NATIONAL SIGINT PLAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82B00871R000100100004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 26, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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USIB /IRAC-S -9. 4/29
26 February 1975
Limited Distribution
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
THE INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
REFERENCES a. USIB/IRAC-S-9.4/Z7, 12 February 1975,
limited distribution through restricted channels
b. USIB/IRAC-S-9.4/26, 16 January 1975,
limited distribution through special
channels
c. USIB/IRAC-S-9.4/28, 24 February 1975, limited
distribution through restricted channels
1. In restricted session of the joint USIB/IRAC meeting of
26 February with the Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office, in
attendance, Mr. Colby invited comments on the National SIGINT Plan.
Mr. Colby said that NSA had done a superlative job in pulling together a lot
of complex material into a comprehensive plan. He did not mean to imply,
however, that he or others necessarily agreed with everything in the plan,
but he did believe that it was a major step forward and he wished to thank" and
applaud all those who worked on it.
2. In response, General Allen noted that the thrust of the plan was
descriptive rather than issue oriented. He said it was most useful to NSA as
an internal planning document and served as a basis for current program
planning within the structure of resource decisions which are now taking place.
Specifically, it has been used during the discussions of the program managers
review process for the CCP. He said the plan is an indication of NSA's
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3. Mr. Colby said that the plan did suggest one question in its
relation to the CCP. Should it serve as a substitute for the program?
General Allen believed that the plan should not serve as a substitute, but
should serve as a basis for programming. He said the document, as such, is
far more useful if it does not become a programming vehicle. To be a program
document, it would require a great deal more detail and approval, which. he thought
would be a most difficult if not impossible task. Dr. Hall commented that
General Allen had made an important distinction between the purpose of the plan
and the programming process.
4. General Tighe said that DIA supported the concept of the NSP as
well as the need for such plans in the human and photo areas.
5, expressed some concern regarding the relationship between
the plan and the USIB-approved Five Year Guidance for the NRP. He said that
unless care was exercised, it was possible that the two would be in conflict.
Mr. Colby responded that this may not be a problem in the sense that it may help
to identify issues and allow for discussion of alternatives.
6.1 endorsed Mr. Colby's comments regarding the high
quality of the plan, but said that he had some concern for the next steps in the
overall process, i. e. , how do we get from where we are today to where the
plan says we should be? How would the plan tie into and influence policy decisions
downstream? He said that it was essential to tie resources into the process at
some point, but agreed that this might not necessarily be done in one document.
Mr. McAfee said that he liked the idea of a National SIGINT Plan and supported
the suggestions in the OMB letter.
7. Mr. Collins commented that Treasury had some concerns regarding
the treatment of economic needs. He said that one portion of the plan recognized
the requirement for an increase in economic coverage, but there is an
inference that more resources will not be applied until there is a better under-
standing of -the economic requirements. Mr. Collins said that Treasury has
learned from high-level economic customers, both in and out of the Treasury
Department, that there is indeed a need for increased SIGINT coverage
particularly in areas where the information is unique, such as information on
the movement of petro dollars. upported the Treasury view, 25X1
noting the Director of OMB's personal interest. General Allen stated that he
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had been in consultation with the NIO for Economics on this question and
that, since the plan had been published, the effort had increased somewhat.
He said that he did not question the need, but had to examine the
contribution or unique value of expensive COMINT to economic intelligence.
8. General Walters congratulated General Allen on the plan, as did
I ladded that the plan helps NSC consumers to know what
is available in the SIGINT arena.
9. In response to Mr. Colby's invitation to address the SIGINT
Committee paper, General Morrison noted that the SIGINT Committee
commended the plan and felt that it would help the committee in its work.
General Morrison reviewed each of the committee's recommendations as well
as the follow-on actions which would be addressed by the committee. He
concluded by suggesting, that the USIB/IRAC note the NSP, concur in the
SIGINT Committee assessment, and endorse the recommended changes and
actions listed in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the SIGINT Committee paper.
10. Dr. Hall agreed that the suggestions in the SIGINT Committee
paper might be a good thing to do, but recommended that they be provided as
general guidance to the Director, NSA, rather than being formally approved
by the USIB and IRAC. He thought it would be useful to recognize the plan
as DIRNSA's document for describing and providing visibility to the SIGINT
system, but not as a mechanism for program decisions. He suggested that
the plan, if tied down to program decisions, would lose its purpose.
11. The Chairman commented on earlier point on the 25X1
next steps. Since there are differences on some aspects of the plan,
Mr. Colby suggested that the various agencies and the SIGINT Committee
address this matter for the purpose of identifying major issues which could
be considered in the resource review process. This should be done within
the next few months in order to develop recommendations on which issues
should be considered in the program cycle. This process would be one
way of translating the plan into resource considerations. One problem was
the issue raised by the JCS regarding how much direct support and SIGINT-
related information should be included in the CCP as non-add items.
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Dr. Hall said he was happy to see this problem addressed in the NSP as long
as it was not a program document. Mr. Colby agreed, but observed that this
is an issue insofar as the JCS is concerned, and one that must be addressed.
He understood the JCS concern that commanders in the field must have their
intelligence assets, but suggested that advanced technology will inevitably
lead to more centralization.
12. Another possible issue involved personnel and the closely-related
problem of more qualified linguists. Mr. Colby suggested that more resources
may become available by making better use of service reserve components.
He o e linguists' problem involved the whole community, not just
NSA. commenting on his letter, said that the linguistic problem
was significant and required more work. He again stressed his hope that, as
the resources planning cycle evolves, it would be possible to use'this document
as one means of reviewing resources. As such, the current iteration of the
NSP could serve as a test document for this purpose.
14. General Allen stated his appreciation for the commendatory
remarks made by the USIB/IRAC Principals. He said that more work was
required on the plan, but noted that this first attempt had resulted in a
coherent description. In the second iteration he said he would try to identify
issues. He said NSA would now proceed on the next cycle; rather than re-
drafting the current plan he would work toward the next iteration.
15. Mr. Colby suggested that the USIB and IRAC applaud the plan,
note it, and that the members be requested to review the plan for the
purpose of identifying major issues. Such issues should be submitted in time
for consideration by USIB and IRAC in June.
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16. The USIB and IRAC:
a. Noted the National SIGINT Plan;
b. Agreed that the SIGINT Committee recommendations be
provided to the Director, NSA, as guidance for his use as appropriate; and
c. Agreed that USIB/IRAC members as appropriate and the
SIGINT Committee would identify major issues resulting from the NSP and
that these issues would be submitted to USIB and IRAC for consideration..
Executive Secretary
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