JPRS ID: 10702 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080076-5
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 76
• Content Type: REPORTS

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= JPRS~ L/10702
30 July 1982
N~ar E~st (~orth Africa Re ort
~
CF~UO~ 28/82~~
Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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~
JPRS L/1070~
30 Jnly 1982
NEAR EASTINORTH AFRIC~ REPORT ~
(FOUO 28/82)
.
- CONT~NTS `
INTERNA~IONAL AFFAIRS
Informed Sources on Tlonaligned Meeting R~sults
~Thomas Thomaon; REUTER, 17 Jul 82) 1
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Conditions for Possible PLO-Washington Bialogue
(AL WATAN AL-'ARABI, 4-10 Jun 82) 2
~ IRAN
- Mu.lla,hs' War Plans, Social Controls Outlined
.
(TIiE ECONOMIST, 17 Jul 82)
The Avengers of Karbala
~ How the Mullahs Do It
IRAQ ~
Interview with RCC Member Tariq ~Aziz
.(Iraq Tariq 'Aziz Tnterview; ~,L-WATAN AL-'ARABI
4-10 Jun 82) 12
Specula~ion on Next Phase o~ Ir.1q-Iran War
(~L~WATA.'~ ~.L-'ARA~BI, 28 May-3 Jun 82) 18
JORDAN
Interview With Jordan's Foreigr~ Minister on Policy Iasu~s
(Marwax~ Qasim Iat~rview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,
4-10 Jun 82) 20
- a- ( III NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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LEBA1~jON
Effect of Invasion on Elections Examined
(AL-WARAN AL-'ARABI, 11-17 Jua 82) 26
LIBYA
Spain Suspends Its Import Payments
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 9 Jul 82) 29
SYRIA
Muslim Brotherhood Leader on Hamah, Country's Armed Forces
('Adnan Sa'd al-Din Interview; AL-WATAN
AL-'ARA~3I, 16-22 Apr 82) 30
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F'OR OFFICIAL 1 )NLY
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
INFORMED SOURCES ON NONALIGNID MEETING RESULTS
.TN170110 Londan REUTER in English 0030 GMT 17 Jul 82
[Report by Thomas Thomson]
[Excerpt] Nicosia, 17 Jul (REUTER~- Nonaligaed nations winding up emergency
talks today on the Lebanese crisis will criticise the United States for
supporting Israel but invite Washington to help in solving the plight of
Palestinians, informed conference sources said.
A communique to be issued by the 60 or so countries attending the meeting
to consider how to aid Palestinians trapped by Iaraeli troops in west Beirut
would also urge a political and economic boycott of the Jewish state, they
said.
A formula for criticising the United States was hamme~ed out after many
hours of private negotiations. Radical states including Syria, Algeria,
Iran and Cuba, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PL) sought to
denounce the United States, the sources said. But others, including Egypt,
Jordan and Oman, wanted no reference to the United States.
The sources said the meeting was also moving last night towards approving
a proposal to send a delegation of foreign ministers to Beirut, just
150 miles [word indistinct] away across the Mediterranean.
The sources said the nonaligned nations were also considering tha merits of
sending a mission to the capitals of the five permanent members of the
UN Security Co~mcil to argue the case of the Palestinians b ut no final
decision had been taken by last night. ~
CSO: 4400/376
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
CONDITIONS FOR POSSIBLE PLO-WASHINGTON DIALOGUE
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 277, 4-.10 Jun 82 pp 30-31
[Article: "The Conditions for a Dialogue Between Washington and the PLO"]
[Text] AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI is following up the publication of the investiga-
tion it started last'issue into the "substance" of the directions of the poli-
cy of the Reagan Administration toward resolving the Middle East crisis and
its subsidiary problems. At the forefront ie the i~sue of the acceptable basis
for an Au?erican dialogue with the PLO in light of America's written commit-
ment to Israel, made in 1975, not to negotiate with the PLO unless the ~
latter substantiv~ly modifies its charter with regard to the future of Israel,
i.e., unless it accepts the principle of recognition of the establishment of
the State of Israel and its right to exist, as well as Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338.
What is the real position of the United States? Are there ongoing communicr~-
tions in public and in private? What are they?
Washington - AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI Bureau
In his speech before the Council on World Affairs in Chicago in the middle of
last week, U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig maintained silence over the
matter of resolving the problem of American relations with the PLO. At the
same time h~ was quick to confirm that America was taking speedy action to
_ resolve the Lebanese problem, and the problem of the sutonomy discussions,
whereas everyone is agreed that no realistic solution can ignore the PLO at
any basic or subsidiary level of the Middle East problem.
In this matter there are certain cryptic codes.
However, the dialogue that ensured between Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman af the
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee for Europe and t~e Middle East of the House of
Representatives, and Nicholas Veliotis, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, in
the course of their testimony before the Comq~ittee, has shed some light which
helps clarify some of the secret aspects of the "codes":
Hamilton: Let me move now to the PLO issue. Does the present administration
(the Reagan Administration) support and affirm the 1975 agreement?
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Veliotis: Yes, Mr President.
Hamilton: Wh~t is your understanding of the nature of that agreement exactly,
insofar as it relates to our dealing with the PLO?
Veliotis: In clearly defined language, it means that we will not recognize
or negotiate with it.
Hamilton: But can we speak to its officials?
Veliotis: As a general ru1e, no. But there have been exceptions, as we have
seen.
Hamilton: If the agreement (the 1975 agreement) concerns only negotiations
and recognition, then why can't we talk to them (with officials of the PLO)?
Veliotis: At ~he beginning of President ~arter's term a decision was taken
to interpret the 1975 agreement as comprehensive, except for certain limited
exceptions not relating to the issue of peace, i.e., that each decision be
made on a case-by-case basis.
Hamilton: Therefore, this policy is not limited to recognition or negotia-
tion, but is a policy predicated on the baeis that we are forbidden from
speaking with the PLO?
Veliotis: That is the way the agreement was interpreted.
Hamilton: By whom was it interpreted in this way?
Veliotis: By two successive administrations (the Johnson Administration and
the Carter Administration).
Hamilton: D~es that include the current administration?
Veliotis: That includes the current administration.
Hamilton: Can we conclude in brief that the wording of the agreement's text
gives Israel the right to veto any (American) dealing with Israel? In this
regard I quote the following from the text of the agreement.
"The United States promises to consult fully with the Government of Israel
and to coordinate with it at the level of this iasue ita position and its
strategy in the Geneva Peace Conference.
Veiiotis: Not at all. It means that in light of our pramise to Israel we will
not deal with the PLO until such time as the requisite conditions are met.
Mr Chairman, I think th at it ~s important to note that we are bound to a
commitment to Is rael. Ever since we made that pledge--which is naw public--
it has 'oeen regarded as an American proposal to the PLO which the ~atter may
accept if it wishes.
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Hamilton: Don't you accept the argument that the PLO is a powerful party to
the Middle East crisis?
Veliotis: Yes, sir.
Hamilton: Does the United States en3oy flexibility or fY�eedom of movement in
deciding on and implementing new or different policies regarding the PLO?
Veliotis: Presumably, we are free to do as we wish, as an independent and
sovereign state. However, I do believe that our words ac.knowledge that those
commitments and pledges are important to Israel, ~ust as other parties in the
Middle East enjoy great importance in light of the confid.ence demanded by the
situation, especially confidence in us (the United States).
Hamilton: Are we currently attempting to clarify or modify any of the PLO's
views through third parties?
Veliotis: There is what I would call an on-going process, because there is
an unlimited number of volunteer mediators carrying messages back and forth.
This process has been going on since 1975.
Hamilton: If we had a message that we would like to send to Yasir 'Arafat,
could we do so?
Veliotis: Certainly.
Hamilton: And if he had a message that he would like to send to us, could he
do so?
Veliotis: There would be no problem.
Hamilton: Are we presently communicating with any Palestinian officials?
Veliotis: Yalestinian officials?
Hamilton: Ufficials of the PLO, for example?
Veliotis: PLO officials? Certainly not. There is nothing of that sort hap-
pening in the normal course of negotiations. However, as you know there is
some contact relating to security. And I would like to leave the matter
there.
But allow me to clear up things concerning the exchange of inessages. The
situation is as follows: A man or woman comes up and says that he or she is
a contact. On this basis one or both of them says that the PLO would like to
talk to us. Our answer to this is: "That's great: That is our policy."
Conditions for Negotiation
At this point, Rep. Stephen Solarz (N.Y.) enters the debate and talks with
Veliotis:
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Solarz: If the PLO were to accept all of the conditions which we placed in
the 1975 agreement (with Israel), granting Israel the right to exist, accept-
ing Resolutions 242 and 338, then from our part could we begin serious
negotiations with the PLO? Or, do we have the right to insist (and I believe
President Reagan said that it is our right when he was campaigning for
president) that the Palestinians give up terrorism as a condition for our
country's preparedness to negotiate with them?
Veliotis: In my own understanding, if the PLO decides to meet the above-
mentioned conditions, then we will have the right to start a dialogue with it.
But if it chooses not to forsake the use of terror before that time, it will
be precisely that which I will recommend to them in order for them to occupy
first priority on the proposed agenda for negotiations.
Solarz: Let me mention here the conversation that took place between myself
and King Hassan II of Morocco. The King told me that President Carter had
asked him to inform Yasir 'Arafat that as soon as he accepts Israel's right
to exist, as stipulated in Resolutions 242 and 338, President Carter would
invite him to breakfast at the White House the very next day.
I would like to know if you gentlemen have any other explanation for Yasir
'Arafat's continued refusal to recognize Israel's existence and to accept
Resolution 242, thereby foregoing an American breakfast?
Isn't it true that the PLO which 'Arafat represents urnailling to recognize
Israel's rfght to exist because it really wanta to establish a Palestinian
state, not only in the West Bank and Baza, butiti all of the land ruled by
Israel?
Doesn't 'Arafat feel that jf'he were to accept the American conditions then he
would be recalled immediately from his position of leadership in the PLO?
Veliotis: It would be very difficult for me to speak confidently about what
Mr Yassir 'Arafat thinks. I have neNerespoken with him.
Solarz: How do you explain their refusal of the conditions? Isn't it very
clear, after a11, that it is a nation's right to be recognized, a nation that
is a member of the UN and already recognized in most parts of the world?
Veliotis: I am unable to evince any more than what we do know about the
PLO's position. We understand that it feels that recognition of Israel, in
~his form or any other, is the last card that the PLO has to play. Therefore,
this card will only be used during or after negotiations.
Our view has been clearly expressed privately and publicly on several occa-
sions. It is that this card is the first card to be played by any party
desiring to enter seriously into the peace process.
The Final Question
At another point, Rep Toby Roth (Wisc.) entered into the testimony:
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Roth: I have two questions concerning the PLO which I would like to address
to Mr Veliotis: Do you think that it was appropriate (di_plomatically) for two
former American presidents to make statements like Ca~ter. and Ford did
~ after al-Sadat's funeral on the necessity for dealing with the PLO?
The other question is:
The Soviets have recently recognized the PLO. Does that change the situation
in any way?
Veliotis: To answer the last question first, I would say: no, it doesn't
change anything. Soviet recognition of the PLO is a kind of official veil
over a situation that has been going on for a long time. They are telling
the PLO: You now have diplomatic status. In Moscow they have been receiving~
'Arafat and other high Palestinian officials for years, treating each one as
a head of state. But as far as American policy is concerned, this kind of
recognition of the PLO, or any other political recognitic~n, must come after
and not before the PLO demonstrates its willingness to accept the premises
of the "peace game."
This is the significance of the wording of Resolutions 242 and 338.
As for the statements of former presidents Ford and Carte.r, I believe that,
despite the publicity given to these statements, the former presidents will
refrain from interfering in our political life any more deeply, because
their views are only their own individual views. In any case, I don't be-
lieve that I can comment on wnether or not it was appropriate to comment on
the PLO. That is their business as ordinary citizens.
The De Facto Truce
After that, incidentally, came the developmenta whose practical outcome was
the "the real and worrisome truce" achieved by American envoy Phillip Habib
between the three parties: Syria, Israel,.and the PLO.
This truce is not supported by any written agreement, Phillip Habib trans-
mitted verbal messages between the three parties. These "verbal" messages do
not commit anyone to thei.r contents...nor would they do so even if they
were written.
This truce was ab le to withstand an important trial last month when Israel
amassed 25,000 troops to carry out a sweep over southern Lebanon. It aims at
destroying the nervous system of the PLO's infrastructure. However, the
carrot-and-stick approach used by America with Israel, in addition to the
responsible stance taken by the PLO by upholding its cc~mmitments and then by
meeting the Israeli challenge, led to an easing of a crisis that could have
had unforeseeable results, and uncontrollable repercussions.
Observers in Wasinington see the PLO as having supported the de facto truce
achieved by Phillip Habib as a political weapon in their hands. This truce
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contains clear recognition of the PLO on the part of the U.S. and Israel as
a fact that cannot be ignored and as a main party to anything relating to
aspects of the Palestinian issue.
tt is in light of this that informed circles in Washington understand the
reasons why the PLO adheres to the truce and are anxious not to be the ones
to violate it on the Israeli-Lebanese borders.
In any case, observance of this "worrisome truce" is going to be one of
Mr Hatiib's concerns in his upcoming mission, so that the Lebanese house may
be put in order in an acceptable manner until the conditions are creatpd for ~
detaching the Lebanese crisis from the Middle East problem. Or, until such
time that an acceptable formula can be found to solve the problem of the fu-
ture of the West Bank and Gaza, and the future of any comprehensive plan to
resolve all of the aspects of the Middle East problem that all parties~agree
to. Might this formula be based on Prince Fahd's plan that might soon be put
inta motion?
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
9945
CSO: 4404/538
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IRAN
MULLASS' WAR PLANS, SOCIAL CONTROLS OUTLINED
The Anengers of Karbala
London T~ ECONOI~ST in Eaglish No 7246, 17 Jul 82 pp 29, 30
(Teat ~,,torsc trsg~dy o! Shia lslrm was L2bs �
square kilometres of Iraqi territory on
massaae in AD 6ti~ of the forces of this front. They now appear to be trying
Hussein, the PropheCs grandson. at iCar- to make a stand at the base of a line of
hala. SA miles soutfi of Baghdad. Iran'c hills well inside their own territory, which
Shias are now getting their chance of joins up with their defences in the Flat
revenge. On July 12th. Tehenn radio ~untry nonh of Basra.
_ announced that "the sons of Khomeini Until last weekend. lran still seemed to
have now gone to the front with the ~ in doubt whether to move into Iraq.
intention of occupying Karbala". Ac- Hashem Rafsanjani, the speaker of Iran's
cording to the hroadcast, a"great and parliament, told crowds at the Friday
historic battle" was about to take place prayer meeting that unless Iraq paid
which would resuit in the overthrow of reparations for the war "we shall draw
Iraq's Prcsident Saddam Husuin. the money out of its throat", and threat- �
The battk began on Tuesday night. ened that Iranian forces would shel!
lranian troops advanced into Iraq nonh Baghdad. Iran's official terms tor ending ~
of the oece-bustling pon of Basra on a the war are the payment of 5150 billion in
front some l0 kilometres wide. The iraqis reparations, condemnation ot the Iraqi
claimed to have stopped the invaden: ��aggresso~' by an internationaltribunal,
their aircnft bombed several Iranian and the return of 100,()00 Iraqi Shias
cities, including Kermanshah. expelled to iran before the war began.
The lraqis ~nally withdrew from iran- Many senior mullahs are prcssing for a
ian territory to their ovm border last full-scale invasion to c*verth~ow Mr Sad-
month, after suffering a uries of defeats ~m Hussein and set up a Shia lslamic
in the war they started in 19t~. American republic in Iraq. Ayatollah Khomeini's
reconnaiuance photographs suggest that probable successor, Ayatollah Hossein
since then the (ranians have moved tight Montazeri, has urged that an Istamic
divisions down to the area north-east oF army of 3(hn people go forth to "liberate"
Basra. bringing the size of their army in
thac sertor to more tfian 100,000 men. both Iraq and Palestine.
Basra, which is directly across th~ Shatt al The Iraqis, this time, may be able co
Arab waterway from the shattered lran- stop the lra~ians. Their soldiers are likely
ian citia of Abadan and Khorramshahr, to fight better to defend their own coun-
has been under heavy shelling over the try than they did in Iran. Ayatollah
past week. The push to capture the city Khomeini has called on the Shia half of
involves crossing marshy land nonh of (ran's population to rebel but so far che
the Shatt al Arab (and jusi south of the Shias in Iraq's army have fought as well
supposed site of the Garden of Eden in as, or no worse than, the Sunnis. And ~1r
ancient Mesc~potamia). Saddam Hussein's grip on power has if
The lraqis' withdrawal from the high anything tightened since the threat of
ground they had previously occupied in- ~nvasion became real. Half the members
side Iran exposed to attacfc hundreds of of Iraq's ruling Revolution Command
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NNIIEI Council have been p~uged since it issued
the order-at first appa:ently without the
~ ~ president's consent-for lraqi furces to
withdraw from [ran.
S1fAlA Neither Iraq's army nor Iran's is
_ K;,~�~ IRAN starved for spare parts. After an early
~-ti~.., = .KW~�a�~� moratorium on arms supplies from most
M foreign sources, a flow has been reaching
~ both countries. The ~ ren~h and the Ital-
IRAQ~~~ 9~\; f ians have been supplying the Iraqis, who
~ have also had arms irom Bulgaria and
SAU01 Poland. The lsraelis have helped the
AR181A Iranians with parts for their American-
Z o~u~.ia 8a a' made tanks and aircraft. Other equip-
~P'P'~'"~ ~ ment has reached Iran from a curious
Kuw~iT
variety of other countries, some of it
flown over the Soviet Union with Suviet
permission.
A major Iranian attack along the bor-
, IRAN
lU Amaran '
�s~san9erd der could damage the Iraqi oilfields
IRA ~ " '~u+waz strung c~t along it. and further reduce
f Q ~ .
~ tr,Ai,~. Iraq's oil ezports, now running at less
' than 700.W0 barrels a day through the
country's sole remaining outlet, the pipe-
Khorramshahr line across Turke Iranian oil roduction
~~a Abadan`y Y� P
s+~~~.~.e- may now be as high as 2.2m barrels a day,
o M�~ ~o and the Iranians say they want to raise it
~
,
_ ~.s
. v . . ~ , ~y
1 ` R �(Ly /
~
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9 ?
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~f�:
.~c'. N~ ,
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.rl:
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t~~ are~i:nd 3m barrels a day. lranian oil look towards the United States. despite
installations coo~ld, however. be wlner- America's reluctance to criticise lsrael's
able to Iraqi air attack. attack on the PLO in Lebanoa. The
The Iranians are using their newly Americans are worried lest western sup-
diaplayed military strength in an attempt port for the Gulf states and Iraq cause
t~? bludgeon the oil states of the Gulf. and Iran to look for more backing from the
Saudi Arabia in particular. to produce Sczviet Union. Yet the alternative may be
less oil. The conservative Gulf sheikh- to leave the shaky monarchies of the Gulf
doms are thoroughly alarmed by this turn at the mercy of unpredictable Iran.
of cvents. Their fears may lead them to
' How the Mullahs Do It
Loadon THE ECONOIrIIST in English No 7246, 17 Jul 82 p 30
[TeXt ] young revolutionary guards stiU take to workers are ordered to appear either ia
the streets o[ Teheran at dusk every day. the full-length chador or one ot the Mao-
But their war against the left-wing Muja- type trouser oostumes ~vh:sh have re-
heddin guerrillas may be almost wan. placxd dresses and jeans in boutiques
The recent assassination of a senior and swres. University graduates report
ayatollah in Yazd by a man with a that female staff are graduaUy being
grenade who clung to him was an exoep- ousted from important jobs and lunited
tional feat for an oPposition group which to secretarial roles. Some mullahs are
a year ago appeared to be picking off demanding that women should not be
members ot the kadership at w~ll. Sina alloaed to venture outside their homes.
then thousands of Mujaheddin and their The purge of otiicials and experts who
sympathisers have been tracked down, served under the Shah is oontinwng and
imprisoned and in many cases tortured thousands of them cannot 6nd work.
and shot. Iranisn exiks alkge that there The secret polia are also becominB
are some 40.000 political prisoners in more active. "lt's not just the Mujahed-
Iran, and that some 8,000 people have din who are taken away in the night,"
been executed over the past year. said one Teheran tescher. "[n many
The middle classes have been watch- ways it's more frightening than under
ing with horror as the mullahs heve the Shah because you don't know whom
consolidated their rule. Disoontented in- they're going to pick on next."
tellectuals who helped to launch the Most factories are still working at only
campaign that overthrew the Shah are a fraction o( their capacity. But the
now being shown t'~at t~;ey have no role government says it is oomm~tud to oom-
to play in shaping the new Iran. Power plete the grandiose industrialisation pro-
rests on the support of largely illiterate jects ot the Shah. it at a moro kisut+ely
masses, who turn out in 4~undreds of pace. 'Il~e rccent boost in oil exports is at
thousands at government-organised ral- last providing the capital to fulfil those
li~~s. Their puritanical Islamic values are aims. Western traders say that business
being stampcd on the country. with the government is buoming� Oil
The revolutionary guards and local earnings have also been used to reGeve
committees of teenage vigilantes are chronic food shoRages through imports.
ensuring that aU citizens observe a stricdy ~y~~ meat rationed at ?00 grammes per
lslamicwayof life. Armedintrudersmake manth for a married couple and butter
xpot checks on private homes searching and eggs almost unavailable, there was a
(~x alcohol, decadent literature, western ~owing risk that people would take to
pop music and video cassette machines. Bveets out ot sheer hunger.
They als~~ make sure that the swimming ~yith the Mujaheddin hard hit, the
pc~ols of the rich are kept empty to comply only organisation which seems in the
with a recent ban on the sport. It a hidden ~esst capable ot stopping the mullahs is
tx~ttle of Scotch is discovered, the unlucky the army. The victory over Iraq has
hoarder can expect to be lashed; tor less enabled the anny to reaasert ~ome of its
o(fensive luxuries he may be fined or indepen~ence. Otfioets make littk at-
simply warned. tempt to oonceal their disdain for the
An Isl~imic veil is d~xending on wom- chaohe cvle of the ekries. But (e~
~ en. Only a year ago wearing Islamic people believe that the army wiU be in a
clothing was still voluntary. Noa no position to mount a political challenge
woman would darz show herself without for many yeacs to come. Loyal Islartuc
- covering her head and limbs. Women believers have ban vromoted to stand
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between offioen and men. And wherev-
er the army is statiotxd, equaUy IarBe
forces of fanatically bysl revolutwnary
- guards keep a wary eye oa the troops. .
..Once the war with Iraq is over,
they'll send, the army up into Kurdistan,
w hich is completely out of the govem- �
ment's convol," one young officer said.
"That wili Iceep us busy and out of t6e
way tor a coupk of yeats."
Teheran and other ma~or cities pre-
sent a morose picture. Building oom-
plexes started by the Shah are left unfin-
ished, shops are bosrded up or empty.
Among the mide~le classea and those in
the service industries thero is an almose
teadul nostalpa for 'the days ot the
Shah, now remembered as a time of
plenty. It can sometimes take oomic
forms. A w~aiter serving a German busi-
nes~man in the Hotel Intercontinental
wa~ dismssed when his customer oom-
plained that his stea~smelt and tasted
awtul. "But, sir, it's t e best we've got.
We imported it txfore the revolutioo."
COPYRIGflT: The Economist Newapapers Ltd, London 1982
CSO: 4600/647
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IRAQ
INTERVIEW WITH RCC MEMBER TARIQ 'AZIZ
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 277, 4-10 Jun 82 pp 20-22
[Interview with Vice President of Iraq Tariq 'Aziz by W~?id Abu Dhahr in
Baghdad: "Final Calculations: Victory for Iraq"; date nat specified]
[Text] From the battlefield to the centers of decis~ion-making AL-WATAN AL-
'ARABI has followed the Iraqi-Iranian war week after w~ek. The latest develop-
ments in the battlefield took Walid Abu Dhahr to Baghdad for an elucidation of
the situation on the Iraqi and Arab levels and to communicate the Iraqi
leadership's expectations in the forthcoming phase.
This interview with Iraqi Vice President Tariq 'Aziz, and member of the
Revolutionary Command Council, disclosed these expectations and spells out
this critical moment after Iraq's withdrawal from al-Muh2~nara [Khorramshahr].
He also focuses on the prevailing tripartite al?.iance between al-Asad,
Khomeyni, and Begin, and the susplcious behavi~r ~of the Qadhdhafi regime
towards Arab national interests.
Baghdad is still Baghdad, and Ir~q is still the Iraq thaC perturbs its ene-
mies and comforts its friends. i'.:is ~.s the impression one gets upon landing
in the Iraqi capital, interviewing the typical Iraqi, and meeting with an~
Iraqi official.
Iraqis, whether in positions of pow~er and decision�making or in the battle-
ditches, share a common f.aith hardened by experience and ~tempered~by
sacrifice. The battle has made it more resolute than ever. They believe in
their own Arab man--this has never been so persistently repeated--is master
of his own destiny and history.
Tariq 'Aziz, whose faith is embodied in his frankness and quiet manner, spoke
trustingly to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI about everything. He had an interpretation
of the near future that surpassed hasty ~udgments and was instead an eluci-
dation of ultimate truths.
His words were meant say that those who dream of an Iraqi defeat--even a
small defeat--will go on dreaming for a long time before their dreams are
shattered.
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[QuestionJ What is the si*_uation now an the Iraqi-Iranian front?
[Answer] The situation is as follows: Iraqi forces have withdrawn to the
sou*hern sector's international borders.
~ [Question] And the remaining Iraqi bases?
[Answer] The Iraqi forces are still present, in varying degrees of force,
inside Iranian texritories in the northern and central sectors, and in the
northern part of the southern sector (ai-Shash-Dezful).
[Question] Certain quarters in the Western and Arab media that Iraq suf-
fered a severe defeat after the battle of Khorramshahr. What do you say?
[Answerj Ira~ was no*_ defeated. Rather, it achieved the most outstanding
victory in contemporax�y Arab history. Allow me to explain. Iraq did not
seek out this war, nor did it begin it. Iran was the one that started the
aggression. It began an attack on the nationalist and socialist regime of
Iraq and called for its overt~?row. For several months it engaged in deliber-
ate provocations on bases and guarn posts along the Iraqi border. It would
occupy the Iraqi territory Zayn al-Qos and Sayf Sa'd. On 14 September 1980,
- from heavy artillery setup inside Iraqi territory, it shelled the towns of
Khanaqin, Mandali, atd Naft Khaneh. And for the first time in contemporary
Arab history, an Arab army struck at an enemy ocGUpying his land and
attempting to expel him from it. Traq then destroyed the enemy's military
concentrations on its national borders and pursued the enemy tens of kilome-
ters inside his land. The Iraqi army remained inside Iranian territory for
over 29 months in defense of Iraq. It is still to be found in other parts of
Iran that are very important from a strategic standpoint. So where is the
defeat? At no time did we ever say that we desire to remain inside
Iranian territory, just as we always said that we do not covet any Iranian
- land. From a position of strength we called for a peaceful and ~ust settle-
ment of the conflict. On 18 September 1980, when Iraqi columns were advanc-
ing into the heart of Iranian territory at every point, President Saddam
Hussayn called for a ceasefire and a 3ust settlement of the conflict. He
plainly said~, "We absolutely do not wish to humiliate the people and army of
Iran." This was our position ~from the beginning, and it is our position today.
Our fighters remain inside Iranian territory for over 20 months, and we were
alie to achieve the greater part of our military objectives in battle, namely,
the destruction of the enemy's military might, especially its technical
appendages. The achievement of this objective ensures the security of Iran
and the region, now and in the future. The truth will come out sooner or
later that Iran no longer possesses an army capable of playing a ma~or role
in the region. The thrust of Iran's forces presently is in its Guards and
its volunteers, which are only good for internal security and for psychologi-
cal warfare inside l.ranian territory. But they are incapable of forming a
genuine army in the military conflicts going on outside Iran. Iran's air
force, which was once the biggest air force in that region, has been des-
troyed. A large portion of its armored forces have been destroyed, as have
Iranian artillery. Its naval power's importance has been diminished.
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~
Correspondingly, and despite the sacrifices made by Iraq in battle--which
is only nat:~ral--Iraq managed to preserve every category within its armed
forces, with its basic structure and ~triking force intac.t. Throughout the
previous period of fighting, it was well known that the rate of Iraqi
casualties was very low compared to the exceeding high Iranian casualty rate.
In the s~rategic balance-sheet of the conflict between expansionist Iran and
Iraq and the Arab nation, Iraq was victorious, ~ecause it destroyed this
expansionist drive's fighting machine. �
The Threat...And Reality
[Question] But Iran continues to issue threats and says th~t it is a country
with a population of 40 million, and that it is the greatest power in the
region.
[AnswerJ Threa:s over the radio are one thing and reality is another. The
ones making threats either have forgotten, or wish other people to forget,
that they have been at war for over 20 months, and have lost great numbers of
peopcle and material, in order to regain only a part of their land, not all of
it. Keep in mind that ~e ones fighting in his own land possesses greater ad-
vantages in terms of material and morale than those that fight outside their
own land.
[Question] But hc~w do you explain Iran's success in expelling Iraqi forces
from its lands?
[Answer] Iraqi forces have withdrawn in certain instances from Iranian terri-
tory voluntarily and without fighting. In other instances, under orders
from the general command, they withdrew under fire, i.e., while inflicting
heavy losses on the enemy. They would withdraw because our objective is not
to hold on to land but to destroy the enemy's fighting machine that has
expansionist tendencies towards our country. And every tim~e our forces en-
gaged in battle in this fashion, they inflicted heavy losses on the enemy.
In the al-Shash-Dezful battle, the enemy lost over 30,000 men. Our own human`
losses were much lower. And if Iran took a number of prisoners, this doesn't
mean it scored a victory. In World War II there were large numbers of prisoners
taken by both sides, whether they had won or lost. The evaluation of the
success or failure of any battle depends upon the final outcome, i.e., the cal-
culation of all categories of casualties (dead; wounded; prisoners), equip-
ment and territoi�y. In that case, we cannot term Iraq's withdrawal from
Iranian territory itself a"defeat," because Iraq as I said is not intent on
holding land. We must remember a basic truth in these battles, and that is
th at the Iraqi fighter was fighting in a land which his commanders reminded
him daily was not his own, ~nd which he would abandon upon arrival at a peace-
ful settlement. Whereas the Iranian fighter was fighting on his own lands,
and his lines of supply passed directly over his own lands. He was fighting
to regain land that belonged to him. Despite this very important difference
in the two cases, the Iraqi fighters did not give up the land easily. They
fought for it bravely, and inflicted very heavy losses on the enemy.
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Iran 3s three times as great as Iraq in area and population. But despite
this, for more than 20 months the battle was conducted on Iranian territory,
not Iraqi. Does this mean that Iran is "superior"? It indicates a clear
and qualitative Iraqi "superiority" the like of which contemporary Arab
history has never seen.
Those who applaud Iran's alleged victories in this war do so out of a complex
over their own defeats. Hafiz al-Asad, who surrendered the Golan Heights
without a fight in 1967 when he was ~efense minister, who couldti't fight for
~nore than two weeks in 19 73, and whose forces retreated at the end of that
battle while he was president, is unable to look Iraq's vict~~ries in the eye:
First: Iraq was able to continue the war for more than 20 months, despite
conditions of international encirclement and conspiracy by certain Arab
regimes. At the same time Iraq succeeded in maintaining its prosperity and
its economic and cultural development.
Second: Iraq was successful in carrying the battle to enemy terri~ory and
was able to hold on to it the entire time, which is exceptional among even
armed conflicts that crop up between those countries considered superpowers
in the world.
Hafiz al-Asad carmot face tliese truths. Along with those various Arabs whom
;:e mortaged to the Iranian regime, and who stabbed Iraq in the back, he is
attempting to depict the results of the battles as an Iranian "victory."
[Question] Do you expect Iranian forces to enter Iraqi territory?
[Answer] The war was started because Iranian forces were occupying Iraqi
territory, and because it placed its artillery there and shelled our cities.
At that time, the Iranian regime was concentrating its forces along our
border. Its defense minister, Fakuri, was threatening to wipe Iraq off the
map. That meant that they were planning to invade Iraq and append it to
Iran. They thought that they were capable of doing so. But now we have no
doubt that the rulers of Tehran still harbor those intentions, but they also
now realize what it means to attack Iraq. They know the price they paid when
they fought Iraq on Iranian territory. Therefore, the matter is not commen-
surate with intentions, for the intentions of the rulers of Tehran are well
known. 'I'here are no illusions about them. '1'he matter is commensurate with
the rulers of Tehran and their friends among Arab traitors, on the basis of
power, costs, and the Arab and international reaction. If you hear them say
that they will not cross the international border, you can be sure that they
have deduced that any action of this sort will lead to a real bragedy for them.
[Question] What do you think the reaction of the Arab governments will be if
the Iranians attempt to cross the Iraqi border?
[AnswerJ When the war with Iran started, we said that this case should call
into effect the principles of the Arab Mutual Defense Pact, and the principle
of a common Arab destiny. It was incumbent upon the Arab governments to
stand alongside Iraq in an official manner and with all available means. But
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some said that Iraq was inside Iranian territory, and 'cha.t this was a dif-
ferent case because the Arabs have always confronted an occupation by
others of Arab lands. Perhaps this was the first time tr.e Arabs fo~nd them-
selves confronting a situation where Arab forces were cor..fronting the enemy .
and fighting him in his own land in self-defense against certain aggression.
In any case, we don't want to argue the matter. It is not a legal matter,
but a political position. This is because certain Arab ~~tates knew from the
start that it is their duty to stand alongside Iraq publi.cly. Certain other
Arab states took Iran's side in a barefaced manner. Thia latter position has
no legal ,justification in either the Arab League's Charter or in the Arab
Mutual Defense Pact. It is likewi~e a politi,.al positior.. But should Iran
try to cross the Iraqi border, then the legal aspect wou].d be cm,.~.pletely
clear. For this reason, and for political reasons also, we expect that the
majority of Arabs would support Iraq in its bati~e a.:cording to the provi-
sions of the Arab Mutual Defense Pact.
[Question] What results do you expect fram the statements by the Zionist
enemy's Defense Minister Sharon toward arms cooperation between the rulers
of Tehran and Tel Aviv?
[Answer] The arms cooperation between Tel Aviv and Tehra.n is nothing new.
This scandal was exposed with the crash of the Argentine airplane on 18 June
1981. News of this matter was broa.dcast in 3ou~nalistic c.ircles all over the
world. Previous statements on tbP subject ha~~ been issued from Zionist
sources. Rafsanjani once admitted that the~ iought arms from Israel in re-
turn for past debts. Despite all of this information, Hafiz al-Asad's
regime denied it and defended the Iranians. But now Sharon's statements are
off icial and direct and cannot be denied. Now the argument revolves around
whether or not America knew about it. But there is no argument about the
truth of arms cooperation between Tel Aviv and Tehran.
The disclosure of the truth in this way totally exposes the al-Asad-Khomeyni-
Begin alliance against Arab nationalism. It also exposes the suspicious
behavior of the Qadhdhafi regime, that plays mysterious roles on the Arab
level, and the ultimate conclusion that it is against Arab nationalism and
the Arab entity.
We do not believe that the Syrian and Libyan regimes are going to change their
stances, because they are m t unaware of these truths. They are in secret
collusion. These sorts, even if it hurts them to have the truth exposed, will
nevertheless not change their real position even if they do engage in man-
euvering. What is important about these statements is the extent to which it
affects other Arabs who were deceived by Khomevni, who said he was a friend
and that he might ally himself with the Arabs against Zionism. If the dis-
closure of these truths makes the Arabs have a qualitative change in their
positions, then that is a gain far nationalism and will clear up the situation.
We hope so. But if they are silent and do nbt take action in light of these
truths, as every loyal Arab should, then this signifies many things to us
which we will have to confront in time. But we are confi*:ent that the vast
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majority of the Arab Nation who sympathized with Iraq in its battle, and who
- considered it from the beginning to be a natioaalist battle, will find in
these truths support for Iraq's position and an explanation of the suspi-
cious behavior of the others.
The room for lies and deceit is not very large, and truth wi11 come out.
It has been exposed. Thank Go~l.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-`ARABI
9945
CSO: 4404/525
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I
IRAQ
SPECULATION ON NF.XT PHASE OF IRAQ-IRAN WAR
Paris A~,-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 276, 28 May - 3 Jur~ 82 pp 21-22
[Article: "Iraq's Wagers in the New Phase"]
[Text] The latest developments in the Iraq-Iran war are not, for the time
being, in Iraq's favor. They may be explained in light of the basic options
of the Iraqi leadership. These options are wary of becoming the pawns of
superpower interests and of providing gradually a pretext for their direct
intervention in the Gulf. Although the heated explanations of what is
happening on the battlefield do not lend themselves to calm interpretation,
thi~ quick report fram Baghdad may help to shed light on the situation.
The ctirrent phase of the Iraq-Iran war is considered, by virtue of its scope
and stieer military scals, to be a test for the Arabs and their ability to
distinguish their link to issues of common destiny. At the same time, it is
a test for the capability of the Iraqi armed forces to plunge into war,
alone, for 2 years, for the sake of all Arabs.
The Iraqi response to unwarranted Iranian provocations has led inescapably
to armed confrontation, taking the form of open war with Iran. In the esti-
mation of Iraqi political leaders and military, the war is not a"romantic
frolic under the light of the moon." The two, united political and military
leaderships realize that they face a strong opponent with huge material and
human resources; Iran's population is four times th3t of Iraq. But the root
of the matter does not lde in numbers. There is the factor of military
efficiency, and other factors such as the responses of the various parties
directly or indirectly concerned with the war and its outcome. All of these
factors are vital.
From the start, the Iraqi forces demonstrated by training, arms, and absorption
of effective fighting techniques, this ability to obtain quick, even ma~-
nificent,�results--in a manner which reminded military analyats of a blitzkries.
It was these spectacular results which drew the Arabs away from the position of
enthusiastic on-looker to one of actual partnership, giving the battle the
nature of common, nationalist s*.ruggle, and le~tting Iran know that it cannot
simply single Iraq out. Nor can it do so with any Arab state. The world
. has learned that the Arabs know very well that it is a common battle and a
common destiny in a region that comprises the first line of defense of Arab
oil wealth, the new Arab power base in the world.
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Participation...and High Hopes ~
However, effective Arab participation on the front has left much room for
raised hopes by some. On the periphery of i~ortence, the Syrian and Libyan
regimes played a role in stabbing xn the back ~he Arab front in the Iraq-
Iran war.
Previously there had been no need to announce the news that in the first
phase Iraqi forces cou?d have occupied Abadan and Kharg Island. It ciid not
do so because this in turn would have exposed the very heart of Iraq to the
danger of allied~Americau-Soviet i^tervention against Iraq. The Iraqi
leadership accomplished the im~ossible by curbing the recalcitrance of its
Iraqi forces [who wished to push into Iran]. But Iraq did not wish to
start a world war, it only wanted to demonstrate and emphasize thp esab right
to Shatt al-'Arab. And it really did.
Regardless of what is haj~pening now on the front, one indisputable truth
remains: Iraqi militarv steadfastness is a liv{ng legend, and it will trans-
form the Iraqi bor.der a~ territories into a graveyard for invaders. It does
not matter whether tfie Arabs join in the fateful battle or remain for the
most part merely Q~actators, looking and sighing at the fateful battle.
What Now?
Clearly, the Western media's focus ~n the size of what it terms the latest
Iranian victor3:es" in the southern sector (al-Muhammara) hardly had the same
enthusiasm 20 months ago when Iraq was scoring victory after victory, every
day, in the heart of Iran. There is no need to explain this enthusiasm, since
the Zionist sources that direct the media are more than well known.
Naturally one may ask about forthcoming military developments, and whether
the Iraqi leadership really desires to expand inside Iran in the near future.
The decis3ons taken in days to come will determine the outcome for Iraq and
the Arab World.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-'ARAPI
99 45
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JORDAN
INTERVIEW WITH JORDAN'S FOREIGN MINISTER ON POLICY ISSUES
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 277, 4-10 Jun 82 pp 28-29
[Interview with Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Marwa~i Qasim by Florenee
Ra'd in Amman: "The Fahd Initiative has Become an Arab Initiative"; date
not specified] ~
[Text] Jordan continues to be the key to the new diplomatic phase in the
region. It has become essential now to secure Jordan's stance on matters.
How does Jordan view phase following the Sinai evacuation...and the latest
' developments in the Iraq-Iran war and conditions on the West Bank? What is
Amman's position toward Damascus, and the reconvening or the Fez sum~it? How
may be described Jordan-American relations at this point?
These and other questions were responded to by Mr Marwan Qasim, Jordan's
Foreign Minister, in an interview with AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI. We met with him
before his trip to Havana and after his return from Morocco.
[Question] 25 April was a turning point between Camp David and the future.
How does Jordan picture the phase following 25 April?
[Answer] We consider the Palestinian issue to be the ma~or problem in the
region. It can only be resolved upon the guarantee of a complete Israeli
withdrawal from Arab lands occupied in 1967, including Jerusalem, and upon
the Palestinian people securing its legitimate rights, particularly its rights
to ~elf-determination.
Jordan's position toward Camp Davis is well known. lt ignores the main issue
and the rights of the Palestinian people. Jordan was hoping for a comprehen-
sive and ~ust settlement of the Palestinian issue, since it constitutes the
main problem, whereupon it would become easily t~ settle the other, sub-
sidiary problems. Nevertheless, I don't believe that there is any Arab
state or party that ob~ects to another Arab sta~e reconquering its own occu-
pied territory within the confines of its commitment to the ~aelfare and
national rights of the Arab nation, inasmuch this doesn't pre~udice the
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in determining its own future on
its own national soil.
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~
k'hat is required at this point is focusing on regaining occupied Arab
lands and securing Palestinian rights. This will only be achieved with a
strong and cohesive Arab position, balanced by a responsib~e international
position. The latter entails that the superpowers, especially those with
influenr_e over Israel, carry out their responsibility to implement the wi11
of the international co~unity as represented by the resolutions of the
General Assembly and the Security Council pertaining to this issue.
[Question] The Prince Fahd plan is still proposed. Does Jordan regard it as
a starting point in the research for a~ust peace in the near future?
[Answer] Actually, the Prince Fahd Peace Plan is not the first responsible
Arab initiative in the effort to achieve a comprehensive and just peace in
the region. Previously, in the Baghdad summit conference, the Arab states
combined took the initiative and proposed the foundations for the achievement
of a just and comprehensive settlement of the problem. These foundations
were defined as being conditional on the total withdrawal of Israeli forces
from all of the Arab.territories occupied in 1967, including Jerusalem, and
the guarantee of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, especially
its right to self-determination on its own national soil. Our acceptance of
this initiative, issued by Prince Fahd, was based on our mutual agreement .
in the Baghdad summit to most of the principles that the Palestinian thinking
manifested in the plan of Mr Khaled a1-Hassan, head of the Foreign Relations
Committee of the Palestine National Congress, presented before the inter-
national symposium on the unchanging rights of the Palestinian people, con-
vened a few days ago in Paris, meets with the Saudi principles, which became
an Arab initiative upon its adoption by the ma~ority of Arab atates in the
Fez summit conference.
[Question] Does Jordan expect Israel to annex the West Bank once and for all.
Does it have a plan to abort this new scheme? What are its main directions?
[Answer] Israel's expansionist ambitions and Arab r3ghts are no longer a
secret to anyone in the world. Israel won't hesitate to carry out these am-
bitions one of these days. As for confronting these ambitions this is a
matter that must be submitted to Arab considerations first and foremost.
The matter of confrontation is a national issue not to be confined t~ Jordan
alone. For this reason, Jordan has persisted in calling for the urgent agret-
ment on a comprehensive Arab strategy for confronting Israel's expansionist
ambitions, a strategy which could draw upon combined human, financial,
economic, military and political energy and resources--in deed, not ~ust in
- words. Responsibility would have to be shared. On this basis it would be
possible to create a new Arab position and reality which Israel would be
unable to confront or overcome.
[Question] The latest act of aggression on the al-Aqsa Mosque caused wide-
ranging Arab and Islamic reactions. But no practical steps were taken to
prevent any further possible attacks. What possible plan is there in this
regard?
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[Answer] It is not possible to detach the issue of Jerusalem and the al-
Aqsa Mosque from the prevailing issue in the region as a whole. As much as
.lerusalem and the al-Aqsa Mosque are regarded as an Arab issue, they are also
an Islamic issue that has top priority among Islamic isst~~s. In all of its
Arab and Islamic meetings, Jordan has been concerned to propose ideas relating
to maintaining the steadfastness of the citizens of Jeru,salem and to pre-
venting the occupation authorities from attacking the ho].y places or changing
the Arabic and Islamic character of Jerusalem. Neverthe].ess, the prevention
of possible attacks can only be accomplished through an ~greed-upon, compre-
hensive strategy emitting from a united and cohesive Aral~ic and Islamic s*_and.
Iraq's Strength
[Question] How do you view the results of the latest bat:tles on the Iraq-
Iran front, and what are your expectations in the forthcc+ming stage?
[Answer] Iraq is waging a battle with Iran with complete faith that it is
defending Arab rights ignored by Iran. In this battle Iraq is relying upon
itself and upon the moral support given by its Arab brothers for whom it is
fighting, despite the fact that there are some who have chosen to aid the
enemy and abandon their brothers. Iraq is fighting to achieve certain ends
that are not opposed to these others' self-interests znd their dreams of in-
fluencing the destiny of the Arab nation. They are also providing dangerous
opportunities for the two su~erpowers to benefit at the expense of the
national welfare.
We must work sincerely to strengthen the Iraqi front and maintain its co-
hesiveness. Iraqi military might is also our might. We must confront the
Iranian aggression despite what the Iranian regime and its allies in the
region and abroad promote as propaganda. Jordan's support of Iraq stems from
a~Qosition of principle. Jordan takes the same position on the issue of
Palestine or of any other Arab land faced with aggression.
[Question] What is Jordan's position toward the Gulf states' coordination
of military defense?
[Answer) Jordan was the first to point out the necessity for finding s~~me
kind of cooperation and coordination among the Gulf states in order to defen~3
itself from any external ambitions. On more than one occasion we asserted
that the task of defending the Gulf region is a responsibility of the Gulf
states, especially after Iranian ambitions and threats were c:ewly manifested
in that region. In our estimation, the war that Iraq is fighting at present
with Iran and with all of the other parties aiding Iran is nothing but an
attempt by Ira:, and :~ts supportive parties to reach the Gulf states after .
overcoming Iraq as a principal power in the region carrying out its duty of
defending the interests of the Arab nation against foreign threats.
[Question] Do you expect Israel to attack southern Lebanon, and what are the
Arab and internati~nal conditions that would determine such an attack?
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[Answer] Israel's ambitions on the water and soil of Lebanon are very old,
and continue to persist at present. They serve Israel's aims of expansion
and hegemony. Israel is trying to create pretexts for reaching the waters'
source in Lebanon and controlling it, even if there were no Palestinian
presence or resistance there. Similarly, Israel avoids any public announce-
ment of what its borders are. No one in the world today knows just which
borders Israel wants recognized. The situation currently prevailing.in
Lebanon has aided Israel in reaching Lebanese waters and will facilitate com-
plete control by Israel in the event of the success of those forces support- .
~ ing Israel and helping it to partition Lebanon.
Hence, Arab efforts must be directed at rescuing Lebanon from the plot being
hatched by Israel and at pulling it out of the situation it has fallen into.
Several parties have worked continuously and persistently at fragmenting and
partitioning of Lebanon and imposing their domination over it. Similarly,
~ these parties along with certain Arab countries have provided Israel with one
excuse after another to do as it pleases and implement what it wishes in
Leb anon .
[Question] Jordan has annr,unced that members of the Village League in the West
Bank have been sentenced co death. Was this decision part of a larger plan for
confrontation in coordination with the PLO, or was it an independent Jor-
danian decision?
[Answer] The application of Jordanian law to those adherents of the Village
League or those cooperating with the occupation authorities is not new. The
Jordanian government never ceased to apply it since the occupation of the
West Bank in 1967. Several Jordanian sentences have been issued against those
who have been proven to cooperate or to have sold real estate to the enemy.
~ We are continuing to apply Jordanian,law in the matter of the Village League
beca~ise in our view the League constitutes a crime against the country.
These Jordanian measures we~e met with relief and with Arab support, and they
don't imp.ly that we are coordinating with anyone by implementing Jordanian
law. .
[Question] Do you expect the Fez conference to reconvene?
[Answer] We are confident that there will undoubtedly be an Arab meeting at
the summit level so that all Arab countries may bear their historical respon-
sibilities w~th respect to the events and dangers confronting the Arab nation.
Similarly, there is no doubt that this meeting will take place in accordance
_ with new premises which will enable the Arab leadership to take an historic
decision to preserve the supreme national welfare and to guaranCee that a
united Arab stand will be reached. It will be a decision to guarantee that
Arab rights are secured and the Arab character defended. Also, the absence
oi certain parties from the summit doesn't mean that the majority of Arabs
will not bear their national responsibility with confidence and courage.
[Question] How would you describe Jordan's relations with the new American
administration as compared with the Carter administration?
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[Answer] We hope that our relations with the American administration will be
based on an understanding of our rights, our demands, and our fundamental
needs. After flis Majesty's recent visit to the United States, we found more
understanding than in the past. We hope it will grow stronger in the
f uture.
[Qu estion] Has Jordan chosen once and for all to go with the Soviet missiles,
or is it keeping up contact with the United States to buy the Hawk missiles?
[Answer] Jordan's defen~e needs arE certain to be supplied by either side,
because we are defending Jordan and the vital welfare of the Arab nation.
These needs are subject to the particular conditions and events through whict~
we are passing. We are concerned with strengthening our defense capability to
the greatest extent possible. We will obtain arms from either side, despite
efforts by Israel and its supporters in the Senate, led by Sen Kennedy, to
prevent Jordan from obtaining advanced American weaponry. Similarly, certain
other sides are unfortunately trying to sabotage Jordan's effor-ts to obtain
advanced weaponry.
. The Dangerous Harbinger
[Question] Do you believe that the wave of Khomeyniism presents a direct and
genuine threat to the Arab Gulf States? Or is it on the verge of dying out?.
[Answer] The at~tempts by Iraq and the Gulf States to build bridges of trust
and good neighborliness with the new regime in Iran are well known. But the
Khomeyni regime, in my opinion, is ignoring Iraq's initiative and its demand
that the agreements concluded between the two parties be implemented. That
regime persists in hatching plots and interfering in the internal affairs of
Iraq and the Gulf states, ~ust as it did recently in Bahrain. Similarly, the
new regime in Iran refused to withdraw from the Iraqi positions determined in
the treaties signed by the two countries. Instead it went even further by
making threats to bring the region under its hegemony. In this way Iraq found
itself forced to confront Iranian ambitions in defense of threatened Arab
states and of the rights of itself and all of those who stood by Iraq. It had
to stop Iran's expansion and its ambitions, despite the opportunism of local
and international parties over the situation in attempting to weaken Iraq and
control the Gulf region.
[Question] The summit conference of non-aligned nations will be held shortly
in Baghdad. How does Jordan view this meeting, and how can it be employed in
the service of the Arab cause?
[AnswerJ The convening of the non-alignment su~nit in Baghdad comes as an
implementation of the non-alignment summit in Havana. There is no getting
around it, despite the attempts by Iran and its allies to change the meeting
place. Most of the countries in the non-aligned group are determined to
attend the session in Baghdad. This session will help greatly in explaining
the Arab cause to the greatest possible number of the world's countries.
Tliis session will be the starting point of international support for the
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central Arab issue, and support for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people. It will be a clear inauguration of the isolation of Israel and all
of the other enemies of the Arab nation.
[Question] Now that the Syria~Iraqi border is closed, as well as the oil
pipelines in Tripoli and Baniyas, haw does Jordan view its relations with
- 5yria?
[Answer] The latest Syrian measures against Iraq constitute, in our view,, a
dangerous harbiager that damages the national stance. They are regarded as a
frank violation of Arab economic agreements, as well as a breaking of the Arab
Mutual Defense Treaty. These measures are also regarded as well as a
fragmentatioa of the principles and the national ideal that biads the Arab
sister states and draws our people together. It is the responsibility of all
the Arab states to forbid the Syrian regime from carrying out these
measures. Jordan appraises its relations in the light of the supreme national
welfare. On this basis, Jordan encourages and works with any Arab movement
which calls the Arab states to the road of cammon national work and which for-
bids them continuing to side with the enemy in its aggreseion against Iraq
and Arab rights. .
[Question] Do you believe that Husni Mubarak is a continuation of al-Sadat,
or is he an Egyptian president pursuing an independent course?
[Answer] We don't believe that Husni Mubarak is a continuation of al-Sadat.
We evinced that from a n~ber of his positioas, the most prominent being his
refusal to visit Jerusalem. Whereas it was easy for al-Sadat to visit
Jerusalem. We hope that what he intenda to do in the future will be within
the limits we hopefully await.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
,
9945
CSO: 4404/538
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, .
Lr'~ANON
EFFECT OF INVASION ON ELECTIONS EXAMINED
~
paris ~~dATAN AL-'~1RABI ia Arabic No 278, 11-17 Jun 82 pp 18, 19
~~1.^ticle: ~'Tha Cards Are Being Shuffled in the Lebanese Presidential Campaign"
~ex~ 'rJhat about the Lebanese presidential campaign, in the light of the Israeli
iavasion?
The political cards have been reshuffled, of course, and it uill take some time to
deal them again. However, there is a feeling that the "Syrian candidate~~ in the cam-
paign has lost most of his cards and that new bets are being ~laced on a salvation
candidate.
?efore the rec~nt aggression, efforts were being devoted to setting the date of the
election and determining a quorum and requisite ma~ority for the desired candidate.
'Fhe official approach Was that the elections should be held in July, provided thati
the date be announced after consultations With various parties.
Today the picture has changed completel;~, and the possibilities at issue are three in
number:
4 ccnstitutional crisis embodied in a vacuum in the center of power.
~ new ?la.-~, American probably, calling for rin extension of ~he term] of President
Il;/as Sarkis.
a ~Gndidate suddenl~ brought forth by new conditions.
In t.ze framework of the contacts that are underway on the presidential campaign, in-
~ormad sources nave affirmed that the people presented for serious consideration are
now Col Gabi Lahud, Deputy F~,i' ad Plaffa' , and ~orme] President Camille Chamoun, al-
thoueh it is Col Lahud, who recently returned to the army, who is now the focus of
con~a.cts ~mong acti~~e parties. Informatioa being bruited about in his regard indicates
that his nomination anjoys the support of the United States, Syria and active Lebanese
forces, uith the exception of the Phalange Party, which is i.n serious, decisive oppasi-
tion to him.
'~~'he sources add that the Phalange Party, which has spelled out the specifications of
the new president through Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil's numerous stated positions, con-
sidsrs that it is the basic Maronite force and has the right to determine the form and
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specifications of this president. Therefore, when Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil declares
that he Will not sign the '~Maronites' struggles" over to anyone, he means that he will
not allow any Maronite who does not receive his endorsement to be a candidate or a
president. Therefore, it appears out of the question so far, in the Phalan~e context,
that agreement might be reached over at least two persons, Gabi Lahud and Camille
Chamoun. rhe latter was chairman of the Lebanese F~ont, Which has met with the dis-
favor of the Phalange, especially in the eyes of Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, xho has
not allowed the Chamoun clari to make Maronite decisions or have an influence in them.
He was behind the 7 July 1980 operations, which ali.minated the effective Chamounite
prssence by elimiaatirig the military forces of the Liberal Nationalists' Party, and
in fact would have swept away Chamoun's own son, had he not ma.naged to escape from
the eastern section. The person uho contrived all that for the sake of unity iri
Maronite representation nocr can, and is, spelli.ng out the specifications of the Goming
president. Therefore, Lebanese sources believe that no candidate for the presidency
uill be so bold as to run before first going through Bashir al-Jumayyil in order to
receive his satisfaction and blessi.ngs. However, the same sources add that the Leban-
ese parties do not constitute a basic force in the equation of the election of the new
president, although they do constitute a pressure force. Therefore, Bashir al-
Jumayyil, who is trying to eliminate the political inf].uence of all Maronite leaders,
on orounds that he is the only person bearing the Maronite rifle, is tryirg to exert
such a pressure on the foreign forces that are helping to create the new president.
One can determine the features of this position through tuo positions he has taken.
'I'he first is the refusal to take Philip Habib~s visit insofar as it deals With the
presidential campaign, seriously, and the second is to reject a president uho emerges
as the result of a settlement among the various parties.
Howev~r, the sources in their turn, state that many Maronite forces can
divorce themselves from the will of Bashir al-Jumayyil if they sense a lack of inter-
national, especially American, enthusiasm for his theses and consider that the foreign
approach tends not to adopt severe or rigid positions vis-a-vis the issues at hand.
~ One item of information now being bruited about in Beirut is the fact that the Syrian-
Phalangist dialogue, xhich has been going on at various levels in Beirut and Damascus
r~cently, has, among the issues it has been dealiag with, discussed the presidential
campaign. Agreement was reached to keep some people out of the transactions because
they do not enjoy the support of any active party and they are unable to exercise any
role, that is, are weak and not suited to this position - for instance, the current
minister of i.nformation, Michel Iddih, the governor of the Bank of Lebanon, Michel al-
It~:uri, the deputy F~'ad Lahud, and the minister Rene Mu'awwad. In addition, agreement
- has been reached that it is necessary to try to bring in a strong president who can
ta'6e part in a solution to t~he Lebanese crisis or set forth a plan for a solution that
he can carry out, even if all parties do not agree to it. The information holds that
tze 3.i.scussion has not dealt with any persons who might be described as strong aud
a~le to arrive at a solution.
a,lthoug:~ some perties still are putting people like Raymond Iddih or Sulayman F~an-
ji;~~:h, iorward, these parties have been persuaded that it is i.mpossible that either of
tne two could come in, for well lrnown Arab and local reasons, and that they are being
put forward just for pressure~s sake or to mr~neuver to avoid the premature showing of
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cards. Therefore some observe~s consider that the obscurity cf the local-Arab-
international equation Will in the short run result in a race among parties to man-
euver and play only the cards that have been shoWn, but not to play the hidden
carde, which are the real ones. The real cards are the ones nov beiag shuffled in
the wings, especially in the wings of the ma~or electors. Hatib's visit to Damas-
cus after Beirut lies in the context of this shuffling process.
~om the conflagration in the south the neW president may emerge.
1158? '
CSO: 4~04/531
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~ LIBYA
SPAIN SOSPENDS ITS II~1PdRT PAY1~N'rS
Paris MARCSES TROPICAOX ET 1~DITSRRANEENS in Frehch No 1913, 9 Jnl 82 p 1967
[Text] Spain has suspended, ar~ of 30 June, payment for its imports from Libya
in order to urge Libyan authorities to settle an arreara of 130 ffillion dol-
lars due to Spanish businesses, it has been learned from a trustw~orthy source.
The suspension of payment for Spanish importa, consistiug almost totally of
petroleum and natural gas, applied to purchases made during the second tri-
mester of the year, the same source indicated.
Speaking for himaelf, the Spanish secretary of atate for foreign trade, Mr
Aguatin Hidalgo de la Quintana, described the affair as "delicate." He never-
theless emphasized that Spanish authorities had not frozen the Libyan Cmtral
Bank's account at the Banco de Espaaa (the Spanish Central Bank).
In vieW of Tripoli's delay in settling its arrears Which then had risen to 71.5
million dollara, Madrid had adopted at the beginning of the year a firet re-
taliatory ~easures, by auspending for oae manth the i~port of Libyan petrole~.
In 1981, theae purchases of crude oil had reached a daily average of 55
thousand barrels.
By virtue of an agreeaent signed subsequently em 9 February to resolve this
dispute, Libya pramised to settle its arrears after a delay of oae ~onth. On
ita part, Spain bad agreed to import 50 thousand barrels of crude daily.
Tripoli at the beginning of June was paying 37 million dollars, for inporxs
undertaken ia 1982, but etill o~+~es 130 ~3.llion dollara, Madrid atated, of ahicb
100 million ie for purchases of goods and 30 mili~,on for civil engineering
contracts.
The Spanish-Libyan trade balance praeents a considerable iibalance in Tripoli's
favor. In 1981, the reaerve ratio of Spanish i.mports to ezporta Mas only 30
percent. Also, the Libyaa Central Bank's accouat at the Banco de Espana ac-
tually yields a positive balance of more thaa 232 million dollars.
J In Spanish official circles, it has been noted that Spain's petroleum bill
amotmts to some 50 million dollars a month and that:the Libyan debt thus can be
discharged in less thaa three months.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
- CSO: 4519/242
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SYRIA
,
MUSLIM BROTHERSOOD LEADER ON HAMAH, COUNTRY'S AR1rD:D FORCES
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 270, 16-22 Apr 82 pp 35-39
[Interview with 'Adnan Sa'd al-Din by Walid Abu Zahr; date and place not
spec if ied]
[Text] For this meeting and the atmosphere in which aa exciting story was
told, I beg the indulgence of tbe reader for mq ekipping many of the dramatic
details and for casting shadows of dense secrecy over the events. Suffice it
to say that this meeting took place in one of the impenetrable strongholds
of the Muslim Brotherhood that 'Adnan Sa'd al-Din uses as a secret mobile
co~and post from which he directs the activities of the Miuslim Brotherhood
and their armed struggle against the enisting regime in Syria. The activities
are now unified under a single cammaad whose threads 'Adnan Sa'd al-Din
holds and coordinates with other armed resistance groups that have entered
the arena in Syria.
Preparation for this meeting was actually begun in Paris after the tragic
events of Hamah and after the announcement of the formation of the Patriotic
Alliance to save Syria. When messengers came to us to deliver statements in
the name of the Muslim Brotherhood and in the name of the Patriotic Alliance
and they obtained from AL
WATAN AL-'ARABI the agreement the implication of
which were final and unalterable, we asked permiasion to make a trip to ~
enable us, and the reader with us, to learn about the mentali~y of the
leadership that the bloody struggle in Hamah brought forth.
Since the name of 'Adnan Sa'd al-Din had begun to appear in circles having
a combat relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, we suggested meeting with
him...We got what we wanted. We traveled for this purpose over many winding
paths until we reached the "base" in the darkness of a bitterly cold night.
The base was no more than a simple, faded inconspicuoue house. We entered
that simply furnished house with the "Brothers" who accompanied us carrying
automatic weapons. While sipping the tea of traditional hospitality and
trying to restore with its warmth what the cold of the night demanded, an
imposing man in his 50's came in. Everything about him sigaaled vitality arld
dynamism. You were fascinated by hia eyes that radiated dignity and
enchantment. Calmlq and confidently, he walked over to us and without
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preliminaries said: I am 'Adnan Sa'd al-Din. We skipped the usual greetings
and familiar courtesies to engage (immediately) in this conversation which
lasted 2 hours. When it ended, it was past 2 am aad the night had begun to
prepare to retreat before the light of dawn. That was an indication of an
ard~uous return to our starting point in order to bring this interview
promptlq to AL-WATAN AIr'ARABI and our readers at a time when they are annious
for anqthing that will thraw light on the escalating armed struggle in Syria.
[Abu Zahr] I said to him without any preliminariea, Who are you? And he
answe~�ed without hesitation:
[Sa'd al-Din] My name is 'Adnan Sa'd al-Din and I am 52 years old. I joined
the Muslim Brotherhoa3 on 5 July 1945 aad have been in cloae touch with the
movement and the group from that daq until thie hour.
I participated in all kinds of activities, including guidance, political
action, and administrative work...Thea in 1975 I was ent~rusted with the
leadership of the movement after differences of opinion had crept into the
ranks over secrecy because the movement changed from open to secret activities
since the advent of this tyranical regime now crouching on the chest of Syria.
[Pause] After ~hat an attempt was made to repair the rift and close ranks.
This attempt reached a peak in 1974 and ended with the call for general
elections ia the ranks of the group in which the leadership participated just
as most of the indiv~duals of the group do likewise. As a result, I was
charged with serving as a general control officer responsible for activities
and for strengtheaing unitq in the ranks.
[Continuing] Effective activity began early in 1976. Among the reaults of
~ this activity was the unification of individuals of the group in accordance
with sound organization...and they operated in accordance with a well-conceived
plan the drafting and study of which took more than a year and a half and
ended with a definition of purpose, goal...stages, methods, etc.
After this unif ication of the individuals of the organizatian, there was
anothesc unification of the organization with the masses in most Syrian cities.
The organization grew at an astonishing rate. EWeryone kue~w its purpose,
goal, and tasks and adjusted his position accordingly. The true state of
affairs was manifested particularly in the cities of the north, in Adlab,
Aleppo, Rif Adlab, and Rif Aamah as well as in Latakia. This healthy
phenomenon then began to spread to the east of Sqria and to the south as well.
Another accomplistunent of this stage was the strengthening of the bond
between the organization on the inside and the organization on the outside.
There had been a chasm However, it was filled up and bridges and
channels were built. Each of them complemented the other. That produced
swift efforts, which also ended in a total unification of the Muslim .
Brotherhood movement inside S~rria with that outside and with the Muslim
Brotherhood movements elsewhere in the world. Thus, we established verq firm
relations with about 30 organizatians in the Arab World, Asia, Africa, and in
foreign countries as well.
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[Abu ZahrJ Without trying to break his train of thought, I asked: Were
these relations limited only to groups affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood?
[Sa'd al-Din] No, we established relations and alsa strengthened them with
Islamic organizations in the Indian subcontinent, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkeq,
and other places in the world.
And finally...after a new spirit began to spread and new blood circulated in
this organization and after it discovered its way and purpose and defined
its goal, and after it proceeded in accordance with its well-conceived
plan...it found itself face to face with great treschery embodied in the
regime of the Asad brothers, Hafiz and Rif'at in Syria. This personal
regime did away with the ruling Arab regime of Syria and traveled down a
deviant path, propelling it (Syria) forcefully toward the abyss...But let us
not rush things. That story will emerge in the course of our intervieRa.
[Apologetic smile, continuing] One of the most important accomplishments of
this stage was the organization's preparation for the struggle with the enemy
and confrontation of this danger. It responded to the supporters of God and
the call of the people to save this plotted-against country. This is the
people who gained the upperhand so that the organization had to stand up
, openly against oppression and the oppresaor and corruption. The movement
began to engage in armed activities in Syria.
[Abu Zahr] When was the Muslim Brotherhood organization founded as a
disciplined and united movement in Syria? And do its leaders remain inside
Syria while others are outside?
~ [Sa'd al-Din] The Muslim Brotherhood organization in Syria was an echo of the
Muslim Brotherhood organization in Egypt. Its first stirrings began in the
1930's, 1935-1936, and it came out into the open in 1937.
This organization at first took the form of widespread m~vements in the big
major cities. These movements had different names such as Noble Traits of
Character, Association of Helpers, Association of Muslim Brothers, Muhamaoad's
Youth, Muslim Youth...Then at the end of the 1930's and beginning of the~
1940's, these movements, different in name but similar in goals, urged each
other to form a single movement called the Muslim Brotherhood Movement and
choose its first leader, i.e., its co~ander, or controller of the organization,
Dr Mustafa al-Siba'i (May God '~,ave mercy on him!).
The leaders of the organization were assigned to Syria and other countries.
Nowever, they act in accordance with the demands of the stage to unify
activities and goals within and without and to strengthen the deep bond with
our people, our country, and our land in an atmosphere of increasing harmony.
The Tragedy of Our Age
[Abu Zahr] If we consider the Hamah uprising to be a concrete manifestation
of this harmony, I should like you to tell us in detail about what happened
in Hamah and what was the extent of the actual losses suffered by the regime's
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forces and your forces and by the inhabitants of Hamah.
[I saw tears in his eqes whenever the name Hamah was mentioned, but he
continued to speak quietlq] [Sa'd al-Din] What happened in flamah can be
called "the tragedy of our age." We read and heard a great deal about
similar distressing ev~nts in our time, but we never lived through a tragedq
like this one with such meaning and depth.
We read about what happened in same German cities after the war whea the
occupiers devastated them and about the Marxist revolution in China and the
Saviet Union...Many tragedies have occurred in the world, especially in the
Third World. But we never heard or lmew of su~h a tragedy like the tragedy of
Humah.
" We must not forget that Hamah stood up against the Crusaders and (other)
foreigners. That is why the Ayyubid kings took it as their first capital.
Although the big Crusader armies came close to the main cities of Syria, they
were unable to come close to this city.
In the time of the French mandate, Hamah became a bone sticking in the throat
of the French...It continued for a quarter of a century fighting, battling,
and resisting them. France punished Hamah and deprived it of all means of
subsistence and elements for grawth and development, leaving it a rural,
farming town...It forbade it to create institutions on its land and to enter
the industrial age. However, this only made the people of Aamah more
energetic. Prof Akram al-Hurani in hia talk with qou last week told qou a
great deal about the recent historical characteristics of Hamah's
unyieldingness .
[Continuing] So it is not strange that the present regime finds in Hamah an
obstacle before it and before the plot which it came to carry out on 9yrian
land in order to eliminate its heroic and leading role in the Middle East.
As (Miles) Copeland, a CIA agent aad representative of its mentality, said in
his book "The Game of Nations" and as his counterparts said: "Syria is a
snakepit for American imperialism." It refused foreiga sid and alliaaces.
It was always helping oppressed peoples. It was always offering assistance
to its brothers in obtaining their independence...Therefore, Copeland and
other thinkers and observers of Western intelligence agencies were trying
to sabotage this role...They tried military coups and other things. Theq
relied on leading personages but they didn't aucceed...Then they relied on
obvious agents to no avail. And finally they brought in this regime as part
of their attempt to put an end to Sqria's traditional role.
Since Hamah formed an obstacle to this terrible plan, it was logical (to
believe) the reports that had been reaching for ue a long time which said
they are plotting evil against this city...They want to wipe it off the map
and revise its population make-up.
Yes, for more than 2 years news has been reaching us that they are plotting evil
against this city. In fact, their ugly intentions were revealed by "sweep
operations," a euphemism for the desecration of cities, housea, and holy places.
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[Continuing] More than 2 years ago the oppressive regime Uegan to give its
men and myrmidons in this city a free hand to wreak havoc :Ln it. What most
inflamed the people and provoked their resentment and anger was that this gang
enjoyed, and still en3oys, a free hand in peaceful homes t~~ kill, desecrate,
and plunder...violate the honor of the men and shredding tlle honor of the
women. Indeed, they did not hesit..ate to attaek (even) children and kill them.
During that time the Arab media was mostly shackled and the Arab conscience
was on vacation...The world media shared in this indifferei~ce. It was as
though these crimes were a motion picture. The last act i~z these outrages
reveal that Haf'al-Asad and his brother Rif'at (there is n~~ truth to what
was said in AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI about differences of opiniox~ between them, it
is a play they perfected more than 10 qears ago and they r~avealed it by
dealing with the opposition in all of its aspects, are pri~iciple actors in
this play. Whenever shocking crimes occurred, Hafiz al-As,ad disavowed them,
blamiaig them on his brother. Then later on we find the tw~~ brothers
cooperating in new crimes and taking part in other plays. Therefore, the
Syrian people pronounced judgment against them as being equally criminal and
responsible above others for everything that happens in Syria.
[Continuing and speaking like a roaring waterfall] About 2 months ago the
al-Asad brothers and the myrmidons who help them, such as 'Ali Eadar and
Muhammad al-Khauli, agreed to give Rif'at unlimited suthority to declare
martial law and assign h~m 12,000 soldiers to launch an attack against the
northern cities in order to "cleanse them" of opponents, with the city of
Hamah regarded as the region of primary operations...They 3aid he could kill
as many as 5000 without seeking the agreement of anyone, and they named about
a hundred families he could exterminate. They empowered him to kill
arbitrarily and randomly, which was nothing new in his modus operandi. But
this time it took the form of a decree. He ~ame to Hamah where he continued
this policy for 2 months during which time w~~�received detailed news about it.
We were asking the young men and Mujahidin to be patient, control th~ir
nerves, and avoid a clash. They were saying we will die every day...or part
of the city will die. Haw long? One house was searched more than 10 times.
Hardly had Hulagu's soldiers left the house when they entered it again,
knowing that what embittered the city most was violation of. the honor of the
people...No one possessed of dignity, knawledge, or advancPd years escaped
being abused. No woman in the homes they invaded was safe from their ugly
behavior or their disgraceful actions. Nor did the childr~en escape...They were
often killed in front of their parents. Worst of all, when an informer would
come and tell them "I saw a man enter this building and he didn't come out,"
theq would break into the apartments of the building. When they searched it
and didn't find him, they demolished it while the people were inside. They
killed many innocent families, everyone of its members, in this way. At this
time Hafiz al-Asad was talking about how calm Syria was and how he wiped out
the gang, i.e., the Muslim Brotherhood and the opposition.
We Know...But
The world knew these facts yet remained silent about them. I say frankly that
we have information about more than 10 Arab states representing about 75
percent of the inhabitants of the Arab homeland and persons directlq
responsible...They say we know more than what you lrnaw about the tragedy that
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is befalling Syria. We have the details just as you do, and more.
Nevertheless, we keep hearing about telegrams of congratulations and telegrams
of condolence being exchanged between them and the butchers of Damascus...Yes,
more than that, we find that they shower the men of the tyrannical regime with
gifts beyond all imagining. They give them billions and they know how these
billions are spent. Theq must know, as we kaow, about the conditian of the
banks, which are uneasy abou~� the large sums deposited by the Mafia mob ruling
Damascus.
Let us return to Hamah. Samah found itself and its people found themselves
facing a systematic plan for its annihilation. We were hoping that reason
would prevail and that the city would be saved from disaster. Sut what was
planned was planned. ~
' When the inhabitants of Hamah realized they had reached a deadlock, they rose
up in the night using the weapons they had and the weapons they wrested from .
those boisterous fellows af ter a surprise attack was launched against them...A
great battle broke out among the p~ople of the city with all its groups and
factions, young men and old men, children and women, in defense of their land,
~ blood, and honor. The Christians were side by side with the Muslims. I saq in
this corniection that the Cf?ristians in Syria recorded a shining mark that will
hav~ a very great impact on the future of Syria and the region in real
soli~3arity and in the most critical of circumstances and in situations �ocTites
strongest pressure. I record here that although Hafiz al-Asad found lxyp
among the Muslims and all the other sects, he was unable to convince a single
responsible spiritual Christiaa to issue a for~al statement against the revolt
of the people. It must be admitted that the Christians around Hamah were also
honorable. They were praud to aid the casualties when the missiles and
artillery began to mow them down in the quarters of flamah and force them to
seek refuge in the outskirts. Iiafiz al-Asad obtained with these terrible
weapons, weapons of mass destruction, an instrument to suppress the~people
~ of Syria after the army's mission changed from the defense of Syria s borders
to the suppression and persecution of the Syrian people.
There are many details that out of respect for the honor of the people we
refrain from mentioning, things the sou~. loathes to talk about, because one
cannot bear to hear them. When all the people know what haPPened to the girl
students and the circumstances under which they were criminally attacked, they
will know the magnitude of the responsibility, the scale of the crime they
committed, and the degree of responsibility of those who stood alongside
Hafiz al-Asad and helped him. I am referring here to some of the Arab rulers
whose names I need not mention...
The dead are a~any, 8,000 accoraing to the lowest estimate. Other estimates
place the number of victims of the massacre at 30,000, not to mention the
enormous destruction of homes, although the flamah population was between
280,000 and 300,000 individuals.
I want to state that these fateful and tragic events cannot be ignored by the
people. I am not saying it is only the people of Hamah who are seeking
revenge against this tyrarniical regime, for all the Syrians sympathize with
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the peoplz of Hamah. But those people of Hamah w!zo have sworn vengeance are
many. Perhaps the leaders of the ruling regime lmow that ~very well.
Liquidations in the Army
(Abu Zahr] What is the present attitude of the Sqrian Ar~y, especiallq in light
of the events of Hamah? And is it true that one of the brigades 3oined the
Mujahidin in Hamah?
[Sa'd al-Din] The 47th Brigade was stationed 7 lmn from Aa~nah near Ma.'rin, a
' village on the way to Homs. This brigade was placed here as a means of
threatening the city as was intended. When the fighting broke out in the city
and the Mu~ahedin were in control all over, there was an o�pen aplit in the
b rigade, so~ of them supporting the people. and the Mu3 ahe3in. This breakdown
and dissension continued to the end. Something of this kind, but to a lesser
extent, occurred in the 21st Brigade, which was brought from Qatifah to the
city of Hamah to demolish it.
The Syr ian Army is suffering from this regime what (other) groups of people are
suffering. The basic mission of the Syrian Army, as I said, chan~ed from
defense of the homeland and its borders to an instrument o.E repression, and

~ the liquidation in it have not yet stopped. This shows that opposition has not
/ ceased nor does it appear that it can be stopped....
Hafiz al-Asad wanted to place the higher units of this arnry in the hands of
those who assist him t~rough the factions in governing Syrta. Uprisings in the
army follow one another. Three months ago the whole world heard about the
~ arrest of a large number of off icers, perhaps about 200 acr_ording to the
lowest estimate, hut some observers say there were 400 offtcers from the
various services.
I The army is going through the same crisis in all respects :Erom which the
Syrian people are suffering: sectarian discrimination, persecution of everyone
with a free voice, insulting individual honor without reasun or cause,
arbitrary persecution to the point of crimes--all of which we detest and
~ re3ect. The people entertain the hope that the Syrian Army will participate
in settling the situation at the decisive hour...This is our opinion of our
army. Despite all the liquidations and all the wounds it ]zas suffered, it
will remain a patriotic army that will shake this shame off itself and wipe it
from the brow of the people and unite with them so that the people of Syria
can resume their well-known role in the region, resist their enemies, and
share in bearing their burdens. This is our view of the axmy, that's what
it was and still is. The hope we rest on it increases day by day. I apologize
for holding back on some of the details because they are m:tlitary secrets,
but tomorrow holds no secrets.
[Abu Zahr] Why don't Aleppo and thP rest of the Syrian cities show solidarity
with Hamah?
[Sa'd al-Din] All the cities do maintain solidarity with one another because
o� the people's unity, but they are not in a position ta stand with Hamah
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because the people are unarmed and the regime's army is not engaged at the
borders. The borders are protected~by the international police which helped
it more than 20 times. The people were quickly disarmed. That was because
the penal code specified a one month�s prison term for carrying a gun without
a permit. But Hafiz al-Asad raised the penalty from l month to 5 years and
then raised it (again) in a new decree to 20 years or death. The people were
stripped of all means of resistance.
We Will Hang You in Front of Your Shops
(Sa'd al-Din continues] Aleppo tried to protest but it was threatened with
bombardment, wipe out; and destruction. Damascus also tried, but Hafiz
al-Asad su~oned to the republican palace members of the chambers of commerce
and threatened that anyone who closed his shop would be hanged on its door...
Don't you believe, as I do, that foreign occupation would not dare to do
anything like that?
- This was not all. Other actions were taken that provoke laughter and disgust
at the same time - and the worst calamity is what provokes laughter. After
Hamah was demolished, the regime brought out the inhabitants of villages in
Jabal al-'Alawi by well-known police methods to stage a demonstration in
- support of Hafiz al-Asad's stance in which he would say: These inhabitants
of Hamah are celebrating the demolition of their city and dancing on the
corpses of their sons!
As the Prophet (God bless him and gran t him salvation!) said: "If it is not
granted, do as you wish." ~
Does he know shame aF a11 this creature who stands before a city that has been
demolished and flatt~sned over the heads of its inhabitants. Foreign
correspondents see that it has become like the ruins of some German ci~ies~
after World War II. Despite that, immorality reached the point where he
could say that those singers.in the pho~ demonstration are celebrating it
while dancing on the corpses of their children!
They talk about Nero who set fire to his capital, Rome, a little more than
2000 years ago to en3oy the sight of the fire. We do not know whether these
stories are imaginary or not, but people will say even after a thousand years
that during an extraordinary period Syria was governed by a perverted group
lacking in moral values, beliefs, and standards and that it was devoid of any
loyalty to the people or the homeland and the nation. Its head and president
deeply rooted with ni~ regime in planned treachery could announce,without
blinking that the people of Hamah are now demonstrating to support him after
the city was pulled down on their heads.
The most ridiculous part of this disaster is the walk of 100 meters that
Hafiz al-Asad took among the crowds along the Corniche Mazra'a in Damascus.
last 7 March to prove he is not afraid to mee.t with the people.
But everyone knew that the crowd surrounding him were soldiers from the
intelligence service and defense units wearing civilian clothing. Moreover,
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special forces had previously occupied a11 the houses along the route that
Hafiz al-Asad took and forced the inhabitants of every houFSe to remain in one
room throughout this play.
~ Television began to 3oin in the 100-meter walk, in scene atter scene, to show
_ Hafiz al-Asad in a display of empty heroism.
We consider Hafiz al-Asad to be all but finished, and his ~.ast sp~ech proves
it. The only consolation for the victims was that hysteric:al speech which
produced a good effect in warni~g the people of Syria and 1:he other Arab
countries (about him) .
These are short selections from the tradegy of Hamah that will perhaps rouse
the nation to shake off the dust of inactivity, brush away the cobwebs, and
move forward.
...Is the Druggist Suitable?
[Abu Zahr] Last year the Sqrian regime signed a treatq of friendship and
cooperation with the Soviet Union. What is your view of tlte backgound and
consequences of this treaty?
[Sa'd al-Din] The Soviet Union has signed many treaties with many countries.
However, this game has been exposed. The Soviets insist or~ it, as they did
in their dealings with the Shah of Iran, Sadat, and others.
~ Therefore we do not expect too much from these treaties.
More than anyone else, the Soviets know that Iiaf iz al-Asad would not remain in
power five minutes if there were genuine, credible, and honest ele_ctions.
Our information confirms that the Soviets know the truth about Hafiz al-Asad,
but they ~naintain theatrical friendly relations with his regime because
they are better for them than their absence...instead of being out of the
region after their experience with al-Sadat and Somalia. They are satisfied to
sell arms in order to have funds with which to buy wheat and technology from
the advanced Western countries.
[Abu Zahr] What do you think of the coalition of opponents in the new crucible.
And how can this coalition deliver the Syrians from their great ordeal?
[Sa'd al-Din] We stated in the program of our rebellion 2 years ago that our
power, after relying on God, is strengthened by all our people participating
in this rebellion...It was our intention from the beginning and our
understanding of the history of Syria and of its population and social make-up
that complete cooperation between all the sons of the people is essential.
He who doesn't understand this reality has forgotten the main issue in this
struggle.
Hence, this matter was self-evident and clear to us. Even the 'Alawites
whom Hafiz al-Asad wants to throw into the struggle were sent an appeal to
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join us againat this plague who wants to li~e on the debris of sectarian
disputes between tae children of one people.
Our concern has been �or this coalition to consider the faith of the nstion,
ies traditions, values, and inheritance. We have enco~tered na difficulties
in this regard...Indeed, we found the other parties juat as desirous of it
as we are.
They are Arabs just as we are Arabs and Muslims 3ust as we are Muslims. We
. therefore found no difficulty in.convincing the others. On the contrai,q, we
found complete mutual understanding.
We spoke about the freedoms in our rebe113on. We asserted our belief in a
multiplicity of parties and in the freedom of people to form parties provided
that these parties do not adopt beliefs or principles that conflict with the
faith of the nation and that they are not tied to a foreign power. The decision
in this matter should be left up to the ~udicial authority and not to the
executive authority to use to murder the public freedoms. Therefore, our
round of talks with the opposition groups did not take much time. In fact,
we found ourselves in complete agreement on a solution (to the problem) of
what will save Sqria...and deliver her from her ordeal ao that she can resume
her role throughout the world.
Our next stage will be the stage of escalating armed struggle...How we wish
we didn't have to carry arms, but the regime in S~rria has forced all cultured
persons, scholars, scientists, and some of the people, all of them, to bear
arms against it.
We have suffered from a regime that kills prisoaers, assassinates leading
personalities, and takes away freedoms. 'It bans the press, violates honor,
and kidnaps women fram the streets...We have suffered from a regime about
which it is useless to complain. We can't even pray in the mosques. If people
meet in a mosque, the artillery demolishes it. Complaints even to God are
prohibited.
The hypocrites who surround Hafiz al-Asad tried to teach him to pray properly
in order to complete the deception. But they still haven't taught him, or he
was unable to leam, how to place his right hand on his left hand. And
whenever he appears on television,~we (still) see him placing his left hand
on his right hand.
At any rate, disclosure of the secrets of the government and of the governor
made all the parties believe there is no deliverance from him except by armed
struggle.
[Abu Zahr] Did the political and military cooperation between the Syrian and
Ira~ian regimes also extend to economic matters?...Aow do you understand this
relationship.
[Sa'd al-Din] As for the Iranian revolution, we fully sympathized with it at
first in the days of the Shah. Rhomey ni in France kept saying that he would
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have friendly relations with his neighbors, that he would call the Gulf not
the Persian Gulf but the Islamic Gulf, and that he would return tre islands
occupied by force by the Shah to the United Arab Emirates. fle said he would
not proceed from the fanatical Shi'a Safavid dynasty or fram the Umayqad
dqnasty which quarreled with the Prophet's familq...but fr~~m the concept of
the Orthodox (caliphs).
We said if this is indeed the case, the regime will be sowad and cooperation
with it will be possible on great issues to the benefit of the inhabitants of
the region. But strange to say, after Khomeyni came to po~aer, he did not do
anything that he promised. On the contrary, we fouad the ~tudies and writings
and constitutional provisions heading in another and very ~arrow direction...
a sectarian direction. We thought our common interests would malce us all go
beyond this framework, but we found them clinging to this ~nore than in the
time of the Shah.
We were very patient and consulted with them on this matter. A number of our
delegations visited them...We were very anxious to remain ~n good terms with
them. The responsible ones amang them promised us theq wo�uld correct this
error. They blamed it on the lack of govemment unitq and on the fact that
their groups were very different and incompatible...that t'hey do not understand
many of the issues or knaw anything about them and they want to trq to
understand them again, although their circim~stances are grim...etc.
Then we saw the~m draw close to the regime of Hafiz al-Asad. They said we will
~ not be able to cooperate with you if you attack the ruling party in Syria
and don't attack sectarianism there.
We said to them: If you saw two faults in the Sqrian regime, why are we only
attacking it from one corner for anly one shortcoming...Even if the regime were
partisan in Syria and freed the parties, we would enter into a free,
constructive, and public dialogue with it. But the danger is that the regime
is heading in a dangerous partisan direction. You say you do not agree with it
either in its partisanship or in its sectarisnism. In that case, your hostility
toward this regime should steadily increase. Why do you stretch out your
hands to it? They said we will correct this error. Whenever we asked them,
they would say to us: "Do not attack it in a partisan way."
At the same time there were secret and sectarian contacts between Damascus and
Tehran. Indeed, information about our visit and talks with them was steadily
passed on to Damascus. I did not visit Tehran, my associates did, and everq
delegation that went there returned with a negative attitude and we found its
hopes for the Iranian regime had dwindled. We soon discavered that this regime
squatting in Tehran was in the same trench with the regime of Hafiz al-Asad.
We found this odd and asked for an explanation...We said: You want to regain
and liherate Palestine, yet Hafiz al-Asad agreed with "the red line," i.e.,
the truce line with the Zionists. You say you want to liberate Jerusalem, yet
Hafiz al-Asad allows international policeznen to come in. You say you call for
modesty in women, yet Hafiz al-Asad tears the veil and clothes from women and
looses the mob on veiled girls in Damascus. You want a regime that observes
the traditions of Islamic morality, yet Hafiz al-Asad and his regime violate
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these traditions every day. What d~ you ha.ve in common with flafiz al-Asad
if not blind sectarian fanaticism?
[Continuing] The situation in Iran, according to my information, threatens
to fall apart...The moderates with whom we can came to an understanding are
under_siege. The magazine AL-SHAHID, which pubished one letter from us, was
threatened with destruction if it cooperated with us one more time.
We know we are going with this regime down a blind alley and that narraw
sectarian considerations have overcome rational values.
Just 2 week ago the preacher in Iran ~oined with the foreign minister in
accusing us, distorting our history, and attacking us. We were forced to
defend ourselves and reply to this deceit and false charges in accordance with
the words of God: "Then those who are fighting would be victcrious."
[Continuing] The regime in Iran is proceeding in an increasingly sectarian
and significant direction. We received copies of books they recently published.
They are proceeding in a significant direction and attacking the best men of
Islam and some of the Orthodox caliphs...in the Persian language. We think
too highly of ourselves and of the peoples of the region to fall into this
swamp.
Calamity after Calamity
[Abu Zahr] During 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam's last visit to Iran he concluded an
agreement for Syria to be supplied with 60 million tons of Iranian oil in a
year in an attempt to provide the Syrian regime with the meana of survival.
What do you think of it?
[Sa'd al-Din] Cooperation between the Sqrian aad Iranian regimes will make
each of them a disaster for the other and whoever supports either of them
will suffer the consequences. An agreement like this is fresh proof of the
error of the Iranian regime because if it didn't know the truth, the matter
would be less serious, but the men of the Iranian ~egime, as we heard from
them, know the truth of the situation in Syria...
So Iran is not starting from a basis of principle in its foreign policy. Iran
calls itself an Islamic state but it associates and deals only with those who
cooperate with South Yemen and with the regime of Hafiz al-Asad...Even in
conferences that it organizes in Iran (our youths attended several of them)
we find that 90 percent of those invited are from among tl~e enemies of Islam
from the extreme left, from Nicaragua, from Vietnam, and from other states not
tied to Islam.
[Abu Zahr] What is your opinion of the Camp David agreements? Do you favor
them as Hafiz al-Asad says?
[Sa'd al-Din, smiling] This question doesn't deserve an answer. Those who
bear arms and offer their lives to free their homeland do not ask about
corrupt treaties.
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Our history is eloquent. Nothing disturbs Zionism as much as our movement.
The Camp David group and Aafiz al-Asad lmow who the men of the region are and
who are the ones willing to give up their lives for the ca�ase of God in
defending their land and their people. They know who reje~t all solutions that
call for surrender. I ask who are the ones who opposed the treacherous
agreements in Egypt? They were the Muslim Brotherhood. W{ao settled affairs
in Egypt? Khalid al-Islambuli and his brothers from among the universitq
youth are the ones who settled affairs. Hafiz al-Asad did~z't do it. A1-Asad
played with Camp David in another way consistent with the ~psychology of the
inhabitants of the region, using the "red line" and the in~ternational
police...and a perpetual honeymoon with Israel and joint dramas.
The Camp David question, you'll forgive me, w~e don't ask about it. But the
real parties (concerned) ask about it and Aafiz al-Asad doas as head of his
real parties.
I want to note here that we have documents, secret letters exchanged between
Hafiz al-Asad and big powers arovad this region...In fact, we have documents in
Hafiz al-Asad's voice as he announced sectarian states, relying on the support
of Israel for these sectarian states.
Voice of Reason
[Abu Zahr] What is your opinion o� the war between Iraq and Iran?
[Sa'd al-Din] We said before and we say now this war must be halted immediatPly.
Then unconditional and direct negotiations to settle the dispute, to stop the
war becasue it is wasting the strength of the region...We hope the rulers of
Tehran will listen to the voice of reason.
[Abu Zahr~ Will the Sqrian Patriotic Front cambine with the Christians?
[Sa'd al-Din] Yes, indeed. The first to broadcast the news in Paris was a
Christian belonging to the Front. He is solidly behind it.
- [Abu Zahr] What do you thinlc of the relationship between Islam and Arabism?
[Sa'd al-Din] There used to be an artificial and formal dissension between
Arabism and Islam, and the enemy profited greatly from it. Many of us and
others as well fell into the trap of bygone contradictions, but this
dissension shows signs of ending, with complete and total solidarity
developing between Arabism and Islam. Western missionaries and orientalists
worked for it. It has a long history. It has been interpreted in various
ways since the last century in the corridors of the E~merican and Jesuit
universities. And secret conferences have been held (to discuss it).
You ask: Is it necessarily so that if I am an Arab, I am a heretic and enemy
of Islam? If I am a sincere Muslim, do I have to hate the Arabs to whom I am
related?
...What is this artificial dissension?
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We fou~d the melting pot where Arabism inspired Islam and Islam inspires
Arabism and there is no room for dissension between them.
As many on both sides have said: Arabism is the body and Islam is its soul.
A goul-'cannot do without a body nor a body do without a soul. This
formulation will have the best consequences in this region, God willing.
[Abu Z~hr.] You are against what is called the Ba'th Party in Syria. What
is qou'opinion of the Arab Soci$list Ba'th Partq now in power in Iraq?
~ [Sa'd al-Dinj The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party in Iraq is the original one.
It opposes the regime of Hafiz al-Asad. It is one of the main groups with
which we have had discussions. T~Ie did not find any incompatibility between
them and ourselves, judging by the texts of the articlea I mentioned
previously...0a the contrary, we foimd that it is based on believing, religious
people and that no party chose malevolent sects to make them a support for
their power. We therefore found many of the differences of opinion between
us and the party to enter the ranks of the Syrian opp~sition. It exists on
Syrian territory because we have allied ourselves with the Arab Socialist
Ba'th Party leading Iraq. The Nasserites and Arab socialists and many other
political groups have allied themselves with us on this basis.
The Ba'th in Iraq differs radically and totallq in its make-up and orientation
from the party of the same name in Syria. If it were like Hafiz al-Asad's
party in its orientation, we would not have met with it under any circumstances.
We found it to be radically different from Aafiz al-Asad's party. It is a
party of the nation. It has a foundation representing the nation while the
other (Sqrian) is a sectarian party...We found its leaders, after we got to
know them close-up, to be trulq religious men. I don't want to go into ~he
details because we would be discussing persanal matters of no concern to us naw.
In Syria, it is impossible for anyone who fears God and knows Him to co~me to
the top. In fact, one obtains a position of responsibility only bq way of
immorality, atheism, apostasy or by attacking the values of the nation and its
inheritance. Some party members at the top know the ture state of affairs in
Syria and there is a dialogue and cooperation between us and them. Their
situation is distressing. No one dares to pray. In fact, some of them reveal
their thoughts in Ramadan so as to remain in power, to prove theq are worthy
of assuming responsibility in Hafiz al-Asad's regime...The distance is great
and the difference vast.
[Abu Zahr] There are Alawites who are for the regime and others against it...
How does the movement deal with the Alawites?
[Sa'd al-Din] Given our revolutionarq bent, we do not want to exchange the rule
of one party for the rule of aaother. Given our fighting orientation, we do
not want one sect to take the place of another...Here we say clearly the
Alawites are fellaw citizens, many of them have been wronged. Hafiz al-Asad
wants to hurl them into the furnace of sectarian war. Some of them actually
weep and curse Hafiz al-Asad the way the other aects curae him. We want to save
them from the sectarian qua~nire as we want~to save all the groups of our people.
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Hafiz al-Asad wanted to exalt the sect. Then he waated to set the sect over the
nation and the tribe over the sect and the family over the tribe. But our
accounting is only with those who acted in collusion and dipped their hands
~ in blood. As for the great majority of aects that cmne undex the pressure of
this tyrannical regime, we are vorking to save them just as we are working to~
save other groups. We do not say this for political reasons...We say it out of
principle and good will. This is what we learned from the noble messenger
when he conquered Mecca and said to its people: "What do you think I am doing
to you?" They said, "noble brother and son of a noble brother." He said: "Go,
for qou are free." j
[Abu Zahr] Syria's future program is for everyone. This is clearly stated in
the program of the Patriotic Alliance. About a year ago an attempt was made
to assassinate Aafiz al-Asad and you isswed a statemeat in which you announced
your responsibiiitq for it. Can you throw a little light on this action?
[Sa'd al-Din] The truth is there are pereons close to Aafiz al-Asad who are
cooperating with our Islamic movement. Theq were weary of his crimes so they
attempted to assassinate him.
[Abu Zahr] Do you want the last word?
[Sa'd al-Din] Our word has been ready for a long time and it is: 0 rulers of
the Arabs, 0 rulers of non-Arabs, 0 mankind everywhere...You must consider the
future of your relations with the Syrian people.
It is a serious matter that this silence and this attitude prevail. We are
afraid that the rulers' attitudes will spoil the relations of our people in
Syria with the rest of the Arab people, relations~~that constitute a basic
strategy for this nation in its capacity for steadfastness, liberation, and
progress.
I am convinced the regime in Syria is temporary and accidental...It does not
represent the inclination of anyone in our nation. God willing, it will go
away soon. I am not only optimistic, I am convinced this black summer cloud
will be dispersed soon, very soon.
Finally, our pe~ple have sworn and�issued their judgment t~ punish this killer
who has penetrated deeply into the blood and who has dipped his hands and the
hands of his retinue into the blood of the innocent and the blood of the
chaste. We say to him what Khalid ibn Walid said while besieging the
Byzantines in the stronghold of Aleppo after the siege had been going on for
9 months and the Byzantine leader thought boredom had crept into the ranks of
the warriors so that he could negotiate with them to withdraw. Said Rhalid ibn
Walid, May God be pleased with him, addressing the reader and the infidels
around him: "Where is your escape? By God, if you ascended to heaven, God
would have caused us to ascend to you. And if you descended to earth, Qod
would have cause us to descend to you. I have come to you with a people who
love death the way you love life."
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
5214
CSO: 4404/439 END
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