KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00311R000100070001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 4, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
DIRECTOR of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Key Intelligence Questions
For
Fiscal Year 1974
Secret
4 January 1974
DCI/IC 74-1215
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
Additional Warning
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 365211
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 58(2)
Automatically declassified on
Impossible to determine
(unless impossible, insert dote or event)
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Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1974
Table of Contents
Page
Introduction ................................. 1
Soviet Union/Eastern Europe .................. 3
Sino-Soviet Relations ........................ 7
The People's Republic of China ............... 8
Middle East and Moslem World ................. 10
Western Europe/NATO .......................... 11
Southeast Asia ............................... 12
East Asia/Western Pacific .................... 13
Latin America ................................ 14
Economics .................................... 15
General, Worldwide ........................... 18
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KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS
FOR FY 1974
INTRODUCTION
1. The attached compilation of Key Intelligence Questions for
Fiscal Year 1974 is issued as guidance to the Intelligence Community
for the collection and production of intelligence on subjects of major
importance to national-level intelligence consumers.
2. Two additional categories of intelligence collection and
production, not included in this priority national intelligence
guidance, are:
a. Lower 2riority national intelligence subjects: These
are deliberately omitted in order to highlight the priority which
attaches to the Key Intelligence Questions. It is recognized
that some attention must be devoted to lower priority subjects
(e.g., developments in Africa), although such subjects should,
to the extent possible, require less expensive and less difficult
collection techniques. The relative priorities of the broad
spectrum of intelligence topics are reflected in the compre-
hensive listing of U.S. foreign intelligence topics in the
Attachment to DCID 1/2 currently being considered by the USIB.
b. Departmental and tactical intelligence (including the
intelligence requirements of the operational commanders, certain
warning and surveillance activities, etc.): It is clear that
some appropriate portion of the national intelligence effort
must be devoted to meeting these needs, and the National Foreign
Intelligence Budget Recommendations take account of this fact.
Continuing efforts will be made to improve the interaction and
mutual support of national and tactical programs so that each
may be served by the same activities to the maximum extent possible.
3. The attached Key Intelligence Questions are circulated for the
following purposes:
First, to insure that these subjects are given priority
in the regular collection and production activities of
appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community.
Second, to enable preparation of a baseline review (as soon
as feasible for FY 1974, but normally at the beginning of the
fiscal year). This review will, in summary form, identify the
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status of current knowledge on the subject of each Key Intelli-
gence Question, identify the important gaps, and the collection
and production activities needed to fill the gaps. Its principal
feature will be the acceptance of responsibility by appropriate
individual intelligence agencies of the obligation to collect or
produce on individual Key Intelligence Questions.
Third, to provide the basis for a recapitulation and evalua-
tion, after the close of the fiscal year, of the performance of
the Intelligence Community and of individual agencies on each of
the Key Intelligence Questions.
Fourth, to enable experience with the Key Intelligence
Questions process in the balance of FY 1974 to be used in
preparation of questions for Community use in FY 1975.
And fifth, to permit the use of conclusions drawn from the
recapitulation and evaluation of the FY 1974 effort as factors
in Community resource allocations, specifically including the
preparation of the DCI's National Foreign Intelligence Budget
Recommendations to the President in November 1974.
4. While the attached Key Intelligence Questions are issued for
guidance during the balance of FY 1974, it is clear that a full response
to some of the questions cannot be expected within this time frame. It
should be possible, however, to measure and evaluate to a degree the
extent of progress within the period remaining in the current fiscal
year.
5. The considerations cited in the introductions to the individual
geographic and topical sets of Key Intelligence Questions provide
guidance for longer-term forward planning for collection and production,
particularly for subjects involving RDT&E and associated long lead times.
6. No priority is implied by the order of listing of the various
Key Intelligence Questions. Difference in priorities exists, but it
is not considered that refinements in levels of priority are necessary
for the Key Intelligence Questions effort.
7. The attached Key Intelligence Questions are subject to
additions or modifications during FY 1974 if such are required by
major changes in the international situation or in the foreign intelli-
gence environment.
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SOVIET UNION/EASTERN EUROPE
The Soviet Union is the primary target of US intelligence
efforts and can be expected to remain so because Soviet intentions and
actions can so directly relate to the basic elements of US national
security and to achievement of US foreign and economic policy objectives.
With or without a viable detente, intelligence on the USSR will remain
of continuing highest priority in the coming years.
In both the near and long term, improvement in the capabilities
of Soviet strategic and conventional forces is a matter of major
concern to the United States. Inherent in this problem is the monitoring
of Soviet compliance with SAL and MBFR agreements. This involves detailed
coverage of weapons systems capabilities and close attention to the
early phases of Soviet military RDT&E relating to strategic offensive
and defensive weapons systems.
Soviet political, economic and military contacts with the rest
of the world are increasing the variety of topics on which high quality
US intelligence is required. This puts a continuing priority on the
need for intelligence, not only on Soviet military capabilities, but
also on the dynamics of the Soviet political power structure, on factors
influencing the Soviet leadership, on Soviet perceptions of the United
States, and on the basic objectives of the USSR both at home and abroad.
1. Soviet political dynamics
a. Basic Soviet policies and objectives with respect
to detente.
b. The principal influences operating within Soviet
decisionmaking circles -- including competitive factions,
policy disagreements and differing conceptions of US
objectives in detente -- which importantly shape Soviet
foreign and strategic policy planning and actions.
c. Soviet and Warsaw Pact strategic plans, doctrine
and vulnerabilities for political, economic and military
contest with the United States and Europe.
d. Soviet strategic planning, objectives, and activities
re the Middle East and South Asia.
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2. Soviet objectives in arms agreement negotiations
a. Soviet objectives and negotiating positions in the
SALT Phase II negotiations.
b. Soviet objectives and negotiating positions for MBFR
discussions.
c. Soviet intentions and actions with respect to adherence
to the ABM Treaty and the SAL Interim Agreement.
3. Soviet ICBM systems
a. Soviet progress and objectives re increasing the
counterforce capability and survivability of its deployed
ICBM forces.
b. Soviet progress in development of improved MIRV
capabilities for ICBMs and SLBMs, including types, characteristics
and operational objectives.
c. Soviet progress and objectives in development of a
mobile ICBM.
4. Soviet nuclear weapons
a. Soviet doctrine for deployment and use of nuclear
weapons in land, sea and air forces.
b. Soviet objectives and progress in underground
nuclear testing, and Soviet policies with respect to a
comprehensive test ban.
5. Soviet long range aviation
a. The intended size, role and armament of the Backfire
force.
b. Soviet progress in development of improved tankers,
a follow-on heavy bomber and air-launched stand-off weapons.
6. Soviet naval systems
a. The extent to which Soviet SLBM capabilities against
the United States are increasing -- with particular attention
to progress toward deployment of a full inventory of DELTA/
SS-N-8 submarines, their patrol program and patrol areas,
and command and control capabilities.
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b. Soviet RDT&E and deployment of follow-on SSBN/SLBM
and other naval ballistic and cruise missile systems,
particularly follow-on submarine-launched systems.
c. Soviet progress toward acquisition of advanced
ASW detection capabilities and improvement of present ASW
detection systems.
d. Soviet plans for the role of their aircraft carrier,
force goals and the rate of construction.
7. Soviet strategic defensive systems
a. Soviet progress in ABM development and plans for
further ABM deployment.
b. Soviet development of a look down/shoot down
capability for interceptor aircraft and associated warning
and control systems.
c. Soviet progress in the development of advanced
technology weapons systems and components, with particular
attention to beam weapons.
8. Warsaw Pact-NATO balance
a. Strengths and weaknesses of the Warsaw Pact forces,
including combat effectiveness of the ground forces and the
Pact capabilities to sustain forces in non-nuclear
combat.
b. Soviet views of Warsaw Pact-NATO military asymmetrics,
particularly as these relate to MBFR and to Soviet criteria
for establishing adequacy of forces for military and
political security.
c. Warsaw Pact tactical nuclear doctrine and capabilities,
including availability of storage depots in Eastern Europe.
d. Soviet capabilities for rapid deployment of forces
from the USSR to Central Europe.
9. Geographic expansion of Soviet naval and air activities
Demonstration of capabilities and intentions to expand
Soviet military presence, and resultant influence, in
strategic areas distant from the USSR (e.g., in and around
Cuba, the waters and littoral of the Mediterranean and the
Indian Ocean, and selected areas of Africa), and the reaction
to such presence of the countries involved.
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10. Eastern Europe
a. Centrifugal and centripetal forces and tendencies
importantly affecting current Soviet/East European relationships.
b. The leadership succession problem in Yugoslavia after
Tito's death or retirement; in particular, indications that
Tito's successors will remain strongly committed to independence,
and any evidence the USSR is moving to exploit the post-Tito
situation to bring Belgrade back into the Bloc.
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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Actions and reactions between the USSR and the PRC could have
such an important impact on US interests worldwide that particular
intelligence effort needs to be directed to obtaining an awareness
and understanding of what is going on between these two countries.
The serious border dispute is long-standing and still seems far from
solution, with a resultant threat of hostilities which calls for
continuing intelligence attention.
Status of Sino-Soviet relations
a. Plans, intentions and objectives of the USSR
and the PRC with respect to Sino-Soviet confrontation or
reconciliation.
b. Quantitative and qualitative ways in which the
military balance between the Soviet Union and the PRC in
the border regions is changing, and any modification of
Sino-Soviet tensions, particularly as regards the likeli-
hood of hostilities, which these changes portend.
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THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Recent improvements in the military capabilities of the PRC
and the country's more outward-looking political stance have markedly
increased the extent to which China's policies and actions can affect
US security and policy interests. Both Mao's age and indications of
considerable in-fighting among members of the governing elite make
the character of the post-Mao leadership a matter of considerable
importance.
The Chinese may already have achieved an effective nuclear
deterrent against the USSR and they are working toward a nuclear
capability against the United States. The evolving PRC nuclear
forces could result in major qualitative changes in China's strategic
relationship with the Third World as well as With the two superpowers.
The situation calls for close and continuing attention to PRC military
capabilities, particularly its nuclear delivery systems.
12. PRC relations with the "outside" world
a. PRC attitudes and objectives regarding the US role
in Asia.
b. China's intentions and progress toward attainment of
a role as leader and spokesman of the Third World and the
degree these tend to dampen or stimulate PRC sponsorship and
support of revolutionary movements in the less developed
countries (LDCs).
c. Identification of the leading candidates to succeed
the present leadership and their foreign policy/economic/
military views.
13. The military import of expandin PRC nuclear capabilities
a. The present status of PRC nuclear capabilities in
terms of the availability and location of delivery vehicles,
targeting sectors, the numbers and types of weapons in
stockpile, and the warhead production rate.
b. Status of production and deployment of the Chinese
SSBN.
c. PRC strategic concepts for the use of its missiles
and bombers, with particular attention to Chinese doctrine
for the utilization of nuclear weapons, command and control
capabilities, and force goals for nuclear delivery forces.
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14. PRC RDT&E efforts which could affect the future strategic
balance
Characteristics of PRC offensive missile systems, with
special reference to ranges, vulnerability, reliability,
accuracy, and reaction times.
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MIDDLE EAST AND MOSLEM WORLD
Current US interest in the Middle East and Moslem world focuses
on obtaining an Arab-Israeli peace and restoring the flow of oil to
non-communist countries. For both the short and longer term, achieve-
ment of political and military stability in the area is of high priority
importance to the United States. This means there must be continuing
attention by US intelligence to information needed to support US
efforts to assure continuing access to oil supplies, to increase US
influence with the Arab states and to reduce vulnerabilities of the
Moslem countries to Soviet and other anti-US influences. (See Economic
Section for questions related to oil.)
15. Political and military stability in the Middle East
a. (especially Egyptian, Syrian,
Jordanian, Saudi and Palestinian) views on and strategies
toward the major issues of a peace settlement.
b. The Soviet role in the Middle East as it affects
prospects for and against US peace efforts, i.e., in what
ways and on what issues is the USSR exerting its political,
economic and military influence on the Arab states.
c. Actions which the USSR and industrialized non-
communist nations, especially France, are taking to supply
arms and/or technology to Arab countries, thereby contri-
buting to the Arab-Israeli arms race and conflicting with
US objectives.
d. Identification of threats to the political stability
of major Moslem countries, and of increasing tensions between
these countries (e.g., between Saudi Arabia and Iran).
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WESTERN EUROPE/NATO
US interests are deeply involved in the ongoing efforts of
European leaders to redefine the political and economic involvement
of Europe in the world, to identify their own national roles in
today's Europe, and, on both national and supra-national levels, to
clarify their relations with the United States and the USSR. The
Middle East problem and the energy crisis have intensified some
long-standing problems, introduced some new ones, and accelerated
de facto decisionmaking of profound consequences for the future of
the alliance, both in its NATO manifestation and in other political
and economic aspects. Strains in the close ties which have long
existed between Western Europe and the United States call for
continuing priority attention to this area by US intelligence.
(See Economic Section for questions in that category.)
16. The US role in Europe and the cohesiveness of NATO
a. The assessments of important political leaders in
Western Europe (and their principal oppositions) as to the
US role in Europe.
b. The likelihood of major near-term leadership changes
in important West European countries.
c. Centrifugal and centripetal forces and tensions upon
NATO and the EC.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
Ongoing or threatened insurgencies adverse to US interests in
all Southeast Asia countries are, and probably will continue to be,
the major focus of US intelligence in this area of the world. The
situation is in flux throughout Southeast Asia and some level of armed
hostilities with anti-US overtones can be expected to continue through-
out at least the next several years.
17. Political and military stability in Southeast Asia
a. The objectives, intentions and capabilities of
North Vietnamese and other communist forces to launch and
sustain major military actions in Indochina during FY 1974;
any limitations on weapons, ammunition and food stuffs
which could constrain such actions, and the likelihood
and effect of support or restraint from Moscow and Peking.
b. Evidence of any significant erosion in the position
and stability of the Saigon government.
c. Foreign policy or other internal developments in
Southeast Asian countries -- particularly any indication of
significant change in basically pro-US policies -- which
could affect the short-term or long-term prospects for
retention of US military bases in countries such as
Thailand and the Philippines.
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EAST ASIA/WESTERN PACIFIC
19. The military situation in Korea
Objectives, capabilities and intentions of North
Korea for launching and sustaining major military
action against South Korea in FY 1974 and the likelihood
and effect of support from Moscow and Peking.
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LATIN AMERICA
Improvement of US understanding of Latin American political
dynamics and their impact on US objectives in the Western Hemisphere
is of sufficient importance at policy levels of the US Government to
call for careful intelligence attention. The emergence of increasingly
nationalistic, highly personal governments which exhibit anti-US
tendencies is the primary force working against US interests. Obtain-
ing and analyzing the information needed to cope with this situation
will require a continuing intelligence effort.
20. Political and economic relationships with the United States
Policies and attitudes of Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Panama, Peru and Venezuela (including the motivations,
objectives and personal strengths and weaknesses of the
leaders and leadership elites), which have a direct influence
on United States interests in Latin America.
b. Developing intra-Latin American alignments, within
or outside the OAS, on regional or global issues of interest
to the United States.
21. Panama Canal negotiations
Panama's intentions and bargaining vulnerabilities in
negotiations for a new Canal Treaty or related agreements,
and the willingness and ability of the Torrijos government
to make concessions.
22. Cuban policies and pro rams
a. Cuban relations with and/or subversion in Central
and South American countries, and Cuban relations with the
USSR and the US which affect US interests in Latin America.
b. Cuban internal weaknesses.
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ECONOMICS
Intelligence on economic developments affecting US national
security and on the plans, policies and economic performance of
major US economic competitors is rapidly increasing in importance
to government policy makers. The acquisition and analysis of foreign
economic information has become, and is expected to remain, a high
priority task of US intelligence.
The place of the US economy in the world has changed. This has
resulted in high priorities being given to economic intelligence on
US dependence on the mineral resources of other countries,
especially petroleum, is mounting. Incomes of oil-producing states
are rising at an accelerated pace and some of these countries are
exerting pressure on the United States and other countries by con-
trolling oil supplies. The world demand for US grains and oilseeds
has expanded. The Soviet Union is attempting to make up for defi-
ciencies in its economy, and in so doing is seeking increased economic
exchanges with the United States and other high-technology countries.
Acquiring data on natural resource availability worldwide and on foreign
technological developments of economic importance are expected to be
tasks for the US intelligence community of increasing importance in
the coming years.
23.
The oil problem
a. Policies, negotiating positions and vulnerabilities
of the major foreign petroleum producers with respect to
output, export and price of oil.
b. Impact of oil crisis on the economies, commercial
arrangements, and economic, political and military policies
of Japan, Canada, and the European countries.
c. New sources of energy and processing, including oil.
d. The composition and location of monetary reserves
of the major oil producing countries, and movements from
one currency to another, particularly with respect to dollars.
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24. Soviet economic capabilities and vulnerabilities
a. Soviet needs for imported technology to improve
productivity growth and military capabilities, and
successes in obtaining that technology.
b. The effect of the Soviet balance-of-payments position,
including gold production and sales, on ability of the USSR
to trade with non-communist countries and to undertake
credit obligations arising out of major new US investments.
c. The interaction of Soviet economic policies and
military expenditures, and its effect on Soviet economic,
political and military strength.
25. Crop prospects, demand and stockpiling
Information required for forecasting the international
market in 1974 for key cereal and vegetable proteins,
especially as influenced by the needs of the USSR, PRC
and Eastern Europe, and by national stockpiling policies.
26. Potential shortages
Identification of important natural resources or
products (other than petroleum and food crops) which will be
in limited or short supply in 1974, and any indications that
resource-rich less developed countries (LDCs) are usin or
intend to use competition among the United States,
and Western European nations for such resources as a tool
for influencing US economic or political policies.
27 25Xf6tternational economic policies of major US competitors
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GENERAL, WORLDWIDE
Some important problems for which intelligence inputs are
required at policy levels of the government are either worldwide in
scope or involve a number of countries in different areas of the
world. Rather than repeat the Key Intelligence Questions for each
country to which they apply, four questions of this nature are
grouped in this section.
28. Nuclear proliferation
Objectives and actions toward nuclear weapons
development, or the acquisition and deployment of
25X6 such weapons, b countries other than the USSR, PRC,
and the
29. Law of the Sea
Negotiating positions and bargaining vulnerabilities
of key countries on the form and content of a Law of the
Sea treaty, with particular attention to issues on which
the attitudes and intentions of these countries are likely
to be so contentious as to put in jeopardy prospects for
any treaty minimally acceptable to the United States.
30. Narcotics
a. Identification of the major producers and traffickers
in illicit narcotics and their methods of operation (i.e.,
where are their production areas, laboratories and storage
facilities, and how and by what routes and timing do they
move illicit narcotics to the United States).
25X6 b. Effectiveness of the anti-narcotics programs of
France, Turkey, Thailand, Burma and Laos (including
e wRingness of these governments to cooperate with
US efforts to expose and prosecute producers, traffickers
and their collaborators).
31. Activities of terrorist/extremist roues
a. Advance information on overseas attacks against
US citizens and property wherever terrorist or extremist
groups plan such operations.
b. Identification of the composition, intentions and
capabilities for foreign anti-US terrorist or extremist
groups (including their sources of funds and weapons,
the issues with which they identify, their relations with
other like-minded groups, the extent of government support
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or opposition, their impact on government policy and
stability of the regime, and any evidence of influence
from Moscow or Peking).
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