JPRS ID: 10669 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080043-1
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10669
19 July 1982
- West Euro e Re ort
~ p
(FOUO 44/82)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATIOl~I SERVICE
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JPRS L/10669
ly July 1982
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 44/82)
CONTENTS
THEATER FORCES
BELGIUM
SP's Tobback on Cruise Missile Sites, Socialist Strategy
(Louis Tobback Interview; VRIJ NEDERLANDA 19 Jun 82) 1
' FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Alternative Dciense Strategy Needed for Bundeswehr
(Wolf Perdelwitz; STERN, 9 Jun 82) 9
ITALY
Critical Analysis of NATO Strategy by Gen Salatiello
(RIVISTA MILITARE, Mar-ppr 82) 15
POLITICAL
FRANCE
Internal Dissension Among PCF Leadsrship Examined
(Irene Allier; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 22 May 82) 29
Aron, Fontaine on Detente, Poland, Germany, North-South Issues
(Eric Rousael; PARADOXES, Apr 82) 34
MILITARY
FRANCE
Recognizing Enemy, Communicating, In European Theater
(Claude Delt~os; ~ES D'AUJOURD'HUI, May 82) 44
UNITED KINGDOM ,
'THE TIMES' QUESTIONS VALIDITY OF DEFENSE CUTS
~ (Editorial; THE TIMES, 1 Jul 82) 49
- - a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
L'!lp ~1~FT^i ~ T, T iCF l1Ni V
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THEATER FORCES BELGIUM
SP'S TOBBACK ON CRUISE MISSILE SITES, SOCIALIST STRATEGY
Amsterdant VRIJ NEDERLAND tn Dutch 19 Jun 82 p 8
[Interview with Louis Tobback by Jef Coeck]
[Text] Louis Tobback, chairman of the Belgian socialiats'
parliamentary delegat~on, is known for wesr~ng hi~s heart on
his 3leeve. When fie knowe a thing for sure, or feels it, he
says it. And it makea~no d~Pference Whether it is criticism
of his opponents, the closing of nuclear power plants, or, as
in this case, the controversial placement of American cruise
missiles in his country. "Give us Americans again at last
who can read and write."
Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens'a Catholic-liberal coalition, which, as
is well known, possessea plenam,~ poa7ers, will Aoon face a number of impor-
tant decisions. There is the semiannual evaluation of the misaiZe question.
It can be reasonably expected that the path o~ least resistance will be chosen,
~ and that a definite decision w~ll be postponed another 6 months. According to
the Flemish socialists that is a kind oP sw~ndle. Karel van Miert, the party
chairman, has declared that the decision has been made long eince, and that he
knows where the new cruise missilea will be put: in the little village of
Florennea in the Ardennes.
Furthermore, before the recess of the Selgian regfonal parliaments a Broad Pub-
lic Discussi~on on nuclear energy muet flare up�~�-for that discussion is still
not so broad in 8elgium that the population must be drawn into it.
Louis Tobback, the noisy chairman of the Flemish socialista' parliamentary dele-
gation, has meanwhile announced that as of 1 J'uly he wants to put an end to the
cabinet's plenary powers. How Tobback will bring that about ia completely un-
clear, but anybody that asks questions about that is a chronic old grumbler,,
We are talking with the defense specialist Tobback about nuclear rockets, uu-
clear power plants, and the future of his Socialist Party.
[Question] Not long ago DE MORGEN said that in aome Flemish party circles
closing the existing nuclear power plante ia being advocated on the ~letherlands
model. Has nobody heard here that the PvdA [(Netherlanda) Labor Party} has
abandoned that position again?
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[Answerj Oh, yes, certainly we know about that. That is why we do not want to
get entangled in the PvdA's dead-end strategy! In the matter of nuclear power
- plants we simply want no new ones added. ,Closing the power plants that already
exist is an untenable line. And it is preciaely that point that the PvdA is
aZways trotting out again!
[Question] It is quite logical that the SP [Socialist Party] does not advocate
the closing of nuclear power plants, since the Socialiat Willy Claes built them
for years as minister of economic affairs.
[Answer] Look here, that is so typical! A malicious remark that shows little
grasp of democrxtic procet~ses! Claes never had a single power plant built. The
government we have participated in since 1977 has established and rsspected a
~norr,~l~rium, a stoppage of the construction of nuclear power plants.
[Question] Moratorium? During the same period Doel-3 and Tihange-2 have been
erected! ~
(Answer] But that deciaion had been made earlier...
[QuestionJ You are not going to claim that Claes is against nuclear energy,
are you? He put out a"White Book" that was largely in favor of nuclear power
plants.
[Answer] No, in that White Book he left the choice apen...
(Quotation from the White Book, 1978: "Prospects concerning the capacity to be
installed. Under the minimal hypothesis, toward 1989 a nuclear power plant of
1,300 megawatts must be added; under the maximal hypothesis that must be done
by 1986. At this moment it may be reasonably hoped that compiete mastery of
this energy technology will be achieved very rapidly. In evaluating the risks
it must not be forgotten that every industrial activity involves certain risks."
Etc., etc.)
Tobhack: Do not forget ttiat the situation is somewhat difPerent on this issue
in Flander.s from the situation in the Netherland3. There you have a broad
public movement against nuclear energy.
[Question] Here, too. The VAKS (~'erenigde Actiegroepen voor Kernetop [United
Action Groups for a Nuclear Stop]~ are very active. The SP systematically
~~teers clear of them, of course.
[Answer] Not true. Every time the VAKS has asked for a discussion we have re-
ceived them.
[Question] Nothing has ever come of it.
jAnswerJ Yes, ttiere has.
- [Question] What, then?
[Answer] It will su~fice if you take cognizance of the amendments tttat we are
presenting with a vie.w to the Great Energy Debate that will soon bP held in
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parl.iament. Then you would see that we take good positions on it.
[QuestionJ In the meantime, of course, nuclear energy has become an opposition
issue.
[Anewer~ No, no. Just compare Cl_aes's views with those df Knoops (the liberal
- secretary of state for energy).
[Question] I have never said that it could not be wbrse.
(Scornful laughter resounds through the room.)
[Answer] Liaten, I am not planning to accept all VAKS's positions unquestion-
ingly. No matter how appealing and full af good intentions they may be. I my-
self am against any additional nuclear power plant and for development of
alternative sources of energy. But I am not against nuclear power because it
is nuclear. I am not a green boy.
_ [Question] Shall we now make the trad itiona~ transition from nuclear energy to
nuclear rockets? The cabinet has announced that after the NATO summit meeting
in Bonn it may posaibly make a decieion about the placement of the missiles.
What decision is that, in your opinion?
" [Answer] The decision has already been made and it is yes. What is the iasue,
esEentially? It is a matte'r of Reagan's knowing for sure that he can aet those
things down in Belgium if he needs to do ao. Well, he has that certainty. Be-
fore his departure for Europe the American President said: "We must salute the
West German, British, and Belgian governments for their leadership in this
critical iesue." Surely that ia clear? Apparently he cannot count on the
Netherlanders, but he can count on the Belgiana.
[QuestionJ Such a statement is at most an indication, not proof.
jAnswerj I agree, but there are also the statemenbs oP our det~nse minieter,
the Liberal Vreven. He speaks and acts as if to him it were a matter of cot~rse
that those misailes are coming.
[Question~ Or~ the other hand, there is the "new flexibility" o~ rhe CVP [Chris-
tian Social Party]. It participated ~n the latest antt--qaissile demonstration of
f, June. At the demonstration in Oct4ber of last year it was still completely
- absent.
[AnswerJ Oh, well. The CVP is mainly participating in the coming elections.
[Question] Xou think the CyP has its eye on the municipal council ,elections in
October and is trying to take th~ wind out of the aocialist opposition's sails?
[AnswerJ It is trying, but will not succeed. Among people who think at all,
its cyniciam can only increase the abhorrence oP the CVP.
[QuestionJ But it cannot be denied thst the Catholic column and its political
arm, the CVP, are under great preasure ~rom opponents of the missiles. Let
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me mention the Christian Labor Movement, the Ir~terdiocesan Pastoral Consulta-
tion, 1'ax Christi, and whatever they all call themselves. I might also say,
might I not, that the CVP is just democratically bowing to the ma~ority posi-
tion?
[Answer] You might say that, yes. And I think that is fine. The main thing
is to keep the missiles away. If the CVP helps us do that, so much the better.
It also furthers polarization, and that is a bonus. That way still more of
the conservative-minded CVP'ers will flee to the Liberals. A eplendid thing!
If we can force the CVP to declare itself on more issues, maybe we will attain
a healthy democracy in Flanders.
[Question~ Where are the missiles to be located? The SP first said Zutendaal,
then Kleine Brogel, and now Florennes. When I hear that I am inclined to be-
lieve the minister of def ense, who says that the SP wants to get at the truth
by lies. Why do you not simply admit that you do not know?
[Answer] Because T do know. It t~iZZ be Florennes. A~nd I should like to point
out that you must read a little more carefully. It wae not the SP but DE MORGEN
that ever said that they would be placed in Zutendaal. That they were destined
for Kleine Brogel was stated in the confidential report that Minister Simonet
sent to the members of the parliamentary committee on defense and foreign af-
fairs...
Confidential �
[question] My head is whirling. You did say that the~~ will be in Florennes?
[AnswerJ Delieve me, it will be Florennes. Not Zutendaal or Arendonk or
Bachten-de-Kupe. FZorennes! We have the best conceivable reasons for saying
that so positively.
[Question] What reasons?
[Answer] Well, unfortunately, I cannot make that known; that is confidential
information. But if Vreven should say tomorrow that it will ciefinitely be
Saint-Hubert, I am prepared to state that he is lying. It is no worse here
than in the United States; did you know that? The Mormons of Salt Lake City
were informed in advance of the placing of the I~IX rockets in Utah. Not only
that, the president takes account of their ob,jections and ultimately does not
pl.ace the MX in Utah. The Belgian ia not even suppoaed to know that there will
be rockets in his country. And what does the minister of. defense do? He puts
his tortgue in his che~k. "Aha, you are trying to get at the truth." As if
that were a reproach!
[Quc~stionj are assuming that the 48 Belgian rockets will also be placed
in Belgium. Strictly spesking that need not be. There is a scenario conceiv-
able by which Belgium and the Netherlands temporarily push their rockets off
on each other. Suppose questions are asked about the matter in the Second
Chamber. "Is it true that they are in M,~astricht?" Then they are transported
superfast to Belgium, and then the Netherlands minister can declare in all
conscience that there is not a cruise miasile to be found in the whole of the
Netherlands. In the reverse direction it would, of course, work in exactly
the same way.
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[Answer} Haha! If that is true we had better cease our resiatance. Si non ~
ver~o ~ ben trovato. This smells of Orwelll This presupposea such a large dose
of restrietio mentalis (narrow-mindedness) that it must have come from a Chris-
tian brain.
[QuestionJ Tl:e socialiat Stemerdink has found out that the CDA [(NEtherlands)
Christian Democratic Appeal] ie toying with such a plan.
[Answer] There you are. I think the Holy Ghost hae been at work here.
~
[Question] Surely it does not matter a straw where thoae things are located?
Their great strength lies in mobility.
[Answer] Where in Belgium they are placed does indeed make n~ difference at
all from the military point of view. If France is willing to take them off
our hands and they are then se~ up right by the Belgian border, that gets rid
of the problem as far as I am concerned. After all, I cannot prevent the
French from putting their Pluto rocketa there.
[Question] With all your talk about where they will or will not be placed, you
have really been focusing the discusaion on an irrelevant point.
[An~werj I have not focuaed the discussion at all. The SP is continuing ta
urge that no new rockets come to Belgium at all. That does not alter the fact
that the residents are concerned about the pZaee where they are set up.
jQuestionJ And are the residents wrong about that?
[Answer] Oh, people resct sub~ectively and emotionally. I, too. Hygienically
it makes no difference whether my drinking water, so long as it is well con-
trolled, comes from under the churchyard or not. But I would rather not know
about it.
jQuestion] Reagan comes to Eurape and suddenly the NATO summit meeting seems
to be being held not in flrussels but in Bonn. Apparently the Americans feel it
is f un to whisp~r 3earets with the social democrats.
_ [AnswerJ I have it from a good source that it was not Schmidt but the liberal
Genscher that invited the American President to Bonn. Schmidt has no secrets
to whisper. At the last SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany], where I was,
by the way, he had to promise that the misaile iasue would be reviewed in the
fall of 1983. For the Americana Sctnnidt has now more than ever become an
unreliahle partner. I am not initiated into the aecrets of the CIA--it is dif-
ferent with the KGB1--but I could imagine that behind closed doors in the
United States there is consideration of the replacement of Schmidt by Strat~ess.
Or Kohl; that is still the greatest point of uncertainty. To put it euphemis-
tically,.Schmidt is being very poorly repaid for the services he has rendered.
The Moor has done his duty, the Moor can go. Let it be a lesson to all oth~r
social-democratic leadera.
Pork and Beans
[Question] Is this anti-Americaniam?
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[Answer] No, I am not anti-American. I am against this administration, just
as I was against the preceding one. I hope from the bottom of my heart that
before too long a time there will be an American government that I can stand
behind. The Kennedy line, Cyrus Vance--my full sympathy goes out to them.
Cive us Americans once more at Zast that ca;T read and ~rite. I have sat and
watched French television broadcasting the show from Versailles. There was a
interpreter of 14th century Ars Nova ballades on. They are smooth, light bits
of musi~, but you could clearly see that they were over the head of the cowboy
Ronald, who understan~s only his own pork-and-beans culture.
[Question] Oh, I thought you were about to go after the Sun King Mitterand?
[Answer] I must admit that what I have gotten to see of Mitterand lately is a
real disgrace. I am almost inclined to say that it would do Thatcher credit
that she left, if it were not that she so urgently had to wage war. VersaiZZes
is a blot on the soeialist scuteheon.
[Question] Reagan once let it slip that if necessary he would deploy the cruise
missiles without nuclear warheads...
(Answer] That is outright insulting, for it appears that Reagan thinks we
Europeans are idiots. Rockets are always stationed without warheads. The
warheads are often kept kilometers further up. Naturally you ecm aZso Zoad a
cruise missile with a box of praZines. But Zet us agree that in that case the
cost of the whoZe system seems a trifle extravagant. What Reagan is demo-
gogically aiming at is this. If you have 40 cruise missiles you f~re ofP 39
of them with conventional charges to keep the opponent's defense system busy.
Only one of the rockets has a nuclear warhead, and on the other side they
do not know which it is. That makes the system relatively cheap, too.
[QuestionJ If we had to do it all ourselves it would come out a bit more ex-
~pensive, it is true. A number of European gentlemen, including Tindemans, our
minister of foreign rel~tions (and the CDA'ers Penders and Janesen van Raay),
have set up an international pressure group to deal with European defense ques-
tions. How acceptable is it for Tindemans to play a prominent part in that?
[Answer] Completely unacceptable. This club just wants to try to keep the
peace movement in check. It is a new movement from the extreme right, way
over toward the fascists. That can be seen from the program and from the names:
Strauss, Otto von Habsburg, von Kielmannsegg... Tindemans is now trying to
~ deny that he has anything to do with it, but his credibility in the matter has
been reduced to nil. I have the evidence in hand: documents, facts. The
meeting at which the European Institute for Security Questions was founded was
held at the Egmont Palace in Brussels. By the way, Bernard (to his assistant),
tliat reminds me that I must ask the government what that piece of nonsense cost.
(To me again:) The Egmont Palace is made available by the Belgian government
for off icial and prestigious occasions.
[Questionj I keep coming back to your way of conducting the opposition. Ask-
ing questions is fine; action is better. Won't you agree with that?
[Answer] That is why I have switched over to action in my own electoral di.s-
trict, Louvain. I have formed a list there with SP'ers, communists, and the
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pulitically homeless. The advantages are legion. If small leftist groups keep
coming up with separate lists, they will never get a seat. In the Belgian
electoral sysCem the left-over votes go to the biggest party; i.e., the CVP.
I also feel that the childish disputes of leftists among themselves have just
got to stop. Not that I have now become a communist; I am not that crazy.
The united list is also an appeal to the politically homeleas: "As it is, you
and those like you are everlastingly going to stand on the sidelines. I want
to put the old slogan of the Netherlanda New Left into practice: 'If you want
the party further to the left, join in!"'
[Question] Excellent, but ~hom will you bring in that way? Phrase making friars
. and democratic demagogues? I notice, for example, that the sound anticlerical-
ism that certainly still exists within the party is systematically denied by
the leadership. To say no more.
[Answer] I am what you call a sound anticlerical; Christians do not interest me.
What interests me is that peopl.e who are progressive, or call it leftist, not
be kept apart from each other because of those damned columns. Indeed, the dan-
ger exists that you are going to form a etub of sociaZ u~orkers, The PvdA knoi,~s
aZl about that. I am particularly excited about the dialog that we in Louvain
can engage in with the politically homeless, the independent leftists. They
are the salt in the mass! They open the way into a world other than the party
world. Because of its position as the underdog in Flanders the party is get-
ting scared of its own shadow. Cold water fright! It Zooks as if the SP had
become a sort cf tribe ~ahere you do not get the right to apeak until after the
initiation rites.
[Question] Exactly. At the SP congress earZy in May Jef UZburghs, the CathoZic
pastor from Limburg, was allowed to take the floor. Nice for him, but what did
he have to say? He talked about "socialistn with a human face, the encounter
function, and new and fresh analyses." Is that the kind of fashionable chit-
chat the SP needs?
[Answe~] No. But it should first be said that not everybody is such a chilly
materialist as you and I. Some people also have spiritual needs. Second,
there is more to it than the words he uses. A man Zike UZburghs is a Ziv~.n,~
repr~oof to the t~hole party. What he is doing there in Limburg among imported
laborers and other oppressed people, in short, his invoZvement, is a hundred
times as great as that of the ordinary SP militant.
[Question] Agreed; that man was at the Limburg mines back in 1970 during the
weeks of wildcat strikes. I did not see the SP there, then still called the
BSP [Belgian Socialist Party]. So sincerit~ and the Breakthrough idea consist
in your having to wait 12 years before get up to the trough a little Uit?
[Answer] Why should you not be willing in politics to start small? It was
not until Van Miert came in as chairman tn 1977 that things began to change
gradually. Because you are half Netherlands I will make another comparison
with the Netherlands. What we are now striving for is not the Breakthrough
of the Netherlands party in the 1950's; we want the New Left in power. This is
~r t~crrrni.ng: if anyone should ever try to eleanse our party documents of every-
~ thing that might disturb the believers, I wouZd resign irrmtediateZy. Why is
our greatest concern for the Christians? That is ~ust a sociologtcal fact.
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~Qu~stion] Then it is not a matter of votes, or, to continue in that style, of
r,rr.nni.n,~ :;ouZ~?
[Answer] Not in the negative sense that you are giving to it. But it is a
matter of winning p e opZe. You cannot get around the power of numbers...
The conversation has now clearly taken a different turn. The politician has
gradually lost all trace of swagger and smart cracks; this is not a laughing
matter. I still try to f ind out what the party has to offer the Breakthrough
crowd. "Blood, sweat, and tears. But do it anyway," is the answer. The awk-
ward feeling creeps over me that I also have Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons
standing beside me on the sidewalk. But you can get rid of them by the idte
use of God's name. I am saved by the telephone. Another journalist, this
time from the BRT [Belgian Radio and Television (Dutch Service)], wants to
talk with the parliamentary delegation leader.
COPYRIGHT 1982: VN/BV Weekbladpers,
8815
CSO: 3105/187
8
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~~Tr~i r^O~C~ ~:n~rar. ~gyIC OF GERPiANY
ALTERNATIVE IIEFE"~1SE STRAT~Y NEEDED FOR BUNDES'4lII~
Fiar.?bur~ 9TIIUd in Gern~an 9 Jun 82 pp 18-30
~Zeport by i�lolf ~erdelwitz: "Neither I~ed, Ytor Dea.d."
~e:
] Critics say the FRG is armed the wrong way. Our ax-
Mored arr.u.es are better slaited to offense than defense- and
in ca~e of war we would only be left with the choice between
ca.pitulation and nucleax suicide. Is some kind of "alter-
na.tive defense" a way out ?
st bottom, it is really quite siu~ple. If the Warsaw Pact mounts an attaclt
a,,.,^~ainst us, w~. defend ourselves trf conventional mearis until everything is
Y.aputt in our c~untry. Then, we defend ourselves with battlefield nucYear
weapons until all of Central ~,irope is ka.putt. And after that, we defend
oursclves rrith the stra.tegic riuclear miseiles of the Americans until tbs
rrhole world is kaputt. Eben officers of the Bundeswehrfs general staff
view the consequences of N1~T0 ~ s existing "flexible responae" doctrine in
this ~anr_er.
The core of this doctrine which has been official NATO policy since 1967
is that an attack should be repulsed as close as possible to the frontier
so that there will not be a"protra.eted struggle on the soil of the FRG."
Tr;e I3onn defense r~hi.te booi: of 1975 states tha,t nuclear weapons should be
use~.i "as late as possible but as early as necessaxy.~~ This uncertainty re-
~~.sdin~ the use of nuclear weapona is intentional. The ene~y should not
~~orr ~rhat the r~TO response will be and therefore be deterred out of fear
of a ~;eneral riuclear tiaax.
~ut ~�~hat if this d~terrence does not work ? Are r~e then really rather dead
~'::a:i red ?
;.y in a fortress under sie~e, it seema~ the Bundeswehr leadership in its
r~inistry up on Bonn's ~Iardthoehe haa taken shelter behind the deterrence
doctxine. It has done ~o despite the fact tha.t it can no longer be over-
loo~:ed that the :~le3t Germ~1 ar~~yr-~~one of the finest combat forcea," as
:.inister F.ans Apel ha,s put it--can no more survive in ita present state
t~~,r. the saurians ~rhom the arms opponents like to point to by saying:
"~ied out--too much armor, too little brains.~~
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I:.ardthoehe is being challenged from several directions at once not that it
~eem~ to bother the armchaa.r strategists one bit. ~ren the usually pro-mili-
tary :Iambur~ weekly DI~, ZEIT was saying recently: "On Hardthoehe, clii:gin~
t~ old strategieu and systems is deemed more important than looking for new
dcrartures; Defense Minister Apel has gone fishing intellectually."
Tliere axe more than enou~h reasons to look for new departures--towit:
There is the peace movement which considers President Reagan's arms policy
of "re-armin~ in ord.er to disaxm" absurd and dangerous and would rather dis-
axri right away.
'rliere is the grovrin~ number of critics of all stripes politica,lly who think
thcy 1rno1~r by now what the secret behind Helmut Schmidt's sixties' philosophy
is. ihe PRG, he said then, can only be defended "at the cost of total de-
struction." Given the fact tha.t two-thirds of the 6,000 nucleax weapons de-
ployed on FRG soil have a reach of less than 120 kilometers, they m~.~st per-
force er.plode on German soil once they are fired. This is tantamount to de-
fense through suicide and that is wY~y the critics axe looking for ways to
mount an "alternative defense."
Treri, there is the forthcomin~ lack of personnel which will force the Bundes-
tirehr to trim down. Lower birth rates will reduce the number of available con-
scripts to below the 200,000-man annual m~n;m�m by ~9g'j~ prolo~ing military
service would help very little, as the Bundeswehr has determined. Each month
of added service would make up for ~ust 10,000 of the missing conscripts;
bui at the heig~t of the lower birth yeaxs~ the shortfall would amount to at
least 70,000 to 30,000 men.
:~ir.ally, there is the la.ck of funds projected �or Zears into the future which
cai~l call for economy ~easures. During the boom yeaxs~ the politicians gave
tl:e militax~,r just about anything they asked for; but now costs have out-
stripped the ability to pay. Last year, the Haxdthoehe bu~~get could only be
preserved i.ntact by talcin~ up a collection among the other ministries.
';fiere only the newest and most complicated equipment was good enough~ there
~,*rew up an army tha.t put the fear of God even into high-rankin~ military men--
not only those on tl^.e enemy side but on our own side as well. With the'Leo-
~~~.,rd 2," a, maximu~ of technical sophistication has been reached which can
jutit barely be handled by the conearipts.
~~onurbations Are i~,ngerous for Tanks
i~;an;,~ critics also consider this type of equipment dar~erous for other reasons.
T,~,c?_ec? into defense operations close to the border, the Bundeswehr has equip-
;r.ent ut its disposa,l that is suitable to re-fighting the Blitz~iegs of World .
lJ~r II. Feace reseaxcher Lt Col Alfred Mechtershei.mer (ret~ calls the Bundes-
ti~re}ir a"composite of the l,frikakorps and American expeditionary forces."
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~Ze Bundestiaehr, with its fast armored forces, would indeed be an exceptional
attack force. For that matter, that fa what it is supposed to be, since de-
�en~e operations close to the border would be impossible excep'c by mountin~
quicY, counter-thrasts, in the opinion of the military experts. But the nei~-
bors to the ~ast~ who have ha.d painful experiences with attackin$ Gez~ma~n ar-
mies, mi~ht be justified in worrying about thia type of equipment, critics
~a;~, asking themselves just how seriously we take article 2~ o~ the Basic
I,a~; ~ahich calls the preparation of an aggressive war "uncor_stitutional."
~'ven high-ranY.ing Germaaz military men doubt that the Bundeswehr, in its
present form, is ideally equipped to defend the FRG. "I believe we have the
wror~ ::ind of militaxy equipment~" T~iajor General Guenter Vollmer (ret) says.
~",;'e not only wish to defend ourselves; it even says so in our Basic Law. For
defensive purposes alone, we do not need t~.nks! We have axmor plating on
just about ever~fthing; arid tanks are an incredibly suitable attacY weapon."
The senseless "~lyper-sophistication of technology" applying to fully mecha-
nized, axraored army units comes in for criticism by Brigadier General Franz
LZz1e=rJettler. The price of progress is that these troopa can be used on al-
1:~LOJt "half the terrain of Germar~y" only at the greatest risk~ he claims.
Z~e dcnsely populated conurbations alonE; the Rhine, the Main and the Ruhr
would be a dangerous envirorunent in which to operate for tanks suited for
combat in the open. And tanks would be of no use whatever in about 30 per-
cent of the territory of the FRG covered with woods and highlands. Uhle-
Uettler l~ows whereof he ~peaks. He is a Panzer general himself.
Fie �eel~ the an~y has reached a"cul-de-sac."~ ~quipped with more and more
perfect armaments, it car~not be used in a lar~e past of the axea it is meant
to defend. Iiecau~e perfect equipment is dependent on pei~~ct supply, each
combat soldier iaust be backed up by three support peraonnel. And this gi~an-
tic sunply operation itself ie such a delicate business that it must be pro-
tected in turn
by combat troops that are then missing at the front.
In addition, this train acts as an intellectual drain on the combat unit:~~
l:e sa.ys. 'I'he supply units ase compoaed of the most intelli~ent conscripts
for the most part; the combat units often have to make the best of it with
-thc "dumbest." "In our hi~h-technolopr armi.es~" Uhle tidettler says, "the
hu~,e non-combatant units constitute the cream of the crop. The combat units
~ust ;,~t the low-fat r~ilk most of the time."
aoldiers ~hould Go Dack to Walk~ng
~'o= this reason, the Pa.~~~r general calls for doin~ without armor. The ~ol-
ciiers should climb out of their ' i~w:,.~ten" armored personnel carriers and ma~:e
tl:eir ~ray throu~h the woods ligiztly armed liY.e the infantry of old. "L~lho else
could cii:lod~~ the enem;~r from the I3hoen IIhle~rlettler asks.
~'ranz Uhle=dettler: 'Combat Area Central ~,irope. Dar~rs of I~yper-Technology
fo~� the Armed Forces," Olzog Publiahin~ House, I~Iunich; 280 p.

~
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i:a~vr General Jochen Loeser (ret~~ goe~ one step f~,irther. He, too, deplores
t'_:e "paxalyzation of the armed forcea by an oversized administrative app~
ratus" and the "hyper-technization and bureaucratization" under which the
"striking power" of the Bundeswehr muet suffer. He, too, Irnows whereof he
snea:~:s. Loeser was an armored infantry ~eneral. If the FRG cannot be defen-
clec by its existynE;~ military forces, Loeser says, then this comes down to a
~~oica between capitulation and nucleax suicide. ~
~ut T.oeser believea he has found a narrotiu alternative that liea between
"red" and "dea,d"--"coraprehensive defense" using conventional defensive
weapons wk:ile at the same time renouncing the use of battlefield nucleas
weapons.
ifi is plan which originated with Starnber~ peace researcher Horst Afheldt
_ sone yeaxs a~o~ makes a lot of sense. This, however, would call for com-
nlete re-thinlcin~ which mi~t be painful for some of the ~enerals because a
;.~ul.titude of sr~all en~agements--in which the aggressor would be worn down
and wt len~th forced to retreat--~would take the place ~f decisive battles
fou;;ht by fast-moving arcnored units.
"~he ba~ic idea is this: If the ~Jarsaw I'act really en3oys as ~assive a supe-
rierity as N~1T0 always clai.ms, it would make no sense for the West to pre-
paxe for battle, matching the other side tank for tank and cannon for carmon.
Uiider ~uch circumstances, the numerically inferior side invaxiably loses.
It is therefore senseless for NATO to structure and equip ita divisiona
e::actly as the 'cJ,..rsaw Pact does because in a direct confrontation it would
be bound to lo~e. "The 4+lest must pay back in another coin."
The coin I~oeser and AfheldtYave in mind is this: Small units are distributed
throu~;~out the territory of the FRG. It is their primaxy task to defend tre
::rea tY:at has been aasigned to them in peacetime and with which they are
~=lailias. ~lherever the atta~cker en~oys superiority~ they pull back and even
rerc~it hira to roll past them in the woods. P~Iost of them are only lightly
a,rrsed; their main weapons being small, portable precision mis~iles to deal
~~itn the enemy a.rmor. ~hfeldt has come up with the surprising conclusion
that if each of these 12 to 20~man units-~rhich he calls "techno-commandoes"--
'_~oc}:~ out just three ene~ tanks, the Red Ar~r will reach 'che East bank of
the 'thine with ~ust one tank a,nd will have to ~ive up.
`Pec~nically, this would not be a problem even today. The Dundeswehr's anti-
tar': rocl:ets are e::tremely accurate; their hit ratio is more than 80 percent.
- 'i".:ey~ a.re a.lso small, easy to transport and inexpensive. They do not even cost
one percent of ~�rhat a taxik cos~s and there is a tremendous political advan-
~a:;e trey have, too. They ca~not be used in an attack, but on defense they
are hard to beat.
y' Jochezi Loeser: "I1e:ith~er ~ed, N~r~Dead. Survival ti�lithout Nuclear~~:Jax--
: 3ecurity
Political Alternative" Guenter Olzo~, Munich, 280 p
iIorst ~,hfeldt: "Defense and Peace," Carl Hanser, P~hxnich~ 346 p
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I~ut ~hfeldt's plan ha.s a big drawback, which is also political. It presup--
roses close cooperation between military and civil defense and as a con-
_ sequence ~ t~eater de~ee of militarization of the FRG as well as the
sunply of ar,ns to the population even during peacetime. The techno-commandoes
would practically have to ke~p their missilea in their cupboarda at home.
Loeser, for his part, ca11s for a mix of small combat units and conventional
arr+.ed forces. The small units are to delay the ene~r adva~ce with the larger
units mounting li~,*htning counter-thrusts. "The attacker would be faced with
ever new surprising situations," Loeser says. '"r7hen he ha.s captured a small
~ector, he is hit fron new resistance pockets from the depth of the network
~~rhich axe hard to pinpoint with an intensity of fire which has an unexpected
effact in con~un:;tion with the maz~y roa,dblocks and reinforczments of the
terra,in. .~very little forest ~ully, every firebreak, every valley and every
l:ill become~ a~roble~a for the attacking axmored units."
:~n the neu-cral countries of ~irope-a.bove all in Austria and in Switzerland-
:i,~ailar deiense stra,te~ie3 have alrea.dy been put into operation. They have
or.e r~a,jor advantage and some ~a,jor disadvantaa~;es. Armed forces of this kind
are suitcd for defensive purposes only and therefore cause no fear amon~ the
nei~;hborin~ countries; but at the same time they create a risk of the we~.pons
fallin~ into the wrong hands and ha,ving war spill over the entire country.
Fi~;urin~r on a"Protracted Nuclear War"
:wrtisan-like fighting raethods have proved their effectivenesa'before after
all. Durin~ the past ~.0 yeaxs, only one re~u].as ~r ha.y been able to defeat
a~uerilla a.rmy-the nritish ar~y in 2~'Ialaya in a war that la,sted from 1948
to 1~57. Eut I~1ao Dze Dong~s battle for China, Tito~s victory over Hitler
and thc Vie~nar~ ~:las all are convincing proof of the chances for victory of
such fi~hting method:.
The rrar in Vietr_am, however, also shorrs what sacrifices such a battle de-
raands. For decades to come, large sections of the country will still be
:,tudded ~rith duds and contaminated ~rith chemical defoliants. In Germany,
the consequences would be none the lesser. A Bundeswehr stuc~y reached the
concluyion that a conventional war of 20 days~ dur~tion would wreak the
:a~me destruction as a nucleax war lasting 5 days.
ior this reason, peace researchers as well as the peace movement are alre~~.c~
~;oin~ one ~tep ~urther. If deterrence no longer represents a credible way of
preventin~ ~~~as, ho~�r then can wax in Central ~zrope be prevented at a11 ?
Tl~cre axe four proposals bein~ discussed in addition to ~lfheldt's and Loe-
~er'~ defensive ytrate~,y alternatives:
: unified ~.irope should itself become a nucleax superpower.
Thc countries of Central L~irope--led by the FRG and the GDR--should become
ncutral and nuclear-free.
'.;olf ?'erdelrritz Heiner Bremer: "Hosta~ I~:~.irope," Olle P~ Wolter, 352 P
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Tl~e ~i'~ ~hould capitulate in case of an attack but should then resist occu-
pa.tion by resorting to civil d3sobedience.
u~.-, Central ~.irope should be at least partially clisarmed while members of
the three political parties represented in thc Bundesta~; call for a reduc-
tion of nucleax axsenals.
,'Iaa:fred 1~loerner of the CDU considers at least part of the nucleax weapona
on ~erman soil Nuperfluous, if NATO were to rear~m its conventiona.l forcea.
Jucr~;~en T~Ioellemann of the FDP thinlcs that most battlefield nuclear weapons
ir_ t:~e I'RG cari be dispensed with but calls for a"subatantial" reduction of
ti~e nurUer o~ tan::s in ~~;a~tern ~ ope to make up for it. And Lgon Bahr, the
yecurity er.pert, wants to see no nuclear weapons deployed at all in
coun~ries ~rhich cannot themselves decide on their use--+which is another waf
of ~a~~in~ that he favors a nuclear-free zone in Central ~,lzrope.
:~'~~t yahr did not make ar~y headway with this proposal in the discw3aions of
~ ~?~e international co~unission cha,ired by former Swedish ?'rime T�~iniater Olof
~alne. ~Y:is disarmarnent stuc~y group-in which former U.3. Secreta,ry of State
~;,-ru~ larice and CPaU central committee member Georgi3 Arbatov also took part-
;r~uld only recoramend a 150-kilometer wide nuclear-free zone on both sides of
tlic ~a.~tern border of the FI~G. The fact is tha,t most nuclear weapons are
c.~ .,~,lo;,~ed outsid.e this belt even now.
i~.f ~iie four proposals aimed at lesaenin~ the da~nger of 4rax in Central '~~irope,
cn1;;~ the la,st or.e-involvinr;r partial troop reductions by both sides--seems
wt all realistic at this time. But some skepticism is called for. The ne~o-
tiationw on bala.nced trooP reductions which ha.ve been goin~ on for 9 yeaxs
in ~fienna h~.ve not even been able to a~,~ree on how mar~y soldiers each side
a.c+.uWll;~ ?ia.s at present. t~s for the other three proposals, they would touch
~_~r~~,-r_ tl:e :,uprem~~.c~ of the two superpowers in their spheres of influence and
~uch I^ieet rritj: r^si~tance.
i:e~
rarl:ilc, the LT.3. d.efense depastment is at work refining the ill-starred
de~errence doctrine. ~ new "defense guidance" by the Pentagon has no~�r come
u-~ �,ritl: calcul~.tions on a"~rotracted nucleax wax." vIL ~JLLT was :ncensed--
bu~ onl;,� uecau~e these plans became public ~ust a few cia,ye prior to Reagan's
_ t~�i-~ ta the r~G. "Secret plan~ should stay secret~" the papex said.
~lr ~~i,;tie~t cou'rt of Til,TO r^,eraber country rlorway, on the other hand~ pul.led
tl;f: emcr~�ency bra'::e at ~ust about the same time. The state, the court found,
~lcc~ not have the ri~t to force youn~ men to taye part in a war in which
t.~~~;;~ ;~u~t fi~ht a~ain~t na..~cind usinE; nuclear weapons.
Ct,_i;:IG::i 19~2 Gruner J~.hr ~G & Co
~ ~
/ r
c,.:: ~~03/544
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THEATER FORCES ITALY
I
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF NATO STRATEGY BY GEN SALATIELLO
Rome RIVISTA MILITARE in Italian Mar-Apr 82 pp 25-39
(~xcerpt~ RIVISTA MILITARE, which w~nts to be regarded more and more as a
highly qualified forum far the exchanging of ideas, ia happy to publiah an
article by Army Corps General Luigi Salatiello.
~'he incieive thoughts contributed by this article unquestionably are in con-
formity with the role of the author ae an emerging personality, giving ev i-
dence, as they do, of his unusual analytical ability i.n complex and delicate
areas of military doetrine and policy.
The article is also particularly valid and definitely authoritative by virtue
of the writer's exceptional preparation and many-sided experience, for during
his prestigiou s career he has performed very important command and staff
tasks and held positions of great -esponsibility within the domain of the cen-
tral organizations of the Ministry of Defense (among other thing s, he has been
Director General of Motor Vehicle Transportation).
An originality of concept is evid snt in the wQy tt~e variou s parts of the arti-
cle are put together which reflects a definltely personal manner of looking
at military sub3ects of great significance.
Particularly characteristic of the article is the fact that it include s pro-
posals and views which certainly will be the fo~erunners of euitable further
doctrinal works on the part of "Dhe people engaged in doing this work."
The deductive rigor of the suthor's inqu iry into the eub~ect matter gives
linear coherence to the analysis which, conducted under the aeg is of a cau -
~ tious realism, constitutes a model of inettndology and ia distinguished by
stimulating m4tivations of useful dialectical unrest.
While thanking General Salatiello for his courteous and w~elcome cooperation,
RIVISTA MILITARE hopes that the article will encourage a constructive debate
in a vivifying context of opinions, wt?ibh are the primary carriers of the
development of military thought.
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Introduction
In recent months, military problems~ and, more particularly, problems of mili-
tary policy, have been the center of attention where public opinion is con-
cerned. All the communications media, from the daily newspapers and the
periodicals to radio and televi�ion, have been occupied with them. Experts,
nonexperts and even the man in the street have talked about them. Two sub--
jects, in particular, have polarized these discussions: the deployment of the
Pershing 2 and cruise missiles which are intended to reduce the diecrepancy
Uetween the two nuclear powers confronting each other in Europe, and which
decidedly favors the Warsaw Pact at present, and the United States' deci sion
to put the neutron bomb into production. That we would return from the
Euromissiles and the above-mentioned bomb to a di scussion of NATO strateg y
was inevitable, and that is what happened.
Sensible things, others which are less sensi~ble and some things which were
simply foolish were said. Some commentators endeavored--successfully--to be
ob~ective, while others, appointing themselves interpreters of the anxi,ous
longing for peace which quite properly animates almost the entire tuman race,
lost sight, not always in good faith, of the fact that we are living in a
world pervaded by ten sions of all kinds (frequent~y hloody ones) and fell into
the facile rhetoric of d isarmament as if peace had not always been in danger
of being broken by the sword for as long as the w~rld has existed. Finally,
not a few, who are the servants of a class-struggle ideology which knows only
one fatherland, resolutely d~clared th enselves to be in favor of maintaining
the nuclear "status quo" in anticipation of negotiations which are destined
to be of no avail.
Well-known scientists meeting at Erice discussed nuclear energy and, more
generally, the goals which science should pursue, in a learned manner, and
they agreed unanimously and without any reservations that science is unfaith-
ful to its basic purposes if it does not aim at the moral and material ele -
vation of mankind. One cannot fail to be in agreement with that attitude
while at the same time not condemning those who have devoted themselves to
maintaining the safety and ensuring the survival of their respective coun-
tries, and also not forgetting that war--which is never justifiable when it
takes the form of offensive usr--has alw~ys constituted a potent factor where
speeding up scientif ic progress was concerned.
Those are opinions and discussions which fortunately have not cracked the f irm-
ness of the parliamentary majority on which the present administration relies.
The courageous and opportune confirmation given last August to the dec~sion
to accept the installation of cruise missile bases in Italy in a proces s
which started with the invitation to our allies to begin negotiations concern-
ing a balanced reduction of the number of theater weapons does credit to our
politicians--or at least to those capable of discerning the true intere sts of
Italy through the cloud of lies raised to make it diff icult to ~udge impar-
tially.
Such lively participation by the mass media and the public in problems of
military policy, and more specifically military problems, is an extranely
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desirable occurrence. I mentioned that a few months ago in a study which
appeared in this publicationl, stating that "nationRl defense is a need which
all Italians have in common and it is right that its aimes, its sub~ect
matter and the ways that need is satisfied should be ;aidely known and dis-
cussed in every center capable of contributing ideas."
The Minister of Defense, Honorable Lelio Lagorio, hi~nself, in presenting the
estimate of defense expenditures for 1981 to Parliament, asserted, with con-
siderabl more authority than I have, that "the purpoae of this increased
activit~ is to be found in a desire to bring the problems of defen.se out of
the limited area within which the employees of the ministry operate. The
problems of defense, are political, eocial and economic problems w~ich are of
interest to the entire Italian population because the people are directly in-
volved in them."
Having said the above, I should like to try, in the pages which follow, to
put at the service of the readera of RIVTSTA MILITARE the expertise and
~ experience which I possess after 45 yeara of service, putting a little order
into many things which are correct, incorrect and tendentious tha~t have been
said in recent times regarding the strategic courses being taken by NATO and,
above all, to put forward some new ideae both in regard to the defense of
Europe and the military instrument destined to provide it.
For that purpose, hav~ng def ined the concept of deterence, we will see what
its structure is like and how it was modified, little by little, by the ad-
vent of the atomic bomb. Then, after summarily examining the repercussions
the nuclear factor has had on ground operations, I will focus on current NATO
strategy in the Duropean theater, too, in order to ~udge whether the new
theater weapons and the neutron bomb are going to affect that stra*_egy, and,
if so, in what ways.
In a third section, I will sub~ect that strategy to a critical examination
and state a personal opinion of my own--an opinion which will not be binding
in any way upon dfficial Defense circles where their ability to guarantee thP
defense of western Europe against the danger of aggression, or their lack of
such ability, are concerned.
Finally, before bringing thie article to a conclusion, I will go into the sub-
~ect of the difficult economic situation in which our armed forces now find
thanselves.
Critical Examination of NATO's Current Strategy
Unfortunately, we have to state, frankly, that NATO's current strategy is not
very credible either on the conventional or the nuclear level.
On the conventional level because the ratio of the respective forces is so
unfavor~~ble to NATO as to make it necessary, if there was not to be a quick
and irreparable surrender, to increase the intensity of the response at a
rapid rate of speed until the threshold of the fir st nuclear etrike was
reached .
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On the whole, this theory did not provide anything at all that w~s new, from
the conventional point of view, becavse a defender has always, at least from
the time when war made itself rational by providing itself with laws, prin-
ciples and rules, had recourse to all the means in his poesession, once the
lines along which the attacker is moving have been identified during the
- initial resistance efforts, to block those penetrations when they have come a
certain distance ar~d then to reconquer the lost territory, if possiUle.
But there is more to it than that. A pitched battle, which ie the fundamental
act toward which the strategic maneuverings tend becauee of ite consequences,
~ which, if they are not decisive, provide the side which prevails with con-
siderable advantages as far as continuation of operations is concerned, and
which is highly diamatic because of the large number of sacrif ices in men and
materiel which it requ ires, obeys a logic and follows a pattern from which it
cannot deviate, if one allows for the exceptions which prove the rule.3 The
logic is that of every test of force in which each of the tw~ adversaries
seeks to prevail over the other and does not aait to do it until his back is
against the wall.
The pattern can be summarized as follows. The side which assumes the initia-
tive and attacks, and which has the resources to permit to do so, presses its
attacks urgently because it knows that time is on the side of the def ender,
who, since he is unable to be strong everywhere, keeps many units in reserve
an3 concentrates them where the pressure is the most violent. In its turn, the
defending side must prevent the f ighting from spreading into the open country,
where--as I have observed in the past -the aggressor can make the weight of
his superiority count, and for that purpos~, while making u se of adequate
tactical depth, must not concede any successea to his adversary which would
compromise his winning the battle.
So gradualness in responding, where conventional ~rfare is concerned, does
not make sen~e tactically. It is only acceptable if one wishes to express
a political intention to avoid sharp and dangerous accelerations in reacting
to aggression-an intention which unquestionably is praiseworthy even if not
very realistic for one of tw~ reasons--either because battles are not won with
prudence or because the ratio of the respective forces to each other is so
unfavorable to one side that it can only hope to put a stop to the aggression
by accomplishing a maxfmal acceleration of its reaction.
It is not credible on the nuclear level because it seems very improbable and
not very realistic to me to believe tl~et the Soviet Union would be able to
"absorb" without reacting to that limited number of nuclear strikes, even
though of slight power and demonstrative in nature, which, according to NATO,
urere supposed to demonstrate its f irm intention to resist aggression at all
costs. It might have been able to do so in the days of its nuclear inferiori-
ty, but why should it do so today when the term s of the confrontation have
been reversed? And if it w~s not willing to give in, as seems logical, a
chain reaction would be set off whoae f inal, disastrous outcome would be a
general nuclear war.
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On the other hand, let us not forget that the keys to the Alliance's nuclear
power are almost entirely in the handa of the United States and it i;s hard to
- see why that country would be under an obligation to use thea~ when what was
at stake, in addition to the defense of Europe, was its o~n survival.
In spite of off icial declarations of loyalty to NATO, there are unequivocal
_ indications of a progressive cooling off of America's interest in the
" Alliance. Too frequently the European partners in the Alliance have dis-
sociated them eelves from United States policy vis-a vis the Soviet Union and
have not supported having recourse to su btle "distinctions." Too frequently
the Furopean nations have professed, without having the means to support it,
to have developed an autonomous role vis-e-vis the Soviet Union. And finally,
there too frequently has not been an, and there still is no, agreement among
those European nations on the evaluatinn of international events and the
- attitude to be taken toward the Soviet Union. It is not improbable that the
hypothesis that, without greater cohesion in the Western national poli~ies
and an effective strengthening of the Alliance, the Americans will remove
themselves from NATO will turn out to be true. The establistiaent of a mobile
emergency force in the United States, which has been in the newa recently,
could foreshadow a revision of American policy toward Europe, if not specifi-
cally in the sense of a separation from NATO, then at least in the sen se of a
different conception of the military contribution to be given to the other
me~nbers of the alliance.
This emergency force (RDF), which will be ready in 1985 and will be ~aade up of
3 Army division s, 1 of marines, 2 battalions of Rangers, 2 groups of special
forces (Green Berets), the pertinent airborne carriers and adequate logistical
support, would make it possible for the United States to have the benef it of
the advantages of a central position with respect to the entire globe which
the Soviet Union enjoys on the Huropean-AsiaCic continent.
The advantages of a central position from the military point of view are well
known. They make it possible to deploy only a portion of one's power at tne
borders and to maneuver the main body of one's forces as necessity dictates.
It was precisely by virtue of that position that the Central Powers in Wor1.d
War I and Hitler's Germany in World War II were able to make headway against
preponderant forces for years, achieving successes in the first phase of
operations which were all but decisive, and the reason they finally were de-
feated was that, since their strength consisted predominantly of ground forces,
they were not able to paralyze maritime transportation and the role of such
transportation was essential for the Allies.
The Soviet Union would have a better c}iance of successfully exploiting its
central position no w than the former central regimes had, in view of the
fact that the Soviets have naval power, against the European nations, the
noninsular Asiatic nations and the United States itself, if the latter were
engaged in Europe. In its turn, the United States would be in a position to do
the same thing by developing its emergency force on a world scale, thanks to
the airborne and naval carriere available to it at present and in which it
has an indisputable supremac y, within the framework of a return to its role
of the primary economic power in the world and the champ~,on of freedom which
the new administration is pursuing in a decisive manner.
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If the above-mentioned forecasts were reliable, what reasons does the United
States have for madernizing (Pershing 2) and strengthening (cruise missiles
and neutron bombs) NATO's potential in the European theater? It can be sup-
posed that it has done so for psychological reasons looking in two directions,
as follows:
With respect to their allies, that the tt~eat of the inadequately opposed
R.ussian m issiles could be conducive to compliant behavior -and there is no
lack of indications of such a trend. With respect to the Soviet Union, which,
strong in its conventional-forces superiority and convinced that the United
States would not be the~,f irst to pull the nuclear trigger, could "precipitate
matters" and "dictate" to one or more European nations or launch air-ground
operations destined to achieve rapid succesa since the Europeans lacked the
will to fight.
_ I imagine that many people, when they read these forecasts, will believe that
they are the result of a pessimistic attitude, but it is the duty of people
who prepare for war not to be optimistic and to adopt a coldly realistic way
of looking at thing s.
I remember that the officers who, at the beginning of my career, introduced
me to the complex gub~ect of operational problems (and first of all the un-
forgettable General Saltini!), taught me that, when evaluating the enemy's
possible lines of action for the purpose of determining our o~n plan of
maneuvering, it is necessary to give proper consideration to the line of
action of the enemy which is most unfavorable to us, even if it is not very
probable. I do not think that such a wise rule t~as become invalid, even
though the times have changed.
Points of Departure for a Revision of NATO's Current Strategy
I will not presume to suggest a new and different strategy on the basis of
my own powers alone.
I can only indicate, in the;fffi~n of suggested points of departure, the direc-
tion in which it would be necessary to move to avert a third world war and,
if unsuccessful in that, to limit its scope.
1. It does not seem realistic ta suppose that nuclear explosions, f irst
warning explosions and then selective ones, would be the only onea that took
place.
It seems more logical to think that they would end up setting off a war in the
European theater which would devastate Europe.
2. In the same way, it is not very probable that a nuclear war in a particu-
lar theater will be dissociated from a general war. One would grow out of
the other.
3. Consequently it can be presumed that the United States will not launch the
first strike, which, spiraling, would involve it in a nuclear war.
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4. In the same way, it follows that the response to a conventional attack,
which is what the Soviets probably would launch if they undertook an aggres-
sive move, even though their doctrine, for propaganda reasons, puts the accent
on a combination of "nuclear" and "traditional," cannot be anything but con-
ventional, without any hope of nuclear succor which would not arrive -a hope
which might have a negative effect or_ morale.
5. If the preceding hypotheses were plausi~ble, an improving and strengthening
of our convent3nnal forces would be absolutely necessary, not for the pu rpose
of tringing them to the level of the Soviet conveational forces, which would
entail unacceptable f inancial and social burdens for the Western democracies,
but to obtain a ratio of forces which would make it possible to have an
adequate chance of withstanding the initial attack while awaiting reinforce-
ments which, ho wever, should not be late in arriving.
6. In addition to being predictable, it ia also probable that nuclear
weapons will be banned. In the meantime, since any moratorium wh ich would
freeze the present Soviet superiority wc~uld have to be rejected, it will be
necessary to go ahead with the modernization and strengthening of European
theater weapons. If the Soviet Union became aware of a reluctance on the part
of the United States to pull the nuclear trigger, they could be the ones who,
in the face of an inferiority which might be a symptom of psychological
disarmament, w~uld take the initiative in setting off limited and selected
nuclear explosion s f or the purpose of hurrying u p the surrender of the West. .
7. Although, as well as can be foreseen, a nuclear war appears improbable
today and tomorrow, the ideological conflict which divides the Western demo-
cracies from the Marxist world, together with the ever present expansionist
impulse of the Soviet Union~ makes a m~litary initiative by the latter, tru st-
ing in its formidable conventional~warfare force, possible at any time.
There is an additional reason for believing in that possibility. The new
Amarican administration, for the purpose of restoring thrust to that coun-
try's foreign policy and building up its allies' conf idence, has launched a
program simed at strengthening its m ilitary appavatus which, in addition tr~
the development of the emergency force we have already talked about, cuntem -
plates strengthening and increasing its strategic nuclear deterrent (with t?~e
acquisition, among other things, of new intercontinental missiles--the MX--
100 B-1 bombers and an undetermined number of the revolutionary "stealth"
bomber. That decision constitutes a gernuine technological challenge, and
only two courses are open to the Soviet Union in the face of that challenge:
--Either to take up the gauntlet and, to keep pace with the high level of U.S.
technology, augment their already considerable military expenditures to the
detriment of expenditures for social purposes, which have been seriously in
arrears for years, thus bringing internal problems about from which it is
diff icult to perceive a way out for them;
-Or, if time was pressing, to attack western Europe and confront NATO with
the fait accompli of a more or less exten sive invas3on and uncontrollable
developments,
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The Italian Situation
We cannot conclude our labor without taking a look at the Italian situation.
As f ar as the operational problems are concerned, we have nothing to add to
the transitory allu sions which were made in the preceding paragraphs, and all
the moce so in regard to the sub3ect matter which we have dealt with in detail
in other works which have appeared in this publication,4 with reflections
wh3,ch we believe are still valid.
On the other hand, there is an urgent need to emphasize the critical
situation the army f inds itself in where materiel is concerned, which, to-
gether with the inadequate f inancial compensation accorded the officer and
noncomm issioned off icer cadres and the f eeling of isolation from the central
fabric of the cnuntr y's lif e to which they point, not unjustly, is the cau se
of profound discontent-a situation whose importance should ~not be under-
estimated.
When, a few years ago, for reasons not unlike those which are making their
appearance once again today, the restructuring of the army was implemented
(but it would have been more truthful to call it a redimensioning), 87
battalions or equivalent unfts were done away with, the number of combat
vehicles was reduced by 900, 450 artillery pieces were retired from service
and a considerable number of territorial logistical and administrative organ -
izations were dissolved. At the same time, a different structure of the field
army was ~mple~nented by centering it, in order to put it in step wi~h the
nuclear age, on the t~ igade as the basic, combined-arms large unit. When the
brigade was created, it was necessary to give up a good many divisional
commands and all the regimental commands, either to prevent duplications or
to slim down the chain of command. The abolition of the regimental comanands
represented a very painful sacrifice in view of the heritage of traditions
connected with them, ev en though the pain was moderated, in part, by the
fact that the glorious battle f~lags were turned over to the batta].ions.
What remained when the operat;on was cn�*.~leted-3 army corps commands, 4
divisional command s, 24 brigades of various kinds (armored, mechanized,
motorized, mountain troops and parachutists) and various tactical and logisti-
cal support organizations--were regarded as quantitatively sufficient to
present either a deterrent force capable of digcouraging any threats from the
northwest within the framework of a limited coriflict or a defensive capability
in line with the m issions assigned by NATO in case of a general confli~t.
I said "quantitatively" on purpose because, from the qualitative point of
vie w, there is a diff erent story to tell. As a matter of fact, the opera-
tional efficiency and readiness of units is measured in terms of the quality
of materials and their reliability, strength levels, the competence of the
cadres, the training of the personnel and the spirit ~ich animates the~m.
There is no doubt, at present, tt~at, where materials and strength levels are
concerned--factors which are almost exclusively dependent upon the availa-
bility of funds -we have been pursuing an involved course for years which is
the result of and is characterized by inefficiency. and consequently it is
impossible to perform the "minimal" tasks scheduled for performance.
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The cuts of which we have spoken were not accomplished without produc3ng
trauma and the chief o~ staff at that time, who had the courage to take the
initiative in carrying them out, ran the risk of unpopularity. But to avoid
making those cuts it would have been necessary to have offset them with an
extraord inary endowment of funds for the purpose of modernizing the materiel
in the hands of the troops and to have cau sed a rap id and strong improvement
in the quality of the units kept active to take place which would have pro-
duced a pronounced improvement in combat capability. And, in actual fact,
the parliament, with a perceptibility wh.=.ch is to its credit, launched a pro -
motional law (No. 372) in 1977, as it had already done for the navy, and had
extended to include the air force immediately afterwards, which allocated
1.115 billion lira to the army to be spent in annual installments whose
amount had been fixed by the budget legislation.
Unfortunately, the shortage which had accumulated during years of scanty
attention paid to the military institutions by the politicians was a great
deal larger than the appropriation which was allowed. Added to this wras the
fact that they did not have the farsightedness to index the f inancing, and
consequently it was consistenty eroded by inflation and the continuous deter-
ioration of the value of the lira in exchange for foreign currency.6
The fa~t is that, since installments amounting to a total of 916.5 3illion
lire had been appropria~ed and expended from 1977 to 1981 and since an
appropriation of 198.~ billion lire was anticipated for 1982, the special
law can be considered invalid at the end of 1982, while on 31 July 1981~the
cost of the new ten-year m odernization program worked out by the general staff
~ of the army was estimated at 4,374.5 billion lire, or four times larger than
the allotment previausly granted by Parliament. To this must be added the
fact that the ordinary tudget, which is chronically insufficient, is almost
completely consumed for training expenses, the funds for which also turn out
to be less than what is requ ired, with a deficit which amounts to approxi-
mately 200 billion lire for the 1981-1982 two-year period, thus making it '
necessary to reduce expenditure s drastically, to spend every last lira for
supplies and to defer larger and larger numbers of acquisitions from one year
to the next. Consequently--tnodernization aside--if the ordinary appropria-
tions are not increased by at least 100 billion lire a year at 1981 prices,
the critical situation in which the army is struggling could expand into
genuine paralysis. And love of my country persuade s me to pass over the
cuts made in the armed forces' budget this year with the truly praiseworthy
intention of reducing the public def icit, but the~suspicion that it would be
easier to make cuts in the area s in which the responsible people at the top,
althoug h resisting strenuou sly, are accustamed to be compliant in the end and
a base provided with means of producing pressure and the ability to c�nclude
contracts does not exist, is a legitimate one. And the matter is all the mare
deplorable in that we occupy one of the very lowest places on the list of
NATO countries where the am ounts allocated to defense are concerned, whether
- one calculates in term s of the percentage of the nation's overall budget or
in terms of the gross national product.
In the face of these deficiencies, the following requirements can be listed
br ief ly:
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Tlie "Personnel" Component
It ~s necessary to raise the strength levels and increase, with appropriate
- incentives, the number of long-term volunteers needed to operate the modern
and sophisticated weapons systems.
The "Fire" Component
For antitank defense, which is an area of vital importance on the future
battlefield, which will be dominated by armored vehicles, we must integrate
the action of the recently-acquired TOW with a shorter-range missile system,
which might be the French-German Milan, and fill the minimum-range gap with
an individual weapon which, it is to be hoped, will be one of Italian produc-
tion--if the Folgore is completed (but it is said that it will take more than
15 years)--but it may be one of foreign origin.
For antiaircraft defense, with the operational capability of low-altitude
Hawk-Helip system extended to 1993-1995 by a series of improvement s, it is
now necessary to think of a light missile system, a conventional weapons
system for defense against low-4ltitude and very-low-altitude targets and
a self -defense weapon.
Studies are going on in regard to all three of the requirement s listed above
which are expected to culminate in the f~rn ishing of prototypes, and those
studies are f inanced, in part, by means of contracts. And here, although it
is not my intention to get into aa argument with tne general staff of the
aripy, I should like to ca11 for a display of prudence.
Poverty sometimes pushes us to use our money poorly, in the sense that, in
trying to economize, we end up acquiring equipment which has been outstripped
by technological progress and which, all thin~s considered, costs as much as,
if not more than, equipment which is a great deal better but whose only
defect is the�,f~ct that it came from abroad although it could have been co-
produced in Italy. ~
I am ref erring, as some readers will already have realized, to the so-called
"self-propelled twin antiaircraft" weapon which, since it is of rather modest
caliber and was not provided with search or guidance radars in the initial
version (and I do not believe, objectiveZy, that the chassis that was
selected--that of the No. 113 VTT, which originated in the United States and
was coproduced in Italy makes it possible to do any better), would only
partially solve the vitally important problem of defense against low-altitude
and very-low-altitude targets. Although I regard the desire to use only
Italian technologies which was the basis on which the choice was made as a
commendable motive, I would suggest that, before making an irreversible
decision to move on to series production, the prototypes be subjected to a
rigorous program of experimentation, while also c~mparing tbem with foreign
systems designed for the same purpose and seeming to be superior in perfor -
mance. There i;s plenty of time to do it.
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For artillery on the ground, since the FH-70 pi~gram concerned wirh the 155/39
ho witzer on whaels has been completed, we are moving ahead, on a trilateral
basis (Italy, the FRG and Great Britain), with the development of the SP-70,
~ which is the tracked version of the~Ffl and which, it is calculated, will be
operationally eff ective until the year 2000 and beyond. We would also like to
get into a quadrilateral program (United States, the FRG, Great Britain and
France) for the production of a saturation weapon on a self propelled chassis
and with a range of 35 to 42 kilometer s.
The Combat Vehicle Component
Tanks
No new acquisitions are programmed in this area, although our line of tanks
was in need of some quantitative expansion, but it w~ould be a serious mistake
not to provide for the f ollowing:
--A general overhauling of those vehicles which have reached the limits of
acceptibility (10 to 12 years of service or, as an alternative, 10,000
kilometers of operation), to prolong their life of reliable service for a
second ten-year period.
--Increasing the operating~cepability for all, ar most of, the Leopard tanks,
bringing to the maintenance facilities the most important improvements sug-
gested by the clu b consisting of the countries which use that type of tank,
among which improvements--as was emphasized earlier--the intrc,duction of a
modern firing system, or at least its principal components, is a basic require-
ment.
--Participation in the French~erman agreements concerning the decision as to
what tank is to replace the French AMX-30 and the German Leopard 2 in
approximately 1990 to 1995. I have reason to believe that a request in this
regard given to the FRG by us on the gaver~ental level w~ould be given seriou~
consideration since we use the Leopard tank and that could be converted int~
great advantages for Italian industry, as well as -obviou sly--for our army.
Vehicles for the Mechanized Infantry
Now that a considerable number of tracked M-113's have been modernized,
partly by civilian indu stry (the VCC-1 version) and partly by the motor
vehicle transportation installa~tions (the VCC-2 version), which made it pos-
sible to transport the infantry accompanying the tanks (although tl~e.y could
not fight from the vehicles), a succc~ssor for the.nn is glready under ~=~udy.
It is natural to wonder why advantage has not been taken, and is not being
taken, of the opportunity to acquire a wheeled, protected vehicle to serve
alongside the future VCC and satisfy the requirement in question. An army of
limited size, like ours, not oMly need s tactical mobility--that is, the
ability to move and f ight away from roads--but also strategic mobility--that
is, the ability to travel long distances on roads in a short time in order to
transfer units from one operat~onal sector to another, distant one.
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Wheels, which always have been synonymous with strategic mobility, have made
enormous progress even cn diversified terrain, and t~he cost of acquiring
and maintaining them is less than it is for tracks. There is no serious
basis for the objection that using vetiicles of a larger type increases the
logistical burden.
The Visi,on and Night Fighting ~onponent
Taking into account the importance the night environment has assumed because
of the protection it offers men and vehicles, there is a desire to acquire
~bstantial quantities of apparatus for the intensification of light for
guidance and firing and at the same time to become familiar with thermal infra-
red technology, whose eff ectiveness for long-range weapons systems is
recognized by everybody.
The cost of the required itenis mentioned above, not including the overhau ling
and m odernizing of bhe Leopard tanks, which, in view of what the other coun-
tries which use that vehicle are doing, I regard as an indispensable step that
cannot be postponed, is estimated at approximately 2,600 billion lire. to be
f inanced in annual installments through 1991, provided that the assumption of
an annual 3% increase in real terms in the ordinary budget, as agreed upon at
the 28 January 1981 session of the Supreme Defense Council, becomes operative.
Let us hope that Parliament and the gwemment wtll take the army's fate to
heart, as they did in 1977 (but the situation of the other two armed forces
is no better) and act according ly.
If they do not, it would inevitably be necessary to take another look at
the role assigned to us within the orbit of NATO, together with our opera-
tional possibilities. That would be a review of the situation which, although
initiated by the highest-ranking military commanders, mu st inevitably be
referred back to the highest-ranking political decisiornaakers, who are the
ones responsible for the fundamental choices concerning national defense.
Conclusion
It is time to conclude this article.
We are of the opinion that the conviction that the employment of nuclear
;aeapons would not do anybody any good wlll soon gain a good deal of ground
and that consequently they will be interdicted and destroyed. In the mean -
time, it is necessary that we should remain alert and give maximum coopera-
tion to the United States so that it will move ahead with the European
theater's nuclear program.
If there is a war in Europe, it will be necessary to respond to an attack,
which in all probability would take the f ozm of conventional warfare (un-
less, if NATO's present condition of inferiority continues and becomes more
pronounced, the Soviets want to succeed by strong ~arm methods by appropri-
ating the idea of limited and selective nuclear strikes to themselves) with a
defense which also was conventional, without waiting for smne nuclear assis-
tance which is not going to be provided.
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Naturally, if we wish to resist aggression, it will be necessary to streng-
then and impr ove our conventional forces to bring them to a level which, with
the help of the factors wllich traditionally work in favor of the defense
(depth, knowledge and organization of the terrain, planned f iring, etc.), will
make it possible to confront a quantitatively superior f ighting f orce success-
fully.
The European countries must realize the need to~make that effort as soon as
possible, closingiranks and endeavoring to bring about a military cohesion
which, added to the existing economic cohes~on, will endow a unif ied
policy which, ensnared in national interests, f inds it diff icult to make the
right decisions, with a mare tangible signif icance.
Western Europe possesses the means it needs to be able to play a role of its
own in the world if it does not think it can take up an intermediate position
and oppose either the Soviet Union or the United States. Our position is
and will be beside the Americans because the material and moral ties which
unite us with them are too numerou s and too solid .
The Americans, in their turn, are not unaware that our respective fates are
linked together and, once they have put their own economy in order, will help
us, in their own interests, to get out of our carrent difficulties. And if,
then, to regain prestige in the world, they should decide to draw up their
general strategy in global terms and, consequently, to renegotiate, on a~
new basis which was profoundly different from the present one, their parti-
cipation in the military organization of NATO, no one can doubt that they
will be at the side of the free nat~ons in their hour of need, ~ust as they
were in World Wars I and II, although without previously having located bases
and expeditionary forces on their territory.
We have already spoken of the obligation Parliament has, for us Italians, of
allocating to the armed forces the furd s which are afisolutely indispensable
to make them credible in carrying out their principal mission--that is,
guaranteeing Italian independence and Italy's republican institutions. Let
us remember that even a great thinker who died recently, a man who was fiYm
in his Catholic faith and a pacifist by conviction and not out of opportunism,
the FYench philosopher Jean Gu itton, wrote8 that "to make sure that there will
never be a war, it is necessary for it to be possible that one will take
place at any mament."
A paradox, certainly,rsince Guitton, like any other man of good sense, w~uld
have preferred, in a free w~rld finally free of ideological, political,
economic and social tension s--thanks to the efforts of all people of ,ood
will--for the fu ~ds which today are invested in armaments to be employed for
the material and moral elevation of mankind.
FOOTNOTES
1. "La Difesa avanzata" ,~dvanced Defensg,7, RIVISTA MILITARE No 5,
September - October 1980.
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2. The minister was referring to the greater frequency, by comparison with
the past, with which the top military leaders and the head of the depart-
ment, himself, speak in public.
3. For a thorough discu ssion of this subject, see "Alcune correlazioni fr~
tattica e strategia" ~ome Correlations between Tactics and Strateg,y7 by
the same author, RIVISTA MILITARE Nos 7- 8, 1973.
4. "Spunti per una nuova concezione difensiva" ~oints of Departure for a
New Defensive Concep~, RIVISTA MILITARE No 3, 1976; "Difesa avanzata"
[~vanced Def ense~], RIVISTA MILITARE No 5, 1980.
5. ~ome combined -arms brigades, quite different from the single-branch
brigades (that is, camposed exclusively of infantry units), whi,ch per-
formed epic deeds dur ing World War I, were already present in our army
for particular purposes (brigades of alpinists for use in mountainou s
environments, infantry b~rigades for territorial defense and brigades of
parachutists for strategic maneuvers) .
6. The Ztalian war industry, although it had gained leading positiona in some
areas, depends upon foreign countries (the United States of Amertca, the
FRG, the United Kingdom and France) for a large number of licenses and com-
ponent parts.
7. In this connection, see:
Clifford D. Bradley: "Confronto ruota - cingolo" LZ`omparison of Wheels
with Track~, ARMOR, May - June, 1981; "
G. Avelli: "Mazzi corazzati" Q~rmored Vehicle~, RIVISTA MILITARE No 1,
1982.
8. "La pensee et la guerre" ~,'1'hought and Wa~. Ed. Desclee de Brouwer, 1969.
COPYRIGHT: RIVISTA MILITARE PERIODICO DELL'ESERCITO ANNO CV NUMERO 2/1982
9258
CSO: 3104/230
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POLITICAL FRANCE
INTERNAL DISSENSION AMONG PCF LEADERSHIP EXAMINED
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 22 May 82 pp 44-45
[Article by Irene Allier]
[Text] In their quest for a new party l~:ne, Communist
leaders and militants are searching, hesitating and
groping--unconvincintly.
"Its successive changes have discredited the entire party leadership,"
exclaims Jean-Michel Catala, co-director of REVOLUTION and a member of the
Central Couimittee, speaking before the entire political buresu.
"The party's foreign policy is, if I may say eo, outside our policy," Felix
Damette, another Central Committee member, remarks ironically, in front of
Maxime Gremetz, head of the foreign affairs section. It is repeatedly
aligning itself with the USSR, while neglecting our participation in the
government."
"In organizing our struggles," suggests economist Philippe Herzog as he
addresses members of the CGT, "there is no need for workers to fight a
government of which we are a part, while fighting against the management of
their companiesl"
Where are we indeed? In the social hall of the tiny village of Saclas
(Essonne) where the PCF has moved from 11 through 13 May to lend an
unprecedented atmosphere to a Central Co~mnittee session, broadened to include
the first secretaries of the federations. An odd session, without agenda
or general resolution. This time, no high priest has been privileged to
officiate at the usual high mass. Even Georges Marchais did not ascend to
the pulpit to deliver the Word. In a few words--but what wordsl--he
restricted himself, as an introduction, to report the heavy toll of disasters.
"Where are we? Well, we are in the government, but after losing one million
voters, and with a party that ia not in gear. Obstacles are everywhe~e:
internally the ma3ority of comrades have not grasped the significance of the
24th Congress, nor that of the lag which we experienced in 1956 and which is
still affecting our actions today. Outside the party, public opinion equates
us with the USSR. Our image is tarnished in the areas of liberties and
democracy. What is to be done? Comradea, it is your turn to share your
experiences."
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Evidently the comrades are ill at ease and tense. Will the federal secretaries
dare to say that the leadership has lost all credibility, that it is being
whispered in the ulls that the leadership does not convince anyone when--
after having waged its well-known battle against the Socialist Party--it now
claims to ~oin that party in leading France tawards Socialism throug limited,
progressive and democratic reforms? Some venture to say so, without daring
to open the issue of participation in government. "It is all right to echo
the words of those Communists who still come to cell meetings," Catala says,
ironically. "But it would be better still to be concerned with the opinions
of those sho no longer attend them..." A pregnant pause.
The leadership had organized this session to feel the party's pulse. First
diagnosis: the pulse is weak and irregular. Those attempting to offer this
drifting party some politico-social prospects compatible with its role in
government are opposed by the uncontrolled reflexes of those who are reluctant
to change their ways. One of these, for instance, is Etienne Fa~on, who,
pretending not to hear that the PCF is in the government, stubbornly states:
"If we are having troubles, the reason is that neither the Communists nor
public opinion are sufficiently aware of our own position, and of party
policy," (as opposed to that of the government, of course.) Later, Maxime
Gremetz lets the cat out of the bag. As is known, the PCF officially advocates
a French policy of steering clear of both blocs. This does not prevent the
man in charge of PCF foreign policy from forgetting that imperative in favor
of his own deep-down preference: "The international scene," he states, "is
characterized by a counter-offenseive bn the part of imperialism in order to
restore the military supreanacy it had lost." Better still, now Gremetz
announces a ma~or decision (made, of course, with the political bureau's
blessing): a decision to lend support to a powerful "peace march" in Paris
on 20 June. To be sure, the idea will not originate with the PCF, but with
some 100 "well-known person," whose signatures it is presently collecting
(they are said to include the inevitable Aragon and Edmonde Charles-Roux,
Gaston Defferre's wife, as well as Herve Bazin.) To be sure, slogans would
be worded in such a way as not to embarrass the government: "Neither
Pershing nor SS 20," for instance, and the PCF has been invited to take part
in it. Still, the PCF has decided to send 100,000 Communists into the
streets for the occasion. Who could be fooled? "There is indeed some
contradiction there," a Central Committee member concedes.
Second diagnosis: the Party is having doubts. The leadership is only
partially successful in its attempt to show a united front when facing the
militants who are balking at the PCF's participation in government. "Insofar
as it is capable of conviction," says one member of the political bureau,
"the leadership is gradually convincing itself that the Socialist experiment
can succeed" and that the Communist Party must play its part in it. However,
it is still being torn apart whenever, in foreing policy, it must take the
inescapable consequences of its choices in domestic policy. The Fiterman
affalr is a glaring demonstration of this fact.
What happened? In early May, Yves Moreau, foreign policy columnist for
L'HUMANITE, publishes a series of articles concerning the Malvinas,
violently directed against Great Britain. Wihtout hesitation and without
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any rhetorical hedging, he, like the USSA, aidee with Argentina. On 10 May,
in a lengthy interview, Georges Marchais doea attetnpt to eatablish a
precarious sort of balance between "the murderous madness of the British
prime minister, the Argentine forces' military coup, and the manipulations
of the United States," but it is an arduous path that leads him to hia
conclusion: "Weapons must be silenced to make way for negotiations."
And, then, on 16 May, a dramatic turn of events: on the French television
program "Le Grand Jury--Le Monde," Charles Diterman, minister of state--and
of transportation--declares, out of the blue: "In the few ma~ or articles
published in the paper (L'HUMANITE) I felt that their authors (aic) were
extreme in their positions and that their argumentatioa was somewhat
excessive. Argentina committed an armed coup; this is a fact that cannot
be ignored." Astonishment and anger at L'HUMANITE. This is the first public
indictment of the Central Cou~ittee's newspaper by a Communist leader. "This
. is an attack against Leroy, against Marchais," people whisper in the hallways.
Fiterman had not stopped there: in the same breath, he had implicated the
Communist group in Parliament which ~ust the day before, had abstained from
voting on the bill concerning audiovisual matters. "I do not wish majority
groups to come up with different votes," he said. "I prefer them to vote
together. I believe that, if they don't get together, with exactly the
same position, it's unfortunate."
Saving the Mayors
What was the director of L'HUMANITE to do? Defend the journalist, one of
his tru sted men? Protest the "attack"? Not at all. Questioned on 18 May
on France-Inter, Roland Leroy creates a new sensation: "My opinion is exactly
the same as Charles Fiterman's, but I was not there when the articles were
published." And, to everyone's astonishment, he adds: "From now on, the
Communist must put an end to their habit of being so cocksure of everything,
at every moment, and of settling every case once and for all, as if they
possessed revealed truth."
In a news conference, a few hours later, Maxime Gremetz himself, disconcert-
ingly matter-of-fact, will declare himself in total agreement with Charles
Fiterman's criticisms. "We do much arguing in the Party," he concludes,
satisfied.
Completely disoriented, the general membership sometimes wonders if its
leadership has gone mad, and whether all this does not conceal some double-
cross. There is indeed a rumor that the leaders are divided and may be
keeping a foot in both camps: one group, apparently in the minority, would
be on the failure of the socialist experiment and would suggest that the
PCF prepare to pull the chestnuts out of the fire. How? By keeping a few
free spots for itsself within governmental solidarity: by abstaining in
certain secondary votes, by criticizing certain decisions, by pointing out
the PCF's own positions. Then, at least, should a failure of teh Left occur,
the YCF coulc say: "We were right in stating that the PS had taken a turn to
the right. We did all we could. The failure is not our doing..." Such an
attitude would explain the PCF's stubborn refusal to do its self-criticism for
the 1977-81 period, which ranged from the breakup of the Leftist Union to
participation in government.
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"Nonsense," reply those whose thesis is held by the majority. "If the ~.eft
is removed from power, the PCR is lost, along with the Left, and eventually
doomed to disappear. It is therefore to its advantage to do everything in
ite power to insure the success of the Left. Its very survival is at stake..."
This second line of argumentation is the one officially developed by the
Communist leaders, regardless of tendencies. At any rate, this is the
thesis foll.owed by the two leading Communist ministers, who are undertaking
to use their government experience in deriving from it a new line that would
be coherent and would have long-term workabilitq for the party.
However, that thesis is not enough to mobilize a party that has been sluggish
for mvre than 4 years, inhibited by its 1981 failure at the polls and paralyzed
by fear, should it stfr, of disturbing the government. Furthermore, in
what direction should it stir? In Saclas, some people have tried to find
their bearings through the fog, to offer some anchoring points and some sort
of future to failure-weary militants. First of all, through unity, which is
becoming fashionable again, as municipal elections are approaching. In
her speech on that essential point, Madeleine Vincent recalled the PCF's
starting position: "We want proportional, one-round-only elections, and
_ joint Soc~ialist-Communist lists everywhere. We are not going to get them,
however," she warned. "Therefore we must prepare ourselves for a compromise."
For the PCF this compromise invovles saving its big~city mayors. The
party wants to keep them, even where the PSF has got ahead since the 1977
municipal elections. Such is the case in Saint-Etienne, for instance. To
save a[mayor such as] Sanguedolce, the PCF would even be prepared to let
the PSF have the ma3ority of municipal council seats (although until now the
PCF had held the ma~ority there). Will the PSF accept?
~ Some twisted minds have glimpsed a vulgar tactical intent in this "unity at
any price" order of the day, and in the compromise being contemplated.
Wasn't this a betrayal of the strategy of the 24th Congress, which provided
for a permanent affirmation of the PCF's personality and identity? The
party as a whole still needed to be presented with an outline of the long-
range policy. This taks was entrusted to Paul Boccara, the unforgettable
inventor of the theory of "capitalism monopoliste d'Etat" [monopolistic state
capitalism], (dubbed CME), that not so long ago led the PCF into some
unfortunate avenues. No matter. Today Boccara is developing prospective
theories which, while lacking contact with immediate reality, do not lack
interest. According to the substance of his explanations to the Central
Committee, the world will have emerged from this crisis in 20 years. Perhaps
capitalism will, too; we must not delude ourselves. However, the expansion
of the public and nationalized sector and the total nationalization of credit
will have turned France into a country with a mixed economy, neither a state
capitalism nor a socialism after the Eastern bloc, and in that economy the
workers--provided they have been able to seize their opportunity--will also
have been able to gain managerial powers and give the economy some motives
other than profit alcne. Is this complicated? "I may be the only person
able to demonstrate this, but I am demonstrating it," replies Boccara, amid
the indulgent smiles that greet this theory, which may be complex but has
the rare merit of existing.
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In a Spot
At any rate, on 18 May, L'HUMANITE has a page one headline reading
"Management Is Your Business." In other words, 30 years after the Italians,
the French Communists are contemplating a take overl0 or 20 years from now
of civilian (and economic) society from within, in order to transform it.
"This is how we'll manage the solution to the crisis," a militant remarks
ironically. Still, Cabanes, in his report in L'HUMANITE, enthusiastically
writes: "Let's become financiers to control the use of public aid pr~grams."
Can such ambitious--and remote--ob3ectives overcome the inertia of a party
that has been idle for so long? Paul Laurent who, in his capcity as
secretary of the organization, hasn't until now been able to overcome it,
presently has his remedies: in simple, straight-forward terms, he suggests
that the Central Comtaittee replace the leaders of inactive cells and sections.
In short, there are changes in the air for useless cadres. For his part, Guy
Hermier, who is in charge of intellectuals, ie getting ready to set aside
those he has been using for the past 3 years: they have become unusable
for the PCF's "new practice"! Can all this create an illusion? "The Party
is in a spot, and will remain there for a good 10 years to come."
Emanating from a member of the political bureau who is not known for his
lack of orthodoxy or for indulging in moods, that diagnoais counts he3vily.
~COPYRIGHT: 1982 "le Nouvel Observateur"
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r~x urrt~u~ u~r, uriLx
POLITICAL FRANCE
A.RON, FONTAINE ON DETENTE, POLAND, GERMANY, NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES
Paris PARADOXES in French ~Apr 82 pp 43-54 ,
[Discussion with Raymond Aron and Andre Fontaine by Eric Roussel: "Detente:
Myth or Reality"]
[Text] In its Spring issue, PARADOXES is presenting a rather
exceptional document. An inf ormal discussion between two
first-rate personalities, the authors of equally authoritative
works, Raymond Aron and Andre Fontaine, chief editor of LE
MONDE.
For the benefit of ot~r readers, these two clear-sigt!.ted observ-
ers of international politics have accepted to converse, to
compare their views on the present atate of the world and es-
pecially on the burning questions of the hour: the end of
detente, the Polish crisis, German neutralism, as well as
North-South relations. As will be seen, their analyses of
all these problems sometimes differ. However, it will also
be noted that their views on essential points concur, which
only goes to show that there is only one possible strategy
against the Soviet threat and the state of economic war in
which we find ourselves.
One more word about our guests before we get to the heart of
the matter. Not ta introduce them, of course, since they
are well known, but to mention that Raymond Aron gave us last
fall a very stimulating essay, "Le spectateur engag`" [The
Engaged Spectator] (published by Julliard, aee Francois Fejtoe~s
article in our November issue) , anc'. thF~t, soon af terwards, .
Andre Fontaine published "Un seul lit pour, deux r2ves" [One
Single Bed For Two Dreams] (published by Fayard), a history
of detente which is a sequel to his famous history of the
cold war.
A major book which has served as starting point for our
debate.
[PARADOXES] Raymond Aron, you have read Andre Fontaine's book; what is your
opinion?
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[Raymond Aron] Let us skip the compliments and one single reservation, this
is too much of a"pure narrative."
[Andre Fontaine] This is precisely what I intended to do.
[R.A.] In "Republique Imperiale," I thought, I had gone too far myself in
that direction, but it was a much more abstract and less detailed narrative.
This being said, let us get down to the content. You call your book a
"history of detente." However, after reading it, it is not clear whether
the So~~iets considered the detente as a good time to lull the West into a
false ser~se of security aad continue their expansion or, on the contrary,
as a time of real appeasement. You did not come to a decision on this point
of essential importa~sce to understand that period.
[A.F.] Don't you think that, during these two decades~ the Soviets have had
two conceptions of detente?
[R.A.] Well, no, I don't. I believe that they never had but one, including
under Khrushchev.
[A.F.] I wonder whether, early in the period we are talking about, the Soviets
did not th i nk that the U.S. lead in the field of armament was such that
they would be hard put to catch up. It seems to me also that, in the years
1972-73, the Soviets showed a certain desire to establish an era of coexis=
tence. Of course, later on, events got out of hand because of Watergate...
In fact, I think that the Soviet dream is a dream that stretches over an in-
determinate period, that it accelerates at times, and at other times, on the
contrary, it slows down. I always had the impression, including right after
World War II, that th er e were hesitations and probably several schools.
[R.A.] Men, by definition, often have ambivalent feelings,and it is naturally
hard to exclu~'se this theory a priori. As for Rhrushchev after the 1962 crisis,
it seems cer::ain to me th~.t he became aware of the U.S. military superiority
and that he u~~:~oubtedly wanted a period of detente. But we must add that an
extremely tense situation had been deliberately created by the Soviets because
of the Berlin ultimatum. You begin in 1962. But 1962 is the end of the
period that started witr. the Soviet threat of signing a treaty between the
GDR and the USSR; such a treaty would have led to a unilateral modification
of the status of Berlin. So that, in hindsight, it appears that the years
1958-1962 have been a period of Soviet diplomatic offensive which was not
based on military superiority.
[A.F.] But, still, did not at least the illusion of such a superiority follow
their sputnik?
[R.A.] Not so. The Russians may have believed that the United States were
stupid enough to take seriously either Kennedy's election campaign statements
(missile gap) or Mao's formulas such as "the East wind is prevailing over the
West wind." And at that time, with the sputnik and the first Russian missiles,
some Americans believed that the Soviets were going to produce massive quan-
tities of intercontinental missiles. Soon afterwards, however, we could note
that they did not mass-produce these long-range missiles, but medium-range
missiles like the SS4 and the SSS.
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~ vr� v.. ~va~aa+ V~I~a Vl\Lil
Therefore, before the period you are dealing with, there was the Khru~hchev
pc:riod with, let us say, a"Soviet brainwashing" of the West. In 1962, this
offensiv~ which was based on a bluff, ended, probably because, in the fall, tre
Soviets became aware that, after all, Kennedy was to be taken seriously.
f.A.F.] Curiously enough, Khrushchev has left the memory of a peace-loving man,
whereas he took great risks. He probably was one of the la�t ideologists: he
strongly believed that co~nunism would work. Much more so than his successors.
[R.A.] Yes, he belonged to that first generation who still had an ingrained
faith. ~ut, to come back to detente, there is no doubt that, from the fall
of 1962, Khrushchev tried to adopt a new style of relations and that, in
Kennedy--surrotcnded by Harvard people who had conceived the theory of arms
control (red telephone, etc.)--he found an interlocutor. The result of this
change of mind was the July 1963 agreement on the suspension of detectable
nuclear tests. At a time when, precisely, the USSR and China made public
their historical dissension.
IA.F.] The coincidence of thESe two dates, besides, is very significant. For
the first time, the two giants were signing a treaty which their principal
allies--China on one side, France on the othe.r--refused to sign.
[R.A.] Definitely. To summarize, I would therefore say that I believe ths.t
detente was sincere in that it was a useful basis chosen by Khrushchev after
his 1962 failure. I believe that the Soviets then und.erstood that there was
a minimum amount of common interests that should be preserved or, to put it
more clearly, that a nuclear disaster h~.d to be avoided. But I would make
the reservation that, apart from that, they never taught their people any
other theory but that of the unavoidable opposition between the: two blocs.
Therefore, they acceptec~ a temporary coexistence but, in their mind, it has
to end in a final victory of their world.
[A.F.) Yes, with the slight difference that, af ter 1954-1955, the dogma of
the unavoidability of war between the two worlds--which had been ir~ favor under
Stalin--was abandoned. With the mental reservation, of course, that the
superiority of the so-called progressive forces would be such that the final
war could be avoided. Therefore, there was an adaptation. -
(R.A.] as a function of nuclear weapons. And at the time much mo~e as a
function of nuclear weapons ths.n as a function of detente. Stalin's successors
did understand that the final war would have to be a nuclear war.
[A.F.] Definitely, but it also appears to me that on all these questions, the
Soviet military thought is much less refined than the taestern thought.
[R.A.] That is right; first, they do not use the essential concept of the
United States, i.e. dissuasion. Like Clausewitz, th.ey say that war is the
continuation of politics by other means. They never say that nuclear war
would be a joint suicide. They say that it would be a frightening war but
th~.t there would be a winner and a loser.
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[A.F.] That is true. But in their private conversations at the end of the
1950's, it appears that the Soviets did tell thE: Chinese: "Your adventurism
l~eads to war." And this has also been at the root of their difference. This
being said, it seems to me that a prolonged period of detente started in 1962.
From that point, we have arrived at a bizarre situation since the word detente,
which initially described a stage, is now describing a situation.
[R.A.] Yes, and I have always considered that the rupture in the style of
East-West relations started at the end of the Cuban crisis, at the time when
Khrushchev's offensive ended. And one peculiar fact amon~ othe:rs is that the
lon~ war in Vietnam was associated with a somewhat different type of relation.
In a way, it was an accident.
[A.F.] That is it, an accident, a diversion and, at the same time, I think it
contributed much to the USSR's strategically catching up with the United States.
Indeed, is it not extraordinary to note that in 1962 the ratio of strategic
forces was roughly 5 to 1 in favor of the United States and that, 10 years
later, the first SALT agreement consecrated a certain Sovietic superiority?
[R.A.] Yes, but only for intercontinental missiles; a characteristics of the
United States is that, periodically, they will design great plans (Kennedy's
1,000 minutem~n in 1962); nevertheless, it is true that their apparent military
superiority as far as arms are concerned dates back to these years during
which the United States were obsessed by the Vietnam war. This also explains
why the United States no longez~ want to intervene in the world.
[A.F.] The best illustration of this attitude is Central America, where the
United States are intervening less and less, whereas for a long time they
considered this part of the world as a private preserve.
[R.A.) Yes, and to this must be added the fact that the u S. military budget
has continued to decrease after the Vietnam war. Finally, we realize now that
the United States cannot rearm massively without profound changes in their
economy, and Reagan is now unable to get out of the contradiction into whi~h
he has placed himself: to reduce taxes and, at the same time, increase military
expenditures. The USSR, on the contrary, is rearming as much as it can, which
is a threat to detente. In fact, the inequality between non-nuclear forces
is increas.ingly in favor of the Soviet Union and it is not sure that the
Russians will always resist the temptation not [as published] to take advantage
of it since, contrary to the Americans, they are acutely aware of the ratio
of forces.
[A.F.) And I believe we can say that the Soviets, who never use the word
dissuasion, are often practicing it to protect what they have. It is certain
that, in the case of Poland, dissuasion has been given full play.
[PARADOXES~ Could we now briefly and seriously discuss the Polish crisis?
[R.A.) In this respect, I think we can say that, over a surprisingly long
period, a phenomenon very uncommon in the Soviet world has taken place in
Poland: a popular revolt with an alliance of the intellectuals and the
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. run ~rrt~teu. u~~, u1vLY
proletariat. This, in my opinion, has been the: cause of the Poles' illu-
sions which, paradoxically, were still reinforced by the attitude of the
Soviets who, certainly, wanted to avoid as much as possible a direct inter-
vention that ~aould have been in contradiction with their great European
policy, the objective of which is to get Germany out of the Atlantic alliar.Ce.
[A.F.] Yes, a peculiar fact in Poland is that the revolt actually started in
�1956, at the time of the Poznan riots. Little by little, a certain liberal-
ism had been instituted in Poland. Besides, Gierek had understood that the
Poles were deeply opposed to co~unism and that the only way to make them
put up with it was to improve the standard of living of the people. This is
why he wanted Poland to become a large exporting power, another Poland, which
implied a formidable indebtedness at the start--although the results appeared
positive for a time--and a de facto sharing of the power with the Church.
Already then, however, Gierek was worried about the future and I well remem-
ber his telling me during an interview that everything would go well as long
as the crisis of capitalism did not worsen too much. Already then, he felt
that Poland would have trouble exporting to markets suffering from a rece.ssion.
This said, the second aspect of the Polish crisis which I find interesting is
th~.t dissension took months to develop, whereas, in Hungary, the intervention
had been more brutal. The main difference between what happened in Hungary
and Czechoslovakia on the one hand, and in Poland on the other hand, is that,
in the first two countries, the party apparatus escaped Russian control--which
resulted in the ~:rrest of Dubcek and the execution of Imre Nagy--whereas in
Warsaw tt;e party apparatus remained faithful although it had lost cont.rol of
the situation.
Another extraordinary fact is that the military coup took place before anybody
on Solidarity's staff had been informE:d of it, whereas it was believed that
the union had many sympathizers, including in the Army.
[R.A.] I agree with you to recognize the illusions of the Poles, but when it
comes to a comparative analysis of the three countries, I would not put it
exactly as you do. I do believe that we must make a distinction between these
three cases: Czechoslovakia, where everything came frotr, the top since, after �
a change of majority inside the party, a wave of liberalism occurred--without
any troubles and without much popular enthusiasm eithe:r--Hungary, where there
also was a crescendo, as well as a violent revolution. And, finally, Poland,
a c~se very different from the other two since what occurred was a sort of
diffuse revolution supported by loose structures--the unions--which brought
aboL~.t a disintegration of the party.
The surprise for us, as you said, was to find that Solidarity--which was
everywhere--had not anticipated all this. As far as I am concerned, during
tl-e last few weeks it seemed obvious to me that a"normalization" was about
to take place.
[A.F.] It was unavoi.dable. I think tr.at from the moment Solidarity's congress
appealed to workers in socialist countries to follow the Polish example,
provocation had gone far enough. It was impossible to imagine that the Soviets
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would let that happen. Also, the demand for free elections wasanother great
risk for, according to the polls, if such elections were to take place in
Poland, only 3 to 4 percent of the people would vote for the communist party.
Moscow could not accept such a repudiation. And, paradoxical.ly, I believe
- that the successive retreats of the power did in faet encourage such an
escalation.
[R.A.] Yes, but we must say that these extreme forms of provocation happened
after the coup had been organized. Those who prepared the coup played a sort
of comedy by pretending they would accept all this.
[A.F.] Certainly. But we do not know, and it will take some time before we
know, when the limit of the tolerable was reached. Because, in practice,
when we went to Poland we still had the. impression of a certain liberalism.
[R.A.] Yes. Before the troubles began, I had in fact been invited by the
"Flying University." The lectures, which were tolerated, took place in apart-
ments and there was an atmosphere of true liberalism; an atmosphere which, by
tl;e way, was very differentfrom thatwhich can be noticed in Hungary where ~his
phenomenon is due to the party. Now, unfortunately, I believe that we are going
toward a process similar to what happened in Czechoslovakia. In time, I be-
lieve. the reQime will harden.
[A.F.] It will harden, but it will have great difficulties in putting the peo-
ple back to work, and it is still difficult to imagine what compromise could
be acceptable both to the Russians and to the Polish masses.
[R.A.] On the other hand, if the West does not help Poland, the USSR will have
to. This means that, actually, the Poles shoul.d be given a minimum amount of
foreign currency and raw materials. But the economy is now in such a state of
disintegration that no one can tell which way things will go.
In fact, if the Poles should ever wish to f eed themselves, they will have to
reexamine the principles of communism, they will have to assure the farmers
that their land will not be nationalized; they will have to give them pe~r,iis-
sion to enlarge their properties, in other words, they will have to do the
exact opposite of what has been done until now, since individual property was
. respected and, at the same time, the regime`s inefficiency was ensured by
the suppression of all encouragements to production. This is really the height
of absurdity!
For the time being. thanks to the black market, the limit of what is bearable
has not yet been reached, but it could soon be. In fact, it is hard to imagine
how a true normalization--i.e. the accession to power of a government truly
backed by the people--could take place.
[A.F.] At any rate, for the time being, the situation is certainly worse than
in Czechoslovakia...
.[R.A.] Yes, for,in Czechoslovakia,material conditions are relatively good.
And, besides, the Czech are more passive or, rather, they have adapted to des-
potiam bette~than the Poles. For, in Poland, the striking fact during the
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recent period, has been that, for the first time since the war, the Poles
r edisc o v er ed their romanticism. Whereas, in 1956, they had been extremely
"good," this time they allowed themselves to be carried away, and that was
the result of the party's tolerance. It is in fact paradoxical that the
unions wanted to launch "normal" union activities against a power which ap--
peared to exist no longer. They "stepped onto an eiderdown" and went too far.
My Polish friends were surprised when, a few months ago, I wrote in L'EXPRESS
that normalization was unavoidable and that the only question was to know
who would take care of it. Unfortunately, facts proved me right.
[A.F.] I wrote about the same thing in LE I~IONDE and, like you, it made me
unpopular. But I do not regret it because, when you know you are not going
to do anything, you have no right to push othe rs to a n escalation. In my
opinion, this is irresponsible.
[PARADOXESI Do you think that, in Moscow, it was the army or the party who
decided to intervene?
[R.A.] As for me, I believe that, in the Soviet Union, the party is always in
charge and plays a decisive p~.rt. The ties between the party and the army
are,I believe, extremely strong.
[A.F.] Then, you do not agree with Castoriadis's analyses?
[R.A.] Castoriadis has developed a theory. He hFis never studied the USSR. He
has discovered what we had known for a long time, viz. that the power of the
USSR lies essentially in the Red Army. This is nothing new. As for the rela-
tions betweer.. the party and the~ army, he does not know them any better than
we do. It is also not possible to forecast with certainty what the war policv
of the Kremlin or the army would be.
[PARADOXES] What do you think of international reactions to the Polish crisis?
[R.A.] There is not much to say. Emotional reactions varied depending on
political situations and, especially, on traditions. To the French sensibility,
Poland means something and, in my opinion, the French reaction has been largely
sincere. It has of course been intensified by political interests: that of
the socialists, to place the comanunists in a difficult position; that of the
opposition, to place the socialist-communist coalition in a difficult position.
' As a result, I believe that, in France, there has been a certain amount of
political manipulation, as well as a considerable sincere reaction.
In the FRG, whose interest it is to maintain tolerable relations with the
Soviets, popular emotion has of course been less strong. But, now that it is
clear that tt;.e French are not willing to use the economic weapon, it appears,
as a German university professor recently said, "that the French and the
Germans are now in tune."
(A.F.] All you say is perfectly true but, as far as France is concerned, I
think we should .nention the fascination exerted by Solidarity on CFDT
(French Democratic Confedera::ion of Labor), and especially on its general
secretary. To tl-em, it ~.~as a self-~management movement...
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[R.A.) that did not manage anything...
[A.F.] Right, but there certainly was a deep sympathy on their side and their
reactions were very quick. In this respect, it is highly significant that
Edmond Maire was one of the first to protest against the signature of the
gas-supply agreement with the USSR.
[R.A.J Al.l that is true; nevertheless, we can still ask ourselves whether it
is reasonable for the West to arm themselves against the Soviet threat and,
at the same tune, to grant their potential enemy low interest rate credits.
As far as I am concerned, I have been thinking for years that this was un-
reasonable, but I must admit that, on this point, the positions of the
government and of the opposition are similar.
[A.F.] That is right, an~. we can be sure that, if the opposition were still
in power, the agreement would have been signed... and denounced by the
opposition.
[R.A.] All we can say is that the draft prepared by the former majority, at
least, involved a smaller amount of gas. But, in fact, the results would
probably have been roughly the same. It is just that the present goverrnnent
has had the weakness of shouting much louder than Giscard would have. As
a result, the discrepancy between words and deeds appears more striking.
[PARADOXESI And Germany? Are you not worried b~ its present evolution?
[R.A.] On th�t subject, I would like to submit my latest definition of
Germany. Its f irst national interest is to maintain its alliance with
the United State~, which gives it some security.
Its second national interest is to maintain tolerable relations with the
Soviet world. The first national interest is a prerequisite to enable Bonn
to discuss with Moscow. The second interest requires that the human benefits
gained by political concessions not be followed by excessively strong tensions
between the East and the West. These two interests are hardly compatible
under extreme circumstances. When circumstances become extreme, the Bonn
government does its best not to clash with either party.
[A.F.] I believe that the question of human benefits is very important, be-
- cause Bonn leaders feel that, ultimately, it is up to them to preserve the
relative improvement in the relations between the populations of the two
Germany's which resulted from the Ost-Politik. And they know that the
Russians are going to react, should they exert the slightest reprisa]. After
Schmidt was reelected 18 months ago, he did call Honnecker to order when the
latter tried to im~ose a unilateral increase of the foreign currency alloca-
tion which West German visitors must procure. H. Schmidt interrupted his
vacation but, in the end, did nothing...
[R.A.] Which also shows the existence of a trap which can be summarized as
follows: all concessions from the East are temporary; all renunciations
from the West are permanent. This is characteristic of our negotiations
with the Soviet world. It still does not mean that the Germans are neutralistic,
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1 V1\ Vi L iVitlL V~lL VL~LL
since they need the American alliance to enable them tc have tolerable dis-
cussions with the East. All the same, the danger of a strong reaction from
Washington is always present, ar.d the German position certainly does not
promote the will to resist in Western Europe.
= [AF.] In fact, I do not think that those in power are neutralistic. Ths.t phe-
nomenon car�, be perceived at a different level. I recently went to Tuebingen
to present a lecture and I was struck to see to what extent the university
community--faculty and students--is pacifist. With the very naive idea that
the development of a pacifist trend in the FRG could have a contagious effect
on the East.
[R.A.] Actually, all this is a way to hide a deep-seated feelin~, fear of the
Soviet Union. From tl-,en on, you can find very good reasons, but everyone
knows that, at thE: root of all this, there is the transformation of the ratio
of force:s between the two blocs. Those who lived during the 1930's k no w
very well what it is like to be afraid of a powerful neighbor. Here, we can
show off because we are f artker away and because we have been told that we
would have security without war...
[A.F.] But, at the same time, we can say that the whole French policy during
the past 20 years developed under the protection of a German-U.S. wall which
we thought was impregnable. Now, from the moment these two words, U.S. and
German, are uncoupled, it is obvious that events present themselves in a very
different light.
(PARADOXES] What is now, in your opinion, the future of North-South
relations?
[R.A.) In this respect, I do not think that there can really be any great
policy between developed and developing countries as long as the schism between
tY~e communist and the capitalist worlds exists. As long as this schism will
oppose tc,o blocs of industrialized countries, such a policy will remain
paralized. The USSR has a policy of "liberation" which, actually, consists
in overthrowing moderate regimes and regimes favorable to the West; it does
not have a Ftolicy of aid to poor ccuntries. And when it grants aid, it is
often in the form of weapons and to regimes which are more or less converted
to Marxism-Leninism.
[A.F.I Yes; this being said, we are all fully aware that the East-West logic
is leading nowhere and that East-West relations must of necessity have a
North-South componEnt. During the past few year.s, the USSR progression has
indeed taken place mainly in Third-World countries and has consistently been
aimed at depriving the West of its sources of raw materials. Therefore,
if Saudi Arabia should one day go over to the other side, that would be a
disaster. This is why it is obvious to me that the interest of the developed
North is to achieve a minimum of consolidation of the economies of the South.
(R.A.] I agree with you, but what means of action do we have in Saudi Arabia?
It is a traditionalist country and, in addition, a rich country that resists
foreign pressures. As for Africa, I believe that even if we give a lot of
money to Zaire, we will never create a stable economy there. The same is also
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true of South Africa: I do not aee how we could replace the present regime,
which we condemn, by another that would not be revolutionary and would give
. the country such a flourishing economy. Certainly, the most solid in all
of Africa.
[A.F.] This is also the reason why goverrnnents are of ten more violently op-
posed to this regime in words than in deeds. All the same, I do believe that
the problem of North-South relations is of capital importance, since the
South is experiencing a formidable population growth which, moreover, is
accompanied by a rapid deterioration of its standards of living.
[R.A.] Yes, but, again, what can we do? Take Mexico for instance. What
action can we have in a country with an apparently stable regime, a lot of
money and oil?
[A.F.] I know that this is very complicated, but I do not see how we can
provide some sort of purpose for our societies if we neglect this problem.
Besides, if we do not do anything, many poor countries will certainly fall
into the Soviet sphere of influence.
[R.A.] I am not so sure of that. Look at what happened in Southeast Asia:
in Indian, in Fakistan, in Indonesia. These countries have experienced
serious crises, but they did not go over to the other side. And besides,
I must say it again, the countries which are of vital importance to the West
are those of southern Africa and those of the Near East. Both here and there,
our means of action are limited.
[A.F.] I still believe that, basically, people need hope. They want to be
giver objectives. Now, in our western societies, we no longer have a purpose
and I believe tbat this situation is dangerous in that it can lead to revolu-
tionary troubles as a result of the governments~ unability to offer an ideal.
(R.A.] Maybe, but you could also conclude, like certain ill-disposed individ-
uals, that nations need war. Obviously, this is not your conclusion, but the
idea that the Europeans could be appeased by telling them that they must
send money to Bangladesh seems unrealistic to me. Certainly, we can aid the
poorest countries but, first, I do not believe that this project will enthuse
the Europeans ar~d, second, we cannot expect a great strategic benefit from
such an aid ~~r, once again, our means of action on the cauntries that are
vitally important to us are very limited.
[A.F.] I still believe that the cor,cept of a purpose is fundamental, especial-
ly for the young. And I do not see what other objective we could offer but
a world economic order.
[R.A.] Yes, but was the victory of the socialist party, one year ago, deter-
mined to any extent. by the prospect of achieving the world economic order you
are mer~tioning?
[A.F.] Certai.nly not. France remains a very self-centered country. However,
it is much less indifferent to the Third-World I"cartieriste"l than it used
to be.
[R.A.] At least, that is something!
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Compagnie Europeenne d'Editions et Publications Periodiques
9294 43
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MILITARY FRANCE

~
RECOGNIZING ENEMY, COI~IUNICATING, IN EUROPEAN THEATER
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in Frfnch May 82 pp 58-60
[Article by Colonel Claude Delbos: "Information on the Battlefield in the Euro-
pean Theater of Operations"~
[Text) In wartime, knowledge of the enemy through operational
intelligence is an absolute necessity. Some new techniques
have been perfected in eupport of this search. Used by the
combatants and the specialists, tr?ey should make possible a
continual updating of the situation of the enemy. But in or-
der to be usable, the i~nformation thus obtained must be trans-
mitted rapidly to the decision centers, where it is exploited
in real time.
Operational intelligence can be defined as intelligence making it.possible to
conceive and conduct war operations. Its aim is the best possible knowledge of
the enemy. Obviously, such knowledge always remains imperfect, for the enemy
is maneuvering and he makes a strong effort not to reveal either his exact sit-
uation or his intentions. It is for this reason that operational intelligence
is a search activity that seeks, beyond what the enemy lets us see, to discover
what he is hiding from us. It is a matter of forming the most exact idea pos-
sible of the nature, position and volume of the enemy, but also of anticipating
his initiatives or his reactions. That ia why the military leader--whtever his
level, tactical or strategic--muat see to it that a search is made on the bat-
tlefield itself for everything that can enable him to know his present enemy
and to predict his future enemy.
Intelligence has always been one of the components of war activity, and modern
conflicts do not escape this law; but one must take care not to be content to-
day with the methods inherited from the past. The evolution of the techniques
employed in modern conflicts necessitates an "updating of intelligence."
This updating concerns all combatants, for all, to varying degrees, have a role
to play in the matter of battlefield intelligence; but it concerns particularly
the specialists in the intelligence function, those whose responsibility it is
to discover what the enemy is hiding from us. They have to make reaolute use
of all the resources of the available techniques, so as to increase the depth
of their search and accelerate the exploitation of their information.
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The Battlefield
The battlefield, as it can be imagined today in Europe, has characteristics
that must be taken into account.
The first characteristic to be taken into consideration for the engagement of
our forces is the numerical superiority of the potential adversary and his pos-
sibility of using this superiority by manning the battlefield in such a way as
to maintain a strong rhythm and leave us no respite. For us, the only way to
respond to this is to localize and destroy by fire the maximum amount of the
enemy means of combat before they come into contact with our own forces. This
brings out an aspect of intelligence that takes on importance: intelligence
about objectives. It should be noted here that the employment of nuclear fire,
within the framework of an air-land c anbat, acquires all its deterrent force
only if it is capable of inflicting massive losaea on the adversary. It is
therefore important to be able to strike at the right place, and to this end,
to have means available that make it possible to localize objectives in the
heart of the enemy formation.
Motorization, generalization of four-wheel-drive and cross-country capacities,
and the development of amphibious equipment give the formations great mobility.
Simultaneously, the nuclear danger makes for dispersal. The result of this is
a great difficulty in finding the enemy in an emptier landacape and over ex-
panses more vast than in the past. The task is all the more arduous in that
the traditional means of in-depth intelligence, aviation, finds more and more
difficulty in flying over a battlefield that contains formidable antiaircraft
capacities.
Because of their mobility, the reserves kept far in the rear are capable of in-
tervening in shorter times. The generalization and perfecting of transmission
facilities, added to the mobility of the forces, make possible sudden changes
of posture and almost immediate reactions. This speed of posture change im-
pos~s shorter reaction times on intelligence. The ideal would be to be able t~
exploit target intelligence in real time.
Another characteristic of the battlefield is the ubiquity of the enemy tlireat.
The combat is in the sir and on land, and aviation and helicopters enable the
enemy to intervene with fire at any point in the formation and in the rear.
Taking advantage of the intervals and voids created by dispersal, he can sud-
denly pin combatants down, infiltrate units, and create a threat capable of
throwing us off balance.
In the face of these threats, safeguarding will depend on the speed a;~d cor-
rectness of reactions, which themsElves are a function of the speed and preci-
sion of the command's intelligence.
There are doubtlessly a good many other factors to be studied in order to re-
view the question completely, but limiting oneself to what seems essential, one ,
perceives several imperatives that intelligence has to take into account today
when envisioning the conduct of operations in Europe:
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--search for intelligence in depth, by means complementary to aviation;
--reduction of times for treatment of information and real-time exploitation of
target intelligence;
--centralization of items of information that are numerous but of a detail na-
ture and related to more extensive zones.
The Combatant as a Source of Intelligence
This last-mentioned point--the centralization of information relating to the
entirety of the zone of responsibility--is in reality a conclition for the safe-
ty of our forces. In effect, it is easential not to be ignorant of anything
that may occur in contact, within the formation or to the rear. This is the
first function that the intelligence system has to take on, and it concerns all
combatants. Thus, no matter what his station, the cambatant must have re-
ceived ~raining that makes him capable of identifying and localizing any mani-
festation of the enemy that he may observe, so as to get an idea of it in a
form that can be exploited. And the leaders, at whatever level, must be con-
cerned to orient their subordinates toward the intelligence to be sought.
The generalizatioc: of optical and infrared equipment, of low-light devices,
telemeters, radars, :o cite only the essential things, gives another dimension
to the possibilities c~Y observation by the combatants on the battlefield. One
must know how to use this modern equipment to the advantage of safety and in-
telligence; the transimission facilities of the units, and even more, the fa-
cilities that will go into service in the coming years, have possibilities that
have to be taken advantage of in order to transmit information rapidly.
All combatants are therefore potentially sources of intelligence through their
observations. Nevertheless, it must be realized clearly that an intelligence
system that contented itself with these sources would be condemned to knowing
about the enemy only what he chose to show. If one wants to know what he is
hi~ding, one has to use partiaular means designed for the search for intelli-
gence, and specialists who, on the basis of the enemy's visible manifestations,
considered as indications, will know how to discover his hidden potentials.
There is indeed a battle of intelligence.
Search in Depth
Henceforth, this intelligence battle is to be carried on with the three impera-
tives taken into account that result fram the characteristics of the battle-
field:
--search in depth;
--reduction of exploitation times;
--centralization and treatment of information items that are numerous but of a
deatil nature and scattered.
In-depth search is a necessity connected with the extensiveness of the zone in
which the enemy can keep means capable of playing a role in maneuvering. The
~ objectives to be found are first of all the combat unita--dispersed, camou-
flaged, awaiting orders to relieve those of the first echelon--but also the
firing materiel, the launching ramps, the CP's [Command Posts], the logistics.
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Everything that can be localized and destroyed in depth will constitute a
lightening of the task of our direct-combat forces. Our aviation, desp:te the
ground-to-sir defenses and the enemy aviation, will doubtlessly gather int~lli-
gence. But it will be largely absorbed in the tasks proper to it, in great
depth, on the scale of the theater of operations. Other means are necessary
for meeting the needs of the big ground-forces units.
The Army's means of intelligence are therefore intended to be developed. Ob-
servation is making considerable progress, as we have seen. Radars are pro-
gressing also--ground surveillanCe radars and trajectography radars--but the
interesting progress in this area will be the flying radar that will make it
possible to observe beyond 30 km. There has been progress in electronic intel-
ligence, but means of localization by radars, infrared devices and lasers can
still be envisioned. The effectiveness of deep patrols ahould be increased by
the use of pickups adapted to their misaions.
Finally, besides the images obtained by an observation satellite that are de-
finitely exploitable to the benefit of the ground forces, overflight of the en-
emy with drones that can be sent out on programmed flight and with RPV [expan-
sion unknown), remote-piloted mini-airplanes, represents a further opportunity
for obtaining images. These machines can overfly the enemy zone and bring back
photos of it or transmit televised images. Intelligence is thus obtained in
real time, and the second imperative required of intelligence--reduction of
the time taken--is thus fulfilled in part.
Cutting Down Time
How is the problem of time posed in the area of intelligence? Three factors
play an important role. The first is the forwarding of the intelligence. If
this forwarding is done by a hierarchical route, with each level studying and
deciding whether to transmit or not, one sees that there�will inevitably be de-
lays, which would be eliminated by addressing the information directly to the
recipient concerned. This preaumes, at the regimental level or the intelli-
gence-unit level, the competence of an intelligence officer to decide on the
forwarding of the in~elligence. The second factor is the necessity of a con-
tinually available means of transmission. The intelligence may be a notice of
alert, and it has to be able to be passed on. Specialized communication links
are therefore necessary between the intelligence officers responsible for ob-
taining the information and putting it in proper form, the intelligence-exploi-
tation units, and the CP's for the available means of fire. The third factor
in cutting down time is the exploitation as such; but this involves the problem
posed by the centralization of intelligence for the processing of it.
Centralization of intelligence is indispensable. Each observer, each means of
search, has, if something is found, only a piece of a puzzle, and ihese pieces
have to be gathered together to make the complete picture. If one imagines the
centralization of an army corps' intelligence, one sees the difficulty, at this
level, of processing, within an adequate time frame, the information coming
from the combat units and from the intelligence-search units, with each giving
its limited view within an immenae zone of army-corps responsibility.
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The teams responsible for this work in our present CP's are still doing every-
thin~; with ballpoint pen and grease pencil: recording, filing, sorting, compar-
ing, interpretation, visualization. These operations take time. At times of
saturation, it is not impossible for an item of information to be lost. But ~
this work typically amounts to data-processing, and the computer should be abl~
to improve matters.
In conclusion, operational intelligence is involved today in an evolution that
has to be kept on top of, accelerated perhaps, so as to maintain in our forces
a sufficient credibility in the face of their possible adversary.
This adversary, who counts on numbers and tempo, so as to overwhelm us with his .
mass, has to be countered by effective intelligence action that makes it pos- ~
sible to anticipate his initiatives and 'hit him as far away as possible. This
intelligence action involves all combatanta, considered as potential sources of
intelligence. The collection and centralization system has to be based on
qualified intelligence officers and must have specialized means of transmission
available. All the means that technology can furnish for increasing the effec-
tiveness of in-depth investigation of the enemy formation must be put to use.
Finally, computerized means must be used for forwarding and pro .ssing intelli-
gence, in order to reduce the time needed for exploitation of it.
Such a system, putting varied modern means into action, has to be sparked by
specialists trained in the techniques of intelligence acquisition and in the
methods of exploitation and, especially, possessing in-depth knowledge of the
adversary. That is why it could well be that an updating of our operational-
intelligence system depends first of all on better training of the people who
serve it.
Col Claude Delbos, a graduate of Saint-Cyr (class of 1954),
served in Algeria and in the FRG before becoming an instruc-
tor at the ESM ~Higher Military School] (Saint-Cyr). He has
commanded a battery of the 35th RAP [Parachute Artillery Regi-
mentJ and has been chief of the training section of the 16th
RA [Artillery Regiment]. He holds the DEM [General-Staff Di-
plomaJ and the BEMS [Certificate of Higher Military Studies],
and after holding various general-staff positions and command-
ing the 8th RA at Commercy, he is currently in the EMAT[Land Forces
Staff or Military Academy for Communications?]
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'aujourd'hui"
11267
CSO: 3100/714
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MILITARY UNITED KINGDOM
'THE TIMES' QUESTIONS VALIDITY OF DEFENSE CUTS
PM011447 London THE TIMES in English 1 Ju1 82 p 13
[Editorial: "Too Much on the Rhine"] ~
[Text] The defense white paper which is to be debated in the commo.ls today
is the final product of that hurried defence review which was set in motion
eighteen months ago when Mr Nott went to the T1.efence Ministry. It wa,, brought
to a~reliminary conclusion by the end of last s~mer. It was never explained
what caused the hurry, and certainly the review suffered from the need for
such haste, since a whole raft of essential strategic questions was swept
aside and left unanswered in the process.
Mr Nott's f inancial task seems to have been to cut forward costings by about
eight billion pounds over the next ten years, saving half of that simn in the
process, an d reserving the other half in a central uncommitted fund. His
political task was to leave our continental European forces effectively untouched
~ so as not to disturb Britain's relationship with her European allies at a moment
of sensitivity in the EEC. Mtlitarily this left virtually only one option,
which was to let thp main burden of cuts fall on the navy, since both the army
and the RAF were featured more specifically in the formal force co~nitment to
NATO. The navy, by its very nature, deals in a less precise operattional
, environmental than the geographical sectors of West Germany or the provision
of that country's air defence.
As a result of his review Mr Nott proposed to cut the navy by twice as much
as the army and by seven times as much as. the RAF--to the tune of some
five billion pounds over ten years. This was to be achieved by reducing the
active surface fleet of frigates and destroy ers from a current figure of
about 65 to one of 42; selling the carrier invincible to Australia: eliminating
th e need for warships to undergo mid-13fe modernization which normally helps
_ long-life hulls to accommodate changes in more rapidly obsolescent weapon
3ystems; and the closure of naval dockyards. The fleet of frigates and
destroyers w~ould ostensibly be backed by another eight ships on stand�-by--not
the kind of stand-by which this su~maer enabled ships to be quickly activated
for service in th e South Atlantic, but one in which the ships would be unable
to put to sea without substantial refits--a state nearer stand-down than
sta nd-by.
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There was some laudable cost control 3n these decisions, taken against the
background of lamentable strategy. The strategic effect of concentrating
so much of our military etfort in th e north German plain is that the military
utachine becomes obsessively concerned with that area, to the exclusion of the
rest of the world. Th e"short war" enthusiasts in the army and Royal Air
Force, dedicated to the territorial trip wires of NATO military planning, seem
once again to have won the day in the Defence Ministry. Just because our
ultimate security lies with the preservation of peace in Central Europe, it
does not follow that th e main threat to that security will come in Central
Europe. On the contrary, most strategists now accept that the very stability
of the force-~am each side of the iron curtain has led Soviet strategists to
pursue an indirect approach through massive naval expansion and the
encouragement of indirect threats to the Western position through proxies
far from Central Europe, in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa and
Latin America. With all that going on there is no need to ask why things are
so quiet on the Rhine.
Mr Nott should be asked two questions. The first is to explain why he did
not fully examine the financial consequences of a military alternative to
his programme of savage naval cuts--by saving on the cost of our peacetime
commitment to maintain force levels in Germany. The second would be to
explain why, given that great sav3ngs could be achieved without impairing our
war-time commitment to the defence of Germany, there is such coyness about
initiating discussions with our allies to bring about a more equitable sharing
of the defence burden.
Britain maintains 60,000 soldiers and nearly 11,000 airmen in West Germany.
They are accompanied by as many wives and children. The Defense Ministry rents
or owns some 45,000 married quarters, educates 28,000 children and provides
medical services for the lot. The cost of education, health and housing for
these service families is at least 450 million pounds a year which would not
fall on the defence budget at all if those troops were stationed in Britain,
with adequate plans to deploy them in Germany whenever it was necessary both
for operational training and for real emergenc3es. On top of that Rhine army
employs nearly 25,000 local people in servic3ng its peacetime establishment,
costing probably anoth er two hundred million more.
The purpose of our troops in Germany is to deter an attack and be ready to
fight should such deterrence fail. The existing strength of,sixty thousand
soldiers is barely half what Rhine army would comprise on a war establishment,
and even now is often nominally below our treaty level of 55,000, with units
serving in northern Ireland though listed on th e stre~th of Rhine army.
It would be possible militarily to bring home many of our army and air forces
from Germany, while equipping them with the capacity for rapid redeployment.
After the initial capital cost of refurbishing barracks, and arranging for new
married quarters, it would save hundreds of millions of pounds on the defence
budget. Some of that could go to repair the damage which Mr Nott's plan will
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~ progressively, and seriously inflict on the fleet from 1986 onwards~ with
fewer ships at sea, fewer hunter-killer submarines on order, and the prospect
of a further savage contra~tion in the early 1990's when the full effects of
this year's decisions will be felt.
These matters should be put fairly to our allies with a request for an adjust-
ment to our treaty commitments. Perhaps those who have misgivings about such
a transfer of resources would have a stronger case if they spent as much per
�head on defence as Britain does; but none of them does. Before that can
happen, however, the British defense establishment itself must reach a concerted
view. Mr Nott may have successfully split the chiefs of staff committee,
so that he can claim he is not ignoring their concerted advice. Certainly
the army and RAF chiefs seem to have sat back--like shadows '~awning at the
mass"--and watched, indeed connived at, the axe falling on the navy, with no
apparent concern for the unbalanced way iY: was done.
They should consider the possib ility that they are wrong. The certainties of
the "short war" theory-~which lead to such an obsession with Central Europe--
are an unsound basis on which to calculate future strategy. Any British
Govermaent must consider that the possibilities for harrassment or minor
aggression are infinitely more varied and numerous at sea than they are on
that frontier in West Germany. It is vital, therefore, that Britain should
be able to deploy forces at sea which could match each phase of a potential
escalation, and that must include an adequate fleet of surface vessels as
well as submarines, and carriers. That is not preparing forces to fight the
last war (in th is case, th e Falklands); it is preparing, as best we can, for
the unforeseen.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Lim3.ted, 1982
CSO: 3120/69 E~
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