VALIDITY STUDY OF SNIE 65-58 THE OUTLOOK IN INDONESIA PUBLISHED 12 AUGUST 1958 AND SNIE 65-59 LIKELIHOOD OF INDONESIAN ARMED ACTION AGAINST WEST NEW GUINEA PUBLISHED 10 FEBRUARY 1959

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP82M00097R000600020027-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 6, 2006
Sequence Number: 
27
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 18, 1959
Content Type: 
NOTES
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PDF icon CIA-RDP82M00097R000600020027-5.pdf62.16 KB
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Approved W Release 2006/01/17: CIA-RDP82MO 7R000600020027-5 Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP82M00097R000600020027-5 Approved For Releasi.Q006/01/17 SOCR&E2M00097R0006W020027-5 USIB-D-16. 2/23 "18 Decein.b:er 19:59 UN:'1TED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Validity Study of SNIE 65-58 The Outlook in Indonesia Published 12 August 1958 SNIE 65-59 Likelihood of Indonesian Armed Action Against West New Guinea Published 10 February 1959 The attached validity study of SNIE 65-58 and SNIE 65-59 was noted by the Intelligence Board on I:B: :c-emb:e?r 19.:59 (USIB-M.70, item 9. b. ). Executive Secretary Approved For Release 2006/01/17SpLAfp2M00097R000600020027-5 Approved For ReleasmL006/01/17 SEJG l 2M00097R0006 020027-5 USIB-D-16. 2/23 9 December 1959 Validity Study of SNIE 65-58 The Outlook in Indonesia Published 12 August ."19,58 SNIE 65-59 Likelihood of Indonesian Armed Action Against West New Guinea Published 1(0 February 1959 1. In the main SNIE 65-58 has held up well. In general, the estimates concerning probable Indonesian Communist Party tactics, the rebellion in the outer islands and the economy have been borne out by events. 2. The Communist reaction to the postponement of the ele-ctions was considerably more mild than we estimated. The estimate erred in indicating that Sukarno would probably seek to consolidate and strengthen the non-Communist parties to balance the growing electoral strength of the Communists. Instead, he has continued efforts to weaken the non- Communist parties and has depended more upon the army as a counter- weight to the Communists. 3. SNIE 65-59 has proven to be valid and we would make no important substantive changes in it today. Approved For Release 2006/01/1,E ralRf?P82M00097R000600020027-5