JPRS ID: 10683 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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_ JPRS L/ 10683
23 July 1982 ,

.
Wes~ Eur~ e Re ort
. ~ p .
CFOUO 45/82)
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. JpRS L/10683
23 ~uly 1982
I~'~ST EUROPE REPORT
cFOt7o ~ ~5/sa)
~ CONTENTS
ECON(~IIC
FR.ANCE
Aerospatiable President Announces Profit~ Rsduced Debt for
1981
(AIR ET COSMOS~ 8, 22 May 82) 1
Inveatment~ Renovation Help
Helicopter Salea
ITALY
~ Intervi.ew With CalLts I~ama on Confindustria Policy 4
(Luciano Lama Interview; PANORAMA, 24 May 82)
SPAIN
Labor Agreement Fails Becaus4 of Worsenin8 Economy 10
(CAt~IDIO 16, ].!t Jun 82)
POLITICAL
FR,ANCE
Former Prime Minister Sees Deterioration in Ties With Africa
_ (Pierre Messmer Interv3.e~w; LE POINT, 21t May 82) 15
Meaning of Socialist Radicalization ~ned
(CC'~IENTAIRE, Sum 82) 18
Position of Conservative Cluba, UDF, RPR ~ned
(Colet~e Ysmal; PROkTE'~~ May 82) ~5
- a - [III - WE - 150.FOU0]
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1
FOR OF'F7CIAL fUSE ONI.Y
ITALY ~
Intervie~+ With Nepolitano on P3I, PCI Rslations 35
(aiorgio Napolitano Intervie~r; PlNORAMA~ 24 Mey 82)����
public ppinion Survey ori PCI, II3SR Poleanics '
(PANO~tAMA, 21~ May 82) 40
MIISTARY
FRANCE
Air Baeee Conduct ltegular Wsr Sceria,rio Lxercisea ~
(ARMELs i `AUJO~UR',:'~IUI~ May 82 ) 43
~e Defense Teated, by Jacquea Boichot
Pilots~ Rsaction Time Tested, by Theodore Mahlberg
Firing I~~cercises Conducted, by Roger Mathieu
� .
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DCONOI~'iIC FRANCE
AEROSPATIALE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCES PROFIT~ REDUCID DEBT FOR 1981
Investment~ Renovation Help
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 8 May 82 p 9
[Article by J.M.: "Satisfactory Situation at AEROSPATIALE"; passages enclo-
sed in slantlines, printed in boldface]
[Text] On 28 April, the president of AEkOSPATIALE [National Industrial Aero-
space Company]~ Mr Jacques Mitterrand~ as the guest of the Association of Pro-
fessional Aeronautics and Space Journallsts, gave an overview of the activi-
ties of his company. In our last issue we provided our readers~ as stop-press
news~ with a few significant figures taken from that lecture~ which, however~
deserves to be reported at much greater length today.
~The results~~ before taxes, of the 1981 ~.ccounting period are largely poai-
tive, and the saane will very likely be true for 1982. This satisfactory re-
port is in keep~ng Frith a perspective of recavery which was atarted as of 1978.
In 1977~ the losses reached a level of ~47 million francs~ or less than 10
percent of the turnover (approximately 10 billion francs). In 1979~ the ba-
lance had been restored with 8 million francs~in positive results for an
11 billion f~anc turnover. ~ .
In 1980, AEROSPATIALE registered a 119 million ~a~ ,c profit for a 13.~169 b~-
lion franc turnoveri in 1981~ the latter reached app~oximately 16.5 billion
francs for the company, and~ 17:5 billion~ ~`rancs fo~''the ~oup, ~Frith 'the re-
sults being between three and four times those for the 1980 accounting pe-
riod...~
~~The trade situation was good in 1981i it.presents itself as satisfactory '
for 1982. The business~ having gotten ricl of its ma3or clinkers, is of high
uallty." Other positive elements: an already very advanced and vt,,~� clear
~renovation~ of the enterprise as a whole~ and specifically of its ~industrial
plant/= the ~investment~ policy has recov~sred very activelys million
francs in i977~ 238 ~llion francs in i978~ ~'93 ~lion francs in 1979~
million francs in 1980 ~d ~9~5 ~lion francs in 1981~. Ttie fi.gures reporhed
in the 1982 budget amount to app~oximately ~1,200 million francs~; 40 to
45 percent of these investments were made in the "Airplanes"Divisinn~ in con-
nection with the development of the Airbus program: in spite of the launching
of the ~ATR-42~ program in cooperation with Aeritalia~ ~the primary task of
the Airplanea Division is to condurt the Airbus prograan~.
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~The indebtedness~ has been si~i.ficantly reduced. In 19?7~ it was 4.411
billion francs: in 1978~ it had been reduced to 3.663 billion ~~~$~the end
1979 ~ 3� 294 billicn fra,ucs~ in 19~0 to 2.236 billian francs and /by
of 1981 to 677 million francs~. But President Mitterrand believes that this
level of indebtedness is almost aufficient and that in all likelihood it will
be greater in the coming years���
This situation is due to significaat dpwn payn?ents being made on certain con-
tracts, to the relative reduction of eapenditures, to the austerity of the ma-
~~;T ,~agement, and of course to the results of the buainess activ~.ties.
However, there axe various w~orrisome elements: the need to renew the range
of products, the marginality of the French domestic mexket~ hence the need
for sigr~ificant ~exports~~ limited however by the serious crisis experienced
by the aixline companies, the sluggishness of European cooperation~ the atag-
nation of some markets~ tne growing effort bein a~e.de ir~ t,rms of self-finaxi-
cing _for study and future program development ~in the face of a~owing bud-
getary austerity), the evolution of currencies, and the lack of control of
inflation. The increase in the value of the 3ollar xas rathat favorahle~ but
it is difficult to conta~n French inflation~ and President Mitterrand i~ afraid
that serious problems may arise, which are tied to the e~�oluti~n of currency
exchange values and of the lack of control of inflation.
/In the social area~~ a.n increase in contributions is to be noted~ xhich
threatens to become even greater. The measures of solidarity which have been
taken i+ill entail 220 to 230 million francs in supplementa.ry xages and social
contributions~ or 3.5 percant of the ag~egate remunsretion of employees (5
to 6 percent over a full year).
Prior to the si~?ing of the ~soliciarity contract~ ~rith Mr Aurouxr as 3~00~
individuals seemed theoretics~.lly interested~ they xere counting on t~500 de-
partures~ but there were 2,5~1~7 candidate~...
Jn 31 Decenrber~ the personnel atrength was 35~390 individuals (parent company)~
as against a goal of 35~396� In 1982~ natural attrition should produce ap-
proxima.tely 500 departuresi the reduction of wor hours by 1 hour per week
and the fifth week of vacatior_ represent~ in order~to restore~ the poten-
tia1~ the hiring of about 41W individuals. Taking into account the ~increa-
se/ in potential which is being considered~ that is 570 ~na~v~duals~ and the
effect of the solidarity contract~ the 1982 hiring perspectives ultimately
involve 3~390 individuals~ or more than 10 percent of the cux~rent personnel
strength. But experience shows that ~it is difficult to fir~3 the necessary
personnel/~ eapecially in the skilled and higtil.y skilled categories~ including
engineers. Competition with the other indu~trialists is intense...
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Helicopter Sa,les
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 22 Ma.y 82 p 15
LArticle by J.M.s "AEROSPATIALE: More than 7~000 Helicopters Sold"]
[Text] On 30 June~ AEROSPATIALE announced the following balance sheet for its
helicopter sa~es:
- AS.332 "Super Pwna"s 1411, units sold in 14 count~ies (of which 59 for the
1981 accounting period)=
- SA.365 "Dauphin II": 4~07 units sold in 26 countries (of which 125 in 1981);
- AS.35o ~~Ecureuil/ASta,r": 945 units sold in 21 countries (of which 207 in
i98i);
- AS�355 "~~euil II~Twin 5tar": 461 units sold in 21 countries (of which
210 in 1981~i
- SA.340/341/3~?~2 "Gazelle": 1~060 units sold in 36 countries (of which 123
SA.342 in 1981)i
-~A�315 "Lama"= 369 units sold in 29 countriea=
- SA.316/319 "Alouette III"s 1~439 un~ts sold in 74 countries (of which 15
' in 1981); '
- SA.321 "Super Frelon": 99 units sold in 8 countries.
Or a total of 4,924 helicoptersi by addin8 the 680 "Puma" which have been
delivered~ the 1,305 Alouette III~ and the 159 SA�1221 "D31nn~" one arrives
at a~�and total ~f 7,000 units sold in some.100 countries.
The most remarkahlQ points in these statiatics are obviously related to the
significant development in the sales of the three new eneration helicopterss
Super-Puma~ Dauphin II~ and the famil.y of the Ecureuil~AStari the latter,
with 1,406 units sold~ has already ex~eeded the Alouette II ~ and is coming
within a hair's b~eadth of the Alouette III. There is a reasonable cha,nce
tha,t, as of this year~ AF~itOSPATIALE will g~o bey~ond the mark of the 1000 AS.35o
and of tha.t of the 500 AS.355~
Let us recall that in 1981, AEROSPATIALE sold 769 new helicopters as a~gainst
639 in 1980, 511 in 1979~ 363 ~ 1978 ~d 343 in 1977� As of the middle of
i983~ +.he duction rate will reach 75 to 80 helicopters per month~ of which
50 AS.35o AS.355~ 16 Dauphin II and 6 Super-Puma.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982
8463 .
cso: 3100/707
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ECONOMIC ITALY
INTERVIEW WITH CGIL~S LAMA ON CONFINDUSTRIA POLICY~
Milan PANORAMA in Italian 24 May 82 pp 214-21~
[Interview with Luciano Lama, aecrets~ry of the Italian General
Confederation of Labor (CGIL)t by Maesimo Riva; "And on the
contracts, let there be war!"]
[Tex~] "There~s maneuvering going on in Confindustria,
and it~s aimed at cut,ting the workers~ real
wages," the CGIL secretary chargea. The union
will agree to the 16-percent cap, he says, but
~s for sny diacussion of changea in the COt in-
dex, the answer is a flat "No" until inflation
has been brought down to t~lerable levels.
If Confindustria wante war in the upcoming contract negotiations,
. i+~ will g~t it. In responae to the trumpete Vittorio Merloni
sounded at Confindustria~s assembly on Tueaday 11 May, Luciano
Lama saunds the no leas warlike tocsin in his union~a stronghold.
The quarrel would seem to be over the pre-nagotiation demands
laid dc~wn by induetry: first we reach an agreement on labor costs,
then we atart talking renewal of labor contraats, which expired
several month~ ago. The real stakes in these preliminary bouta,
though, are a lot higher than that. In the interview granted
PANORAMA~ Lama warns that the core isaue is the queation of the
workers~ real wagea~r Confinduetsia is out to slash them, and the
union is equally determined to protect them.
Even so, the leader of Italyta biggest labor organization admits
that another heavy risk hanga over the contract negot3ations:
that battle could chan~e to political war between political par-
ties and speaial-inter~est groupa that could divide both the na-
tion and the political majority that keeps Spadoli.nits government
in office. Lama openly accuses Confindustria of seeking to heat
up t~e labor-management conflict to a point where it could bring
down the goWernment and precipitate a general crisis in the sys-
tem. ~
Labor is ready to agree to a 16-percent cap on inflation in 1982,
but �Xill reject any attempt to cut the real purchasing power of
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Lhc pay envelope. Therefore, Lama waras, any chance of labor~s
conscnting to review the cost-of-liviag index will be poatponed
until such time as inflation hae been brought down to acceptable
levels. In any case, any audit of the costs of labor's demands
must be conducted as par-t of contract negotiations: In LamaTs
view, there is no ~ther bargaining table.
Merloni says he is firmly determined aot to agree to contract
n~gotia~ions~ while Lama states his _own determination to insi~t
on them. As the openin~ shots in th~.s contra~t war were fired,
the co7nflict seemed wholly impatient of inediation: one or other
of the combatanta must lose. Luciano Lama~ s public statements .
But
reflect hia boundless assurance that he is d'n the right.
will that suffice to give him victory in the end? Herbe the~~w~
is what he is doing to prepare for what will probably
bitterest and lengthiest labor battle in this postwar period.
Queation: ~onfindustria is standing pat, and Merloni said it
no contract ne-
again, to loud applause, at its latest assembly:
gotiations without prior agreement on labor costs and the COLA.
What is Luciano Lama's responae to this prior condition?
Answer : That nobody has ever got v~ry f ar by laying down prior
conditions, either on his own behalf or i.n the interests of others.
There i8 a tendency theee daya to portray Confindustria's etub-
bornness as a great act of heroism. You would think that Mer-
loni's words were the last word of the youngeat of the Horatii: ~
By ri~te, Confin3ustria ought to have the courage to saY etraiSi~t
out what is hidden aeh3.rAd thia sudden flight to pre-conditions.
Question: It seems to me, though, that industry has made it clear
what it wants: to avoid ahouldering the contract coat in addi-
tion to the costs it must pay as a result of suah automatic ad-
justment mechanisms as the COLA. Isn't thi~s, th~n, the real risk.?
Answer: And we shall check :tb make su~gn ~ouCo.nfindustriahwon~t
sit down at the negotiating table. Bu
do that. Therefore I interpret its refusal as proof that there
are some things hidden behind ita pre~conditions that have~nothing
- to do with money matters: aad I mean political maneuvering against
the government and again~st organized labor's role in the nation
and in its institutions. They want to bring about a clima~fecourae
would be propitious for a reactionary c~ange of course.
they are laboring under a delusion, but that won~t keep them from
tryin~.
Queation: It is, indeed, a rare occurrence for a ~president ~of
And
Confindustria to attack a government the way Merl.ani has~
yet, the burden of his chargea does not~~aaem to have been cut from
whole cloth. In June of 1981 Spadolini sponsored negotiations on
labor costs, which led absolutely nowhere. Is is so aurprising
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that, after so many months, Confindustria should declare its
disappointment'with such ".incunclusiveness?"
Mswer: And what do we do about Confindustria~s own "inconclu-
siveness"?In June 1981 there were two major commitments made:
first, that both sides would base their behavi~r on respect for
the assumption of a 16-percent rate of inflation in 1982; se-
cond, that the fight a~ai.nst inflation would not be waged by re-
sorting to policie~s conducive to recession. At this point, it
is we who are disappointed, not Confinduatria.
Question: What has organi~ed labor done or proposed over all
these months, though?
Answer: We~ve done a lot. For instance, we have tried to set up
talks with industry geople on the matter of labor mobility and
working hours, but they refused to talk. And again: w~ were
the ~irat to raise the issue of severance pay, which now has
Confindustria howling both against the referendusn and against the
law to avoid it. Here again: flat refusal. But how can this
be? In 1976 we reached an agreement, and now it is i.mpossible
to reach a new one: why? It~s clear, though: somebody wants a
~ head-on confrontation with organized labor, at all costs. .
Question: And yet Confindustria has put the ques~,ion of the COLA
on the table, and you have refuaed to discuss it...
Answer : Of course we have, and we shall go right on refusi.ng.
In the 3une 1981 agreemen~s there was the commitment to defend
the real purchasing power of wages. But then, by laying hands on
the COLA, they wanted to wriggle out of that commitment. So far
only one industry spokesman has said it out loud: real wages will
be cut. Probably what Mandelli says is what a lot of people in
Confindustria want, but won't say so. In that case, it is they,
not we, who are going back on the i981 agreements.
Question: Are we ever going to get labor's opinion, once and for
all, on thia blasted cost-of-living index? You cantt get very
f ar by laying down pre-cor~ditions, true : but you can ~ t get f ax
with taboos, either: right?
Answer: There are no taboos: the cost-of-living index will have ~
to be modified. It is simply that we don~t want any changes or
reforms until inflation rates come down...
Question: So we're right back where we started: but isn~t the
cost-of-living index one of the reasons for high inflation?
Answer: Who says so? I can see.countries that have no such ma-
chinery, and are sick with inflation just the same. I~=~m think-
ing of France and Great Britain, for exaniple.
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Question: The fact remains that our situation is full of flaws
and rife with negative conaequences. Let me give you one in-
stance: inflation has been dropping of recent months, but even
so the next trigger-point will~be around 12 points again. How
do you explain this c~ntradiction?.
Answer: Simply: contrary to what a lot of people have always ar-
gued, the index catches up with inflation, rather than running
ahead of it. In other words, it does not raise wages exorbi-
tantly. Furthermore, you have to remember that the trigger point
is still where it was 2 or 3 years ago. And we all know that
'1,300 lire in 1982 is not the same as 2,300 ~ire in 1979, ei~her
in corporate coats or in the workers~ pay.'envelopes.
Question: There are other drawbacks, too. Fnr example, the COL
index also reflects price increases due to increased taxe s. When
you do this, aren't you gutting Parliaunent's taxing power, and
aren't you, de facto, hampering the government's fre~dom to take
fiscal measures against inflation?
Answer : That' s t rue, but only on the surf ace. The index is one
of the defenses around wages, and then there are contracts, too.
.What you don~t get from one side, you try to get on the other.
That's.what is done in all countries that look at conaume~r pricea~
without distinguishing between the gross and the net after taxes.
Even in Sweden and in Germauzy
Queation: Actually, it seema.t o me ~hat in GermanY they have
~ signed contracts for 198'L with increases below the inflat ion rate...
Answer: Very true: in Germany, tne uniona have agreed to a cut
in w~rkers' real wages. Precisely what we are not ~repared to
accept in Italy. This is a fundamental point that must be made
clear to all part ies, beginning with the government and Confin-
dustria.
Quest~on: But then, in these conditions, how do you get out of
the stonewall-to-stonewall deadlock over the contract issue?
Answer: There is only one way out: get Confindustria to back
down on its pre-conditions, and go to the table on national con-
tract negotiations. This~muat be the place for lira-by-lira
verification of the claiined cost of labor's demands.
Question: In the June 1981 agreement there was a 16-percent lid
placed on inflation, to which labor contracts were also to be sub-
ject. Does labor intend to stand by that commitment?
Answer: Of course. We are perfect ly happy with the 16-percent.
Besides that, though, there must also be some allowance made for
the productivity increases that might be achieved: these, too,
must show uP~fi~hehcontractual~platform,~and3thatwiamwhereeweimust
the merita
talk about the overall cost~.
?
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Question: Are you planning to ask the ~overnment to step in to
~;et negotiations with industry started?
Answer: We~re not going to ask anybody for anything. We shall
push Confinduatria into negotiatiuns by means of union action, and
by showing the whole country the futility and the danger of pre-
conditions. As for the government, we expect it to be cons~istent
in its behavior....
y~ueP~ion: In other words, to presaure the state-owned companiea
- into breaking ranks with ~onfindustria and opening separate nego-
tiations?
Answer: As for publi~ employees' the government has dealt with
the unions without lay3ng down any pre-conditions. I see no rea-
son why the state-owned corporations ought to behave otherwise.
Question: Well, though, there is political disagreement on that
score right now among the parties and ~unong cabinet ministers.
From raany quarters, one gets the impression that the contract
issue is getting to be the central one in a lot of large-scale
political maneuvers, some of them aimed at Spadolini~s government. ,
How does organized labor view these moves?
Answer: I am very much concerned about them, indeed, because we
do not want to see this clash become politicized. The danger is
that a matter of labor's interests could be manipulated t,o foster
ends that have nothing to do with protecting the earnings of work-
ers. The fact is that Confindu~stria, first and foremost, doesn't
play around when it comes to politicizing, and that it is sniping
at us and at the government alike. This proves that its objective
is to turn the country around, politically, and thus to diminish
the clout and the voice of the social classes represented by or-
ganized ~.abor. This is the moat alarming aspect of their resort
to pre-conditions.
Question: There are people, even in Confind~~stria, who are hold-
ing out a hand to organized labor and usging both sides to put aside
traditional an4;agonisms. What is your answer to these people?
Answer: For the time being, I say to them that they should get
down to work at convincing Confindustria as a whole of the need
to sit down around the table and negdtiate. The only place to
test good intentions is in bargaining.
Question: What if the loser in this~~showdown turns out to be the
Spadolini government?
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Answer: That will be the final, incontrovertible evidence that
some forces are determined to twist this whole~process for po-
litical destabilization. Organized labor has no intereat in
sti.rring up confusion and disorder, and the worlcera will judge,
with all siue severi~ty, those who try to use the contract issue
for partisan political purposes.
- COPYRIGHT: 1982 Arnaldo Mondadori Edxtore S.p.A� A'Iilan
6182 ~
CsO: 3104/212
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ECONOMIC SPAIN
LABOR AGREEMENT FAILS BECAUSE OF WORSENING ECONOMY
Madrid CAI~IO 16 in Spanish 14 Jun 82 pp 66-68
[News commentary: "The ANE That Never Was"]
[Textj A year ago, during the afternoon of 9 Jene, a hietoric pact was
signed in Spain, the National Employmeat Agreement (ANE), which was touted
as the philosopher's atone for all the problems of the Spanish economy. The
strategy was simple: the workers would make a wage concession, with increases
between 9 and 11 percent, and the employers would make investments creating
350,000 new joba and reactivating tbe economy.
One year later, the mechanism has not worked. The workers have seen their
wages reduced within the agreed-upon range (the average wage increase has
been 10.29 percent); however, unemployment has continued to grow (279,000
more unemployment eince the ANE was signed and as of the beginaing of April)
and pricea continue out of control (a 5.2 percent increase in the first 4
months, even though the government's prognosticatioa was 12 percent for the
entire year). .
Doubtless this will force an [upward] revision of wages in September-Qctober,
when the rise in prices for the fi~st 6 months is known. As a guarantee
clause imposed by the unions, the ANE established the following proviso: if
prices rise more than 6.09 percent in tr~a f irst 6 months (they are expected
to increase between 6.5 and 7 percent) "an [upward] revision of wages will
be effected equivalent to the excess above the figure cited, with computation
of daubl~ this excess to allow for the behavior of the consumer price
index [CPI] for the entier 12-~month period."
Wage Revision
This increase will be effective retroactive to 1 January 1982, pursuant to
the ANE, indexed to the wages used as the reference point for this year's
increases. This [upward] revision could presage a"long hot summer," with
some employers who never had faith in the ANE being beset by a complex of
problems, with unions which have auffered a loss of wages and their own
inability to make a serious offaet of ~obs in e~cchange for the wage concession.
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"The ANE ia not the problem, as it was and is necessary. It ie iastead the
fact that the ANE was not accompanied by other remedies~ givea the delay in
international reactivation, the drop in consumption and economic activity
and the absence of pr ivate investment, CAMBIO 16 was told by a distinguished
As a matter of fact, the
PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party~�economist.
socialist executive committee has just described the economic situation as
"of great concern," and criticiem is mounting within the PSOE of those who
defended the wage reduction as the answer to all problems. "We have seen
that the bright idea of some UGT [GeneraY Union of Worlcers] leaders and a
PSOE economist, who said that two percentage points less in wages are equal
to 350,000 jobs, is somewhat unrealistic, except in a planned economy,"
added the ac+cialist expert, for whom "the ANE has not done the ~ob."
The employers signed the ANE under gavernmental preseure and a few months
after the fateful 23 February; however, they never agreed with its philosophy.
Now, Jose Antonio Segurado, the "hawk" of the employers' or~anization, the
CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Busineas Organizations], is stating it very
clearly: "We employers will not sign another ANE. We favor agreements
between social parties without government intervention." For experts of the
business sector, the principal problem of the Spanish economy on this first
birthday of the ANE is the public deficit. "The public deficit is
destroying the ANE. It is preventing materialization of the hoped-for
effect of the wage concessioa," an expert from the private banking sector
told this magazine.
The Woret, the Deficit
In his opinian, the deficit in the public sector is pushing up prices, is
forcing the Bank of Spain to adopt a policy of containment of available
credit ("the fact that interest rates have not come down in the last few
years is due principally to the deficit") and reinforcing the upward thrust
of the peseta's rate of exchange.
"This is serious because it encourages the purchase of foreign products
instead of national products, which means that we are exporting ~obs; and
that the deficit is destroying employment. Therefore, the PSOE has for the
first time attacked the public deficit because it knows that it ~s working
against employment," he added.
In fact, Joaquir.. Almunia, a member of the PSOE executive committee, has said
that Che increase in the public deficit is now 1 billion peseta3 and that
there is a lack of control and rigor on the part of the govercm.ent. "The
increase in this def icit will have negative repercuseions on all the country's
economic sectors," Almunia added.
For the employers and the political right, the def icit has become the
principal offensive weapon against the government's economic team.
Jose Antonio Segurado, v ice president of the CEOE, has accused the government
of "not having the political will to control public speading." There are
also indicatins that the sub~ect of the deficit is an offensiYe..weapon inside
the UCD [Democratic Center.Union] itself.
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"Anyone who says that the government does not have the political will to
reduce public spending, if he knowa what he is saying, is lying and, if
he does not know what he is saying, he is irresponsible. I call upon
whomever it may concern to go over the [budget] actions taken line item
by line item," Finance Minister Garcia Anoveros stated inclusivelq as he
presented the breakdown of the 1981 [as publishedJ Budget, which had a
bottom-line deficit of 618 billion pesetas, a figure which appears to have
been reached already.
Garcia Anoveros, with a stern look on his face after a television intervie~,
added that the government was all alone in the public deficit sector.
"There are many people complaining; however, requests for spending come
from all sidea. From the right, for example, the AP [Popular Alliance]
has presented an illegal family allowance proposal to Congress which would
entail the expenditure of 680 billion pesetas. And from the left~ even
though the f igure is smaller, there is also a request for more spending."
If, for many experts, the public deficit is the number one economic problem,
for most Spaniards unemployment ie the main worry. And there is a certain
amount of pessimism because, in spite of the wage concession, the number of
unemployed continues to rise. The most recent figures from the National
Statistics Institute (INE) speak of 2,062,600 unemployed at the end of
March, 74,000 more than at the beginning of the year. And 279,000 more
. unemployed than when the ANE was signed.
"We have to be careful with figures. It is true that unemployment continues
to rise; however, what is more important is that the employment situation
is improving. For the first time in the f irst 6 months of 1982, employment
has increased," CA1~I0 16 was told by a high official in the Ministry of
Economy. In fact, during the first 3 montha of the year, the work population
increased 0.29 percent.
Employment Improving
"This gives us cause for hope, as it confirms the trend of the last three
quarters, namely that the rate of ~ob losses is dropping. Althou~h this
has atill not halted the increase in unemployment, there is reason to hope
that the increase in employment will absorb the growth in the work population,"
the administration expert added.
At the beginning of 1981, the rate of the drop in employment wae 4 percent;
at the end of the year it had o~ily declined 2 percent; and in this first
quarter it has increased 0.29 percent, for the first time. The impression
is that the increase in unelnployment is no longer being produced by the loss
of ~obs (except in some specific realignments) but instead by an increase in
the work population, by those 150,000 young people entering the 3ob market
every year. But that increase in the work population cannot be stopped by
the ANE. which has to be givea credit for the riae in employment, according
to government sources.
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Even so, emplcymcnt will not be reactivated until the economy recovers. And
that dependa a great deal on the international economq~ which ie not improving
as expected. The forecasts made at th$ beginaing of the year by the OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] for its 24 countries,
a growth rate of 1.25 percent thie year, will not be met; aad now there is
an estimated growth rate of between 0.3 and 1 percent.
Spain also has revised its 3 percent downward, to 2.5 percent, which, for
businesa sector experts consulted by this magazine, "is a dream."
The very depressed international econamy affecte the level of ecoaomic
activity, but very fundamentally Spaniah prices. "We are paqing the
consequences of American policy which for a q~ar and a half has been
devaluating the peseta. Thus the factor of imported products, which are now
more c~stly, ia ma~king the CPI rise more than expected," this magazine was
told by sources at the Minietry of Ecoaomy.
For other experts, prices have riaen more than expected because of the
food factor (increases in agricultural pricea) and because of the devaluation
of the peseta, although it could be a factor in greater economic activity,"
given the way in which the market.operates in Spain. All the experts are
confident that if the dollar does not continue to rise, wages moderation
can begin to come into play and prices, at year's end, will not have increased
more thaa 13 percent.
There are indicators of economic activity to suit all tastes. One of the
experta points out that investment and economic activ3.tq are stagaated,
while othera say that they are begtnning to be reactivated. It all depends
upon what side these factors are viewed from. "The economy ie ia the proceas
of moderate expansion. Exports and public investment are picking up, while
private investment is not now negative a., in previous years," Ministry of
Economy sourcea maintain.
The most recent somewhat revealing percentage figure, for January (oh,
statietics!), speaks of a 3.3 percent drop in the industrial productioa
index. Not so, eay experta of the bueiness sector. "Be careful. The month
of January had one less work daq; therefore, in reality there was a 2 percent
increase," an administration expert points out. h",1at is more, the price8
of durable gooda are increasing at a rapid pace, which is interpreted as
indicative of a certain amouf~t of reactivation of private consumption.
Waiting for the Econod4ic Takeoff ,
The year 1982 was goi~lg to be the qear of "the worat is over," the begiaaing
of reactivation. flowever, the latest figures on unemployment and prices have
_ darkened the picture, at least at the public opinion level. "Everything seema
more negative because the government has givea the country very inflated
expectatians which are now turning against it, in a'boomerang' effect." The
economy ia going along more or less as predicted at tbe beginYl~fg of the
year. We knew that it was going to be a better qear than 1981, and it is;
however, we had no reasons to expect a rapid reactivation and we have not
had one," an expert close to the banking aector points out.
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The socialiste think that things are not going better because the goverament
is not taking the bull by the horns and does not have.an overall economic
policy. Joaquin Almunia has said, "The only way to oaercome the econcmfc
crisis is a policy ~f coordination."
Confronted by both positioas, the government continues to displtty moderate
optimism. "The economy is reactivating as had been predicted. Employment
is increasing; economic activity has picked up samewhat; and there are
improvements in exports and the foreign deficit. The only things not going
well, and we feel that these will be corrected during the qear, are inflation
and the public deficit, which must be controlled," CA1~I0 16 was told bq a
high off icial of the Miaistry of Economy.
COPYRI(~iT:. 1982, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
8143
CSO: 3110/164
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PULITICAL FRANCE
FORI~R PRII~ MINISTER SEES DETERIORATIQ[d IN TIBS WITH AFRICA
Paris LE POINT in French 24 May 82 p 88
~nterview with Pierre Messmer, former prime minister and Africaa affairs
specialist, by Mireille Duteil; date and place not given: "Doubt flas Arisea
Between Africa and France'r
(~`ex~ At a time when Fran~ois Mitterrand is mnlcing hia first official tour
in black Africa, Pierre Messmer, former governor of French West Africa and
specialist in African affairs at the RPR, coneiders thst French policy is
viewe~l with increasing disapproval in Africa.
~'ierre Messme~ At first, Francois Mitterrand's election was well received
in most African couatries. Withia 1 year, however, I see that this favorable
reaction has declined everywhere. In certain countries it has even been
replaced by an uafavorable attitude.
(~L POIN1~'' flow do you explain that? ~
(~nswe~ This change has several causes. ~tu: first has to do with the present
government's policy aad its ideology. ~Socialists have a third-~worldist policy
that is aimed at all underdeveloped countries, whatever they may be. The
recent reorganization of the Ministrq for Ca.operation illustrates thie. Sud-~
denly, Africans fear that the privileged relatioas they are used to haviag
might again be challenged. That is oae of the reasons for the doubt that has
arisen in Africa.
The second reason is more political. Socialiats aad communiets in power are
somewhat suapicious of regimea that for the most part have be~ea born of
military coups d'etat. Such governmente do not seem good to them. There is
no natural sympathq between them. Rather, I should have said there is a
natural antipathy between them. All that is discusaed and repeated in Africa,
and +the favorable attitude at the outset hae much diminished, the more so be-
cause there have been certain actioas.
~uestio~ What do you mEan?.
LKnswe~ There were efforts at destabilization. There is no doubt that, des-
pite goven~ment denials, the Patass~ affair in Oubaagui wa~ one of them. The
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Uubangui government boasts of having seized documenta coataining explicit
proof of it. At Libreville there is also a less aerioua matter but neverthe-
less of the same kind. I could cite ma~ce of them.
[~uestiun~ Should there not be a difference between PSF actione and those of
the g~vernment?
Q~nswe~ This distinction is easy for a European to uaderstand, but it is
unacceptable for an African, in whose eqes the PSF is above all the party of
the president of the Repub lic. Africaus wonder how the president could allow
his party to conduct a policy that is different fro~ his owa. For them~it
is either duplicity or lack of authority. In either case, it is not good.
[~uestio~" Can one deal, under the pretext of realiam, with goverc~ents that
trample on human rights?
~Anawe~ My reply is that tlhe government is doing it in Chad by furnishing
arms and munitiona that allow the Chadians to massacre each other.
(~'uestiog7 Let us discuas Chad. You cannot deny that the departure of the
Libyans is a positive development.
LAnswe~ Quite so. But that is only a first steg~.. The ob~ective is peace.
. I see that it has not been attained; on the contrary. I thiuk the policy to
follaw is not to intervene militarily, either directly or indirectlq. Cur-
rently, direct military intervention has ended. I had already criticized it
under Giscard. But, through the furniahing of arms, indirect military inter-
vention continues. Ia my opinion the French ought to coafine themselves to
humanitarian actions, acting through de facto suthorities wherever they exer-
cise their power. With Kamou~ue, in the south; with Goukouai, at Fort
Lamy; with Hissein Habr~, at Ab~ch~, for exa~mple. France does not have to
choose sides with the different Chadian groups now tearing themselvea apart
to seize pawer.
`Questio}~ Your solution amounts to legalizing an ethnic Chsd...
(~'nswe~ We tried in vain in the colonial period to eliminate it.
[~ueatio~]i But it was the Gaullists wha started things in Chad by supporting
Tombalaye...
~swg~ You are r~ght and it is because of that defeat that I stopped support-
, ing that policy. For the past 10 yeara I have constaatly proposed another one.
~uestio~ ~oday it is said that more democratic government-to-govemment
relations must replace the personal relations betweea chiefs of state. Is it
not time to clean up Franco~African relations? You cannot deny that in the
past Bokassa's eviction and Dacko's arrival in a French plaae deeplq shocked
African people. And yet Foccart left onlq good memories...
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Q~nswe~ Government-to-gov~ernment rilatians are no more democratic thr~a
personal ones. I do not believe that this ia necessari'ly a step fozward.
Critiziziag the personalization of political ties between France and Africa
betrays ignorance of African peychology. However, one must aever be a prisoaer
of these ties; de Gaulle aad...even Pompidou wera not; but VGE ~al~rq
Giscard d'Estain~ aad Fran~ois Mitterrand are, in a way, prisonera.
[~uesti~ Mitterrand?
Q~nswe~ I do not want.to~.tell qou haw, but I kaaw. And I have proof of it.
[~'uestiq~ In your opinion wbat are the greatest current dangers to Fraace's
Af rican policq?
~nswe~ The greatest current danger~ are the disinterest of the Socialist
govemment and the indifference of a large part of the French public opinion.
COPYRIGHT: LE POINT 1982
9772
CSO: 3100/730 .
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F~2ANCE
POLITICAL
MEpNING OF SOCIAI+IST RADICALIZATION F�XAMINID
Parie OOI~II~ITAIRE in French Sum 82 pp 276-280
~rticle result of a diacussion among persons of vaz'ious profeBeions and
political views who have adopted the peeudonym 'Xenocrate~
The word "radicalization" ie a quite recent neologism, for it appeari ul~.a~t
summer in the wake of the left'e instal].ation in po~wer. It rras pe~t't
ly linkcd to the June legielative elections, which gave the PS, ae we 1~oM?,
the "imposaible chamber;" eince with 269 seats the Socialists alone have aa
abeolute me~3ority in the Palias Bourbon. Thus the concapt of "rad~~alize~-
It proceeds
tion" doee not in iteelf have a concrete or preciae content.
at once from a reflex of fear by the different coaleervative and lii~rb longs
families, and from a politicians' tactic by RPR aad UDF.1ea~~
wiu break
to symbolic diecourse: the idea that the xhole state appe~ra
with pluraliem and drift tawarde ever more planified and bursaucratic pre~a-
tices, with the Socialist-Conaciuaist coalition heaceforth damin~atin6 0~'
~or institutions--the presidency, the National As~sembly~ the trade uaion
. groups. In a word~ "radicalization" would mean impoeition of state control
aad bureaucratization on the oouatry~ a"soft revolution" in the name of aa
ideology called socialiat. ~
After a year in power, it is no^w of interest to~asls~we heTeitthhas frn~i~ndca
ization" is more than a scare word or slogan,
foot-hold in our politica2. and administrative reality.
It is evident that auch a phenomenon can be seen in a thoueand ~YBlo ers'
pendi on whether one ie a member of the CNPF ~FrencY~ NationalOEmP tha
Council or a PCF militaat. We can nevartheless striqe to pinp
ob~ective i.ndice6 which c~raao~therchangee effectad`eincef10rMayc end ~
tion," aad ask this queat
toward rampant statiem? ,
The First Deciaions ~
Several decieions taken arid laws voted pursuant to the 110 Propoeals for
F~Ce_~alBO known as the Mitterrat~d program--contain nothi.ng in the nature
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of 5tatism. On the contrary~ we are eeeing a determination to disengage
the state: b~ departmental decentralization; by regionalization in a typi-
cally liberal form; by a special status for Corsica; by abrogation of such
exceptional procedures as r-eeort to the State Security Court, permanent
armed forces tribunals, or special aati-demonstrator lawa; by deregulation
of private associative activities, etc. Concerni.ng the broadenin.g of the
nationalized sector, we can legitimately ask what differentiates the mie-
sion of general administrators chosen by the government from that formerly
assigned to chaixmen co-opted by a"capitalist" board of directors. Indeed,
if it is conaidered in terros of the ixtjuactions addresaed to the 51 admitt-
- istrators appointed by their supervising ministries--Economy and Finance or
Industry--that mission is based on all the key words of triumphant liberal-
ism: competitiveness, eerrting'~~c~pac}ty, profit, strategy, efficiency.
The spirit of the reforms completed or in progress is not therefore synony-
mous with "radicalization," and it is moreover remarkable that those in pow-
er stress their desire to liberate society so as to return to each citizen
all his responsibilities. The PCF leaders are not alone in insisting heavi-
ly on that goal of liberalization.
Flzndamentally~ the first acts of the government in power have seldom flowed
from th~ logic of a coherent system. They have resulted either from cou~mit-
ments made by Francois Mitterrand~by chance~ in the tribulations of his long
march to the highest affice--ae is particularly the case with the national-
ization program--or from the interests and aspirations of a certain elector-
a1 constituency, as in the case the proclaimed determination to abolish
the free schools; or from a rather Keynesian analysis of the economic cri-
sis, which runs counter to that made in most WeBtern countries~ but which
in.itself is in no way "radicalizing."
Why then fear that the S ociali8t government is tightening the net of bureau-
cratic atatiem?
A Return to Dogmatism?
In truth, "radic~lization"--if it should occur in a country as d~veloped as
ours--will not emerge from a series of texts or reforms, but from a reintro-
duction of dogma, of ideology, into the practices of power. From a l~ow-
ledge born of experience, we would pass insidiously and slowly to one based
on doctrinaire certitudes--"socialist" i.n this instance. More fundamental-
ly, the gove::.~~ant~ to insure its legitimacy~ would start from the follow-
ing postulate: the French opted in May 1981 for a Socialist state~ very
specifically for Socialist bureaucracy~ a8 the caste best able to guaran-
tee the survival of technologic~l soc'ety.
Such a return to dogmatiam, which is never without regreasion or obscurant-
ism, would inevitably proceed through a rehabilitation of the "party" as
the instrument of i.nstigation, initiative~ and governmental action. The
'~pe~rty" would not only control but accompany the executive in management
of state affairs.
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Rereading Augustia Cochin ~
To underatand the progreesion of that influence, i~ is not without interest
to reread Augustin Cochin. Recently revealed to the public through a new
edition of his works and through the studies devoted to him by Francois
Flxret, Cochin is the great historian of i�evolutionary dynamics. It is in
the name of the na.tion, he explains, that philosophical societies apeak.
In pri.nciple~ then, democracy would be u~l.~mited. In the shadows, however,
inner circles prepai~e decisions; a emall mi.nority, with mastery of the me-
chanisms by which is expressed the "national will," animates a process
which intervenes to authenticate the democratic ideal to which it appeals.
This mechanism is not static; ia the course of succeseive siftings, it pro-
pels to the top a certain tyQe of man; from Mirabeau to Robespierre, from
the Constituent Asaembly to the Convention, it tende necessarily, and in-
dependently of the leaders, towards an i.ncreasing "radicalization." "In
deliberating political clubs as in philosophical aocietiee, writes Augustin
Cochin,"not all members are equally assiduous, active, zealous, or fitted
for work. A spontaneous.sor'~ing operatea in favor of certain temperaments
better gifted for the operation in question. Out of a hundred members,
there are hardly five effective ones, and they are the masters of the group;
they are the ones who select new members, appoiat the secretariat~ make the
motions, man,age the votea Thus within~aociety at large fe:f'ormed ano-
ther society~ srr?aller but more active and unified, which will no trouble
directing the larger without its knowledge. It is composed of the most ar-
dent, least scrupulous, and most adept at the cuisine of votes. Each time
the larger group meets, those few foregather in the morning~ aee their
friends~ concert their p]*an~ give the word, excite the lukewarm~ and bear
down on the timid. Since their entente is of long standing~ they hold all
the trumps. They have cowed the secretariat, shoved aside the troublema-
~kers, set the date and agenda....The "general will" is no freer than a Io-
comotive on its rails."
Although Cochin's thesis applies pricnarily to the PCF~ which ia rather close
to what the Jacobin Club an3 the philosophical societies were like, it ap-
plies as well to the PS, in which the essentially Jacobin tendency has now
won the day.
The Party Regime
In other words, and accordi.ng to Cochin's reasoning, "radicali.zation"--
statism--will become effective if the croeaed ideologiea of the PS and PCF
succeed in irrigating the minds of the establishment. From a regime of
consensus legitimized by the idea that the president, once elected, ia the
representative of all Frenchmen in their diversity and plurality of thought,
we would then pass to a dominant party regime founded on the principle that .
the president is first the representative of the Socialists: a regime in
which the philosopher's stone is given priority, if need be in contempt of
the formal rules on which the republic is founded. It wae Claude Estier~
in L'UNITE of 22 January, who questioned the "ostensibly legal arguments"
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ul~ Ll~e Constitutional Council against the nationalizations bill; it was
[~io??el Jospin who declared in October that "never have great waves of re-
form allowed themselves to be stopped by any supreme court"; it was Andre
Laignel who said in a parliamentary debate: "You are legally wrong, for
you are a palitical minority"; and it was Louis Mermaz, speaker of the Na-
tional Assembly, who predicted: "Henceforth, it depends on us that there
be an alternation between the only forces of the future...."
Francois Mitterrand~s septennate has i.n fact i.naugurated a ritual without
precedent under the Fifth Republic: the weekly rendez-vous every Tuesday
- morning at an Elysee breakfast of the head of state, his prime minister,
the first secretary of the PS, and a few barons of the Socialist apparatus.
~ If this "summit," free of all formality, is not in itself a decision-making
~roup, neither is it a mere gathering for mundane conversation. Whatever
the intentions of Francois Mitterrand~such a meeting, when institutional-
ized, objectively gives the PS leadership the means to bring its weight to
bear on the functioning of the public powers: the meane to influence--if
not to determine and control--national policy.
It would be a mistake to underestimate the impact of this very select com-
mittee, with the "party" readily assuming the title of "representative of
the people of the left." The head of state, it will be said, intends above
all to keep the upper hand over the troops of the PS. Of course. Francois
Mitterrand will not, however, prevent a debate from axising between him,
Pierre Mauroy, Lionel Jospin, and a few others. Who, in the end, dominates
whom? The answer is difficult, since Francois Mitterrand, no matter what
one says, has a very artificial public image: a.n him the personage masks
the person. In the course of months and yeaxs, in proportion to the "char-
isma" of each, it is likely that a balance of power will emerge between
the Elysee, Matignon, and PS headquarters--one in which ~ocia3.i:st~.and par-
tisan ideology will not count for nothing.
It is conceivable that the deep finalities of the state appaxatus would
then in time experience a shakeup. And the focus used above with refer-
ence to regionalization, nationalizations, and various reforms would be
very suspect.
Ideology and Archaiam
Certainly, the process by which the ideology of one party, in a country
such as ours, could mesh with the government's policy to the point of over-
whelming democratic pluralism would clearly be very subtle. There are,
nevertheless, certain warning signals which testify to a degree of exasper-
ati~n on the part of Socialist ~eaders in the face of what they call the
"soft" line followed until now. For example, Christian Goux, chairman of
the Finance Committee of the National Assembly, warns that "we must final-
ly apply our policy, and with men who believe in it." He is a statist, an
advocate of economic planning, a true believer in strict control of prices
and incomes. Other signs ~"'e the theme of "democratization of nationalized
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~;nte~�p~�ises," that of "representation of political parties in ent.erprises,"
~,f�.:� det,:~te provoked witYiin the majority by the Anroux report. In a word,
r~ nurnber of PS leaders aspire to "ideologize" the social fabric, to reinvent
r~ "citizenship" the French are held to have lost. A specious, groping man-
euver grounded in reaction; one which presents itself as ideologically re-
volutionary, but is essentially reactionary in the face of modernity: in
time, it would institutionalize a permanent balance of forces i.n all the
rnechanism of social life; to the informational, technological, and scien-
tific complexity of the contearporary world, it would oppose a dogmatic, set,
and simplistic language. If the next few months were to confirm this PS
;~mbition to impose its tablets of.law on the representatives of the state,
the'famous "axchaism" formerly denounced by Michel Rocard could find room
to spread.
In nationalized enterprises the logic of realism and pragmatism would be
~~apidly led astray, with social objectives regularly being put ahead of eco- .
nomic imperatives and requirements of profitability. Indeed profit--though
not becoming the ultimate end, and though achievec~'with a. concern for social
' pi�ogress--still remains the best instrument for measuring the quality of an
enterprise. But it is a datum scorned by socialist ideology. It belon~s
on the list of banished words, with "money'," "boss," "large," and "bourgeois."
Such a vicw of the play of economic forces would not fail to influence the
conduct of 3.eaders, and we could see a slippage towards expediency, towards
increasingly frequent recourse to public funds. That would be followed
shortly by the vicious circle of inordinate budget deficits; protectionism--
f'or there are those in the PS who want to reduce our foreign trade to 20
percent of our GNP; a marked increase in the burden of taxes and special
levies; and a weakening of our international competitive position.
It can already be noted--to the extent that reduction of social hazards,
and consequently of social performance, serves as the philosophical founda-
tion for reduction of inequalities--that the authorities direct their main
:zttack, by means of tax and income policy, against "productive inequalities,"
that is, inequalities between individuals. On the other hand~ they permit .
continuation, and even expansion, of "collective inequalities" which are
the vehicles of economic Malthusianism, and which axe embodied in statutes,
vested rights, and guaranteed minimum clauses. The decision promulgated
by the Elysee on the "39-hour" question is a perfect illustration of such
conservative and statutory practic~s. The brightest jewel of bureaucracy
is "statutory" society. A"social" or socialist economy is the most ela-
borate form of a"statutory" regime favoring a permanent mass of people of-
ten mediocre and irresponsible.
It is difficult to conceive, however~ that "radicalization" could make real-
ly appreciable gains unless economic difficulties take a sudden turn for
the worse. It is when faced with adversity that a partisan government ra-
dicalizes itself, by imputing its vexations to this or that socio-profes-
sional group, and by cleverly appropriating all forms of discontent: in a
word, by attributing to itself the noble role which would consist of de-
nouncing corporate egoisms--the expression is in the air--or a reactionary
"plot," "sabotage," all things which would serve as pretexts for extremist
measures.
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:;ceriar�ios
In terms of political strategy several scenarios are conceivable:
`l'he PS could progressively yield to the PCF without a fight. That would
mean a soft "radicalization" which would proceed by a series of apparently
minor concessions, whose cumulative effect would gradually lead to a trans-
fer of power favoring the "pure and hard" ideologues of the Socialist-
Communist coalition;
_ Or the PCF, while avoiding harsh defiance, could strive to weaken the gov-
ernment by opposing the "left wing" of the PS to its "right wing." That
tactic, dubbed "Hungaxian salami," would adopt the goal of denouncing all
those who "compromise with reaction," and of shifting the center of gravity
of the PS leftward;
Or� thirdly--if this can be imagined--a direct confrontation between the PCF
and PS could lead to the latter's capitulation, with the armistice between
the two parties resulting in "Finlandization" of France.
It will be noted that the general resolution presented to the 24th PCF
congress fits into the concept of a"Finlandized" Europe. Dismemb~arment of
NATO and the EEC, gradual neu~;ralizaticz of West Germany, and military dis-
engagement by the United States would reduce Europe to a mere cluster of
more or less autonomous principalities on the marches of the Soviet empire,
and whose bonds of vassa.~age would be reflected by economic and technologi-
cal tribute. In such a situation, the Soviet interest, in a country such
as France, would not lie in actually seizing power, but in insuring the
docility--masked by democratic forms--of those vested with national sover-
eignty.
Beyond those most peasimistic hypotheses, another must be considered: the
government could set up a facade of "radicalization" behind which it could
carry out a discreet socio-economic reorientation. Did not radicalism,
eaz�ly in this century, break with socialism by putting forth new secular
and republican slogans, thereby keeping the appearance of a party of the
left? Secularism, the battle over schools, and antimilitarism in the Drey-
fus affair allowed Waldeck-Rochet and Combes to break away from the con-
sF,:vatives while following a very prudent social policy. Today the Social-
ists, by speaking in a very leftish language on appropriate themes, could
maintain a political excitation and pressure as a means of letting off the
steam of the militants. The resurge~ce of the battle over schools is a
~ood example of this method of compensation. In foreign policy, the diplo-
macy followed towards Latin America fits the same scheme. It is always
possible to put a Phrygian cap on a relatively prudent policy: that is
simply a matter of allowing the development, here and there, of permanent
personality conflicts which the government can arbitrate with the desired
degree of harshness. A few dissidents--heads of enterprises, journalists,
and the like--can occasion admirably orchestrated figurative "executions."
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'Phat thsatrical "radicalization" of the left, which consists in concealing
~ return to opportunism beneatt? the cloak of a highly accentuated class
vocabulary, reverts to the tradition of the right, which wraps its conserva-
tive policy in fine unanimist speeches. In that category, the Oscar winner
is Mexico, which masks a plutocratic society behi.nd an ostensibly revolu-
tionary label.
This sketch of a"radicalization" of socialism in the French marmer in no
way pretends to prophecy. It is but one among some ten other possible
paths of evolution for the present septennate.
It i~ likewise by deliberate design that no analysis has been made here ei-
ther of the evident risks of a"radicalization" of rightist political forces
in response to that of the left, or of the powerful obstacles the government
would no doubt meet should it ever set in motion a process of radical state
control. It is even now noticeable that a liberal center-left~ concerned
with both justice and realism, is becoming disturbed by trend which conforms
but little with the results expected from the 10 May victory. Moreover, a
drift by the regime would inevitably lead to the casting out or voluntary
departure of several personalities, who would then be well placed to denounce
before the public any possible threats to civil liberties. On the trade
~mion front, the leaders of Force Ouvriere, the CFTC, OGC ~eneral Managers'
Confederation~, FEN ~Tational Education Federation~, and CFDT, moreover,
proved at the time of the Polish crisis what their attitude would be if our
fundamental rights were one day threatened. As for the media, print or au-
diovisual, they maintain a salutary critical distance, although they are
the systematic target of resentt~nnt by Communists and five or six PS lead-
ers including Poperen, Estier, and Rousselet. Ruling out the worst case,
it appears that "radicalization" would lead to growing isolation of the
holders of power from the organizations which brought them to office.
This much remains, which should be remembered: i.n a relativistic, unstable,
anc cybernetic world, the ideological certainties which guide Communists
and a number of Socialists are not without their dangers.
WPYRIGHT: 1982: S. A. Commentaire
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POLITICAL FRANCE '
POSITION OF CONSERVATIVE CLUBS, UDF, RPR EXAMINED
Paris PROJET in French Msy 82 pp 587-597
(Article dated 26 March 1982 by Colette Ysmal, Center for the Study of
Contempotary French Politics (FNSP): "Opposition Group Situations"]
[Text] The results of the recent cantonal elections (14 and 21 March 1982)
show changes in public opinion. The right, very much a minority in May and
June 1981, finds itself a slight ma~ority 10 months later.l The conservative
~ , parties, which had announced their intention of setting out to regain power
starting with the local help, saw their wish fulfilled. They themselves
were doubtless surprised by that. In fact, the paradox is that this
electoral success is based on no real strategy and on institutional and
programmatic deficiency: Ten months after the election of Francois
Mitterrand to the presidency of the republic, the opposition has managed to
channel discontent. But it has not yet overcome its structural weaknesses,
weaknesses that its changeover from majority to opposition had expo8ed.
The Flowerir.g of Clubs and Colloquia .
During the weeks following the legislative elections there was disarray,
which was expressed in the proliferation of "clubs" or study groups.
Undoubtedly the conservative parties, still mesmerized by the left, were
rushing to adopt proven reciFes as their own. They too are discovering
their powerlessness in the face of a government that no longer belongs to
them, in the face of an overwhelming parliamentary ma~ority and in the face
of their own more or less highlighted nonexistence. In September 1981, two
RPR [Rally for the Republic] leaders started The 89 Club, and Jean-Louis
Berthet, former member of Jean-Pierre Soisson's cabinet [of advisersJ, brought
- together several dozen people close to the UDF [Union for French Democracy]
in the Pact for Government and Liberal Action (PAGEL). In early December
1981, Charles Pasqua, with about 10 UDF and RPR cofounders rallying around
him, introduced Solidarity and Liberty to the press. In January 1982,
some individuals close to the National Center of Independents ~oined together
in Independent and Liberal Presence, a Future and Liberty Association held
its first press conference and the Republican Action Committees (CAR) made
itself known through a poster campaign. Finally, during the same period,
well-known people were reviving alreadq existing structures. That was the
case with Olivier Stirn, member of the Radical Party,;who revived his
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Muvement of Social Liberals, and with the CDS [Center of. Social Dem~crats],
which pi~t new life into its France-Forum Club, named after the magazine
Eounded in 1957. '
With the exception of the Movement of Social Liberals, which says it is
seeking "French-style social democracy," all these organizations claim to
be antisocialist. However, the main thing is not ao much their doctrine
a~ their strategy. 'For all of them, whether they are close to the RPR or
tbe UDF or are outside those two political formations, it is a question
fitst o.f providing themselves the means of regaining their "educative power"
from the left prior to any recovery of political power. Hence, the success
of these study groups in becoming involved in debate on ideas and providing
an opposition with plans and with a more stirring "ideology" for Frenchmen
than mere management questions. However, these clube are also a way of
insuring a reduced presence. They address themselves easily to people who
are not politically active, who at any rate were not so before 10 May, and
who, as the CAR's posters say, "feel the need nowadays to get involved and to
act without joining a party." The political formations are present in the
form of their representatives, if only to IDonitor the operatio~s of the clubs.
But even if those forma~ions are a little uneasy, the; are thankful for
initiatives that seem to be a good formula for the right, since the aversion
of conservative voters for involvement in the parties is so great.2
The targets are relatively obvi,ous: people who are naturally hostile to
socialism, first and foremost independent workers and professional people,3
but also those categories over which the left and the right have been
fighting for about 10 years, especially professionals who, according to the
opposition, co~nitted the sin of voting Socialist in May and June 1981 but
will have quickly gotten over their illusions. It is significant that many
prime movers in these clubs are themselves high-level public or private
sector professionals.
Getting "educative power" back im�lies the organization of colloquia and
seminars. These have increased in number, in particular with the organizing
oF two big events: "For An Alternative to Socialism" (Paris, 5-6 December
1981) and the "Freedom Meetings" put together in Lyon on 29 January 1982.
By so doing, the parties of the opposition seemed to draw closer to the
groups of the "new right": the latter groups themselves, reviving Gramsci
in passing, extol the "power of ideas" and maintain�that renewal comes
tlirough revolution in mental outlooks. Alain Groitteray, Lionel Stoleru
and Alice Saunie-Seite--members of the Republican Party--participated in
tt~e "For M Alternative to Socialism" colloquim in which GRECE [Research
and Study Group for European Civilization] was a prime mover; Alain Juppe,
Alain Griotteray and Alain Mayoud (UDF) l~ed the Clock Club's political
seminar (12 December 1981)...
The Parties of the UDF Searching for Their ldentity
These supplementary or parallel activities must not, however, hide the fact
of the crisis of the parties themselves--a crisis of which those activities
are the expression, at least in part, and a crisis that undoubtedly affects
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the UDF more severely than it does the PRP. It is quite understandable that
the UDF and the parties that comprise it up were the most affected by the
May-June 1981 events. Their status as government parties, or "the president's
parties," had deprived them of any doctrinal or strategic autonomy, since
they were only there to ~xpand on the decisions of the president of the
republic. With Valery Giscard d'Estaing's defeat, the UDF lost its natural
Leader and found itself orphaned. Lastly, the very structures--weak and
not very democratic-~f each of the parties scarcely predispose them to
converting themselves into instruments for mobilization of the masses or into
tools for f raming conservative opinion. So much so that the UDF parties
appear to be once again searching for their identity.
llpheaval of Structures and Lack of Activists �
Similar problems beset the Republican Party (PR), the Center of Social
Democrats and the Radical Party--all rushir.g to become the spearhead of the
"liberal" opposition. The first problems concern structure and modes of
action. Each party has been well aware of its ineffectiveness or lack of
preparation for confronting a new situa~ion. That is why inevitable
reflection Tnas reemerged regarding party statues, which both the CDS and the
PR are contemplatin.g changing in the near future. To increase activism--to
have more participation in decisions by party members, who insistently~~called
for that at the time of the "summer universities" organized by the two
political formations--to institute at all levels the principle of elections:
such things are now the watchword. But, for the moment, all of this has
become a dead letter, as has the quest for new modes of action. It is still
just as difficult to find the staffs or the federations of the Republican
P:irty and the CDS, and still just as~difficult to follow the activity of
their activists in the field. Their organizational activity, which is quite
often organized around national elected representatives, is in abeyance for
lack of militants. Perhaps for want of financial means, no big poster
campaign (except for the cantonal elections, of course) has been undertaken.
Finally, political activity has remained centered on the Parliament or the
ruling bodies of the parties. With the exception of the Radical Party, which
has held a congress, no party has called its activists together to include
them in decisions to be taken or already taken. It is only the party bureaus
or political councils (in which party activists are a minority) that have met.
Once again in October 1981 the Republican Party changed the team surrounding
- Secretary General Jacques Blanc at the sole discretion of the latter and his
close associates... ~
Leader Absence
The most current issue, however, is ttiat of the party leaders, and the
divisions to which that gives rise or which it maintains. There too each
party clearly feels the need to provide itself with a leader who is not
discredited in public opinion, who is capable of competing with Jacques
Chirac and "electable to the presidency" in 1988 and who is also able to lead
the party renewal. But who? In the CDS, the succession to Jean Lecanuet is
bringing different views of the party and its policies into conflict. AmonB
those who are best situated at the moment, Bernard Stasi, decked out in a
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center-left image, seems closer to the party activists and seems more
favorable toward asserting the CDS outside the UDF, whereas Pierre
Mehaignerie, m~re concerned about surrounding himself with technicians and
experts, appears to b~ closer ta the UDF and hopes to lead the latter toward
"centrist" positions.
However, it is within the PR that the issue arises most aharply, for there
lurks the ghost of Valery Giscard d'Estaing. The Republican Party suffers
Erom two handicaps. The f irst is not having control over.the former president
oE the republic's possible political return; the second ts not even befng
unanimous about the appropriateness of that return. In f~ct, in the
Republican Party nobody knows what the new Chamalieres Countq councillor
is going to do and nobody knows what he should do. On this last point
there are at least three groups coexisting in the party. First, the group
of the faithful, such as Aubert Bassot, Claude Wolff and Michel d'Ornano, who
stress that Valery Giscard d'Estaing is the natural. leader of the
Gi~cardians, that he must return and that in that evant the party must, as
has always been the case, put itself at his service.
Without being hostile to Valery Giscard d'Estaing, others, on the other
hand, manage nicely without his being around and think that the Republican
Party must be transformed and have autonomy and its own program without
delay; these are the ones called the "young deputies" (Charles Millon,
Francois Leotard, Francoia d'Aubert). Finally, the last group wonder about
the appropriateness of calling once more on the former president of the .
republic. They are afraid that the spring 1981 defeat discredited him as
an individual. However, they ask themselves in a more profound way if it
is not Valery Giscard d'Estaing's political theory itself--the liberalism
put fo naard as codified by "Democratic francaise"-~which was coademned in
May 1^3:, .:nd if it is not in the sear~h for other polltical solutions that
the PR will find its salvation. Be that as it may, this vacuum does not help
the Republican Party's public image.
Political Formations Without a Program
The third set of problems that the UDF parties must confront concerns their
program. Up to now, the thr.ee political formations have confined themselves
to parliamentary debate, making use of all legal proce~ls8tomthe~n~ of
censure, amendments, moving the previous question, app
Constitutional Council) to hold up changes soughr by the Socialists. In t+oth
Parliament and the media they have made known their unrelenting opposition
to socialism and have criticized government action. But the art of criticism
seems to be easier for them to handle than that of making specific and
~oncrete proposals. What would the parties of the UDF, driven from power,
do if they were to return to power? 7'hat remains, for the moment at least,
an open quesCion.
During its November 1981 congress, the Radical Party reaffirmed its desire to
go back to radicalism's roots and equip itself with a reform doctrine,
one resolutely so, in particular by rethinking the Radical Manifesto
published under the aegis of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber. For its part,
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tt~e CDS asserts, as it always has, that "hope is the center" (the theme of
its new posters), and it wants to rediscover the inspiration of a liberal
and social issues doctrine suitable for the heirs of Christian Democrats.
Committees are working within the CDS to come out with proposals and texts
with a view to the congress planned in May 1982. For the m~ment, nothing
from those reflections has yet been revealed. As for the Republican Party,
it has just made its "Republican Manifestu" pilot study public. As the
t,Itle indicates, it is a matter of a declaration of principles more than of
a program. In addition, more than half of the text is devoted to a criticism
of socialism, which has nothing new and in which catastrophism prevails
over analysis; the other half is a pure and simple repeat of "Democratic
francaise," albeit stripped of the latter's analysis of French society and
social developments.
in summary, the three parties have not really known how to extricate
themselves f rom three pitfalls. The first is to believe that something new
must nec~ssarily be ma3e out of something old, or to be so lacking in
imagination that everyone is proposing to go back to their roots without
asking themselves if those roots correspond to the present state of French
society. The second is to confine oneself to talking in overall and general
terms. The third is failing to avoid the traps--traps for those who are in
opposition--of facile demagoguery. Should we smile when we read that only
liberalism will make it possible to fight unemployment and inflation?
What are we to think when we learn that af ter 7 years in power during which
it blocked any change the Republican Party wants "reform in companies" giving
more power to wage-earning employees?
What Future For the UDF?
The crisis of the parties goes hand in hand with uncertainties concerning the
future of the UDF itself. Does the UDF confederation--created in February
1978 to oppose the RPR with an eye on the March legislative elections--still
have a function, and what is tttat function? Nobody seems to question the
need for the UDF on a strictly electoral level for harmonizing candidacies
and, if possible, arriving at single "liberal" opposition candidacies.
But beyond that, how should the UDF stand in relation to the parties that
comprise it? What is its right place? What purpose should it serve?
First of all, it is a matter of deciding whether the.UDF should or should not
remain a mere confederation of parties. In fact, only Jacques Blanc,
secretary general of the Republican Party, has proposed--he did this in
September 1981--a merger of the parties, which would, whatever the
circumstances, be beneficial to his particular party organization. It is
his organization, in fact, that is the strongest of all the organizations
in the UDF, inasmuch as it has perhaps the greatest number of inembers,
definitely the most members of parliament and local elected officials, not
to mention the pool of inen and ideas that make up the Outlooks and Realities
Clubs. Since the merger solution was rejected, the UDF will remain a
confederation. However, the centrifugal tendencies in it are growing; and
each party holds the others more or less directly responsible for the [1981]
- defeat and demands its own identity and autonomy within the UDF organization.
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l[ is within the Radical Party that discontent is greatest: one faction,
assembled behind Brigitte Gros, proposes that the party just plain leave the
UI~F. Whether or not that argument prevails in the end, the UDF is finding
itself treated as being more conservative than centrist, and both the CDS
nnd the Republican Party are accused of having constantly delayed the ~
necessary reforms. The CDS as well is sorry it was not listened to enough
between 1974 and 1981, and it barely conceals its reservations prompted by
both the men and the ideas of the Republican Party, which are suspected of
regarding social issues as totally insignificant. The result is that the UDF
cannot speak with a single voice and cannot substitute for its parties, each
oE which maintains its own troops and principles.
The latter are undoubtedly less distant from one another than they think.
But the debate over structures and political viewpoints is intensified by
the leadership issue. The chairmanship of Jean Lecanuet is not i~ediately
in question. But, as he has said, if the UDF wants to egist in actuality,
it has to draw from within itself a credible candidate for the next
presidential election. The day of reck~oning seems a long way off, but it
is also true that it takes time to make a name for oneself in public opinion.
The whole field should not be left free for Jacques Chirac either. The
i.ssue of Valery Giscard d'Estaing reemerges here. The UDF is no more in
control of the decision than is the Republican Party. Moreover, the former
is more divided than the latter. Neither the Radical Party, which counts
for little, nor the CDS in particular seem disposed to leave it up to the
former president of the republic. In an interview in PARIS~lATCH, Bernard
Stasi made it known in diplomatic terms that "Valery Giscard d'Eataing is not
the only benchmark (of the CDS) and is not (its) natural leader for ever
and ~ver." OEher claims cgrry weight: Raymond Barre's--he remains very
reserved about the UDF--and perhaps Rene Irbnory's. Finally, certain members
of the CDS would like a new man from another generation. But belonging to
which party? Even though necessity knows no law, will the different
political formations that demand their autonomy and their own identity
agree to gather together behind a single man without mental reaervations4
The Calm and Masterful RPR
- Ry comparison, the RPR appears much calmer and more masterful. It is true
that the RPR enjoys advantages superior to the UDF's--advantages that allow
it to adapt itself better and more quickly to the preaent state of affairs.
Its first advantage stems f mm its structurea and its organization. The
RPR's activist potential must not be overestimated. But unlike the
constituent parties of the [1DF, the RPR seems well entrenched all over
Che country and seems able to mobilize men for political action who are
reliable; dedicated and accustomed to "classic" activism, even if under
difficult political conditions. So the RPR's problem is not to create an
organization but to improve the performance of the one that exists. In
particular it has to make some very suthoritarian structures more dem~cratic
--structures that currently convert activists into cheer-leading squads
but keep them away from decision-making. An effort has been made to give
party members a gre~ter share in decisiona and improve the cohesion of the
whole. In fact, the RPR Party Conference, held in Toulouse on 23 and 24
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January 1982, was preceded for the first time by an overall consultation
of party activists by questionnaire with regard to program; for the first
time as well, this conference was not just a"high mass" in the Gaullist
tradition--in fact, forums were organized in which the party members were
able to express their views and discuss the final motion, which was put to
a vote.
An Undisputed Leader: Jacques Chirac...
The RPR's decisive advantage, however, is havxng a sole and undisputed leader,
Jacques Chirac, who Was reelected chairman at the time of the Toulouse Party
Conference by 99 percent of the recorded votes--a leader who, in addition,
has managed to change his image. One remembers that at a prese conference
Valery Giscard d'Estaing had introduced his former prime minister as a
hurried and restless man; one remembers as well the man of "coups"--the
municipal elections in Paris, one that he pulled off, and the Cochin appeal,
one that damaged him in public opinion. Now Jacques Chirac has changed into
a"calm powerful figure" confident in the future, a~responsible politician
avoiding overweening bei~avior as anathema. This was clearly seen at the
time of the cantonal elections when, in contradiction to the opinion of
certain RPR and UDF friends, he declared *.hat the results of those elections
did not conatitute a challenge to the national government, that government
being based on another electoral legitimacy... In addition, the ItPR chairman
is anxious to impose this new style on his whole party, as if ~he dreads
the schemes of slightly irresponsible party officials or activists. At the
time of the Toulouse Party Conference, he recommended in particular that
all aggressiveness toward the government and all personal attacks on men
in the government be avoided. Sticking to policy criticism--that is the
watchword.
...But a Fuzzy Program
By doing the above, the RPR wants to assume the role of opposition party. It
still has to f ind itself a policy and a program. In that respect, things
become less clear or less easy. The RPR's first current ob~ective is to
present itself as a fresh political formation of the future. For the RPR,
that implies standina definitively aloof from "historic Gaullism." The
Toulouse Party Confe~ence made a real break with a whole body of symbolism.
For the first time there was no portrait of Charles de Gaulle or photo of
Georges Pompidou in the conference hall. Also for the first time, none of
the historic leaders--the ones called the "barons"--appeared on the platform
or spoke. The team that surrou~ds the chairman and secretary general,
Bernard Pons--in particular the 24 "off icial representatives" named on
24 February 1982--is made up of inen who did not experience either Free France
or the RPF [Rally of the French Peoplp~ or even the beginnings of the Fifth
Republic. So trust is being placed in Jacques Chirac's followers, of
caurse, but also in a new generation that has no use for solidarity born of
past struggles. In the RPR there is no talk anymore except about the future,
and it is not making appeals anymore except to young people.
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That description of the future was awomed up at the Toulouse Partn Conference
under three themes: "Nation; Republican Ideal; Progress. Making the
comparison with the traditional options of the RPR and even of Gaullism,
none of the themes is really original. All of them stand as a total
rejection of socialism or communism. Everyone is q~~ite sure that Marxism ie
not a French doctrine and that the Com~unists included in the government
are foreign agents. In a more practical vein, the government's foreign and
defense policies were, after what was a wait-and-see period, condemned,
without it being very clearly realized whether that reproach stems from a
supposedly excessively accomoodatir.g attitude toward the USSR or from a
submission to American interests thafi is considered excessive.
The rehabilitation of the "Republican Ideal" is in a way only a new
incarnation of the Gaullist temptation to appropriate the republic for
themselves and deny others the right to invoke it. Between 1946 and 1958,
Ceneral de Gaulle did hardly anything else; besides, the republic was always
a part of the Gaullist acronyms in the Fifth Republic: Union for the New
Republic [UNR], Union of Democrats for the Fifth Republic [UD/VR], Union of
Democrats for the Republic [UDR], Rally for th~ Republic [RPR]. The ne~w
element, however, comes f rom th~ shift from the question of institu*ions,
which the left does not threaten as such, to a yuestion of society, which
is certainly never absent but is more topical now. It is no longer a matter
of defending an institutional form but of defending a type of society that
was thought to be defined once and for all in the principles of the middle-
class rewlution of 1789. The Socialists and, a fortiori, the Com~unists are
not republican, for they do not derive their inspiration from the aiore-
. mentioned principles or at least not from the interpretation the RPR gives
them. ~
As for "Progress," it is still a empty slogan that gives hardly any specific
indications about what the ItPR w~ould do if it came back to power. One
finds in it the voluntarism ctiaracte�'istic of the RPR from the time when it
was opposing Valery Giscard d'Estaing's policies. Growth /must/ [in
italics] be high, unemployment /must/ ~in italics] be fought, inflation
/must/ [in italics] be stamped out--all that based on a liberal credo. One
' can, to be sure, make ou~ a picture of the social strata that the PRP wants
to keep or win over: the far~ers, the manufacturers, the businessmen and
the craftsmen, the professional people and, lastly, the managerial-level
people, who are deliberately flattered. However, the conflicts bEtween
these different strata are hardly resolyed. How is one to reconcile the
hymn to freedom of enterprise and to the respect owed to leaders, which are
being proposed to some people, with participation in decisions, which is
being promised to others? Also, how is one to reconcile the values of
order, discipline and authority, which appeal to some, with the ideas of
general responsibility, whict attract others? Is relentless denunciation
of bureaucracy and collectivism enough to combine all these aspirations
bn a long-term basis?
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The Opposition and Its Unity
Whatever the problems the opposition has had to confront since 10 May, it
m.zn~ged to silence its dissensions and come to an agreement, in appearance
:~t least, in order to face its first election deadlines. Unity on candidacies
at the time of the June 1981 legislative eleetions, the Janc ~cy 1982
by-elections and the cantonal elections--motions of censure ~ointly signed
and voted for--repeated declarations by the UDF officials closest to the
center-left, Olivier Stirn and Bernard Stasi in particular, that their
opposition is unrelenting--everything leads one to believe that the evil
spirit of dissension is not about to take hold of ~he UDF and the RPR
again. And yet nobody can ignore the fact that the question of leadership,
which the various political groups will approach in different positions or
with different advantages, must be faced at a future date.
Up to now the RPR has not been able, or rather has not wanted, to press
its advantages. On the contrary, by agreeing to respect--especially at the
time of the cantonal elections--gains in political situations within the
opposition, it has avoided setting itself up as the spearhead of the
opposition. However, despite having had fewer candidates than the UDF, and
however vague political labels in that kind of election may be, the RPR
seems to have been the main beneficiary of the election. More important,
without a doubt, is the RPR's specific situation compr~red with the political
groups in the UDF. The RPR actually exists, whereas the UDF is searching
for an identity. The RPR has a leader who was already a,candidate in the
last presidential election, who achieved a respectable tally in it and who
is certifiably "electable to the presidency," whereas the UDF is likely to
be searching for a candidate for a long time yet. Even if the RPR is
something vague and broad, it has a single doctrine, whereas each party in
the UDF is trying to find its own in different ideological traditions...
In short, one does not have to be an expert to foresee that with the passage
of time the RPR and Jacques Chirac will be in a position to emerge in a
leading role within the opposition.
From this perspective, the UDF appears to be in an untenable position. On
the one hand, it is difficult for the UDF to put itself under the leadership
oE the RPR if one takes the past as much as the UDF's "centrist, liberal,
and social logic" into consideration. So the UDF finds itself either faced
with the risk of splitting apart or forced to counter the RPR in deliberate
fashion. But in that case the UDF would be fostering division that the RPR
w~c~uld be able to make use of and that might put the UDF back into a
subordinate and marginal role within the opposition; that situation Grould be
even more serious within a new majority. Were it to call on Valery Giscard
d'Estaing or Raymond Barre for help, one would see a confrontation of the
1981 type again at that point, since it is so hard to imagine Jacques Chirac
stepping aside.
Should the leadership issue be settled, however, the opposition would still
have to clarify its political positions or work out programs to meet
deadlines in national politics. For the moment, whether we are talking about
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~I,~~ 1~1~F'ti conGtituent groups or the RPR, we have seen that those programs
amvunt to criticisms of government action, fundamental opposition to the
society they suspect the Socialist of being in the process of establiahing
and general principles teeming with contradictions. All of that may
temporarily be enough to win conservative voters and attract malcontents
from all sides. But what will it do when it is a zaatter of presenting a
government program? It is true that there is no rush, since legislative
elections are slated for 1986.
P.S. Valery Giscard d'Estaiag has since been invited by Jean Lecanuet to
sit on the UDF's Political Buresu, and when that group had i~s parliamentary
meeting days, Jean-Claude Gaudin, the group's chairman, revived the idea of
a merger. However, those two moves gave rise more to reservations than to
enthusiasm. Attesting to that were the silence that greeted Valery Giscard
d'Estaing's return and the irritation of a number of Radical and CDS membera.
Many would,prefer that the UDF concern itself for the moment with immediate
election deadlines and as far as anything else goes give itself time to
reflect .
FOOTNOTES
1. Without getting into the controversy over the results, one can say that
the voters who did not vote for the far left--the PC [Communist Party~,
the PS [Socialist PartyJ, the MRG [Left Radical Movement?] and the
. true "miscellaneous left"--represent about 50.5 percent of the recorded
votes.
~ 2. Besides, there are precedents: the Outlooks and Realities Clubs, the
Grenelle Club, Jean-Pierre Proutesu's Republic and Democracy, Edgar
Faure~s New Social Contract..�
3. Let us note that the structures for accommrodating people in these
categories are increasing in number in parallel fashion without one
always being able to specify the exact relations those groups maintain
with the parties of the ogposition. Let us mention Justice and
Republic, for jurists;.Horizon 86, established by and for attorneys;
and Future and Freedom, in which doctors get together.
4. Let us remember that Rene Monory, Jacques Barrot and Jean-Marie Caro
also figure as possibilities.
COPYRIGHT: CERAS, 15, rue R.-Marcheron, 92170 Vanves April 1982
9631
CSO: 3100/640
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F ~ ~
POLITaCAL ITALY
INTERVIEW WITH NAPOLITANO ON PSI,PCI RELATIONS
Milan PANORAMA in Italian 24 May 82 pp 73-75
[Interview with in-Party opposition leader Giorgio Napolitano
by Chiara Valenti: There Is an Alternative. This One.]
/P~ext7 Often pointed out as Berlinguer~s man antagonist,
as ~he leader of his laborite and moderate oppo-
' sition, Giorgio Napolitano, 57, born in Naples, is
in any case one of th~ CP's most visible "spake8men.
In the Chamber, where he is PC party whip, he stub-
bornly pushes his own good-neighbor policy toward
the socialists. Of recent weeks he made a lengthy
trip to the United States to tend the connections
he had initiated in recent years. In a time of
confusion and apparent crisis in the PCI, confirmed
by, among other indications, the findings of PANO-
RAMA~a poll published directly following this inter-
view, we asked G.iorgio Napolitano for his views on
what is happening inside and outside his party.
[Question] Mr Napolitano, there is talk about the Communist Party~s
losing its grip and its credibility. Among the various symptoms
reported, the survey findings we publish in this issue of PANORAMA
point to this conclusion.
[Answer] I should not be one to attach overmuch importance to
those findings. Looking at our party~s political auccess most
recently, such as our victory over the Mafia in Sicily nr over
Comiso, I should say on the contrary that we have gained ground.
I feel I can say the same, if I am to judge from my observation
post, about the.Chamber of Deputies, where we communists are in
contact with different and even hostile groups. There has been
~rowing approval of the PCI~s attitude , precisely on the issue
of individual and collective liberties, and on the issue of demo-
cracy.
[Question] And yet people seem to be most baffled on this very
. ground. After the tough polemics with the USSR over the last few
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moiiths, for example, the Politburo~s spokesman, Vadim Zagladin,
r~c:instated you in an interview in LA REPUBBLICA, ca~ling you
"a grcat Communist Party, a brother Party."
(_Answer] Hot-and-cold showers are no answer to problems as grave
:?~icl complex as those surrounding relations between the CPSU and
t.hc PCI. We have never been in favor of liquidating those rela-
i;ions. Breaking off diplomatic relations is not in the general
interest, and primarily the interests of detente. We continue to
be in favor of direct and frank discussion, but it will assuredly
take more than a somewhat self-critica~ admission of error to make
us set aside ba,3ic issues and positions. Or to make us return to
relat ions bound up with a set of ideological reference points we
cannot accept.
[Question] You have just come back from a long ~rip through the
United States, where you met with intellectuals and experts close
to Reagan. What do the Americans think of the "breakaway"?
~Answer] In all politically informed American circles, the posi-
tions we have taken since December have made quite an impression,
and have been appreciated for their unquestionable authenticity.
[Question] In short, they had an even greater impact there than
_ thcy did in Italy?
[Ariewer] As for Italy, I should not confuse two different levels.
I~cre, in my opinion, our international positions have gained in
credibility and in conviction. Even so, there is still some argu-
ment and uncertainty in areas of public opinion as to the actual
possibility of communists' getting into the cabinet.
[Question] This is another sore point. Your proposal of an al-
ternative seems unclear to a lot of people. Some of your very
positive opinions in the aftermath of the Christian Democrats~
convention have certainly evoked the ghost of the historic compro-
mise.
~Aiiswer] While there may have been some misunderstanding, it seems
to me that Berlinguer effectively dispelled it. Having said that,
I i'ail to see how anybody could imagine that we could be pinned
doF!ii to a position of pure indifference and inertia toward what is
happening in the DC. I believe that the Labourites in Britain, too,
ar�c: ~reatly concerned over the conflict between Mrs Thatcher and
otlier forces within the Conservative Party. Are we to take no no-
tice when the line adopted in the preamble of the procedings at
the 1979 convention was shouted down? Are we not to perceive in
this a portent of the fall of some hoary illusions and prejudices,
like calling the communist question closed?
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~lu~~st, ion ~ And yet the socialists, who were supposed to be your
partciers in an alternative government, seem to think otherwise.
Claudio Martelli accuses you of fishing for deals with the DC:
:~nd now the two of you are at daggers drawn.
~_AriswerJ I resent this description of our relations with our so-
cialist comrades as if there were nothing to them but irreconcil-
able conf licts. You have to look a little deeper into things if
you want to understand them. The attack, based on a flimsy pre-
text, like the rest of the polemics aimed at us, are thoroughly
t.ypical of the present PSI leadership. They are, I should say,
an all-but-inevitable function of a strategy designed to maximize
the PSI's role, vis-a-vis both us and the DC. This is clearly
r~ot what we wo~xld ca~l the alternative strategy, and we have al-
r~eady put our finger squarely on the ambiguity of it all.
[Question] In other words, Martelli is attacking you just to get
attention.
~AnswerJ Al1 I am saying is that I see his charges as a maneuver
c:alculated mainly to cast us communists as unenthusiastic propon-
ents of the alternative. Yet there is always the possibility that
there is a real obsession at work here, with the idea that the
the ever-dreaded deal between the Christian Democrats and the com-
munists will be reached over the heads of the socialists. And
yet that is a ridiculous and utterly groundless fear.
LQuestion] You, Mr Napolitano, seem to be very possibilist~
yet UNITA has takei~ a very different tone.
' ~Aiaswer] I should look more at the facts. And I should not for-
~et that, along with all the noisy polemics, there is also colla-
boration between us and the PSI.
[Question] Could you cite me some practical examples of that?
[AnswerJ After a period of widespread tension, we have built good
working relationships in the governance of such great cities as
t~lorence, Milan, and Turin. Furthermore, I maintain that the very
fact that we did not insist beyond a certain degree on June
clections warded off serious tension between PSI and PSI and.op-
ened the way to convergence on goals to be pursued in Parliament '
as well.
[uuestion] Did you have any direct influence on this socialist de-
cision?
[Answer~ I believe the socialists took our adamant opposition
into account, yes. .
[Question] The new DC secretary, Ciriaco De Mita, has said that
the PCI is not so much a different party as a confused party.
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(~AnewerJ I find this smug tone from the secretary, even the new
~ecretary, of a party lik~ the DC, whose chronic confusion is
lc~endary, alto gether uncalled-for. Besides, they have been
calling all along for more debate and less doctrinaire attitudes
in the PCI, yet now here they are practically complaining that our
~~arty is not the repository of absolute, immovable certainty. The
tr~uth of the matter is that some of our fundaraental positions are
spelled out in very precise and clear-cut terms. On other issues
tt?ere is sorae soul-searching going on, and it is very serious in-
dced.
[Question] In short, you mean that different lines are stirring
in the PCI these days.
[Answer] I am not talking about hard and fast opposing positions.
On the alternative line, there is unity in the party. And, just
to make things clear, I am in complete agreement, too, with what
Herlinguer and Sulmona have to say about the way we forra our at-
titudes toward the DC.
[Question] Let's try to sum that up one more time, for the bene- ~
~ fit of those who are not experts in the subtleties of political
issues. You say you don't want to join in a government with the
DC, but you also talk about an alternative in which there are se-
veral poles, among them a Catholic one. What does that mean, in
practical terms? That you are still hooked on the old dream of
splitting the party of De Gasperi, Fanfani, and Gi.ulio Andreotti?
[Answer] That is a hypothesis that cannot be ruled out, but one
on which we are very catatious. We think, first of all, given an
alternative government, we might advance the traditional bounda-
ries of the left forward a little, so as to make room for part
of the Catholic forces, which could be made to flo~v toward the
PSI, the PCI, or the other lay parties. And we believe that we
must be mindful of the existence and the positions of major Ca-
tholic organizations. We are also thinking in terms of a DC that
is not forever doomed to reraain a conservative party, in the
strict sense of the term, but rather as one that can change under
ttie prodding of the more progressive portion of the a'atholic elec-
torate and that, some day, mi~ht turn into the moderate opposition
to a government based on the left.
[~uestion] That sounds like a delightful prospect. Reality,
though, would seem to be pulling in the opposite direction.
[Answer] Of course our proposal for an alternative presupposes
some profound changes, not only in relations among the political
parties, but in the nation as a whole.
[Question] Mr Napolitano, you have always had the reputation of
an honest reformer. How do you envision the future of your party?
Do you think that the third way coincides with the social-democra-
tic way?
~ 38
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~ Mswer~ About that "reformist" tag, I remember what happened to
(~~rnando Santi, who was always known as a reformist, but who wound
� ~~l~ t,o the left of the PCI. I believe that we are a party deter-
mined never to abandon the most v~ital and still valid core of com-
munist tradition. A party at the same time determined to come to-
~ether with the most advanced positions of the European socialist
movement. One might well ponder: is is mainly we who are thinking
about the communist experience, or the French socialists~ who are
re-thinking the social-democratic experience? I say this merely
to underscore the fact that, if we are to judge ourselves and
others in these times, we simply must break out of the old pat-
terns.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Arnaldo Mondadori Editore S.p.A. Milano
618z
Cso: 3104/212 .
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POLITICAL ITALY
PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY ON PC7~ USSR POLEMICS
Milan PANORAMA in Italian 24 May 82 pp 75-7b .
[Survey results: "It~s better not to trust them..."]
[Text] The PCI~s break with Moscow is not chaaging manY
minds. For a lot of people, the Communiat Party
is still a party to be kept under a ban. There
you have the most uaexpected findings in the
ppNpRAMA/Deraoskopea survey. Why this attitude?
On 1S December, 1981, Enrico Berlinguer stood alone before t~heTY
cameras and touched off a revolution in the PCI's history:
eudden, total "break" with the Soviet Union. Shortly thereafter
ca~ae Moscow's savage responae, the rebellion~f~ ~h ~on C~lacera
- and, with his~, aa entire wing of the Party, 8~
ating internal atrife of recent months.
What did all thi-s mean to ordinary people, to the voters? To what
extent was their opinion of the PCI altered by the stunning col-
lapse of one of the most cogent arg'!~ments in the anti-communist
arsenal, the PCI's tiea to Moscow? To find out, PANORAMA commis-
sioned Demoskpoea to conduct a survey,~~interviewing 2,000 people
selected as representative of the Italian population. The.find-
ing quite unexpected is that the breach has chanaed very
�ew minds, and that for most people, the PCI should still be barred
f rom gove rnment .
In reply to the question: has your confidence in the PCI increased
or diminished since the "break" with the U3SR? 49 pe~ent, practi-
cally half the people interviewed, said they trusted it exactly as
much as they had before. And against 20 percent who trust it more
spoke another 20 percent who trust it less. The substance of that
opinion is borne out by the response to another question, which
asked whether or not the co~nunists can hope now for a place in
government like any other party. For 36 percent who said they
might, there were 45 percent who were convinced that "the PCI has
yet to prove that it is genuinely democratic and independeat."
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"Same As E.er, More Than Ever..."
The PCI's recent positions on events in Poland
and i.ts heated polemics with the USSR have led
to a brea~C between the PCI and Moscow. Can
Italians truet the PCI now that the break has
come? Atid if so, how much?
-~oo u n~an ranKu c~
~e M A1 M R h~ IN WI Ny TOTALq
PI~ dl prinw . 14.~ !~f Zr.~ Z1A 47a tt.~ !.Z Z.Z Z6.7 20A
M~no ~ peNni ~1.~ 1Z1 ~.1 11.i Z73 ~4.i !4A 61.E S2.! 20.1
Con� p~ . i~ 4~.f 47.~ q.6 i1.Z 6t1 a0.f ~d.2 41~4 4~.1
Non b~dl~ . . ~4 4.4 i.7 - 4.! ~.0 - , - !.Y
Responses (by political preferences) in left to right.
Answers (top to bottom): More than before; Less than before;
Same as before; No answer.
What's going on between PCI and PSI? �m~, ~
Naw that the PCI has pulled away from fra Psi e Pd
the USSR's positions, do you thiak the
split between the PCI and PSI still -
makes sense? ~ ~O~ un ~O . . . ~'t
t~o, non h~ Oto ~ao . Z!J
Answers, top to bottom: Yes; No; None. Na+lnd~. . . ~7s
Social Democrats? No Waql
Since its break with Moscow, do you think the
PCI will become more like the European Social
Democrats (those in Scandinavia or Germany),
or do you think it will go on being the kiad
of communist party it hae always beerr?
~ ~ IffCON001A /I[IE~EM2A IOIITIp)
' ~ :
h hi h{ M R hA Ni iW
~ ~ ~ ~
!
un P.Aia srmw �n~ .o~~.a
O~motratN wroP~~ 1~.0'/A 11.~ /3.1 ~2.~ ~OA 41.5 41.f ~.1 ~.0 f.' ~t 1f.f
un p.nno eoewM~t. ean.
� nNb sw V~dlsbM fOJ ItA ~O.t i3.1 f0.1 IS.~ ~.7 ~7.t N.i N./ M.! SO q.~
Np~ w. 1~.f 17.! NA xi.~ 17.1 21A 1~.t ~.1 25.1 29.! 17.~ 7 rt.t
Responsea, by schooli.ng (College, high school, elementary or non~)
and by political preference left to right.
Answers: Like the European Social Democrata
i'he same communist party it has always been
Don~t know.
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I f' tF~~: respondents are broken down according to their political
~,i�~f~r�ences, wc find that among Christian Democrats the percen-
tage of nay-sayers jwaps to 64 percent, among Republicans to 60
percent, among Social Deraocrats to ~0 percent, and among Liberals
t:o an astounding 81 percent. Respondents giving favorable replies
rc:acted in an unexpected way to another question, to wit: if it
would be better for the country if the PCI formed a coalition
cabinet with the DC or without them, 49 percent answered "with
the Christian Democrats~' and only 44 percent answered "without."
On the whole it is a negative picture, one that shows us us that
the PCI has never stood so low in the public esteem as it does
right now.
What is going on here? According to one young and brilliant stu-
dent of politics, Gianfranco Pasquino, who is in favor of the left .
alternative, the blame for this frame of mind among the people
lies squar~ly upon the PCI itself. '~The decline in confidence is
t-hc initial reaction to confusion, to uncertainty. Once they had
made the br~ak, the communists gave the impression that they would
like to mend it again. The likeliest assumption is that they don~t
liave enough intestinal fortitude, or unity enough in their leader-
ship, to make it stick. And people can sense this,~' says Pas-
quino. Somewhat more ironic in his assessment is Alberto Ronchey,
the inventor bf the "K factor." "Where the misunderstanding arises
is in the choice of the word 'strappo;' which means a rending or
tearing apart only if you're talki.n about cloth or paper. This
however, turned out to be a aprain ~a second meaning of the word~]."
In Ronchey's view, all this mistrust toward Berlinguer~s party
~ stems less from international issues than from its having opted
for the left alternative. "A PCI that wants to form a government
only with the Socialists is far scarier than a PCI that is some-
how tamed by the historic compromise. And it is this very fear
that I call the K factor. "
Further confirmation that the PCI's new deciaions have not gone
down too well comes from a set of questions about its getting to
be more like a social deraocrat party.
Only 20 percent of respondents, a slim minority, sees the party
~oing down that road. "The fact is that this party can~t seem to
come up with new images, new points of reference," says sociolo-
~ist Franco Ferrarotti, a PCI sympathizer. "The basic attitude is
conservative, stand-pat, and the third road fails to materialize."
This is a loss of credibility that carries in it some electoral
repercussions as well. Asked, "do you think that the PCI will get
more votes from now on?" only 14 percent answered "yes." When th~
same question is asked about the PSI, the "yes" replies shoot up
to 49 percent. Then there was one curious detail. This optimism
as to the success of Craxi~s party is shared by just about half of
the communist voters.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Arnaldo Mondadori Editore S.p.A.
618~
Cso: 3104/212 112
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M 1 l,ITARY FRANCE
- AIR BASES CONDUCT.REGULAR WAR SCENARIO EXERCISES
Base Defenae Tested
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French May ~2 pp 28-30
[Article by Air Force Brigadier General Jacques Boichot: "Tactical Eva~.uation"]
[Text] The tactical evaluation of an air base has the essen-
tial aim of keeping the com~nand periodically informed about
the units' ability to carry out their wartime missions and
also missions in time of crisis or in peacetime.
The air bases carry out daily combat-training activity in order to be ready to
cope, in time of crisis or in wartime, with multiple aggressions or missions.
In order to make an ove:all evaluation of the ability of the bases, and also of
the operational units stationed at them, to carry out their misaions, the com-
mand periodically aets up tactical evaluations. Thus, an evaluation team,
composed of officers and noncom~aissioned officers from the general staff and
directorates of the air region and from the m~jor user commands concerned, ar-
rives at the base unannounced to obaerve the reactions to the various exercises
and incidents introduced at a high rate, for a block of time that can be nearly
a week.
For the base com~and and personnel, the fundamental principle then consists in
"playing out" the plans and directives at all levels and in the most realistic
way possible. In effect, the only way of reacting leads to this question in
each instance: "If this incident or aerious event were really occurring today,
what cauZd be done with the means at our disposal?" During this time, the
evaluators stay at the poats assigned to them, without impeding the activity of
.the personnel, and they record the different reactions observed without com-
ment, unless safety is at stake.
A Realistic Scenario
The various incidents and events initiated during the evaluation have been pre-
pared for very thoroughly several weeks in advance, in accordance with a coor-
dinated and coherent acenario that calls all of the base's units into action.
Such a scenario can, for example, unfold as follows.
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nn J day at 2300 hours, the evaluation team, which has previously met in the
~~reatest secrecy for a preparatory presentation, arrives at the gate of the
base chosen and immediately issues an alert that calls for the personnel to be
called out and the base t~ be put into an operational posture, notably with
camouflage and reinforcement of defense, and also for the air combat units to
be activated. The airplanes are prepared ar.3 immediately dispersed and camou-
flaged. The first two planes ready take ocf on alert for a night-interception
mission. At dawn the next day, the base undergoes a heavy air attack that
starts a serious fire and causes serious damage to the electric-power plant and
to the means of communication.
The air-watch network, activated frrnn the beginning of the exercise, signals
many sir raids that put the base's antiaircraft defense to the test and cause
severai serious incidents: for example, destruction of the meas, so that field
kitchens are activated, and an exerciae in neutralization of an unexploded
bomb.
In a following phase, the rescue teams have to save a pilot wounded during a
mission and then get his damaged plane, which is partially blocking the landing
Cield, out of the way. At the same time, the Medical Corps has to set up a
field medical group to accomodate many wounded.
Activity Continues
After night falls, commando units carry out harassment of aenaitive points of
the base and attemgt to penetrate ite defense system. The entire base is
placed on reinforced alert and weapns gre distributed to all peraonnel, who
take up their assigned combat positions.
During the entire day following, the mechanice must nevertheless continue to
prepare and arm the sirplanes, which take off at an accelerated cadence for as-
sault missions and real firings on the firing ranges. The results of these
firings determine the success of each pilot's mission.
In the afternoon, the task of the personnel is further complicated by radioac-
tive contamination due to fallout from a nearby exploeion. On this occasion,
the know-how of the specialized tesms for receiving airplanes in a radioactive
environment has to be demonstrated.
Uuring the following night, the commandos, who have tested the alertness of th~
base's defenses, attempt actions in force, including helicopter-borne raids, in
order to lay siege to the field.
'1'he last day is devoted to a"hot" debriefiag on the commando actions, the
shooting by the personnel with individual weapons, and a detailed inapection of
the barracks and technical installations to check whether the base has the
means best-suited to its missions and to study what improvementa are possible.
1'he evaluation is naw completed, but the coimnander of the air region and the
- major user commands concerned now have a very detailed report,a v~zitable "pho-
tograph" of the base and its units. This document brings out the points on
~
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which the base commander will have to concentrate his efforts, but it wi11 also
I~c� exploited at the various levels of command, to remedy the deficiencies re-
y:ardinK the means, to amend the operations directives and orders if necessary,
~~r to takc advantage of the good ideas and interesting actions taken that will
t,e [orwarded to the other air bases concerned.
ln effect, it is not a matter of knowing whether an evaluation has been succesa-
ful or not, but it will certainly be "useful," for the essential thing to be
obtained from its definition is the word "capability." This word relates, of
course, both to the means available to the base and to the know-how and motiva-
~ion of the personnel, but also to the deficiencies and the progress to be
achieved in all areas and at all levels.
Thus it has been possible to note, at all our bases, an important metamorphosis
that has been going on for the last several years: shelters for sirplanes and
personnel, enclosures, camouflage, antisircraft protection--to mention only the
most spectacular achievementa. These resulta are not, of course, excluaively
the fallout from the evaluations; but only exact knowledge of the situation can
enable us to progress, and the evaluations thus contribute to improvement of
the conditions of preparation of our air bases and combat units, with a view to
continually increasing the operational effectiveness of the Air Force.
General Jacques Boichot, a graduate of the Flight Training
School (class of 1952), has made most of his career in opera-
tional units. He commanded the 2/11 fighter squadron, and
later the fourth fightex k-~ng. In 1976, he commanded the B.A.
[expansion unknown] of Toul, and then became chief of the
third buresu of the EMAA [Chief of Staff of the Air Force].
At present he is director of the Firat CATac [Tactical Aerial
CorpsJ. General Boichot totals 5400 flight hours.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'aujourd'hui"
Pilots' Reaction Time Tested
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French May 82 pp 31-33
[Article by Air Force Major General Theodore Mahlberg: "Putting Units in Pos-
ture")
[TextJ In peacetime, an important part of air activity is de-
voted to training of the squadron, with the aim of ensuring,
on a priority basis, the combat pilots' progression toward high-
er qualifications. This form of training, though indispensable,
is not sufficient for obtaining truly opertional unite; it is
also necessary for them to be capable of reacting rapidly to the
least indication of alert, and, particularly for the tactical
units, capable of maneuvering within sizable formations and op-
erating in a coordinated manner within an interbranch framework.
'I'he Air Force has a limited number of combat airplanes capable of carrying a
wide variety of armaments and of taking action in highly varied zones of opera-
tions. Because of its characteristics of speed of intervention and flexibility
of use, the sir arm is a favored means of battlefield action. It is therefore
nFCessary for the units to have the ability to adapt to varied situations and
to balance out their efforts in such a way as to be capable of intervening
rapidly where the need is manifested.
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In~~�rv~�nin~ Rapidly
It:i~~iJ intcrvention supposes first of all a reactiDn in the shqrteat times p0s~
4ible. This capability is indeed an essential condition in prdex fox a unit tp
t~E� declared operational. It requires reflection beforehand on a certain number
of scenarios, and imagining their development. Secondly, regular practice of
activation exercises makes it possible to "break in" the reflex actions that
make the phrase "putting into posture"* almost automatic. Thus, depending on
the mission assigned to the unit, what is involved is, on the one hand, the
arming of the planes with bombs, rockets or air-to-air missiles, and on the
' other hand, fitting them with extra tanks appropriate for the range of action
anticipated. Furthermore, frequent changes of configuration are practiced so
as to create automatic routines among the technical personnel and thus reduce
the risks of error. ~
It is important, during this delicate and fundamental phase, for the work of
each person involved to be done in good order and to be well-coordinated. ~t
' is by long practice that the time-periods can be effectively reduced to the
minimum.
Itapid reaction also necesaitates a permanent alert structure, at both the com-
mand level and the level of the means of execution. Continuousness, which is
the rule in the Air Force, involves both the air-defense chain, the operational
� centers of the central general staff and of the big cocomands, and the alert
teams or the teams tak ing part in security and protection at the air bases.
Thus, for the Air Force ae a whole, thousande of inen and women keep a watch in
. addition to their normal activity or are on alert ready to take action. The
unexpected missions that could be triggered can take various forms: setting up
a Jaguar patrol thousands of kilometers away, where a preeence mission is nec-
essary; interception of an intruder who penetrates the national sir space;
transport of equipment in humanitarian-aid situations; medical evacuation in
liaison with the SAMU's [expansion unknown]; assistance to military or civilian
airplanes in trouble; etc.
Finally, the capacity to intervene in short times requires appropriate modes of
action, and the success of any distant operation is mainly dependent on in-
flight refuelling these days, because it makes it possible to eliminate stops
and gives the possibility of operating at long distances from home bases.
Flexibility of Use
7'l~is is the second quality to be maintained and developed in our units. It is
indeed fundamental, in view of our available potential airpower, to take the
best possible advantage of the flexibility of use that the airplane offers.
7'he mobility of the units is a decisive factor in this area. The exercises in-
volving alI the tactical units gneerally entail deployments and redeployments
that make it possible to vary the formation and adapt it to the evolution of the
threat. In metropolitan France, it is usually the combat squadron that does
such movement. As for external action, smaller units are often used to adapt
the air support to the particular conditions of each operation.
*"Putting into posture" is an expreasion uaed in the Air Force to mean put-
ting the units on a war footing.
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'l~l~~~re is the same quest for mobility in the routine training of the units,
wt~ich regularly deploy outside their home bases to do firing exercises at spe-
cial centers or combat exercises at sea. These numerous trips put heavy bur-
dens on the personnel, who are frequently absent from their homes; but this is
thP price that has to be paid in order to have operational units.
h'lexibility of use depends also on the maintenance of a certain multipurpose
character in our combat squadrons. Air missions are uaually grouped in two
large families--tactical support and air defense; the former has the offensive
character of attack on ground targets, while the latter, related more particu-
larly to air combat, therefore takes place at generally high altitudes. For
each of them, sircraft with specific performance charactersitics are needed,
and crews that have had appropriate training.
As regards the airplanes, in view of the relatively small number of them which,
because of costs, a country like France can provide itself with, the best com-
promise between high-altitude and low-altitude performance characteristics is
~enerally sought in the design stage.
As regards the crews, the growing complexity of the equipment and the limita-
tion of sir activity to 180 hours per year per pilot, because of the rise in
tt~e cost of fuel, no longer make it possible to have combat pilots capable of
carrying out missions of a highly technical character in both of these two
Fields of specialization at the same time. However, in order to be capable of
carrying out a strong effort in a particular area or one that requires consid-
erable concentration of ineans, each air unit will have to maintain--in addition
to its main mission, which certainly takes priority in the training process--
the capacity to carry out one or even two miasiona designated as secondary, in
a simplified version and within a limited framework. Thus a unit whose main
mission is, for example, all-weather penetration, will be assigned a daytime-
interception role on a secondary basis. Day-to-day training will be propor-
tioned in :unction of the degree of priority assigned to each of these activi-
ties.
'Che tactical reAction exercisea have resulted in considerable progress in the
conditioning of the units. They make the peraonnel break out of the base
training routine by crystallizing the efforts of everyone toward a common pur-
~~ose and generally permitting the activation of the entixe chain of command,
from the operational staffs responsible for mission conception to the units
charged to carry them out. They periodically place the units in fictitious
crisis situations that are as realistic as possible in order to evaluate the
activation procedures and the application of the dispersal and camouflage pro-
cedures. Thus, the putting-into-posture exercises ordered several times per
year at the level of the FATAC [Army Light Plane Division], lst RA jAir regi-
mentJ, will involve one or more air basea of the region, or even all of them.
Ott~ers, of broader scope, such as Datex, will involve the entire Air Force.
This practice, which has proven its worth, ia to be continued.
Air Force Major General Theodore Mahlberg has done a large part
of his career in operational units: Fighter Squadron 1/11, Sth
Fighter Wing. In 1973 he was com~nander of the Dijon air base,
~t~
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then chief of staff for air defense, deputy chief of Air Force
general-staff operationa, and he is presently second in com~nand
of the FATAC/lst RA and commander of the northeast sir-defense
zone.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'aujourd'hui"
Firing Exerciaes Conducted
_ 1'aris ARMEES D'AUJOtIRD'HUI in French May 82 pp 34-36
~Article by Air Force Colonel Roger Mathieu: "Toward the 'Direct Hit'--Checking
Combat Pilots' Firing and Bombing Ability"]
(Text) For any combat pilot, the end purpose of a flight is
destruction of the objective. Through the "firing exercises,"
tactical evaluations, intersquadron competitions and training
missions, the Air Force monitors the operational level of its
units and its pilota' ability to put their shots on target.
At 10,000-meters altitude, off Corsica: four Mirage IIIE's make a live firing
pass, with 30-ann cannons, at an acoustic target towed by a Mirage IIIC.
On the C,aptieux~sir~to-ground firing cange, north of Mont-de-Marsan, four~other
Mirage IIIE's come in at low altitude for an operational rocket-firing pass.
These patrols have taken off from their base field in the couree of a tactical
~ evaluat.ion: placed in conditions as cloae to a real mission as possible, the
pilots will be judged on their firing results in particular. For destruction
of an objective in the air or on the ground will always remain the end purpoae
of combat aviation.
Monitoring of the firing and bombing ability of the pilots in operational units
. i.s a permanent concern of the command: it is present daily in the course of
training missions, but especially during the special periods of the "firing ex-
ercises," the tactical evaluations and the intersquadron competitions.
Firing Ability: Daily Checking
Whether afire-power-support mission with conventional weapons, the firing of an
air-to-sir ~r sir-to-ground missile, or a very conventional dogfight is in-
volved, the pilot returning from his flight in peacetime must know with maximum
certainty what would have happened "if he had really fired." Indeed, the mis-
_ sion is considered successful only after detailed restitution of the firing
phase. ~ .
The recording sim camera, which runs during the period of simulated firing,
makes such precise restitution all the easier to achieve in that our sirplanes'
"head up" visualizations present all the esaential parameters today.
The tape recorders on board present valuable supplementary information by re-
cording the pilots' "live" comments and any radio exchanges that may occur.
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Isur NothinR Takes the Place of Live Firing
'Pt~e cost of modern armaments, which has only increased with the sophistication
� uf the munitions and the missiles, is well-kno~m. The combat squadrons are
therefore being allocated only a limited amount of rea~ munitions and "exercise
munitiona"* annually.
Each full squadron carries out an operational assig~ent of 3 or 4 weeks at
Cazaux or Solenzara in order to do an annuai "�iring exercise" oriented primar-
ily toward sir-to-sir cannon, but also toward conventional sir-to-ground fir-
in~.
These exercises are t}~ concrete focus of the Air Force's effort to maintain a
high operational level among the combat-unit pilots: .
--training of young pilots under simplified firing conditions;
--perfecting of older pilota under limit conditione of use of conduct-of-fire.
In air-to-sir cannon firing, for example, an acoustic target is towed 500 me-
ters behind a fighter that gradually maneuvers into conditions close to those
of a dogfight. The firing pass is tricky, demanding the firing pilot's entire
concentration: often at supersonic speed, under considerable acceleration, a
very short burst, of half a second, is fired.
There is an immediate confirmation report, for the pilot learns at once, by re-
dio, how many shells passed within a radiue of 3.5 meters around the acoustic
target.
For the purpose of standardizing the level of firing skill required of the pi-
lots, they undergo "qualification" tests in the course of three missions in
wl~ich a certain minimum score has to be achieved; this is the case for the
unit's priority and secondary missions.
Apart from these firing exercises, regular training in air-to-ground firing
(cannon, rockets, bombs) makes it possible to keep up the level achieved and
also to pass certain qualification teats: on return froma ground-attack mis-
sion, the airplanes do live firing on one of the suthorized firing ranges.
Aerial Firing: the Operational Goal above All
'I'he combat pilots' motivation for this seronautical discipline has al~ays been
very sharp: indeed, the entire stakes of�a 1-hour flight are in the balance in
tt~e Eew seconds in which the objective is sighted and the pilot takes position,
aims and fires. Thus there is a latent competition among the pilots of a
syuadron and between the squadrons themselves; and this wholesome emulation
nlays a part in maintenance of the highest level for the results achieved.
* An exercise munition (shell, rocket) has no explosive charge. An exercise
_ bomb is a simplified projectile but has the same ballistics.
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Among the exerciaes having the character of competitions organized to this end,
the most celebrated is indisputably the "Comet Cup," which, every 2 yeara, pits
all the French fighter and reconnaissance aquadrons against one another: each
is represented by two pilots, one of whom must be the aquadron commander (or
aecond in command), who thus have to demonstrate their abilitiea publicly.
1'he tests, in two flights, include an attack on a ground abjective, air-to-
Kround cannon firing, an interception and air-to-sir cannon fire.
What better opportunity could there be for judging the firing ability of our
pilots?
The range of our armaments is diversifying and is becoming increasingly coher-
ent with the airplanes and the conduct of fire: in addition to the conventional
munitions, there are the scatter weapons, the guided muaitions, the missiles.
The costs of theae sophisticated munitions rule out the poseibility of a great
deal of training firing in the units: this firing comes only in grouped exer-
cises that make it possible to confirm the areas and procedurea of use. On the
other hand, simulated firing, in the sir or at the ground, ensure a satisfac-
tory level of training for our pilots.
Monitoring of the firing and bambing ability of the combat pilots is, in the
last analysis, a constant fac~tor in all missions, whether they involve live
firing or not.
The main guarantee of the level achieved will always remain motivation for fly-
ing--and for firing!
Colonel Roger Mathieu entered the Air School in 1958, and has
commanded Fighter Squadron 1/13 and the 30th Fighter Wing. He
has graduated from the ESGA ~Higher School of Air Warfare], and
is currently chief of the "operations" division of the 3rd De-
partment of the EMAA lAir Force General Staff~.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'aujourd'hui"
11267
CSO: 3100/713 ~
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