ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 22, 1960
• Content Type: MEMO

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22 August 1960
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: Annual Report to the National Security Council on the
Status of the Foreign Intelligence Program
REFERENCE: USIB -D-3. 2/6, 7 July 1960
1. Attached for Board review is a draft report in response to a memoran-
dum from the Executive Secretary.of.the National ..Security. Council, dated
1 July 1960. This memorandum. requested .that. the.C,entral Intelligence Agency,
in consultation with other departments and agencies, submit not later than
1 September 1960 a report on the status of the foreign intelligence program as
of June 30, 1960. Particular reference wa.t made to NSC 5906/1, the relevant
paragraph of which deals with establishing and.-maintaining an intelligence
system capable of providing early warning, assessing the capabilities of foreign
governments and anticipating important developments abroad.
2. This draft report has been prepared in the Intelligence Board Secre-
tariat on the basis of contributions from the member agencies and the various
subcommittees. It was reviewed and coordinated at a meeting to which all
interested agencies and subcommittees were invited to send representatives.
3. An annex on activities in the COMINT and ELINT fields is being cir-
culated separately through special channels as USIB -C- 5. 4/2.
4. In order to meet the deadline set forth by the NSC, this.report (in-
cluding the special annex) will appear on the Board agenda for the meeting of
30 August.
Executive Secretary
HEIRES
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22 August 1960
Second Draft
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE
STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM*
(Fiscal Year Ending 30 June 1960)
I. Organization, Inte.gation and Coordination
During its second year of operation, the United States Intelligence Board
moved further to solidify its managerial direction of the national foreign in-
telligence effort, while strengthening its over-all capabilities to follow closely
those world developments of particular interest to policy makers. This was
done principally through the vehicle of regular weekly Board meetings. In dis-
charging its responsibilities, however, the Board also received important
substantive and technical support from its. sub-committee structure and from
effective liaison and day-to-day working arrangements between the members
of the intelligence community, both in Washington and the field.
The Board's guidance of the community was effected primarily through
means such as the promulgation of broad intelligence directives, establishment
of priorities and requirements, and.s.pecific policy decisions. For example, in
approving a new list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives (DCID No, 1/3,
New Series) the Intelligence Board provided over-all guidance for coordination
of intelligence collection and production in response to requirements relating
*Activities in the COMINT and.ELINT fields are discussed in a Special Annex
to this report distributed through separate channels.
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to the formulation and execution of national security policy. In the clandestine
field, the Board also issued various new basic directives. These regulate the
coordination, liaison arrangements and cover support. for our espionage and
clandestine counter-intelligence activities abroad,(DCIDs No. 5/1; 5/2; 5/4,
New Series) and govern the operation of a central community index and re-
pository of certain counter-intelligence information (DCID No. 5/3, New Series).
Moreover, the community moved to-improve further its guidance for the
clandestine collection of priority. information, largely .through a new approach
involving the statement of requirements and. targets. on a world-wide rather
than country basis. The concept. that MAAG.and. certain non-intelligence
mission personnel should. report items of interest to intelligence was reiterated
and given further emphasis by a JCS directive, thus broadening our collection
base in areas where the attitude and influence ofthe military is often a key
factor.. We provided further operational guidance to field personnel on matters
With respect to overt collection, we revised our procedures and policies
for the coordination of such collection abroad (DCID No. 2/1, New Series). In
addition, special efforts were made, both at headquarters and in the field, to
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develop more effective coordination of overt collection activities by all repre-
sentatives of U. S. intelligence agencies stationed at
posts abroad. The Board also initiated a review of the directives providing
In the \picaonsprocurT
ment area, there was some improvement in our over-all ability to acquire
Soviet materials but important gaps persisted with respect to certain military
publications. Due to increasingly severe restrictions imposed by the Chinese
Communists upon the export of their materials, it was necessary to intensify
our specialized collection efforts in that field; nevertheless, procurement of
these publications is still a major problem with-particularly significant
deficiencies in the scientific and technological areas.
Despite the guidance furnished in both the overt and covert collection fields
through various general directives and the PNIO's, many practical difficulties
arise' in effectively implementing such basic guidance, especially in trans-
lating broad statements of priorities into the more specific requirements needed
for efficient collection in the field.
The community also directed attention to various priority collection matters
of a specialized nature. In support of U...S. research and development on
defense against Soviet ballistic missiles, for example, the Intelligence Board
established and transmitted to the Secretary of Defense a requirement for a
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specially equipped KC-135 aircraft, studie.d,..:intensively.the...possible use of
ships instrumented for this purpose and mounted. an, extensive community-
organized effort to observe .Soviet,_mis.sile tests. conducted in the Central
Pacific. The Board also estab.lished,.intelligence requirements for satellite
reconnaissance vehicles and for surveillance of foreign satellites.
With respect to intelligence documentation techniques and procedures, we
completed a major revision of, the communityls intelligence subject and area
indexing codes. We also continued to .study .the.. application of modern data pro-
cessing techniques, including the -potential of mechanical translation for
partially alleviating, some .of_our problems.
In the field of security, the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation
with the Board, issued.. guidance for..the implementation of the Presidential
directive regarding "Disclosure..s.of. Classified Intelligence"... We also developed
improved procedures and technique.s for carrying out our investigations of un-
authorized disclosures. The c.ommunity, in addition, undertook a thorough
review of the basic directive. governing dissemination and use of intelligence
(DCID 11/2).
In the area of fiscal and administrative planning, the Board issued a
coordinated cost data report covering the foreign intelligence activities of the
community as a whole for fiscal year 1959 and made some progress in the
development of uniform cost criteria. Moreover, our foreign intelligence
publications were examined, particularly from the standpoint of eliminating
possible duplication1 improving coordination and reducing costs. A plan for
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more effective intelligence support of the Government under emergency
conditions was also prepared by a community task force and submitted for
USIB consideration.
As before, we produced.a .large number of community-coordinated publi-
cations repre senting, in their respective fields, the end product of the entire
intelligence process. The National Intelligence .Estimates covered a wide range
of geographical areas and problems of interest to policy-makers, with special
emphasis on Soviet and Bloc activities. With respect to basic intelligence,
budget reductions and diversion of effort by contributing agencies prevented
achievement in FY 1960 of National Intelligence Survey production targets (and
may likewise in FY 1961) and required as an interim measure that maintenance
of previously published NIS be limited to higher priority areas and topics.
However, by the end of the year there had been essentially complete NIS
coverage of the JCS highest priority areas and approximately 80 percent of
initial world-wide coverage. The Current Intelligence Bulletin continued to
furnish all-source current intelligence on a coordinated, timely basis to the
highest policy levels in Government.
During the period we continued to benefit from intelligence liaison and ex-
changes with friendly foreign.governmets on both the overt and covert level,
particularly in our relations with the
intelligence authorities. 25X1
II. Early Warning Capabilities
The problem of providing strategic early warning continues to grow in
complexity in the face of increasing Soviet progress in advanced weapons
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systems, particularly in the field. of._.intercontinental ballistic missiles. Major
elements of our resources continue to be directed toward this problem. Never-
theless, no sure sources of warning of ICBM attack have been developed. Our
capability to provide warning. of attack by conventional forces (alone or in con-
junction with missiles) is a little more. hopeful, despite several developments
during the year which have adversely affected the quality and availability of
certain important types of warning information. In situations initially in-
volving more localized crise..s, advances in. analysis techniques, exchanges of
information, with
improvements in the . speed of communi-
cation and liaison and collaboration within the intelligence community have
helped to improve the chances for timely warning.
In the courage of the year, the
Intelligence Alert Indicator List
was revised and the basic le.rts. Agreement amended. Generally
speaking, the Agreement was broadened to provide for exchange of information
assessed as indicating that a nation of the Sino-Soviet Bloc is about to engage
in international hostilities anywhere in the world, as opposed to the earlier
limitation to the NATO area. With the completion of preliminary elements of
the Warning Systems Survey, action was taken both toward developing valid
missile indicators in cooperatio and
following up other leads and suggestions arising from the Survey. In addition,
the Watch Committee of the USIB has initiated a thorough re-examination of
its charter and procedures. Various automatic data processing systems also
are being investigated for their potential use to the strategic warning system.
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In the related field of communications, ..as the CRITIC system continued to
operate, its procedures were further .developed and additional steps were taken
to implement the Department of-Defense "Criticom" Plan designed to augment
and improve transmission facilities. It now appears that where U. S. Govern-
ment-operated communications are involved there is a high likelihood that
within the foreseeable future ill move to Washington with
average speeds approaching 10 minutes; however,. the-prospects are much less
encouraging where we must depe.nd..on commercial or non-U. S. Government-
operated communications facilities. Nevertheless, despite these advances,
our over-all capabilities for providing strategic early warning remain limited,
and the warning problem appears likely to grow even more difficult for intelli-
gence as we move further into the missile era.
III, Intelligence Capabilities by Area
A. The Sino-Soviet Bloc
1. USSR
There have been no substantial. changes during the year in our capa-
bilities with respect to political intelligence on the USSR. Our judgments con-
tinued to be based primarily on a wide variety of available overt source materials.
We also benefited to some extent from increased contacts between Westerners
and Soviet nationals at all levels, including Mr. Khrushchev himself, and from
clandestinely acquired information. Accordingly, we are able to gauge the
general pattern and direction of Soviet policy and, at times, to predict its
course over the short term. However, we are seldom in a position to anticipate
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particular Soviet foreign policy moves or significant shifts of power on the
internal scene. Regarding the Sino-.Soviet relationship, major uncertainties
persist but the emergence of almost open debate between the countries provided
us with valuable evidence bearing on this question. The expanding political
and economic offensive of the_..Sino-Soviet Bloc in 'underdeveloped and newly
emerging countries also remains a priority target.
We continue to be able to assess the broad strengths and'weaknesses of
the Soviet economy with considerable confidence. Our ability to forecast the
long-range growth prospects of that economy -improved during the year through
the development of more reliable. research and analytical tools. Mission-
oriented analyses of military expenditures were carried out for the first time,
offering new and firmer insights into .the costing .of Soviet military programs and
providing a more useful base .for comparison of U. S.. and Soviet military out-
lays. Nevertheless., despite .a.-concerted effort to focus on economic aspects
of the production of military equipment_a.nd.e.speeially guided missile weapons
systems, serious gaps remain in our information on these areas, including on
ICBMs. However, general pr.o.gre..ss. along all these fronts is enabling us to
clarify and redefine certain priority economic. intelligence collection require -
ments.
Military intelligence collection in the USSR. remains a major problem due
to factors such as stringent Soviet internal security measures and. the in-
creasingly difficult and costly effort required to obtain data on complex new
weapons systems. Moreover, in the cessation of U-2.flights the community
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lost a highly valuable source of. intelligence on areas of critical importance to
the U. S. . Despite these diffi.cultes, we are still able to assess with reasonable
assurance the broad military capabilities of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless,
we are hampered increasingly by the cumulative effects of certain continuing
gaps in our information, especially concerning rapidly developing changes in
Soviet military organization and doctrine as well as in their advanced weapons
capabilities. The most. pres.s.ing.need.at present concerns the development of
the Soviet ICBM program and the current and prospective scale of ICBM opera-
ational deployment. Other urgent problems concern two Soviet defensive pro-
grams against U. S. retaliatory forces: the Soviet anti-ballistic missile system
and the anti-submarine warfare system. Additionally, despite intensified
collection efforts, we have been unable to acquire topographic maps and
geodetic data required for the identification an.d_precis.e targeting of military
objectives in the Soviet Union in the detail required for the effective employ-
ment of ballistic missiles. A mapping and geodetic .earth satellite, presently
in an advanced stage of development, offers some hope of meeting these require-
ments..
During the past year, we .improved our coverage. of Soviet programs
in the. atomic energy field. Useful new information, was obtained, for example,
on the production rates and grades of Soviet Bloc uranium ores. We refined
our estimate of Soviet U-235 production; however, we feel less certain than
last year about our estimate on plutonium production. We also gained further
information on the general status of Soviet reactor technology as well as on the
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cutback in the Soviet nuclear-.electric. power program. In addition, we have
identified Soviet programs for the construction of nuclear submarines, but
still have not identified specific Soviet research and .development-.programs
for nuclear propulsion of aircraft, rockets, ormissile_s. Our knowledge of
nuclear weapon fabrication and stockpile sites in the USSR has increased but
weaknesses persist in our intelligence on the types and quantities of nuclear
weapons stockpiled by the Russians.
Principally through extensive and costly collection and analysis
efforts, there has been some.increase in our general knowledge of the USSR
missile, anti-missile missile .and space pro.grams during the past year. Our
firmest intelligence continues to ..c once rn.Soviet re-search and development in
these fields, especially on ballistic missiles. Some progress was made in
and valuable new data were acquired through
means such as our community .organized.observations of Soviet test firings
in the Central Pacific. Nevertheless, as a consequence of Soviet security
restrictions and the complexity of the technical problems, critical gaps remain
in our information on matters such as location and identification of Soviet oper-
ational sites, deployment patterns, missile production, stockpiling and related
training activities.
As a result of analytical studies and further exploitation of both overt
and clandestine collection opportunities, we improved our intelligence on
Soviet science and technology. However, our capabilities in these fields are
limited by serious existing deficiencies in our raw data. Nevertheless, gains
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occurred especially in the fields of., fundamental sciences, organization and
control of science, education in the-sciences, conventional weapons systems
(including BW and CW), electronics (particularly with respect to Soviet air
and missile defense systems), earth satellite and space vehicles, and communi-
cations. Moreover, we have a firmer understanding of the role of Soviet
science as an instrument of national power,
2. Communist China
Although we registered some improvements in both our overt and
clandestine reporting on Communist China, our over-all coverage of that country
continues to fall considerably short of essential needs in virtually all areas.
Open source materials, and information furnished to us by friendly countries
in Communist China
provide us with a general knowledge of principal developments; how-
ever, they do not constitute a satisfactory basis for predicting specific events
or redirections in either the domestic or foreign policy fields. While our
military intelligence is sufficient for .generalized assessments, it remains de-
ficient in important areas such as Chin,e.se Communist moves to develop or
acquire nuclear weapons. Similarly, our scientific intelligence tends to be
adequate only for broad judgments as to the size, direction and progress of
Communist China's scientific effort. In the economic field, there continues
to be a large volume of Chinese Communist materials available, but accurate
assessments are handicapped by the unreliability of these data and by the lack
of adequate confirmatory evidence.
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3. Other Bloc Areas
The quantity and quality of intelligence on most Bloc countries continue
to suffer from regime security policies which restrict contacts with citizens or
officials, limit travel and hamper. other intelligence activities. Despite these
policies, however, a modest increase in contacts with Bloc officials and a
larger flow of tourists to the Eastern European Bloc areas during the year pro-
vided us with some additional collection opportunities. Poland in particular
tolerated relatively free contact. Both our overt and covert coverage of East
Germany is good, with covert sources providing especially valuable data on GDR
political affairs as well as on intra-Bloc relations, Nevertheless, our informa-
tion on the Eastern European Bloc countries does not provide us with a reliable
basis for the prediction of uprisings or new policy orientations. Our intelligence
data on North Korea, North Vietnam, and Mongolia remain generally limited
and, in certain categories such as order of battle information, are seriously
inadequate.
B. Non-Bloc Areas
Our intelligence coverage of Western Europe continued to be extensive and
generally satisfactory; the problem is more one of analyzing the large volume
of material available than of acquiring additional data. However, we would
benefit from further coverage of NATO and defense activities of these countries,
and additional information on trends in popular attitudes and reactions to inter-
national events in certain countries.
There was a steady increase during the year in our over-all capabilities to
collect intelligence on the Middle East from both overt and clandestine sources,
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For example, Qasim?s difficulties and the conflict between Communists and
nationalists in Iraq, as well as the emerging problems in Iran were all well-
covered. The greatest advances in political intelligence collection were made
in Iraq (where our collection had been seriously disrupted by the revolution of
the previous year), while limited progress was achieved in countries such as
I fghanistan. Military intelligence on the Middle Eastern
countries continues to be generally adequate to assess capabilities in broad
terms but it remains relatively weak on details concerning the Iraqi, Afghan,
as well as important data bearing on intra-regional
and UAR forces.
disputes.
Our intelligence on non-Communist Asia remains satisfactory in most
respects, although there are variations from country to country in the depth
of coverage and difficulties of analysis. Reporting
~as
particularly improved during the year, and establishment of a new attache
I
25X1
should improve our capabilities in the troubled northern border
areas. On the whole, s suf-
ficiently good, but significant gaps exist below that level and become extremely 25X1
important when the top layer of government is replaced, as in Korea. We also
need additional information about existing and potential coup groups within the
various governments, other dissident movements and the machinations of
Communists in the area.
The sudden recent emergence of a number of new nations in Africa, com-
bined with increased Communist penetration and political instability in the area,
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has considerably expanded requirements for intelligence. Our ability to fulfill
these rapidly growing requirements is severely limited. However, diplomatic
representation was increased, steps were taken to enlarge service attache
coverage, and moves were made to develop and expand our current and po-
tential clandestine capabilities. Greatly intensified efforts will be needed,
nevertheless, to remedy our deficiencies in information on local economic and
social organization, political groupings, military establishments, and bio-
graphic and other data about the myriad of new leaders.
Although our intelligence on.Latin America was strengthened during the
year, swiftly moving events have placed additional demands on intelligence in
that area. Major problems stem from ultra-nationalism frequently coupled
with anti-U. S. sentiment and extremist intrigues, as well as from the rapid
pace of social and political development. These have been complicated by the
sharp rise in Sino-Soviet Bloc influ,pnce:s in-Cuba and increased Communist
subversion elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. Such developments further
underscore our needs for information about the leadership and organization of
revolutionary and reform elements and on the political reliability of the security
and military forces.
IV. Outlook
We expect to make further progre.s.s in the areas of integration, coordination
and management of the national foreign intelligence effort. In this connection,
the question of establishing priorities and requirements and making the most
efficient allocation of available assets on a community-wide basis in the face of
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increasing demands on resources will remain one of our most difficult and
challenging problems. We_ho:pe to.d.evelop more refined procedures for as-
certaining intelligence costs .and to improve further.our coordinating machinery
for both clandestine and overt collection. In addition, we should benefit from
the greater experience of. our analysts and from more efficient intelligence-
handling techniques, including increased use of modern data processing as
appropriate..
In terms of substantive coverage, we may reasonably expect to alleviate
many of our more serious pre-sent intelligence gaps on non-Bloc areas. This,
however, will require a greater concentration of our resources on under-
developed and uncommitted c.ountrie.s, including increases in diplomatic, service
attache and clandestine coverage, further. development of area experts, special
language training programs, and... s.ubs.tant.ially increased
In both these and other non-Bloc countries there also must be greater emphasis
on intelligence regarding opposition elements and minority groups, second
echelon military and political leaders, public attitudes, important economic
developments, and other factors potentially contributing to political instability
or vulnerability to Bloc penetration.
With respect to Bloc areas, there appears to be no prospect of an early
relaxation of the stringent security restrictions which seriously hamper our
collection activities. As a result, our political, scientific, and economic
intelligence will probably continue to rely heavily on analysis of material from
essentially overt sources for the foreseeable future, particularly on priority
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targets such as the USSR and. Communist China. Weexpect to register some
gains in military intelligence through increasing our overt and covert collection
assets, improving analytical methods and developing better technical collection
techniques. New devices, such as reconnaissance satellites also offer hope,
when fully operational, of overcoming certain deficiencies in our coverage.
Nevertheless, we are faced with formidable obstacles in reducing our existing
gaps or in meeting inevitable new requirements in many important areas of
military intelligence. In the early warning field, we shall continue to study
intensively the indications and warning source.s question, improve our communi-
cations procedures, benefit from more modern transmission facilities and
develop more efficient processing procedures. However, in the light of the
growing capabilities of advanced weapons..sy.stems, the early warning problem
appears likely to increase rather than diminish in complexity and difficulty for
intelligence. Under these circumstances, while expecting:. important improve-
ments in our over-all coverage, we cannot predict with confidence an early
elimination of many of the more serious deficiencies in our intelligence on
the Bloc.
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USIB-D-3.28
11 August 1960
First Draft
Distribution: Regular "D" except N,SC
Plus 2 copies to each of the following:
Chairman, COMINT
Chairman, Committee on Critical Communications
Chairman, Committee on Documentation
Chairman, Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Langujage Publications
Chairman, Committee on International Communism
Chairman, Committee on Procurement of Foreign Publications
Chairman, Cost Estimates Committee
Secretary, Critical Collection Problems Committee
Chairman, Domestic Exploitation Committee
Chairman, Electronics Intelligence Committee
Chairman, Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
Chairman, Interagency Defector Committee
Chairman, Interagency Priorities Committee
Chairman, National Intelligence Survey Committee
Chairman, Satellite Intelligence Requirements Committee
Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee
Chairman, Security Committee
Director, NIC, Watch Committee
Approved For Release 2006/11/08: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010003-5