JPRS ID: 10696 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10696
29 July 1982
USSR Re ort
p
MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 10/82}
, `
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� JPRS L/10696
29 July 1982
~ USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO io/s2)
� CONTENTS .
ARMED FORCr~S
Excerprs From Book on Electronic Warfare
' (RADIOELEKTRONNAYA BOR'BA (SREDSTVA I SPOSOBY PODAVLENIYA
I ZASHCHITY RADIOELEKTRONNYKH SISTEM), 1981) 1
Boo'.c Excerpts: Training For Modern Battle
(CHELOVEK V SOVREMENNOY VOYNE, 1981) 11
Book Excerpts: CPSU Documents On The A.med Forces
(KPSS 0 VOORUZHENNYKH SILAKH SOVETSKOGO SOYUZA: DOKUMENTY,
_ 1917-1981, 1981) 27
NAVAL FORCES ,
Book ES~cerpts: Soviet Submarines in Great Patriotic War
(SOVETSKIYE PODVODNYYE LODKI V VELIKOY OTECHESTVENNOY VOYNE,
1981) 52
PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, CONIl~IENTS
International Symposium On History of World War II
(A.M. Filitov; VOPROSY ISTORII, No 4, Apr 82) 60
- a- [ II I- USSR - 4 FOUO]
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ARMED FORCES ~
~ .
~
UDC 621.37/.39
EXCERPTS FROM BOOK ON ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Moscow RADIOELEKTRONNAY~ BOR'BA (SREDSTVA I SPOSOBY :�ODAVLENIYA.I ZASHCHITX
; RADIOII.EKTRONNYKH SISTEM) in Russian 1981 (signed to press 10 Sep 81) pp 1-8,
152-153, 228, 316-320
[Annotation, table of conte~zts, introduction, excerpts from parts I, II and
III, and bibliography fron book "Electronic Warfare (Means and Methoas of
Jamming and Protecting Radio Electrvnic Systems)", by Aleksandr Ignat'yevich
Paliy, Order of Labor Red Banner USSR Ministry of Defense Voyennoye
~ Izdatel'stvo, 20,000 copies, 32Q pages; passages in slantlines printedtn boldface]
[ExcerptsJ The book generalizes material from open Soviet and foreign litera-
ture on means and methods of communi~ations ja~ing and protec*_ion of radio
electronic systems, illustrated with examples of comhat actions by armiea of
capitalist states in Vie~nam and the Near East.
The book is intended for Soviat Army and Navy off icers.
Contents
Introduction 3
Part I- Electr.onic Countermeasures and ~estruction of Electronic Equipment
Chapter 1. Active Communications Jam~aing 8 ~
1.1. Classification o�` Active Communications Jamning 9
1.2. Kinds of Modulation of Active Communications Jamming 14
1.3. Active Jamming Equipment 40
� l.ri. Effective Range of Active Jamming Equipment 62
Chapter 2. Passiv~ Communications Jaffining .....................~,.......e.. 73
?..1. Scattering Properties of Military Equi.pment and Objects............ 74
2.2. Chaff 77
2.3. Corner Reflectors...... . 90
- 2.4. Lens Reflectors 97
2.5. Reradiating Antenna Arr~ys 99
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a
Chapter 3. False Targets, Decoys and Unmanned Electronic Warfare [~EW]
Aircraft 102
. 3.1. False Targets....o 102 ~
3.2. Aecoys for Guided Weapons 105
3.3. Unmannpd EW Aircraft 106
' Chapter 4. Disruption of Electronics by Ionizing and Electromagnetic
Emissions.....o . 109
4.1. Conditions for Propagation of Electromagnetic Waves 109
4.2. Effect of Ionizing Radiation and Electromagnetic Pulses on
Electronic Equipment Operation 110
, Chapter Reducing the Effecti~~e Scattering Surface of Military
Equipment and Objects 116
5.1. Radar Absorbent Materials 117
5.2. Giving Military Equipment and Objects Low Re"lecting Shapes...... 123
Chapter 6. Special Means for Destroying Electro~c Equipment....,....... 124
6.1. Equipment for Passive Homing of Missiles on Electronics.......... 125
E.2. Missiles Homing on Sources of Radio-Frequency Em~ssions.......... 132
_ Chapter 7. Features of Ja~ing Electro-Optics 140
_ 7.1. Reduction of Intensity of Radiation and Scattering of_ Light Waves 140
by Objects
- 7.2. False Therncal Targets 141
- 7.3. Active Jamming of Electro-Optics 142
7.4. Aerosol Form~tions 143
Chapter 8. Features of Sonar Jamming 147
- 8.1. Passive Sonar Jamming Measures 147
8.2. Active Sonar Jamming Measures.......~ 149
Part II - Electronic CaunLercountermeasures [ECCM]
Chapter 9. ECCM Againsi Intentiona'1 Coumunications Jamming 152
9.1. Basic Concepts and Definitions ...............................o... 152
9.2. ECCM Technical Methods and Means 153
9.3. Organizational Measures of ECCM 204
Chapter 10. Unintentional CQmmunications Jamming and the Electro-
magnetic C~mpatibility of Electronics 206
10.1. Basic Concepts and Definitions...........~ 206
10.2. Unintentional Interference from Electronic Equipment............ 211
10.3. Industrial Electronic Interference 216
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10.4. Methods of Ensuring Electromagnetic Compatibility of
Electronic Equipment 218
- Part III - Electronic Warfare in Combat Operations
Chapter 11. EW in Ground Forces Combat Operations........ 228
11.1. Ground Forces EW Forces and Equipment 228
11.2. Methods of EW in Ground Forces Combat Operatione 238
- 11.3. Conducting EW in Ground Forces Combat Operations 252
Chapter 12. EW in Air Force Combat Gperations 256
12.1. Air Force EW Forces and ~quipment 256
12.2. EW Methods in Air Force Combat Operations 263
Chapter 13. EW 3n Naval Combat Operations..~ 271
13.1. Naval EW Forces and Equipment............o 272
~ 13.2. EW Methods in Naval Combat Operations 278
Chapter 14. EW During Missile Penetration of Antimissile Defense........ 281
,14.1. General Description of ,Antimissile Def.ense Systems and Means.... 281
14.2. EW Means and Methods f or Penetrating an Antimissile Defense..... 284
Appendices:
1. Bands of the Electromagnetic Spectrum 291
2. Designations of Military Electronic Equipment Used in the United
States 292
3. Basic Characteristics of Foreign Active Communications Jamming
Equipment 294
4. Basic Characteristics of Foreign Chaff Dispensing Devices.......... 304
5. Basic Characteristics of U.S. Unmanned Aircraft Intended for
Reconnaissance and Communications Jamming 306
6. Characteristics of Foreign Missiles Hotning ot: Electronic
Equipment 308
Basic Characteristics of Foreign Electro-Optic Jamming Equipment... 310
- 8. Equipment of Forej.gn EW Aircraft and Helicopters 312
Bibliography 316
Introduction
After means of radio communications were introduced into the Army and Navy in
the early 20th century, signal intelligence and communications ja~ing bega~
to be employed. Subsequently new methods and technology were developed for
intercepting and jamming radar, radio navigation, radio communications
(including radio relay) as well as other radiotechnical equipment. Later the
jamming of electro-optics and sanar began to be employed. Measures were
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developed simulta~neously for ensuring the security of electronic equipment
against signal intelligence and for preserving its working capacity under the
effects of intentianal jamming and homing weapons. Genuine engagements devel-
oped in the field of electronics, which were called electronic warfare (some
foreign ~rmips specifically use the term warfare). Use of EW means helped
achieve success in combat operations on the land, in the air and at sea.
- Electronic equipment (RES), which includes anparatus for radio communications,
~ radar, radio remote control, radio navigation, radio telemetry, television,
electro-optics and sonar equipment,allows the accomplishment of diverse mis-
sions in intelligence and control of forces and means of armed conflict�u din
detection, identification and determination o� coordinates of targets, g 8
weapons to them, the collection and processing of data on the enemy, naviga-
tion support to combatants, aircraft and spacecraft, and the transmission of
orders, instructions, reports and other information needed for activities of
the armed forces is a f ar from complete list of the capabilities of electronic
equipment. Electronic gear has become the most important component of many
kinds of weaponry, military equipment and automated reconnaissance and control
systems. It cc~nsiderably increased the eff iciency and reliability of control-
ling troops, naval forces* and weapons and increased the combat capabilities
and effectivenesf~ of the means of armed warfare.
The stability with which the RES functions has a substantial influence on the
effectiveness of reconnaissance, co~�nar.d and control and weapons control.
This is why all armies of capitalist states are intensively developing and
perfecting technology and methods of combat ing enemy RES and ensuring stabil-
ity in the operation of similar means of their own armed forces. As an analy-
sis of the foreign press shows, electronic warfare (REB) is taken to mean a
~ system of ineasures and actions by troogs (for::es) for the use of special elec-
tronic equipment, and tactical and technical procedures for the detection and
jamming of eneiuy electronic equipment and command and control and weapcns con-
trol sys~ama, and for protecting similar equipment and systems of friendly
troops (forces) against enemy ~amming. According to offi~ial views of the
North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) command element, and the United States and the
FRG above all, its component parts are: electronic countermeasures, electronic
security and measures for their suppprt.
/Electronic countermeasures/ (REP) ~onsist of the measures and actions con-
ducted by troops (forces) in combat and in an operation to disorganize or
reduce the operating effectiveness of enemy electronic systPms and equipment
by acting on them with electromagnetic or acoustic emissions. REP includes
the creation of active and passive electronic jamming, the u~e of radar,
infrared (thermal) and sonar decoys, acting on the environment of the propa-
gation of electromagttetic (acoustic) waves, and radio deception.
Various weapons are used in combination w ith the REP equipment for neutral-
izing RES.
*Subsequently "naval forces" are called "forces" for short (editor's note).
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/Electronic security/(REZ) represents the zggregate of inethods and means
assuring stable operation of RES under conditions of p r essur e by means of
REP and special enemy homing weapons. It is achieved by concealing RES
emissions from signal intelligence, by protection against electronic jamming
and destruction by homing weapons, and by training crews to operate under ECM
conditions.
/REB support measures; provide for collecting data on enemy RES, target desig-
nation for REP equipment, and warning friendly troops when they are being
illuminated by electronic equipment and about enemy use of com~unications
jamning and use of weapons homing on RES. Signal intelligence--a form of
military intelligence conducted by means of the detection, interception and
analysis of electromagnetic emissions and determination of the location of
RES--is considered to be the primary element of REB support. Information
collected by signal intelligence is used in analyzing the enemy grouping and
actions as well as in organizing and conducting electronic warfare.
The idea of the possibility of combating electronic equipment was expressed
for the first time by the inventor of radio--the Russian scientist, Professor
A. S. Popov. In a memorandum to the Russian military department in 1903 he
expressed the idea of the possibility of performing reconnaissance and
creating radio interf erence for means of radio communications, and he sug-
' gested measures for protecting such means against reconnaissance and jamming.
In 1935-1936, when the first Soviet models of radars were being tested, one of
the~r creators, Professor A. M. Bonch-Bruyevich, pointed out the need to com-
bat radi_o jamming and to develop radio countercountermeasures.
The first instances of the performance of signal intelligence and communica-
tions jamming were noted in 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War. For example,
" during the Battle of Tsushima the commanders of the cruiser "Izumrud" and the
de~~troyer "Gromkiy" ordered the jamming of radio communications of the Japan-
- ese ships. Signa? intelligence and communications jamming saw further devel-
opment during World War I and especially during World War II, and later in
the largest local wars unleashed by imperialist states in Korea, Vietnam and
the Near East.
During World War II, beginning with the summer of 1943 British and American
bomber aviation successfully created passive and active jamming of gun laying
radars of fascist Germany's air defense system. Radio deception was conducted
during combat operations. Air and artillery strikes were delivered against
r.adar posts and cammunications centers. The use of communications jamming led
- to a reduction in effectiveness of German AAA fire. For example, an average
- oE some 3,000 roimds would be expended by AAA to destroy a bomber under condi-
tions of jamming, and only 600-800 rounds in the absence of jamming.
_ lluring the postwar years scientific research in developing new REB equipment
was expanded continuously in developed capitalist countries. In 1950-1952
special commissions for scientific research in the field of creating REB
equipment were set up in the United States and Great Britain. The commissions
drew up recommendations on the further development of REB equipment and
methods of its use an d proposed methods for evaluating its effectiveness on
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the basis of an analysis of the experience of combat employment of ~amming
equipment during World War II.
In 1953 the United States adopted a special REP equipment development
program--QRC (quick reaction capability) program. In the opinion of the
developers of this program, electronic jamming equipment differs from other
electronic equipment above all by the fact that it has to have the capability
uC a quick reaction to a change in characteristics of the RES being jammed. It
was believed that in comparison with means of destruction, the REP equipment
and methods of its use change faster. In the 1950's the United States deter-
mined the role and place of REP equipment in the armed forces and developed
the basic principles for organizing a system of this equipment as well as
tactics of its use.
During the wars in Vietnam and the Near East the air force, ground forces and
naval forces employed active and passive jamming ~f radars, radios and the
homing heads of surface-to-air missiles. It was then that they began to
employ antiradiation missiles for the destruction of radars, and decoys for
deceiving the operators of these radars. Technical means and methods of pro-
tecting RES against ~amming and the destruction by homing missiles also were
employed.
According to foreign press statements, the capabilities and role of electronic
countermeasures and electronic security are growing even more at the present
time in connection with an increase in the scope of use of RES in the arme3
forces. The imperialist states have created ground-based, airborne, shipborne
and space signal intelligence systems which continuously intercept and
analyze electromagnetic and acoustic emissions and determine the location of
their sources. The means and methods of REB are developed or improved with
consideration of the data collected.
Thus a contiuous struggle is going on in the world between the means and
methods of electronic countermeasures and electronic security. Examples of
the use of ineans of REB in combat operations are described in the book based
on the experience of local wars and exercises conducted in armies of the
capitalist states. Only publications from foreign sources were used in
writing chapters 3, 6-8 and 11-14.
Part I- Electronic Countermeasures and Destruction of Electronic Equipment
As shown by the experience of local wars unleashed by imperialist states in
Southeast Asia and the Near East, electrunic equipment was destroyed or
jammed basically by homing missiles and means of REP. Destruction of RES also
was accomplished by aviation, artillery and reconnaissance-sabotage subunits.
Missiles homing on sources of electromagnetic emissions are considered to be
the most effective means of destroying RES.
Electronic countermeasures are conducted by creating electronic jamming, by
using false targets and decoys, by changing the electrical properties of the
environrnent (in which electromagnetic and acoustic waves are propagated), by
reducing the radar, optical, thermal and acoustic contrast (visibility) of
military equipment and objects, and by radio decepti~n.
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Part II - Electronic Countercountermeasures
` Chapter 9- Electronic Countercountermeasures Against Inten[ional Cummunicatiuns
Jamming
~ 9.1. Basic Concepts and Definitions ~
Protection of RES against intentional and unintentional.electronic jamming is
achieved by using technical means for ensuring noise stab ility and by the
accomplishment of organizational measures [1, 4, 5, 12, 18J. Noise stability
(PU) characterizes the capability of electronic equipment and systems to
operate with the requisite quality under the effect of interference. It is
evaluated by the probability that the RES (system) will perform missions under
conditions of intentional and unintentional 3a~ning. For example, the PU of a
radar often is characterized by the probability of correct detection of sig-
nals reflected from targets. The demands on PU are distinguished by great
diversity depending on permissible distortion of the signals (data) being
received. For example, in some data transmission systems using EVM [elec-
tronic computers], a distortion of no more [han one character per million
transmitted is permitted, while a radar sometimes can perform its functions
with a loss of up to 40 percent of the signals reflected from the targets.
The accuracy with which a signal is reproduced at the receiving location under
conditi~ns of ja~ning or the signal-to-noise ratio often are taken as a. quan-
titative measure of PU. This means the minimum signal-to-noise ratio at the
input of the receiver's linear part which provides a b~~en quality of recep-
tion of the data (signals). The less the si~nal-to-noise ratio required for
operation of RES with the necessary quality, the greater its PU with all
other conditions being equal. In addition, the Pti can be evaluated by the
probabilities of a false alarm and missing a target, by mistakes in transmis-
sion of sampled data, and so on.
As shown in information theory, all methods of providing the requisite PU are
based on obtaining redundancy in the message being transmitted, i.e., on
increasing signal volu~ V~ by increasing duration T~ (transmission time),
signal bandwidth Of~ and the signal-to-noise ratio. This provision of inform-
ation theory is described by the expression V~ = T~~f~log2~p
It is not only the PU of electronic equipment and systems that are distin-
guished, but also the PU of their individual elements--receivers, range meters
and so on. Noise stability is pro~ided by using technical methods and means
of protection against ~ammi.ng,accomplished in designing the RES, and by per-
Eorming organizational measures during operation.
Part III - Electronic Warfare in Combat Oparations
The armed forces of capitalist states have special EW units, subunits, air-
craft and ships for jamming RES in combat operations, outfitted with s~gnal
intelligence equipment, equipment for active and passive electronic ~amaning,
- antiradar missiles, devices for using decoys, and means of radar, thernial and
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optical camouflage. ~uring combat operations the protection of RES ~:gainst
electronic jamming is assured by organizational measures and by use of techni-
cal devices f or protection aga~nst jamming. In addition, missile systems,
f ield artillery, aviation and naval forces are employed for the destruction d~
electronic objects [26, 27, 28, 29)�
Bibliography
1. Atrazhev, M. P., I1'in, V. A., and Mar'in, N. P., "Bor'ba s radic,elek- ~
tronnymi sredstvami" [Electronic Countermeasures], Moscow, Voyenizdat,
1972, 272 pages.
2. Beketov, A. A., Belokon', A. P., and Chermashentsev, S. G., "Maskirovka
deyst~iy podrazdeleniy sukhoputnykh voysk" [Concealment.of Ground Forces
Subunit Operations], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976, 232 pages.
3. Vakin, S. A., and Shustov, L. N., "Osnovy radioprotivodeystviya i radio-
tekhnicheskoy ra2vedki" [Fundamentals of Electronic Countermeasures and
Electronic Intelligence], Moscow, Sov. radio, 1968, 446 pages.
~ ~ 4. Vishin, G. M., "Selektsiya dvizhushchikhsya tseley" [Moving Target Indica-
tion], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1966, 276 pages.
5. "Zashchita ot radiopomekh" [Electronic Countercountermeasures], edited by
Maksimov, M. V., Moscow, Sov. radio, 1976, 496 pages.
6. Zyuko, A. G., "Po~nekhoustoychivost' i effektivnost' sistem svyazi" [Noise
Stability and Effe,ctiveness of Communications SystemsJ, Moscow, Svyaz',
1972, 3.59 pages.
7. "Ispol'zovaniye radiospektra" [Using the Radio Spectrum], translated from ~
the English, Moscow, Svyaz', 1969, 272 pages.
8. Knyazev, A. D., and Pchelkin, V. F., "Problemy obespecheniya sovme5tnoy
raboty radioelektronnoy apparatury [Problems of Ensuring Joint Operation
of Electronic Equipment], Moscow, Sov. radio, 1971, 200 pages.
9. Kanareykin, D. B., Potekhin, V. A., and Shishkin, I. F., "Morskaya
polyarimetriya" [Naval Polarimetry], Len3ngrad, Sudostroyeniye, 196$,
328 pages. .
10. Kobak, V. 0., "Radiolokatsionnyye otrazhateli" [Radar Reflectors], Moscow,
Sov. radio, 1975, 248 pages.
11. Klimovich, Ye. S., and Klimovich, L. S., "Zen-itnyy kompleks protiv
samoleta" [The Air Defense System Against the Aircraft], Moscow, Voyeniz-
dat, 1978, 192 pages.
12. Lif, E. B.; "Aren't the Ground Forces Overloaded with Communications
- Equipment?", ARMY (United States), No 9, 1973, p 93.
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13. Mayzel's, Ye. N., and Torgovanov, V. A., "Izmereniye kharakteristik
rasseyaniya radiolokatsionnykh tseley" [Measurement of the Scatter
Characteristics of Radar Targets], Moscow, Sov. radio, 1972, 232 pages.
14. "Obshchesoyuznyye normy dopus~.ayemykh industrial'nykh radiopo~ekh"
[Uni~nwide Standards for Permiasible Industrial Interference], Moscow,
Svyaz', 1973, 73 pages.
15. Paliy, A. I., ''~Zadiovoyna" [Electronic War�are], Moscow, Voyenizdat,
1963, 208 pages.
16. Paliy, A. I., "Radioelektronnaya bor'bs" [Electronic WarfareJ, Moscow,
Voyenizdat, 1974, 272 pages.
17. Prostakov, A. L., "Sonar Countermeasures," ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE
OBOZRIIVIYE, No 9, 1973, pp 58-65.
18. Pchelkin, V. F., "Elektroma~nitnaya sovmestimost' radioelektronnykh
sredstv" [Electromagnetic Compatibility of Electroaic EquipmE:ntJ, Moscow,
Znaniye, 1971.
19. "Radiopriyemnyye ustroystva" [Radio Receivers], edited by 'Lyuko, A. G.,
Moscow, Svyaz', 1975, 400 pages. '
20. "Radiotekhnicheskiye sistemy v raketnoy tekhnike" [F.iectronic Systems in
Missile Technology~, general editors Galkin, V. I., Zakharchenko, I. I.,
and Mikhaylov, L. V., Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1974, 340 pages.
21. "Spravochnik po radiolokatsii" [Radar Reference], translated from the
English, Moscow, Sov. radio, 1976-1979, vols 1-4, 1,768 pages.
22. White, Donald R. J., "Elektromagnitnaya sovmestimost' radioelektronr~ykh
sredstv i neprednamerennyye pomekhi" [Electromagnetic Compatibility of
Electronic Equipment and Unintentional Ja~ning], translated from the
English, Moscow, Sov. radio, 1977-1978, lst ed., 350 pages, 2d ed., 272
pages.
23. Fel'dman, Yu. I., Gidaspov, Yu. B., and Gomzin, V. N., "Soprovozhdeniye
dvizhushchikhsya tseley" [Tracking Moving Targets], Moscow, Sov. radio,
1978, 288 pages.
24. Khorbenko, I. G., "Ul'trazvuk v voyennom dele" [Ultrasonics in Military
Affairs], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976, 139 pages.
25. Shirshev, L. G., "Ioniziruyushchiye izlucheniya i elektronika" [Ionizing
Radiat~.on and Electronics], Moscow, Sov. radio, 1969, 192 pages. �
26. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Vol 102, No 4, 1975, pp 40-142.
27. Latur, N., "Electronic Warfare, NATO'S FIFTEEN NATIONS, April-May 1974,
pp 73-79 (NATO).
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28. MacMillan, D., "Electronic Warfare," INFANTR'Y, March-April 1974.
29. Miller, B., "Electronic Warfare," AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY,
Vol 91s No 10, 8 September 1979, pp 67-82.
COPYRIGHT: Voyenizdat, 1981
6904
CSO: 1801/232
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. ARMED FORCES
BOOK EXCERPTS: TRAINING FOR MODERN BATTLE
Moscow CHELOVEK V SOVREMENNOY VOYNE in Russian 1981 (signed to press 25 Sep 81)
pp 254, 255, 3-7, 8-9, 27-28, 33, 39-40, 42-43, 44-45, 46-47, 66, 67, 69, 79, 80,
127, 210, 211-213, 248-253
[Tab1E of contents, annotation, introduction, conclusion; and excerpt~ as indicated
from the book "Man in Modern Battle", by G. V. Sredin, D. A. Volkogonov, and M. P.
Korobeynikov, Voyennoye Izdatel'stvo, 35,000 copies, 254 pages; passages enclos~d
in slantlines printed in italics]
[Text] Contents Page
Introduction 3
Chapter I. The Spiritual Factor and its Role in Modern War............ 8
Chapter II. Socia2 Consciousness as ar. Object of Moral-Political and
Psychological Training 27
Chapter III. Methodological and World-Outlook }iases of.Moral-Political
and Psychological Trainind 46
Chapter IV. The Essence and Tasks of Moral-Political and Psychological
Training 67
Chapter V. Principles and Methods of Moral-Political�and Psychological
Training 80
Chapter VI. Molding a Courmunist World Outlook--the Most Important
Direction of Moral-Political and Psychological Training.. 112
Chapter VII. Molding Correct Impressions of Possible War in the Men..... 127
Chapter VIII. The Molding and Solidarity of Military Collectives......... 150
- Chapter IX. Instilling a High Sense of Discipline--An Important Direc-
tion of Moral-Political and Psychological Training....... 171
~ Chapter X. Generating a Readinzss for Heroic Actions in the Men....... 192
Chapter XI. Molding Psychological Stability and Physical Endurance in
the Men 2?0
Chapter XII. Exercises, Cruises, Flights, Launchings--the Basic ~
Practical Element of Moral-Political and Psychological
Training 229
Conclusion 248
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Annotation
The book examines ti~e theoretical bases and methnds for the moral-political and
psychological training of the Soviet servicemen. The authers analyze experience
in this work and show the broad complex of ways for its improvement with considera-
tion of the contemporary ~evel of development of mi'litary affairs.
The book is intended ior commanders, political officers, and teachers of the higher
military educational ina>titutions of the Soviet Armed Forces.
Introduction
A special feature of the contemporary era consists of �the intensification of the in-
fluence of real socialism on the entire course of world development. The further
strengthening of the socialist comononwealth's positions is continuing. The sphere
of.imperialist dominance in the world has narrowed. Internal contradictions in the
countries of capital and competition between them have becotne aggravated.
As was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, "the difficulties which capitalism is ex-.
periencing also influence its policy, including foreign policy. The str.uggle around
the basic questions of the capitalist countries' foreign-policy caurse has become
intensif ied. Recently, the enemies of detente, arme limitations, and improvement of
relations with the Soviet Union and other socialiat countries have become noticeably
more active.i1 Imperialiam's aggressive nature and, first of all, American, has in-
creased sharply.
The CPSU and the Soviet state are opposing imperialism's dangeroua intrigues with
firnmess and self-restraint and a consistent, constructive policy of peaceful co-
existence, mutually advantageous and equitable collaboration, and the decisive de-
fense of the vital i.nterests of the peoples. In the accountability report of the
CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress, Comrade L. Y. Brezhnev put forth
new, cardinal ideas and important, constructive suggestions in the field of foreign
policy. They are the organic continuation and development of the historic Peace
Program which was proclaimed by the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses as applicable to
the most urgent problems of international life. It is a Peace Program for the 80's.
At the same time, considering imperialism's increased aggressiveness, the Svviet
Union has been forced tc concern itself with the strengthening of its defensive
capability and the improvement of its Armed Forces.
V. I. Lenin's instruction that any revolution is worth something only if it is able
to defend itself2 remains exCeptionally timely for our time, too. Lenin's scientific
substantiation of the objective necessity for the armed defense of the socialist
fatherland comprises an important part of the theory of socialist revolution, for
there has not yet been a case in world history where the exploiter class, having lost
power, would not try to regain it by force. That's how it was in the past, and
that is how~matters stand ~even now. "The experience of the revolutionary movement of
recent years," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "has shown graphically: if a real
threat to the domination of monopolistic capital and its political henchmen arises,
imperialism will stop at nothing, rejecting any appearancc of democracy whatever.i9
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The entire history of the struggle for socialiem praves convincingly that the vic-
tory of the socialist revolution and its achievements rQquire reliable guarding
against the encroachments of im~erialist reaction As historic experience shows,
possible errors, omissions, and miscalculations in this field are fraught with seri-
ous consequences. tn characterizir_; the content of~ the regularity of the defenge Af
the socialist revolution's achievements and its attainments, a number of important
aspects can be noted.
First. Armed revolutionary violence as a responsive measure in regard to counter-
revolution and imperialist aggressors is completely and hiatorically ~ustified,
proper, and necessary. Violence never was an ideal of socialism. The working masses
have recourae to it only as a forced, responsive measure neaessary to defend their
fundamental class interests and uphold freedom and independence. Therefore, the
fantasies which bourgeois propagandists are spreading to zhe effect that a atriving
for violence allegedly is inherent ~n socialism only plays the role of covering the
military circles' own aggressive preparations.
Second. The armed defense of socialism is not exclusively the domain of military
affairs. It is connected with all spheres of public life: politics, economics,
ideology, science, and culture. The Soviet people, having built a developed social-
ist society, created a~l the necessary material and spiritual preconditions for the
maintenance of the.combat might of the Armed Eorces at the level of contemporary re-
quirements. This became pogsible thanks to the big succ=:sses of our s~ate in th.e
field of economics, acience, education and indoctrinatian of the Soviet people,
and th~ steady improvement of military orgar.iizational development.
Third. The defense of socialism bears a c'learly expr~ssed international nature. In
all the wars which were imposed on our pec,ple by imperialism, and especially in the
i Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Armed Forces, in defending.their fatherland, also
accomplished a liberation, international mission. And now, when newer and newer
countries have set forth on the path of building socialism, class solidarfty in en-
suring the security of creating a new life acquires special significanee.
Foiirth. As long as imperialism exists, the necessity to protect socialism will be
preserved. Aggressive imperialist forces are whipping up the arms race, which re-
presents a serious threat to the peace and security of peoples,and are trying in
every possible way to prevent the relaxation of tension. The CPSU proceeds from the
Lenin principle that peace will move the matter forward an infinite number of times
better than war....i4 Therefore, the struggle for the confirmation of the principle
of peaceful coexistence in the practice of international relations is not only an
objectively desirable form of mutual relations of states with different social sys-
tems, but also an important method for blocking the main reason of contemporary wars
which is rooted in the aggressive essence of imperialism.
It is.known that the Soviet Armed Forces now have no domestic function, wh~ch is re-
flected in the CPSU Program. In a developed socialist societg where a high level
- of socio-political unity of the people has been attained, there are no social forces
against which the emplo~ment of the army would be necessary.
The external function of the Soviet. Armed Forces has become even mare c~ultifaceted.
It is accomplished in two main directions.
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The first of them reflects the necessity for.the reliable def~nse of the socialist
fatherland as well as of tt?e entire socialist commonwealth. This is attained ~,y the
maintenance of constant combat readiness to repel a possible attack by any aggressor
and to stop the~provocative attacks on the part of militaristic forces. "A strong
a11oy of high technical equipping, military skill, and invincible morale--auah ie
= the comhat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev aC
the 26th CPSU Congress.5
It is important to stress that our Armed Forces ensure favorable external conditions
- for the building of socialism and co~nunj.sm in the closest collaboration with the
~ armies of the fraternal countries within the framework of the Warsaw Pact Organiza-
tion.
Another expression of the external function of the Soviet Armed Forces consists o�
the fact that t~ey are a powerful factor in the security of all peoples and the
preventi~n of a new world war.
After World War II, imperialism created many centiers of tension, conflicts, and local
wars. It repeatedly broughi. the world up to the dangerous line of a big military
conflagration but, cansidering the might of~the socialist commonwealth and its re-
solve to defend peace, it waa forced to withdraw. Now, operating from a position of
- strength, it is all the more difficult for :!mperialism to dictate its will to
peoples and unleash war with impunity. A paradox appears in ever greater relief:
the military aapabilities of imperialism's aggreasive blocs are increasing, and
their ability to attain their political goals with the use of military force is de-
creasing. This is the direct conseque~nce of the objective changes in the correla-
tion of forces in favor of socialism.and the intensification of the role of social-
ist armed forces as the guarantee of peace and international stability.
In implementing the majestic plans of communiat creation the Soviet Union, at the
same time, is devoting the necessary attention to strengthening the country's de-
fensive capability. "...If they corce us," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "we will
find a rapid and effective response to any chsllenge of militant imperialism.i6
The contemporary situation ir.~poses apecial demands not only on the ~technical equip-
ping of the Soviet Armed Fotces, but also on the ideological maturity and moral-
political qualities of the personnel. Ever greater significance is being attached
to the spiritual factor under contemporary conditions. The morale of the people and
the army has not played such an active role in the solution of the problem ctf war
and peace in any era as it does now.
' Instilling lofty mor.al-p~~litical and psychalogical qualities in the personnel is one
of the main directions in raising the level of combat readiness of the Soviet Armed
Forces. The strengthenir.~g of the role of moral-political and psychological training
now is caused by a number~ of factors.
The improvement in the means of conflict causes a change in the procedures and meth-
ods for the co~iduct of war. The increase in the scope of combat operatione, their
dynamism, chacigeability in the aituation, the lack of sufficient a:id checked infor-
- mation about the combat situation, interruptions in control, th2 constant threat of
the e~iemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction, exhaustion, and wearing down
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of the troops, the neceGsity to restore their ccvbat effectiveness and organs of
control, and other conditions of contemnor;~ry battle require of the men mobility of
thought, independence, self-control, endurance, steadfastness, activity, selfless-
ness, and other qualities. Moral-political and psychological training is aimed at
their formation.
~ T_he general-educational, :.echnical, and cultural level of the personnel of the
Soviet Armed Forces has now grown significantly. This requires the introduction of
certain adjustments in the forms and methods of work with the men and the scientific
organization of moral-political and psyc~ological training. Considerable experience
on these problems has been accumulated in the Armed Forces. Supported by the basic
provisions of Marxism-Leninism and the decisione of the CPSU, co~nanders, political
officers, and party organizations �re improving the process of the personnel's moral-
political tempering. Many scientific recommendations are being introduced success-
fully into troop practice, which leads to an increase in the combat readiness and
combat capability of the units and r~ubunits. The main goal of this book is to fur-
ther the improvement of the process of moral-political and psychological training of
the men for actions under conditions of contemporary war.
Chapter I. The Spiritual Factor and its Role in Modern War
The spiritual factor has always played a tremendous role in the course and outcome
of war, but now its significance is great as never before. This is explained by the
ever increasing scope of the icleological antagonism of two social systems and the
special features of contemporary war. "Our party noted L. I. Brezhnev, "proceeda
from the Lenin teaching that however great may be the technical equipping of the
army,~an, who has mastered the equipment to perfection, remains the main and de-
- cisive force in war. This is especially important now, in the age of nucleax mis-
_ siles, when the fate of the war will be decided by people who have mastered ~~eapons
and combat equipment, are morally and physically tempered, and are boundlessl.y de-
voted to their motherland, the party, and the people."~
'!'he significance of the spiritual factor in war, its essence, structure, and func-
tions can be disclosed and understood correctly only on the basis of the basic pro-
vision of Marxism-Leninism concerning the most important role of social existence With
respect to public consciousness which possesses relative independence and is able
to exert an active influence on the course of social processes.
An analysis of the spiritual factor and its manifestations and role in war presumes
the elucidation of the nature anc: political content of a specific war. Without this,
it is impossible to see the socio-political direction of the spiritual factor for
each of the warring sides. "The social nature of war," wrote V. I. Lenin, "and its
true significance are determined...by /what policy/ the war continues
('war is the continuation of politics') and /what class/ is waging the
war for what goals.i8 The reasons, goals, and nature of a specific war directly
cause the content and manifestation c~f the spiritual factor in war. A just war ex-
pands the spiritual possibilitie$ of the fighting masses and, conversely, an unjust
war limits and reduces them.
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Chapter II. Social C~nsciousness as an Object of Moral-Politica~l and Psychological
Training
The system of idEOlogical indoctrination which exists in a socialist society proceeds
from the necessity to so change and develop social and individual consciousness that
~ communist world-r~utlook lines and the spiritual direction which characterizes the
new man dominate in it. Our party's activity in this field is determined by the
most important Lenin proposition that "the development of the co.zsciousness of the
masses remains, as always, the basis and main content of all our work.i9 In the
decree of the CPSU Central Co~nittee, "On further improvement of ideological and
- political-indoctrinational work," it is stressed that its goals are "the ind.octrina-
tion of all workers in a spirit of high ideological c~*.tent and devotion to the social-
ist motherland and the cause of communism, a commun3st attitude toward work and pub-
lic property, completel.y overcoming vestiges of bourgeois views and morals, the
comprehensive and harmonic development of the personality, and the creation of
~ genuine wealth of spiritual culture."lo
Under conditions of the Armed Forces questions of the formation and development of a
social and individual consciousnese have special significance. It is not difficult to
imagine how tremendous would be the spiritual loads and moral and psychological
strain which would come down on the consciousness of a person in case of war. And
if a situation of constant mortal danger, uncertainty, dynaAism of the situation,
' and the uncompromising nature of the struggle require of a person, the collective
and society the maximum straining of all spiritual strength in order to hold out in
this competition and win, then both social and individual consciousness ahould be
ready for this ahead of time. Therefore, it is important to have good knowledge of
the structsre, content, and regular laws in the forming of social consciousness--the
main ob~ective of the moral-political and psychological training of the trcops.
Social consciousness is derivative and secondary from social existence. They do
not oppose each other, but always step forth in dialectical unity. In stressing
that social existence is primary and social consciousness is secondary, the
classicists of Marxism thereby solved a basic question of philosophy as applicable
to society. Social existence and its central, main part--productive relations,
step forth as the basis for social consciousness. "Just as a person's knowledge
reflects existing nature irxespective of him, that ig, developing matter, so does
the /social knowledge/ of a person (that is, different views and philosophical,
religious, political, and other teachings) reflect the /economic system/ of
society:'ll The specific condition of social existence of any historical era also
finds its reflection in the corresponding social consciousness.
Social consciousness is the totality of the ideas, views, and concepts which exist in
society in a given era and in which social reality is reflected. It comes forth as
an integral spiritual system which expressea the most essential features inherent ~n
a specific social system and material base. Corresponding to a developed socialist
society and a state of the entire people is a specific qualitative state of spiritual
- culture, the most important part of which is socialist social consciousness. Certain
types of social consciousness are inherent in esch era and in each social system.
Ordinary consciousness is the synthesis of the knowledge of people which is acquired
in the process of production and other experience and of social psychology.
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- Empirical experien~e is accumulated over the durarion flf the millenia of human
civilization in the course ~f man'~ struggle with nature and social forces, and
as a result of t't~e formation of a specific tenor and way nf life. This experience
was passed down from generation to generation in the form of tradi.tions, morals,
customs and views on various spheres of human activity and Phennmena of social life
which have been formed.
In the military field special significance was had and is had by past wars and the
experience of enduring difficulties and overcoming dangers and burdens of field and
campaign life. 0� course, much of past military experience is gradually losing its
significance because of the ever more decisive intrusion of the achievements and
recommendations of science, new expertence, and new, more improved knowledge into
practice.
Political consciousness occupies a special place in the structure of social con-
sciousness,for the systematized theoretical expression of the fundamental interests
of specific classes and their goals and means of attainment is accomplished with its
help. The provisions of political ideology are the most important tool in the strug-
gle for power, its formation, and its strengthening. Political ideology is expressed
in the form of party and state documents, political concepts, programs, platforms,
plans, and declarations. In the society of developed socialism, political ideology
is expressed in its most brilliant form in Marxist-Leniniat teaching, our party's
Program and Regulation, the Soviet constitution, and the decisions of the CPSU and
the plenums of its Central Committee. The entire meaning and entire content of com-
munist ideology are connected with serving the working people and their interests,
requirements, and needs. The political �orm of social consciouaness of a developed
socialist society is characterized by a high degree of maturity, class wisdom, and
an understanding of historic respnnsibility.
Political consciousness is expressed not only in ideologieal form, but also in
psychological refinements: class feeling, ~ocial attitudes, spiri�tual atmosphere,
revolutionary enthusiasm, and so forth. Class interests and requirements also step
forth ds the basis of the formation of socio-psychological elements of political
~ consciousness. The working masses are capable of comprehending them in full measure
- and expressing them scientifically only in revolutionary theory--the teaching of
Marxism-Leninism which opens up historical perspective for them, arms them with goals
and the ideological means of conflict, and rallies the masses w~th their vanguard at
the head--the communist parties. The politica? consciousness of bourgeois society
reflects basically the class interests of the predominant, exploiter social forces
and ideologically provides the appearance of legality of existing inequality, in-
jiistice, and social oppt'ession.
The military content of political consciousnese in a socialist society is expressad
in the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and th~ army and the defense of the social-
ist f.atherland, and in military doctrine, the principles of military organizational
development, and the theory of party-political work in the Armed ~orces. The
assimilation and realization of their provisions in practice have tremendous signi-
ficance for ensuring the security of our state and raising the combat readiness of
the Soviet Armed Forces and the ideological indoctrination of the personnel.
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Legal consciousness reflects the will of the ruling class, which has been Taised to
a law, in the spiritual sphere. The golitical superstructure always includes a
certain system of juridical standards which have been established by the state.
People's realization of the essence of law and order and the understanding of th~
legal and illegal, just and unjust, should and must comprise the content of pec,ple's
_ legal consciousness. ~
Moral conscio~sness reflects ths moral interrelations of people. It exfsts in the
_ fArm of mnral standards, principles, aesthetic categoriea of good and evil,,duty,
honor, conscience, dignity, bravery, heroism and so forth which tiave been formed.
The relation of society, class, and specific people to the interests of the mother-
land, the people, the collective, the family,and their own obligations is expressed
in ethical categories. Society imposes moral requirements primarily in the form
of public opinion, rules and standards of conduct, and socialist customs which have
been formed.
_ Aesthetic consciousness is an artistic, figurative view of ~he world. The de~velo~ed
personality relates to the surrounding world not only with utilitarian. yardsticks,
but also with aesthetic ones for, in his social essence, man is capable not simply
of producing material good, but also af creati~g, "he aleo forms materials according
to the laws of beauty.i12 Art, as the most important manifestation of the aesthetic,
not only accompiishes the function of satisfaction with the beautiful and the ele-
vated, but it also creates a.creative, constructive, and innovational element in the
consciousness. At the same time, art performs political ana moral-pedagogical func-
_ tions, expressing in artistic forms one's attitude toward reality, social processes,
and ~ocial existence. The role of art does not presume only copying reality and
creating pale shadows of real life. Art reflects life from the viewpoint of the
interests of various classes.
Religious consciousness, which still also occurs in a aocialist society, is the
fantastic reflection of reality which has b~en engendered by cerCain social reasons.
The basis of religious consciousness is formed by ~aith in supernatural forces and
submission to the Most High's will. Its origin is connected, in the social plane,
primarily with the weakness of people when facing nature and the blind forces
- of social existence. In the past, the world-outlook lines of the workers and their
_ ~ feelings and aspirations depended to a tremendous degree on religious consciousness.
"The feelings of the masses," the classicists of Marxism noted, "were fed exclusively
with religious food....'?13
The materialist world outlook has always come out against religious consciousness.
In a socialist society the proportion and signif icance of religious ideas and views
are decreasing more and more with Che further strengthening of the materialist
world outlook.
The forms and levels which are in social consciousness manifest themselves, but in a
different plane and in the individual consciousneas.
Ideological-indoctrinatianal work which is directed towax~' social consciousness and
- collectives of people requires constant differentiat3on and know3edge of the special
- festures of each personality. The concept of an "individual approach" means not
only the method and way of accompliahing indoctrinational influence, buv: also
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consideration of the specific character of.the consciovsness of each individual,
his capabilitiea, inclinations, level of.development, interests, and life's goals.
There are no two absolutely identical people in the world, either. Even with great
physical similarity twins differ in various parameters which characterize their
psqchophysiological, moral, and socio-psychological features. Each personality is
inimitable and unique. And auccess in mo~ding rhe needed qualities depends (along
with many factor~) on the degree of the study of each person's special features and
the ability to find the ID~st effective methode for indoctrinational influence on his
consciousness, require::~ents, and intereste.
An individual approach in ideological indoctrination and moral-political and psy-
- chological training presumes consideration not only of the level of education,
professional preparedness, experience, and culture, but also of the personality's
psychological features: require~nents and motives, character, temperament, capa-
bilities, and so forth.
Even a brief examination of the structure, forms, and special features of social
consciousness shows how important it is consistently to consider all the special
features of the object of our molding influences in the p~ocess of training a
person for the most difficult tests of contemporary war. ti genuinely scientific
approach to moral-politjcal ~and psychological trainin~; also consists in considerable
measure of knowledge of the essence, features, and spscific character of the con-
~ciousness of the collective, group, and individual ~,erviceman.
Chapter 3. Msthodological and World-Outlook Bases of Moral-Political and Psycholo-
gical Training
In getting to know and transforming reality, people are guided by a apecific meth-
odology. When we are discussing the transformation of reality, by methodology we
mean the teaching on the structure, logical organizat~on, methods, and means of ac-
tivity. If we are speaking about science, methodology is defined as teaching about.
the principles of the structure, forms, and methods of scientific knowledge.
F. Bacon compar~ed the role of inethod in scientif ic knowledge with a lamp which lights
the road for the traveller in the darkness. As in theory, so in practice a person
- uses various methods. Some of them are general. Theq are used in all sciences and
in all cases of practice. Others are special. They are employed only in particular
sciences and in corres~onding particular spheres of practical activity. The main
and detenaining role here is played by general methods. Philosophical teaching about
general methods of knowledge artd the transformation of reality is also called
/methodology/ [in boldf aceJ. Dialecti~al and historical materialism is accepted as
the general methodology of scientific study in Soviet science. Marxist-Leninist meth-
odology comes forth as a tool not only of theoretical knowledge, but also of the
revolutionary transformation of reality. Problems of war and the arwy are investi-
gated and studied within the framework of all component parts of Marxism-Leninism.
The complexity of the scope and delving into the essence of the processes of war and
the army is attained by this. The most important proviaions of Marxist-Leninist
teaching on war and the army rest first of all on the basic conclusions of dialec-
tical and h!.storical materialism as well as of political e~onomy and scientific com-
munism.Y" B~cause war, speakint in the words of V. I. Lenin, is an "archmottled"
phenomenon, consideration of all its aspects, *_i?e eombined employment of the
means and methods of all component parts of Marxism-Leninism, and reliance on the
achievements of other social eciences and, in particular, military history are
necessary.
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Chapter IV. The Essence and Tasks of Moral-Political and Psychologi~al Training
The tasks of moral-political and psychological training are determined by the ob-
jective requirements of war and the nature of contemporary combat operations. The
armies of the socialist states determine these tasks and the ways for their accoinp-
lishment from scientif ic positions. The Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal of the
Sovi.et Union D. F. Ustinov, in speaking to the personnel of a unit, stressed that in
the field of moral-political and psychological training of the Soviet Armed Forces
the tasks consist of developing in the men the abilities and skills to operate under
the most difficult conditions of contemporary war. Ideological indoctrination forms
the basis of this training.ls
Psychological tra~:.ing ensures the instilling in the men of those qualities which
make them cdpable of operating successfully under dangerous,.strained conditions
of contemporary war and accomplishing the combat mission in complete conformance
with their communist conviction and moral principles of conduct. The qualities of
the man's mind are improved in the course of psychological training: needs and
motives, character, temperament and capabilities, sensations, perceptions, ideas,
attention, memory, imagination, thinking and speech, feelings and will, knowledge,
abilities, skills, and habits necessary for successful operations in contemporary
war. The basis of psychological training in armed forces of the socialist states is
moral-political training.
The requirements imposed on the intellectual components in the men's activity have
now increased sharply. It should be noted that in works on the psychology of think-
ing, including operational-tactical thinking, a withdrawal has been noted fr~m the
traditional analysis of thinking types, forms, and operations and the qualities of
the mind to an analysis of the structure of the thinking act--understanding t~he mis-
sion, estimate of the situation, and adopting a decision.
Thus, the essence of moral-political and paychological training consists of the
purposeful molding of the mural-political and paychological stability of the person-
ne1 and their constant readiness to endure the most severe tests of contemporary war
and not to lose the will for struggle and victory. The tasks of moral-political
and psychological training are determined by those requirements which contemporary
war imposes on the spiritual strength of the m~n. The most important task of moral-
political and psychological training is teaching the men the ability to control
their behavior in battle. Moral-political and psychological training is not an in-
dependent type of training of the personnel. Its basic content is envisaged by the
entire system of political and combat training, military indoctrination, and the
- organization of military life.
Chapter V. Principles and Methods of Moral-Political and Psychological Training
The moral-political and psychological training of the troops is inseparable from
party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces. Party-political work is the
scientifically substantiated ideological and organizational activity on the imple-
mentation of party policy in the Armed Forces. It is directed toward the indoc-
trination of the servicemen in a spirit of com~unist conscientiousness, Soviet
patriotism, socialist internationalism, political vigilance and class hatred toward
the enemies of our motherland, loyalty to military duty and the military oath, and
constant readineas to come forth for the defense of socialist achievements.
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The tasks of party-political work are the rallying of the Armed Forces personnel
~ around the Communist Party and the Soviet government, strengthening the combat might
~ of the Soviet Armed Forces, molding lofty mor.al-political and combat qualities and
firm discipline in the men, mobilization for the attainment of high effectiveness
and quality of combat and political training, improvement of field, air, and naval
ability, and the mastery of new combat equ~pment and weapons; under combat condi-
~ tions--mobilization for the accomplishment of the con~ander's combat order, for
the defense of the socialist fatherland, and for the complete defeat of the enemy.
Chapter VII. Molding Correct Impressions of Posaible War in the Men
! Contemporary war is a phenomenon for which it ia not easy to prepare. An incorrect ~
notion of the processes of war and the nature of its caurse spiritually weaken a
person in a combat situation. And if the training and indoctrination of the men do
not fully prepare them for the possible tests of contemporary war, this will inflict
gre2t damage on combat readiness. "Nothing has such a negative effect on the tac-
tical training of troops as simplifications and indulgences in combat training.
They create in the personnel incorrect notions of contemporary battle, hamper the
generation of lofty combat qualities in the men, and limit creativity. To teach
the troops in a difficult and strained situation and under conditions as close as
possible to combat conditions," stressed the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the
~ Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, "is an immutable law of high combat readiness and it
must be strictly observed."ls
~
Chapter XI. Molding Psychological Stability and Physical Endurance in the Men
The performance of duty in peacetime and the con~uct of combat operations in time of
war are connected with the overcoming of difficulties and tests. Therefore, the '
serviceman must possess such qualities as psychological stability and physical en-
durance.
Psychological stability and physical endurance are unthinkable without the man's
optimism. It is difficult to expect decisive and bold actions from people who are~
pessimistically attuned. A spirit of cheerfulness and optimism--this is what is
typical of the psychological atmosphere of a collective which is well serried on an
ideological basis and ready not only to stand its ground in a period of failures, but
also to impose its will on the enemy and win, Formed in tt~e consciousness of the
serviceman along with optimism and faith fn victory is co~viction of the necessity
for the complete defeat of the enemy who has unleaehed war against our motherland.
Psychological stability of the serviceman is impossible without a high sense of his
own dignity. Ambition should also be stressed. A sense of human dignity, noble
pride,and the deepest spi.rit~al requirementto operate always and everywhere as a per-
sonality richly endowed with intellect, wi11, and feelings help the serviceman to
maintain the presence of spirit. A man who possesses a sense of personal dignity
is able to submit to reason even at the moment of the strongest spiritual shocks.
This ability is called self-control. The predominance of reason in such a man by no
means weakens suffering, but only introduces a certain balance in its interaction
with thought. It is important that the man have sufficiently developed self-
respect.
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Under c~ntemporary combat conditions~, it seems that everything is direct~d toward
making the serviceman psychologically unstable. Danger, physical strain, uncertain-
ty, and chance--these are the obstacles and distracting circua?staaces which are di--
rected toward disorganizing the mind. And when a man perceives the surraunding ~
world, evaluates it, and foresees further development coolly, calmly, and quickly,-
then bravery is spoken of as the manifestation of the preaence of spirit.
A man's behavior in a dangerous situation, his psychological stability, and physical
endurance depend to a considerable degree on his temperament or type of higher ner-
vous activity. Generally accepted vital indices of a psychological property are
endurance, fitness for work, degree of fatigue, even temper, restraint, patience,
a~siduity, the ability to wait, evenness of mood, mobility, speed in shifting atten-
tion, ease in changing feelings, and ease in breaking an old stereotype and eatab-
lishing a new one.
As psychological studies show, among pereons with a weak nervous system hindrances of
various types during work time and the distraction of their attention shar~ly worsen
the accuracy and speed of perception and remembering, which leada to a rapid increase
in errors; among persons with a strong nervous system, conversely, these functions
may even improve in a diff icult situation. Thus, for example, the very same side
irritant (sharp, prolonged noise) lowers light-color sensitivity in people with a
weak nervous system and, conversely, increases it in people with a strong nervous
system. The same thing is also noted in relation to the distinguiahing and remember-
ing of various information (for example, blips on a radar scope).
Conclusion
In contemporary war, as always the decisive role belongs to man. The moral-politi-
cal and psychological ability of the people and the army to endure the most difficult
teats and not lose the will to victory depends on many factors. In addition to the
determining ones--public-social, economic, and ideological--great influence on the '
spiritual strength of people is exerted by succeases or defeats, the combat experi-
ence of the personnel, the quality of combat equipment and weapons, the maturity of
command personnel and the ability to withstand the enemy's ideological sabotage.
Spiritual steadfastness and complete confidence in the certain triumph of our ~ust
cause provide the men of the socialist armies with indisputable moral-political
superic?rity over the personnel of the imper.ialist armies. V. I. Lenin noted, "That
people will never be defeated in which the maj~rity of the workers and peasants
recognized, felt, and saw that they are defending their own, Soviet power--the power
of the workers, that they are defending that cause whose victory will ensure for
them and their childrem the possibility to en~oy all the blessings of culture and
all the creations of human labor.i17
Without belittling the significance of other factors which decide the outcome of
war, it can be stated that questions of the moral-political and psychological train-
ing of the troops for operations under conditions where contemporary means of con-
flict are employed have especially important signif icance.
In reading Napoleon's book "Thoughts," V. I. Lenin extracted the following sentence
which interested him: "In each battle, there is a moment when the bravest soldiers,
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~
after the greatest strain, feel the desire to run; this panic is engendered by a
lack of confidence in their courage. An insignificant instance, some pretence is
sufficient to return this conf idence to them: hi,gh skill consisLS in creating
them.i18 The combat experience of the Soviet Armed Forces shows that in such a
situation great significance is had by the abiZitq of military leaders and co~anders
to master the situation when it is mocr_ critical and inspire the personnel with the
~ inflexible resolve to accomplia*: the assigned mission. The personal example of the
~ co~munists and Komsomols also plays a large role. In other words, in order to free
some men from posaible temporary confusion, a sudden thrust from without is neces-
` sary: the commander's confident behavior, a firm command, personal example. The
goa? of this energetic influence of commanders and politiCal officere on the ideolo-
gical and psychological elements of consciousness consists of seeing that each mem-
_ ber of a section, crew, and subunit directs all his will, thought, and feelings
toward the continuous accomplishment of his responsibilities and his milita.ry duty.
In the words of V. I. Lenin, in the most difficult situation it is ne.:essary not to
let oneself become demoralized or dieorganized but to preserve a sober estimate of
the si:tuation and maintain courage and firnmess of spirit.i19
f By means of an external influence a person successfully overcomes possible temporary
manifestations of spiritual weakness, and the public, social aspect of his behavior
gains the upper hand over the instinct of self-preservation. Commanders` and politi-
cal off icers' constant contact with the personnel, their confidence and firmness in
handling people, and the maintenance ~f high discipline guarantee againat the mani-
festation of panic or confusion. V. Y. Lenin repeatedly stressed the thought that
"war is war, it requires iron di.~cipline.i20 The maintenance of a high.degree of
organization, discipline, an~; strict order strengthens the spiritual strength of the
~ men and imparts even greater courage and steadfastness to them.
It is important that in foresee~ng possible tests, each man possess sufficient ex-
perience in moral-psychological control of his behavior and be able to suppress or
- block some feelings (fear, confusion) and strengthen others (hatred for tha enemy, a
sense of military honor, and others). And here a special role uelongs to commanders
and political officers who can reliably control the spiritual condition of people
by various methods of. their influence.
; What do we mean by controlling the spiritual condition of the personnel? In essence,
it is the process of_ restructuring and making more active the moral-psychological
~ capabilities of people so as to effectively ensure to the maximum high readir.ess
and inflexible resolve for the fiercest struggle and victory over the enemy. If we
define this thought concretely, it can be said that control of spiritual forces
presumes good knowledge of the attitudes and opinions of people and constant moral
influence on their consciousness so that feelings of firm confidence, calmness, and
optimism dominate in the spiritual atmosphere of the military collectives. Control
of. the spiritual processes also means the timely disclosure and elimination of
unfavorable elements in the moral-psychological state of the personnel.
The central element in indoctr~nating necessary qualities in the personnel is
political training. Mastery of Marxist theory permits molding a scientific world
outlook in people. The system of political training of the personnel which has de-
veloped in our army meets contemporary requirements and is the most important ele-
ment in training a person for the defense of the socialist fatherland and for the
most difficult tests of war.
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The decisions of the 26th Party Congress disclose new, broad possibilities to raise
the quality of the personnel's political tempering and their indocfirination�in a spirit
of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism. As L. I. Brezhnev noted in a
report at the Congress, A strong alloy of high technical equipping, military
skill, and invincible morale--such is the combat pot~ntial of the Soviet Armed
Forces."21
In response to the decisions of the 26th Party Congress, socialist competition is
being initiated more and more widely in the Armed Forces. The Soviet servicemen are
accomplishing the socialist obligations assumed for combat and political training,
raising ratings, and mastering new equipment. An important,place in competition is
occupied by moral questions: the struggle for observance of the standarda of military
ethics, overcoming antipodes of communist morals, and the creation of the most favor-
able moral climate in the troop collectives. All this helps raise to an even higher
level the content and effectiveness of the ~roops' moral-political and psychological
training.
One of the most important conditions for moral-political and psychological training
is strict observance of the established tenor of army life, its traditions, and
military customs. Scientifically substantiated strict regulation of military activi-
ty instills in the servicemen accuracy, execution, and self-collection and it trains
them to value the time factor. However, the measured rhythm of everyday army life is
interrupted occasionally by the assignment of unexpected missions and the most
- varied special situations with the subsequent execution of marches, firings, missile
launches, and so forth in order to develop the personnel's readiness for a rapid
transition from peacetime to combat conditions.
In molding the serviceman who is ready for any tests, the entire system of routine
army days also accomplishes an important national, state indoctrinational task. By
the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, On further improvement of ideological and
politica~-indoctrinational work," the Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Di-
rectorate of the Soviet Army and~Navy have been charged with implementing measures
directed toward the further strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces' indoctrination-
al rc;~e. The CPSU Central Committee points to the necessity for the further increase
in the glorious traditions of the Armed Forces, service in which is a remarkable
school of work and military ability, moral purity and courage, patriotism and com-
radeship. The Soviet servicemen, it is stressed in the decree, should have a pro-
found realization of their duty to ensure the peaceful labor of the Soviet people
and the defense of the cause of peace and socialism.
Military service occupies a special place in the indoctrinational system of our
society. In fact, it arrives at the age (from 18 years of age) when the process of
the formation, development, and consolidation of a person's basic qualities is es-
pecially intensive. Buring service, the general procesa of communist indoctrina-
tion and the formation of a comprehensively developed personality of a socialist
society continues extremely effectively.
T~ao groups of interconnected preconditions exert a certain influence on the spiri-
tual development of the Soviet serviceman: the basic group consists of the socio-
political conditions and spiritual �actors which exist in a developed socialist
society as well as the specific conditions of military service and way of life.
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The main feature of the conditions for today's military service consists of the
, necessity to be in a state of constant combat readiness. This special feature is
a factor of tremendous social significance which has imposed a noticeable imprint
, on the entire structure, rhythm, and features of contemporary army life and its
, spiritual atmosphere. Realiaation of his direct responsibility for the security o~
; the fatherland and for the future fates of the peoples accelerates the molding of
the qualities of patriot and internationalist.
A system of combat and political training has developed and is being continuously
improved in the Armed Forces, contributing in every possible way to the political,
moral, professional, and physical development of the motherland's young citizens.
The role of military labor is exceptionally great here. A high degree of regu-
lation of actions, great tension, and the necessity constantly to subordinate one's
efforts to the previously assigned task are inherent in it.
Army life itself with the special order inherent in it exerts a specific influence
on the development of consciousness, habits, and many qualities of the personality.
The generation of new rules, habits, and standarde of behavior under the influence
of the specific processes of service and life affects the development of the per-
sonality and its qualities, capabilities, and inclinations.
Under conditions of military service, these and other molding factors create extreme-
ly favorable preconditiona for the formation of the personality. And the indoc-
trinators--commanders and political officers--always face an important methodological
task: to be able to use, coordinate, and direct these molding factors. The essence
of controlling the process of the spirituaZ development of the personality of the
serviceman and the military collective also consiets of this to a considerable de-
gree.
Success of moral-political and psychological training is ensured by the ~oint, co-
ordinated work of commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol organiza-
tion- which are tirelessly attaining new achievements in the training and indoc-
trination of the personnel and the development, in them, of the moral-political,
combat, and psychological qualities which are necessary for the accomplishment of
the missions facing the Soviet Armed Forces which are called on to be in constant
combat readiness guaranteeing the immiediate rebuff of any aggressor.
FOOTNOTES
1. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Ma~erials cf the 26th CPSU Congress), Moscow,
1981, p 20.
2. See: Lenin, V. I., "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 37,
p 122.
3. Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim Kursom" [Following the Lenin Course], Moscow, 1976,
Vol S, pp 481-482.
4. Lenin, V. I., op. cit., Vo]. 40, p 247.
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5, "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 66. .
6. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 May 1981.
7. Brezhnev, L. I., "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" [On Guard Over Peace and
Socialism], Moscow, 1979, p 139.
8. Lenin, V. I., op� cit., Vol 34, pp 196-197. '
9. Ibid., Vol 13, p 376. �
10. "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political-Indoctrinational Work":
Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1979, p 3.
11. Lenin, V. I., op. cit, Vol 23, p 44.
12. Marx, K. and Engels, F., "Iz rannykh proizvedeniy" [From Earlier Works],
Moscow, 1956, p 566.
_ 13. Marx, K. and Engels, F., "Sochineniya" [Works], Vol 21, p 314.
14. See: Yepishev, A. A., "Ideologicheskaya rabota v Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh
Silakh" [Ideological Work in the Soviet Armed Forces], p 204.
15. See: Uetinov, D. F., "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'qi" [Selected Speeches and
Articles], Moscow, 1979, p 355.
16. Ibid., p 395.
17. Lenin, V. I., op. cit., Vol 38, p 315.
18. "Leninakiy abornik" [Lenin Collection], 12, p 383.
19. See: Lenin, V. I., op. cit., Vol 44, p 229.
20. Ibid., Vol 40, p 178.
21. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 66.
COPYRIGHT: Voyenizdat, 1981
6367
CSO: 1801/229
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~
~
; FOR OFFICIAL USF ONLY
;
` .
i
~
~
1
ARMED FORCES
~
BOOK EXCERPTS: CPSU DOCUMENTS ON THE ARMED FORCES
i
i tioscow KPSS 0 VOORUZHFNNYKH SILAKH SOVETSROGO SOYUZA: DOKUMENTY 1917-1981 in
~ Russian 1981 (signed to press 31 Mar 81) pp 1-16, 609-623
[Foreword, Table of Contents and Annotation from book "The CPSU on the Armed
Forces of the Soviet Union: Documents, 1917-1981", compiled by N. I. Savinkin
~ and K. M. Bogolyubov with assiatance in preparation of material by A. I.
. Golyakov, in the "Officer's Library" series, Order of Labor Red Banner
Voyennoye izdatel'stvc, of the USSR Ministry of Defense, 95,000 copies, 623
~ pages]
[Excerpts] Contents
i
~
i Foreword 3
~ 1517-1920
;
2d All-P.ussian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies,
25-26 October (7-8 November) 1917 17
V. I. Lenin, To the Workers, Soldiers and Peasants! 17
V. I. Lenin, Decree on Peace 18
V. I. Lenin, Declaration of the Rights of the Working and~Exploited People. 21
~ V. I. Lenin, To the All-Army Congress on Army Demobilization 24
On the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, Decree of the Council of People's
Commissars 25
V. I. Lenin, The Socialist Homeland is in Danger! 26
V. I. Lenin, Position of the RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Labor Party]
(Bolshevik) CC on the Issue of a Separate and Annexational Peace........... 28
7th Special RKP(l,) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congre5s,
6-8 March 1918 31
V. I. Lenin, Resolution on War and Peace 31
V. I. Lenin, On the Supreme Military Council, 1 April 1918 32
V. I. Lenin, RKP(b) CC Decree on the Question of the International
Situation 33
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V. I. Lenin, Telegram to the Petrograd Committee of Communists,
27 July 1918 33
V. I. Lenin, To G. Ye. Zinov'yev 34
V. I. Lenin, Speech at Rally of the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment,
. 2 ~ugust 1918 35
V. I. Lenin, Greeting to the Red Army on Occasion of the Taking of Kazan'.. 37
V. I. Lenin, Telegra~m to Command Cour3es in Petrograd, 18 September 1918... 38
V. I. Lenin, Letter to Red Army Men Who Participated in the Taking of
Kazan' 38
V. Lenin, Central Committee Circular Letter to All Party Members Who �
Are Commissars, Commanders and Red A~my M~en, Fall, 1918 39
V. I. Lenin, Telegram to CIC of 2d Army, 7 November 1918 40
V. I. Lenin, Speech on "Red (~f�i~er's Day," 24 November 1918 41
V. I. Lenin, Telegram to CIC I. I. Vatsetis 41
- On the Policy of the Military Department, RKP Central Committee Decree..... 42
8th RKF(b) Congress, 18-23 March 1919 43
V. I. Lenin, From Central Committee Report, 18 March 43
From Program of Russiar~ Communist Party (Bolshevik) 45
In th~~ Military Field 45
Resolution on the Military Question 47
A. Gene.ral Provisions 47
B. Pracr.ical Measures 51
Greeting of the 8th RK1'(b) Congress t~ the Red Army .............o........ 59
V. I. Lenir~, From Speech at Closing of the Congress, 23 March............ 60
V. I. Lenin, Address to the Red Army 61
V. I. Lenin, Letter to Petr~igrad Workers on Aasistance to the Eastern
Fxont 63
V. I. Lenin, RKP(b) CC Theses i~t Connection with the Situation of the
Eastern Front 63
To All C uberniya and Uyezd Committees 66
V. I. Lenin, Draft CC Directive on Military Unity 69
For Defense of Petrograd 71
To All Party Organizations 72
Instructions to RKF ~C Representatives in Guberniyas 74
V. I. Lenin, Note over the Direct Wire to Chairman of the Sovnarkom
[Council of People's Commissars] af the Ukraine, 28 May 1919 75
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V. I. Lenin, Beware of Spies! 76
i V. I. Lenin, Telegram to K. Ye. Voroshilov, Copy to F. A. Artem, Khar'kov,
~
' 1 June 1919 77
~ V. I. Lenin, Telegram to V. I. Mezhlauk, K. Ye. Voroshilov, G. N.
Mel'nichanskiy, F. A. Artem and G. N. Kaminskiy 78
' V. I. Lenin, Telegram to Rewoyensovet [Revolutionary Military Council]
of the Eastern Front 78
On Importance of the Petrograd Front for the Situation of the Entire
Soviet Republic, From RKP(b) CC Decree, 10 June 1919 79
From Account of RKP Central Committee 80
V. I. Lenin, Everything for the Struggle Against Denikin! (Letter of
RKP(b) CC to Party Organi~ations) 83
To A11 RKP(b) Organizations ................................................100
On Mobili::ation of Party Members for the Front, RKP(b) CC Decree,
i9 Juiy i919 ...............................................................i0i
V. I. Lenin, Directives on the Defense of Odessa and Kiev ..................102
V. I. Lenin, Letter to Workers and Peasants on Occasion of the Victory
over Kolchak ...............................................................103
V. 1. Lenin, To S. I. Gusev ................................................110
RKP CC Circular Letter .....................................................lll
V. I. Lenin, To E. M. Sklyanskiy ...........................................113
On Party Work in the Red Army ..............................................113
V. I. Lenin, Example af Petrograd Workers ..................................114
The Question of the Situation ac the Fronts, From RKP(b) CC Decree,
15 October 1919 ............................................................116
On Mutual Relationships of Rewoyensovet's and Staffs w~th Party
Organizations ..............................................................118
V. I. Lenin, To the Workers and Red Arcny Men of Petrograd ..................119
V. I. Lenin, To Comrade Red Army Men .......................................120
V. I. Lenin, To G. N. Kaminskiy, D. P. Os'kin and V. I. Mezhlauk,
~20 October 1919 ............................................................121
V. L. Lenin, Greeting to the Petrograd Workers .............................122
To All Guberniya and Uyezd Committees of the RKP and to Front and Army
Political Departments ......................................................123
J. I. Lenin, Letter to Workers and Peasants of the Ukraine on Occasion
of Victories over Denikin ..................................................125
9th RKP(b) Congress, 29 March-5 April 1920 .................................131
V. I. Lenin, From Central Comtnittee Report, 29 March .....................131
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Resolution on Transitton to a Militia System .............................133
Greeting of 9th RKP(b) (;ongress to the Red Army and Red Fleet of the
RSFSR ......................................................................136
The Polish Front and Our Tasks, RKP(b) CC Theses, 23 May 1920 ..............137
V. I. Lenin, For Assistance to the Wounded Red Army Manl ...................141
From Account of RKP(b) CC for the Time from the 9th Congress through
15 September 1920 ..........................................................142
To All RKP(b) Guberniya Committees, RKP(b) CC Circular .....................I47
9th All-Russian RKP(b) Conference, 22-25 September 1920 ....................148
Resolution on Organizational Account of the CC ...........................1.48
V. I. Lenin, To the Poor Peasants of the Ukraine ...........................149
For Assistance to the Front ................................................150
On Social Security for Families of Red Army 1~Ien ...................~........151
V. I. Lenin, Labor and Defense Council Decree, 24 December 1920..........�..152
1921-1940
On the Red Army, From RKP(b) CC Circular Letter, 12 January 1921...........153
lOth RKP(b) Congress, 8-16 klarch 1921 ......................................154
- From Resolution on Glavpolitproavet [Main Political Enlightenment
Committee of RSFSR People's Commissariat of Education] and the Party's
- Agitprop Tasks ....................:......................................154
- Decree on the Military Question ..........................................155
On Strengthening the Red Army ..............................................159
On Servicing Red Army Men Released for Long-Term Leaves ....................164
More on Servicing Persons Released on Long-Term Leaves .....................166
To All Party Members Released from the Red Army on Indefinite Leave........167
On Staffitig Military Educational Institutions ..............................169
On Mutual Relations of Political Departments of the Red Army and Fleet
with Party Organizations of the RKP(b) .....................................171
For Strengthening the Staffing of Military Educational Institutions........172
On Halting Demobilization of Political Workers .............................174
RKP(b) CC Instructions to Organizations of Red Army and Fleet RKP(b)
Cells in the Rear and at the Front .........................................175
V. I. Lenin, Letter to G. K. Ordzhonikidze on Strengthening the
Georgian Red Army ..........................................................186
On Commissars and Politica~ Workers in the Red Army ........................186 ~
llth RKP(b) Coitgress, 27 March-2 April 1922...........~ ....................189
30
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i '
i From the Resolution of the December 1921 RI~ Conference on the Question
~ of Strengthening the Party, in Connectian with Consideration of Experi-
ence in Checking Its Personnel ...........................................1~9
' Decrees on Question of Strengthening the Red Arary ........................190
On the Campaign of Recruitment to Military Educational Inatitutions,
RKP(b) CC Letter......o ....................................................1~32
On Participatian of Guberniya Cammittees in Red Army and Fleet
Political Work .............................................................194
On the Red Army's Sth Anniversary ..........................................195

j From Account for a Year of Work of the RKP(b) CC from the llth to the
12th RKP(b) Congress .......................................................196
~ 12th RKP(b) Congresb, 17-25 April 1923 .....................................206
Fr~m Resolution on RKP ~C Acco~nt ........................................205
From Resolution on Questions of Propaganda, the Presc ~nd Agitation....,.206
From Resolution on Worl~ of the RKSM [Russian Commani.st Youth League].....207
0 4th RKP(b) CC Conference with Responsible Workers oi National Republics
and Oblasts, 9-12 June 1923 ................................................207
From rhe Resolution "Practical Measures for Implementing Resolution
of 12th Party Congress on the Questian of Nationalities" .................207
- RKP(b) CC Statute en Political Indoctrination of Predraft-Age Youth and
~ Mutual Relations of PUR [RewoSensovet Political Directorate] Entities
- with the RKSM ..............................................................208
On Strengthening k'ork in the Red Army, From RKP(b) CC Circular Letter,
29 Oc.teber 1923 .....................................................~......210
~ Most Important Upcoming Party Tasks in Area of the Press, From RKP(b) CC
Decree, 6 Februa_ry 1924 ....................................................22.1
On Wo.rk Among Demobilized Red Army? Men and Those Cal~ed into the Arnry,
RKP~h) CC Circular Letter, 17 March 1924 ...................................212
- On the Military Departmeat, From RKP(b) CC Plenum Resol~xtion,
- al t9arch-2 April 1924 ........................................o.............214
_ 13th RKP(b) C:ongress, 23-31 May 1924 .......................................215
From Resol.ution or~ the Press .............................................215
_ From Resolution on Work Among the Youth .`L16
' Un Predraft Training ........................................................216
From RKP~b) :;C Instructior.s to RKP(b) Cells in the Red ~z~my and Fleet,
20 December 1g24....... ....................................................217
- Greeting of RKP(b) Central Committee to Editors and Associates of the
_ Newspaper Ki2ASNAYA ZVEZDA ..................................................223
- Questions of the Work of Military Cells ....................................123
31
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On One-Man Command in the Red Army .........................................227
_ ..229
= Training Persons on Leave from the Red Army, RKP(b) CC Decree............
= Qn Work Among the Demobilized Red Army Men, RKP(b) CC Letter, ...,..230
25 July 1925
Statute on Work Among RLKSM [Russian Leninist Comm?unist Youth League]
- Members in the Red Army and Red Fleet, l~pproved by RI~(b) CC, RLKSM CC
- and PUR, 27 July 1925 , .232
On Supporting Released Command Personnel ...............................:...237
To All VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Organizations and..�.238
` to All Worker:; and PeasanCs, From Appeal of VKP(b) CC
From Slogans for "Defense Week" ............................................240
Jn Recruitment Campaign to Military Schools, VKP(b) CC Decree,
15 Ju1y 1927 ................................................242
- On Using Persons Denobilized from the Red Army in Local Soviet,
Cooperative and Social Work, VKP(b) CC Decree, 14 October 1927 .............243
On Celebrating the lOth Anniversary of the Red Army, k'rom VI~ (b) CC .
Decree~ 19 January 1928 ....................................................244
From VKP(b) CC Slogans for lOth Anniversary of Red Army ....................246
On Political-Moral Status of the Red Army, From VRP(b) CC Decree,
- 30 October 1928 ............................................................248
On the Work of Military Cells, VKP(b) CC Decree of 10 December 1928
Based on Report of the PUR. � 249
On RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] Command and Political ......_..253
Personnel, VKP(b) CC Decree, 25 February 1929
~n Training Persons on Leave for the RKKA, VKP(b) CC Decree,
12 April 1929 . . ........256
On the Status of USSR, Defense, From VKP(3) CC Decree, 15 July 1929........258
f 16th VKP(b) C~ngress, 26 June-13 July 1930 .................................261
From Resolution on Account of V'KP(b) Central Committee ...................261
On the "Defense Decade," VKP(b) CC Decree, 5 October 1930 ..................261 ~
On RICKA Command and Political Peraonnel, VKP(b) CC Decree, 5 June 1931.....262
On Publication of "History of the Civil War," Fram VKP(b) CC Decree, ..265
_ 3o Juiy 1931
_ VKP(b) CC Greeting to Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the USSR .....266
_ Revolutionary Military C~uncil
17th VKP(b) Congress, 26 January-10 February 1934 267
On Party Organizations in the Red Army?, From G'K.P(b) Bylaws ...............267
VKP(b) CC Greeting to the lst Horse Army on 15th Anniversary of Its ..268
Actival:ion.....~
- 32
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On Creation of the USSR Defense Committee, From VKP(b) CC Decree,
27 April 1937 ..............................................................268
~ On Creation of Military-Industrial Co~ission under the Defense
Committee, From VKP(b) CC Decree, 31 January 1938 ..........................268
For the 20th Anniversary of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and
Navy, From Theses of the VKP(b) CC Department of Party Propaganda and
. Agitation ..................................................................269
On National Units and Formations of the RKKA, From VI~(b) CC and USSR
SNK [Council of People's Commissars] Decree, 7 March 1938 ..................286
On Selection of 4,000 Party Members for Political Work in the RKKA,
~ From CC Politburo Decree, 29 August 1939 ...................................287
On Military Retraining, Recertification of Party Committee Workers and
on the Procedure of Their Mobilization into the RKKA, VKP(b) CC
Politburo Decree (Extract), Y3 March 1940 ..................................288
On Strengthening One-Man Command in the Red Army and Navy, USSR
Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase ..................~..........................289
~ 1941-1945
On the Military Situation, From USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase,
22 June 1941 ...............................................................291
On Mobilization of Reservists in the Leningrad, Baltic Special,
Western Special, Kiev Special, Odessa, Khar'kov, Orel, Moscow,
Arkhangel'sk, Ural, Siberian, Volga, North Caucasus and Transcaucasus
Military Districts, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase, 22 June 1941......293
On the General Headquarters of the High Command of the USSR Armed
Forces, Decree of USSR Sovnarkom and VI~(b) CC (Extract), 23 June 1941.....294
On the Soviet Information Bureau, VKP(b) CC and USSR Sovnarkom
Decree, 24 June 1941 .......................................................294
On Conditions of Working Time of Workers and 'r'�mployees in Wartime,
USSR Suprem~ Soviet Presidium Ukase, 26 June 1941 ..........................295
On Selection of Party Members for Strengthening Party-Political
Influence in Regiments, VKP(b) ~C Politburo Resolution, 27 June 1941.......296
To Party and Soviet Organizations of Front Oblasts, USSR Sovnarkom
and VKP(b) CC Directive (Extract), 29 June 1941 ............................297
Formation of the St~te Defense CoAnnittee, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium,
VKP(b) CC and USSR Sovnarkom Decree, 30 June 1941 ..........................299
~ On Motor Vehicle-Tractor and Cart Transportation Supplied for the

Z' Red Army, USSR Supreme Soviet Ukase, 3~0 June 1941 ..........................300
On Universal Compulsory Training of the Population for Air Defense,
USSR Council of People's Commissars Decree, 2 July 1941 ....................300
On Voluntary Mobilization of the Workers of Moscow and Moscow Oblast
into Home Guard Divisions, From GOKO [State Defense CommitteeJ Decree
No 10 Dated 4 July 1941 ....................................................302
33
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On the General Headquarters [GF:n) of the High Command, State Defense
Committee Decree (Extract), 10 July 1941 ...................................303
On Reorganization of Entities of Political Propaganda and on
Establishing the Institution of Military Commissars in the Workers'
and Peasants' Red Army, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase ................304
Statute on Military Commissars of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army,
Approved by USSR Suprem~ Soviet Presidium ..................................305
On Organization of Struggle in the Rear of German Forces, VRP(b) CC
~ Decree (Extract), 18 July 1941 .............................................306 ~
On the Supreme Commander, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, USSR Sovnarkom
and VKP(b) CC Decree ;Extract), 8 August 1941 ..............................308
On Strengthening Military and Physicat Training of Pupils in
8th-lOth Grades of Secondary Schools, USSR Council of People's
Commissars Decree, 11 August 1941 ..........................................308
On Conferring Military Ranks on Supervisory Personnel and Red Army
Men Distinguished in Fighting for the Motherland, USSR Supreme Soviet
Presidium Ukase, 18 August 1941 ............................................309
On Procedure for Acceptance into the Party of Red Army Men and
Red Army Supervisory Personnel Who Especially Distinguished
Themselves in Fighting, VKP(b) CC Decree, 19 August 1941 ...................309
On Collection of Warm Articles and Underwear for the Red Army
Among the Population, VKP(b) CC Decree, 5 September 1941 ...................3i0
On Universal Compulsory Tra~ning of USSR Citizena in Military
Affairs, GOKO Decree, 17 �eptember 1941 ....................................311
On Organization of All-Union Assistance Committee for Serving Sick
and Wounded Fighting Men az:d Commanders of the Red Army, From CC
Politburo Decree, 8 October 1941 ...........................................313
On Establishment of a State of Siege in Moscow, State Defense
Co~ittee Decree, 19 October 1941 ...........................................314
On Selection of VKP(b) Members for Political Management Work in
the RKKA, VKP(b) CC Politburo Decree, 10 November 1941 .....................315
On Procedure for Conferring Next Militar.y Rank on Supervisory
Personnel of the Army in the Field, State Defense Committee Decree,
20 November 1941 ...........................................................315
On Acceptance of Candidates for VKP(b) Membership Distinguished in
Fighting Against the German Invaders, VKP(b) CC Decree, 9 December 1941....317
On Party-Political Work in Hospitals of the USSR NarkomZdrav
[People's Commissar for HealthJ, VKP(b) CC Decree, 12 January 1942.........317
On Measures for Preventing Epidemic Diseases in the Country and the
Red Army, State Defense Committee Decree, 2 February 1942 ..................318
On Celebrating the 24th Anniversary of t?~e Red Army, VKP(b) CC Decree,
20 February 1942 ...........................................................321
34
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From Slogans of the VKP(b) CC for 24th Anniversary of the Red Army.........321
On Measures for Reinforcing Rear Directorates of Fronts, Armies,
Corps and Divisions, State Defense Committee Decree, 19 May 1942...........324
Questions of the Partisan Movement, State Defense Committee Decree,
30 May 1942 ......................................................:.........324
Questions of the Partisan Movement, State Defense Com~ittee Decree,
28 September 1942 ..........................................................325
On Establishment of Complete One-Man Command and Abolishing the
Institution of Military Commissars in the Red Arury, USSR Supreme
Soviet Presidium DecrEe ....................................................326
On Extension of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree on
Establishing Complete One-Man Command and Abolishing the Institution
of Military Co~unissars in the Red Army,to the Navy .........................328
From VKP(b) Slogans for the 25th Anniversary of the Red Army ...............328
On Reorganization of the Structure of Party and Komsomol Organizations
in the Red Army and on Strengthening the Role of Front, Army and
Division Newspapers, VKP(b) CC Decree, 24 May 1943 .........................330
On Procedure for Conferring Military Ranks on Red Army Servicemen,
USSIt Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree, 24 July 1943 .........................332
On Division of Navy Servicemen into Rank-and-File, Petty Officers and
Officers, USSR Supreme Soviet likase, 10 August 1943 ........................333
On Organization of Suvorov Military Schools, Special Trade Schools,
Special Nurseries and Children's Receivers and Distributors for
Children of Red Army~ Soldiers and Partisans of the Patriotic War as
Well as for Orphans Whose Parents Died at the Hands of German
Occupiers, From USSR SNK and VKP(b) CC Decree, 21 August 1943 ..............334
On Approval of a New Model of the Red Banner, the Guards Red Banner
and Statute on the Red Banner of Troop Units and Combined Units,
and of the Navy, USSR Supreme Soviet Ukase, 5 February 1944 ................336
From VKP(b) CC Slogans for 26th Anniversary of the Red Army ................337
From VKP(b) CC Slogans for 27th Anniversary of the Red Army ................339
1946-1981
19th CPSU Congress, 5-14 October 1952 ......................................341
Party Organizations in the Soviet Army, Naval Forces and in
Transportation, From CPSU Bylaws .........................................341
20th CPSU Congress, 14-25 February 1956 ....................................342
From Resolution on Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Co~nittee...342
For the 40th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution
(1917-1957), From Theses of CPSU CC Department of Propaganda and
Agitation and Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU CC .................342
35
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For Soldiers of the Valorous Armed Forces of the Soviet Union--Privates
and Seamen, Sergeants and Petty Officers, Officers, Generals and
Admtrals, Party and Komsomol Members, Address of the CPSU CC, USSR
Council of Ministers and U5SR Supreme Soviet Presidium in Connection
with the 40th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution........348
On Improving Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy, From
CPSU CC PlPnum Decree, 29 October 1957 .....................................357
On Erection of a Monument in the City of Stalingrad to Commemorate
the Victory over Fascist German Troops at Stalingrad, CPSU CC Ylenum Decree
23 Januarq 1958 ............................................................358
Greeting of the CPSU CC, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidiwn and USSR
Council of Ministers to Personnel of the Valorous Armed Forces of
the Soviet Union ...........................................................359
On Military Councils of the Sovi~t Army and Navy, From CPSU CenCral
Committee and USSR Cour.cil of Mit~isters Decree, 17 April 1958 ..............361
Extraordinary 21st CPSU Congress, 27 January-5 February 1959 ...............362
From Resolution on the Report "On Control Figures of Development of
the USSR National Economy for 1959-1965" .................................362
To the Main Political Directorate of the Sovtet Army and Navy, Greeting
of the CPSU Central Committee ..............................................362
On Job Placements and Material-Personal Support of Servicemen Released
from the Armed Forces in Accordance with the Law on a New Significant
Reduction of the USSR Armed Forces, in the CPSU Central Committee and
USSR Council of Ministers ..................................................363
On Creation of the Military Council of the Missile Forces, CPSU
Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree, 22 June 1960.......369
On the Work of Voyennoye Izdatel'stvo, From CPSU CC Decree, 13 March 1961..370
22d CPSU Congress, 17-31 October 1961 .................371
Strengthening the Armed Forces and the Soviet Union's Defenses,
From CPSU Program ...........371
To Soviet Armed Forces Personnel, Greeting of the CPSU Central
Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers.....373
On Creation of the Political Directorate of the Missile Forceo,
From CPSU CC Decree, 4 April 1963 ..........................................376
On the Next Tasks of the Party's Ideological Work, From CPSU CC Plenum
Decree, 21 June 1963 .......................................................376
On Measures for Further Improvement of Preparation of Predraft-Age
and Draft-Age Youth for Service in the USSR Armed Forces, From
CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers Decree, 20 July 1964 .................378
On Celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the Soviet People's Victory
in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945, From
CPSU CC Decree, 30 March 1965 ..............................................380
36
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~
I.. I. Brezhnev, From the Report "Great Victory of the Soviet People"
at Ceremonial Meeting in the Kremlin's Palace of Congresses Dedicated
f to the 20th Anniversary of the Sovie~ People's Victory in the Great
Patriotic War, 8 May 1965 ..........................3~4
' On Serious Deficiencies in the Work of Party Organizations and
Political Entities of the Odessa Military District and the Red Banner
Baltic Fleet in Acceptance into the Party and Indoctrination of Young
~ Party Members, From CPSU CC Decree, 22 June 1965 ...........................410
L. I. Brezhnev, From Speech in the Kremlin at Reception in Honor of
Military Academy Graduates, 3 July 1965 ....................................412
' 23d CPSU Congress, 29 March-8 April 1966 ..421
L. I. Brezhnev, From Accountability Report of CPSU Central Committee
~ to the 23d CPSU Congress ...........................421
From Resolution on the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central
Committee ................................................................423
On Status and Measures for Improvement of the Work of the Volu~utary
Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy (USSR DOSAAF),
CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers Decree, 7 May 1966......... ........425
L. I. Brezhnev, From the Speech at Kremlin Reception in Honor of
Military Academy Graduates, 1 July 1966 ....................................432
On Celebration of the 25th Anniversary of the Soviet Guards, From
; CPSU CC Decree, 23 August 1966 .............................................442
i
, On Organization of the Military History Institute, From CPSU CC Decree,
- 27 August 1966 .............................................................443
- To Workers of the City of Moscow and Moscow Oblast, to Participants of
the Great Battle of Moscow .................................................444
On Measures for Improving Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and
Navy, From CPSU CC Decree, 21 January 1967 .................................446
50th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, From
CPSU Central Committee Theses ..............................................451
L. I. Brezhnev, From Speech at Kremlin Reception in Honor of Military
Academy Graduates, S July 1967 .............................................461
Un Establishing Memorial Banners for Military Combined Units, Units and
5hips in Honor of the SOth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist
Revolution, CPSU CC, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of
Ministers Decree, 10 July 1967 .............................................469
On Creatio*~ of Political Directorates of National Air Defense Forces,
Air Force, and Navy, Political Department of Airborne Troops and on
Structure of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and
P7avy, CPSU CC Decree, 30 September 1967 ....................................470
On Measures in Connection with Adoption of the New Law on Universal
Military Obligation, CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers Decree,
12 October 1967 ............................................................470
37
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L. I. Brezhnev, Fifty Years of Great Victories of Socialism, From
Report and Concluding Speech at Joint Ceremonial Session of CPSU
Centrat Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet and RSFSR Supreme Soviet in �.4r1
Kremlin Palace of Congress, 3-4 November 1967
From Address of CPSU CC, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidiwn and USSR
Council of Ministers to the Soviet People and to all Toilers of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub�lics ....................................480
Greeting of the CPSU Central C~mmittee, USSR Supreme Soviet
Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers to Soldiers of the Heroic
Armed Forces of the Soviet Union ...........................................480
To Soviet Border Guard Personnel, Greeting of CPSU Central Committee,
USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers ................484
L. I. Brezhnev, From Speech at Reception in Honor of Higher Military
Educational Inst~tution Graduates, 8 July 1968 .............................485
On Preparations for Centennial of the Birth of Vladimir I1'ich
Lenin, From CPSU CC Decrae, 23 July 19b8 ...................................491
To Political Entities, Commanders and Political Workers of the
Soviet Army and Navy, Greeting of the CPSU Central Co~?ittee ...............492
On Publication of "History of World War II 1939-1945," CPSU CC
Decree, 27 June 1969 .......................................................493
On the Centenni3l of the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, From
CPSU Central Committee Theses, 23 December 1969.....~ ......................493
L. I. Brezhnev, Train and Indoctrinate Soviet Military Personnel
in a Leninist Manner, from Speech at Critique of "Dvina" Troop
Maneuvers on Z4 Ma.rch 1970 in.City of Minsk ................................495
On Celebration of 25th Anniversary of the Soviet People's Victory
ir~ the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, CPSU CC Decree, 16 March 1970.....498
L. I. Brezhnev, From Report The Cause of Lenin Lives ar...d Wins"
at Joint Ceremonial Session of CPSU Central Comanittee, USSR Supreme
Soviet and RSFSR Supreme Soviet Dedicated to the Centennial of the
Birth of Vladimir I1'ich Lenin, 21 April 1970 ..............................501
To Military Academy Graduates, Greeting of the CPSU Central
Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of
Ministers, 4 July 1970 .....................................................503
24th CPSU Congress, 30 March-9 April 1971 ..................................505
L. I. Brezhnev, From Accountab ility Report of CPSU Central
Committee to 24th CPSU Congress ..........................................505
From Resolution on Accountability Report of the CPSU
Central Committee ........................................................508
To Mil.itary Academy Graduates, Greeting of CPSU Central Committee,
USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers ................509
38
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~ On Preparations for SOth Anniversary of Foundation of the USSR,
From CPSU CC Decree, 21 February 1972 ...............511
j To Soviet Military Academy Graduates, Greeting of CPSU Central
~ Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of
~ Ministers, 11 July 1972 ....................................................513
' L. I. Brezhnev, From Report "On SOth Anniv~ersary of the USSR" at
Joint Ceremonial Session of CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme
Soviet and RSFSR Supreme Soviet in Kremlin Palace of Congresses,
21 December 1972 ..........................................515
Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy,
Approved by CPSU CC, 16 February 1973 ......................................518
; Greeting of CPSU Central Committee to All-Army Conference of
Party Organization Secretaries .............................................530
To Military Academy Graduates, Greeting of CPSU Central Committee,
USSR Suprer~~e Soviet Presidium and USS1~ Council of Ministers,
2 July 1973 ................................................................532
To Newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, Greeting of CPSU Central Cownittee...........534
To Military Academy Graduates, Greeting of CPSU Central Committee,
USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers,
_ 1 Juiy 1974 ..........................535
On ?Oth Anniversary of the Soviet People's Victory in the Great
Patriotic War of 1941-1945, CPSU CC Decree (Summary),
31 January 1975 ............................................................536
On Supplementary Benefits for Patriotic War Invalids and Families
of Deceased Servicemen, CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers
Decree, 18 April 1975 ......................................................543
On Provision of Living Space to Servicemen Released from the
USSR Armed Forces to the Reserve or into Retirement, CPSU CC
and USSR Council of Ministers Decree (Summary), 29 April 1975 ..............546
L. I. Brezhnev, From Speech "Great Exploits of the Soviet People"
at Ceremonial Meeting in Kremlin Palace of Congresses lledicated
to 30th Anniversary of the Soviet People's Victory in the Great
Patriotic War, 8 May 1975 ..................................................548
To Military Academy Graduates, Greeting of CPSU Central Coimnittee,
USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers,
27 June 1975 ...............................................................555
25th CPSU Congress, 24 February-5 March 1976 ...............................557
L. I. Brezhnev, CPSU Central Committee Account and the Next
Party Tasks in Domestic and Foreign Policy, from Report to
25th CPSU Congress .......................................................557
To Military Academy Graduates, Greeting of CPSU Central Committee,
USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers,
30 June 1976 ...............................................................561
39
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J On 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution,
From CPSU CC Decree, 31 January 1977 .......................................562
To Military Academy Graduates, Greeting of CPSU CC, USSR
Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers,
29 June 1977 ...............................................................564
From Constitution (Basic Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, Chapter 5, Defense of the Socialist Homeland ....................566
L. I. Brezhnev, From the Report "The Great October and Progress ,
of Mankind" at Joint Ce~emonial Session of CPSU CC, USSR Supreme
Soviet and RSFSR Supreme Soviet in Kremlin Palace of Congresses, '
2 November 1977 ............................................................566
Greeting of CPSU CC, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR
Council of Ministers to Personnel of Valorous Armed Forces of
the Soviet Union ..................e........................................570
To Soviet Border Guard Personnel, Gr~eting of CPSU CC, USSR
Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers .....................573
To Military Academy Graduates, Greeting of CPSU CC, USSR
Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Mintsters,
28 June 1978 ...............................................................574
On Measures for FurthPr Improvement of Mater~al and Personal
Conditions of Great Patriotic War Participants, CPSU CC and
USSR Council of Ministers Decree, 10 November 1978 .........................576
On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination
Work, From CPSU CC Decree, 26 April 1979 ...................................578
To Political Entities, Commanders and Political Workers of
the Soviet Army and Nav;;, Greeting of CPSU CC Central Committee............579
To Military Academy Graduates, Greeting of CPSU CC, USSR
Supreme Soviet Presid~um and USSR Council of Ministers,
29 June 1979 ...............................................................580
On the 110th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir T1'ich Lenin,
From CPSU CC Decree, 13 December 1979 ......................................581
On Celebration of 35th Anniversary of the Soviet People's
Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, CPSU CC Decree,
14 January 1980 ............................................................582
L. I. Brezhnev, From tl� Speech "Our Course is Peaceful Creation"
at a Meeting with Electors of the Baumanakiy Electorial District
of the City of Moscow, 22 Februax}? 1980 ....................................584
On Additional Measures for Improving the Material and Personal
Conditions of Great Patriotic War Participants, in the CPSU
Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers ............................590
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~
~
~
, On the International Situation and Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union,
CPSU CC Plenum Decree, 23 June 1980 ........................................592
To Military Academy Graduates, Greeting of CPSU CC, USSR Supreme Soviet
~ Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers, 27 June 1980 ......................596
26th CPSU Congress, 23 February-3 March 1981 ...............................598
~ L. I. Brezhnev, Account of CPSU CC to 26th CPSU Congress and Next Party
, Tasks in Dome~tic and Foreign Policy (Excerpt) ...........................598
From Basic Directions of the USSR's Economic and Social Development
for 1981-1985 and for the Period up to 1990, Approved by 26th CPSU
; Congress .................................................................607
FOREWORD
The Great October Socialist Revolution opened up a new historic era--an era of
revolutionary renewal of the world, an era of transitian fron capitalism to
socialism. The victory of the Great October, the major event of the 20th cen-
tury, fundamentally altered the course of development of all mankind. The
world split into two opposite social-economic systems: socialist and capital-
ist.
Imbued with class hatred for the popular masses, the international bourgeoisie
, decided to stifle the proletarian revolution no matter what and restore capi-
; talist orders in our country. It not only was supporting the internal coun-
~ terrevolution by all means, but also itself took the path of direct military
~ intervention against the young Soviet state.
History placed the Communist Party face to face with a most difficult and at
the same time urgent task of organizing armed defense of the first republic of
workers and peasants in the world and co.untering the aggressiveness of the
class enemy with the indestructible military might of the socialist state. In
substantiating the objective need for creating a new type of army for protect-
ing the socialist homeland against an attack by the joint forces of interna-
tional imperialism and internal counterrevolution, Lenin emphasized that "any
; revolution is worth something only if it is able to defend itself,i1 and that
"we could not exist without armed defense of the socialist republic.i2
Vladimir I1'ich Lenin, the greatest theorist at:~ strategist of the proletarian
revolution, was the organizer of the Armed Forces of the Soviet state. The
birth of the Soviet Armed Forces and their heresic history are linked insepara-
bly with the name of V. I. Lenin. He deserves the historic credit for sub-
stantiating a military program of the proletarian revolution and for elabora-
ting the teaching on defense of the socialist homeland.
Lenin's immortal ideas about defense of the Motherland and the principles of
military organizational development he elaborated became the basis of the
Communist Party's military policy. From the very beginning they ensured the
party's undivided management of the entire matter of national defense. The
Central Committee Decree dated 25December 1918 stated: "The policy of the
military department as well as of all other departments and establishments is
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conducted on the precise basis of general directives issued i~y the party in
the person of its Central Committee and under the direct supervision of the
Central Committee." '
Leninist principles of party management of the Army and Navy have *~een firm in
all historic stages of the Soviet state's development.
In fulfilling Vladimir I1'ich's behests, our party performed an enormous
amount of work in creating socialist arm~ed forces. Proceeding from Lenin's
guidelines, the CPSU believed and continues to believe that the teaching on
defense of the homeland is part of the Marxist theory of socialist revolution
and that defense of revolutionary achievements is one of the principles in
building socialism and communism. Analyzing some of the lessons of social-
ism's conten?porary development, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized that
"socialism can be established only if the power of the workers is able to
defend the revolution against all attacks of the class enemy (and such attacks
are inevitable, both within and most probably from without).i3
This edition of the collection "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo
Soyuza" cuntains resolutfons of CPSU congresses and conferences, and of CC
p.tenums; Central Committee decrees, direct :s, lettera, addresses and greet-
ings; V. I. Lenin's accountability reports at party congresses, addresses,
letters and telegrams; Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speeches; and other documents
reflecting the enormous work of the Communist ~arty to strengthen the Soviet
Army and Navy and to increase their combat effectiveness and combat readiness.
The CPSU's work of strengthening national defenae and organizing protection of
the socialist homeland is exceptionally many-sided and encompasses many
aspects of the life of Soviet society. This collection contains documents
reflecting chiefly the political, ideological and organizational work of the
Communist Party in the Soviet Armed Forces. A number of party CC documents on
these matters are being published for the first time in this book.
The collection's contents graphically show the primary directions in the
Communist Party's work of organizational development of the Soviet Armed
Forces, the build-up in their combat might, and the increase in combat effec-
tiveness and combat readiness of the troops. One can trace clearly in the
documents how our party, in various stages of development of the Soviet Armed
Forces, managed the work of their manning, technical outfitting and logistical
support, and showed concern for improving troop organizational structure and
the training and indoctrination of Army and Navy personnel.
A ma~or place in the collection is occupied by documents devoted to party-
political work in the Armed Forces and to organizational development and
strengthening of political entitiea and party organizations. One of the RKP
CC letters published states: "In order for the Red Army to be really social-
ist, it not only must be class in composition, but its personnel also have to
perceive their class intereats clearly and correctly. For this we need party
work in its midst."
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Lenin viewed the work of Army and Navy party organizations, commissars and
political departments as a powerful means of ideological conditioning of per-
sonnel and of raising the combat effectiveness and combat readiness of the
Soviet Armed Forces. He emphasized that "where party policy is conducted the
strictest where discipline is firmest and where political work is con-
ducted most solicitously among the troops there is no slackness in the
Army, its order and spirit are better and there are more victories."�' The
party's leader revealed the essence of commun~st indoctrination of military
personnel and elaborated principles and methods of party-political work among
the troops. He taught military cadres and all party members to arrange ideo-
. logical indoctrination work in the Army on a class basis and to develop in
soldiers an unshakable ideological conviction and utter dedication to the
cause of communism.
Lenin's statements on the need for.perfecting all party-political work, ele-
vating the role and influence of Army and Navy party organizations, and
shaping and developing in military personnel high political and moral-combat
qualities can be traced through all resolutions of party congresses, CPSU CC
decrees, instructions to party organizations in the So~viet Arary and Navy, and
other documents. The Leninist science and art of political work among the
masses and the party's enormous historical experience in managing the Armed
Forces is a guarantee of successful accomplishment of the tasks of com~unist
indoctrination of military personnel and of developing in them the palitical,
moral-combat and psychological qualities needed for winning victory in modern
warfare.
The documents contained in the collection attest to the fact that in creating
and strengthening the Armed Forces of the Soviet state V. I. Lenin and the
Commim ist Party showed daily concern for the trainfng, indoctrination and
placement of military cadres.
The party Central Committee took very effective steps aimed at mass training
of commanders from among the workers and peasants. As early as late :920 the
country had 158 military educational institutions in which 54,000 cadets were
training. In subsequent years the party did not relax attention to the train--
ing and indoctrination of military cadres. The work of training co~and-
political and engineer-technical personnel of the Army and Navy assimmed enor-
mous scope in the Great Patriotic War years.
Following Lenin's behests, the CPSU has shown constant concern for military
- cadres and for their Marxist-Leninist conditioning and military-technical
training even in postwar years. Our Armed Forces now have remarkable, highly
trained officer cadres. Over 90 percent of all Army and Navy officers are
party or Komsomol members. A majority of the off icers have a higher military
or military-special education.
Al] documents included in the collection are arranged in chronological order
and reflect the most important historic stages of development of the Soviet
state's Armed Forces. They are living proof of how the Communist Party devel-
oped and carried out measures for strengthening our Motherland's defenses step
by step. In so doing the party gave thorough consideration to the features of
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the socialist revol~ti~n's historic development, the d~veloping internati~nal
situation, successes of socialist economics, the development of military
science and the means and methods of warfare, as we11 as the growth in politi-
cal awarenes~ and in the general educariona"l, technical and ccltural level of
Armed Forces personnel.
- The collection "KPSS o VoeruzhQnnykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza" opens with the
address of the 2d All-Russian Congress of Soviets "To Workers, Soldiers and ~
Peasants!" and "Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploieed Peo-
ple," written by V. I. Lenin. Trese documents for the first time advanced the
task of armir.g the workers and forming a socialist Red Army of.workers and
peasants, which was legalized by the Council of People's Commissars Decree on
Organization of the Workers' and Peasanta' Red Army.
Subsequent documents, encompassing the Civil War period, reveal the titanic
work of Lenin and the Communist Party to build the Armed Forces and manage
their combat activities. The numerous party mobilizations and the dispatch of
revolutionary workers to the front played an enormous role in the combat
development of Red Army units, in increasing the peraonnel's solidarity about
the party and Soviee power, and in reinforcing diacipline and steadfastness in
combat. .
The 8th party congress was of very great importance for strengthening the Red
Army. The congress approved Lenin's guidelines on building a mass, standing,
regular Red Army; formulated the basic provisions of the party's military
policy; and defined tasks in military organizational development and party-
political work among the tro4ps. "The Army must be an Army trained, armed and
organized according to the last word of military science," it was emphasized
in the congress resolution on the military question. The congress devoted
particular attention to the planned allocation of par~y forces in the Army and
. Navy and to strengthening political work among the troops. The congress wrote ~
in the resolution it adopted: "Shift the center of gravity of communist work
at the front from front political departments to Army and division political
departments so as to animate it and bring it closer to units operating at the
front."
Party documnnts published in the collection def ine tasks during the fight
against armies of the White Guard and foreign interventionists and contain
concrete instructions on organizational and political strengthening of the Red
Army and its logistical support.
The victorious conclusion of the Civil War marked the beginning of a new stage
in development of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Soviet state was ringed by
hostile ;orces which might act against our country at any time. "We ended one
- period of wars," said Lenin at the 8th All-Russian Congress of Soviets, "and
we must prepare for a second; but we do not know when it will arrive and we
must make sure that when it comes we can be up to it.i5 Proceeding from these
tasks, the RKP(b) CC stated in a circular letter dated 12 January 1921: "The
party decided and the All-Russian Congress of Soviets unanimously affirmed
that the Army has to be preserved and its combat effectiveness raised."
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The '_Orh RKI'(b) ~on~ress outlin~d ways for rEOrganizing the Red Army. Congress
resolurians on the ~ilitary question re~nfarced Lenir.xst principles of mili,-
tary Qrganizational development j.n peacetim~ and out~ined a program of party
- activity to strengthen and develop the Soviet Ar~ned Forces u~der new condi-
- tions of socialist reorganizatiun of t~e country's nattonal economy.
- Documents ~ontafned in the colLection and taking :~n the period from the end of
_ the Civil War to the beginning 4f the Great Patriotic War clearly attest to
the Communist Party's constan~ concern for strengthening the Army and Navy,
~ for dheir technical reoutfitting, fer imprev~r.g party--political work and ele-
vating the role of party organizatior.s ~mons the troops, for ideological-
= political indQCtrinatio~ ot Saviet military personnel, and for training mili-
tary cadres.
In tre face of imminent threat of aggr~ssion on t'~2 p ar t of fascist Gex~many,
the Communist Farty took energetic steps tn deploy the Armed Forces and out-
= rit them ~rith ~onCemp~~rary corabat. equipment, relying on successes of the

a socialist economic s}~stem ach~Leved thanks tc~ the countr.y's industrialization
and the collectivization of agricultLre. T.here was a rapid expansion of the
industrial base of art~llery and small arms in the pr~zwar ~ears, and t~e best
tanks in the w~orld and new types of sixcraft. and war5tiips ~ere created.
Much attention was glVPll to reir.forcing Army and Navy party organizations.
From 1939 until mid-1941 t:~e number or party ~~mbers in th~ Armed Forces rase
more than threefold an~l consi~ted ef ovQr 560,0(30 persons~ Some two million
Soviet m.ilitary personnel were Kcrasomc'_ menbers.
The party's vigorous work of preparing the cauntry and the Army to repuJse
aggression, carried out in tt~~ period of peacsful construction and especially
= in the pre;aar y~ars, ?aid the rvaterial dr_d wo.raZ-pulitical foundation of our
victory over the fascist German i.nvaders.
_ The Great Patri~tic War wa.s a serious test for the S~viet state and its Armed
Forces. The C~mmuni:~t Farty unfolded enormous war~C. of mobilizing all the
country's phy~ical and spiri~.ual cGpabilities and all the people's energy to
combat the tot. It was th~ party which ~rgd:~izEd and rallied tens of millions
of people and directn~ their enQr~y and wilt toward a sing~e goal--victory.
The ~;ountry became a~ingle mil_icary ca~np. Tt~e party shifted the national
- econ~my to a wartime foo*_~ng. Ma~c+r industriai bases for. producing arms were
= created in the east in short periods af time. Tn surmountin.g the unbelieva-
ble hardships of wartime, Soviet citizens in the r~ar assured the uninter-
rupted ~~~pply of t}~e fr,~nt with conbat equipment, weapons, ammunition, food and
cl.othing by tlteir selfless l.abor.
T'he party performed enoraous work of compreh~nsive strengthening of the S~viet
- Armed Farces and a continuous buile~-up in their combat might. The documents
being published indicate how the party took vigorous steps in the war years to
raise the Army and Navy's combat effectiveness, to perfect their organiza-
tional structure, to outfit the troops with the latest combat equipment, to
provtde them with experienced cad~es, to rei~zforce politica.l entities and
party organizarions, and to improve party-political work among the personnel.
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- The party's Central Committee was the staff from which supreme pol~itical and
~ strategic leade~~ship of military actions was exercised.
7'he Soeiet people, led by the Co~unist Party, won not only a military vi.ctory,
but ar~ ideological victory as well over the enemy. The party's ideological
{.nfluence was supported everywhere: at the front, in territory temporarily
occupied by the enemy, and in the country's rear areas. Lenin's ideas of
defending the socialist homeland took hold of the masses and were an enormous
force which united millions of Soviet cit izens for the selfless struggle for
the freedom and independence of the Land of S4viets.
The defeat of fascist Germany and imperia list Japan, involving the Soviet
Union's deciding role, and victory of revolutions in a nwnber of countries of
- Europe and Asia sharply altered the arran gement of class forces in the inter-
- national arena. A world socialist system formed and there began an active
- process of the downfall of colonialism.
These new achievements Y~y forces of socialism and democracy caused fear and
bitterness in the imperialist camp. Reactionary forces of the primary
capitalist countries, and U.S. imperialists above all, waged a struggle
against socialist states and liberated peoples. Imperialist circles b~gan to
whip up international tension. They created the aggressive North Atlantic
Alliance (Nti.i.'0), untwisted a mad arms race, and unleash~d a"cold war" against
countries of the socialist community, and against the Soviet Union above all.
In the face of the growing aggressiveness of imperialism the Commnunist Party
undertook cardinal steps for further strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces
and outfitting them with the most up-to-date combat equipment, including
nuclear missile weapnns. As a retaliatory measure and in order to unify
forces for stopping possible aggression on the part of states of the aggres-
sive I~ATO bloc, the socialist countries of Europe formed a defensive military-
political alliance which went doran in history under the name of the Warsaw
Pact.
Documents ~f the postwar period published in this collection characterize the
work of the Communist Party and its Central Committee to manage the Soviet
Armed Forces in the difficult international situation and under conditions of
- scientific-technical revolution and fundamental transformations in military
affairs. The doctmments formulate tasks of indoctrinating personnel in a
spiriC of uttLr dedication to the cause of communism, in a spirit of Soviet
patriotism and soc ialist internationalism, allegiance to military dut.y and
constant readiness to defend the socialist homeland. The resolutiox~a of party
congresses, Central Committee decrees and addresses on military matters, and
speeches by CPSU CC General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet
Presidium, Chairman of the USSR Defense Council, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev out-
line paths of further development and strengthening of combat mig:* and
increasing tlie combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.
Documents published in the collection indicate that the party and its Central
Committee are keeping a constant focus on questions of military organizational
development and improvement of the USSR Armed Forces. The concern of the CPSU
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, and Soviet state fox strengthening national defense is reflected in the USSR
! Constitution, where it states: "Defense of the socialist homeland is among the
~ most important state functions and is a matter of all the people...
"It is the duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people to defend the socialist
! homeland reliably and to be in constant combat readiness guaranteeing an
~ immediate rebuff to any aggressor."
~ Our country strode far forward in the postwar time. Successes achieved in
; economic development and the outstanding victories of Soviet scientific-
~ technical thinking permitted a fundamental change in the Army and Navy's tech-
~ nical outfitting as well. First-rate combat equipment and weapons were
created by the hands of Soviet scienttists,~ designers and workers.
The appearance, development and improvement of nuclear missile we3pons and the
outfitting of our Armed Forces with missiles of varioua classes and other new
means of warfare led to a sharp increase in their combat might and had a deci-
sive effect on the forms and methods of conducting military operations.
In December 1959 the CPSU CC and Soviet government adopted a resolution on
, creating a new branch of the Armed Forces--the Strategic Missile Forces. This
was a fundamentally new step ensuring a further increase in the USSR's defen-
sive might and in the security of fraternal countrie~ of the socialist
community. The party condu~ted a fundamental reorganization of all branches
of the Armed Forces and combat arms. Their arms, combat equipment, organiza-
tional structure, and methods of training and controlling the troops were
placed in conformity with the demands of conducting military actions in modern
warf are .
Together with the technical outfitting of the Army and Navy and assurance of
the harmonious development of all branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms,
the Communist Party and Soviet govern~ent give unremitting attention to the
training and indoctrination of military cadres. A special place in resolving
the complex tasks of troop management is given to military councils, which
have the rights of examining and resolving all the most important issues in
the life and activities of the Army and Navy and which bear responsibility to
the CPSU CC and Soviet government for the status and combat readiness of the
troops.
The transformations in military affairs place higher demands on our Armed
Forces personnel. In exercising its management of the Armed Forces, the
Communist Party and its Central Committee consistently strengthen one-man
command and at the same time elevate in every way the role and influence of
political entities and party organizations. The CPSU demands that co~and-
ers, political workers, and all Army and Navy party members steadfastly
improve the combat schooling of unit and ship personnel and indoctrinate
Soviet military personnel in a spirit of high ideological conviction, effi-
ciency, unremitting vigilance and constant combat readiness.
The party teaches that the importance of moral-political and psychological
training of tl~e troops rises sharply in modern warfare, especially with the
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use of nuclear missile weaponry. In order to endure in combat and win victory
over a strong enemy, Soviet military personnel not only have to master weapons
and sophisticated combat equipment, bUt also be ideologically convinced and
possess high volitional qualities and the ability to overcome all hardshipa of
modern combat physically and psychologically.
The need to strengthen the ideological-political indoctrination of Soviet
military personnel under present-day conditions als~ is determined by the
sharp aggravation of ideological opposit ion between socialism and capitalism.
The development of countries of the socialist com~unity, the growth in their
might and the strengthened beneficial effect of the international pol~cy they
conduct now make up the primary direction of mankind's social progress. The
attractive force of ideas of scientif ic socialism is growing steadily and more
and more millions of people on all continents are assimilating these ideas.
In an attempt to check this process, the forces of imperialism and reaction
intensify ideological struggle. Imperialist propaganda, with which the
propaganda of ~~i~ing hegemonists openly coordinates, continuously wages a
furious assault ot~ rhe minds of Soviet citizens and attempts, with the help of
the most refined methods and modern technical means, to poison their awareness
with slander of 5oviet reality, to blacken socialism, to embellish imperialism
and its predatory, inhuman politics and practices. Hired ideological subver-
sives make attempts to lisarm Soviet citizens and our military personnel
spiritually.
The Communist Party proceeds from the assumption that there can be no place
for neutralism and compromises in the struggle of the two ideologies. High
politfcal vigilance, vigorous, eff icient and persuasive propaganda work, the
expoe~.:re of hostile ideological subversive acts and a prompt rebuff to them
are needed here.
All ideological work in the Soviet Armed Forces is conducted on the basis of
resolutions of party congresses and CPSU CC plenums, Central Committee decrees
and instructions of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. The documents published in the
collection contain the CPSU's demands for a further strengthening of the
indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces, a comprehenaive improvement
in party-political work, and the development in Soviet soldiers of a scien-
tific outlook, high ideological conviction and irreconcilability toward the
class enemies.
Enormous successes have been achieved in recent years under the tested manage-
ment of the Leninist party in our country's social-economic development and in
the increase in the workers' welf are and t h e c u 1 t u r e and awareness of b road
masses of the people. A developed socialist society has been buitt in the
USSR by the selfless labor of Soviet citizens. The Soviet state's economic
and defense might has become stronger as a result and a further improvement of
the USSR Armed Forces is taking place.
In directing military organizational development the party always has pro-
ceeded and is proc~eding from the assumption that it is an inalienable part of
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statewide organizational development. This is why all characteristic features
inherent to our Armed Forces were developed further and were enriched with new
content in the stage of mature socialism.
~ The USSR Armed Forces now are the armed forces of a state of the whole people.
They act as a powerful tool for protecting the interests of the whole people
and assuring security of the socialist homeland. Soviet soldiers, true sons
of their people, are closely rallied about the Leninist Communist Party and
the Soviet government. They are distfnguished by a deep love for the people,
high political awareness and a sense of responsibility for their Motherland's
destiny. Brought up in a spirit of friendship of nations and proletarian
internationalism, Soviet Army and Navy personnel are steadi.ly strengthening
the combat cooperation with personnel in armies of fraternal countries of
socialism. The present generations of Soviet military personnel, like their
grandfathers and fathers, are ready and capable of acting at any time in
defense of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the cause of peace and
socialism. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev remarked in the CPSU CC Accountability
Report to the 26th party congress that "a firm alloy of high technical out-
fitting, military proficiency and indestructible morale--that is the combat
potential of the Soviet Armed Forces. Now it is the sons and grandsons of
Great Patriotic War heroes who stand in the ranks of the Motherland's defend-
ers. They did not go through the severe ordeals which fell to the lot of
their fathers and grandfathers, but they are true to the heroic traditions of
~ our Army and our people. And each time the interests of national security
and the defense of peace demands it, when it is necessary to asaist the
victims of aggression, the Soviet soldier stands before the world as a self-
less and courageous patriot and internationalist, ready to overcome all diffi-
culties."
The CPSU and Soviet state are steadily conducting a peaceloving Leninist
foreign policy. In the 1970's a normalization of the international situation
was achieved above all as a result of the many-sided, vigorous work of the
Soviet Union and socialist co~unity, with reliance on a growth of the~
economic and defense might of countries of socialism. Peaceful coexistence
among states with different social systems bec.ame established in the process
of detente and began to be filled with concrete economic and political con-
tent, and a clear abatement of the "cold war" was seen.
But at the borderline of the 1970's and 1980's the international situatfon
became seriously complicated through the fault of imperialist circles. The
aggressive nature of the politics of imperialism, and American imperialism
above all, rose sharply. Not wishing to reckon with the realities of the
modern world, the aggressive NATO circles headed by the United States set a
course for disrupting the military balance existing in the world in their own
favor and to the detriment of the Soviet Union and the socialist co~unity as
a whole, to the detriment of international detente and the security of nations.
Hence imperialism's line on strengthening the arms race, unleashing provoca-
tions against socialist and other independent states, the creation of centers
of tension, and NATO's militaristic activeness. Antisovietism and anti--
coIIUnunism have been turned into an instrument for whipping up the arms race;'
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into a tool of struggle not only against the i3SSR and other countries of the
socialist comnunity, and not only against.communists, but aiso against all
enemies of war and peaceloving forces; into a means of undermining detente.
~ A rapprochement of aggressive circles of the West, and the United States above
all, with the Chinese leadership is occurring on an antisoviet basis inimical
to the cause of peace. The partnership of imperialism and Beijing hegemonism
represents a new, dangerous phenomenon in world politics.
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is steadfastly continuing thz course
for preserving and developing international detente. At the same time the
CPSU believes that intrigues of imperialism and other enemies of peace demand
~onstant vigilance of Soviet citizens and comprehensive strengthening of o sr
state's defenses in order to disrupt imperialism's plans for attaining mili-
tary superiority'and exercising world diktat.
Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in the CPSU CC Accountability Report to the
26th party congress that "the party and state have not lost sight of questions
/of strengthening the country's defensive might and its Armed Forces/ for a
single day. The international situation obligates us to this."
Material included in the collection will help the reader understand even more
thoroughly that CPSU management is the primary source of the might and invin-
cibility of the Soviet Armed Forces and the be-all and end-all of Soviet mili-
tary organizational devel~pment.
Thanks to the CPSU's wiae Leninist policy in the area of military organiza-
tional development, the Soviet state of the whole people has powErful Armed
Forces which possess all necessary means,for performing their responsible mis-
sion of being a guardian over the Soviet ppople's peaceful labor and the bul-
wark of universal peace.
This collection of documents unquestionably will be a valuable aid for all
USSR Armed Forces personnel as well as for a wide range of readers studying
the CPSU's activities in military matters.
FOOTNOTES
1. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works],
XXXVII, 122.
2. Ibid., XXXVIII, 138.
3. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursam: rechi i stat'i" [With a Leninist
Course: Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1978, VI, 588.
4. Lenin, XXXI7~, 56.
5. Ibid., XLII, 143-144. .
SO
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~
~
~
~ Annotation
The collection contains documents drawn up by V. I. Lenin, resolutions of CPSL'
~ congresses and conferences, party CC plenums, CPSU CC decrees, directives,
letters and addresses, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speeches, and other documents
reflecting the many-sided work of the Communist Party in Soviet military
organizational development and in the creation, strengthening and constant
~ improvement of the USSR Armed Forces.
The book is intended for a wid2 range of military readers and everyone inter-
ested in the CPSU's military activities.
COPYRIGHT: Voyenizdat, 1981
6904
` CSO: 1801/262
i
51
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NAVAL FORCES
BOOK EXCERPTS: SOVIET SUBMARINES IN GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR
Moscow SOVETSKIYE PODVODNYYE LODKI V VELIKOY OTECHESTVENNOY VGYNE in Russian 1981
(signed to press 8 Sep 81) pp 191, 189-190, 3-8, 169-173
[Annotation, table of contents, foreword, and conclusion from book "Soviet Submarines
in t:1e Great Patriotic War" by L. A. Ye~:el'yanov, Voyennoye Izdatel'stvo, 39,000
copies, 191 pages]
LExcerpts] Annotation
The book tells about methods of combat employment of the Navy's submarines during the
Great Patriotic War and presents a great number of the most typical examples of how
our submarines operated on sea lines of communication, during mine laying, in the
conduct of tactical reconnaissance, the navigation-hydrological support of assault
landings, and the accompliahment of other missions.
The book is intended for naval officers and officer candidates of higher naval edu-
cational institutions and is of interest for all those who are interested in the
Navy's combat past.
Page
Contents
Foreword 3 ~
Chapter 1. Soviet Submarine Forces of the Period of.the Great Patriotic War
Quantitative composition of submarine forces, classification, and basic
technical specifications of elements of submarines 9
Distribution of submarines among the fleets, organization of forces,
control of submarines 15
Methods of submarine combat employment ......................s............. 17
Chapter 2. Submarine Combat Operations on Enemy Sea Lines of Communication
Operations of submarines of the Northern Fleet 62
Operations of submarines of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet
Operations of submarines of the Black Sea Fleet 95
Operations of submarines of the Pacific Fleet 115
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Page
Chapter 3. Protection of Sea Lines of Communication, Reconnaissance,
Patrol Duty, and Otl:er Submarine I~:3ssions
i ~'rotection of sea lines of communication..., 119
Reconnaissance 126
Patrol Duty 132
tJavigation-hydrological support of combat operations 134
Transportation of people and cargoes by subnarine 137
Gunnery firing on shore installations 141
Chapter 4. Overcaming the Counteraction of Enemy Forces and Means of
Antisubmarine Defense by Submarines
Overcoming minef ields 144
Overcoming booms 149
Overcoming counteraction of antisubmarine warfare ships 151
Combating submarines 159
Forced crossing of antisubmarine barriera 161
Conclusion 169
Appendices: 1. Basic technical specifications of the Navy's submarines
of the period of the Great P2triotic War 174
2. Losses of the German merchant marine and navy and those
of its allies in the Great Patriotic War 178
3. ChronoloQ,y of events 179
_ Abbreviations Used 186
Bibliography 187
Foreword
Guided by the Lenin precepts on the reliable defense of the achievements of October,
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government.always attached
great significance to the creation of a strong and combat-effective submarine fleet
in the country. The six-year naval development program (1926-1932) which was ap-
proved in December 1926 envisioned the construction of 22 submarines. In addition
to this class of ships, the fleet was to receive 3 destroyers, 18 destroyer escorts,
5 hunter-killer ships, and 36 torpedo boats.
In the years of the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937), in foreseeing aggression
against our state and wide-scale combat operations at sea, the construction of 137
submarines was begun. Of surface ships, S cruiser~, 4 leaders, 46 destroyers, 6
destroyer escorts, and 27 minesweepers were layed down. During the prewar decade,
the shipbuilding industry transferred more than 200 submarines to the fleet. By the
start of World War II (1 September 1939), the Soviet Navy had occupied first place
among the world's naval fleets for number of submarines.
During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet submarines accomplished a
broad range of combat missions: they fought on enemy sea lines of communication,
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defended their own sea lines of communication,, layed mines, conducted reconnaissance,
r.ransported people and cargo, and accomplished navigation and hydrographic support.
of naval forces. Their operations nn enemy sea ~ines of communication we~e most
effective. Destroying enemy vessels travelling with reinforcements for the front
line and transports shipping strategic raw materi,als, submarines not only rend~red
assistance to our troops which were operating on the maritime flanks, but they also
inflicted direct damage on the war-economy potential of fascist Germany.
Submarine combat operations played a large role in the Far North where the waterways
had exceptional significance for supplying the German-fascist troops wfth ammunition,
~ warm clothing, and food. Already in.the third month of the war the fascist command
was forced to admit that the strikes of Soviet submarines on ~he coastal communica-
tions in the Arctic significantly hampered the implementation of plans to capture
Murmansk as early as 1941.
In the Baltic Sea, due to the activity of our submarines the enemy was forced to re-
duce water shipments significantly and to use the already loaded land roads to sup-
ply his troops at Leningrad. .
On the lines of communication of the Black Sea, the attacks of our submarines were
especially effective during the period when the occupiers were forced to evacuate
the Crimea.
Some of the strikes of the Soviet submarines on the lines of communication proved to
be especially telling for the enemy. In January 1945, submarine "S-13" of the Baltic
Fleet attacked and sank the liner ("~Iilhelm Gustlow") on board wh~ch were more than
7,000 soldiers, seamen, and officers including about 1,300 submariners. Three days
of mourning were declared in Germanq on this occasion. The convoy officer responsible
for the safety of the crossing was ahot, and the commander of "S-13," Captain 3d Rank
A. I. Marinesko, was placed on the list of personal enemies of the Third Reich.
In April 1945 the transport '~Goya" was sent to the bottom in the Baltic. The Hitler-
ites lost more than 5,000 soldiers, officers, and cadets as a result of the torpedo
strike launched by the Guards submarine "L-3" (commander Captain 3d Rank V. K.
Konovalov).
Exceptional significance, measured first of all by the material loas in~licted on the
enemy, was had by the minefield barrier operations of the submarines. They also
hindered the fascists in the deployment of combat ships, restricted the transports' ~
freedom of movenent, and attracted a considerable quantity of mine-sweeping and
other supporting forces. The mines were placed in places most vulnerable for the
enemy: at exits from bases, in narrows, and at conmaunication hubs. For number of
mines placed in active mine barriers (that is, in enemy waters), the eubmarines
occupied first place among all naval forces.
Submarine operations proved to be effective in the defense of their own sea lines of
communication. They played an exceptional role in the North where external water-
ways had a s�trategic character.~ At that time, the Soviet Navy could send out against
the enemy's big surface ships based in northern Norway only submarines and, partial-
ly, aviation. Deployed near the exits from the f3ords, the submarines were a factor
which restrained the activity of the German squadron in that region. It was namely
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here that the flag battleship "Tirpitz," which had moved out as part of the squadron
to intercept an Allied convoy, was attacked by submarine "K-21" (commander Captain
2d Rank N. A. Lunin). As a result, the squadron was forced to abandon accomplish-
ment of its mission.
Submarines achieved great successes in accomplishing naval reconnaissance missiona.
- Possessing the ability for. covert operations, they penetrated into areas defended by
the enemy where they observed his forces and means and reported important informa-
tion to the command. The landing of reconnaissance groups on the enemy-occupied
coast by submarines had substantial significance.
Submarines operated successfully when supplying besieged Sevastopol' with ammunition
and with navigation and hydrographic support of amphibious forces, especially during
the execution of the Kerch-Feodosiya amphibious operation~in December 1941.
, Submarines were the most universal forces in the fleet as regards the variety of the
missions accomplished.
Soviet submarines had to accomplish combat missions under the most difficult condi-
tions--in constricted and shallow areas and in the presence of serious mine danger
and a strongly developed enemy antisubmarine defense. Not one foreign fleet which
participated in World War II experienced such difficulties. Submarines of Germany,
the United States, and Japan operated primarily in the oceans, outside a developed
enemy antisubmarine defense. The opposition which wa~ exerted against them, which
proceeded primarily from ships for the close-in protection of convoys, remained not
very effective for a long time.
In the Barents Sea, the sailing of our submarines was complicated by the long period~
of the polar day and night, the fact that the enemy had skerried channels which were
difficult for submarines to reach, frequent fogs, intermittant snowfalls, and strong
tidal currents.
In the Black Sea, where communications passed close to the shores, submarines were
forced to maneuver in areas with depths not exceeding 15-20 meters. When a sub-
marine moved in the submerged position, a trace from the silt which was raised by the
propellers,which was long and easily noticeable from a ship and airplane,often trail-
ed behind it.
The most difficult conditions developed in the Baltic. Here, in order to emerge in
the open sea our submarines had to cross the narrow and shallow Gulf of Finland
which was densely crammed with enemy mines and nets.
Conditions for the combat operations of Soviet submarines became even more difficult
in the course of the war. The loss of bases in the Baltic, in the northwest and on
the Crimean coast of the Black Sea, and the blockade of Leningrad hindered the de-
ployment of submarines and worsened conditions for their basing and repair.
Despite all this, our submariners operated actively, decisively, and boldly. They
persistently looked for and sank enemy ships at sea. Their combat skill was
strengthened and improved in difficult battles. Tactics were developed and new,
more effective methods for the combat employment of submarines were employed.
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The position method was practiced initially, and then they began to employ cruising
in limited areas. In the course of the war, submarines changed over to group actions.
Instances of coordination with aviation, especially reconnaissance aviation, occurred
considerably more often.
- Methods for the combat employment of submarine weapons, primarily torpedoes, develop-
ed and improved. From firing single torpedoes, the submariners changed ouer to ffr-
ing several torpedoes at time intervals, and subsequently, to firing a salvo with a
"spread." The employment of more modern methods of torpedo firing increased the ef-
fectiveness of submarine operations.
When they did not have the opportunity to employ torpedoes, the submarines often
surfaced and entered into a gunnery battle with enemy ships.
Even bourgeois military historians were forced to acknowledge the high comh?t skill
of the Soviet submariners which was displayed in the years of the Great Yatriotic
War. For example, a former admiral of the Hitlerite fleet, (Yu. Rower), writes:
"The strength of the Russian submariner consists of his readiness for self-
sacrifice.... The Soviet submariners have no short~ge of combat readiness and
steadfastness or...the necessary navigational and tactical abilities."*
Typiral of the Soviet submariners was the striving to accomplish the combat mission
come what may. Even at the most difficult muanents, none of the submarine crews lost
the presence of courage, panicked, or permitted thoughts of abandoning the accomp-
lishment of the combat miss~on or voluntary surrender to the fascists.
Much was told in our press about the military labor of submarine commanders and crews
during the years of the struggle with fascism. Remarkable books by famous submarin-
ers have been publish~d--by Heroes of the Soviet Union Ya. K. Iosselian', I. A.
Kolyshkin, V. G. Starikov, I. V. Travkin, I. I. Fieanovich, $nd G. I. Shchedrin,
submarine officers P. D. Grishchenko, I. S. Kabo, V. Ye. Korzh, M. K. Chuprikov, and
0. G. Chemesov, and other authors. Prominant naval commanders Admirals N. G.
Kuznetsov, A. G. Golovko, Yu. A. Panteleyev, and V. F. Tributs devoted many pages to
the submariners in their memoirs.
This book will acquaint the reader with tb:~. nature and conditions of the combat opera-
tions of our submarine forcea in 1941-1945, with their quantitative and qualitative
composition, and with examples of the accomplishment of varfous combat missions by
submarine commanders. The book does not claim completeneas in illuminating these
questions; it should be considered only as the next step in the study and generaliza-
tion of the experience of combat activity of Soviet submariners during the Great
Patriotic War.
Conclusion
In the years of the Great Patriotic War Soviet submarines accomplished a broad range
of combat missions. Possessing great cruising capacity they went out to the enemy's
*
(Ro~,,r?r, Y~). "Operations of Soviet Submarines in the Baltic in 1939-1945.
Translated from the German. Central Naval Library (TsVMB) No ~S, 1958, pp 21, 23~
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sea lines of communication and, without giving themselves away, they~attacked enemy
vessels. In the Barents, Baltic, and Black Seas the submarines destroyed more than
300 transports with a total tonnage of more than 1 million gross registered tons
~ and about ~00 combat ships with torpedoes and mines.
~ Submarines played an important role in the accomplishment of such missions as the
defense of their sea lines of communications and naval bases, reconnaissance, per-
' forming patrol duty, delivery of ammcnition and food to besieged Sevastopol', and
navigation and hydrographic support of amphibious operations.
The active operations of the subma rlnes forced the Hitlerite command to divert con-
siderable forces and means from the accomplishment of other missions, in particular
from rendering assistance to their ground forces on the maritime directions, which
reduced the combat capabilities of the fascist fleet as a whole.
The Great Patriotic War was not only a serious and comprehensive test of the combat
qualities of the Soviet submariners, but also an important stage in the development
of the tactics for employing submarine forces. At the start of the war, primarily
the position method for employing submarines was practiced; later, the Soviet naval
command began to plan cruising in limited areas and the redeployment of the subma-
rines using the method of maneuvering positions. At the end of the war, the group
employment of submarines in screens became widespread in the Northern Fleet.
The submarines changed from the independent accomplishment of missions to coordina-
tion with other fleet forces. Beginning with 1943, naval operations began to be
conducted with the active participation af submarine forces. Submarines coordinated
most closely with reconnaissance aviation which, thro~gh shore-based command posts,
provided them with data on enemy ships and vessels at sea. Subsequently, when
extendable antennas appeared on the submarines, it became possible to receive infor-
mation directly from the airplanes.
Attempts were undertaken to organize the operations of several submarines in a tac-
tical group; however, due to the imperfection of ineans for hydroacoustical ~ommuni-
cation, this proved to be impracticable.
The main weapon of submarine forces were the torpedoes. During the war, submarines
accomplished 679 torpedo attacks and expended 1550 torpedoes. On the average, four
or five torpedoes were expended �or each sunken ship. At the beginning of the war,
the aimed method of firing torpedoes was widespread in the fleets, but already by
the end of 1941 the :'oviet submariners had changed over to salvo firing with several
torpedoes at time intervals. The method of firing with a"spread" began to be prac-
tised from the second half of 1943. By this time, proximity fuses began to be in=
stalled on the torpedoes.
At t?~e start of the war, torpedo attacks were accomplished under conditions of a
relatively weak antisubmarine defense, which permitted closing with the target and
launching torpedoes at short distances. Subsequently, when the system for the pro-
tection of transports became considerably stronger, the submarines were forced to
fire from great distances, through the escort screening line. The number of night
attacks increased significantly in the course of the war. The best trained c~m-
manders of submarines were the first to accomplish torpedo attacks using sonar data.
This progressive method later became widespread in the Northern Fleet, especially
at the end of the war.
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The working out of new methods of torpedo firing, the installation of more improved
instruments and, of course, the growth in the combat skill of submarine commanders
ensured an increase in the success of torpedo firing from 30 percent at the start of
the War to 70 percent by its conclusion.
The submarines had recourse to guns primarily when attacking single transports when
the employment of torpedoes was impossible for some reasons. In some cases, the
submarines entered into a gunnery battle with antisubmarine warfare ships, but only
for purposes of self-defense in order to break away from enemy pursuit.
Despite their relatively small scale, mine barrier operations of submarines greatly
hindered the navigation and combat activity of the German-fzscist fleet. During the
war, submarines accomplished 90 mine-laying operations. There T.~ere 1,749 mines
layed on which more than 50 enemy transports were blown ug. The greatest effect was
provided by laying mines in nests. They hindered sweeping and made considerable
water areas dangerous for ships.
The organizational structure of submarine forces did not undergo any substantial
~hanges in the course of the war. Brigades formed of several divisions completely
justified themselves. At the same time, war experience showed that the control of
submarines needed centralization. For this, on the Black Sea as well as on the
Baltic several brigades were merged into one under a single command.
Fleet commanders assigned missions to submarine commanders and determined the areas
and times for combat operations. In individual periods, they personally controlled
submarine operations at sea. Such moments were typical of the Northern Fleet at the
start of the war and of the remaining fleets during the preparation and conduct of
sea operations. ~
Force staffs controlled the combat operations of submarines skillfully at all atages
of the war.
Division commanders were occupied with the preparation of submarines for combat opera-
tions. All division commanders were participants in many combat cruises and taught
subordinates the skill of fighting based on personal experience. As the closest
teachers, they played a large role in molding lofty moral and combat qualities in
young commanders.
Great significance for the success of submarine operations was had by all types of
support, primarily the timely transmission of reconnaissance data on the coordinates
and elements of the movement of enemy convoys (transports) and on their defensive
system to the submarines. Information on the condition of anti~ubmarine defense,
the intensity and disposition of minefields, and the routas of advanced cruiser
lines and antisubmarine warfare airplanes meant much. The main role in reconnaissance
of enemy lines of communication was played by naval aviation. Electronic reconnais-
sance equipment was widely used in the Northern Fleet and useful info~rmation was
delivered by reconnaissance groups landed in the enemy rear.
One cannot imagine the combat activity of submarines without maintenance support.
Thanks to the selfless labor of the workers of the maintenance enterprises and bases,
- the submarines eliminated damage received on combat cruises in the shortest times and
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~ returned to action. The workers c+f ~che ship-building industry gave.the Navy 52 new
submarines in the course of the war. To build up force~ on the most important sec-
- tors, submarine units were transferred from one fleet to another. The Pacific Fleet
performed the r.ole o� a unique subm3rine reserve for the Northern and Black Sea
j Fleets.
The combat successes of the Soviet submarines in the Great Patriotic War were deter-
mined to a great extent by the fact that ~heir personnel, brought up by the Comanuniat
Party in a spirit of devotion to the socialist motherland and hatred for fascism,
strived to inflict maximum damage on the enemy and to accomplish their assigned mis-
sions with honor. Under unusually difficult and complex conditions of combat cruises
and, at times, in very dangerous and critical situations, the seamen displayed high
military skill, inflexible steadfastness, and an unben~ing will for victory.
The Communist Party and the Soviet government evaluated highly the services of the
submariners to the motherland. During the Great Patriotic War, about 6,000 subma-
riners were awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union for bravery and heroism,
and 20 of them were awarded the lofty title of Her~ of the Soviet Union. Four sub-
marines which distinguished themselves the most received ~Lhe honored title of Guards
Red Banner, 12 became Guards, and 23 were awarded Orders of the Red Banner. High
awards were also conferred on submarine forces: a brigade of submarines of the
Northern Fleet was awarded Orders of the Red Banner and Ushakov lst class, a brigade
of submarines of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet--the Order of the Red Banne*, the lst
Submarine Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet--the Order of the Red Banner, and the 2d
Brigade--the Order of Ushakov, lst Class.
In the postwar yearE, thanks to the tremendous successes in the development of the
economy, science, and technology, and as a result of the heroic labor of the Soviet
people, revolutionary transformations were accomplished in our country in all fields
of military affairs. The Soviet Navy was transformed beyond recognition and made a
sharp qualitative leap in its developmeat. It became a genuinely ocean-going
and nuclear missile navy which meets all the requirements of modern war. Nuclear
submarines and rocket-carrying naval aviation began to comprise the main strike
force of the Navy.
In their combat capabilities, contemporary nuclear submarines can in no way be com-
pared with aubmarines of the period of the Great Patriotic War. Armed with mis-
siles, homing torpedoes, and various electronic equipment and possessing virtually
unlimited cruising range, these underwater ships are capable of inflicting destruc-
= tive strikes against shorc tnstallations on the aggressor's territory from any
region of the world oce