VALIDITY STUDY ON NIE 11-6-56 CAPABILITIES AND TRENDS OF SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PUBLISHED 9 OCTOBER 1956

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP82M00097R000600020030-1
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 6, 2006
Sequence Number: 
30
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Publication Date: 
August 19, 1959
Content Type: 
NOTES
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PDF icon CIA-RDP82M00097R000600020030-1.pdf72.37 KB
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Approved For Relwe 2006/01/17 :` QI 2M00097R0"00020030-1 USIB-D-16. 2/20 19 August 1959 Validity Study of NIE 11- 6 - 5 ~ Capabilities and Trends of Soviet Science and Technology Published 9 October 1956 The attached validity study of NIE 11-6 -56 was noted by the Intelligence Board on 18 August 1959 (USIB-M-53, item 5b)o Executive Secretary Approved For Release 2006/01/17 ~KRET DPR 2M00097R000600020030-1 Approved For Rel@6e 2006/01/17 i CW 2M00097R0W 1 00020030-1 USIB-D-16. 2/20 19 August 1959"' Validity Study of NIE 11 -6- - 5 Capabilities and Trends of Soviet Science and Technology Published 9 October 1956 1. We believe that the main judgments of this estimate, insofar as subsequent evidence has appeared, have proved to be valid. This applies particularly to judgments about the importance attached to science and technology in Soviet policy, financial support, increase in scientific and technical manpower, and Soviet progress in the fundamental sciences. Our estimates of Soviet military research and development also proved generally sound, notably with regard to (earth satellites, missiles, ground weapons, and electronics. However, Soviet aeronautical research and development capabilities now appear to have been overestimated. 2. On the subject of organization, planning, and control of Soviets: science, while the estimate did note the emphasis on the need for "closer relationships between scientific research and indihs'trial application, " it did not predict the major reorganization of Soviet research which accompanied the economic reorganization of 1957. Similarly, in the discussion of Soviet educational institutions, there was no forecast of the educational reforms proposed by Khrushchev in September 1958. It should be remarked, however, that these are specific developments of a kind which intelligence does not expect to predict, and failure to do so in no way affected the validity of the main estimates in this paper. Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP82M00097R000600020030-1 SECRET