REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AS OF 30 JUNE 1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 31, 1960
• Content Type: MF

TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
t 690- T when filled in form is d6swoehed from controlled document.
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
SOURCE
ff
M7 i
ssU ,3,2/1O ??. .
CIA CONTROL NO.
DOC. NO.
31 Aug 1 50
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE
18 e,
COPY NO.
V
a 11t
,
LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES
~~
h
TOPSECE
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it
is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control
personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive
and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand
columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the
right-hand columns
REFERRED TO
RECEIVED
RELEASED
SEEN BY
OFFICE
SIGNATURE
DATE
TIME
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE AND OFFICE
DATE
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate
spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
DOWNGRADED
DESTROYED
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
TO
BY (Signature)
TO
BY (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
BY (Signature)
DATE
DATE
OFFICE
DATE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
V `Ir
15,1
TS #172743-a
USIB-D-3. 2/10
31 August 1960
Final - USIB Approved
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MEMORANDUM FOR The Executive Secretary
National Security Council
SUBJECT Report on the Status of the Foreign
Intelligence Program as of 30 June 1960
1. The attached report has been prepared pursuant to Presidential
directive as forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence through
your memorandum of 1 July 1960. A Special Annex on COMINT and ELINT
matters is being transmitted through separate channels.
2. On 30 August 1960 the United States Intelligence Board concurred
in this report and its Special Annex.
NSC 6013, Part 6
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
TS #172743-a
USIB-D-3, 2/10
30 August 1960
Final - USIB Approved
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE
STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
(Fiscal Year Ending 30 June 1960)
Submitted by
United States Intelligence Board.
August 1960
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
 T "I T% !\ Tom'" r1 1" T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
TS72743-a
USIB -D-3. 2 /10
30 August 1960
Final - USIB Approved
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE
STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM*
(Fiscal Year Ending 30 June 1960)
I. Organization, Integration and Coordination
During its second year of operation, the United States Intelligence Board
moved further to solidify its managerial direction of the national foreign in-
telligence effort, while strengthening its over-all capabilities to follow closely
those world developments of particular interest to policy makers,, This was
done principally through the vehicle of regular weekly Board meetings. In dis-
charging its responsibilities, the Board received important substantive and
technical support from its committee structure and from effective liaison and
day-to-day working arrangements between the members of the intelligence
community, both in Washington and the field.
The Board's guidance of the community was effected primarily through
means such as the promulgation of broad intelligence directives, establishment
of priorities and requirements, and specific policy decisions. For example, in
approving a new list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives (DCID No. 1/3,
New Series) the Intelligence Board provided over-all guidance for coordination
of intelligence collection and production in response to requirements relating
*Activities in the COMINT and ELINT fields are discussed in a Special Annex
to this report distributed through separate channels.
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
 'rnn crnnr. rr
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
TS72743-a.
USIB-D-3, 2/10
to the formulation and execution of national .security policy. In the clandestine
field, the Board also issued various new basic directives, These regulate the
coordination, liaison arrangements and cover support for our espionage and
clandestine counter-intelligence activities abroad (DCIDs No. 5/1; 5/2; 5/4,
New Series) and govern the operation of a central community index and re-
pository of certain counter-intelligence information (DCID No. 5/3, New Series
Moreover, the community moved to improve further its guidance for the
clandestine collection of priority information, largely through a new approach
involving the statement of requirements and targets on a world-wide rather
than country basis. The concept. that MAAG.and certain non-intelligence
mission personnel should report items of interest to intelligence was reiterated
and given further emphasis by a J.CS directive, thus-broadening our collection
base in areas where the attitude and influence of the military is often a key
factor. We provided further operational guidance to field personnel on matters
With respect to overt collection, we revised our procedures and policies
for the coordination of such collection abroad (DCID No. 2/1, New Series). In
addition, special efforts were made, both at headquarters and in the field, to
-2-
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
 '7%n c?n"nr?r+
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
TS172743 -a
USIB-D-3. 2/10
develop more effective coordination of overt collection activities by all repre-
sentatives of U. S. intelligence agencies stationed at
posts abroad, The Board also initiated a review of the directives providing
In the publications procure -
ment area, there was some improvement in our over-all ability to acquire
Soviet materials but important gaps persisted with respect to certain military
publications. Due to increasingly severe restrictions .imposed by the Chinese
Communists upon the export of their materials, it was necessary to intensify
our specialized collection efforts in that field; nevertheless, procurement of
these publications is still a major problem with particularly significant
deficiencies in the scientific and technological areas.
Despite the guidance furnished in both the overt and covert collection fields
through various general directives and the PNIO's, many,practital' difficulties
arise' . in effectively implementing such basic guidance, especially in trans-
lating broad statements of priorities into the more specific requirements needed
for efficient collection in the field.
The community also directed attention to various priority collection matters
of a specialized nature. In support of U. S. research and development on
defense against Soviet ballistic missiles, for example, the Intelligence Board
established and transmitted to the Secretary of Defense a requirement for a
-3-
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
T 172743-a;
USIB -D-3. 2 /10
specially equipped KC-135 aircraft, studied. intensively the. possible use of
ships instrumented for this purpose and mounted an extensive community-
organized effort to observe.Soviet missile tests conducted in the Central
Pacific. The Board also established intelligence requirements for satellite
reconnaissance vehicles and for surveillance of foreign satellites.
With respect to intelligence documentation techniques and procedures, we
completed a major revision .of. the community's intelligence subject and area
indexing codes. We also continued to study the application of modern data pro-
cessing techniques, including the potential of mechanical translation for
partially alleviating some of_.our problems.
In the field of security, the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation
with the Board, issued guidance for the implementation of the Presidential
directive regarding "Disclosures of Classified Intelligence". We also developed
improved procedures and techniques for carrying out our investigations of un-
authorized disclosures. The community, in addition, undertook a thorough
review of the basic directive governing dissemination and use of intelligence
1(DCID 11/2).
In the area of fiscal and administrative planning, the Board issued a
coordinated cost data report covering the foreign intelligence activities of the
community as a whole for fiscal year 1959 and made some progress in the
development of uniform cost criteria. Moreover, our foreign intelligence
publications were examined, particularly from the standpoint of eliminating
possible duplications improving coordination and reducing costs. A plan for
-4 -
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
 ""-% T% e, r, " 71 r, F"
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
T172743-a
USIB-D-3.2/:10
more effective intelligence support of the Government under emergency
conditions 'was also prepared by a community task force and submitted for
USIB consideration.
As before, we produced a large number of community-coordinated publi-
cations representing,in their respective fields, the end product of the entire
intelligence process. The National Intelligence Estimates covered a wide range
of geographical areas and problems of interest to policy-makers, with special
emphasis on Soviet and Bloc activities. With respect to basic intelligence,
budget reductions and diversion of effort by contributing agencies prevented
achievement in FY 1960 of National Intelligence Survey production targets (and
may likewise in FY 1961) and required as an interim measure that maintenance
of previously published NIS be limited to higher priority areas and topics,
However, by the end of the year there had been essentially complete NIS
coverage of the JCS highest priority areas and approximately 80 percent of
initial world-wide coverage. The Current Intelligence Bulletin continued to
furnish all-source current intelligence on a coordinated, timely basis to the
highest policy levels in Government.
During the period we continued to benefit from intelligence liaison and ex-
changes with friendly foreign governments on both the overt and covert level,
particularly in our relations with the
intelligence authorities.
II. Early Warning Capabilities
The problem of providing strategic early warning continues to grow in
complexity in the face of increasing Soviet progress in advanced weapons
-5-
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
T.172743 -a
USIB-D-3, 2/10
systems, particularly in the field of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Major
elements of our resources continue to be directed toward this problem. Never-
theless, no sure, sources of warning of ICBM attack have been developed. Our
capability to provide warning of attack by conventional forces (alone or in con-
.junction with missiles) is a little more hopeful, despite several developments
during the year which have adversely affected the quality and availability of
certain. important types of warning information. In situations initially in-
volving more localized crises, advances in analysis techniques, exchanges of
information,with improvements in the speed of communi-
cation and liaison and collaboration within the intelligence community have
helped to improve the chances for timely warning.
In the course of the year, .the ntelligence Alert Indicator List 25X1
25X1 was revised and the basic Alerts Agreement amended. Generally
speaking, the Agreement was broadened to provide for exchange ,of information
assessed as indicating that a nation of_the Sino-Soviet Bloc is about to engage
in international hostilities anywhere in the world, as opposed to the earlier
limitation to the NATO area. With the completion of preliminary elements of
the Warning Systems Survey, action was taken both toward developing valid
missile indicators in cooperation and
following up other leads and suggestions arising from the Survey. In addition,
the Watch Committee of the USIB has initiated a thorough re-examination of
its charter and procedures. Various automatic data processing systems also
are being investigated for their potential use to the strategic warning system,
- 6 -
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
TaS172743-a
USIB-D-3, 2/10
In the related field of communications, as the CRITIC system continued to
operate, its procedures were further developed and additional steps were taken
to implement the Department of-Defense "Criticom" Plan designed to augment
and improve transmission facilities. It now appears that where U. S. Govern-
ment-operated communications are involved there is a high likelihood that
within the foreseeable future ill move to Washington with 25X1
average speeds approaching 10 minutes; however, the prospects are much less
encouraging where we must depend.on commercial or non-U. S. Government-
operated .coriimunications facilities. Nevertheless, despite these advances,
our over-all capabilities for providing strategic early warning remain limited,
and the warning problem appears likely to grow even more difficult for intelli-
gence as we move further into the missile era.
III. Intelligence Capabilities by Area
A. The Sino-Soviet Bloc
1. USSR
There have been no substantial changes during the year in our capa-
bilities with respect to political intelligence on the USSR. Our judgments con-
tinued to be based primarily on a wide variety of available overt source materials.
We also benefited to some extent from increased contacts between Westerners
and Soviet nationals at all levels, including Mr. Khr.ushchev himself, and from
clandestinely acquired information. Accordingly, we are able to gauge the
general pattern and direction of. Soviet policy and, at times, to predict its
course over the short term. However, we are .seldom in a position to anticipate
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
T1.72743 -a
USIB -D-3. 2 /10
particular Soviet foreign policy moves or significant shifts of power on the
internal scene. , Regarding the Sino-Soviet relationship, major uncertainties
persist but the emergence of almost open debate between the countries provided
us with valuable evidence bearing on this question. The expanding political
and economic offensive of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in underdeveloped and newly
emerging countries also remains a priority target.
We continue to be able to assess the broad strengths and weaknesses of
the Soviet economy with considerable confidence. Our ability to forecast the
long-range growth prospects of that economy improved during the year through
the development of more reliable research and analytical tools. Mission-
oriented analyses of military expenditures were carried out for the first time.,
offering new and firmer insights into the costing of Soviet military programs and
providing a more useful base for comparison of U. S. and Soviet military out-
lays. Nevertheless, despite a concerted effort to focus on economic aspects
of the production of military equipment and especially guided missile weapons
systems, serious gaps remain in our information on these areas, including on
ICBMs. However, general progress along all these fronts is enabling us to
clarify and redefine certain priority economic intelligence collection require-
ments.
Collection of military intelligence in the USSR remains a major problem
due to factors such as stringent Soviet internal security measures and the in-
creasingly difficult and costly effort required to obtain data on complex new
weapons systems. Moreover, in the cessation of U-2 flights the community
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
~++ TW 172743
USIB-D-3, 2/10
lost a highly valuable source of intelligence on areas of critical importance to
the U. S. Despite these difficulties, we are still able to assess with reasonable
assurance the broad military capabilities of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless,
we are hampered increasingly by the cumulative effects of certain continuing
gaps in our information, especially concerning rapidly developing changes in
Soviet military organization and doctrine as well as in their advanced weapons
capabilities. The most pressing need at present concerns the development of
the Soviet ICBM program and the current and prospective location and scale of
ICBM operational deployment. Other urgent problems concern two Soviet de-
fensive programs against U. S. retaliatory forces: the Soviet anti-ballistic
missile system and the anti-.submarine warfare system. Additionally, despite
intensified collection efforts, we have been unable to acquire topographic maps
and geodetic data in the detail required for all :military purposes. , Reconnais-
sance, mapping and geodetic earth satellites, presently in an advanced stage
of development, offer prospects of meeting these requirements.
During the past year, we improved our coverage of Soviet programs
in the atomic energy field. Useful new information was obtained, for example,
on the production rates and grades of Soviet Bloc uranium ores. We refined
our estimate of Soviet U-235 production; however, we feel less certain than
last year about our estimate on plutonium production. We also gained further
information on the general status of Soviet reactor technology as well as on the
cutback in the Soviet nuclear-electric power program. In addition, we have
now identified probable Soviet projects for the construction of nuclear sub-
-9-
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
TS # 172743-a
USIB-D-3. 2/10
marines, but still have not identified specific Soviet research and development,
programs for nuclear propulsion of aircraft, rockets, or missiles. Our
knowledge of nuclear weapon fabrication and stockpile sites in the USSR has
increased but weaknesses persist in our intelligence on the types and quantities
of nuclear weapons stockpiled by the Russians.
Principally through extensive and costly collection and analysis
efforts, there has been some increase in our general knowledge of the USSR
missile, anti-ballistic missile and space programs during the past year. Our
firmest intelligence continues to concern Soviet research and development in
these fields, especially on ballistic missiles. Some progress was made in
Hd valuable new data were acquired through
means such as our community-organized observations of Soviet test firings
into the Central Pacific. Nevertheless, as a consequence of Soviet security
restrictions and the complexity of the technical problems, critical gaps re-
main in our information an matters such as location and identification of
Soviet operational sites, deployment patterns, missile production, stock-
piling and related training activities.
As a result of analytical studies and further exploitation of both overt
and clandestine collection opportunities, we improved our intelligence on
Soviet science and technology. However, our capabilities in these fields are
limited by serious existing deficiencies in our raw data. Nevertheless, gains
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
T172743
USIB-D-3. 2/10
occurred especially in the fields of fundamental sciences, organization and
control of science, education in the. sciences, conventional weapons systems
(including BW and CW), electronics (particularly with respect to Soviet air
and missile defense systems), earth satellite and space vehicles, and communi-
cations. Moreover, we have a firmer understanding of the role of Soviet
science as an instrument of national power.
2. Communist China
Although we registered some improvements in both our overt and
clandestine reporting on Communist China, our over-all coverage of that country
continues to fall considerably short of essential needs in virtually all areas.
Open source materials, and information furnished to us by friendly countries
n Communist China
ever, they do not constitute a satisfactory basis for predicting specific events
or redirections in either the domestic or foreign policy fields. While our
military intelligence is sufficient for .generalized assessments, it remains de-
ficient in important areas such as Chin,e.se Communist moves to develop or
acquire nuclear weapons. Similarly, our scientific intelligence tends to be
adequate only for broad judgments as to the size, direction and progress of
Communist China's scientific effort. In the economic field, there continues
to be a large volume of Chinese Communist materials available, but accurate
assessments are handicapped by the unreliability of these data and by the lack
of adequate confirmatory evidence,
provide us with a general knowledge of principal developments; how-
- 11 -
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
TS 172743 -a
USIB -D-3. 2 /10
3. Other Bloc. Areas
The quantity and quality of. intelligence on most Bloc countries continue
to suffer from. regime security policies which restrict contacts with citizens or
officials, limit travel and hamper other intelligence activities. Despite these
policies, however, a modest increase In contacts with Bloc officials and a
larger flow of tourists to the Eastern European Bloc areas during the year pro-
vided us with some additional collection opportunities. Poland in particular
tolerated relatively free. contact. Both our overt and covert coverage of East
Germany is good, with covert sources providing especially valuable data on GDR
political affairs as well as on intra-Bloc relations. Nevertheless, our informa
tion on the Eastern European Bloc countries does not provide us with a reliable
basis for the prediction of uprisings or new policy orientations. Our intelligence
data on North Korea, North Vietnam, and Mongolia remain generally limited
and, in certain categories such as order of battle information, are seriously
inadequate.
B. Non-Bloc Areas
Our intelligence coverage of Western Europe continued to be extensive and
generally satisfactory; the problem is more one of analyzing the large volume
of material available than of acquiring additional data. However, we would
benefit from further coverage of NATO and defense activities of these countries,
particularly those related to the situation in Africa, and additional information
on trends in popular attitudes and reactions to international events in certain
countries.
There was a steady increase during the year in our over-all capabilities to
TOP 12.SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
T'?172743 -a
USIB_D-3, 2/10
collect intelligence on the Middle East from both overt and clandestine sources.
For example, Qasim's difficulties and the conflict between Communists and
nationalists in Iraq, as well as the emerging problems in Iran were all well-
covered. The greatest advances in political intelligence collection were made
in Iraq (where our collection had been seriously disrupted by the revolution of
the previous year), while limited progress was achieved in countries such as
countries continues to be generally adequate to assess capabilities in broad
terms but it remains relatively weak on details concerning the Iraqi, Afghan,
Afghanistan, Military intelligence on the Middle Eastern
and UAR forces,
25X1
regional disputes,
as well as important data bearing on intra-
Our intelligence on non-Communist Asia remains satisfactory in most
respects, although there are variations from country-to-country in the depth
of coverage and difficulties of analysis. Reporting was
particularly improved during the year, and establishment of a new attache
~hould improve our capabilities in the troubled northern border
areas. On the whole,
ficiently good, but significant gaps exist' below that level and become extremely
important when the top layer of government is replaced, as in Korea. We also
need additional information about existing and potential coup groups within the
various governments, other dissident movements and the machinations of
Communists in the area.
The sudden recent emergence of a number of new nations in Africa, com-
TOP13SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
T 172743 -a
USIB-D-3. 2/10
bined with increased Communist penetration and political instability in the area,
has considerably expanded requirements for intelligence. Our ability to fulfill
these rapidly growing requirements is severely limited. However, diplomatic
representation was increased, steps were taken to enlarge service attache cover-
age, and moves were made to develop and expand our current and potential
clandestine capabilities. Greatly intensified efforts will be needed, neverthe-
less, to remedy our deficiencies in information on local economic and social
organization, political groupings, military establishments, and biographic aid
other data about the myriad of new leaders.
Although our. intelligence on Latin America was strengthened during the
year, swiftly moving events have placed additional demands on intelligence in
that area. Major problems stem from ultra-nationalism frequently coupled
with anti-U. S. sentiment and extremist intrigues, as well as from the rapid
pace of social and political development. These have been complicated by the
sharp rise in. Sino-Soviet Bloc influences in Cuba and.increased Communist
subversion elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. Such developments further
underscore our needs for information about the leadership and organization of
revolutionary and reform elements and on the political reliability of the security
and military forces.
IV, Outlook
We expect to make further progress in the areas of integration, coordination
and management of the national foreign intelligence effort. In this connection,
the question of establishing priorities and requirements and making the most
efficient allocation of available assets on a community-wide basis in the face of
TOP l4 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
T64 172743
USIB?-17-3, 2/10
increasing demands on resources will remain one of our most difficult and
challenging- problems. We hope to develop more refined procedures for as-
certaining intelligence costs and to improve further .our coordinating machinery
for both clandestine and overt collection. In addition, we should benefit from
the greater experience of our analysts and from more efficient intelligence-
handling techniques, including increased use of modern .data processing as
appropriate..
In terms of substantive coverage, we may reasonably expect to alleviate
many of our more serious pre-sent intelligence gaps on non-Bloc areas. This,
however, will require a greater concentration of our resources on under-
developed and uncommitted c.ountr.ies, including increases in diplomatic, service
attache and clandestine coverage, further development of area experts, special
language training programs, an.d.substant.ially increased
In both these and other non-B.loc countries there.also must be greater emphasis
on intelligence regarding opposition elements and. minority groups, second
echelon military and political leaders, public attitudes, important economic
developments, and other factors potentially contributing to political instability
or vulnerability to Bloc penetration.
With respect to Bloc areas, there appears to be no prospect of an early
relaxation of the stringent security restrictions which seriously hamper our
collection activities. As a result, our political, scientific, and economic
intelligence will probably continue to rely heavily on analysis of material from
essentially overt sources for the foreseeable future, particularly on priority
- 15 -
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
 T/l n n"doll n"r"
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6
%Now Tc 172743
USIB -D - 3. 2/10
targets such as the USSR and Communist China. We expect to register some
gains in military intelligence through increasing our overt and covert collection
.assets, improving analytical methods and developing better technical collection
.techniques. New devices, such as reconnaissance satellites also offer hope,
when fully operational, of overcoming certain deficiencies in our coverage.
Nevertheless, we are faced with formidable obstacles in reducing our existing
gaps o.r
ting inevitable. new requirements in many important areas of
military Intelligence. In the early warning..fi.eld, we. shall continue to study
intensively the indications and warning sources question, improve our communi-
cations procedures, benefit from more modern transmission facilities and
develop more efficient processing procedures. However, in the light of the
growing capabilities of advanced weapons systems, the early warning problem
appears likely to increase rather than diminish in complexity and difficulty for
intelligence. Under these circumstances, while expecting important improve-
meats. in our over-all coverage, we cannot predict with confidence an early
elimination of many of the more serious deficiencies in our intelligence on
the Bloc.
- 16 -
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP82M00097R000300010002-6