OVERVIEW OF IMAGERY SATELLITE ISSUES, ACTIVITIES, AND PLANNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00311R000100190002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Overview of
Imagery Satellite Issues,
Activities, and Planning
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Published by the Intelligence Community Staff
for the Director of Central Intelligence
September 1976
Copy N2 125
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OVERVIEW OF IMAGERY
SATELLITE ISSUES, ACTIVITIES
AND PLANNING
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Foreword ..................................................................................... v
Summary ......................................................................................
1
I-Introduction and Background
A. Purpose and Scope ............................................................
5
B. Evolution of Imaging Satellite Programs .........................
5
II-The Issues
A. An Overview-Policy Perspectives ........... ....
11
B. Strategy ...............................................................................
12
C. Policy Planning
Enviro
nment ................................
...........
12
D. Issues Requiring
Natio
nal-Level Policy Decision
............
13
E. Issues to be Res
Foreign Intellig
olved
ence ...
by the Committee on
.........................................
............
18
III-Overview of Nati
Program Ac
A. Intelligence Need
onal I
tivities
s and I
ntelligence Imagery
and Plans
magery Collection Require
ments....
23
B. Satellite Imagery
Colle
ction Systems ...................
.............
30
C. Imagery Exploit
ation a
nd Exploitation Requirem
ents .....
37
D. Dissemination o
f Imag
ery and Imagery Data ....
.............
40
E. Intelligence Com
munit
y Major Planning Milesto
nes.......
43
F. Fiscal Implicatio
ns .......
.........................................
.............
45
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FIGURES
Page
1. Total Imagery Satellite Launches Per Year.........., 7
2. Average Gross Number of C IREX Targets Covered
Per Mission ....................................... 7
3. Average Gross Search Coverage Per Mission
F 1) ................................
4. National Reconnaissance Program Imagery
I
6. NRP Imaging Program Plan ................... ...... 33
......................
7. Imagery Collection and Processing Costs,
Including Support ............................ ..... 46
8. Imagery Exploitation Costs............ 49
9. Imagery Dissemination Costs............ ........ 51
...........................
10. Total Imagery Costs ............... .. . ................. 53
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Satellite Systems ........................... 31 25X1A
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FOREWORD
This document presents a series of policy issues which are critical
to the future course of U. S. satellite imagery activities and the
planning for them. It also presents an overview of the current and
planned satellite imagery activities and addresses the strategy reflected
by these activities and plans.
In the course of producing this document, it became apparent that
the primary purpose of it should be to highlight these critical policy
issues. This course of action seemed all the more appropriate because
these policy issues are not within the purview of the individual
organizations participating in the national program of satellite imagery
activities. Some of the issues are for the Committee on Foreign
Intelligence to resolve, while others will require resolution by the
National Security Council.
Thus, this document is not a comprehensive and integrated
operating plan for national satellite imagery activities. In the absence
of a centralized national imagery policy authority, probably the best
that can be achieved in this respect is a greater degree of coordination
of the several individual activities. However, whether the imagery
community, as currently organized, provides the desired level of
flexibility and efficiency is itself at issue.
Whatever the organizational case, the primary message of this
document is this: Better management and planning for satellite
imagery-related activities can proceed only if guidance is provided in
the form of decisions on the policy issues presented herein.
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SUMMARY
Before it is possible to develop an integrated plan for the conduct
of national imagery satellite activities which is both comprehensive
and functional, decisions are required on a number of major policy
issues.
These issues fall into two series. First, there are issues which
concern matters of U. S. national policy, thus requiring resolution at
the National Security Council level, And, second, there are issues
which are wholly concerned with Intelligence Community activities
and can be resolved by the Committee on Foreign Intelligence.
National-Level Issues
Those issues concerning U. S. imagery satellite activities which
must be resolved at the National Security Council level are the
following:
? How should U.S. intelligence and civil imagery programs be
coordinated in order to realize consistent and compatible
national objectives?
? Should there be a unified U.S. policy to protect the
operation, products, and technology of satellite imagery
programs?
? Is the projected risk of loss of the National Reconnaissance
Program imagery systems acceptable?
? To what degree should U.S. military forces rely on national
intelligence imagery satellite capabilities for intelligence
needed to conduct military operations?
? What is the U. S. national policy regarding the employment
of an active imagery satellite system?
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? Should the U.S. develop a single unified policy for allocating
and managing the resources necessary to support the
processing and exploitation of imagery from both the
intelligence and civil imagery collection programs?
Intelligence Community Issues
Those issues concerning U. S. imagery satellite activities which are
directly associated with the Intelligence Community, and are
appropriate for resolution by the Committee on Foreign Intelligence,
are the following:
? In the context of the entire National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP), what is the desired role for the satellite
imagery program?
? What are the validated national intelligence needs which
imagery satellite resources can satisfy?
? In terms of the decisions reached concerning the role and
resource level of the satellite imagery program, which, if any,
of the U. S. satellite imagery systems can be terminated?
? What portion of NFIP funds and manpower resources should
be allocated to the satellite imagery program?
? Is the present imagery community organization, and the
tasking and management structure, adequate to respond
effectively to present and anticipated demands?
? Should the Intelligence Community develop an integrated,
centrally directed plan to manage the Community's imagery
processing and exploitation resources?
All of these Intelligence Community issues have been the subject
of continuing review. In support of CFI decisions required in
November 1977, a major effort is underway to conduct a Community-
wide review of imagery needs and the resources required to satisfy
them.
However, before any effort is directed toward better integration of
these semi-independent activities, to become a more comprehensive
and more functional operating plan, it is essential that clear and
authoritative resolution of these issues is forthcoming.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND
BACKGROUND
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A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
Development of a comprehensive plan for the conduct of national
imagery satellite activities is a principal project listed in the DCI's
Resource Management Objectives for the Intelligence Community.
This document presents those national policy issues and Intelli-
gence Community management policy issues which require resolution
before further progress can be made toward developing such a plan.
This document also presents a brief overview of U. S. imagery
satellite activities and plans to date, in order to put these critical issues
into a logical framework and present them in a context which is more
easily understood.
The current intention is also to publish, separately, a series of
annexes which are companion pieces to this document. These annexes
present a much more detailed account of the U. S. intelligence imagery
satellite activities now being conducted and planned than is contained
herein. The annexes, now in preparation, cover the topics of imagery
collection requirements, collection systems, exploitation, dissemina-
tion, military operational requirements, and non-military applications.
B. EVOLUTION OF IMAGING SATELLITE PROGRAMS
Since 1960, satellite photography has provided U, S. intelligence
and policy communities a means of observing activities worldwide,
particularly in the Communist countries. The accumulated photogra-
phy contains a record of the physical dynamics of military forces,
economic growth, and the geophysical environment of these areas.
The first satellite reconnaissance imagery was returned from space
by a system designated CORONA in August 1960, CORONA was
designed to obtain photographic coverage of broad areas, to aid in the
identification and location of Soviet strategic weapons systems. The
first CORONA acquired more photographic imagery of the Soviet
Union than was provided by all of the U-2 missions flown over the
Soviet Union. The CORONA Program spanned 12 years, ending in
May 1972.
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II. THE ISSUES
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A. AN OVERVIEW-POLICY PERSPECTIVES
It has become increasingly apparent that the U. S. can no longer
afford multiple overlapping civil and intelligence programs which
pursue by different routes parallel or conflicting national objectives.
Executive and Congressional guidance has made it abundantly clear
that budgetary justification must be traceable to national objectives,
and to national intelligence needs.
The projected future environment in which these programs must
function suggests that expanding capabilities and demands will tend to
exacerbate rather than alleviate resource problems.
Most of the key intelligence needs of today are expected to
continue into the 1980s. However, their relative priorities can be
expected to change. Additionally, there will be an increasing demand
for a global real-time information capability spurred on by available
technical capabilities in communications, computers, and collection
modes. The use of space for communication, navigation, and the
collection of political, economic, military, and scientific and techno-
logical information will continue to expand.
The utilization of and need for energy and raw materials will
intensify international competition for sources of energy and other
natural resources. The achievement of national objectives through
political and economic means will tend to dominate the spectrum of
conflict; however, destabilizing civil and national hostilities are likely,
particularly in the "Third World." Overall, the current concentration
of imaging capability in the Northern Hemisphere, and particularly
the Communist world, will need to be readjusted to expand the
coverage of third-world countries.
Arms control and treaty verification issues will continue to be
paramount in the 1980s, Nuclear proliferation will increasingly affect
major power relationships. For example, a nuclear capability in Brazil,
Argentina, and South Africa by 1990 could serve to complicate these
issues considerably.
The space environment itself is also subject to the possibility of
hostile action. As weapons technology evolves, deployment of space-
borne or ground-based anti-space system weapons could occur.
However, continued dominance of the space environment by the U. S.
and USSR suggests that a space conflict would be dependent upon a
serious confrontation involving the two countries.
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& STRATEGY
The national strategy for satellite imagery is reflected explicitly in
program milestones for our current systems. Strategy is expressed
implicitly in documentation at the national level, e.g., the DCI's
National Foreign Intelligence Program Recommendation: FY 1977-
1981. These strategy expressions call fir ;,,,9rrar1.
A key element of our current national imagery satellite strat-
egy-and indeed of all U. S. satellite overflight efforts-is universal
acceptance of the right of overflight and the continuance of a non-
hostile space environment.
The question of our ability to maintain this strategy, the
uncertainties in the changing world environment, plus the steadily
increasing pressure on resources, are the primary factors underscoring
the need for timely resolution of certain key policy planning issues,
C. POLICY PLANNING ENVIRONMENT
The rationale for current imagery policy and its implementation is
largely an outgrowth of the direction and planning required for
utilization of present satellite imagery systems. However, it is clear
from the context of the following paragraphs, quoted from a 1975
memorandum from the Chairman of the National Security Council
establishing the Standing Committee on Space Policy, that these
activities are necessarily being drawn into a larger integrated space
policy:
"The Committee should review the relationship between civil
and intelligence space programs, the military significance of
certain civil space programs, and any relevant international
considerations. The Committee should propose for the President's
consideration, appropriate new policies or changes to existing
policies, and be a forum for the interpretation and implementation
of such policy."
The final charge to the Committee in addressing the issues
concerning the national space policy, as it relates to the civil/military
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interfaces, emphasizes the critical issues pertinent to the national
imagery policy and strategies:
"DOD and NASA have requested that at an early opportunity
the Committee examine the international political considerations
of remote earth sensing, the protection of sensitive space
technology and the public release of space data and information."
D. ISSUES REQUIRING NATIONAL-LEVEL POLICY DECISION
Effective planning for satellite imagery activities cannot be
pursued without timely resolution of a number of key policy issues.
These include a number of specific issues which require decision at the
NSC level.
These issues are interdependent and affect the total NRP, not
merely imaginiz
satellites. For example_ the issues relating to
require consideration of
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must be resolved at the National Security Council level are the
following:
1. Expanded Applications and Usage of Satellite Imagery.
ISSUE: How should the intelligence and civil imagery programs
be coordinated to realize consistent and compatible national objec-
tives?
ine impact or a particular ecision on the o al intelligence program.
Those issues concerning U. S. imagery satellite activities which
Guatemalan earthquake.)
In recent years there has been an expansion in the applications
and usage of satellite imagery within the U. S. Government. Civil users
are now obtaining meaningful contributions from intelligence satel-
lites. Imagery applications include those related to agriculture and
crop forecasts, political-territorial issues, energy/geologic exploration,
transportation systems, urban studies, population, settlement and land-
use problems, narcotics control, natural disasters, and water-resources
assessments. (It should be noted that aircraft photography can often
adequately meet the civil requirements, e.g., in the case of the recent
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How effectively and extensively these applications will be pursued
will depend on the following:
a. availability of satellite imagery in sufficient quantity
and quality to address new classes of problems;
b. continued development and prioritization of imagery
requirements based upon national-level policy needs;
c. development of imagery-sensor packages by both the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and NASA that are
complementary in the information they provide;
d. Policy decisions affecting the utilization of classified
programs by potential civil users; and
e. the existence of an effective organizational structure to
integrate intelligence and civil applications with collection
capabilities.
National policy objectives concerning foreign political, economic,
technical, and military events tend to cause the distinction between
Intelligence Community and non-intelligence interests to disappear at
the national level. Both the technology and application of the
intelligence and civil programs are merging despite the efforts of
NASA and the NRO to emphasize the differences and unique aspects
of their programs.
The perception by foreign states of U. S. space policies and
activities is of interest to both NASA and the Intelligence Community.
The question is whether foreign states perceive these activities as
contributing to their own vital interests, or, at the very least, as not
being harmful to those interests. It is in this instance that the entire
issue of expanding applications and the necessity for policy decision
comes into focus. The awareness and availability of more and better
satellite imagery data, regardless of its source, is likely to give rise to
anxiety and opposition in the international arena unless it is
accompanied by applications which can be demonstrated to be of
positive and practical advantage to those concerned, and/or a program
for controlling the availability of this data. This immediately brings the
NASA policy of unlimited data distribution into question.
Both intelligence and non-intelligence programs and output must
be judged in the context of the support they provide to larger national
objectives and policies. Usage of the imagery-derived data and the
degree of data dissemination must be weighed against policy interests
in each case, particularly national security considerations.
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Development of consistent and compatible NASA and Intelligence
Community programs requires policy decisions affecting the jurisdic-
tional authority and, eventually, the organizational budgets of all these
organizations. Currently such determinations tend to be made
organizationally. The resultant "policies" are simply the product of
organizational bargaining. In place of this, national policy objectives
need to be developed irrespective of individual organizations.
2. Security.
ISSUE. Should there be a unified U.S. policy to protect the
operation, products, and technology of satellite imagery programs?
Expansion of both Intelligence Community and non-intelligence
programs has resulted in a merging of the programs' technology and
applications. This overlap causes security policy decisions-or the lack
thereof-in one program, to directly affect the security of other
programs. For example, our "national technical means of verification"
and, in turn, our U.S./Soviet arms limitation policies are, in large
measure, dependent upon our intelligence satellite imagery systems.
Security control is necessary to minimize the danger that greater
knowledge of U. S. intelligence satellite imagery capabilities, oper-
ations, and materials could result in meaningful degradation of
information gain or even in a hostile space environment and complete
denial.
Protecting the "fact of " the U.S. satellite intelligence effort
involves more than just the question of the Soviets or others ultimately
discerning the capability of U. S. systems. Of equal importance is the
protection of an international climate in which the Soviets and others
will continue to allow the United States to collect data on a
noninterference basis, or, conversely, identification of those conditions
that would encourage interference.
Expanded application of civil satellite imaging programs has
brought about wide dissemination of these products to all interested
users, since these programs are not encumbered by security controls.
And, broad utilization of the products from these imaging programs
probably does, for the most part, reinforce the continued peaceful use
of space and encourage a continuing benign environment.
Whether certain U. S. national interests are served by the present
civil satellite imaging program and its attendant procedures is not at
issue. The security issue in this context arises from the fact that the
intelligence satellite imaging programs, which also serve important
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U. S. national interests, are threatened with an unacceptable degree of
exposure as NASA expands its activities in the civil satellite programs.
Looked at simply, the United States is operating a satellite
overflight program with two separate and distinct components and
policies. One component (NASA) is operated on the assumption that
public release and broad dissemination of its data is in the best
interests of the nation and, indeed, of mankind. The second
component (Intelligence) takes the position that public admission and
dissemination is not in the national interest, since the intelligence
product provides a vital input to national security and international
stability, and exposure could lead to curtailment or cessation of the
program. However, both compartments are ultimately dependent
upon a universal acceptance of the right of overflight and the
maintenance of a benign space environment. To this extent, the
"security " of both compartments is inseparable.
Effective security control, like the expansion of applications, is
dependent upon a consistent and compatible policy for both
intelligence and civil programs. Ultimately, the question is what can
and cannot be publicly released, based upon the best interests of the
United States.
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4. Military Tactical Usage.
ISSUE: To what degree should U.S. military forces rely on
national intelligence imagery satellite capabilities for intelligence
needed to conduct military operations?
Since the first CORONA launch in 1960, military forces have been
provided with satellite imagery-derived intelligence to su ort their
readiness
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7. Resource Utilization.
ISSUE: Should the U.S. develop a single unified policy for
allocating and managing the resources necessary to support the
processing and exploitation of imagery from both the intelligence and
civil imagery collection programs?
The requirements for intelligence to support U.S. policy clearly
are expanding beyond the purview of traditional intelligence
collection. The distinction between the goals of the intelligence and
civil imagery programs is disappearing, the methodologies for
exploitation have become more complex, and there is increasing
demand and competition for the resources needed to utilize the
product of imagery collection more completely. The U. S. Government
cannot afford totally independent and parallel processing and
exploitation structures, one to support the intelligence program and
another for the civil program. Consequently, it is necessary to have
some clear rationalization of how resources will be applied and within
what priority.
E. ISSUES FOR RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
The issues which are appropriate for resolution by the Committee
on Foreign Intelligence concern the desired role for the imagery
program, the development and operation of collection systems, and
management and control of the imagery processing, exploitation and
dissemination activities. Underlying each of these considerations is the
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matter of allocating Intelligence Community resources and justifying
resource expenditures in an era of steadily increasing budget pressures.
Specifically, these issues are the following:
1. Role of the Satellite Imagery Program.
ISSUE: In the context of the entire National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP), what is the desired role for the satellite imagery
program?
2. Validated Imagery Needs.
ISSUE: What are the validated national intelligence needs which
should be satisfied by imagery satellite resources?
3. Resource Allocation.
ISSUE: What portion of NFIP funds and manpower resources
should be allocated to the satellite imagery program?
4. Required Collection Systems.
ISSUE: In terms of the decisions reached concerning the role and
resource level of the satellite imagery program, which, if any, of the
U.S. satellite imagery systems can be terminated?
5. Imagery Community Tasking Management.
ISSUE: Is the present imagery community organization and its
management and tasking structure adequate to respond effectively to
present and anticipated demands?
6. Imagery Community Exploitation Management.
ISSUE: Should the Intelligence Community develop an inte-
grated, centrally directed plan to manage the Community's imagery
processing and exploitation resources?
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III. OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL
IMAGERY PROGRAM
ACTIVITIES AND PLANS
To help place these issues in a more meaningful
context, this part of the document describes the activities
and planning initiatives which are currently conducted in
the National Imagery Program.
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A. INTELLIGENCE NEEDS AND IMAGERY COLLECTION
REQUIREMENTS
The activities of the National Imagery Program, like those of our
National SIGINT and Human Sources Programs, are driven by
statements of objectives, priorities, and needs issued by the DCI.
1. Guidance Documents.
Currently, four national-level documents express these objectives
and needs:
a. Objectives for the Intelligence Community.
This document is prepared annually for the President by the
Director of Central Intelligence. It contains both substantive
intelligence objectives and resources management objectives.
The substantive intelligence objectives are given greater specific-
ity in the Key Intelligence Questions (see below) and constitute the
primary guidance for our foreign intelligence effort for the current
fiscal year.
The resource management objectives deal with the means for
achieving the substantive objectives. They include specific milestones
for achievement in all categories of resource management. For
example:
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(1) Objective 1 deals with evaluation of Community
performance and related activities;
(2) Objective 2 deals with program and budget review
activities;
(3) Objective 3 deals with planning and guidance
activities;
(4) Objective 4 deals with research and development
activities;
(5) Objective 5 deals with efforts to review and improve
the substantive requirements mechanism (a key area
of imagery interest); and
(6) Objective 6 deals with activities in the interaction
and mutual support between national and depart-
mental/command (tactical) intelligence systems.
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b. Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs).
These questions are developed by the Intelligence Community in
coordination with the National Security Council Intelligence Commit-
tee (NSCIC). They are issued as guidance to the Intelligence
Community for the collection and production of intelligence, and
cover only subjects of major importance to national-level consumers.
Departmental and tactical intelligence needs, which are developed by
the Department of Defense, are given special attention in the
preparation of KIQs.
c. Perspectives for Intelligence 1976-1981.
Perspectives for Intelligence is issued annually by the DCI to
provide general guidance to the Intelligence Community covering a
period of five years into the future. This document is composed of four
parts:
(1) Part I is a general overview of the international
political, economic, and security environment;
(2) Part II is a broad statement of the needs the
Community will be expected to meet during the
period;
(3) Part III provides specific guidance concerning
activities which should be initiated or on which
planning should commence; and
(4) Part IV provides guidance for implementation of
Perspectives against major national intelligence
problems.
d. U.S. Foreign Intelligence Priorities for Fiscal Years
1977-1981.
This annual Attachment to DCI Directive (DCID) 1/2 is a
comprehensive statement of the U. S. needs for substantive intelligence
during peacetime and through any period of tension into the onset of
hostilities involving the United States. It is intended to serve as basic
guidance for planning and programming the U.S. foreign intelligence
effort. The Attachment states that it provides specific priorities for
elements of the Objectives and Key Intelligence Questions which are
expected to be of continuing national concern. It also provides a
priority system covering topics of overall national intelligence interest
for each country of the world on which intelligence attention should be
focused over the mid-term period.
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2. Intelligence Needs.
Needs for intelligence to be obtained through imagery collection
are initially identified by the national agencies, military services, and
Unified and Specified Commands. These expressions of need undergo
a competitive process designed to eliminate duplication and to delete
those of insufficient priority to warrant the expenditure of satellite
resources. A formalized procedure is followed which provides critical
review and validation or deletion at several levels including final
review and approval or disapproval by representatives of the Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI) before these expressions are used to
recommend program actions to task or modify operational systems or
to build new systems.
Those expressions of need which survive this validation process
are known as "collection requirements." Expenditure of limited
resources is considered in weighing each of these requirements.
Prioritization is a vital part of the process. The instrumentality for day-
to-day execution of guidance and the detailed tasking of National
Reconnaissance Program systems is the DCI Committee on Imagery
Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX).
U.S. intelligence needs derivable from satellite imagery can be
grouped into four basic categories:
a. Political.
The formulation and execution of U.S. foreign policy requires
intelligence which will support the negotiation of cease-fires, treaties,
and other agreements and compliance with their provisions; intelli-
gence related to the production and distribution of illegal drugs
destined for the U.S.; and intelligence on armed conflict not involving
U.S. forces.
b. Military.
The formulation and execution of U. S. military policy requires
intelligence which will provide warning of attack involving the U.S.;
the size, disposition, and capabilities of opposing strategic and tactical
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forces and their support facilities; the military production capacity and
output of opposing countries; capacity and output of and the
production of maps and strategic target locations.
c. Science and Technology.
Formulation of U. S. military, education, economic, and energy
policy requires information on the technical /scientific characteristics
of existing and prospective opposing military systems, and on the
status of foreign nuclear and other applied science. Among other
purposes, such intelligence is needed for policy formulation to prevent
technological surprise.
d. Economic.
The formulation and creation of U. S. economic policy requires the
monitoring of agricultural, manufacturing, and business trends
worldwide.
Typical examples where satellite imagery has been used include
the monitoring of off-shore oil and gas drilling activities.
3. Collection Guidance.
National-level guidance for imagery collection requirements to
support U. S. intelligence needs has three levels of specificity:
a. Broad Requirements for Collection System
Development.
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This guidance delineates intelligence needs and assesses these
needs in terms of existing or programmed collection systems and
potential technical means for overcoming gaps in capabilities. It serves
as the basis for initiating de~e1onment of new systems, The
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b. Standing Requirements for Planning the Operational
Use of Existing or Programmed Collection Systems.
These requirements take into account the specific capabilities of
operational collection systems and the targets and areas against which
the collection capability should be used.
The experience and expertise of the Intelligence Community are
focused through the COMIREX to ensure that each requirement lends
itself to satisfaction through imagery collection and that each
requirement is of sufficient importance to warrant the use of national
collection resources.
c. Mission-to-Mission and Current Guidance.
Prior to every imagery satellite mission, COMIREX reviews the
status of validated collection requirements across the entire range of
problems to which overhead imagery can contribute. Some of these
requirements are generated by current events. Others reflect the near-
term needs of the organizations dependent on satellite imagery.
Reassessing the status of these two categories of requirements prior to
each mission serves to give the mission greater value and utility than it
would possess if it were programmed against the standing require-
ments alone.
4. Imaging Requirement Types.
Director of Central intelligence requirements for current imaging
systems are divided into two general types-search and surveillance:
a. Area Search Requirements.
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number of continuing area imagery requirements.
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The principal continuing intelligence problems which involve
area search are those involving nntpnfi i1 r
Strategic Arms Limitation agreements have prohibitions on
various offensive and defensive deployments, as well as limitations at
existing sites. Search imaeerv nlavs n mninr rn1P in
Third World nuclear capabilities are expanding. During the next
half of this decade, these efforts may prove difficult to detect and
monitor.
In many countries, general developments which involve new
activity or programs at previously undeveloped locations will require
search imagery for initial detection.
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Search-type imagery collection requirements prepared by the
COMIREX recently have emphasized the direct relationship between
area search imagery collection and the intelligence problems which
that collection is intended to solve. As the ecomes
operational and assumes a share of the total imagery requirements,
additional modifications to the requirements statements-particularly
search requirements-arp nnt,oin ti.a I? J?i. - r
b. Surveillance Requirements.
Surveillance is the periodic coverage of installations, objects, or
activity for the purpose of updating information previously ohtainpra
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Some of the most important problem sets concern indications and
warning of hostile military artinn can,ncf- 0- IT C Tr.-
In addition to the periodic surveillance imagery required to
monitor the status of foreign activities and upgrade our knowledge of
them in a systematic way, it is necessary to acquire imagery to fulfill
specific, time-dominated intelligence needs-those known as "current
intelligence" needs.
Collection requirements to support current intelligence needs
include:
(1) crisis reconnaissance-imagery of an anticipated or
on-going confrontation or conflict where U.S.
interests are involved;
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(2) current events-any time-limited activity of which
imagery is needed;
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(4) follow-up imagery-that needed to amplify or
classify information gained from previous imagery;
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5. Summary.
The development of guidance, tasking, collection, and exploita-
tion is continuous in all aspects. As new imagery is acquired, results are
assessed and new evaluations of intelligence needs are prepared taking
the previous results into account. The Intelligence Community
continuously assesses intelligence needs, and, through COMIREX,
translates them into appropriate collection requirements. This assures
that, within the capabilities of existing systems and programs,
maximum responsiveness to intelligence needs is maintained at all
times.
B. SATELLITE IMAGERY COLLECTION SYSTEMS
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90).
2. Mid-Term Planning (1977-80).
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3. Long-Range Collection Perspectives and Estimates (1980-
Most of the key intelligence needs of today are expected to
continue into the 1980s; however, their relative priorities can be
expected to change. Thus, today's needs which drive many current
intelligence activities do not provide sufficient guidance to conduct
meaningful planning for effective methods of operation in the 1980-90
time frame.
In the 1980s it is reasonable to expect a world which is more
economically interdependent, with competition for energy sources and
raw materials having become more intense.
Arms control issues will certainly continue into the 1980s. These
issues will be greatly complicated by an expected proliferation of
nuclear capabilities during this period.
Both the economic expansion and the nuclear proliferation will
involve areas of the world and specific countries which are not now
routinely photographed, calling for expansion or adjustment in the
U. S. imaging program.
The use of space as a medium for communication, navigation, and
intelligence collection will expand, as will the potential for space-borne
weapon systems, and ground-based anti-satellite systems.
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C. IMAGERY EXPLOITATION AND EXPLOITATION REQUIRE-
MENTS
1. Authority and Concept.
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continue or alter its current policy of open distribution of imagery
acquired from unclassified NASA earth-sensing satellites.
Beyond the capabilities of satellite systems and image qualities,
the most important asset to the exploitation process is data base
operation and maintenance. Steps are under way to improve storage
arid retrieval of both imagery and other data in this time period.
4. Long-Range Perspectives for Imagery Exploitation.
Principal factors which will influence the exploitation process
during the late 1970s and the 1980s and their estimated impact are:
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c. Continued emphasis on arms control monitoring will
be made more difficult by the proliferation of nuclear
capabilities in the world and by deployment of mobile
strategic weapon systems;
d. Increased importance of economic intelligence may
require revised tasking and require additional training of
imagery analysts.
D. DISSEMINATION OF IMAGERY AND IMAGERY DATA
1. Introduction.
Requirements for imagery dissemination are prescribed by the
Exploitation Subcommittee (EXSUBCOM) of COMIREX in response
to Community needs. Imagery products to be disseminated include
film, exploitation data, and printed matter. Additional imagery-related
material which must be disseminated includes data on target coverage,
film indexing, camera performance evaluation, mapping, cloud
coverage/general weather, requirements satisfaction, and overall
system performance evaluation. The dissemination process is con-
stantly moving data, whether it be the film products, data on
operational control and management of a mission under way, future
mission planning data, or exploitation end products.
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well be that new applications will require that intelligence
imagery be increasingly used for civil applications. If this
proves to be the case, plans will have to be developed to
provide for expanded dissemination of imagery from Na-
tional Reconnaissance Program satellites to increasing num-
bers of U.S. civil agencies;
e. Security controls could be modified to allow expanded
use of imagery products.
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4. Long-Term Plaus ~ I980-90).
The pressures of increasing population, dwindling resources,
realignment of major power relationships and emergence of new
power centers, nuclear proliferation, and mutual economic
interdependence will pose hitherto unknown requirements on the
intelligence function. Financial pressures as well as the value of having
timely and dependable information for U. S. decision makers will alter
the traditional delineations between departmental and national
intelligence entities and their civil counterparts concerned with
agricultural, financial, and commercial intelligence.
These scenarios clearly will demand a highly responsive intelli-
gence dissemination system. The demands on information handling,
processing, storage, and retrieval systems, and on analyst support
systems will be heavy and continuous. Proper and imaginative
development of state-of-the-art systems for information handling will
only be possible in the 1980-90 time frame if strong centralized
management and control exists.
E. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MAJOR PLANNING
MILESTONES
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(3) Civil Uses of Satellite Imagery. The area of civil
applications has perhaps the greatest potential for
impact on the intelligence imagery exploitation
community. Efforts have already been successful in
using satellite imagery for crop analysis, mineral
surveys, watershed and drainage analyses, disaster
assessment, pollution measurements, and other areas
which extend the traditional uses of intelligence
imagery. All indications point to an increased use of
imagery assets for such applications in the future. If
this occurs, it will require attendant increases in
resources expended for exploitation.
4. Dissemination.
a. Current Costs Associated with Dissemination.
Community costs associated with the dissemination of satellite
imagery are shown in Figure 9, Imagery Dissemination Costs. The
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