
effective support to national authorities.
Improved Indications and Warning
Capabilities and Alerting Mechanisms
? Revised procedures define responsibilities of
the National Intelligence Officers and other
elements of the Community for the prepara-
tion, coordination, and issuance of "Intelli-
gence Alert Memoranda."
? Procedures have been approved for the
issuance by the Strategic Warning Staff
(SWS) of a Strategic Warning Notice when-
ever there is evidence that the Soviet Union,
the Warsaw Pact, the People's Republic of
China, or North Korea is considering mili-
tary action beyond its borders.
? Procedures have been developed to produce
for senior consumers during crises an all-
source, Community-coordinated National
Intelligence Situation Report (NISR). The
first NISR was produced in August 1976
during the Korean DMZ crisis.
? Continuing efforts are being made to im-
prove the presentation and display of indica-
tor lists, particularly in high potential crisis
areas such as Korea and Europe.
Major Long-Standing Problems
Despite the corrective actions described above,
certain long-standing problem areas remain.
Relatively little progress has been made on the
long-standing and important problems of inte-
grating intelligence with political and military
crisis actions, improving the Community's abili-
ties for early and accurate identification of
impending crises, and establishing clearly the
responsibilities of the DCI during crises and
wartime.
One problem is the tendency of the intelli-
gence, policy, and operational elements of the
Government to restrict the flow of information to
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one another. Ingrained attitudes which exist
within the Intelligence Community, the policy-
making, and the operational components of the
Government are largely responsible for this
situation. The Intelligence Community, for ex-
ample, is concerned that its product might be
compromised and leans toward compartmenta-
tion to protect sensitive sources and methods. In
some cases this has inhibited the timely reporting
of important intelligence data to users, including
those who may be required to take some
preventive action because of the data. The same
tendency exists among policymakers, especially
in the State Department, where there is reluc-
tance to disseminate some types of cables
(NODIS and EXDIS) to other elements of the
Government lest a leak of sensitive information
undercut the Government's political and diplo-
matic efforts. The problem also manifests itself
during crises when-as happens all too fre-
quently-policymakers, special crisis task forces,
or the military withhold information on options
under consideration, planned actions, or ap-
proved operations. The result is that the Commu-
nity has an inadequate basis for tasking intelli-
gence collection assets for observation of foreign
responses to US actions and is hampered in
interpreting foreign actions because some may be
taken in response to US actions. Moreover, when
the Community is not aware of options under
consideration and is not involved in staffing
them, policymakers are not afforded an evalua-
tion of those options from the Community's
perspective on foreign viewpoints and capabili-
ties.
Clearly, sensitive information, sources, and
operational plans must be protected. However,
such information should be routinely dissem-
inated to all relevant elements of the Govern-
ment with appropriate restrictions, when neces-
sary, on further distribution rather than the
current practice which is to restrict dissemination
of potentially sensitive material as a matter of
routine. The Intelligence Community Staff is
working with State and DOD to develop
procedures in accord with this principle in the
case of the National Intelligence Situation
Report. But this problem exists in many areas
related to warning and crisis operations and more
needs to be done, on a case-by-case basis, to work
out procedures which will provide the best
possible intelligence support to the Government
during crises, while protecting truly sensitive
information and operations.
The Intelligence Community must improve its
capability for timely recognition of impending
crisis and hostile foreign actions so as to provide
better warning of such events. This is a matter of
selecting relevant indicators from a large flow of
data, recognizing departures from "normal"
patterns of international behavior, and identify-
ing and estimating the likelihood of various
foreign courses of action. The decisions to issue a
warning may require balancing the costs of false
alarms (disruption of normal US Government
processes undercutting the credibility of the
Intelligence Community and generating unwar-
ranted hostile reactions) against the advantages
of early warning if a crisis is indeed pending
(alerting of military forces and diplomatic posts,
and US actions to head off or mitigate the crisis).
As users and the Community both become more
sophisticated in their understanding of the nature
of the warning problem, more emphasis is being
placed on accurate identification of pattern
changes and their implications-the charting of
the "international temperature"-than on pure
"prediction" of events by the intelligence Com-
munity. Some users suggest the expansion of the
responsibility of the SWS to encompass a much
broader warning function. The spotting of key
indications is becoming more difficult as the
technological capability for collection grows, and
with it the volume of data available to intelli-
gence. Further, improvements in analytical tools
for pattern recognition have not kept pace with
technical collection capabilities.
Human analytical limitations which are part
of the warning problem include:
? The tendency to estimate the likelihood of
various foreign actions from the perspective
of US behavior patterns and standards of
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"rationality," rather than from the perspec-
tive of the foreign people involved.
? The inherent difficulty of anticipating an
opponent's actions or intentions when the
opponent has not yet made a decision. The
difficulty increases as the opponent's deci-
sions are influenced by US policies and
actions,
? The failure to integrate intelligence over
time, prior to or during crises, to detect
cumulative evidence of changes and to
identify trends which point to patterns of
behavior.
Post mortems of Community performance
during crises have proved to be a. most useful
means for surfacing such analytical problems and
working out their solutions. However, the current
environment of leaks and increased availability
of Intelligence Community reports to the Con-
gress tends to discourage written post mortems.
But the Community must continue to conduct
post-mortem reviews, with the rigorous self-
examination they entail, if it is to identify and
take corrective actions.
Reflecting many of the problem areas discussed
above is the apparent systemic discontinuity in
the interchange of warning and crisis related
information between the operating environments
of key organizations supporting national policy
formulation and decisionmaking (e.g., the NSC
and WSAG) and the component agencies of the
Intelligence Community.
The present structure of warning and crisis
related intelligence collection, processing and
reporting facilities essentially terminates at the
departmental or agency level, as represented by
the various operations and alert centers alluded
to earlier. Thus, the upward flow of warning and
crisis intelligence tends to be diffused due to the
absence of a focal point at which the products
and capabilities of the Community are integrated
for national-level support. This lack may be the
underlying cause of significant redundancy and
duplication in intelligence reporting to decision-
making levels of government during crisis
periods. Recently developed National Intelli-
gence Situation Report procedures promise
amelioration of the latter problem. However,
inasmuch as their implementation is based on ad
hoc action on a situation-to-situation basis, they
must be considered an interim improvement
rather than a permanent remedy for the disconti-
nuity noted.
A basic problem is that the role and responsi-
bilities of the DCI during crises and wartime are
not spelled out in existing legislation or executive
orders. It is clear that, during a major confronta-
tion between the United States and the Soviet
Union or a war, with military operations impend-
ing or in progress, national intelligence assets
should provide greater support to military oper-
ations than is the case during peacetime. It is
equally clear that in such times the President and
the National Security Council must make deci-
sions which can affect the vital interests of the
nation-decisions on broad strategy, the disposi-
tion and employment of conventional fores, the
use of nuclear weapons, and the conduct of
negotiations intended to end the crisis or war.
These decisions must be supported by intelli-
gence, presumably through a channel which is
independent of the Department of Defense.
37
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A new examination of the long-standing
problem of the DCI's responsibilities in major
crises or war should be high on the agenda of
both the DCI and the National Security Council.
This examination should include a definition of
the relation between the DCI and other authori-
ties (Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense,
Joint Chiefs of Staff) during major crises or war
and the development of plans to provide
adequate communications, staffs, facilities, and
procedures to allow the DCI to carry out his
responsibilities.
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