JPRS ID: 10678 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10678
22 Jufy 1982
Sub-~ahc~ran Africa Re ort ~
~
FOUO No. 7$3
~g~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/10678
~ 22 July 1982
SIiB-SAHARAN ,'~FRICA REP~RT
FOUb No. 783
CONTENTS
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Briefs ~
. Opposition Members in France . 1
CHAD
Reasons for Vict~ry of Hissein Habre Noted �
(Siradzou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQU~, 16 Jun 82) 2
Briefs
Goukouni's Actions Against GJNT Members 5
CONGO
Briefs
_ COC Temporary Executive Commitee Disbanded 6
Strengthened ''talian Cooperation . 6
PCT Central Committee Meeting 6
Special Assembl;~ Se: sion 7
French Ai.d, Romanian Delegation 7
~ DJIBOUTI
Afar Ethnicity Linked to Creation of PPD
(AFRICA, Feb 82) 8
ETHIOPIA
Tripartite Alliance Seeks to Curb 'U.S. Imperialism'
(AFRICA, Feb 82) 11
GA~ON
Nation's Economic Situation in 1981 Analyzed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX yT MEDITERRANEENS, 14 May 82) 13
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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� Document Describes Mining Activities in 1981
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS, li Jun 82) 18
Briefs
Insecurity in Libreville 21
~ Amoco's Gabon Activities 21
GAMBIA
Briefs
National Assembly Session 22
GUINEA
Briefs
Joint Danish Shipping Operations 23
Spanish Relations 23
KENYA
Analysis of Luhya, Naudi Land~Brawl
(AFRICA, Feb 82) 25
LIBERIA
Briefs
IDA Credit 27
Mining Project 27
NIGER ~ ~
Briefs �
Desertification Advancing 28
Belgian Cooperation 2a
~ NIGERIA
Problems in Labor Situation Reviewed ~
(Eddie Iroh; AFRICA, Apr 82) 29
SENEGAL .
Planned Cutback in French Cooperation Miasion Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 14 May 82) 31
Brief s
Stopover for British Military Aircraft 33
ZAIRE
Palitical, Economic Background Reviewed
(AFRICA, Apr 82) 34
~ b -
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i
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
BRIEFS
OPPOSITION MEMBERS IN F'RANCE--The presence in France of two members of the
opposition sought by the Central African police has angered the authoritie~ in
Bangui. One of the coauthors of the pro-Patasse coup d'etat attempt on 3 March,
General Bozize, is reported to have been living in a southern suburb of Paris
for 3 montha. As to Lt Col Kaso-Ngo, former leader of the MLPC [Central Afri- �
can People's Liberation MovementJ headed by Ange Patasse, he arrived in the
~ Frei?ch capital at the beginning of May after being expelled from the Congo.
French Miniaterial Delegate to the Ministry af External Relations for Coopera-
tion Jean-Pierre Cot wil?. doubtless, during his first trip to Bangui, which is
scheduled for 9 July, make an effort to alleviate the concerns of his inter-
~ locutors on the sub3ect of the activities of these two men. [Text][Paris
JEUNE AI~'RIQUE in Frencr. No 1119, 16 Jun 82 p 38][COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique
GRUPJIA 1982.] 5157
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CHAD
~ ItEASONS FOR VICTORY OF HISSEIN HABRE NOTED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1119, 16 Jun 82 pp 26-27
[Article by Siradiou Dia11o: "Chad--End of a Long March"]
[Text] Never two without the third. After having occupied Nd~amena twice
(in 1978 and 19?9) on a trial basis, Hissein Iiabre has just pulled off a veri-
table master coup with his third entry into the city. The leader of the Nor-
thern.Armed FoYCes (FAN) took over the capital of Chad at dawn on 7 June,
without encountering any real resistance there. Accompanied by th~ last group
of faithful follawers, President Goukouni Oueddei had crossed the Chari River
a short time previously, seeking refuge in Cameroon, just as Hisaein Habre had
done in 1980, when he was forced to leave Nd~amena when it v~as occupied by tl:e
forces of the Transitional National Union Government (GUNT), which were sup-
ported by Libyan air power and armored units.
The chief of the FAN chose to live in Maroua, 275 lrm to the south of Kousseri.
But since he planned to continue the war, the Cameroonian suthoritiea notified
him that he would have to leave the country. There is good reason to presume
that Goukouni Oueddei wil~. soon be the recipient of the same in~unction:
either to bury the war hatchet for good and remain in Cameroon, or to go else-
where. Perhaps to Algeria, whose ambassador in Yaounde is reported to have
been sounded out already in this connection by representatives of the van-
quished chief of state. Faced with the same alternative, Sissein Habre, for
his part, chose Sudan as the host natlon--a choice which paid off.
Established on the frontier between Sudan and Chad, in ~the little village of
D~enena, it did not take the chief of the FAN very long to reorganize his
troops, which included some 2,000 men at that time. Some were survivora from
Ndjamena, while others had come from other parts of Chad which the GUNT forcea
had subsequently occupied. The common denom~nator for a11 these men wae the
high level of their morale. And that was despite the crushing defeat auffered
some days earlier in Nd3amena. L~.1 the foreign commentatora were struck by
the confidence of Hissein Habre's supportera. Confidenee first of all in them-
selves, but also in their leader, for whom they were all ready to fight and
even make the supreme sacr~fice. United Nations experts, repreeentatives of
humanitarian organizationa, doctora and ~ournalists, without diatinction, were
keenly impressed by the determination of these guerrilla fightera,~the frugal�~
ity of their lives and the iron discipline which prevail.ed in their raaks.
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cjurirtered for the most part within their own country, their main leaders
included, the FAN :~enefited from firm support from abroad, beginning with
' neighboring S~~dan. As a rear base, this country provided Hissein Habre with
valuable logistic aid, despite the open hostility of the people who, in the
frontier region, are profoundly Mahdist and more or less sympathetic to
~ Qadhdhafi. Setting aside the other obstacles, including those having to do
with language, President Nimeiri gave massive and unfailing support to the
FAN. The retreat of the Libyan troops from Chad at the end of 1981, followed
shortly after~rdrd by the visit paid by Goukouni Oueddei to Khartoum, changed
nothing of this. The protests by the chief of state in Sudan concerning non-
intervention ~rere nothing buC a wartime ruse. He continued to aid the nation-
alist chief of the north well and truly.
Foodstuffs, weapons, ammunition and fuel bound for the zones controlled by the
FAN continued to pass through Sudan. From Egypt there came not only weapons
and ammunition taken from the arsenals established in earlier times by the
Soviets, but military advisers responsible for training recruits as well.
Communications were organized with the aid of Egyptian technicians and the
transmissions themselves were relayed by communications centers in Cairo. As
to the nerve center of the war, the money needed to buy foodstuffs, to pay the
soldiers and to finance the many missions abroad, it was mainly Saudi Arabia
which took charge.
Riyadh also pruvided Hissein Habre with considerable diplomatic support, not
only through it dense network of relations in the Arab world and in Africa,
but in the West as well. The fact that certain leaders turned such a deaf ear
to the repeated appeals for aid from the president of the GUNT cannot be ex-
plained otherwise. Finally, behind this curtain of inextricably involved com-
plicity and more or less indirect support was the United States. Determined to
oppose Quadhdhafi everywhere and by every means, the Americans had to support
the leader of the FAN. Hadn't Hissein Habre provided indications enough of his
hostility toward the turbulent Libyan leader?
Since the outcome of the Claustre affair, that French ethnologist he was forced
to release under a double in~unction from Goukouni and Qadhdhafi, he professed
- a fierce hatred of the latter. Since the enemy of its enemy was necessarily
its friend, the United States had hardly any problem in aiding Hissein Habre.
Strengthened by such soZid diplomatic support and served by a well-or$anized
and perfectly disciplined army, the chief of the FAN was bound to triumph.
Particularly when he was opposed only by an eclectic coalition representing
ill-restrained ambitions. The factions ma.king up the GUNT had r.2ither cohesion
nor a plan nor a true leader. "The only real force in this country is Hissein
Habre and him alone," we were told with a touch of bitterness in December of
1981 by Ahm.at Acyl, the GUNT minister of foreign affairs and lEader of the
Revolutionary Democratic Council. "If the inter-African force for maintaining
peace remains neutral and does not help us, he will make short work of us."
Now the ~AU contingent made of Nigerian, Senegalese and Zairean troops (3,000
men in all) has remainad with weapons at the order. ~
~ 3
Tn++ /'~TTT/'~T AT ~i(~n ATT? V
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After harassing the Libyan troops atationed in the eastern part of Chad, the
FAN followed in pursuit as soon as they began their~retreat in November 1981.
Immediately taking Abeche, and then Biltine and Faya-Largeau, Hissein Habre's
men made a lengthy stay in Oum Adjer. And after waging a harsh battle against
the government troops, they then took all the time they needed to reestablish
their ranks and their liaison and supply lines befbre launching a pincer opera-
tion against Nd~amena. After the fall of Ati, the stronghold of Ahmat Acyl's
Revolutionary Democratic Council, as well as Mongo and Mouasoro, nothing fur-
ther stood in the way of their entry into Ndjamena.
The only key position remaining along the route,to the capital was Massaguet,
80 km to the north of the capital. Now afLer 5 hours cf violent battle be-
tween the FAN and Goukouni's People's Armed Eorces, Massaguet, in turn, fell
on the evening of 5 June. ~ao days later, the FAN, commanded by Idriss Deby,
the deputy chiPf of the general staff, took Ndjamena.
This victory was the culmination of a long march undertaken 10 years ago by
Hissein Habre. His stubbornness proved strategically successful, even if,
tactically speaking, it sometimes played him dirty triclcs. This was the case
in 1980, when having refused to negotiate a cease-fire with Goukouni
he provided the prPSident of the GUNT with a golden pretext for appealing to
the Libyans to drive him out of Ndjamena. At the present time, it is Goukouni
Goukouni's turn to meditate on his stubbornness. For in the end it was his
categorical refusal to agree to any negotiations with his brother enemy (as
urged by the OAU) which led to his defeat. The fact remains that the resorC
to arms has finally determined the outcome of the long civil war in Chad, and
has brought forth a leader--Hisaein Habre, whose victory is now total and un-
challenged.
- Provided the redoubtable faction leader is able to prove himself a skillful
statesman. And can promote a policy of reconciliation, unity and national
understanding involving all the forces and all the individu~ls useful to peace.
And that he erases the errors of French diplomacy, which were after a11 only
the result of a misunderstanding. In order to bind up the wounds of Chad and
relaunch the train of its development, which has been standing, disabled, in
the station in Ndjamena for 15 years.
COPYRIGHT: .Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982.
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~
CHAD
BRI~FS
GOUKOUNI'S ACTIONS AGAINST GUNT MEMBERS--Former president Goukouni Oueddei
sought to clear the apace around him in the months which preceded his fall
(7 June) by eliminating all the lukewarm elements in the GUNT [Transitional
National Unio.i Government] suspected of wanting to deal with Hiseein Habre.
The first target was Col Kamougue, for whose arrest for "treason" Goukouni has
signed an order as of the end of January, with the agreement of certain offi-
ciais of the southern forces and a number of officers in the Chadian Armed
Forces (FAT) hostile to the colonel, whose military strength lies above all
with Felix Malloum's former gendarmes. The Zairean chief of atate, Mobutu
Sese Seko, was temporarily successful in suspendfng the ir~plementation of that
order. Goukouni then blamed Ahmat Acyl in this connection. This time, he was
to come up against the Libyan veto. [Text][Paris JEUNE AFRIQUF. in French
N~ 1119, 16 Jun 82 p 38][CO'cYRIGHT: Jeune AFrique GRUPJIA 1981.] 5157
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~ . CONGO
BRIEFS
COC TEMPORARY EXECIITIVE COI~IITTLE DISBANDED--The executive Commafter a
of the Brazzaville Chamber of Commerce has disbanded on 22 May
general meeting held under the chairmanship of the Congolese Minister of
Com~aerce, Elanga Ngaporo. According to the minister, the chamber's situation
is "disastrous" and ffiarked by a"disgraceful apathy." He also declared that
"things have not been clear" during the two inspections which took place
recently, in particular as regards management. ThE temporary executive
committee elected on government initiative is headed by Agathon Note,
OFNACOM [National Ma.rketing Office] general manager. The first vice president
is Marcel Castanou, SIAT [expansion unknownj, the second, MauriCe Ognamy
(press staif), the third, Prosper Gandzien. ihe treasurer is Andre Batanga,
BNDC [National Development Bank of the Congo]. Certain persons, without
_ being members of the Congolese government, have obaerved at times some short-
comings in the operation of the Brazzaville Chamber of Commerce, but the
decision to set up a temporary executive committee, at the very anment when
the Chamber of Co~eice was engaged as the headquarters of the federation of
commercial companies in Central Africa, and especially the charges made
against the management, have aroused anxiety among cae companies wh~.ch operate
operate in the Congo. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French No 1909, 11 Jun 82 p 15I.7, 1518] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie
Paris 1982] 8490 ~
STRENGTHENED ITALIAN COOPERATION--President Sasaou Nguesso received Rnberto
Palleschi, Italian aecretary of state for development cooperation on 2 June
in Brazzaville. At the conclusion of thi.s session, the Italian s~cretary of
state and theminister delegate to the preaident of the Congo, in charge of
cooper,ation, especially in the fields of public worke, fishing, mining,
energy and finance. [Text] [Paris MARCI~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French No 1909, 11 Jun 82 p 1518] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982]
8490
FCT CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING--The Central Committee of the Congolese Labor
Party (PCT), the country's single party, held a regular meeting at the beginning
of May, in Brazzaville, +co stuc~y the situati.on in Africa (Namibia, Western Sahara,
- Chad). Among other things, the Central Committ~e c.311ed on the OAU to become
unitad again on the matter of admitting the SDAR (Saharan Democratic Arab
Republic) in its ra~iks. (Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French No 1905, 14 May 82 p 1286) [COPYRIGHT~ Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982)
8796
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SPECIAL ASSEMBLY SESSION--The People's National Assembly of the Congo has been
c-c~nve ~ed on special session to study supporting measures for the 1982-1986 Five-
Year Plan. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET N~DITERRANEENS in French No
1905, 14 May 82 p 1286] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8~196
FRENCH AID, R(JMANIAN DELEGATION--Two financing agreements involving a total of
200 million CFA francs (4 million French francs) were recently signed in
Brazzaville between Congo and France. The two agreements deal with the agri-
cultural sector and more specifically, with agronomical research and small-
scale motorizatian. Also, a Romanian delegation headed by Marin Capisizu,
secretary of state for agriculture and food industry, has just paid an
official visit to the Congo. Among other things, the delegation had t.alks
with Henri Djombo, minister of water and forestry, and was received by Aime
Emmanuel Yoka, minister delegate to the president's office in charge of
cooperation. The delegation also toured several agribusiness plants in the
outskirts of Brazzaville. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French No 1905, 14 May 82 p 1266] (COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982)
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DJIBOUTI
AFAR ETHNICITY LINKED TO CREATION OF PPD
London AFRICA in English Feb 82 pp 33-34
[ Text N October, Djibouti officially that they were in the pay of a foreign
became a one-party state, under Power. The c~untry concerned was
Pres~dent Hassan (.iouted's ruling not specified, and the evidence for this
Rassemblement Populaire pour allegation, as for the others, has not
- Progres (RPP). It hardly seemed a been forthcoming.
necessary move - the country had nd
other recognized parties anyway. In
fact, the President'sdecisinn ta set up a
one-party state, passed unopposed by ~thnism
the Nat~onal Assembly, was sparked
off by an effort to get an opposit~on
party off the ground a couple of In fact it is certainly true that the
months earlier. creation of the PPD was an attempt to
This was the Partie Populaire de represent, essentially though not
_ Djibouti (PPD), promptly dubbed ap~arently exclusively, one of
, I3jibouti's two main ethn~cgroups, the
'anti-nationalistic and subversive by Afars. The majority of the Somali-
the Governmentwhen it went public in s aking Issas, the other main group,
mid-August. Within a month, the ~sup rt Pres~dent Hassan Gouled
entire 12-man executive committee of and his~ RPP, though the Prime
the proposed new party had been Minister, Barkat Gourad is an Afar
rounded up (thouqh half of them were himself.
released in the new year), and dozens Similarly one of the leading
more of their supporters were briefly members of the proposed new party
detained. And ~.v~th the National
Assembly's legal ban on any other Was the secretary general, Moussa
parties, the YYll lost any hope ofbeing Ahmed Idris, a former MP in the
registered, and any chance therefore French National Assembly in the mid-
of putting ?i~ candidates for the 1~ and an Issa. Most of the other
assembly eleceions which are due to be mecnbers of the PPD council were
held in a couple of months. however Afars; and they included two
former Prime Ministers, Ahmed Dini,
1fie Government's criticisms of the and Abdullat~. Khamil as well as three
PPD were extensive. President former Ministers, Hussein Jabah~
~ Gouled, who was out of the country Mohammed Issa Dit Sheiko and
when the PPD's leaders were arrested, Mohammed Siad Arabe and other
said on his return, that they had been ~ps, Ahmed Dini had resigned four
trym~ to encourage ethnism, and ears ago from hispo sition as Prime
ethnic superiority, and they had distri- ~viinister specifically alleging anti-
buted pamphlets, m itself illegal, and Afar activity by the RPP.
even, he alleged, tned to embezzle I~ fact the Afars have been restive
state funds. Anothe* accusation was since independenc~ in 1977. Underthe
French, the Afa~s were the ruling
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- group and the [ssas who made up an of ~e IVIajerteen cTan~~omaTia, and
estimated 40 per cent of the country's he has been living in exile for some
population, were the critics. The Afars years. While apparently uninvotved in
compris,e some 35 per cent of the the opposition politics of' the Somali
' population, and the remaining 25 per National Movement, or similar
cent are Arabs from North or South organlzations, two of his brothers
Yemen, and Somalis from Somalia, inside Somalia were arrested by
who, not surprisingly tend to align with President Siad Barre's regime and
the RPP. held for some months recently. There
_ ln claiming that the RPP and the Was some reason therefore to believe
Government is unjust ethnically and Osman's death could have been
that it is partial, the Afars point, for olitical. Whether or not he was a
exainple to the amnesty announced for P.
five of D'ibouti's 11 political prisoners v~ctim, as opposition sources allege, of
� in July. ~is left six still held - all Somali hit s.~uads, cannot be
Afars (all convicted of bomb attacks). confirmed; and no evidence has been
produced that t~.e Somali regime is
Dini has also argued that Afars are even prepared t~? deal with its enemies
denied jobs, that F~ench caoperants inthisway. Nev~:r!heless,theDjibouti
are normally sent to non-Afar areas Government ce~tainly believes that
while Afar areas are generally neglec- the roots of G~:nan's murder lie in
ted, that the Government has faled in Somalia itself.
its development promises and it has Equally, the episode ;.nderlines the
alsc~ failed to carry out such matters as vulnerab~lty of the state, and it
removing the fences and check points demonstratesexactlywhytheGovern-
around Djibouti town. Ironically, it ment is so keen that the substantial
was Dini himself who was responsible French presence in Djibouti remains
for keeping these operation unchan ed. At the moment there are
immediately after independence. some 1~,000 Frenchmen in D'ibouti,
T'he appearance of the PPD, despite as well as around 4,000 troops ~includ-
the Government's immediate dism~s- ing a demi-brigade of the Foreign
sal of it as a tiny group and purely Legion), a squadron of Mirages 3s,
ethnic, shook the administration and a substant~al naval task force, in
badly. A number of the RPP s own theterritory of300,000people. France
Afar MPs swiftly changed parties, of course also provides aid of some 20
Eosing rent free Government houses in m~llion dollars a year as well as pays
the process. The whole episode made a~ound 200 million a year foi ~ts
it clear that President Gouled's theory troops, co-operants and other
of consensus politics is even more personnel. France's interest is
fragile thae had appeared on the strategic, as Djibouti commands the
surface. narrow Bab el Mandeb straight un the
Equ ~ily, worrying for the Govern- Red Sea where so much oil st~ll passes.
mer.~ were th links that the PPD might And, the US, similarly appreciates
have been forging with nei~hbouring the strategic importance of the port of
Ethiopia. The PPG even cla?med to be Djibouti; for the f~rst time in 1979, US
soc~alist, and Dini, on a recent visit to warships paid more visits to Djibouti
Addis Ababa, got a very warm than French ones did. That is in fact a
reception. Since independence, connection that President Gouled
Pres~dent Gouled has been watchful of remains cautioas about. He strongly
both his neighbours and equally .condemned the US/Egypt, Sudan,
distrustful of both. The President is Somalia and Oman military
concerned that neither strt~uld have manouveres last year, Bright Star 82.
too much to do with Djibouti. Indeed he even Postponed the annual
The Government has reason to be Franco-Djibouti mil~tary manouveres
wary. In December, for example there co avoid any sup,~gestion of possible
was the fatal shooting of a doctor involvement ~n Bnght Star, which was
Osman in the centre of the capital. also bitterly cnt~cised by two of his
There has been no proof of who was neighbours, Ethiopia and South
responsible, but Osman wasa member Yemen.
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Many. in D ibouti do resent the
French, and c~aim with reason that
their attitudes are colonial. They say
that almost alll of the 200 million
dollars a year spent on the troops and
advisers goes straight back to France,
that the French wages are too hi~h, ~
that the French really run everything
and so on. There is more than a grain of
truth in all this. But still France is
needed by everybody. Ethiopia and
Somalia can't trust each other.
As the episode of the PPD empha-
sises, Afars and Issas remain more
than partially unreconciled, and the
French do st~ll hoid the ring to some
degree. So even the bitterest critics of
French policy in Africa mute their
criticism of D~ibouti.
President ~ouled has b~en surpri-
singly successful in getting aid from
Arab states - 60 million dollars from
Saudi Arabia since 1977, as much
promised by Iraq, as well as sums from
Kuwait, the Emirates and Libya. But
it's not enough. With virtually no
resources (though there is now a real
possibility that there is deep level
water to be found with aU that this
would mean for agriculture) and
thousands of refugees stiil in the
country, who tled from the ~ghting in
Ethiopia four years ago, Djibouti
needs all the help it can get. �
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Africa Journals Ltd., ISSN 0044~6475
CSO: 4700/1454
; ~
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ETHIOPIA
J TRIPARTII~? aLLIANC~ SEEKS TO CURB 'U. S. IMPERIALISM'
- London AFRICA in Engliah Feb 82 pp 44-45 . ~
[Text] N response to joint military man- Ethiopia's Foreign NLinister, Col.
'oeuvres, code-named Bri~t Star Feleke Gedle-Giorgis, in a note to US
82, involving Egypt, Sudan, omalia, Secretary of State, Alexander Haig.
and Oman, orgamsed and financed by Feleke warned that Ethiopia will be
the United States of America, the forced to re-exaTnine the premises of
foreign ministers of Ethiopia, Libya, its entire policy towards the US
and South Yemen recently held an should the manoeuvres involve ac-
emergency meeting in A.ddis Ababa tions detrimental to Ethiopia's
at which they analyzed, and ultimate- national interests. No details on what
ly criticized, operation Bri~ht Star. this reassessment could entail were
Many diplomats in Add~s Ababa, given but the fact that it was still a
both Eth~opia's allies and others, say question of `should' the operation
little else could have been done. The prove detrimental, led some obser-
harshest, and most extreme, methods vers to believe that Ethiopia was still
of retaliation would have been the leaving its door to the US slightly a~ar.
closure of, or further demand of ~er- Feleke regards operation Bnght
sonnel cut-backs at, the Amencan Star as a'war reheatsal', and believes
embassy; an Iranian-style anti- the American RDF (Rapid Deploy-
American demonstration outside the ment Force) deserves another
embassy, which was rumoured to acronym, the QIF, or Quick Interven-
have been planned; or an unlikely call tionist Force. One of the stated results ~
for joint manoeuvres with the USSR of the emergency meeting was
in response. Ethiopia's. deeper integration into the
None of these acts of vengeance socialist camp. But, how much deeper
was suggested, let alone carried out. ;t can go is a common ripost~.
Observers in Addis Ababa say prob- Ethiopia already considers its
ably because such a reaction would
have la ed ri ht into Rea an's national and internat~onal interests as
hands. Ethiopia also remains able to Part and parcei of those of the socialist
camp. An even more profound fusion
protest, along with its allies, that it has W~th Libya, Washington's pet hate
never gone so far as to practise joint these days, is de~nitely an offshoot of ~
war operations with the Soviets. Such o eration Bri ht Star and the ~ ~
joint manoeuvres, outside of being emergency getg-together. Not only
, farfetched, would not go down very because of EthioQia's will, but Libya's
well inside Ethiopia. belief that the Bnght Star manceuvres
were above all aimed at its Jamahir-
W8~111f1g iyah. Therefore, this time around,
regardles of domestic oil revenue
Instead of anything drastic, some ailments at home, promised Libyan
pretty vehement words flowed from
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aid to Ethiopia is, and will continue, oPenly termed a`sunogate' that has
coming thr~ugh. `succumbed to US impenalism. It is
While fusion characterizes Libyan Q~ rhaps telling the Ethiopian Foreign
- Ethiopian relations, a widemng M~ster that spoke of the three
~issure pernneates those with Sudan. If allies' right to stand `steadfast' again~r
any novel item emerged from the provocat~ons.
Official US - Ethiopian relatians
emergency session in Addis Ababa, it are in a state on constant decline. The
was Ethiopia s unleashed and unres- tendency is for both countries to
trained diatribe against Sudan, along entrench ~ntc, politically opposite cor-
. w~rh ~Ethiopia'~ regular o~ponents. ners, with a welcoming glave only
Since Gacldafi's denunc~at~on of occasionally extended for econamic
Suclanese President Nimeiri at Addis aid agreements. The ~ap between the
Aba~ba's Revo[ution Square last Aug- two, far from nanow~ng, is widening
ust, Feleke has mar.aged to walk a to a seemingly unbridgeable gulff.
narrow ~iiplomatic line, with a degree During the same week of operation
uf equilibnum, concerning Sudan. All Bright Star in Egypt, the central
efforts were geared t salvaging the committee of the Commission to
F,ard-won ~ut sinking roapproach- Organize the Party of the Working
ment. Operation Bright Star has en- People of Ethiopia (COPWE) held its
~:ied all the neighbourly pretence. Third Re^alar Plenary Session.
Although many other issues deman-
Intervsntion ded discussion, ~ncluding the vvhat,
when, where and how of organizing
Feleke spoke of retardation of the the party, a conclusive statement of
achievements of cooperation in the pr~or~ties was that Ethio~ia should
region, and particularly with Sudan, strengthen its defence caQability in
because of 'American intervention.' the face of the 'serious ~mpenal~st
It is probably no coincidence that a threat' that Ethiopia and its aliies
reported upsurge in the Eritrean war obviously perceive.�
practically accompanied this de-
terioration in Sudanese - Ethiopian
relations. Although the Sudan has '
~ clipped the win s of the Eri~rea
Liberation Front ~ELF) by disarming
and confining many of its members,
the Eritrea People's Liberation Front
(EPLF) is apparently enjoying re-
newed Sudanese collaboration. It is
now wondered if Sudanese-Ethiopian
relations have reached a point of no
return.
Sudan's cooperation in containing
Eritrean secession is still a priority in
Ethiopia's foreign policy. However, ~t ,
now appears that, in a quid pro quo
situation, the carrot is bem~ replaced
by the stick. In the fore~gn nol~cy
opinion of Ethiopia, althougi~ Cadda-
fi is not entirely trusted by all as an
ally, he is considered irreversibly
anti-imperialist. Nimeiri on the other
hand, especiaUy after Bright Star, is ~
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Africa Journals Ltd. ISSN 0044�6475
CSO: 4700/1452
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GABON
.
' 1QATION'S ECONOMTC SITUATION IN 1~81 ANALKZED ~
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82 pp
1284-1285
~r~erpt,~ In 1981r Gabon, like the rest of the developing countries, suf-
fered the repercussions of the economic crisis experienced by the industrial+
ized countries. All its main export commodities (timber, manganese, uranium
and even petroleum) were affected. But while the price of timber 3nd uranium
remained stagnant and even dropped at times, the recovery of the American cur-
rency h ad a favorable effect on the prices of ma.nganese ore and petroleum in
terms of their value in CFA francs.
It is therefore likely that total earnings fr~*_^ Gabonese exports increased
again in 1981. Yet, a rather exceptional increase in the country's imports
caused a certain slippage in the usual surplus of its balance of payments.
In any case, judging by the growth of.its external net assets, the balance of
payments of Gabon was in good shape in 1981. The same can be said regarding
- the position of the Gabonese treasury in relation to the ban;cing system.
On the other hand, the final months of the yeaa- were marked by an inflationary
pressure which created some social problems ancl which, in January 1982, led
the government to grant a wave increase for the first time in 2 years.
The year of 1982 looks less promising than the previous one. No big improve-
ment is expected regarding the situation of timber, manganese and uranium.
_ The upheavals experienced by the oil markets could also deFrive the govern-
ment in Libreville of part of its expected revenues and forcP it to cut some
of the expenditurec included in the 1982 budget.
Agricultural Production
Cocoa--In 1980-1981, just over 2,800 tons of cocoa were marketed, this amounts
to 1,000 tons less than in 1979-1980 and 1,500 tons less than in 1978-1979.
'fhis significant drop was partly due to the fact that less cocoa was smuggled
into the country. Other contributing factors were the old age of the cocoa
plantations, the damage caused by brown rot, the shortage of manpower and the
failure to increase the prices paid to farmers.
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Yet it should be noted that at the beginning of the 1981-1982 crop year, farm
prices were renegotiated for the second consecutive time. It is true that
these prices are still slightly higher than the prices paid in other African
countries, particularly in ~ameroon and in the Ivory Coast, at least as far
- as top-quality cocoa is concerned (320 ~FA francs per '::.lo).
In any case, the 1981-1982 crop year seems to have started well since, at the
end of its 3rd month,the harvest was more advanced than in the previous year.
Coffee--In contrast~i:o what happened with the cocoa, more coffee was marketed
in 1980-1981 tha:~'~ 1979-1980 (around 1,700 tons compared to 1,300 tons). But
it seems that the gaias registered we~e the result of more coffee being
smuggled from neighboring count~ies rather than an increase in the country's
production.
- As in the case of~cocoa, the price paid for coffee remained~unchanged for the
second time a~ound during ti~e 1981-1982 farming year. But it must be pointed
out that this price, which stands at 180 CFA francs for 1 kilo of coffee
berries, is decidedly higher than the prices paid in other French-speaking
African countries. In any case, prospects,remain uncertain in the current
farming year.
Other Crops--Very little information is available regarding agr~cutural pro-
ducts other than cocoa and coffee. Hawever, it is knawn that in 1981 Gabon's
sugar production was down compared to 1980 (14,000 tons instead of 17,20U
tons) although it produced more than was needed to meet the country's needs.
Forestry Production
Until the end of the first half of 1981, Gabon had been Lslatively untouched
by the prolonged crisis which affected the market of tropical woods ar_d even
- the timber market in general. For instance, the National Timber Company of
Gabon (SNBG) managed to export a].most the same amount of okoume wood as in
1980 and its foreign sales of ozigo wood were even slightly up.
For the entire year of 1981, results were distinctly less satisfactory. The
SNBG bought 17 percent less okoume wood and 29 percent less ozigo wood than ~
in the previous year. This company's exports decreased to a much lesser
extent (5 percent for okoume wood and 16 percent for ozigo wood). On the
other hand, local sales of okoume wood plunged drastically (39 percent) while
sales of ozigo--which had severely shrunk i.n 1980--recovered and almost went
back to their 1979 level.
It should be pointed out that despite the economic crisis, France continued
to be a good client for Gabon. In 1981, French imports of okoume and other
Gabonese woods were slightly up.
Mining and Industrial Production
As in the case of forestry production, the mining sector of Gabon suffered
- the effects of the crisis in the industrialized countries.
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~
Manganese ore exports seem to have been most seriously affected: in 1981, the
shipments made through the port of Pointe-Noire dropped by 28 percent:
1,543,000 tons in 1981 co~ared to 2,137,000 tons in 1980.
The COMUF ~'ranceville Uranium Mining Company] was apparently worse hit than
the COMILOG ~gonue Mining Company7 since it seems that the amount of uranium
mined in Gabon remained practically unchanged (1,033 tons in 1980, 1,024 tons
in 1981) and that exports decreased just very slightly--999 tons in 1980,
9 46 tons in 1981.
- But the volume of crude oil pumped continued to decline: according to special-
ized publications, only 7.65 million tons were pumped, compared to 8.9
million tons in 1980, which amounts to a 14-percent decline. All things con-
sidered, the best results appear to have been achieved in the production of
natural gas where shipments (83.8 million cubic meters) went up by 17 percent
compared to 1980 (71.9 million tons) and by 38 percent compared to 1979.
Gabon does not publish an industrial production index. Also, there are n~
figures for the consumption of high-voltage electricity in 1981, which had
amounted to 309.5 million kilawatts per hour in 1980, a 10-pereent increase.
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to have an overall picture of the
recent activity in the indtistrial enterprises of Gabon.
But we know that the refineries continued to operate at less than full capa-
city and that, in 1981, the two refineries put together processed slightly
less crude oil than ~,n 1980: 1.2 million tons compared to 1.28 million tons.
The timber industry was obviously affected by the repercussions of the crisis.
For instance, Fren.:h imports of wood sawings from ~sibon dropped by more than
half in 1981 (2,200 cubic meters co~ared to 5,100 cubic meters in 1980).
Things were slightly better with veneer wood and plywood, mainly as a result
of a marked increase of sales in the foreign market.
Prices and Wages
We know that after the first petrbleum "boom," Gabon experienced a disturbing
inflation. After that, prices settled dawn and for quits a while Gabon was
one of the Black African countries with a slower rate of inflation. But
towards the end of 1981 there was a recurrence of inflationary pressures.
It is true that despite a noticeable increase in the chapter of "building and
public works" (21.2 percent), the wholesale price index rose by just 9.8 per-
cent between November 1980 and November 1981. 3ut retail prices rose more
sharply, going up by 13.7 ~ercent for high-income households_and, more sig-
nificantly, by 15.8 percent for low-income hauseholds between December 1980
and December 1981.
Consumers were badly affected by these increases because wages had not been
raised since the beginning of 1980. As a result, hhere were strikes, par-
ticularly in Port-Gentil, and the government was forced to increase the
' monthly interoccupational guaranteed minimum sglary from 30,000 to 35,000
CFA francs andt~?e "~.nimum monthly income" from 40,000 to 50,000 CFA francs.
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Foreign Trade
Export Prices--The S1QBG ~has not changed its buying and selling price lists
since 15 April 1980, a far.t which has created problems for the timber enter-
prises and for the S1J~G i~self since production costs have gone up.
In this respect, the COMILOG fared better becaus~ the dollar prtce of mangan-
ese ore was slightly up when the contracts for the 1980 shipments were con-
c luded. Taking into account the recovery of th~ American currency, the
increase in terms of CFA francs was obviously much higher: according ~to
statistics issued by UNCTAD, this increase wa~in excess of 30 percent for
the en*_ire year of 1981.
During a certain period, Gab on, like most of the other oil-producing coun-
tries, had to lower its crude oil prices~in dollars. But here again, the
recovery of the American currency had a favorable effect in terms of the con-
version into CFA francs: in 1981, the average CIF ,rCOSt, insurance,
freight] price of Gabonese petrolewn imported by France was 972.3 French
francs a ton while in 1981 that price jumped to 1,470.31 French franes which
~ represents an increase of 51 percent.
Al1 things considered, uranium was the :o~o~iity most severely hit since,
apparently, its average selling price went dawn by 10 percent.
Volume Exported--We reported earlier the changes which took place in the
amounts of manganeae ahipped from Pointe-Noire. Not counting the shipments

' of petroleum, 1.1 million tons of ~oods were shipped to foreign destinations
from Librevillec�and Port-Gentil during the first 9 months of 1981 compared
to 1.5 million tons for the same period in 1980. This was a considerable
~ drop and timber and petroleum products account for most of it.
During these first 9 months of the yea~, shipments of crude oil fram Port-
Gentil are reported to have decreased by 2 million tons or 33 percent. But
such a drastic decline needs to be confirmed.
Total Valu,~ of Exports--Gabonese atatistics concerning foreign trade in 1981
are still. unavailable. Under these circumstances one has to turn to French
staristi~s and to those compiled, although less trequently, by the OECD.
French imports from Gab on amounted to 2;27y.6 millian French franes in 1981
compared to 2,723.3 million in 1980. This 16 percent drop was mainly due
to a decxease, in quantity as well as in value, of crude oil shipments.
French purchases of Gabonese products other than petroleum also dropped by
slightly more than 5 percent.
The statistics of the OECD reveal decidedly be,tter results. In fact, duf~ing
tne first 11 months of the.year, the dollar value of Gabonese exports to
countries which are members of the OECD went down by just 3.8 percent, but
tak~ng into account the recovery of the American currency this meant an in-
crease of about 24 percent in terms of CFA francs.
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Therefore it is reasonable to believe that unless Gabon's exports went into
a sudde:~ decline towards the end of the year, their valu~ increased in 1981
even though their volume had dropped.
I~nport Prices--Every 2 months, ti~e Gabonese Statistics Service publishes a
who~esale price index for imnorted goods but, from time to time, sharp varia-
tions appear int~e annual rates of increase reflected by that index and these
variations are hard to expla~.n. We will only mention, without comment, that
the rate of increase, which was less than 9 percent for March and July 1981,
jumped to 17.9 percent in May and to 12.6 percent in November.
Volume of Imports--Judging from the traffic of inerchandise through the ports
of Libreville and Port-Gentil, the volume of goods imported by Gabon increased
sharply in 1981. During the fir~t 9 months of that year, 305,000 tons of
goods were unloaded in these two ports compared to 258,000 tons in 1980. But '
it must be pointed out~that far fewer goods were unloaded in 1980 than in
1979.
Total Value of Imports--In 1981, French exports to Gabon rose by 17 percent in
terms of value (2,158.1 million French francs compared to 1,844.1 million in
1980) but the increase was relatively small in terms of volume. On the other
hand, the sum of exports from all the OECD countries to Gabon du~~ing the first
11 months of the year rose by more than 7 percent in terms.of dollars, which
means around 38 percent in terms of CFA francs. So there is re~ison to believe
that there was a particularly sharp increase of Gabonese impor~cs in 1981.
Trade Balance--The deficit in France's balance of trade with Gabon was con-
siderably reduced in 1981 due, as already pointed out, to a drop in t~Ze pur-
chases of Gabonese crude oil. Also, the negative balance of trade between the
OECD countries and Gabon was reduced by $100 million during the first 11
months of the year. Although these are provisional and partial figures, one
may well wonder if, under these conditions, the surplus usually regis~;~red by
Gabon's balance of trade was not smaller than usual in 1981.
Balance of Payments and Monetary Situation--Without recent balance of payment
figures, one must look at the changes registered in the net external assets
to have an idea of Gabon's financial dealings with foreign countries. The net
external assets, which had been in the red for a long time, moved back into
the black column as of November 1980. On 31 October of last year, they
amounted to almost 43 billion CFA fsancs, having increased by more than 47
billion in 1 year. It should be noted that during that period Gabon made
repayments of $6.6 million to the International Monetary Fund and that, by
31 October 1981, its standing debt to that institution was only $13 million.
As for the money supply, it registered gains but the annual rate of increase
(18 percent according to the latest available figures) remains within seemingly
normal limits. On the other hand, credits to the economy, which for many
months had increased at a relatively slaw pace, rose appreciably up towards the
end of the year (20 percent between 31 October 1980 and 31 October 1981).
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris i982
8796
CSO: 4719/977
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GABON
DOCUMENT DESCRIBES MINING ACTIVITIES IN 1981
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1909 11 Jun 82 p 1516
[TextJ A document drawn up by Gabon's general Administration of Mining and
Geology hae just aummarized mining operationa in Gabon in 1981.
Production
The most strfking event of the year is the net drop in export of manganese
ore, whose tonnage decreased by 30 percent compared with the usual sales level
in recent years.
Petroleum production also declined comgared with 1980, 7,651,864 tona
compared with 8,895,005 tona, or 14 percent, artth recent diacoveries npt
yet making up for the normal drop of the main production fields.
Petroleum prospecting is still very active, as in previous years, and is
making progress in the number of wells bored (29 compared with 20 in 1980) ~
and the length drilled (56,791 meters compar~d with 37,453 meters in 1980).
Four new diecoveries and two confirmations of workable deposits are reported.
As regards development of the fields greater activity is also observed: 46
wells bored in 1981 compared with 24 in 1980. 1~o new fields have gone into
production, Ayol and M'Polunie. The starting of operation of the new
discoveries should stabilize production as early as 1982 and allow an increase
beginni.ng in 1983, the General Adminiatration of Mining estimates.
The refineries of Port-Gentil, SOGARA [expanaion unknowa] and COGER [ELF
Gabonese Refining Company] have together procesaed more than 1,193,6`35
~ tons of crude oil in 1981. Export of crude oil was 6,298,803 tons. It was
distributed as follows: United Statea 23.4 percent, France 14 percent,
Brazil 12.8 percent, Netherlande 9.3 percent and Chile 8 percent.
Production of manganese ore was only 1,481,538 tona compared with 2,163,380
tons in 1980. This sizeable decrease in production is explained bq the drop
in salea caused by the liquidation of stocka among producers of ferro-
manganese which has cauaed a drop in demand. To that is added a considerable
decrease of purctiases by some Eastern European countries, especially Poland
and Rumania which are badlq hit by the economic crisis.
i8
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However it is observed that as regards the value of the exports of manganese
ore, the considerable rise in the exchange rate of the dollar has nc~ticeably
mitigated the effscts of the reduction of the tonnage exported. These
exports are distributed as follows: France 22.83 percent, Norway 15.27
percent, United States 12.72 percent, Canada 9.05 percent, Italy 7.80 percent,
Asia 5.72 percent, Eastern European countriea 4.86 percent, Belgium 4.86
percent, Mexicc~ 4.54 percent, etc. The prospects for 1982 are uncertain,
accord~ng to the document which we refer to.
As regards uranium, the market situation has shown little development and
taking into account sales opportunities is~ close to that of the previous year:
1,360 tons of concentrate containing 1,022 tons of uranium metal compared
with 1,381 tons of concentrate containing 1,033 tons of uranium metal in 1980.
On the other hand, the sales price in current francs ia considerably below
that of the preceding year, about 14 percent.
In spite of economic and operational conditions.which are much more difficult
than in recent years, the development program of the means of production has
continued. The Boyindzi mine has begun production since the beginning of
the year and the units of the new processing plant have been completed on
schedule, that is the beginning of 1982. Market development forecasts do
not allow envisaging a much appreciably higher production in 1982. Tonnage
shoul3 increase about 10 percent, wtth the average price being on the 1980
1 evel .
Mineral Prospecting, Cartography in 1981
Prospecting concentrated on three substances in 1981: uranium, gold and
barite.
Uranium is the "number one substance" because of the extent of the facilities
used, the General Mining Administration points out. The Gabonese state
association COGEMA [General Nuclear Materials Company, CFr.]-KEPCO [expansion
unknown] has continued its program of evaluating the indications of the
North Leyou sector in the Lastoursville area, it has done 13,500 meters of
boring there. On the whole, the results of the w~ork are not very encouraging.
COGEMA has continued, on its own account, the geological prospecting of the
South-Franceville area and made a dozen borings for this purpose amounting to
5,500 meters. COMUF [Franceville Uranium Mining Company] has done 1,175
meters of boring on its indications in Lekedi and Bagombe.
In the case of gold, the Eteke :;ndicate made up of the Gabonese state,
BRGM [Geological and Mining Exploration Office] and COMUF has continued its
prospecting in the Eteke-Ovala area. A number of extensive mineralized
areas have been revealed at Ovala and Ndombo-Mobi. Proving these indications
by bore-holing will be done in 1982.
As regards barite, after stopping prospecting for lead and zinc, the
Kroussou syndicate concentrated exploration on barite, numberous indications
of which had been obse~rved along the socle-cretaceous contact. It made a
certain number of tests of geochemical anomalies in the Mayombe mountain
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group as well as prospecting indications of already known mineralizations.
'Ifao indications on the axis of Mayumba-Tchibanga road seem interec~ting. They
will be studied in detail in 1982.
The progra.m of cartography at 1/200,000 and of a mining inventory of the
area crossed by the T~-ansgabon continued in 1981. A radar survey of all the
territory financed by the development budget was made at the end of December
1981. It was made by the American company, Aero Service Corporation. On
the other hand, the national geo~ogical service and the BRGM prospected and
surveyed a section of about 6,500 square meters in the provinces of 1'Eatuaire
(East-Cocobeach) and Woleu-Ntem (southern Mitzic).
In 1982, it is planned to make I30,00f_1 square kilometers of aerogeophysical
survey and 8,000 square kilometers of geological eurvey at 1/200,000 of these
areas. Part of the geophysical survey will be f inanced by EDF [European
Development Fund], with FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund] contributing to the
completion of the geological w~ork of cartography.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
84 90
CSO: 47i9/1118 .
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GABON
1 BRIEFS
INSECURITY IN LIBREVILLE--Since the middle of May, security checks have
become more frequent in Libreville to combat increased banditry there.
According to the government's daily L'UNION of 5 June 1982, about 500
persons, "mainly nonGabonese" have been caught breaking the law since the
beginning of the checks. The Gabonese minister of axternal affairs, Martin
Bongo, summoned on 4 June all the chiefs of diplomatic mission accredited
in Gabon for a report regarding the s~curity of residents in Libreville.
Martin Bongo declared the capital is "unsafe, so the government has taken
measures to pratect the people. Consequently the security forces are going
to proceed with fairly strict checks, eapecially of all automobiles moving
about in the city." These checks, the minister emphasized, are not directed
against def inite persons. "It has been ascertained that criminals use cars
with different license plates, so the police must check exteusively," even
when it involves vehicles belonging to foreign embassiea. The security forces
which were represented at this meeting by colonel ma3or, Leon Osiali,
director general of documentation, are obliged to "meet violence and shoot
in their turn," the ninister declared. A spokesman of the ministry,
indicated at the end of the report to L'IJNION that the nationals guilty of
crimes on Gabonese territory would "be repatriated on the responsibility of
their embassies" without prejudice to the punitive.measures which could have
been taken against them. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAU~X ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French No 1909, 11 Jun 82 p 1517J [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris
1982] 8490
AMOCO'S GABON ACTIVITIES--President Bongo granted an intervi~r on 3 June in
Libreville to George Trump, president a~d general manager of Amoco Gabon,
an affiliate of Standard 011 of Indiana, the world's seventl: oil company.
The conversation, which took place with the United States Ambassador, Terry
McNamara, present, inv~olved this company's operations in Gabon, which began
. in May 1980. Since this date, it is reported by a source close to the
�Gabonese minister of petroleum, Amoco Gabon has made six operational borings
in the area south of Port Gentil, of which �our have shown definite
commercial possibilities. These four bore holes are now producing 10,614
barrels of petroleum a day, it is reported from the same source. Amoco
Gabon, which intends to increase this production to 33,000 barrels per day
- in 1984, has invested 20 billion CFA francs in Gabon until now and expects
to invest 30 more billion between now and 1984. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1909, 11 Jun 82 p 1517] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8490
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r~~~ ~?rri~ i ~~F~ ~~Ni.~~
c~~
BRIEFS ,
NATIONAL ASSEI~I.Y SESSION--The Gambian National Assembly, elected on last
5 May, met for the first time on 2 June at Ban3u1. The assembly is made up
of 27 membera of the PPP [People's Progressive Party] (the party of
President Sir Dawds Jawara), five independent deputies (�ormer PPP members,
elected although they had not obtained the party's approval), three members
of the National Convention Party, as well as five representatives of the
traditional chiefs and eight de~~utiea appointed by the chief of state.
The deputies reelected as president Sir Aleieu Souleiman Jack, who has held
_ this position for 15 years after havir~g been the last governor o~ Gambia
before its independence. In a statement, the vice president of the republic,
Bakary Darba, congratulated President Jawara for having "thwarted the
attempted coup d'e�~t of 30 July 1981 and permitted the holding of free
elections, which proved his popularity." He also emphasized the increased
importance of the role of the Gambian deputies, a certain number of whom will
become members of the Senegambia Confederated Aasembly. [TextJ ~[Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1909, 11 Jun 82 p 1508]
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paria 1982] 8490
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MOR nFMI('IAL IISF. (1N1.Y
GUINEA
BRIEFS
JOINT DANISH SHIPPING OPERATIONS--In October 1981, the Guinean Shipping Co, a
national company of the Guinean Republic, signed in Conakry a cooperation agree-
ment with the Danish shipping firm A/S Deep Sea Shippinq Ltd (DSS) based in
Copenhagen. The aim of the contract was to help the Guinean Shipping Co by
training its seagoing and land personnel and chartering or buying ships which
will be jointly operated. As part of the contract, the Danish ship Gudrum-
Maersj has been chartered and will be operated jointly by the Guinean Shipping
Co and the DSS. On 15 April, that ship was handed over to its operators in
Hamburg where it took cargo, then proceecled to Ipswich, Antwerp and Rouen en
route for Dakar, Conakry and Freetown. On its northbound voyage, it will unload
in Nantes, Caen and probably Antwerp. It is a shelter-deck ship of 3,700 tpl
fdead-weight tons] which was built in 1977 with two hatchways measuring 19.2 by
10.5 meters and its cargo handling equipment consists of two 10-ton and two 25-
ton cranes. The DSS has already been operating four ships on regular service
to the ports of Hamburg, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Ipswich and Rouen, and in Africa to
the ports of Dakar, Kamsar and C~nakry in Guinea, Freetown in Sierra Leone,
Monrovia and Buchanan in Liberia. They call in Antwerp every 10 days and in the
_ other ports every 2 weeks. Out of Europe, they carry miscellaneons cargo in
conventional freight or in containers measuring 20 by 40 feet, motor vehicles
and heavy parcels. They also carry goods from the United States or from the
~ Far East, mostly from China, after transhipment in Antwerp. It must also be
pointed out that the two shipping companies plan to purchase one or two ships
in 1982 for their joint operations and these ships will sail under the Guinean
flag with Guinean crews. Guinean land personnel will also be trained in the
European offices of the DSS. In Rouen, the forwarding agent is the Agence
Maritime de la Basse Seine [Basse Seine Maritime Agency]. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82 p 1271] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982]8796
SPANISH RELATIONS--After having stopped for 12 hours in Rabat during which he
met Moroccan prime minister, Maati Bouabid, and several members of the
government, the Guinean chief of state, Ahmed Sekou Toure, paid a 3-day
off icial visit to Spain from 25 to 27 May. The Guinean president had talks
with King Juan Carlos, Leopaldo Calvo Sotelo, prime minister of the Spanish
government, Jose PedXO Perez Llorca, minister of foreign affairs and
lieutenant general Alvaro Lacalle, chairman of the council of the chiefs of
the general staff. The Guinean delegation was ma.de up namely of the ministers
of external affairs, energy, agriculture, fisheries and livestock and
fircally education. The discussions involved improving bilateral cooperation
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in [he field of fiehing, the coming signing of a cultural cooperation
;?~~reement--which will allow Guinean students to study in Spain--increasing
trade between the tw~o countries and the means for Spain to reduce its deficit
with Conakry. Now very slight, trade between the two countries shows, in
fact, a strong imbalance in Guinea's favor. In 1981 Spai~'s purchases in
the People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea am~unted to 6.2 billion
pesetas (about 60 million dollara) whi~ e Spain's sales were just 920 million
pesetas (some 9 million dollars. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCAES TROPICAUR ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1909, 11 Jun 82 p 1509] [COPYRIGHT: Rene M~oreux
et Cie Paris 1982] 8490
CSO: 4719/1118
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FOR OMFI('IA1. 1~~1~: nN1.Y
: RENYA
ANALYSIS OF LUHYA, NAUDI LAND BRAWL
London AFRICA in English Feb 82 p 42
[ Text ] F all its multi-faceted political land. Precisely who the aggrieved
Oand economic problems, there is party were was not established. The
little doubt as to one of Kenya's prime two neighbouring groups are not
and most sensitive tribulations. The known particularly to hate one
problem of land ownership is a daily another. But scarcely has it been
preoccupation of the vast ma~ority of known, until the November clashes,
the country's populace. It has been that there was a simmering land
debated privately and pubiicly, has dispute between them.
dominated parliamentary sessions for Luhyas involved in the fighting told
years, but the solution still appears far journalists that they had been subject
beyond the horizon. to persistent Nandi attacks over what
It is not a problem that just sprung the Nandis said was an occuparion of
up the other day. It is a problem their land by the Luhyas. The Luhyas
rooted in the country's history. 1fie said that though living on intrinsically
same problem drove hundreds of Nandi land, they had legally acquired
thousand� of Kenyan narion~alists to it and some said the had lived on it
rise up in arms agamst the colonial X
overnment, a bitter stru e culmina- for ten years. They said they could not
ar?g in the country's ugidependence understand why the Nandis had de-
� from Britain in 196d. cided to set upon them. Some said
But even after the ousting of the !nat if the Government was doing
colonial regime, there has been no nothing about the problem, then they
end in sight for land ownership prob- Were left with no choice but to defend
lems and, as in the past, there has themselves, by force of arms.
always been the scent of v~olence in The Nandis, mostly through their
the a~r. No undertaking of Kenya's ~~al leaders, blamed the clashes on
two independent administrations to Luhya provocation ignited by Luhya
solve the land problem has had any small compa ed o the physical hostili-
semblance of great success. ties that seemed to escalate by the
Shoek day. Many Luhya families fled t6eir
homes to the neighbouring Kakamega
It was, therefore, in a sense, not ~5~~ on Lhe KeayalUganda border�
much of a shock to many Kenyans last ~rder between Nandi and
November when they learnt that a K~m~~ where most of the
violent clash between the Luhyia fi~~g took plaa, bec~me a hotbed
of Kenya's Western Province 6 fear and terror. Arms used in the
and the Nandi of the Rift Valley had 5~~g ~~uded poisoned arrows.
left several people dead, many in- e Government stePped in, 5rst
jured and about 100 houses burnt to ~th stern verbal warnings that acny
the ground. The fiRht was over
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FnR OFFroC'lAl, USM: ONt.Y
escalatwn of the fighting would lead hvo years from now. 'Human life
to a tough response. Not much atten- cannot be mortgaged for votes,'
tion was paid to these wamings and warned Moi. He then asked the
the Government's ne~ct move was to paraded 'culprits' to swear never to
~tep up police vigilance and border repeat their `cnminal acts' and hence-
patrols. forth to work for peace.
When it seemed that police rein- ~~r the clashes a local newspaper
forcements were in peril of being ~~~d the general feelings of
overcome by the protagomsts, Rift Kenyans ahen it said: It is important
Valley provmcial commiss~oner that the problem is not blown out of
Hezekiah Oyugi threatened that the Pi�p�n'on. It must be seen as what it
Gbvernment would depioy the crack ~s - an unfortunate incident pro-
ara-military General Serv~ce Unit voked by some selfish individuals.
~GSU). As polia contingents were T ng to read too much into the issue
reinforced, the GSU was put on alert. ""~~lead nowhere. It is also futile to
. Up until this time, high-level official try to ascribe blame to either group
pronouncements on the fighting had wholesale, rat6er than to t6e few in-
not been forthcoming. But suddenly, ~~d~ T~pO�~ble for the trouble. j
on the eve of his departure for
Lusaka, to join ei~ht Heads of State
and Government in s~ ning the Pre-
ferential Trade Area ~PTA) of east-
ern and southem African states
aimed at promoting re~onal econo-
mic cooperation, President Daniel
arap Moi issued a terse warnin8 to
the two wamng groups. The fighting
had to end, he said. Moi, who is also
the cunent Chairman of the OAU,
said he would not hesitate to visit the
troubled area to give the matter his
personal attention.
Unheppy
This is precisely what he did shortly
after returnmg from Zambia. Accom-
panied by key Ministers and officers
of his Government, Moi travelled to
the scene of bloody clashes and
addressed a public meetmg. He angri-
ly declared: `I am not happy to be
here'. The President then proceeded
to parade before the large gathering
tbe leaders of the two groups who, he
said, the Government held respon-
sible for the troubles.
Moi said that there were no fun-
damental differences between the two
~ peoples. It was a question, solely, of a
few ~ndividuals fuelling ethnic ani-
mosity between them w~th a view to
gettin~ themselves elected to Parlia-
ment m the cominR Reneral elections
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Africa Journals Ltd., ISSN 0044-6475
CSO: 4700/1453
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LIBERIA
~
BRIEFS
IDA CREDIT--The International Development Association (IDA), an affiliate of the
World Bank, approved on 6 May a credit of $15.5 million in favor of Liberia
intended to help that country carry out a project to develop food and cash
crops in the county of Lofa. Some of the crops involved are rice, coffee,
cocoa and cassava. Living conditions in the developed areas will be improved by
building roads, sinking wells and creating better health facilities. (Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82 p 1280)
(COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796
MINING PROJECT--The National Iron Ore Co (NIOC) of Liberia recently started a
program to overhaul its iron ore mines and has issued a call for bids for the
supply of materials and equipment. Aid for this project has come from the
World Bank, the African Development Bank, the OPEC Fund for International
Development and from the Dutch FMO [expansion unknown]. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Fr.ench No 1905, 14 May 82 p 1280] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796
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M'OR nRMlt'IAI. UCf: (1NI.Y .
NIGER
BRIEFS
UESERTIFICATION ADVANCING--Col Seyni Kountche, head of state of Niger, has
returned from a 6-day visit to the department of Maradi, in the central part of
the country, and on 8 May he spoke in Niamey about the.problem of the deserti-
fication experienced by that department. President Kountche said in particular:
"If we want to keep the entire country from becoming just a desert, we are going
' to have to find a new strategy." In spite of carrying out vast operations to
fight this desertification, such as the "Green Sahel" Operation and the campaign .
to plant trees in the villages, the desert vontinues its advance, Colonel Rountche
said. [Text~ ~Paris MARCHES TROPICALtX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905,
14 May 82 p 1273] [C:ciPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796
BELGIAN COOPERATION--On 4 May, Jules Marchal, Belgian ambassador to Niamey, held
a ceremony during which he officially turned over to the Nigerien Government a
hydroagricultural complex financed by Belgium. This oomplex, built on the
Niger River, 50 kms from Niamey, at an estimated cost of 2,600 million CFA francs,
, will serve to irrigate 300 hectares of land and to produce about 2,500 tons of ,
paddy rice a year. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TRriPICAUX ET NiEDITERRANEr~NS in French
No 1903, 14 tday 82 j, 1273] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Nbreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796
CSO: 4719/983
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IJIGERIA
PROBT,EMS IN IABOR SiTUATION REyIEWED
London AFRICA in English No 128, Apr 82 pp 33-35
~Article by Eddie Iroh: "Unions Flex Their Muscles"~
[Text] .
FOR one week Iast month it seemed Incomes PoGcyGuidelines and ~hrist-
that the wb~leexecutivemachinery mas Bonv~s for workers which was due
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria had in Deoember 1981.
collapsed under the cnishing weight of While therewas considerable public
`Un~on Power'. The country's entire dispieasuro overthe precipitate action
electricity and power faciliUes were of the striking workers, there was no
shutdownas.aembersofthefilectriciry applause for the manner in which the
and Gas Workers' Union downed authorities seemed to have reneged on
tools in a sudden industrial show of the inoomes and bonus agreement, or
anger that plunged all of Nigeria into for the Federal Govemment's lack of
darkness. haste in wcklingwhat is the mosteffec-
Five days into the power shut-off, tive industrial action since the civilian
the giant Civil Serv~ce Technical administ?gtion came to power two and
Workers' Union of Nigeria (CST- half years ago. Commented the
~VUN) began its own strilce action PUNCH newspaper in a canc~id front-
after the Government had ignored iu page editorisl: `Tt?e current industrial
21-day ultimatum. Conse4uently the cns~s ~s an expression of loss of faith by
radio and signals technic~aes of the workers in ~the dispute-resolution
civil aviation service oined their machinery of the Government'.
'~omrades' in the CS~N and
reduced Nigerian Airways domestic MAChiffAry
flights to 'skeletal services'.
Water supplies were shut off, too. Nor was the Nigerian media itself
And as if that was not enough, engine- equal to its task of brie5ng itself, let
ers and pilots of the state-owned alone infot~ming the public on�the sco~e
Nigerian Airways went on work-to- and effects of a nation-wide electric~ty
.rule (just short of all-out strike) to shut-down. Not until Monday
press their own claims. It was a week in morning, after three days of rumour
which Nigeria's federal -authorities and hearsay, rang~ng fmm the
appeared confused and helpless as the customary power failutes to technical
whole country lay paralysed. hitches at the giant Kainji hydro-
The Electricity and Gas Woskers' electricdam.didNigenansiearnthata
Union had, as it were, embarked on its major national industrial crisis was
strike action without due declaration afoot.
of a trade dispute, claiming that the It took the Government an equal
management af the Nigerian Electric length of time to begin to attempt a
and Power Authority had refused to solution. But even then, what the
implement an earlier agreement on nation was given was a definition of
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what was going on, riot a solution.~ agreement t a was~ reached ~?ug~i .
gtacing the obv~ous, Federal Minister ap~~ to be too little too late. Expests
of Mines and Power Mohammed are unable yet to calculate the damage
Haaaan, described the action of the done to hospital and health services,
aorkers as `illegal,' and worseqed the b~~~ in general and Nigeria's
moodof the angry strikers by threaten- fled~eling industnal establishments in
ing them with mass dismissal� pazq~ular, by the strike acaon. More
unportant, labour leaders as weU as
industrial anslysts insist that the crisis
could have been avoided by the
As the nation headed for what one various managements as well as
Government respondu~g more rapidly '
newspaper editorial c~lled 'comP~~t~ to labour discontent.
paralysis, President Shehu Shagari, ~ S~ �s a~y~~arion has faoed ~
acting w~th the customary. esse and ~on~~~e~~urfrontthanany
caution wh~ch his critics ins~st ~s `foot- o~er Nigerian government since
dragging', moved to invoke limited 1~ ~ y~r ~ne, Nigerian
~ execuUve powers to set up a'task
force' of engmeers to reactivate power ur+iversity teschers went on a strike
that lasted all of ten weeks (the longest
sup~ly to essennal ser~+ices� But some in Ni arian history) b.::~re it was
cynics quipped that the last time most resolved. Before that a general strike
Nigerian en~neers touched a screw- by N.L.C. had embarrassed the
driver was durins their practicals in overnment; doctors in the country
college. Thus, eight days after the ~ad strucr for two weeks during whicE~
power strike was called off, most of enortnous damage was done to the
Nigeria remained without electricity health can services. As we go to press
supply and the hardship continued. all the Colleges of Technology in the
That the striking workers agreed to ~~try have been closed down as a
return.to work at all was.not so much technological students' strike goes
due to any action of the executive as into its seventh week. Last year,
the intervention of the legislature. strikes involving a total of 366,3?3
After a day long session with the �~,orkeTS cost Nigeria an estimated two
Labour Comm~ttee of the Federal milGon man-days. ~
House of Representatives, the leaders gut while there is no doubt that
of the striking workers agreed to call nyore strikes are likely to rock the
off the strike. President Shagari country in the future (there are at least
foUowed by cancelling a hastily- three ultimatums to tt~e Goverament
scheduled radio and televtsion address from various unions at the moment),
in which some observers speculated he ~ one h that both man ement and
might have made some drast~c declara- Govern~ment will have le~.arnt of the
t~ons, including perhaps a state of necessity not only to act or react, but
e Bug all ~hese efforts and even the sometimes to 'pro-a!~t'. �
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Africa Journals Ltd
GSO: 4700/1497
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~
~ SENEGAL
PLANN!:D CUTBACK IN FRENCH COOPERATION MISSION REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82.p 12E~9
(TextJ On assignment to Senegal since 1978, Michel de Bonnecorse, who was the
head of the French cooperation mission in Dakar and is now leaving for a new
post in Madagascar, has summed up the situation of French-Senegalese cooperation.
During the years of 1Q80 and 1981, and within the framework of initiative adopted
under the Plan for Economic and Financial Recovery, Senegal received from
France not only the yearly programs but also several additional credit facili-
ties amounting to some 40 billion CFA francs. De Bonnecourse also touched on
the subject of the reduction in techni~al assistance, saying that the number of
French overseas volunteers now standing at 1,230 will be cut down to Z,000 by
1985.
"it is not by accident that, among African countries, Senegal stands in first
or second place as a recipient of grants from the FAC (Aid and Cooperation
Fund), of overseas volunteers and of committed loans from the Cent~�~1 Fund for
Economic Cooperation," de Bonnecorse said.
"Every year, since independence, France and Seneqal have joinec? in drawing up
an annual program of cooperation which, in recent years, has amounted to between
25 and 30 billion CFA francs.
"It so happens that duriny these la~t 2 years the economic crisis has forced
Senegal to adopt a recovery plan requiring that we provide new funds. This was
incorrectly called "exceptional aid." It would have been more suitable to call
it "support aid" for the recovery plan.
"For this purpose, during the years 1980 and 1981, in addition to the annual
programs France has granted to Senegal some additional credit facilities which
amount to around 40 billion CFA francs. They formed an "assorted basket"
which included grants, advances without interest, soft loans, rescheduling of
debts. It is hard to figure out what all this represents in terms of money,
(especially since some repayments are made within a few months but are a great
help for the Senegalese Treasury.
"Talks are now underway to decide on the contents of a new basket, which means
that we are working together to determine how much aid will be given to Senegal
in the 1982-1983 financial year and to establish the terms and timetable for
that aid."
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, ,
On the subject of the number of overseas cooperative volunteers, de Bonnecorse
said: "The policy followed by the two governments is clear: the number of
French cooperation volunteers must decrease as the Senegalese become capable of
taking over. ~Pherefore we have a progressive and harmonious cutback in per-
sonnel whic:h is not motivated by f.inancial considerations but simply by the
realities of the 'training-job tandem."'
"When I first came to Senegal in 1974, there were more than 1,600 cooperation
volunteers here while, today, they number 1,230...The French-Senegalese Commission
which met recently in Dakar has set the target of 1,000 French cooperation ~
volunteers by 1985. This means that some 100 pusts will be eliminated each year.
Let ~s say that there will be a quantitative reduction and a qualitative pro-
gression," de Bonnecorse said in conclusion. ~
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Patis 1982.
8796
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~
SENEGAL
BRIEFS
STOPOVER FOR BRITISH MILITARY AIRCRAFT--Senegal's minister of information, Djobo
Ka, confirmed on 5 May that Britiah militaxy airplanes are stopping in Dakar on
their way to the British Ascension Island. Many British military planes of
various types, but rnost~y Hercules, were seen to be refueling at Dakar-Yoff
International Airport. Official sources in the Senegalese capital report that
since the onset of the Malvinas conflict, a real airlift has operated between
Great Britain and Ascension Island with a stop in Dakar. LText] [Paris 1NARCHES
TROPICI~?UX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82 p 1269] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796
CSO: 4719/983
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' ZA,IRE
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC BACKGROUND REVIEWED
London AFRICA in English No 128, Apr 82 pp 30-32
LArtic~.s: "Mobutu Walks Measured Stepa"~
[Textl
gNERpL, Mobutu's sixteen yeara
e~ar, the National Council for
~ ofpower have brought no reapite Security and the Supreme Council for
for the Zaireaa re~me. The couatry's Defena ntet to diecuss queations
economy i~ in bad ahs~pe. What has regarding tlie maintenance of order.
k~pt Mobutu at the top ia hie reprea~ive At that time, it ia true, the Karl-I-
rulis, the Wkrana of othez countriea Bond affair had hit the 6eadlinea in the
~a w~m ~~i~, ~a ~ West~rn preaa. An ex-Prime Miniater
o~a~iatent expbitation of the threat of and ~Vtimater of Foreign Affaira ia
commnniat aubveraion. But fc r hoa+ Mobutu's Government, he had taken
long is the tnu state of affairs in Zaire refuge ia Be um and had been
go' to remain behind thia facade of talkin about ~ alarming situation
~~~,y inaide~. He aaid at the time that
In June laat , thepermanent the choice for Mobutu's Zaire was
committee of 2a'~uean biafiopa made ~ between a third war in Shaba Province
public a pestoral letter denouncing `a aad a avilian uprising in the cap~tal,
most diaturb~ng s~tuadon' c6araccer- Kir~shaaa. He also declared his
iud by `a ~arioue diaregeid for man, candid~acy, f
or H
e a
d of State in the next
his modt fundamental and indefensible Preaidenhal elaKiona.
righta.' 'The letter inatanad a number
of `cases of kidnapping~ arbiti'arY $t~pped
arresffi, the settling of aocouats, and
even tortu~, not to mention thefrs and The attention KarI-I-Bond's . pro-
other troubles.' nouncements got in the Weatern capi-
Forty-5ve ~per cent of Zaire's tals was not W the taate of Presideat
populationisCatholic,andtheChurch Mobutu. He acted immediately, and
remains the most oohesive body in the KarI-I-Bond was awiftly atxi'~d of hie
country Its stand is proof eno~igh of po lidcal and avil rights for 8ve yea:a:
the sad level to wWch the oountry haa Then, to make matters worae, tt.ere
fallen. Thepolitical authorities oould waa the shock of Socialist Franoom
not i~ore t6ia. In fact it waa ao coinci- Mitterand's winaing of pawer in
denee t6at in August 1981, one month France; little c~~oe that Fraace'a aew
after the publicstion of the Paatoral President would have any warm
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amounting to around 5ve b~ioa Most VVestem countries and
dollars all told, and from time to time b~~ess interests believe that - in
putting the country's 5nancial hou~ein s i~e of the chsos that exists - in
order. T'ney know well enough that a p
real boost to the economy cannot be in pr~esent circu~stances Presidant
sight -that would involve a sigai5cant Mobutu is a lesser evil. He is the only
nse in the prices of the raw materials leader who can cope with Zaire s
that Zaire exports: copper, coffce, light, at least in the short-term. As for
diamonds, cobalt. No one can see that ~1-I-Bond, he, they say, should be
' happening soon. kept in reserve, for his populanty does
Last year, on the order of the Ir~ter- not e~ctend throughout Zaire, but only
throu his own province of Shaba.
~ national Monetary Fund and the `Club ~~~5 p~~~ ~~tors have t6us
i de Paris' (the `Club de Paris' membeis agreed to support the country and the
~ are i~he mau? private creditors of Zaire), regime by way c~f rcprieve, allowing it
~ both of which sponsor the plan for the to skim off debt~ at regular intervals
ec~onomic reoovery of Zaire, the
~ Zairean Government had to devalue Popular Movement for Revolution
its curtency once again. On 12 (MPR), the sole Qarty in the countr~+,
February 1982, again under pressure had taken the decision to aL'~w certa~n
~ from the IMF, Zaire had to take the firms in de5cit to be tak.;n over by
~ sigiu5cant step of allowin~ about forty private concerns.
state-oontrolled enterpnses whic6 'The consequences of all ~ these
' were runniag at a loss to be privately measures were soon fPlt-a rise in the
' administeral. Among those cost of living, a rise in the cost of food
i enterpnses were commercial farms and basic consumer goods. In spite of
! the KiseQgue mining company in suocessive wage readlustments, there
i Shaba province, the oommercial isanobvionsandcontmuousdeclinein
! company FORESCOM, the Kiashasa real terms in people's standard of
trans~ort company, the officx of living.
~ pubhc vansport u? Zaire as well as the Added to this is thegrowing instabi-
i metallurgy compaay of Maluka. A liry in this region of Africa. Broadly
miaed eoonomic structure is to be set speaking,, the Western powers had
up with Zaireans and foreigners as made thetr help to Zaire conditional
' partners. This move came six months on a reconcilianon with her neigh-
after the Central Committee for the bours, namely Angola, Zambia and
feelings for President Mobutu. - Congo. It was in ttus spirit that
It is not very surprising that on top of ~ Kinshasa normalized relations with
the real economic di~culties that the Luanda. And now, with help from
country faces, the Govemmcnt in South Africa, former elements of the
Kinshasa has tned to dramatize the National Front for the Liberation of
situation in order to get new support, Angola, Holden Roberto's party, .
notably from the Amencans. have become active again on the fron-
tier with An~~la� 'I'here is also a build
Anti-eomrr~unism up of tension between Zaire and
Zambia - through whose territory
In a clever manceuvre Mobutu has most of Zaire's copter is transported.
succeeded in reversing the situation by There have even been clashes at the
obtainfing the sup~ort of the West. frontier. Relations with Uganda are
Aher some hesitaUon, France agreed also strained since Zaire had to deploy
to view the Mobutu Government in a the 31st Brigade of Parachutists in an
more kindl~ light. Belgium gave way attempt to contain the influx of
to Mobutu s pressure and blackmail. refugees. In spite of the Kinshasa
The new Reagan administration with Government's optimistic statements
its instinctive anti-oommunism it is obvious that President Mobutu
immediately became a friend of Zaire. wiA be constrained to walk with
measured steps. �
C6PYRIGHT: 1982 Africa Journals Ltd
CSO: 4700/1497 END
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