PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE 1976-1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82B00871R000100170019-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2006
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: October 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTOR of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Perspectives for Intelligence
1976-1981
Secret
October 1975
USIB/IRAC-D-22.1 /44
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SECRET
NOFORN
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE
1976 -1981
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NOFORN
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Introduction ......................................................... 1
Part I-Major World Problems ........................................ 2
Part II-The Role of Intelligence ...................................... 8
Part III-Implications for Intelligence Planning ......................... 12
Part IV-Implementation ............................................. 17
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NOFORN
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE
1976 -1981
Introduction
1. Perspectives for Intelligence, looking five years into the future, are issued
annually by the Director of Central Intelligence to provide general guidance for
all elements of the Intelligence Community. In particular, these statements of
perspectives are designed to stimulate early action and planning on programs
requiring long developmental lead times prior to their execution-such as com-
plex technical systems, language training, the augmentation of skills, etc. These
Perspectives for 1976-1981 are intended to influence Fiscal Year 1976 decisions
whose effects will be felt or results fully manifest only after several years. Near
term guidance for Fiscal Year 1976 is provided in the Objectives the Director has
submitted to the President, which included both Substantive Objectives (further
articulated in the Key Intelligence Questions-KIQs) and Resource Management
Objectives. The Director's Annual Report to the President on the work of the Intel-
ligence Community will include comments on steps taken during FY 1976 to meet
future requirements as outlined in these Perspectives.
2. The Perspectives open with a general overview of the international politi-
cal, economic and security environment anticipated during the coming five years
(Part I). This is followed by a broad statement of the needs the Intelligence
Community will be expected to meet during that period (Part II) . More specific
guidance is given with respect to activities which should be initiated, or on which
planning should commence, in order to meet those needs (Part III). Finally,
guidance is provided for implementation of "Perspectives" against major national
intelligence problems (Part IV).
3. The Perspectives focus on major national intelligence problems. They
recognize three important additional categories of problems, but these require-
ments are not extensively addressed:
a. Continuing national responsibilities of a lower priority which must
somehow be satisfied with limited resources;
b. The requirements of civilian and military components of the United
States Government for departmental or tactical intelligence support which
often parallel national needs and also necessitate continuing attention and
resources;
c. Unanticipated situations or crises capable of posing major political,
economic or security problems for the United States. Since it may not be
possible to meet the demands of such unanticipated problems by a realloca-
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tion of resources from less urgent activities, some reserve capability must
be included in our planning to give the Intelligence Community the flexi-
bility necessary to cope with the problems of an unpredictible world.
Part I-Major World Problems
1. General. The balance between the US and USSR in the tangible elements
of national power, while continuing to be marked by offsetting assymetries, is
unlikely to change fundamentally. Perceptions of the less tangible aspects of the
balance of power-national attitudes, will, the momentum and direction of inter-
national events-may change importantly in either Moscow or Washington or
elsewhere. In a situation of rough equality in intercontinental nuclear forces be-
tween the US and USSR, other national assets will gain importance as elements
of the "strategic" balance of power.
2. While the Soviet-American relationship will still be the most important
single factor, it will become less central in world affairs. Power will continue to
diffuse, both because of the spread and changes in technology and because of
the growth of interdependence, and issues not susceptible to conventional
methods of diplomacy or force will grow in importance. The spread of nuclear
weapons, the organization of the OPEC cartel and to a lesser extent the growing
demand for raw materials have made coercive power available to additional
states and non-governmental groups including terrorists. These trends, plus a
perception of continuing abatement in post World War II security concerns, will
work upon the cohesion of postwar alliances, which in turn will reduce the
politically useful power of the US and the USSR. The United States therefore
will be faced not only with a persistent threat to its interests from the USSR but
also with turbulence and challenge in its relations with other nations.
3. The USSR. The United States and the Soviet Union will remain principal
adversaries during the next five years. Their relationship will probably continue
to be marked by an absence of armed conflict and at least public adherence, by
both governments, to the concept of "detente." Disagreements between the two
powers will continue to abound, however, in the application of this concept to
specific problems. It is not impossible that these disagreements will cumulate
to a point where the concept itself losses credibility and public support in the
West and hence, political usefulness to the Soviet leadership.
The Soviet leaders seem convinced that in the overall "correlation of forces,"
world events are moving over the long run in favor of the USSR. They will
attempt to further this movement through a variety of political, economic, and
subversive activities, backed with growing military capabilities. In doing so, the
Soviets will be cautious, trying to avoid confrontation with the US and foreign
policies so assertive as to jeopardize what the Soviets see as favorable trends in
US-USSR relations and world affairs generally. They will also favor the use of
state power in the economic, diplomatic, and conventional military fields over the
older revolutionary approach which, however, will continue to be utilized in
favorable situations. The USSR- will seek to keep "detente" as the leading feature
of its foreign policy with the US and Western Europe for at least the next five
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years, largely for pragmatic reasons-i.e., because they think it offers them more
advantages than any other alternative to:
- reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation;
- control local crises which could lead to general war;
- minimize China's chances of developing anti-Soviet combinations
with other major powers;
- obtain Western economic and technological assistance;
- promote the disintegration of US-Allied power blocs; and
- play a superpower role with the US with respect to world affairs.
The Soviets will have to deal, however, with a number of dilemmas as they
attempt to square their long-standing preoccupation with military strength with
the minimal requirements of a detente posture. In the field of strategic offensive
forces, the modernization program now underway will give the Soviets larger
numbers of more accurate missile warheads, improved missile survivability and
greater operational flexibility. In their strategic offensive and defensive programs,
research and development is aimed at unique applications of existing technologies
and applications of advanced technology based on theoretical or technological
breakthroughs. Given present and planned US capabilities, we believe that the
Soviets could not develop in the next five years a first-strike capability so over-
whelming as to prevent substantial retaliation. However, in the conventional
field, the Soviets will continue to build and modernize their ground, naval, and
air forces for theater warfare along the periphery of the USSR and for distant
limited operations. These programs will increase a variety of Soviet capabilities
and strain the credibility of Soviet professions of peaceful intent. The Soviets are
not likely to be substantially restrained by arms control arrangements, although
for political imagery they will espouse a variety of disarmament proposals.
The USSR will continue to see China as a major hostile competitor and will
expend considerable foreign policy support in a global struggle with the Chinese
for influence and leverage, probing meanwhile for elements in the Chinese leader-
ship succession sympathetic to less hostile, more pragmatic Sino-Soviet relations.
In its economic policy, Moscow will continue to give high priority to the
kinds of growth which increase national power and facilitate its projection abroad.
Domestically, however, pressures will grow for modernizing reforms of the Soviet
economic system, particularly its administrative structure. As has been the case
elsewhere in Eastern Europe (e.g., Czechoslovakia), reforms which seek the
managerial benefits of some type of demand system could have implications for
liberalizing other areas of Soviet life, and will accordingly encounter powerful
resistance. Prolonged detente could threaten to erode the pervasive authority of
the Communist Party over the Soviet populace. But these are long-standing and
chronic problems, and over the next five years the regime is quite capable of
resisting unwanted changes in the essentials of the Soviet domestic system.
A key intelligence focus over the next five years will be the Soviet, leadership
succession, as Brezhnev and the other aging seniors leave the political scene and
their replacements consolidate power. Both the new leadership's policy modifica-
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tions and the relative smoothness or turmoil of the succession process will have
implications for bilateral relations with the US and the Soviet stance abroad
generally, as well as for domestic Soviet priorities and the Party management of
the country. While the odds heavily favor continuity, Soviet politics are so central-
ized-and so secretive that significant change under a new leadership cannot
be wholly excluded.
4. The People's Republic of China. China is already in a period of leadership
transition, moving toward a post-Mao collegium. The succession could see an
initial collegial unity followed by an aggressive, xenophobic leader. Alternatively,
the initial period could be followed by the emergence of openly contesting
military, Party, and provincial elements. For planning purposes, however, it
would seem most appropriate to assume that the follow-on leadership in China
will maintain the unity and authoritarian discipline imposed by the Communist
Party, that it will be primarily concerned with internal stability and unity in
meeting the social and economic problems within Chna, and that it will retain
a mistrustful attitude toward the outside world and a particular suspicion of
countries on its periphery.
China will continue gradually to develop its strategic forces and will present
an increasingly serious retaliatory threat to the Soviet Union. By 1980, it will
have the capability of threatening the United States with a demonstration (or
desperation) strike by a small number of ICBMs and possibly SLBMs. China
will maintain large general purpose forces capable of operations on its periphery,
and the gap between Chinese military might and that of its neighbors (other
than the USSR) will probably widen. China will be unlikely to commit its forces,
however, in the absence of major provocation or concern, but given China's
sensitivity regarding its Southern Marches, ambitious North Vietnamese behavior
or Taiwan's procurement of nuclear weapons over the next five years could
generate what the Chinese might regard as sufficient provocation, particularly
if either party appeared to be becoming a Soviet ally.
Internally, China will continue its agriculture-focused economic programs
that are essential to keeping food supplies abreast of population. These programs
will nevertheless enable industry to expand capacity and output selectively and
permit some modest modernization of the defense establishment. Internationally,
China will endeavor to become the ideological leader of the developing countries.
It will participate in aid programs and similar political gestures and will increase
its influence but will not succeed in establishing substantial authority over de-
veloping countries. China may become a significant producer and exporter of
oil by 1980 and problems could arise in conflicting off-shore oil claims.
The chances of major change in the Sino-Soviet relationship during the next
five years are small. Nevertheless, the consequences of the present hostility
have been so important to Asia and to the US that even a moderate improvement
would alter the foreign policy calculations in numerous capitals; obviously, out-
right military conflict would be a critical world event. Changes in either direction
will almost certainly await the advent of new men, but this is likely to occur
within both countries during this period, and it will be important to collect
information and reach judgments promptly on the proclivities of the new leader-
ships.
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5. Western Europe. Both the more stable and developed states of North
Europe and the more fragile and volatile nations of the Southern Tier are under-
going critical changes. Uncertainties abound and results are not foreordained;
some of the determining factors lie within the control of the nations concerned,
while others are international in dimension. US policy will be one variable in
determining the course of events; in some respects it may be decisive, in others
more marginal in impact. In some respects events are working to diminish US
influence (measured against past benchmarks) while in other, less obvious
spheres-e.g., energy and economic interrelationships-it is being enhanced.
But whether US policy is of decisive, important, or very limited impact, Europe's
new uncertainties imply greater need for discriminating intelligence collection
and analysis.
Fnr the .ctatec of the 1 uronean Communitu.I
Post of it from open sources. e effort will have to identify and
assess new trends or shifts in policies and problems sufficiently in advance to
facilitate effective and timely US initiatives or responses. And to be realistic,
such coverage must take into account not only domestic directions and moods
in these states, but also the interplay between the domestic and international
dimensions-including intra-European affairs, the Community's relations with
the developing countries and European relations with the East and the US.
All these problems combine familiar dimensions with newer, less understood
issues such as the social and political repercussions of hyperinflation and vastly
increased energy costs.
Both the old and newer pressures will bear on such key European issues
as Britain's political and economic health and membership in the Community,
whether or not the Italian Communists gain a role in the government, and indeed
whether or not moderate government in the classic European liberal tradition
can cope with current problems while withstanding assaults from extremists of
left and right. The same pressures coupled with other uncertainties in Southern
Europe imply serious difficulties for European defense as it has been known for
25 years.
The politically more fragile states of Southern Europe, at both ends of the
Mediterranean, share the functional problems just mentioned-superimposed on
peculiar new political dilemmas of their own. At one end, Portugal is already,
and Spain soon will be, passing through an uncertain period of transition from
long-established authoritarian regimes of the right to governmental systems which
are not yet defined but will be very different. At best, neither in Spain nor
Portugal will the new governments be as receptive to US facilities or as amenable
to US influence as their predecessors. And it may be that Portugal, and con-
ceivably Spain, will become inhospitable. The USSR did not create this potential
in either state, but it has already encouraged it in Portugal and may do so in Spain.
The situation at the eastern end of the Mediterranean is if anything more
complex. Neither in Greece nor in Turkey are the odds very high for a durable
stabilization of internal politics which would enable both countries to approach
realistically the problems of Cyprus and of rights in the Aegean Sea. Over the
next five years, these problems will generate recurrent demands for US support,
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with accompanying pressures on US facilities which themselves are almost certain
to be cut back to some extent during this period.
6. Eastern Europe. While Eastern Europe will continue to be under Soviet
control, economic uncertainties and recurrent pressures for some loosening of ties
with Moscow will complicate the picture. Poor in natural resources, the region
is faced with a slowdown in economic growth rates which could have reper-
cussions at the political level. The five-year period could see an explosion within
some East European country against Soviet dominance, but Moscow would
quickly reestablish its hegemony, by force if necessary, whatever the price in
terms of other policies. Less spectacularly, individual regimes may find them-
selves able gradually to expand some areas of autonomy, primarily in domestic
policy, while adhering to Soviet guidance in foreign policy and security matters.
The passing of Tito could open a period of difficulty and contest over the suc-
cession and over the external orientation of Yugoslavia, a period that could be
risky should the Soviets try to intervene, either to prevent a westward drift or
to pull the country eastward.
7. The Middle East. This region seems bound to continue to be both volatile
and dangerous. Even if significant progress is made over the next five years in
resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, considerable distrust will persist, providing
a favorable atmosphere for those Arab elements rejecting a final settlement. A
breakdown in the negotiation process is likely to lead to another round of war.
As a further source of instability, the policies of important states are strongly
dependent on individual leaders-such as Sadat, the Shah, Hussein, and Asad--
whose departure could lead to major shifts in national behavior.
The US interests which are threatened by these possibilities are not likely
to decline substantially over the period. Arab oil will not become less important
to the US economy and will remain vital to our major partners. Meanwhile, the
accumulation of oil revenues will magnify the potential for international mone-
tary distortions. While there are important trends which favor an increase in US
influence in the region, these trends will remain subject to sudden reversal.
8. Japan. Japan will continue to play a major role in international economic
affairs generally, expanding its contacts and relations with other countries, in-
cluding the USSR and China. Although Japan has a high degree of internal sta-
bility, it is feeling the social stresses of intense development and rapid economic
growth (e.g., population congestion and pollution, among others). Also, Japan
is among the advanced powers peculiarly dependent on imported raw materials
and energy sources, and hence is both vulnerable and sensitive to changes in
price or availability. Over the next five years, Japan will probably continue to
strive to maintain cooperative relations with the United States because of the
prime importance it places on defense and economic relationships. Differences
over economic issues-bilateral or multilateral-could sour US-Japanese relation-
ships, and the Japanese will be highly sensitive to indications of reduced US
interest in their security.
9. New Powers and Blocs. OPEC's disruption of the non-Communist world's
energy situation is likely to inspire further attempts at cooperative efforts by small
nations to control other important raw materials, such as bauxite and phosphates.
Although most of these attempts will fail, efforts to form various types of pro-
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ducer's associations by these developing countries already have had some po-
litical effects within many industrial consuming states as well as on international
economic and political relationships. Whatever agreements are negotiated be-
tween producing and consuming countries concerning the supply and price factors
for raw materials, the political and economic effects for the international system-
including the connections of the Communist states to that system-could be
significant. Brazil, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Zaire are becoming regional powers
and are playing more substantial roles in international forums. Aside from these,
several nations whose ties to the US have traditionally been close will display
greater independence. This will be particularly prevalent in the economic field
but may also affect certain US strategic interests. Examples of such nations are
Canada, Mexico, Panama, Australia, and Thailand.
10. The Developing Countries will present other major problems to US
policyrnakers. The nature and severity of these problems will hinge in part on
foreign, especially developing world, perceptions of America's ability-and will-
ingness-to succor its friends, to protect its interests and those of its allies, and,
generally, to play an active role in areas beyond its borders. The developing
countries will be especially concerned with US willingness to support transforma-
tions, in their favor, in the international economic and political system.
Nevertheless, developing countries will be most interested in US reactions
to events in Southeast Asia and Korea because these situations represent po-
tentially dangerous circumstances. Of other similar situations, the Arab-Israeli
conflict is the most obvious, but serious stresses could also develop in the Persian
Gulf or in the Indian subcontinent. Additional regional disputes-between China
and Taiwan, Greece and Turkey, and blacks and whites in southern Africa-
could also threaten the tenuous equilibrium between the great powers. The newly
rich powers will rapidly expand their military capabilities; some will develop
nuclear armaments, however primitive. (Israel already has a nuclear capability
and India has exploded one nuclear device; South Africa, Brazil, Taiwan, and
South Korea could develop a capability over the next decade, as could other
nations such as Iran.) If the developing countries do not consider that the US
and other rich industrial states are sufficiently forthcoming in closing the gaps
between the developed and less-developed worlds, they will seek outlets for their
frustration in assaults on the existing international system. The domination by
the developing countries of certain international forums will result in increased
confrontation and could eventually incapacitate these forums as useful interna-
tional organizations for the industrial states. Also, some sufficiently angry de-
veloping countries may resort to covert actions in attempts to blackmail selected
industrial states through terrorism-of a conventional or nuclear variety-or
through covertly sponsored "liberation armies."
11. Social change will cause turbulence and possibly create power vacuums in
a number of areas stemming from increased expectations and a perception of the
growing rather than narrowing economic gaps between developing countries
(and classes within developing countries) and the more developed industrial
world. Areas particularly susceptible to this process will be the Persian Gulf,
certain other Arab states such as Morocco; India, possibly Indonesia, the Philip-
pines, and, in Latin America, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and possibly even
Brazil. Internally this turbulence may be temporarily stilled by some authoritarian
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governments, particularly those benefiting from increased oil revenues, but they
will have difficulties in maintaining themselves over the longer term. Such tur-
bulence will also exist within advanced nations, as economic, racial, ideological, or
regional minorities turn to violence and terrorism to press their claims against
more and more delicately tuned and interdependent societies.
12. The acceleration of events will be characteristic of the years ahead.
This will come from improved communications and transportation, sharply re-
ducing the time available to reflect on, negotiate, and resolve international prob-
lems. It will also raise many local events to international prominence and inflate
national or political pride, posing further handicaps to successful negotiations.
There will be a resulting tendency towards breakdowns of overloaded insti-
tutions, shorter attention spans for individual situations, and a need for simul-
taneous perception and management of a multiplicity of international relationships.
Such change will occur most conspicuously in the fields of science and technology,
but the pace there will have substantial effects on the pace of sociological,
industrial, and institutional change, with resultant political and economic im-
pacts. Identification and accurate assessments of such changes and their effects
will be needed on an increasingly rapid basis.
13. Interdependence will be an increasingly important characteristic of the
world of the future. Intelligence problems will also be increasingly interde-
pendent, requiring more complex models for analysis to give full weight to the
number of disciplines involved. Interdependence will reflect greater national
dependence on other nations but will also reflect an increased coincidence of
interest among groups, industries, and services in all nations independent of
national identification.
Part 11--The Role of Intelligence
1. General. Intelligence will have to give priority to assessments of an
increasing range of problems capable of affecting major American interests
and, hence, requiring US decisions. While intelligence on strategic nuclear
developments and strategic warning of military attack will continue to receive
highest priority, the need will be greater in the next few years for assessments
which anticipate and alert decision-makers to other kinds of policy problems.
In an era of improved communications and transportation, of a contraction of
US forward deployments of forces, and of acceleration in events leading to
crises, the demands will be greater for intelligence which is timely, complete,
and relevant to policy implications. Meeting those demands will be essential
for the use of diplomacy, negotiation, and other benign initiatives to head off
military confrontations or international instabilities. The central challenge to the
Intelligence Community is in providing material which relates directly to the
policy concerns of the highest levels of the US Government. To respond to this
challenge, it is clear that the large amounts of information available will have to
be submitted to analysis of the interdisciplinary type, so that economic, techno-
logical,, sociological, and cultural factors can be combined with political and
military data to provide US decision-makers with a unified, complete view of
the situations which demand their attention-or should demand their attention.
Essential constituents to providing such a unified view include: (1) the
description of the perceptions held by foreign decision-makers of the major
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domestic and international issues with which they are concerned; (2) the pres-
entation of these issues in a context which accounts for all significant factors
that impinge upon them; and (3) the assessment of the intentions and likely
courses of actions of these leaders as well as the capabilities of their countries.
In addition, the Intelligence Community is faced with the requirement to:
(1) more effectively identify that which is significant from the large volumes
of raw information, and to put it in manageable form; and (2) devise techniques
for rapidly and accurately communicating to consumers the essential elements of
foreign situations and the reliability of these assessments.
2. The USSR. The USSR will remain our major intelligence target. Intel-
ligence will be expected to provide precise data on Soviet military capabilities,
economic activity, and efforts to acquire advanced scientific and technological
skills to improve military and economic capabilities. It will be expected also
to supply reliable assessments of Soviet political dynamics and intentions. While
a small percentage of data for these assessments will become available through
open exchange and access, the Soviets will try to keep much more of this infor-
mation secret, and extraordinary efforts will be required to obtain and under-
stand it. One specific priority task will be accurate and demonstrable monitoring
of arms limitation agreements made with the Soviet Union. In the military
field otherwise, special attention will be focused on Soviet research and develop-
ment applicable to weapons and supporting systems which could substantially
affect the balance of power. These will include antisubmarine warfare, ballistic
missiles, satellites, and advanced technology systems. The greater political unity
of non-nuclear forces and perhaps an increasing disposition for their use, at
least by some of the Soviet client states, will put a greater burden on intelligence
to maintain a current baseline of information on such forces. It will also mean
maintaining capabilities for tactical intelligence coverage of potential crisis areas
and for rapid crisis augmentation of such coverage.
Intelligence will need to keep a running estimate of Soviet calculations of
their overall foreign policy balance sheet, and to anticipate shifts in area or
emphasis as well as in the general line. Particularly important elements in this
larger estimate will be Soviet-US, Sino-Soviet and Sino-Soviet-US relationships,
followed by Soviet leverage and intentions in Western Europe and the Middle
East. Anticipating the relative smoothness or turmoil of phases of Soviet succes-
sion politics, and the implications of this and any new leadership policy consensus
will be an important intelligence task, as will the identification of significant
reform tendencies or trouble areas in the Soviet economy.
3. China. China will continue to be an important intelligence target. The
closed nature of Chinese society will make it difficult to assess any turmoil
within the country, its leadership perceptions of threats to China's security, or
threats China might pose abroad. The latter will become particularly important
as Chinese strategic power grows and comes to include capabilities against the
United States itself. It will also apply to Chinese political activities and intentions
in view of China's influence in the Far East and its ties with and aspirations in
the developing countries.
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5. Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe will be a constant collection and assess-
ment target, in order to assess stability in an area where breakdowns in internal
order or major divergences from Moscow could have profound political reper-
cussions. An increasing need to tailor US policy to the specifics of each East
European country will call for improved intelligence. During the five-year period,
the most important intelligence target probably will be Yugoslavia, where a
shift in international alignment actually is a possibility. Rumania's growing
propensity to develop independent economic and political linkages to the West
and China looms as another possibility.
6. Economics. Economic intelligence will increase in importance worldwide.
This will include economic situations in nations having a major impact on the
world economy and on relationships with the United States, such as the Arab
on states,
major suppliers of food- and raw materials, and nations w ere
internal severe economic distress can create world problems out of sympathy or
resonance (e.g., India). Economic intelligence of value to US policymakers is
necessarily international in scope, including such topics as the activities of foreign
multi-national corporations, international development programs, regional eco-
nomic arrangements, and the workings of international commodity markets. In
age. Defining the role of the Intelligence Community in meeting the needs o
government for economic information, allocating resources to serve competing
requirements and consumers, and developing improved means of collection and
analysis will be the most difficult and important tasks faced by intelligence
during the next five years.
7. Other Priorities. Intelligence will increasingly be expected to warn of,
and explain, new situations posing problems to American interests. For an ex-
ample, intelligence will be expected to identify the causes of social change, tur-
bulence, and political terrorism in developing countries, so that the component
elements of these problems can be isolated, negotiated about, or countered with
appropriate mechanisms. This may require intensified efforts on our part to
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understand and communicate the differences among societies, cultures, and na-
tional "personalities." Intelligence will be called upon more often to assess the
threats and effectiveness of possible countermeasures to terrorist acts against
US installations and officials as well as private enterprises and citizens abroad
and, beyond that, the risk that some terrorists may acquire nuclear weapons.
8. The growing interdependence nationally and among disciplines will re-
quire a greater integration of many activities which in prior years could be
handled in separate compartments. Political and social developments will be
heavily influenced by economic and scientific changes. Situations in individual
nations will be subject to major impact from regional developments and even
from worldwide changes. Intelligence will also play a larger role in the interna-
tional arena. Its conclusions, made available to other nations, allied or even
adversary, will focus attention on latent difficulties, raise the level of under-
standing upon which more rational negotiations can be conducted, and surface
long-term negative implications of apparent short-term positive gains. Thus, in-
telligence must extend its perception of new disciplines, must integrate wider
varieties of specialties, and must look to a positive role in the international arena,
in addition to its responsibilities to the constitutional components of our Govern-
ment.
9. A few of the major problems which will be the subject either of dispute
or negotiation, or sometimes both, and consequently will be priority intelligence
requirements, can be:
a. Developments in critical regional confrontations:
1) Arab/Israeli
2) North Korea/ South Korea
3) Greece/ Turkey
b. Indications of a resurgence of other confrontations:
1) Pakistan/ India
2) China/Taiwan
3) Black Africans/White Africans
4) China/USSR
c. Rates of production, consumption, pricing of raw materials and energy
sources, and international commodity arrangements as a means to share the
burdens of price fluctuations between producers and consumers of primary
commodities;
d. Price and non-price restrictions on international trade;
e. The international payments mechanism and the coordination of na-
tional fiscal-monetary policies;
f. National policies with respect to military sales, receipt of foreign mili-
tary and economic assistance, and foreign business activity and investment,
including policies toward multi-national corporations;
g. Arms limitation, nuclear proliferation, and crisis avoidance; and
h. Jurisdiction and exploitation in the oceans and on sea beds.
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10. Much of the information that intelligence analysts will need to discharge
their responsibilities will have to be collected by techniques and sources-some
simple, some awesomely sophisticated-easily jeopardized by public disclosure
which compromises them and facilitates the development of countermeasures to
frustrate them. Thus an essential aspect of the intelligence mission will be our
ability to maintain the necessary secrecy of operations while satisfying legitimate
public interest in their legality and propriety.
Part III-Implications for Intelligence Planning
1. The Planning Environment. In the early 1970s, the character of substan-
tive problems that had faced the Intelligence Community for more than two
decades began to change. The change reflects basically the fragmentation of both
sides of the confrontation between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds
of the 1950s and 1960s, and the increased interdependence of the United States
with the rest of the world on military, political, and economic matters. While So-
viet strategic threat capabilities, China's military development, and crisis monitor-
ing continue as our major concerns (consuming about three-fourths of our re-
sources, annually), a broader variety of US foreign policy issues are climbing the
priority ladder. Significant among these are international energy problems, the
complexity of bi-national and multi-national political relationships, economic
instabilities around the globe, the availabilities of important raw materials and
the threat of extremist and terrorist forces.
The chief concern for intelligence planning in the present period centers
on how we manage our resources to cope with this situation, given:
a. Reduction trends since FY 1969 in our manpower and real dollars
available;
b. Increased demands for more timely and better forecasting in intelli-
gence;
climate tor conducting foreign intelligence created
in part by recent public disclosures of intelligence processes and activities.
Intelligence Community resource planning and management is placing in-
creasing emphasis on national plans, i.e., the SIGINT, Imagery and Human
Sources plans. They should provide the firm base needed to develop broader
operating strategies and clearer resource profiles. A parallel emphasis is being
devoted to continually improving our requirements guidance and response to
customer's needs through such efforts as the KIQ Evaluation Process (KEP).
2. Guideline For Planning. Even assuming an extended period of detente,
the larger portion of intelligence resources will conti a to be engaged against
our major targets; the USSR., China and crises. Thus, with no 25X6
lessening of the importance of what our major Communist adversaries are about,
events in both the industrialized and lesser developed portions of the non-Corn-
mtunist world are taking on new significance for US security and economic well-
being. The likelihood is also greater now than in the past that localized economic,
social, political and military events will interact with the real or perceived power
relationships of the major power blocs in ways which will engage priority US na-
tional interests. All this has created a busier substantive arena for the Intelligence
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Community. Not only has there been an increase in the number of problems that
require simultaneous handling-and this may increasingly tend to overload some
existing mechanisms-there also has been shrinkage in the time available for the
Community to recognize and alert policymakers to significant new developments.
Planning for the Community must take on a stronger corporate character.
Intelligence program managers need to re-think with a collective mind our
intelligence manpower and dollar situation, operational aims, and end-product
requirements. It is a time for ideas and stronger management initiatives that en-
compass both immediate and long-term requirements. Throughout, our ob-
jective is to preserve US technical intelligence advantages over foreign ad-
versaries; the USSR in particular. But we need to prevent decisions that could
lock us into long-term commitments or investments with limited alternatives.
In the planning process, managers will find it necessary in some instances
to modify drastically a balance of resource allocations and applications where
simpler adjustments were sufficient in the past. Decision-makers should be ready
to cut away sunk-costs in activities which result in marginal value. A key func-
tion of managers in building Community strength is to engage willingly and
frequently with each other in cross-program tradeoffs to reduce unnecessary
resource duplications and functional redundancies. Consolidations, from which
lower operational costs and greater functional flexibility can ge derived, should
be encouraged. Resource applications must be brought into clearer visibility and
linked more coherently to substantive intelligence requirements.
The business of intelligence may well require increases in budgetary terms,
if only to maintain today's capabilities at current resource levels. Our first re-
sponsibility in this area is to assure that cost increases, where they are deemed
necessary, are prudent and defensible. The extensiveness of reviews conducted
recently by both Houses of Congress in the FY 1976 appropriations process is
ample evidence of what will be expected of intelligence justifications in the years
ahead. More oversight can be expected from Presidental and Congressional
levels-oversight which will involve a more thorough scrutiny of costs, manage-
ment, plans, and extent of intelligence activities.
Even though we cannot know with certainty what the future will be, plan-
ning mechanisms are needed which will allow us to review each step taken in
developing a broader intelligence capability.
4. Areas to Address. A thorough review and assessment will be required of
each main element in the intelligence process; requirements, collection, process-
ing, production, dissemination, data management, manpower, and research and
development.
5. Intelligence Requirements. Intelligence resources throughout the Com-
munity are driven daily by the intelligence requirements process. Today, there
is a confusing variety of methods and vehicles (even language) used to deter-
mine and state requirements. Improvements are needed immediately. A better
ordering of requirement priorities is needed across-the-board. Better definitions
of requirements will be a fundamental step to overall improvement. The process
must become more streamlined and interwoven throughout the Community to
assure better, quicker, and lower-cost response to the intelligence consumer.
The requirements process will be strengthened considerably by developing
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closer ties between producers and consumers. Better feedback is needed from
policy officials along with better inputs from these officials; information and
materials that are not now being made available to intelligence. Anticipation
of consumer needs and the timing of needs are becoming increasingly important
in a world that is growing more complex. Greater focus should be placed on
shifting ad hoc requirements and how to handle them along with standing
requirements. This subject is being given special attention in the DCI's Objectives
for FY 1976-but the Community should plan for continued attention and
improvement in the out-years.
6. Collection. The pace of technological change increases the complexity of
the target environment at a rapid rate and poses a risk that our present technical
systems may have a shorter useful life. Scientific breakthroughs and improving
foreign technologies increase potential by US adversaries to limit the effectiveness
of our collection systems. Improvements will be needed just to keep pace with
maturation of the foreign technologic environment.
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8. Production. Intelligence improvement will not be complete without a
tandem development in analysis, production, and presentation techniques. Accel-
erated efforts are needed in information science research, automated data
handling techniques, improved analytic techniques, and in the development of
electronic tools that the analyst can use easily and effectively in the production
of intelligence. These must be accompanied by equal stress on deepening the
substantive knowledge of their subjects by analysts through training, area study
and orientation, and language and cultural familiarity. Improved techniques in
writing for the busy policymaker are especially needed and should be given
particular emphasis in our training programs. Those officials whom intelligence
should seek most to influence are those who have the least time to dwell on
tomes. More effective procedures are necessary to evaluate user satisfaction and
dissatisfaction with intelligence products.
9. Dissemination. The number of customers for intelligence will increase.
Some will be customers of new specialties in intelligence, such as economics,
science and technology, etc. Increases in the value and timeliness of production
will also generate a demand for intelligence service to additional elements of
our Government which share responsibility for decision-making on the wide
variety of questions to be covered by intelligence in the future, Demands will
increase for more immediate (faster than the press) reporting of current develop-
ments from the field. Field analysis will remain important but should promptly
follow with appropriate detail, spot reporting of a significant event. Lastly, we
will have increasing situations in which intelligence must be provided to friendly
nations, or even exposed to adversary nations, to serve as a basis for negotia-
tion or monitoring of agreements reached. The dissemination of our intelligence
must reflect these new demands and be conducted in a fashion which clearly
separates the substantive material circulating from sensitive sources and tech-
niques that are vulnerable to frustration or termination by adversaries. We
should also intensify our efforts to downgrade, sanitize, and decontrol where
possible, highly compartmented products so that they may be more widely
disseminated and used. This will require greater refinement in distinguishing
categories of intelligence which can be disseminated to designated audiences
from those elements of the intelligence process which must be given greater,
rather than less, protection in such a new atmosphere.
10. Data Management. Information and data masses should be made more
readily available in a more useful form to all quarters of the Community. There
will be larger volumes and increased diversity of information to be handled by
intelligence in the years ahead. This will call for:
a. A better appreciation and application by managers of the principles
of data management;
b. An upgraded data management system of computers, computer
techniques, and communications capabilities; and
c. Development of a Community-wide data management system and
standards.
Before these improved capabilities can operate as a unitary system, it will be
necessary to standardize intelligence language, data, and computer formats.
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11. Manpower. Investment in new talent, training and career development,
and exposure abroad may well have suffered, in our preoccupation with recent
reductions in manpower levels. The years ahead will probably call for different
organizational mixes of Community manpower, and almost certainly, a greater
breadth of expertise in manpower skills. Organization heads and programs man-
agers will be required to formulate plans annually to:
a. Train and familiarize personnel in new and better analytic meth-
odologies-improve the balance of Community skills to meet the demands
of a changing intelligence environment;
b. Emphasize and accelerate training in foreign languages and cultures
of nations that will be important intelligence targets in the 1976-1981 time-
frame;
c. Provide intelligence officers with better familiarity in matters of policy
formulation, policy and negotiating issues, how to identify and anticipate
issues, and how to relate them to the need for intelligence collection and
production;
d. Ensure availability of technical and academic talents and expertise
on subjects of importance to intelligence in the 1976-1981 timeframe; and
e. Reassess existing manpower commitments against future rather than
past or even present requirements, and place major emphasis on the former.
12. Research and Development. R&D continues to grow in importance in
the planning and management of US foreign intelligence. Along with R&D
initiatives already under way, the IR&D Council should concentrate efforts on:
a. The prevention of surprise in technological progress of other na-
tions-especially by our foreign adversaries;
b. Identification of opportunities and potential problems for intelligence
management to address throughout the next decade and beyond; and
c. Surfacing topics and areas of research not included now in the
Community R&D effort--topics that should be added to our plans against
longer-term problem areas.
13. National-Military Force Relationships. Growing substantive intelligence
needs call for improved mutual support between national and military operating
forces.
In the development of new and improved national intelligence systems and
related program decisions, the intelligence requirements of field commanders
for reporting timeliness and accuracy should be taken into account. As national
interest, mission, and costs permit, national intelligence systems should be sup-
portive to military theater planning and operations.
Similarly, where mission and location permit, intelligence units that are
organic to field forces should be supportive to the satisfaction of national and
departmental intelligence needs. For example, combat readiness training should
include collection and production against actual intelligence targets of interest
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to national-level users as well as to tactical commander needs. Steps should also
continue toward improving the capabilities of reserve and National Guard units
to take on lower-priority, longer-term intelligence tasks.
14. Summary Areas of Concern. Particular attention should be given by
planners to the following:
a. Development of procedures, techniques and systems for improving
our ability to anticipate and alert policymakers to likely future events which
could prove injurious to US interests. New elements and issues on the inter-
national scene stress the need for a continuously sensitive, national intelli-
gence nervous system-one that will be immediately responsive to warnings,
tipoffs, and conditions of opportunity;
b. Continuing reappraisal of our intelligence products-their styling,
utility, and level of comprehensiveness to an increased diversity of intelli-
gence matter and consumer needs;
c. Assurance that substantive consumer needs (rather than momentum
of technological achievement and opportunity) is the driving force of invest-
ment in our expensive technical collection systems;
d. Development of intelligence operational systems for the future that
will be less geographic-dependent or vulnerable to foreign countermeasures;
e. Program planning that is tuned to longer range concerns (5-10 years)
and consistent with our developing concept of what the future will demand;
and
f. Concentrated efforts to develop a stronger relationship between intelli-
gence producers and intelligence consumers.
Above all, flexibility in allocating collection resources and in applying
analytical resources must be enhanced. And, this must be accomplished within
the context of greater intra-Community understanding and cooperation so that
the total output of the Community is of the greatest possible value to the nation.
Part IV-Implementation
1. General. The Perspectives for Intelligence will be utilized and reflected
in the following Intelligence Community planning and management documents:
DCI Objectives
Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs )
Key Intelligence Question Evaluation Process (KEP)
National Foreign Intelligence Program Recommendations
National SIGINT Plan
National Imagery Plan
National Human Source Plan
Intelligence Community Annual Report
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2. The following bodies will be consulted and participate in the implemen-
tation of the guidance contained in these Perspectives, as well as the documents
listed above:
National Security Council Intelligence Committee
United States Intelligence Board
Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee
National Reconnaissance Executive Committee
3. As noted in the introduction, these Perspectives are addressed to major
national intelligence problems. The additional categories of problems listed there,
which are related to national intelligence but not addressed in these Perspectives,
will be implemented by components in the Community following departmental
guidance.
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