COMMUNITY-WIDE, COMPUTER-ASSISTED COMPARTMENTATION CONTROL SYSTEMS (4CS)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82B00871R000100110001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 19, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES ADVISORY COMMITTEE
USIB/IRAC-D-9. 5/17
19 September 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: The United States Intelligence Board
The Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee
SUBJECT :
Community-Wide, Computer-Assisted
Compartmentation Control Systems (4Cs)
REFERENCES :
a.
b.
USIB-M-669, 30 May 1974, Item 5
USIB-D-9. 5/16, 30 October 1974
1. The enclosed memorandum on the subject, with its
attachment, from the Chairman of the Security Committee is
circulated for consideration. The Security Committee recommendations
are contained in paragraph 6 of memorandum. The STAT
attachment is a report of the Security Committee Working Group on
the follow-on study which the Board agreed to support after the
Security Committee recommended rejection of the CLAIRE concept.
2. It is planned to schedule this subject on the USIB
agenda for Board consideration at the 25 September meeting.
STAT
A~tin Executive Secret jy
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Enclosure
SECURITY COMMITTEE USIB/IRAC-D-9. 5 /17
19 September 1975
17 September 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman, United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT .
Community-Wide, Computer -Assisted
Compartmentation Control System (4Cs)
REFERENCE .
(A)
(B)
USIB-M-669, 30 May 1974, Item 5
USIB-D-9.5/16, 30 October 1974
1. Attached is the report of the Security Committee's
working group on the follow-on study which the Board agreed to
support after the Security Committee recommended rejection of
the CLAIRE concept.
2. Toward a goal of inducing economy and efficiency
in the community's management of compartmented clearances,
the representatives of CIA, DIA, Army, Navy, Air Force, State,
ERDA and NSA developed and costed a design to meet their
requirements in this area. The configuration of this system calls
for a central facility in the form of a secure dedicated minicomputer
in one agency connected to remote terminals in other agencies.
3. The design permits registration of approximately
300, 000 individuals, each of whom can be credited with 1, 000
clearances. The design is open-ended and more storage capacity
can be added. The design provides for expansion capabilities
but is limited initially to use in the Washington area. The design
also provides for a suppression capability to limit access to
certain personnel and/or clearances to the inputting department
if this feature is desired.
4. The central facility would cost approximately $431, 707
and require monthly personnel costs of $13, 333 and maintenance
costs of $2, 267. Departments and agencies perceive the need for
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Enclosure
USIB/IRAC-D-9. 5/17
19 September 1975
terminals of different configurations to satisfy unique requirements.
The projected costs of these terminals are:
Equipments
Monthly Maintenance
A enc
DIA
$ 72,900
664
Army
72,900
664
Air Force
52, 822
471
6
Navy
69, 107
61
6
CIA
61,237
1
5
NSA
37,570
320
State
32,570
290
6
ERDA
29,329
0
1
5. The participating members endorse this concept and the
FBI and Treasury Department, while not represented on the working
group due to small need for such a facility, also endorse the proposal.
6. Recommendations
The Security Committee believes that this computer-assisted
compartmentation clearance control procedure is feasible and cost-
effective, and recommends:
(a) That USIB endorse the concept and authorize
its implementation.
(b) That the Office of Joint Computer Services, CLA,
be designated as executive agent for implementation and
operation as a service of common concern
(c) That the CIA fund purchase and maintenance of
the central facility to be located in CIA.
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(d) That the departments and agencies fund the costs
of selection, purchase and installation of terminals configured
to meet their perceived needs.
STAT
Attachment
4Cs Report
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Attachment 1
USIB /IRAC-D-9. 5/17
SECURITY COMMITTEE
WORKING GROUP REPORT
Requirements for a
Community-Wide, Computer-Assisted
Compartmentation Control System
(July 1975)
Security Committee Task XI-I
Attachment:
Supporting Facts and Observations
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Attachment 1
USIB/IRAC-D-9. 5/17
Report of the Working Group of the USIB Security Committee
on Requirements for a Community-Wide, Computer-Assisted
Compartmentation Control System
1. Introduction
This report was prepared by a Working Group of the Security
Committee of USIB with representation from CIA, Chairman, DIA,
Army, Navy, Air Force, NSA, State and ERDA. The FBI and
Treasury declined participation although they expressed interest
in the study.
The report satisfies requirement of a task by the Security
Committee in November 1974 to conduct a study of the intelligence
community's requirements and devise a concept for a viable cost-
effective procedure to assist in control of compartmented accesses.
The Working Group first assembled requirements of the
community members and then submitted a statement of needs to
system design personnel in CIA and DIA for independent feasibility
and cost studies. The Working Group examined DIA and CIA
proposals and selected a DIA design which the Working Group calls
the "Community- Wide, Computer -Assisted Compartmentation Control
System" (4C).
2. Discussion
A. The recommended 4C system consists of a dedicated
mini-computer containing a central data base of intelligence community
access approvals. The proposed system would be developed in two
phases: the first phase provides on-line remote update and retrieval
capabilities within Washington area headquarters offices only; the
second phase permits an on-line expansion throughout the United
States. Once implemented, the system would allow participating
activities direct access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI)
access approvals for most intelligence community personnel in a
timely and efficient manner.
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(1) Benefits from the recommended 4C system as opposed
to maintaining existing separate systems within the intelligence
community include:
a) Improvement of overall efficiency through
uniformity of approach for security handling within
the intelligence community.
b) Cost advantages result which are unattainable
using existing individual system to achieve the 4C objectives.
c) Significant reductions in the volume of clearance
certification message traffic inter- and intra-participating
organizations.
d) Continuous rather than limited incumbent and
billet'access verification by Special Security Officer (SSO)
facilities.
e) Elimination of need for permanent certifications
among participating services and agencies.
f) Significant time savings for outlying Special
Security Officer sites supporting major headquarters and
subordinate elements having high volume in personnel and
billet access requirements.
g) Elimination of need to contact multiple sources
for individual billet access approvals.
(2) Specifically, the recommended system:
a) Meets the basic objectives as set forth by the
Chairman, Security Committee, which are:
1 Permit rapid verification of current (and
future) SCI access approvals of individuals by any
intelligence community organization participating
in the system;
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2 Provide access control and accounting
mechanism for intelligence "bigot" lists and
"bigoted" programs/projects;
3 Eliminate individual SCI access control
systems within participating organizations.
b) In pursuance of the above objectives, the recommended
4C system provides the following capabilities:
I Offers participants an on-line query
capability using cathode-ray tube terminals (CRT)
and remote batch terminals (RBT).
2 Meets the common requirements of all
'member organizations for control and management
of SCI access, and the DoD SCI billet structure.
3 Provides a "suppression" capability that
will conceal, at the option of the inputting organization,
the access authorizations and/or the existence of an
individual's record from other participants.
4 Offers features for controlling the access
of contractors, foreign personnel and others for
whom "need to know" or release authority must be
established prior to each access certification.
5 Can be expanded throughout the United
States and eventually overseas, if desired. (See
Attachment, paragraph 1)
6 Provides an on-line and batch update
capability from remote locations and a complete
audit trail to permit trace of all record changes
to initiating organization.
7 Offers a record of access queries to the
system.
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B. A system designed in accordance with the 4C User
Requirements Design Concept is technically feasible using either a
large scale computer or a mini-computer. The recommended mini-
computer system offers more advantages than the large-scale computer
system (See Attachment, paragraph 2).
C. Estimated costs of a system are outlined below. Costs
cited are based on dedicated secure communications lines. Any
existing secure communication links which can be used will reduce
implementation costs. Detailed cost estimates for the below described
mini-computer alternatives were derived from the DIA feasibility
study.
(1) Minimal System
Monthly Cost
ITEM Initial Cost Pers/Maint
a) Central System usin $ 231, 707 $ 13, 333/$2267 STAT
System software development
costs 200, 000
Subtotal: $431,707 $13,333/$2267
b) One basic query/update device
w/commo (1200 BPS) per intel-
ligence community organization.
(8 ea. CRT + character printer
$147, 680
/$1280 STAT
TOTAL: *$579,387 $13, 333/$3547
STAT
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(2) Washington Area R4C*
ITEM
a) Central System
System software development
costs.
b) Commo (1200 & 4800 BPS and
terminals (CRT w/&w/o
character printers remote
batch terminals o
fulfill Washington area require-
ments as expressed in R4C concept.
Initial Cost
Monthly Cost
Per s / Maint
$231,707
$13, 333/$2267
200, 000
$431, 707
$ 13, 333/$2267
$411, 291
/$3746
$842,998
$13-,333/$6013
D. The 4C system is highly cost sensitive to the requirement
that it be encrypted. The rationale for this requirement is discussed
in Attachment, paragraph 3.
E. Time to fully implement the system within the Washington
area is estimated to be 18 to 30 months from time of USIB approval.
The longer period considers the normal times required for require-
ments analysis, system design, interagency coordination, bid request
preparation/publication, vendor response preparation, vendor selection
and contract award, software development/ equipment receipt and test,
and system testing and training. The shorter estimate assumes extra-
ordinary measures can be taken to compress the schedule. These
might include: commitment of additional in-house systems analysis
and design personnel, appointment of agency representatives with
* R4C indicates that members of the intelligence community were
interviewed to determine what equipment each agency would like to
have in their terminals to do an adequate job. The exact breakdown
of equipment suggested by each member was then priced to arrive at
the $411, 291 figure.
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plenary acquisition authority, and expeditious provision of necessary
r o:m
funding. It also assumes procurement of r _F
lead time is about
existing stockpiles or diversion o
two years) from other projects or programs. The relatively long
period to achieve operational status within only the Washington area
is a disadvantage that would accompany the development of nearly
any automated on-line system embracing the requirements of
multiple organizations and requiring the procurement of hardware,
particularly the cryptographic devices.
F. Achievement of the objectives set forth by the Security
Committee for creation of a community-wide system by linking
together the existing systems of intelligence community members
was not considered cost-effective or feasible. A discussion of this
alternative is in Attachment, paragraph 4.
G. Savings might be derived through implementation of the
4C System (Attachment, paragraph 5).
3. Conclusions
A. The 4C System proposal satisfies the tasking requirements
of the Security Committee.
B. The 4C System would be cost-effective in consideration
of an increase in security, savings to be achieved through elimination
of separate systems, and capability to handle growth rate.
C. The approximate initial costs of the R4C System with
preferred terminals would be $842, 998 (with a possible variance
of plus 20% to minus 10%) for implementation within the Washington
area headquarters sites. Approximately one-half of this amount
would be devoted to the purchase of desired terminal equipment for
intelligence community organizations and one-half to equipment
procurement and software design for the central facility.
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Attachment 2
USIB/IRAC-D-9. 5/17
SUPPORTING FACTS AND OBSERVATIONS
OF THE WORKING GROUP
1. Dedicated Communications Line Costs
These costs are not system sensitive within the Washington area
and may not be so within CONUS. However, at the point of overseas
expansion of the system they will certainly become so. At that time
the feasibility of linking overseas terminals through then existing
switching systems should be addressed.
2. Analysis of Relative Merits of Large Scale and Mini-Computer
in the Implementation of the 4C System
A. Large Scale Computer:
(1) Advantages
STAT
b) CIA. software (GIM) and software knowledge
and expertise would expedite system development by
an estimated ten months.
(2) Disadvantages
a) Available (GIM) software cannot provide both
a "suppression" capability and a capability at remote
terminals for programming of output products.
b) "Spillage" of file data possible due to mixing
of 4C System with other non-related applications
possessing their own sets of terminals.
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c) Backup capability is unknown. It would
require commitment of additional CIA. hardware or
at least assignment of a precedence to 4C sufficient
to permit it to displace other applications on other
hardware. (This requirement represents some as
yet undefined commitment of additional resources.)
d) Expansion potential is uncertain. Other
systems sharing the computer will compete for
available capacity as each system expands. Once
the large scale computer is saturated, there is no
capability for adding small increments of capacity.
B. Mini-Computer
(1) Advantages
a) Security maximized by not mixing file with
other applications having separate terminals.
b) Backup capability achieved through use of
two mini-computers, a dual processor. Both contribute
to normal operations; however, if one fails the system
response is degraded, but it does not cease to function.
Under normal conditions one mini-computer (processor)
would support on-line query operations, and the other
would support batch operations.
c) Capacity of system can be readily expanded
when operations dictate this step by purchase and
installation of an additional mini-computer and disks.
d) The administrative problems of competing
priorities with non-related systems sharing the large
scale computer are avoided.
e) A "suppression" capability is possible
without the sacrifice of any terminal programming
capability.
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(2) Disadvantages
a) Greater initial outlay of funds required.
The $226, 707 required for the mini-computer hardware
at the central site would exceed the rental charges
associated with the CIA large-scale computer until
approximately five years of operations.
b) Software preparation will take more time
due to the lack of an off-the-shelf or a government-
owned existing system that will completely fulfill
system requirement. If the "suppression" capability
remains a firm requirement, the time disadvantage
of the mini-computer disappears as does software
cost disadvantage (up to $200, 000 for mini, something
less for large scale).
C. Conclusion
(1) Time required to procure any additional peripheral
equipment needed for the central system, encryption devices,
and terminal equipment for remote sites would presumably be
the same as for procurement of the mini-computer hardware;
i. e. , time for full implementation would not be appreciably
shorter than for the mini-computer alternative.
(2) The mini-computer alternative for implementation
of the 4C concept would produce a superior system, for about
the same amount of money and time than the large-scale
computer alternative would require.
3. Reasons for System Encryption
Classification of the system at a level of CONFIDENTIAL is
in accord with current community usage for extensive collections of
security access data.
A. Encryption will prevent undetected, unauthorized
introduction via line taps of spurious responses to terminal queries
and will prevent modification of the data base via similar means.
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B. It will prevent intercept of batch products; e. g. , large
access rosters that would aid a hostile spotting and assessment
effort or DoD SCI billet rosters from which significant order of
battle information could be derived.
4. Modification of Existing Systems to Attain "Bigot" List Control
and Rapid Access Verification Capability
After examination and discussion with qualified data processing
systems personnel, this course of action was discarded by the Working
Group. It would require as much or more effort in software develop-
ment than would the development of an entirely new system. It would
take about as long to complete. Major software modifications would
be required for the systems supporting each agency/department.
Report and conversion programs would be needed to channel data to
a central system, presumably a modified STAT
No economies of scale or volume would be achieved in such a "patch
work" system, and if future modifications became necessary their
cost could be multiplied by the number of different existing subsystems
in the network. Such a "system" would suffer from the deficiencies
that exist within each of the component systems in timeliness of
input, data accuracy and, to some degree, information available.
Time required for full implementation would likely equal that for
the 4C concept.
5. Summary of Areas From Which Savings May be Derived Through
Implementation of the 4C System
Current system operating costs are difficult to specify since
most operate on a time-sharing basis using in-house computers. For
most participants it is reasonable to assume that computer time devoted
to security support applications will be significantly reduced by the
transfer of operations to the 4C System. Due to the unique require-
ments of certain participants, they will continue using their existing
systems, thus, somewhat reducing the potential for savings. No
direct security personnel cost reductions can. be predicted. Difficult
to specify but certain cost savings will be achieved through reduction
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of access certification message traffic, reduction in the number of
times which identical information is input to different data bases,
decreases in time lost due to visitors awaiting access verification,
and savings in security processing.
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