JPRS ID: 10668 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10668 ~
19 July 1982
- USSR Re ort
p
MIIITARY AFFAIRS
- (FOUO 9/82)
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JPRS L/10668
19 July 1982
USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 9/82)
CONTENTS
MILITARY SCIENCE, THEOftY, STR.ATEGY
Book Review: V. I. Lenin and Soviet Military Science
~ (M. A. Gareyev; VO~PROSY FILOSOFII, No 4, 1982) 1
,
NAVAL FORCES
Book Excerpts: On Psychological Training of Naval Personnel
(vOYNA, OKE~dN, CI~LOVEK, 1980) 8
Excerpts ~om Book on Soviet Naval Ve3sels in World Wax II
(Geliy Ivanoz?ich Khor~kov; SOVETSKIYE NADVODNYYE
KORABI~I V VFLIRO~Y OTECHFSTVENNOY VOYNE, 1981) 39
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= MILITARY SCIENCE, THEORY, STRATEGY
i
!
BOOK REVIEW: V. I. LENIN AND SOVIET MILITARY SCIENCE
Moscow VOPROSY FILOSOFII in Russian No 4, 1982 (aigned to preas 4 Apr 82)
- pp 151-154
[Review by M. A. Gareyev of book "V. I. Lenin i sovetskaya voyennaya nauka"
[V, I. Lenin and Soviet Military Science] by N. N. Azovtsev, 2d edition,
revised and supplemented, '2lauka," Moscow, 1981, 352 pages]
[Text] The author of this book aet for himself the goal of covering Lenin's
contribution to creation of Soviet military ecience on the basis of a study
~ and generalization of his theoretical and practical activities in the military
field; to uncover the new elements Lenin introduced to the treasurehouse of
Marxiam on thia matter; and to trace the subsequer~t development of Lenin's
ideas.
The book makea an attempt to comprehend the problems posed as a complex, to
understand Lenin's ideas as an integral system of vievrs which reflected condi-
tfons of the first yeare of establiahment and development of military science
of the �irst socialist state in the world, and at the same time to demonatrate
the close Iink of L~nin's ideas and military science of our days.
It should be emphasized in particular that in the courae of his analysis of
various problems of Soviet military acience in all its stagea of development,
the author consistently identifies the current importance of Lenin's heritage
and Lenin's approach to posing and resolving very complex iseues of military
organizational development and waging war in defense of the achievements of
socialism, an approach necessarily assuming an organic connecCion of scien-
tific ob~ectivity and strictneas with political realism and revolutionary
principle, and consistent orientation on bold, imaginative search in the f ield
_ of military theory and practice.
The book focuaes primary attention on showing Lenin's imaginative development
o,`. the Marxist approach to an understanding of war as a sociopolitical phe-
nomenon. The author reveals the fundamental difference between the Marxist-
I.eninist interpretation of the easence of war and bourgeois concepts. A
proper understanding of the essence of war is impossible without Lenin's pro-
foundly scientific, social-philosophical underetanding of the essence of
politics, without identifying its class nature and social-economic roota, and
without a thorough analysis of the politics which preceded and gave rise to a
particular war.
1
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On the basis of Leninist methodology the author also covers strictly military
problems--the character of contemporary armed conflict. He examines the most
important propositions, concepts and categories of military affairs in connec-
tion with their new qualitative definiteness generated by the entire course of
social and ecientif ic-technical progress. He covers the creative contribution
~ of the 23d-25th CPSU congresses and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev personally to an
evaluation of modern military'phenomena, especially the military-political
aituation in the world under conditions of the o~,position of two systems.
In conformity with Lenin's theses, the monogrsrh notes that the Marxist- ~
Leninist teaching on war and the army?, based on R unity of the three compo-
nents of Marxism-Leninism and directed toward an analyeis of the origin,
essence, social f unctioning and development of the army, is the i.mmediate
methodological b asis of military scienc:e of the socialist atate. It is also
important to emphasize this aspect of the matter because the Marxist-Leninist
- teacliing on war and the army sometimea is viewed only as a component part of
historical materialism and no consideration is given to tn~ iact that this
- teaching has both a social-political and political-economic content.
The monograph analyzes the laws of war. It points out in particular that one
, group comprises the most general laws reflecting the relationship of the
courae ancl outcome of waz and armed conflict to the relative economic, moral-
political, scientif ic-technical and military capabilities of the belligerents.
Another group includea specific (special) laws reflecting essential inner
relationahipa in the very phenomena of armed conflict as a uniform procesa of
military operation s on a strategic, operational and tactical scale. The~dis-
' tinction between general and specif ic laws of war and armed conflict have a
relative, not absolute, character. They are interrelated and affect each
other. It is correctly emphasized that both general laws (the lawa of dia-
lectica) ss well as special laws reflecting the ob~ective nature of military
phenomena in the specific conditiona of their appearance, change and develop-
ment are manifested in ~rmed conflict. An unde~rstanding of them provides a
key to choosing the means and methods of contralling processes relating to the
actions of armed forces in war. The book emphayizes that military science
formulates the most important propoaitions and concluaions, which are a
theoretical ref lect ion of ob~ective laws of the course and outcome of arnied
conflict.
Lenin's contribution to an elaboration of the principles of Soviet military
art ia shown convincingly. It is noted that he "revealed special qualitiea of
military art of the socialiat state as the art of a nationwide war againat
impe�:ialiat aggression, having emphasized its revolutionary, innovative
character, purposef ulness and decisiveneas" (p 182).
On the basis of a study of Lenin's theoretical and practical endeavors in the
military field and uaing literature published in recent years, it is shown
that the Leninist methodology provides grounds for a correct understanding of
specific featurea of laws of contemporary wars in which qualitatively new
meana of armed conflict may be employed.
2
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Lenin repeatedly emphasized the determining role of politics with respect to
armed violence and noted that wars always have been and remain a continuation
of the politics of states by means of armed vioience. In Lenin's thinking
this is "a theoretical basis of views on t?~e significance of each given war.it1
He indicated that war is part of a whole and this whole ia politics.
Of course the qualitative changes which are occurring in politica itself and
the meana of armed violence have complicated the interrelationship of politics
and war. On the one hand the role and importance of poli'.ice increase and, an
the other hand, nuclear miasile weaponry exerta a considerably greater reverse
influence on politics. The strategic ~haracter of war itself is changing
radically. But for the main, in its social-political and class essence, war
remains a continuation of politics by violent means.
E~�en today life indicates that any departure from these propositions and from
class positions or the ignoring of this aspect of the matter leads to serious
mistakes.
Graphic confirmati~n of this ie the Maoist distortion of the Marxist-Leninist
teaching on war and the army. Maoism absolutizes military violence and its
means and identifies war exclusively with armed struggle apr~rt from political
and other forms of struggle. The left-opp~rtuniatic iaterpretation of the
essence of war, especially in theses ~n the "omnipotence of war" and that
"war can be destroyed only b}~ meane of war" has found its embodiment in the
Maoist doctrine.
Also groundles~ are statements by some pseudore~olutionaries in the West to
the effect that some provisions of Lenin's teaching on war and the army are
inappropriate for analyzing present-day canditions. Many left-opportunistic
ideologues exaggerate the specifics of war, absolutize its "bloody," violent
element, and dissolve the essence of war in troop combat actiona proper.
Fawning on reactionary circles, they are attempting to ~ustify the existence
of the aggressive North Atlantic Alliance and their countries' participation
in it. In so doing they even admit the possibility of remaining within this
~lliance if leftist forces should come to power in a particular country, i.e.,
remain part of a bloc ai~ned against the USSR and other socialist countries,
part of an imperialist alli.ance of which one of the missions is to suppress
the revolutionary movement, freedom and democracy.
The book devotes much attention to an analysis of the concrete use of Lenin's
military-theoretical heritage in resolving certain problems of military
science under new conditions of our parcy's struggie for peace, for strength-
ening national defense and improving the Army and Navy's combat readiness tn
repulse any aggression.
Issues such as the character and types of ware of the modern era, the essence
and content of the revolution in military affairs and its influence on Armed
Forces structure and their increased combat readiness, methodological problems
of comaaand and control, the scientific and moral-political potential, their
role in reinforcing the military might of the socialist state, problems of
moral-political and psychological preparation of Army and ~iavy troops and f.orces
and a numbe:r of other probl~ma also were developed.
1. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works],
XXVI, 316.
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The author systematizes Lenin's ideas on the structure of Soviet military
science and notes that Soviet military science. in light of Lenin's military-
theoretical heritage, represents a systPm of knowledge on the character and
laws of war, on preparation of the Armed Forces and the country for war in
order to defend socialism's achievements, and on methods of waging it. Jointly
with other sciences, Soviet military science atudies war as a complex socio-
political phenomenon, but the primary sub~ect of its atudy ia armed confl:ct
in war.
The moat important components of Soviet military ecience, in addition to its
general thQOry, are the theories of military art, organizational development
of the Armed Forces, military training and indoctrination, military economics,
and the rear. Military history plays an important role in understanding
patterns of development of military art and the organizational development and
training of the Armed Forces. It should be emphasized that a precise defini-
tion of the sub~ect of military science contributes to an underatanding of its
interconnection and interrelationship with other sciencea, to the identifica-
tion of military problems in all other areas of acientific knowledge and. con-
sequently, to a uwre qualitative, integrated and comprehenaive etudy of raar
phenomena.
While setting forth these iasues correctly on the whole, in our view the
author also should have taken ~ critical look at certain views on the content
and structure of military science in existence prior to the recent past and
caused by an insufficiently deep understanding of the most important provi-
sions of Lenin's theory of knowledge and fundamentals of the classification of
sciences. This ~vas reflected most often in a broadening interpretation of the
subject of military science, in a mixing of its ob~ect and subject, and in
lack of understanding that scb,jects of study of various sciences are deter-
mined not according to the factor of what departments they serve or what
knowledge of related sciences they use, but above all in conformity with those
principles which they directly understand to be categories and methods of
research inherent to them. Attempts were made to include the entire system
of knowledge on war and the army in military science b ased on these premises,
but such issues as conditions of appearance, essence and origin of war and
other issues cannot be understood using the methods of military science. This
was done within the framework of hiatorical materialism and political
economy.
In the classification of military knowledge it was unfortunately not always
taken into account that contemporary war, being a continuation of politics by
violent means, is not only the clash of armed forces, but also a struggle in
the field of politica, economics and ideology. Armed conflict comprises the
deciding indication of war and its specific feature, but war is not limited
to this. Other means, including economic, diplomatic and ideological means,
also are employed to achieve the political goal set in war.
Clarification of the social essence of war and the arnry and the study of
various forms of conflict involve a study of principles quite varied in
nature--philosophical, aocial-political, economic, military and technical--
and the elaboration of tl~eoretical problems which are varied in their basis.
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Nt)R l)MF'I('IA1. I~CM' l1NI.Y
And so an understanding of these principlea as a whole, all together, is not
within the capability of some one science. A study of all these complex,
diverse phenomena can be made only through the ~oint efforts of a large number
- of sciences, including military science.
Three groups of objective processes and phenomena with their inherent princi-
ples requiring study stand out in all obviousneas with an integral examination
of war as a complex social-political phenomenon representing not only the
clash of armed forces, but also a struggle of classea, states, coalitiona and
social systems.
The first group includes the most general laws of war, the sum total of the
most fundamental, basic problems concerning the conditions for the appearance ,
of war and the army, and their interrelationship with other social phenomena
and with the philosophical-sociological, social-political and social-pconomic
essence of war as a whole and of all forma of its conduct accomplished both by
means of armed violence as well as other nonmilitary means. These issues are
studied by all three components of Marxism-Leninism and by its teaching on war '
and the army.
The second group of ob~ective phenomena and principlea which are primary and
deciding in war is connected with the specific features of a continuation of
politics by ff,eans of armed violence in close connection with moral-political,
economic and scie ntific-technical factors supporting the conduct of armed
struggle. These problems serve as the subject of study for military science
as well as special sectors of a number of social, natural and technical
sciences which are contiguous with (border on) military science and. which help
prepare and conduct armed conflict.
The third group encompasses phenomena and principles stemming from features
of struggling with an enemy by nonmilitary forms and means. During a war
politics is implemented chiefly by means of armed violence, but armed conflict
does not exhaust all means and forms of politics. Therefore other forms of
struggle are necessary to conduct politics during a war: economic, scientific-
technical, ideological, diplomatic and other means, with their subordination
to the interests of waging armed conflict. The internal principles of these
forms of conflict are studied by various social, natural and technical
sciences in accordance with their sub~ect matter.
Military science holds a special positiou within the overall system of knowl-
edge on war and the army. Inasmuch a~s it is linked moat of all with an under-
standing of armed conflict, it plays the chief role in elaborating methods
for attaining political go~ls during a war. In our view, these and certain
other issues were not properly substantiated in the book being reviewed.
A correct determination of the place of military science in the system of
knowledge on war and the army and of its sub~ect and atructure has not only
theoretical, but also great practical value. The classification of military
sci~ence must ensure the scientifically grounded resolution of such mattera as
identifying those aectors of science where primary effarts must be concen-
trated for their development in accordance with practical needa; the
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organization and structure of scientific establishmetits; a systems approach to
planning of scientific research projects; and the unification and coordination
of efforts by acientific collectives for atudying the most complex and inter-
related current problems.
A scientifically grounded approach to the classif ication of a syatem of scien-
tific knowledge on war and the army also is important from the standpoint of
the orientation of all sectors of social, natural and technical sciences on
the integrated study of problems of strengthening national defense and
increasi~ng the combat might of the Armed Forces.
The scientific-technical potential of developed socialism serves creative
goals. But imperialist politics of the arms race forces the USSR and all
countries of the socialist community to use the achievements of science to
" reinforce national defense and the country's Armed Forces.
The entire world knows that the Soviet Union ie not striving for military-
technical superiority, but the ever widening incluaion of scientific achieve-
ments in the sphere of military preparationa by the imperialists and the keen
- rivalry in qualitative improvements in arms and combat equipment pred2termine
a shift in the center of gravity in organizational development and training
of the Armed Forces to the f1e1d of a struggle of scientific and technical
ideas.
We also have to reckon with the fact that scientific-technical progress is
developing so swiftly that experience simply does not have time to acctmnulate
in many fields of human endeavor. The need arises ~ore and more in this
regard to make decisions under conditions of a lack of experience. With
regard to military affairs, their practice in peacetime always was relatively
limited, since it ia impossible to recreate many phenomena characteristic of a
combat situation during combat training. The resolution of this problem
becomes more and more difficult as the injurious effects of weapons increase,
especially with the appearance of nuclear weapons.
Foresight, forecasting and simulatian of the character of upcoming combat
actions acquire especially great importance under these conditions. All this
places higher demands on the organization, quality and effectivenesa of scien-
tific research.
The truth that the more complex military affairs become, the greater the
theoretical training needed by military cadres becomes more and more obvious
in our days. The ability to think broadly, deeply and quickly from the posi-
tion of Marxism-Leninism, to see the relationship between the whole and the
part, to set high goals for oneself and to find effective ways of achieving
them all require constant improvement in cadres of various fields of knowl.edge
in general and specialists of military sciance in particular. That is the
ob~ective necessity which confirms once again the truth of Lenin's thesis that
the very best weapons produce no effect "in the absence of people ca~able of
knowledgeably using the latest advancements of military technology."
2. Lenin, IX, 156.
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The book also has shortcomings. Unfortunately the author did not provide a
critical analysis of certain insolvent views distorting Lenin's genuine teach-
ing on war and the army. It is impossible to agree with the author's state-
ment that "military doctrine is formed with the help of military science and
is based on its conclusions" (p 17). Military doctrine has its own military-
~ political and military-technical aspects and so on a scientific plane is tased
on the entire system of knuwledge on war and the arnry. Certain sectors of
military science are covered too generally in the book.
In conclusion, evaluating the work as a whole, it has to be said that the
re:iders received a useful book which continues the work of many military
scholars, philosophers, economists and historians engaged in the study and
propaganda of Lenin's military heritage.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo TsK KPSS P1Pravda," "Voprosy filosofii", 1982.
6 904
CSO: 1801/238
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NAVAL FORCES
BOOK EXC~RPTS: ON PSYCHOIAGICAL TRAINING OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
Moscow VOYNA, OKEAN, CHELOVEK in Russian 1980 (signed to press 31 Aug 79) pp 2-5,
182-204, 228-247
[Annotation, author collective, table of contents, introduction and chapters 6 and 8
from book "War, Ocean, Man", edited by Admiral V. M. Grishanov, 2d edition, supple-
mented, Voyenizdat, 20,000 copies, 247 pages]
[Text] Annotation
In this edition, as in the first, the authors reveal the features of the moral,
political and psychological tr~ining of Soviet navdl seamen, and the basic forms
and methods of efforts to improve the political and inilitary knowledge of seamen,
petty officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers and officers of the navy.
The book is intended for naval commanders and political workers, party and Komsomol
activists, and teachers and students at naval schools.
Author Collective
Candidate of Psychological Scienc;ss Captain lst Rank G. A. Bronevitskiy, Candidate
of Pedagogical Scien,ces Captain lst Rank I. Ya. Ivanov, Candidate of Historical
Sciences Captain lst Ran;c N. N. Makeyev, Doctor of Psychological Sciences Captain
lst Rank A. M. Stolyarenko.
Table of Contents Page
introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Ch. 1. USSR Navy and Its Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. The World Ocean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Navies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Soviet Naval Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Demands Made by War and Combat Readiness on Navymen 15
5. Training Requirements for Ship Commanders ~nd All Ship Officers 24
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Ch. 2. Subject and Content of Moral, Political, and Psychological
Training of Soviet Navymen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1. General Considerations of i~bral, Political, and
Psychological Training of Naval Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2. Subject and Content of Moral-Political Training . . . . . . . . . . 37
3. Moral and Political Training System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4. Psychological Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Ch. 3. Ideological Work on Soviet Naval SYiips and in Soviet
Naval Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1. Comprehensive Approach to Ideological Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2. Marxist-Leninist Officer Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3. Warrant Officer Political Training . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . 64
. 4. Political Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5. Party Education System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6. Agitation-Propaganda Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7. Cultural-Enlightenment Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
_ Ch. 4. Moral, Political, and Psychological Training of Navymen
During the Course of Duty and Combat Training . . . . . . . . . . . 88
l. Proper Organization and Firm Discipline: Conditions
Necessary for a Hiqh Level of Combat Readiness 88
2. Inculcating High Moral, Political, and Psychological
Qualities in Navymen in the Course of Combat Training 98
3. Acclimation to the Sea, an Important Factor in the
Psychological Tempering of Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4. Psycholoqical Training for Damage Control Measures 121
5. The Commander's Rple in Training Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Ch. 5. Ocean Cruising, the Highest School for Nbral, Political,
and Psychological Training of Navymen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
1. Training Sailors, Petty Officers, Warrant Officers, and
Officers for a Cruise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
2. Party-Political Work During a Cruise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
3. Improving Psychological Tempering and Combat Activity During
a Cruise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
4. Psychophysiological Features of Personnel Behavior and Ways
to Make Optimal Use of Z'hem During a Long Cruise 163
5. Organizing Navymen's Leisure Time During a Cruise 175
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Ch. 6. Special Features of Psychalogical Training of Naval Airmen,
Marine Ir_fantry, Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops and
Some Rear Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
1. In Marizie Aviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
2. In Marine Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
3. In Coastal Missile and Artillery Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
4. In Some Rear Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Ch. 7. Moral, Political, and Psychological Training of Personnel
During Complication of the Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
1. Moral, Political, and Psychological Training of Navymen
During Exacerbations of the Military-Political Situation 205
2. Consideration and Localization of Negative Factors Affecting the
Actions of Personnel During a Sudden Breakout of War 209
3. Special Features of Moral, Political, and Psychological
Training for a Specific Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
4. Fundamentals of the Psycholoqy of Conducting a Battle 216
5. Leading Personnel in Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
Ch. 8. Ideological and Psychological Brainwashinq of Personnel in
the Navies of Imperialist States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
Introduction
The Soviet Union is persistently pursuing Lenin's policy of peace and supporting
greater security of nations and broad international cooperation.
Article 28 of the new USSR Constitution reads: "The foreign policy of the USSR
is directed at ensuring international conditions favoring development of communism
in the USSR, at protecting the state interests of the Soviet Union, at supporting
the struggle of peoples for nationa~ liberation and social progress, at preventing
aggressive wars, at achieving universal and total disarmament and at consistently
implementing the principle of peaceful coexistence among states with different
social structures."
Im~lementing its policy of peace, the Soviet state is waging a persistent and
consistent struggle to deepen detente, to implement the Concluding Act of the All-
Europe Conference, to prohibit the use of force in international relations and to
eliminate centers of war danger. "Mankind's most urgent, most pressing task,"
L. I. Brezhnev said during his meeting with voters of Moscow's Baumanskiy election
district on 2 March 1979, "has now become cessation of the arms race and prevention
of the threat of warld nuclear war. As with other socialist countries, the Soviet
Union is sparing no efforts in the strugqle for these goals."*
*Brezhnev, L. I., "Vo imya schast'ya sovetskikh lyudey" [In Behalf of the Well-Being
of the Soviet PeopleJ, Moscow, 1979, p 19.
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However, reactionary forces in imperialist states are offering resistance to detente,
increasing their military preparations, inflating military budgets, intensifying the
_ strategic arms race and creating new, more destructive weapons of mass annihilation.
Hiding behind the false assertion of a Soviet military threat, militaristic circles
are making material and psychological preparations for a new world war. They are
strengthening aggressive military blocs,_ widening their military presence in all
regions of the world and fanning military psycho'sis.
The adventuristic course of the present leadership of China also represents a great
danger to peace. The Chinese leadership has elevated, to the rank of state policy,
the scuttling of detente and provocation of military conflicts. This policy is
to the liking of. the most reactionary forces that are staking their future on
aggression and war.
The difficulties in the way of disarmament, the provocations by reactionary forces
and their efforts to increase military psychosis demand all-out enhancement of
alertness, growth of the struggle for peace and unification of all of its proponents.
The Soviet Union is resolutely fighting in the international arena to eliminate the
possib ilities reactionary forces have for unleashing a new war. At the same time
concern is being shown for strengthening the country's defense capabilities and
improving the Soviet Armed Forces. Defense of the liberty and independence of the
socialist fatherland and *_he security of the peoples of the USSR, and protection
of the great ac-hievements of socialism together with the fraternal armies of other
countries of the socialist fraternity are a basic element in the overall efforts of
the peoples to ensure a sound peace on our planet. "The Soviet Union is effectively
caring for its defense," notes Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "$ut it is not striving and
it will not strive for military superiority over the other side. We do not want to
disturb the approximate equality of military forces that has now evolved, for
example, between the East and the West in Central Europe, or between the USSR and
the USA."*
The Soviet Army and Navy possess the most sophisticated weapons and combat equipment.
But their fighting power is based on more than just this alone. The Soviet soldier,
with his deep ideological conviction, his high political maturity, his limitless
devotion to the Communist Party, his faithfulness to his military duty before the
people and his awareness of personal responsibility for the motherland's protection,
is that decisive force which ensures our superiority over any aggressor.
The Communist Party constantly devotes considerable attention to indoctrination of
Soviet sol.diers. The CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of
Ideological Work and Political Indoctrination" notes that we need to implement
measures aimed at intensifying the educational role of the Soviet Armed Forces.
Soviet military science is founded upon Lenin's interpretation of the relationships
between man and equipment in war, upon constant growth of the role of the moral
factor in modern conditions. Research conducted by scientists in this area finds
practical applications in the moral, political and psychological training of Soviet
soldiers. This is why the press's regular illumination of the recomanendations madz
*Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following Lenin's Course.
Speeches and Articles), M~oscow, Vol 6, 1968, p 595.
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~ by research scientists--recommendations tested in the course of troop combat and
political training--has important significance to improving this work.
As was true with the first edition of the book "War, Qcean, Man", the second edition
examines the problems of moral, political and psychological training of naval
personnel. The uook does not claim to offer an exhaustive treatment of the problems
it poses. Each of them may serve as a topic of special study. Z"he goal of the
book is to help commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations
solve problems associated with moral, politi~al and psycholoqical training of naval
personnel.
The authors express their gratefulness to all conananders and political workers who
had submitted their remarks and advice on the book's first edition, and thus
rendered practical assistance in work on this edition.
Chapter 6. Special Features of Psychological Traininq of Naval Airmen, Marine
Infantry, Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops and Some Rear Services
2'he Soviet Navy possesses harmoniously developed branches of forces--submarines,
surface ships, marine aviation, marine infantry and coastal missile and artillery
troops. 7.'he moral, political and psychological training afforded to personnel
serving aboard submarines and surface ships was discussed above. The moral,
political and psychological training afforded to personnel in the other branches
of naval forces is structured on the same basis as the training provided on ships.
It is the same in content and directions, and to a significant degree in forms arid
methods. But in relation to personnel of marine aviation, coastal missile and
artillery troops and marine infantry, this traininq also has its unique features,
ones stemming from the fact that these are naval branches of forces. The greatest
uniqueness can be found in this case in the psychological training provided in
conjunction with combat training.
1. In Marine Aviation
One of the main attack forces of the navy is marine aviation. Naval pilots must know
how to fly confidently, perform missions above the ocean, land their craft on ships
and on water and so on. Recalling the psycholoqical difficulties of flying above
the sea, three-time Hero of the Soviet Union A. I. Pokryshkin wrote: "Each time I
looked out of the cockpit and saw the dark stormy sea, the raging water so absorbed
my attention that for a few seconds I even ceased to perceive the roar of the engine.
It was only by strenqth of will that I could surmount this sensation and return to
the accustomed little world of my cockpit and the pointers of the instruments.
"But even then, it seemed at first to me that the engine was not roaring as it
should and the pointers were threateningly rising to the critical limits.... It
took some time for me to fully regain my senses...."*
There are doubtlessly certain difficulties in flyir.g above the sea. It is harder,
than over land, to visually determine flying altitude, the sensation of speed is
*Pokryshkin, A. I., "Nebo voyny" [The Sky of War], Nbscow, 1966, pp 306-307.
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less, and sometimes the pilot may even experience the illusion of hovering flight.
When the sky is clear and thz water is still, an inexperienced pilot may mistake
the water for the sky, and the sky for water. The shimmering reflections of sun-
light and moonlight on water have a certain influence on visual perception. When a
helicopter flies over water at low altitude, wave motion distorts the pilot's per-
ception of the craft's actual motion, and it may cause pilot error.
Flying at night is even more complex. A bright star could easily be mistaken for
a light on the surface of the sea, while the lights of ships may be mistaken for
stars. When a pilot turns his aircraft southward in the Arctic, h~ may experience
illusions due to the sharp contrast between the brightness of the northern and
southern halves of the sky. So~times the illusion of banking flight or counter-
rotation is created. Experienced pilots recomunend looking at the bright side of
the horizon at such moments. When a thin film of clouds is present and light shines
from ice crystals in such clouds, pilots flying at low altitude sometimes see stars
above and beneatt. them. Sometimes under these conditions a refraction effect occurs:
Lights on the coast appear not in the horizontal but in the vertical plane.
When flying in northern regions, airmen must also get used to the northern lights.
They are an unusually brilliant phenomenon, and their swift motion sometimes elicits
the illusion of banking. Other unique features of flying at polar latitudes include
sharp changes in weather, the enormous size ~f ice fields and the difficulties of
using radiotechnical and other navigation resources.
There are unique features to taking off and landing on the water and ~n a landing
pad on the deck of a ship. They require high skill and high moral and psychological
preparedness from the aizmen. At night, because the horizon is hard to see and
because there are no flat illuminated surfaces to serve as reference points, it is
harder to visually determine the craft's attitude above the sea than it is over land.
The distance to a ship is harder to reckon, and its outlines are distorted. Develop-
ment of confidence in the craft's dependability and of the ability to make the
fullest possible use of the craft's potentials in all situations has great signifi-
cance to airman training. These goals are served by deep study of the equipment,
demonstration flights, critiques, the personal example of experienced pilots, the
sharing of experience, encouragement of greater friendship between pilots, engineers,
technicians and ship specialists, and mutual trust and respect.
Psychological preparation for the conditions of long cruises is important to
personnel associated with carrier aviation. This training is similar to the
psychological training afforded to personnel aboard surface ships in this regard.
All marine airmen must be made comfortable with the sea, they must know how to
swim, and they must acquire certain naval skills. As with any seaman, the marine
pilot must not fear water.
- Special attention is required by young pilots. In the best military collectives
they are acquainted with the combat history and traditions of the unit, their
individual qualities are studied attentively, and novices are given jobs wliich
fit most closely with each of their capabilities. Young airmen are included in the
most experienced crews. An effort is always made to see that their first flights
would be invariably successful.
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It is important to make note of even the minor first successes of young airmen.
The first solo flights are celebrated as memorable and triumphant dates in their
development as air warriors. At such times, combat leaflets and flash bulletins
are published, photographs are taken as keepsakes, and cartificates are awarded to
the young pilots, with all the personnel formed up for the occasior...
It should be considered that sometimes, after their first introduction to flying,
young pilots gain an incessant desire to fly, and they tend to overstate their
possibilities. It is important to he].p them deeply recognixe the requirements of
flight discipline. As they learn to fly above the sea, the particular features of
such flight must be brought to their attention most carefully by way of explana-
tions and visual acquaintance.
Firm assimilation of what to do in emergency situations plays a major psychological
role in the development of marine pilots. Effective results can be achieved b_y
practicing, in trainers and in the air until they become automatic, the thinqs to
do when the engine stalls and when other malfunctions occur. Also effective are
parachute jumps into water while wearing individual rescue resources, and catapult
chair training.
Constant attention is devoted in naval aviation to preparing pilots for flight
and for com~iat missions in adverse weather. This type of flying requires faulLless
work habits with instruments, a firm knowledge of sensations and perceptions, and
the ability to control illusions that arise especially frequently in adverse weather.
Here is how one marine pilot described a typical incident in the air: "During one
of my flights I was led into the clouds. I was young at that time, and I was not
sufficiently prepared for solo flying in clouds, not to mention with a wingmate.
After hopelessly losing my leader, I peered out of the cockpit, and i.mmediately
the illusions arose. It seemed to me that I was rotating and that the airplane
was flying straight upward. Moreover a loud roar suddenly filled my ears (it had
to be in my imagination, because the engine was working normally). Soon after, my
conception of what was up and what was down vanished. I could not have extricated
myself from this difficult position without the help of my flight leader."
Psychological preparation of the marine pilot for flight in adverse weather
necessarily presupposes his familiarization with all forms of illusions, their ~
causes and the ways of preventinq and surmounting them. Thus the pilot works on
achieving a correct posture, he changes the positions of his hands, legs and body,
- he relaxes excessively tensed muscles, he learns to keep his eyes on the instrument
panel (especially on the gyrohorizon, the vertical speed indicator and the turn-and-
bank indicator), he learns to turn his head to the left and right, and he learns
how to make painful sensations work fur him.
Training in instrument piloting acquires certain psychological significance. It
not only develops a capability for correctly evaluating instrument readings and
reacting to them in the required fashion, but it also develops the pilot's habit of
flying with instruments. Inasmuch as illusions often arise when the pilot shifts
his glance from instruments to the world outside and back, he is taught to observe
the instruments and to correctly distribute his attention between observing a target
and controlling the airplane. This is achievsd through constant training in the
airplane cockpit, in training apparatus and in check-out and ferry flights.
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it is vcry important to teach the airman to trust the instrument readings more than
his owc~ sensations. This is a difficult task, one associated with the developmen.t
of volitional qt,alities, and primarily self-control, as well as w~.th developing
the means of self-control and the techniques of self-inducement and volitional
effort.
There are typical errors associated with flying in adverse weather. Pilots make
them most frequently during the landing approach, attitude correction and landing,
inasmuch as descending flight, penetration of clouds and approach of the landing
strip make up a complex and critical phase of flight. The pilot's attention is
taxed to the maximum at this time, and if the pilot is insufficiently prepared or
if it had been a long time since he had done any hard flying, especially in adverse
weather, the airman sometimes descends below safe altitude prematurely. This error
is often observed in night flying, after penetrating the cloud cover during an
approach assisted by long-range precision approach radar. On seeing the lights of
the system, the pilot sometimes becomes absorbed by the airfield, his attention to
instrument piloting weakens or disappears completely, and he fails to notice his
drop in altitude. Also typical is the pilot's desire to see the airfield as soon
as possible, and therefore he prematurely switches his attention to visual piloting,
while the airplane is still in the clouds. This error car. cause a loss of spatial
orientation, which is haaardous at low altitude. By studying the typical errors
and their psychological causes, crews become better prepared for flying in adverse
weather.
Purposeful development of psychological and psychophysioloqical qualities important
to the pilot acquire great significance in marine aviation. I am referring to
visual, vestiY~ular, organic and other sensations, powers of observation, attention,
thinking in three dimensions, and the rate of thinking and reactions. A pilot
possessing such qualities in a sense becomes a part of the airplane. He begins to
imagine the airplane engine to be his heart, and its parts his organs. These
psychological and psychophysiologi,cal qualities m�ast be developed in airmen on the
basis of a strictly individual approach.
There are many complex elements in the actions of aviation in adverse weather:
~ flying in clouds, penetration of cloud cover, performance of various manPuvers in
~ clouds, resumption of normal flight following such maneuvers, change in speed during
instrument piloting (which elicits a sensation of pitching or diving), take-off and
landing at minimum and below minimum weather, flight in rain, when a film of water
forming on the cockpit glazing can distort perception of reference points or make
them completely indistinguishable, and team flight.
A highly strict sequence must be followed in psychalogical preparation for flying
in adverse weather. Psychological training is first provided in the course of
ferry flights under the guidance of experienced pilots. Gradually, after the
student masters the next level of difficulty in team flying, he progresses to solo
control. After he gains confidence in his actions, the level of difficulty is
raised, and once again the training begins with team piloting. In the first phase,
the pilot may fly in clear weather with a hooded canopy. Then follow penetration
of clouds at high altitude, relatively lengthy straight and even flight through
clouds, performance of maneuvers in clouds, take-off and landing requiring penetra-
tion of a low cloud ceiling, target search and attack in adverse weather, team
flight and performance of combat training missions.
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Many air unit commanders andpolitical workers validly view the flight critique as
one of the effective resources of airman psychological training. The pilot's
confidence in himself in subsequent flights, his initiative, boldness and the
creativeness of his approach to problem solvinq depend in many ways on how these
critiques are conducted.
Airmen receive special training in aerial combat over the sea as well as in combat
activities against marine tarqets. Engagement of enemy carrier task forces, surface
ships and submarines has no comparisons. It is harder to approach a target covertly
at sea than on land. Marine targets are highly maneuverable, they are small in
size, and they possess high-power antiaircraft resources. Z'his is why combat
activities at sea require exceptional boldness, darinq, resourcefulness, swiftness
and cunning of airmen.
A certain amount of attention is devoted in the psychological training of marine
airmen to their confident use of target search resources, to unmistaken and swift
recognition of friendly and enemy ships, and to artful use of missiles, torpedoes
and bombs in the face of artillery and electronic countermeasures in complex weather
conditions. Ways are sought to acquaint the personnel of naval air forces with
elements of combat such as antiaircraft fire, countermeasures by "enemy" fighter
cover, dummy targets and the bursts of bombs, missiles and artillery shells.
Lengthy flying over the sea is typical of the combat activities of naval airmen.
In this form of flying, owing to prolonged tension, mo~ionlessness and constant
observation of the instruments and the outside situation, the pilot may tire
faster than usual, his lower back may begin to hurt, and he may start getting
hungry, all of which would distract the pilot from his main task. Because of the
long time monotonous stimuli act, he may begin to experience illusions, banking for
example. A pilot must have great endurance, stability of attention and discipline.
it is even harder to fly at high altitude: Pressure suits, oxygen breathing appara-
tus and excessive cockpit pressure impose additional loads. There is also a com-
plete range of psychological difficulties unique to ~lying during air-to-air re-
fueling.
All of tkiis requires special training and moral and psychological preparation of
airmen, based on formation of so~.uid knowledge and habits, clear ideas, confidence,
decisiveness, carefulness, powers of observation and self-control. Trainers have
proven themselves well for such purposes.
Flying in combat at low altitude is also difficult. A higher, emotional reaction
to danger is typical of such flying. This reaction is generated by the closeness
of the water surface combined with the high flying speed. The pilot experiences
greater internal activity and stre'ss, and even his body temperature rises. Per-
formatice of missions in this form of flying is al~so made 3ifficult by the complexi-
ties of using radiotechnical resources, by the swi�t tnovement of objects within the
pilot's field of vision, by arisal of interference taking the form of a low cloud
ceiling, fog and smoke, by refraction phenomena and by constraints on banking and
on vertical maneuver. At low ~ltitude, errors are made more frequently in deter-
mining distance to reference points and to targets, the distances between them and
their shape and dimensions, and in estimating the situation. Sometimes the illu-
sion is created that the water surface is rising ahead. Interception of targets
flying at low altitude becomes more difficult.
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Tt~.is is far from a complete lisc of the particular features of the work of marine
pilots requiring mental, volitional and emotional trai.ning and development of the
necessary qualities: sensations, pF~rceptions, attention and ideas. Airmen are
taught to make special preparations on the ground. One useful way to train the
pilot's depth perception and develop stable habits in estimating distances is for
pilots to memorize the dime:isions of objects most frequently encountered at sea.
- Pilots should also be trained to orient themselves quickly, to study and create an
image of the route ahead, and to develop powers of observation. Simulation of situ-
ations at sea with models and use of documentary films are useful in such training
as well. Pilots should undergo systematic training in distributing their attention
on piloting techniques, in maintaining visual observation of the situation and in
working with a sight.
Airman tactical training is conducted strictly in keeping with the uses for which
units and airplanes arz intended in combat. Some airmen are trained to make missile,
torpedo and bomb strikes aqainst various targets, while others focus their attention
on engaging enemy bombers, missile carriers and fighters in aerial combat, annihi-
lating airborne weapons and supporting combat activities. Z'he tactical training of
antisubmarine air units focuses mainly on hunting for and tracking atomic missile
and torpedo submarines, on practicing the means of reconnoitering attack resources
and on other problems. In each case the tactical conditions corresponding to the
particular missions are selected for the purposes of moral and psychological training
training.
Many measures implemented by political organs and party organizations also promote
improvement of tactical training. Discussions and briefings given with the purpose
of assisting the fastest possible assimilation of a new airplane are offered as an
aid to ~ilots and navigators. During such functions the air crews are acquainted
with the kind of training required in modern missile aviation, with the ways the
missiles can be launched, with the fundamentals of using radar bomb sites and radio-
technical bombing aids in the presence of radar interference, and with the safety
measures associated with preparing for and performing missile and bomb strikes.
Marine airmen must be ready io act in response to the enemy's use of mass destruc-
tion weapons. With this purpose pilots ~earn the destructive action of such
weapons and the particular ways they inf'luence the combat activities of aviation,
and they acquire the habits of protectic~n against such weapons. They learn to
respond to the consequences of the use ~f a mass destruction weapon, to correctly
evaluate the radiation situation and s~lect the most effective ways of surmount-
ing zones of radioactive contamination.
There is no place in combat training for simplifications. We cannot condone the
fact that the crews of certain units practice few missile launches at unfamiliar
training grounds, that radar sites and communication resources are not subjected
to jamming, that pilots are allowed to reduce their speed when making torpedo
and bombing runs, that the target situation is rarely changed at some training
grounds and that the complexity of the maneuvers made by marine targets is insuffi-
cient.
Systematic participation in long flights over seas and oceans and participation
in naval maneuvers are a powerful means of psychological preparation of marine
airmen.
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The conditions afforded by long flights over the oceaii and by maneuvers improve
and temper the steadfastness, endurance, will and persistence of the airmen. Their
habits of piloting in conditions close to those of real combat develop quickly and
grvw stronq, and the airmen gain the mental stability they need in the strugqle
against the difficulties of long flights. Personnel of naval aviation are vistially
persuaded of the merits of damestic aviation technology, an8 they qain firm confi-
dence in its strenqths and possibilities.
2. In Marine Ir:fantry
'i'he marine assault landing has proven itself in the history of naval art of war as
one of the effective and widespread means of combat of naval forces on their own
and interaction with ground troo~s. Durinq the Great Patriotic War our navy made
four assault landing operations, and it landed 110 tactical assault forces. Soviet
marines struck the enemy in the rear and in the flanks, they diverted sizeable
enemy forces onto themselves, they foiled the enemy's offensive operations and
tY~ey helped Soviet Army units win time to regroup forces and organize for an
offensive. Because of their fearlessness, their daring in combat and their
capability for fiqhting to the last breath and acting swiftly and decisively,
enemies have referred to Soviet marines as "the black cloud" and "black devils."
Here is what Leonid Sobolev wrote about seamen who fouqht on shore: "They.are
recognized at the front by the blue-and-white stripes that cover their broad
chests, in which the seaman's spirit burns with rage and hatred for the enemy
and pride fur the fleet--a happy and valorous Red Navy spirit, on~ prepared for
occasionally desperate acts of heroism, one ignorant of panic and despondency, the
honest and faithful spirit of the Bolshevik, the Komsomol member, the devoted son
of the motherland.
"The marine spirit is decisiveness, resourcefulness, stubborn valor and unshakeable
steadfastness. It is joyful boldness, contempt of death, long-traditional seaman's
violence and fierce hatred of the enemy. The marine spirit is straightfoYward
combat friendship, a preparedness to support a comrade in combat, to rescue a
casualty and to protect a commander and commissar with one's chest.
"The marine spirit is the great self-pride of people striving to be the first and
best in everything. It is the amazing charm of a joyful, self-confident and lucky
person, one who miqht be a little smuq, a little partial to showiness, to the
spotlight, to eloquence. There is nothing bad about these 'littles.' There is
but one reason behind this elation, this somewhat deliberate pursuit of the spot-
light, one reason, simple and pure: pride in one's colors, in the name of one's
ship, pride in the term 'Red seaman,' graced by the qlory of of the legendary
deeds of Civil War seamen.
"The marine spirit is an enormous love of life....
"The marine spirit is a desire to win. The power of seamen is unrestrainable,
persistent and purposeful....
"When they attack, they do so with the purpose of dislodging the enemy at all
costs.
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"When they defend, they do so to the last, astounding the enemy with a steadfastness
he cannot imagine or understand.
"And when seamen die in combat, they die in a way which strikes terror in the enemy:
A seaman takes with him as many of the enemy as he sees before him.
"It is in it, in a valorous, courageous and proud marine spirit, that one of the
sources of victory lies."*
Modern marines are the worthy successors to the glory of the seamen of the Great
Patriotic War. Their possibilities have now expanded significantly. They are out-
fitted with amphibious tanks, armored transporters, powerful weapons, various landing
resources and landing ships of various capacities. The marine infantry of the
Soviet Navy is a highly mobile branch of forces intended for combat activities in
marine assault landings and in defense of naval bases and other naval objectives.
It is manned by ideologically mature, morally steadfast and excellently trained
soldiers. These soldiers are persistently studying the ways of war in complex
conditions and they are assimilatirg the specialties of marine assault troops,
tank crews, gunners, scouts, combat ~ngineers, divers and many others.
Z'he unique features of the psychologicai training afforded to marines and to per-
sonnel aboard assault landing ships in preparation for combat missions are a product
of the nature of these missions. They must be constantly ready to set out to sea,
sometimes for long periods of time in severe weather; they must be ready to larid on
shore, to fight for a beachhead on shore and to hold and widen it, and they must be
preparEd to defend naval bases and other objectives from land.
Marines who must sail on ships and participate in sea crossings must become habitu-
ated to the sea. They must build up a resistance to seasickness, and they must
become accustomed to life and activities aboard ships and other floating craft--
that is, they must acquire the same qualities needed by all seamen. This is why
the same forms and methods of training applied to ship personnel in general are also
applicable to marines at sea.
After coming aboard ship, marines are usually introduced to the crews, and they
attend conferences and meetings. Such meetings and this form of acquainting the
assault landing troops with the ship's equipment and with the work and life of the
crew improve their psychological preparedness.
Joint training and political indoctrination measures are a regular occurrence
throughout the entire cruising time. Damage control, landing preparation, overboard
rescue, boat lowering, boat manning and other exercises are conducted. Joint wall
and radio newspapers, combat leaflets and flash bulletins are published, and
socialist competition is encouraged, for which purpose common pledges are adopted.
During a cruise and just prior to it, party-political measures that nurture a pride
for one's branch of troops and a love for one's reqiment and subunit in the marines
are conducted. Ceremonies coma~temoratinq heroes of the assault landing forces who
*Sobolev, L., "Morskaya dusha. Zelenyy luch. Dorogami pobed "[The Marine Spirit.
. The Green Ray. The Rpads of Victory], Moscow, 1956, pp 402-403.
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died in the war and ceremonies ir.~ciating young soldiers inta the assault forces
are regularly held.
Every seaman knows that it is often easier to stay at sea than ta land on an un-
prepared shore. Special difficulties arise in stozmy weather, when rocks, reefs,
cliffs and ice are present, and all the more so when there is enemy resistance.
The experience of combat teaches us that sooner or later, troops will have to land
even in icy water, often without adequate rations and gear, but loaded to the
~ fullest with weapons and ammunition. Assault troops land with the internal aware-
ness that it would be much more difficult to return or to retreat for one reason
or another than it would be to land, and that for practical purposes retreat is
impossible. To them,every landing is a decisive one.
Assault troops landing on shore must have a good knowledge of the conditions
awaiting them, and they must be totally comfortable in the water. It is for these
purposes that marines get together with experienced soldiers and with the ship's
personnel, that the actions they are to take after landing are visually demonstrated,
that the ~~nding resources to be used are throughly studied and that confidence in
these resources is built up. Getting'assault troops to know the territory in which
they are to engage in combat better produces useful results. They study the bottom
relief near the shore, and that of land adjacent to the water line.
Young assault troops are "broken in" aboard small boats. They are taught to navigate
boats with oars and sails, to ride the waves to shore and to take off from shore,
to jump into the water fully clothed from a rocki;zg boat and to swim comfortably.
They learn rigqing, knot-tying and mooring line throwing. Diver training in the
entire range of accessible depths ~d in calm and stormy seas is useful.
In addition to participating in the measures listed above, tankmen preparing for
sea crossings and for disembarkation from assault landing ships study the rescue
resources and the rules of using them. They practice dives in rescue gear, they
exercise in tank damage control, they acquaint themselves with the seagoing quali-
ties of the combat vehicles, and they train in special basins and in flooding
chambers. In their training, the tankmen practice the actions they would take in
shallow water and when traveling over the surface of the sea for short distances.
The crews acquire confidence in driving the combat vehicles over water, in sur-
mounting narrow passages, ~n dropping and weighing anchor and in damage control.
Gradually the distance to the shore and the travel time are increased, poorer weather
is selected for training, the damage control scenario is made more complex, and am-
phibious travel is practiced by groups of several crews in qood and bad visibility.
The personnel of assault landing ships experience certain psychological difficulties
associated with approaching the shore, shallow water, especially in stormy weather
and at night, in the presence of mines, during total radio silence and darkness,
and when shore targets are fired upon over the heads of assault forces en route and
al.ready ashore. Special training and exercises help to prepare the troops to sur-
mount these difficulties, and to teach them to act confidently and competently.
Inevitably in a modern war, a marine assault landinq force will be met by strong
defenses and enemy opposition. If they are to surmount this opposition, the soldiers
will have to display high proficiency, great inner strength, fearlessness and
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decisiveness. A member of an assault landing force must be ready to surmount mine-
fields, wire entanglements and other engineer fortifications, artillery barrages,
enemy aviation, hand-to-hand combat and tanks. In this training we use the tech-
niques and resources of psychological training employed in the ground troops.
The fear of mines is surmounted by studying mine-type weapons and learning how to
handle them, disarm them and clear passages through minefields. Experience has
demonstrated the effectiveness of practical work with explosives and with training
mines containing low-power simulating charges which ignite if the student acts in-
correctly.
Interchangeability of crewmembers, which must be practically complete. has especially
high significance in marine subunits. All actions by assault landing i.~rces at
night must be just as confident as in daylight, and this requires regulax night-
ti.mes exercises and training of continually growing complexity.
Simplifications such as, for example, regular training and exercises in the same
well-studied places of embarkation and disembarkation are detrimental to psychologi-
cal training. Ships are allowed to approach the shore at high speed, without even
making depth checks, and no resistance or losses are simulated as the assault force
lands. On shore the latter finds familiar targets that had been used many times
before. The "enemy" shore is well equipped with navigation markers, and so on.
In such an approach the people never experience psychological difficulties that
would toughen them for future combat.
Marine subunits often conduct exercises in areas where marine assault landing forces
had fought during the war. Com�nanders and political workers capitalize upon this
to acquaint the personnel with combat traditions. Meetings with participants of
assault landing operations in the Grtat Patriotic War and analysis of their combat
experience make a deep impression on the soldiers.
Booklets, information files and wall posters prepared by political sections have a
positive moral and psychological influence upon assault force troops. Examples of
some bookTet titles are "Preparing for an Assault Landing Operation," "The First
Wave of a Marine Assault Force," "Read and Remember, Tankman!" and others.
The training marines receive in defending naval bases and other naval objectives and
in capturing enemy bases and objectives is basically the same as the training re-
ceived by ground troops in ter.~.s of purpose, forms and methods. Assault troops
must be morally and psychologically prepared to act primarily in the face of the
enemy's conventional weapons. They must be prepared to fight the enemy's aviation
and tanks, to deal with radioactive, chemical and bacteriological contamination
and to fight ir~ the ci.ty.
Simulation of the typical background of combat--explosions, fires, interference--
is a valuable way to psychologically toughen the personnel during field exercises.
Soldiers become psychologically resistant to the whistle of bullets and nearby
explosions of artillery shells and bombs by participating in gunnery practices,
using smoke-puff charges, and experiencing the explosions of training charges and
of overhead fire. Stability in the face of gunfire and fire grows as the student
learns the properties of incendiary resources, as he practices firefighting tech-
niques and burn care, and as he develops the habits of surmounting fire barrages.
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Assattlt troops benefit from exposure to airplanes flying over them at low altitude,
to diving aircraft and to tanks and combat vehicles overrunning their positions.
Exercise in jtinnping off and on m~ving tanks and throwing qrenades at moving targets
is a commonly encountered practice.
Assault troops gain some idea about the actions they would take in response to the
enemy's use of mass destruction weapons by studyinq special literature, by acquaint-
ing the~elves with visual aids, by participating in training in which fires are
simulated and in which mock-ups of houses and defensive structures are deualished, by
performing exercises in smoke chambers and on terrain contaminated by training war
gases and so on. ,
The physical training of assault troops is organized with a consideration for the
high requirements imposed on their physical qualities, and with an eye on their
psychological training. They practice and take the tests of the Military-Sports
Complex fully clothed, since this is the way they would have to act in a combat
situation. The pentathlon includes a 100-meter dash, a 3-km cross-country run,
diving from a tower and swimming, and a forced m~rch of 6 km. Moreover assault
troops run an obstacle course, row a�ix-oared boat for a distance of 2 km and throw
grenades for distance and accuracy. They also practice the techniques of close
combat: self-defense, hand-to-hand fighting with an automatic weapon, spade and
bayonet.
Marine units are actively seeking new possibilities for using physical training and
sports creatively to prepare the personnel psychologically. For example an obstacle
course can be improved with deep, wide pits filled with water or burning materials,
high obstacles, narrow and rocking bridges, burning beams and so on. Sometimes such
a course is referred to as a"fire trail." Z'he psychological load experienced by
soldiers running an obstacle course can be intensified by including noise and light
effects (explosions, gunfire, flashes of light, sirens, and so on). Certain elements
of special tactical training are practiced on such courses as well: contending
with tanks, surmounting minefields and wire entanglements and laying mines.
Special equipment is also used for psychological training. Thus one of the units
has set up a"tower of bravery." This is a securely built structure about 15 meters
tall. Soldiers climb up it on a rope ladder and descend grasping metal tubes 35 cm
long sliding on cables tilted at various angles. Z'his structure helps to develop
strength, agility, fast reactions, boldness and decisiveness.
It is important in such creative efforts to simulate as accurately as possible the
situations and obstacles which assault troops would encounter when landing on a
shore. These exercises must also be diversified.
Sports such as rugby, free-style wrestl.ing, diving into water from a trampoline and
so on are broadly employed in the psychological training of marine infantry. The
physical training of marine assault troops includes daily physical exercises,
plar~ned lessons in physical education and 10-15 minute exercise sessions before
ass:ming watch. Assault troops compete in strength, agility and endurance during
tir.~e off from study and work.
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3. In Coastal Missile and Artillery Forces
:~c~ldicrs of the navy's missile and artillery troops are outfitted with the most
up-to-date weapons and combat equipment. This includes sophisticated guided
missiles, automatic control systems, long-range artillery, radar and much else.
2'he fireF~wer of the troops, their range of action and the accuracy of their
strikes make for dependable defense of a coastline and of important military-
industrial objectives in the country's maritime regions aqainst attacks from the
sea, and ensure annihilation of enemy forces far away from shore.
Soldiers of many specialties serve in the coastal missile and artillery troops.
'I'hey include missilemen, gunners, radiometric specialists, signalmen, drivers and
so on. Their psychological training falls into three categories associated with
the particular missions and conditions of fighting the enemy on land, in the air
and at sea. These categories are similar, and therefore we will examine them to-
, gether.
Training for combat against the marine and airborne enemy has much in common in
content and methods with the training afforded to all missilemen, antiaircraft
missilemen, gunners and antiaircraft gunners. The great importance of their
missions presupposes, first of all, constant readiness to perform one's military
duty at all costs, at any time and to the last breath. Soldiers in these special-
ties are taught to act boldly, decisively and effectively in response to surprise
attacks and massed attacks by the enemy. The methods of this training include
such elements as abrupt transitions from a ready state or simple activity to
maximally complex conditions (surprise alerts in which maximally complex conditions
are.immediately created, abrupt and frequent tran~itions from inactivity to a maxi-
mum load and back, practice with the large number of targets that could realisti-
cally be expected in a massed raid and so on).
Steps taken to dispel the personnel's fear of airplanes can be useful: overflights
at low altitude by diving aircraft, attacks on combat positions by aircraft firing
dummy rounds, and simultaneous simulation of the explosions of artillery shells
and bombs near the personnel.
Simulation of the complex and tense conditions of combat against the marine and
airborne enemy has a toughening action upon the personnel. In addition to the
usual procedures, the following special ones can be employed:
simulation of targets coming in from different directions, performing all possible
maneuvers in course and speed and flying at speeds which would actually be en-
countered in combat;
a significant increase in the number of targets;
interruptions in target indication, in transmission of information on the enemy
from radar stations and significant errors in the information;
sharp reduction of work station lighting;
los~ (disruption) of external or internal communication through oral scenario in-
puts, disconnection (breakage) of circuits, grounding of conductors, placement of
hoods over microphones;
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simulation of the enemy's use of dwmny targets and antiradar homing projectiles;
practice of all foxms of fire;
abrupt change in the number of targets, disappearance of targets being tracked and
enlargement of returns from local features.
Missilemen must display special endurance in the presence of intense interference
and after suffering combat-related damage.
In modern warfare, the soldier must be prepared to act confidently and calmty in
the presence of electronic countermeasures, he must become accustomed to jamming,
and he should learn to treat it as something normal.
Equipment damage and malfunctions should not cause confusion in the specialist
either. For this purpose he studies and practices the methods of finding and
eliminating faults. But to toughen the soldier it would be important to simulate
the most diverse problems in the work of equipment during simulated combat; moreover
the simulation should be unexpected, it should occur when the situation is at its
most critical point, and in conjunction with other exercise inputs. Special atten-
tion is turned to preparing the operator to work with partially malfunctioning
apparatus. Although they might make the work more difficult, many malfunctions and
combat-related damage arising in auxiliary circuits need not cause a mission to fail.
The soldier must know how to act creatively in such situations.
Inasmuch as combat activities proceed in constant coordination with different naval
branches of forces, coastal mi.ssile and artillery troops train for such activities.
Training in recognition of friendly ships and airplanes and development of powers of
observation and professional memory are effective. During practical lessons, train-
ing sessions and exercises it would be suitable to broadly simulate situations in
which a certain number of maneuvering targets are mixed in with friendly ships and
airplanes. Moreover the number of both the former and the latter should be constant-
ly increased. Systematic lessons in a real situation, where some of the forces act
as the enemy,should be given proper attention. Moreover, targets may be simulated
on display screens on the background of a real situation, and malfunctions can be
simulated in target identification equipment.
Special training measures are implemented to prepare missilemen, gunners, radar
operators and signalmen for action in the face of the enemy's use of mass destruc-
tion weapons. They include notification of the "enemy's" use of such weapons and
simulation of the consequences: interruption of communication, power and water
supply, jamming of doors, fires, lengthy, hard work by the sold~ers for 2-5 hours
while wearing personal protective resources, in the presence of high temperatures
at the work stations, manpower losses and so on. The general training procedures
discussed eariier are used as well.
In addition, attention is turned in the psychological training of coastal missile
and artillery troops to their readiness to repel acts of sabotage, to which tYte
enemy will doubtlessly resort. Transmitting false instructions, commnands and in-
formation is recommended during training for this purpose. At certain times the
soldiers may find themselves fighting on land together with a landed force.
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Therefore their moral-psychological training should include land combat in whi~h the
enemy uses infantry, artillery and mortar weapons, incendiary resources and even
tanks. The soldiers must be ready for close combat as well. The procedures and
methods of such training are much the same as those employed with Soviet Army ground
troops and marines.
4. In Some Rear Services
Timely and fully adequate rear support has always played a significant role in the
success of the navy's combat activities. Today the navy's rear services are a com-
plex combat organism consisting of numerous services performing different functions
aimed at providing comprehensive support to the fleet both in a coastal zone and
in remote regions of the seas and oceans. Z'he rear services possess modern auxiliary
vessels of various types, high-power and complex equipment and shore bases. The
personnel of the rear services are more than just quartermasters today--specialists
in food, clothing and boatswain's supply; they are also engineers, technicians
and experienced seamen.
Inasmuch as the navy's combat activities may proceed over vast expanses of the seas
and oceans, completely new requirements are imposed on rear services personnel.
Supporting naval forces operating at sea or on the ocean, the crews of auxiliazy
vessels have the job of promptly ferrying all of the stores needed by the fleet
from the rear bases to the regions of combat activities, and rendering assistance
in restoring the fleet's battleworthiness. The seamen of auxiliary vessels must
also sometimes spend as much time at sea as warship crews. In modern warfare, they
will operate in a situation of great danger and relatively less protection than that
afforded to warships. Z'he personnel of such vessels will need bravery, steadfast-
ness, selflessness and resourcefulness. Z'he psychol.ogical training afforded to
seamen of the auxiliaxy fleet must be aimed at nurturing the moral and combat
qualities they need.
There is much in common in the methods used in psychological training afforded to
seamen aboard auxiliary vessels and those used in the training of warship personnel.
Practical participation in rear support to long naval cruises today arms the seamen
of auxiliary vessels with rich professional experience and teaches them to think
broadly and act confidently on the ocean expanses. This experience also develops
seagoing qualities, imp~zrts naval skills and adapts the personnel to the difficult
conditions of long cruises.
If the moral-combat qualities of auxiliary vessel seamen are to be improved, they
must undergo special training in conditions as close as possible to those of real
combat, and they must be acquainted in greater detail with what to expect in a
combat situation. This category of soldiers must be adapted to surprise raids by
airplanes flying at maximum speed, to the means of combatting them, to encounters
with enemy submarines, to the danger of minefields, and to sailing as part of a
large convoy; they must learn to act in all combat situations, and they must be pre-
pared for the most complex damage control situations.
An extremely important form of support is provided to the actions of the fleets by
personnel of the emergency rescue service. Z'here is much in common their training
with that provided to seamen aboard warships and auxiliary vessels. But special
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emphasis is validly laid upon psycholoqical preparation for actions in the most com-
plex weather conditions, since it is precisely in such conditions that ships and
vessels in distress require assistance as a rule. Personnel of the emergency rescue
service learn swiftness of action, decisiveness, aggressiveness, self-control,
endurance, agility, skill, resourcefulness and boldness. Excellence of naval
skills is a priority quality of rescue specialists.
It is especially useful to study tre experience of former emergency and emergency
rescue operations, especially with officers of the emergency rescue service--not only
from a naval and technical point of view but also from a moral-psychological stand-
poir~t. After all, the condition and behavior of people in emergency situations
are unique, requiring an understanding and the ability to control them. The pre-
paredness of emergency rescue service officers is improved by comprehensively and
intensively developxng their volitional qualities and their ability to control
people, to lead them in ~ritical moments, to inspire trust, to make psychologically
competent decisions and to efficiently organize rescue operations.
Rescue vessels must be in a high state of readiness to set out for sea for the
purposes of aiding ships in distress; this means that seamen must develop swiftness
of action, efficiency and an ability to shift quickly from a state of prolonged
anticipation to actions at maximum effort, and they must develop resistance to
monotonous factors that may weaken their alertness. Special work is done to keep
the ~ersonnel in a high state of readiness for these purposes.
Conventional and deep-sea divers occupy a special place among specialists of the
naval rear services. During the Great Patriotic War they rescued personnel from
sunken submarines and surface ships and from damaged ships, they made ship repairs
under water, often under savage enemy fire, they assisted in the landing of marine
assault forces, they erected bridges, cleared mines and damaged hydraulic engineer-
ing structures from harbors, restored moorings and laid cables and pipelines beneath
the water.
The conditions under which the navy serves today have raised the requirements on
divers even higher. Only he who is well prepared not only in physical and occupa-
tional respects but also from a moral-political and psychological standpoint can
quickly find a puncture, orient himself easily within a sunken ship, place explo-
sives correctly or weld a seam in deep water.
Ideological maturity is nurtured and high proficiency, courage and a preparedness
for self-sacrifice in behalf of the rescue of others are formed in seamen of the
diving service. Their indoctrination takes various forms, to include meetings of
deep-sea divers with submarine personnel and navy veterans.
The political directorate of the twice-awarded Red Banner Baltic Fleet once published
a special collection of stories about the heroic deeds of naval divers in peacetime.
It also provides biographical information on divers who have earned orders and
medals of the Soviet Union. Displays describing the bravery of divers have been
organized at many bases and in many rooms of combat glory and museums.
Divers must be ultimately confident in the dependability of their equipment. This
confidence is developed throuqh the witnessing of the actions of experienced
specialists, during dives, in damage control exercises and through mutual aid
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training. Naturally, if the seaman has an excellent knowledge of his diving equip-
mc~nt, all of this training will be effective.
- The mental stability of divers depends in many ~,~~~�s on their individual features
and on development of their powers of observation and of underwater work habits.
The aquatic environment is qualitatively different from the aerial environment, and
it imposes serious requirements upon the individual. It has a physiological
influence upon the body, which by itself alters the course of inental processes.
But the aquatic environment can also influence these processes directly. Thus ob-
jects look larqer and seem closer in water. Color sensation is altered. As an
example a red object may appear black or green. As depth increases the lighting
conditions change significantly. Sound perception significantly loses its direction-
ality, and so on. These and many other features require purposeful development of
the psychological qualities needed by divers.
The training of shore-based rear services also has unique features. This category
of personnel, diverse in its specialties, perfoYtns important functions associated
with preparing and supporting ships, vessels, airplanes, missile and artillery
troops and marine units in their combat missions.
The methods used in the psychological training provided to personnel of shore-based
rear services are basically the same as the methods existing in the ground troops
and marines. Drivers, supply personnel, engineers, repairmen, technicians, gunsmiths,
medical workers and other specialists must be thoroughly prepared to perform their
missions in the face of air strikes and actions by sabotage groups and assault
forces, and they must be especially prepared to act following the enemy's use of
mass destruction weapons.
Ideological and Psychological Brainwashing of Personnel in the Navies of
Imperialist States*
The constantly increasing power of the Soviet Union and countries of the socialist
fraternity and growth in the popularity of the ideals of socialism and in the
successes of the national liberation movement have altered the balance of forces
in the international arena.
Due to their continual economic growth, which is predetezmined by the very nature
of socialist society--a society that serves the interests of the laboring masses,
ai~d owing to a foreign policy aimed at confirming peaceful coexistence and exerting
an increasingly greater influence on international relations, the fraternal
socialist countries are now playing a major role in averting a new world war,
reinforcing international security and developing the process of detente.
Sufferinq failure in its policy of dealing "from a position of strength," under
the pressure of a powerful movement of all democratic forces imperialism has been
compelled to recognize the need for detente. But naturally this does not mean that
the nature and reactionary essence of imperialism has changed. Aggressive circles
*Information contained in this cha~ter on the navies of imperialist states was
obtained from foreign publications.
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in the imperialist states, and mainly in the United States of America, refuse to
recognize the positive changes that have occurred in the international �ituation.
As .in the cold war years, they continue to profess a supposed "Soviet threat," they
sup~~ort racist and other reactionary regimes, and they commit open acts of
agqression against liberated countries and movements of national liberation. The
arms race which imperialism beqan is continuing.
Sizeable armed forces are being maintained with arms at ready by the principal
imperialist countries. Numerous military bases are being maintained at the borders
of peaceful states, and they are constantly being reinforced with more and more new
arms and combat equipment.
Presence of mass armies in which most of the personnel are from the laboring classes
places a heavy burden upon the rulinq circles of imperialist countries: They must
achievF� com~~lete subordination of the privates and seamen to the interests of the
imFa~~alist bourgeoisie, and their unquestioninq participation in military adventures.
Military circles are attempting various ways to solve the problems of ideological
brainwashing of the public and of the personnel of their armed forces. They spend
huge sums not only to furnish the armies and navies with modern arms and combat
equipment. Huge amounts are spent on brainwashing the personnel in the spirit of
devotion to the bourgeois structure and hatred of coim?unism. Reactionary forces
are doing everything they can to shield the minds of their privates and seamen from
progressive ideas.
Imperialism cannot hope for success if it openly declares its real goals. It is
compelled to create an entire system of ideological myths which cloud over the
true meaning behind its intentions. For this purpose it has created a gigantic
propanda machine, capitalizing on all modarn resources of ideological influence.
The apologists of the capitalist structure have ha.~, rich experience in deceiving
the popular masses. Z'hey have at their disposal a vast and well-tested propaganda
system, a carefully tuned machine for political brainwashing. In the armed forces
of capitalist states there is a broad network of personnel organs and scientific
research organizations with which to do this work. The responsibility for the
morale of the personnel and their combat readiness is imposed upon the commanders
of the ships, units and formations. There is additionally a professional official
system of propagandists. In the U.S. Armed Forces this system consists of an in-
- formation directorate and the appropriate sections and departments in the forma-
tions. Concerned for maintaining the moral and combat spirit required of the
personnel today, the Pentagon continues to increase the size of its staff of ideolo-
gical personnel in the navy. Moreover a number of scientific research institutions
are involved in efforts to solve moral-combat problems, to include the navy's
insti.tute of human resources, its center for traininq equipment, its institute of
aerospace medicine and a naval scientific research laboratory of undersea medicine.
The recommendations and proposals of these institutions are used aboard the
fleet's ships.
Naval and marine corps associations also deal with the propa~anda of militarism and
brainwashing of personnel in the U.S. Navy. These are professional associations of
naval personnel. Many other groups, including the American Legion, veterans' organi-
zations and war industry associations serve the same purposes.
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Other imperialist states also possess a sizeable brainwashing system. In Great
Britain it consists of four departments contained within the naval staff and sub-
ordinated to the navy's second minister, who is responsi.ble for personnel affairs.
The principal executive organ is the de;~artment of general education. It does
intensive work with naval personnel t}rough a broad network of specialized offiCers.
In addition to tn~nitoring general education and vocational-technical training, this
department publishes various handbooks, textbooks and programs, and it prints propa-
ganda literature, informative materials and teaching instructions. It also trains
officer instructors for ideological stupefaction of naval seamen. A department re-
sponsible for organizinq leisure time and services manages this process in off-duty
time.
The process of religious befuddlement of the personnel is under the guidance of
the navy's chaplains' department. Chaplains are present aboard all large ships and
in all formations. They are the "spiritual assistants" of the commanders, and they
have the right to interfere in all aspects of the service and life of the seamen,
and keep their behavior and political moods under surveillance, keeping the command
informed about everything.
Propaganda of militaristic naval conceptions among the civilian public is the re-
sponsibility of the department of naval information. Books, pamphlets and other
printed matter are published under its guidance with the purpose of exalting the
actions of the navy in colonial and predatory wars and publicizing reactionary
naval traditions, militarism and chauvinism.
Resides this official brainwashing system, militaristic circles are creating various
public organizations in order to encourage the participation of the broad sailor
masses in the process of ideological stupefaction. Z"he purpose fdr this is to
make the activity appear to be of objective necessity, to be in keeping with the
interests of each seaman. In its time, the main headquarters of the U.S. Navy
adu~t~d a decisio~ crcu~i:y so-called "generu~ A~?�cation centers" in all units and
aboard large ships. These were specially equipped rooms and compartments "for
self-education and information for servicemen of all categories, including officers."
According to the newspaper THE NAVY TIN~S, creation of such centers attests to the
command's aspiration for shiftxng the main efforts in personnel training directly
to the ships and units. It is with this same purpose in mind that military reli-
gious propaqanda has been maximized aboard ships and in the units of the American
navy. The staff of priests and chaplains in the navy totals about 1,000 officers
of the military clerical service, to include up to 800 protestants and about 200
re~~resentatives of the Catholic and Jewish faiths.
The system itself of selecting persons to serve aboard the navy's ships creates
favurable conditions for the personnel's brainwashing. The navies of the principal
imperialist states are manned by mercenaries. Such a system can be explained by
- profound sociopolitical reasons. In order to be able to rely on those whom they
arm with modern menacing weapons, the ruling circles of imperialist states want to
have certain guarantees. Direct bribery is one way that this guarantee is reached.
Because the navy is manned by mercenaries, it is possible to subject the seamen
and especially the junior officers to careful political selection, and to demand a
zealous attitude toward service and unquestioning subordination. Under capitalist
conditions, typified by a perpetual army of unemployed, there is even a possibility
for selecting those desiring to join the navy competitively.
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In sum total, the ships of the Amerj.can, English, West German, Belgian and Canadian
naval forces are almost 100 percent manned by mercenaries.
The selection system adopted by the naval forces of imperialist states has a dual
purpose. One, its overt purpose, is to select a professionally and physically
suitable contingent for the navy. The other, a covert class purpose, is to weed
out political undesirables. Z'hese same purposes are served by carefully developed
psychological methods. After all, it is possible to weed out any undes?.rable candi-
date on the excuse of psycholoqical deficiency.
The mercenary manning system, espeaially when coupled with the use of long-term
contracts, means that the bulk of the personnel in imperialist navies look at service
as a well-paying job. Divorced from society, they gradually lose their sense of
class solidarity, and under the influence of the brainwashing system they transform
into the faithful servants of imperialism. The bulk of the mercenaries have been
infusPd with anticommunism and anti-Sovietism, with blind hatred of proqressive
forces. They are opposed to detente as well.
The personnel of American and English atomic submarines, naval aviation and marine
infantry are especially reactionary. According to assertions in the English and
American military press, atomic submarines are manned by personnel "with a higher
level of intellectual development than the average man," and they represent the
"naval elite." In the words of the U.S. Navy's journal OUR NAVY, 75 percent of the
personnel aboard American atomic submarines "are professionals."
Noncommissioned officers are the backbone of fihe submarine crews. They are selected
from among the best trained specialists, ones who have demonstrated their political
reliability and manifested a passion for their wark. During selection, each candi-
date undergoes careful preliminary testing from the standpoint of political loyalty.
Their backgrounds, ties and acquaintances are clarified. Promotion to this level
requires not only the volunt,ary consent of the individual but also a certain amount
of technical training. As a rule the crews of submarines consist of seamen who had
served some time aboard conventional submarines and who had been recommended by
commanders in their former places of service. Material advantages such as high
pay, various allowances and special privileges are created to make service aboard
submarines more desirable.
But the direct material benefits of naval service cannot form the required moral
and combat qualities in the personnel on their own. This is true today especially,
when the armament and combat equipment of the ships require a high level of general
education and technical training. It is by necessity that ships are manned by the
competent and qualified segment of the population of capitalist countries. As an
example the bulk of inercenaries hired by the American navy and marines are recruited
from the industrial northwestern states and California. As a.rule these are repre-
- sentatives of the working and technical intelligentsia. Today's soldier, emphasizes
MILITARY POLICE JOURNAL, "possesses an amazing sense of what is true and what is
false.... He cannot be led about by the nose. He is intelligent and curious, and
; he is better educated than his predecessors. Delicate issues cannot be concealed
from him, and it is impossible to impart blind loyalty."
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In his article "The Lessons of the American Defeat in Vietnam," D. Watt, an English
professor, admits that one of the reasons for the "demoralization of the American
army ia Vietnam" was the weakness of the ideological principles upon which the disci-
pline and morale of the soldiers rested. American soldiers, he writes, could not
"swallow" the endless diet of a"civilizing mission and humanitarianism" served up
to them, and the officers, their leaders, found themselves unprepared to keep the
soldiers under their ideological influence.
- Bourgeois military ideologists arrive at the conclusion that the shaken morale of
the personnel must be shored up. 7~'he military press of the NATO countries emphasizes
that new forms and methods of influence on people must be developed so that the
morale of the armed forces could be kept at a high level today. Many of the old
arguments and theses, ones which in the not-so-distant past were able to form an
obedient and, to a certain extent, a dependable executor of the will of the ruling
classes, are now either hopelessly obsolete in the opinion of many bourgoies military
ideologists, or they cannot produce the expected results. In this connection the
imperialist press is advertising proposals for reexamining some of the issues of
personnel management and for developing new, more flexible forms and methods of
ideological influence accounting for the social changes that have occurred and for
the unique features of young people today. Nbre-sophisticated resources and methods
of influence upon people are needed if today's technically competent and educated
servicemen are to be kept in the prison of bourgeois ideology.
Anticomanunism and anti-Sovietism are the main directions of brainwashing of the
public at large and military servicemen in imperialist countries, including naval
seamen. The shopworn bugbear of anticomnunism, which has been condemned by history,
is consistent with tha arientation of modern bourgeois ideology and propaganda acti-
vity. And even in an environment of lower international tension, reactionary
circles, rather than weakening their anti-Soviet propaganda, are on the contrary
doing everything they can to intensify it and to arouse anticommunist psychosis.
Adapting to a changinq situation in the world, they are attempting to alter only
certain obsolete forms and methods and the tactics of their influence upon the
minds and hearts of people, without changing the essence of their policy. Thus
brazen, open anticommunism aimed at the illiterate and politically backward indi-
vidual has been replaced by a sophisticated quasiscientific method with the same
old anticommunism at its foundation. It serves as the "theoretical basis" of
imperialism's military preparations,and as a barrier to the penetration of progres-
sive ideas and viewpoints aboard the navy's ships and in its units. Under its
cover, reactionary circles are attempting to justify, to world public opinion,
their numerous m.ilitary actions against peaceful nations. By creating the myth of
a"Soviet military threat," of the "dangerous activity" of the USSR Navy in the
World Ocean, the military circles of a number of imperialist states are trying to
justify their actions aimed at increasing tension in some regions of our planet.
False information on the true state of affairs in countries of the socialist
fraternity and in the world communist and workers' movement has the purpose of
forming anticommunist and anti-Soviet viewpoints in the seamen of imperialist navies.
The idea that they must prepare for war and defend Western "c~emocracy" is perpetually
suggested to naval seamen. Attempts are made to persuade them that they have to take
uF~ arms because "the Russians possess modern combat resources, an enormous army and
a growing navy." They must also become qualified specialists in order to suppress
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- internal unrest "organized by communists and their accomplices." The policy of
anticommunism is aimed at persuading each sailor of the "R~ed danger" threateninq him
personally. "When the drill instructor at the training center conducted our
lessons," described one American marine in an interview in the book "Talks With
Americans" published in the USA, "he constantly repeated: 'I am teaching you to
kill communists not just because I'm beinq paid to do so. I want you to understand
how terrible a threat communists are to each of you personally. And if we don't
kill the Reds in Vietnam now, tomorrow they'll be here in America, and they'll
slaughter all of our peaple, you yourselves, your mothers, wives and children.
Is this what you want?� And then we were all supposed to shout with all of our
hearts: 'No!'."
Indoctrination of the personnel in the spirit of bourgeois morality is a typical
direction in ideological and psychological brainwashing of the personnel of
imperialist navies. As we know, bourgeois morality shapes the moral countenance
of the individual in accordance with its main principle, "it's a dog-eat-dog world."
Every commandment of this morality is permeated by a spirit of cruelty, misanthro-
pism, hypocrisy and bigotry. It preaches extreme indi~idualism, a passion for
personal gain at all costs and a cult of physical violence, and it incites lowly
instincts. The nature itself of life in the navy, in which each views his service
as rothing more than a means of providing himself with material security, facili-
tates indoctrination of ship personnel in the spirit of bourgeois morality. Service
and acts motivated by the notion of "money before everything" are given full approval.
Zealous service is rewarded by high pay, bonuses and material benefits, while
punishment takes the form of fines. Combat training also foresees encouragement of
competition, individual initiative and private enterprise.
The cult of violence is typical of bourgeois morality. All means are justified in
achieving a goal. Whatever produces success is right. Those who become successful
and strong are also worthy of power. He who is selective about the resources he
uses is fated to remain poor. These rules are justified by the philosophy of
praqmatism, of "real life."
The cult of violence is especially popular in American society. Americans have
90 million pistols, rifles and other weapons for their personal use. Using a gun
is the easiest way to achieve a goal. The moral side of it all has no meaninq to
most Americans. Nurtured on this morality, young Americans hired for service in
the navy agree to fulfill the orders of their masters to kill peaceful inhabitants
of freedom-loving countries, and they do so deliberately, with an eye on personal
gain. The moral aspect takes a secondary position here. Young people coming to
the navy have already absorbed some of the principles of bourgeois morality, and
they ~re:internally ready to commit all war crimes. The entire moral atmosphere of
bourgeois society stimulates aggressiveness, cruelty and base plans and goals.
The dominance of the cult of violence also makes people ready to go along with
all of its forms without a second thought. Drill is used in the system of moral
indoctrination on this basis and in the interests of transforming the young man
into an"unthinking machine." Drill takes especially vivid forms in the marines.
Here the individual is forced to forget his name, and to remember only his number.
Special marine training is a preplanned system of cruelty called upon to break
the individual's will and to make him as similar to the next man as two peas in a
pod. When violence and terror penetrate into all aspects of the work and life of
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a ur~it, each begins to realize that his sole salvation is to become just as cruel
as everyone else. Psychological pressure that cultivates thoughtlessness, blind
hatred, cruelty and a lust for blood is continually intensifying aboard the ships
and in the units of the American navy.
The personnel of imperialist navies are indoctrinated in the spirit of chauvinism
continuously and in sophisticated ways. Militarists competently speculate with the
patriotic feelings of the people. Special steps are taken in the American navy
to shape the seaman's belief in the superiority of the American way of life. "Teach
our young," Admiral Burke instructs his officers, "to believe that our way of life
is the greatest blessing of the people and of all mankind." And the officers devote
much attention to "explaining" the principles and practice of American "democracy"
to the seamen. Personnel in the British navy are brainwashed in the spirit of
devotion to the existing structure. The queen is always represented as the embodi-
ment of good and justice, as a person caring for the welfare of all strata of the
public. Visits to the ships by persons of the royal family are widely used for
ideolo~~ical brainwashing purposes. Seamen who have had an audience with the queen
are asked to speak to the personnel with the purpose of inspiring their sense of
faithfulness to the monarch.
Much room is devoted in brainwashing to propagandizing faithfulness to military
traditions. From thefirst days of service, the English seaman is persuaded that
the British navy is one of the most powerful and invincible. Fonner Defense Minister
Healy wrote: "Because of the concern of the government and the attention it devotes
to the navy, Great Britain has the world's third most powerful fleet, capable of
annihilatory attacks against any enemy." In order to demonstrate the power of the
navy in England, exhibitions of armament and combat equipment are often organized,
and "navy days" in which the latest ships participate are held annually.
The so-called system of military morals and ethics Plays an important role in the
brainwashing of personnel in imperialist navies. In the American navy it is
spelled out in the "Handbook of Building Character," in which certain supraclass
norms of behavior, supposedly co~non to all members of bourgeois society, are
declared. The modern codes of military morals and ethics are not a~ all something
new. Their roots lie in the abstract codes of honor and duty of the war machine of
the past. Military ethics are an inherent element of the ideology of militarism,
and they are used in attempts to create some sort of moral justification for
aggressive actions and plans. In this connection the military actions of the armed
forces are served up and lauded as manifestations of duty and honor, and the actions
of the probable enemy are labeled as unworthy. The notion that physical annihilation
of the enemy's peaceful populatior. is a normal condition of any war is constantly
inculcated in the personnel.
The system of morals and ethics in the English navy makes broad use of reactionary
customs and traditions. Practically every ship and unit possesses its own array
of traditions. Every seaman must adhere to them without fail. In order to inspire
the pcrsonnel's faithfulness to the regime and their aspiration for zealous service,
tliey are constantly reminded of the glory of their ancestors and of their victories
in numerous wars fought by English colonists over the centuries. The names of
ships that distinguished themselves the most in these wars are given to new ones
that are built. Traditions are maintained by preserving the cut of the uniform
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and keeping lucky charms (mascots) that stay with each ship in all of its cruises
and, as the story goes, bring luck. Observance of customs and traditions, in the
opinion of brainwashing specialists, helps to create a"spirit of comradeship"
aboard ship, to inspire obedience in the seamen to officers and consequently to
the ruling classes.
The system of morals and ethics in the American navy foresees special lessons
and exercises in subjects such as: "The Sense of Duty," "The Home of the American,"
"Integrity of Character" and "One Nation Under God." The purpose of such training
is to shape, in each seaman, the traits and properties of the typical "well-meaning
average man"--the dependable supporter of the ruling classes and a"dedicated"
defender of the capitalist structure. As representatives of the naval department
responsible for personnel brainwashing see it, such a seaman must structure his
entire life according to the program suggested to him in the course of his service,
and to blindly fulfill all orders of the command.
The brainwashing of personnel in the navies of imperialist states assumes various
forms. The principal form is mandatory weekly group lessons with the personnel.
Bourgeois propaganda tries to reprgsent this system of knowledge as a manifestation
of the "principle of democracy," and it refers to these lessons as "debates,"
"commander briefings" and "current events lessons." In fact, however, their real
purpose is to introduce certain stereotypes of bourgeois morality into the conscious-
ness of the personnel. Using a procedure developed by experienced specialists,
psychologists as a rule, lesson leaders direct the outwardly noncoercive and volun-
tary change of opinions into the political channels required by the coimnand.
Ideological influence upon personnel in the naval forces of West Germany is achieved
during work time allocated to a special course developed by the ideological brain-
washing division of the Department of Defense.
But ideological brainwashing of the personnel is not limited in the imperialist
navies to just on-duty time. The command strives to encourage the participation of
"representatives of the masses" in addition to officers in this work, and to make
us~ of leisure time for these purposes. Groups of so-called "senior privates"
and "senior NCOs" are specially selected from among seamen and junior commanders
for these purposes in the U.S. Navy. "Training and indoctrination councils" and
"leadership councils" are also created aboard ships. Council members are elected
at meetings of the personnel, ~d the councils act as advisory bodies before the
commander. This creates not only an appropriate social soil for better indoctrina-
tion and broader dissemination of bourgeois morality and the viewpoints of reactionary
militaristic circles among the personnel, but it also creates the illusion of a
common interest in solving all of the problems facing a ship. The effectiveness
of brainwashing rises as well in this veiled form.
Besides various groups created by the command for purposeful moral and ideological
influence, the sports, literary, artistic, musical, choral and other similar asso-
ciations are created for this purpose.
Through them, a certain influence is exerted upon the seamen and upon their
philosophy. At the same time, personnel encouraged to join such organizations are
used for ideological influence upon the local public in foreign ports.
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Other resources are also used to brainwash the personnel of ships and units. They
include meetings of the seamen with representatives of the most reactionary orgarii-
zations of the USA and other NATO countries, encouragement of seamen to join
political organizations such as "Aid to Refugees From Behind�the Iron Curtain,"
ingtituting special prizes and other measures of materially rewarding ideological
activity.
Officers involved in the activities of the ultraright "John Birch Society," the
racist Ku Klux Klan, the openly fascist "American Nazi Party of White Citizens"
and other reactionary organizations display special activity in the American navy.
The American press has reported, for example, the "broad initiative" of the co~nand
of the naval school in Annapolis, which regularly sends dozens of "groups of
speakers on antico~nunism, formed out of the most reactionary instructors and
students, to the bases and ships. Such measures are organized by the staff of
the marine training center at Parris Island. Propaganda groups formed by this
staff undergo special training and are sent to bther garrisons. They broadly employ
fabricated propagandistic data and prejudiciously collected facts.
A typical feature of the brainwashing to which personnel of the U.S. Navy are
subjected is the broad participation by leading political and military officials,
by representatives of the higher command and by senior officers. These set the tone
in anticommunist and anti-Soviet propaganda. The secretary of defense, the chairman
of the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ~nd other highly placed military
leaders regularly speak to the personnel.
The commands of the armed forces of the prin~ipal imperialist states are now de-
voting persistent attention to improving mutual relationships between officers and
enlisted men. Leadership and mutual relationships in the navy are becoming signi-
ficant problems because the class antagonisms inherent to any bourgeois army grow
to extreme limits in the difficult conditions of lengthy oceanic cruises and es-
pecially in a combat situation. Such antagonisms manifest themselves in various
forms of protest, which sometimes acquire a clearly political hue. The American
press has reported cases of the participation of individual servicemen and small
groups of seamen in antiwar demonstrations,refusal to participate in military actions
in Vietnam for political reasons, and publication of underground antiwar newspapers
t aboard some ships and in some units and bases. In particular, according to press
reports a newspaper entitled "Potemkin" appeared aboard ships of the Sixth Fleet.
For the first time in the history of the U.S. Armed Forces the antiwar movement has
begun assuming more or less organized forms. Cases of desertion for political
reasons attest to growth in the class contradictions in the American armed forces.
Nbral degradation of a significant proportion of the personnel of the U.S. Navy
is also manifested by growth in the number of drug addicts, alcoholics and patients
with venereal diseases.
Tt~e military press of imperialist states writes that often in a combat situation,
"~fficers have lost the reins of control," they have been unable to understand their
soidiers, they have been unable to find a common language with them, and sometimes
they have even simply feared them. Some military scientists even come to the con-
clusion that the command has become "estranged" in a number of subunits and units,
causing deterioration of the personnel's morale. "The low morale of the troops,"
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clc:cl~irc~d the organ of the American military police, MILITARY POLICE JOURNAL, "is to
a great extent the result of poor leadership, and not a consequence of the influence
of external factors."
mhe military leadership of the NATO countries is trying to improve officer and
junior officer training as a means to surmount these difficulties more efficiently.
It is with this purpose that the "scientific principles of leadership in the armed
forces" and the so-called "leadership courses," which are being introduced into the
practical training of the command, are beinq developed. in England,
for example, officers and NCOs are promoted only after comple ting a course of in-
struction in "leadership schools."
John (Edair), a consultant at the English war college in Sandhurst, explains in his
book The Training of Leaders" that the "leadership course" has the purpose of
teaching commanders "to lead people"--not simply to command and administer, but to
be real leaders, capable of exexcising effective leadership over their subordinates
in all situations. 'I'he course particularly foresees the study of modern require-
ments on military leaders, the fundamentals of military discipline, the problems of
personnel loyalty, the factors detennining morale aboard ships and in units, and
other issues.
Bourgeois military scientists are now directing their research efforts toward smooth-
ing out class contradictions among the personnel through a certain "liberalization"
of mutual relations and through devotion of greater attention to their daily needs.
The journal MILITARY REVIEW even advises sending students at military schools to the
ships and units as common soldiers for a period of several months. This, the journal
writes, "would help the future young officers understand the soldiers, to become
familiar with their ways of thinking, problems and moods," it would teach officers
to "speak in the language of the soldiers." The desire to bridge the gap that sepa-
rates enlisted men and officers is obvious in all of these investigations. One of
the possible ways for doing so is to acquire the ability to persuade and inspire
subordinates, to win their obedience by appealing to their "inner feelings and con-
victions."
Improvements in leadership and mutual relations in imperialist navies also pursue
the goal of substituting solution of political problems aris ing in the course of
service by psychological solutions. Z'he English military press warns directly that
political enlightenment of the modern army requires the highest art and the ability
to strike a balance between two hazards. On one hand it may undermine the faith and
loyalty of servicemen, while on the other hand it may steer them toward the in-
fluence of communist propaganda. Both outcomes are thought to be danqerous. The
authors recommend that officers conduct the brainwashinq of their subordinates in
sucli a way as "not to elicit questions and doub~ts"; othexwise they might "reject
the very system which they are called upon to defend."
Imperialists turn special attention in the brainwashing of naval personnel to here
raising its effectiveness. Although they spare no efforts for such purposes,
as in all other areas of bourgeois reality, a desire to obtain the highest dividends
from invested capital manifests itself. But they are unable to achieve high effec-
tiveness just on the basis of ideological influence alone. The reason for this
lies in the poverty of bourgeois philosophy. Attempting to correct this significant
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dcficicncy, reactionary imperialist circles use the latest technical resources of the
ma:~s ~nc;dia and propaganda with the goal of not only imposing their own way of think-
ing but also silencing moral ideas hostile to them, of suppressing the possibility
of internal resistance. All of these resources are broadly employed aboard the ships
and in the units of the navy. Primary among them are motion pictures, radio and
television.
In accordance with the "coimnander briefing" program, in the course of the last few
years the American navy has been outfitting all first- and second-ranked ships with
onboard automated broadcasting centers. The American radio and television network
covers all theaters in which the U.S. Armed Forces are deployed. It was reported
in the ARMED FORCES JOURNAL that the formerly separate propaganda radio and tele-
vision networks of the armed forces in America, West Europe, the Near East, Southeast
Asia, the Western Pacific and other regions have been united into a single global
system. It includes more than 200 radio and 11 television stations located aboard
ships.
The press plays a significant role in the brainwashing of personnel in the armed
forces of the imperialist countries.
Every branch of the armed forces possesses its own journals intended for enlisted
men and NCOs. Moreover the Pentagon employs a large gang of so-called "literary
agents" who supply, on its orders, special reading matter propagandizing war,
aggression, cruelty and violence to the book market.
Just in the USA alone there are a total of about 1,400 military periodicals.
According to data in the ARN~D FORCES JOURNAL the American navy and marines publish
333 newspapers, journals and bulletins. The main naval newspaper is the NAVY TIN~S.
Ships and units also receive all-army newspapers such as STARS AND STRIPES, OVERSEAS
WEEKLY and others. All large warships, marine formations, bases and naval schools
have their own newspapers. 'I"his whole flood of printed matter is filled with anti-
Soviet and anticommunist fabrications, calls to militancy and the basest materials
of detective and pornographic content.
Movie propaganda is given a large role in the brainwashing of servicemen in the
NATO countries. The cinamatographic service of the U.S. Armed Forces spends
millions of dollars on movie production each year. No cabinet department of the
USA must possess more than one studio, according to orders from the White House.
However, as we can see from official statistics, in 1976 the Pentaqon possessed
69 movie studios. Nbreover orders for making movies with a military theme are also
placed with other movie companies. The movie and television programs of many capi-
talist countries offer so-called "horror films" obtained in this way--"The Exorcist,"
"Jaws," "King Kong" and so on.
* *
*
Reactionary circles of imperialist states are using all resources and methods to
strengthen the political dependability of naval personnel. They are intensifying
control over the thoughts and moods of the seamen and their behavior, they are sub-
jecting political unreliables to cleansing, they are engaging in stronger and
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harsher repressions against undesirables, and they are resorting to bribexy of their
followers more and more. But they lay their main hopes on intensifying ideological
brainwashing of the personnel. All of these measures are promoting consolidation
of reactionary and militant forces, ones controlling the situation in the navies of
the imperialist states.
At the same time a significant part of their personnel are attempting to argue the
positions of realism and to arrive at their own evaluations of current events and
facts. Refusing to become transformed into the blind executors of the will of the
ruling classes, into mute robots, ~nto racists and assassins, many naval seamen of
the imperialist navies are resistirig the influence of official propaganda and rising
in protest. These phenomena are having an influence on the combat readiness of the
imperialist navies. However, this should not provide the grounds for understating
their combat possibilities. Experience shows that although in view of the fundamental
c~ntradiction between the interests of the ruling monopolistic circles and the broad
popular masses the possibilities enjoyed by imperialism for ideological stupefaction
of the laborers are limited, they ~re finding the necessary ways and means of pre-
paring the personnel for war. Their efforts in this direction are especially effec-
tive in privileged branches of the armed forces, such as the navy in general and its
basic attack formations in particular.
_onsideration of these possibilities of imperialism is an inherent part of the moral,
political and psychological training of Soviet naval seamen preparing to fight an
experienced, strong and well trained aggressor.
- The combat potential of the fonnation, the unit and the ship could be fully
realized only when the personnel are capable of applying new tactics and surpassing
the enemy in the art of combat. And this would require not only military proficiency
but also a knowledge of the enemy's tactics and combat capabilities. Without a
knowledge of the enemy, all of the efforts taken in troop training may turn out to
be useless. This pertains not to individual aspects but rather to the sum total of
the elements defining the strength of the probable enemy: military, economic,
political and ideological. It is in our interests to objectively evaluate the
forces and possibilities of the probable enemy because, as military history teaches
us, both understatement and overstatement of these possibilities threaten negative
consequences.
Performing their missions, our naval seamen are thoroughly studying the probable
enemies, and they are maintaining a constant combat readiness guaranteeing an
immediate repulse to any aggressor, as required by the USSR Constitution.
COPYRIGHT: Voyenizdat, 1980
11004
CSO: 1801/236
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~ NAVAL FORCES
7
EXCERPTS FROM BOOK ON SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS IN WORLD WAR II
Moscow SOVETSKIYE NADVODNYYE KORABLI V VELIKOY OTECHESTVEN*IOY VOYNE in Russian 1981
(signed to press 29 Jun 81) pp 1-2, 3-7, 251-257, 271-272
[Title page, annotation, table of contents, introduction and conclusion from book
"Soviet Surface Vessels in the Great Patriotic War" by Geliy Ivanovich Khor'kov, Vo-
yenizdat, 20,000 copies, 272 pages]
[Text] Annotation
Taking the most characteristic and instructive examples from actual combat operations,
the author looks at typical tactical methods of operation employed by Soviet naval sur-
face vessels during the Great Patriotic War in accomplishment of a variety of tactical-
operational missions. He illustrates the art commanders displayed in exercising con-
trol of their forces [soyendineniye], ships and weapons as well as the selfless heroism
naval personnel demonstrated in battles for the motherland.
This book is intended for naval off icers and students and cadets of naval educational
institutions.
Table of Contents
Introduction 3
Chapter 1. Characteristics of Soviet naval surface vessels and aircraft and
of the naval and air forces of fascist Germany 8
1.1. Tactical characteristics of naval ships and aircraft 11
1.2. Organization and composition of naval forces 21
1.3. Naval force combat training 26
1.4. Tactical characteristics of fascist German ships and aircraft 29
1.5. Comparative evaluation of the weapons and combat resources of the
ships of the Soviet and fascist German navies 32
Chapter 2. Disruption of sea lanes 36
2.1. Destroyer operations 38
2.2. PT boat "ambush" operations 41
2.3. PT boat "free chase" operations 46
2.4. Massed attack on a convoy by a PT boat force under BKP [shore command
post] control 51
2.5. Combined attack on a convoy by a force of PT boats and naval vessels . 62
2.6. Active mine laying 66
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Chapter 3. Defense of sea lanes 71
3.1. Sweep searching for submarines in coastal sea lanes 73
3.2. Hunting submarines in areas of probable location 78
3.3. Naval operations to protect convoys against submarines 80
3.4. Naval operations to protect convoys against enemy aviation 82
3.5. Repulsion of surface-vessel attacks by convoy eacorts 86
3.6. Convoy passage through hazardous mine conditions 90
Chapter 4. Operations against bases, ports and shore installations 94
4.1. Artillery attack on naval base 96
4.2. Artillery attacks on ports 100
4.3. Torpedo attacks on ships in inner harbors 105
4.4. PT boat attacks on ships at bases 108
4.5. Artillery attacks on shore installations 113
Chapter 5. Defense of zones around naval bases 117
5.1. Defensive minelaying 119
5.2. Patrol boat operations against aviaCion 124
5.3. Patrol boat operations against surface vessels 126
5.4. Patrol ships in submarine-detection operations 131
5.5. Hunting and chasing submarines by groups of ships from patrol support
forces 134
5.6. Check minesweeping 135
5.7. Exploratory minesweeping 136
5.8. Clearance minesweeping against enemy resistance 139
Chapter 6. Support for submarine deployment and return to base 142
6.1. Escorting a submarine with a single ship 144
6.2. Screening force operations in support of submarine passage 145
6.3. Support for submarine deployment from base 148
6.4. Rendezvous with submarine returning from combat run 151
Chapter 7. Surface vessels and ground forces in comb'ined operations in the
coastal sector of,a front 157
7.1. Fire support for ground units (chast') in operations against attack-
ing enemy 159
7.2. Counterbattery bombardment 164
7.3. Groupings of squadron ships in combat operations.to repulse enemy at-
tack on naval base 170
7.4. Fire support for ground forces breaking through enemy defense 176
7.5. Defending ground forces against attacks from enemy ships 180
7.6. Evacuation of ground units from coastal beachhead under enemy land
blockade 183
7.7. Transporting troops under hazardous mine conditions against enemy re-
sistance 188
Chapter 8. Landing amphibious assault forces 192
8.1. Landing tactical assault forces on a coast by squadron ships 194
8.2. Landing an assault force on an island by torpedo and patrol boats 201
8.3. Landing the first wave of an assault force in a port by squadron and
harbor defense ships 207
8.4. Assault landing in a port by.naval base forces 217
Chapter 9. Naval operations by river flotilla ships 227
9.1. Artillery attack during defensive operations against crossings and
masses of enemy forces 229
9.2. Defense of ground-force crossings 233
9.3. Support of ground-force offensive 236
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9.4. Landing an assault force in the depth of an enemy defense 242
9.5. Supporting troop crossings and transport 246
Conclusion 251
Appendices:
1. Abbreviations 258
2. Basic tactical-technical characteristics of naval surface vessels 260
3. Basic tactical-flight data on naval aircraft 266
4. Some tactical characteristics and specifications of fascist German sur-
face ships and submarines
5. Basic tactical-flight data on fascist German aircraft 268
6. Basic tactical-technical characteristics of ship's artillery 269
7. Basic tactical-technical characteristics of ship's torpedoes
Recommended reading 270
Introduction
Surface tactics encompass questions concerning the preparation and conduct of combat
operations involving individual ships or groups or forces of ships operating indepen-
dently or in cooperation with other naval forces. The preparation of and then the
conduct of a combat operation constitute a single, integrated process, the product of
which is the execution of the combat mission. The individual components of this pro-
cess are the following: the training and preparation of the forces to be involved,
planning the necessary support, elaborating the concept of the combat operations, or-
ganizing tactical cooperation between forces participating in these operations, con-
trolling them over the course of the sea passage and during combat and then achieving
the assigned objective.
Soviet naval surface tactics underwent further evolution in the course of the Great
Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Study of the materials from this period allows us to fol-
low the practical apFlication of provisions of guiding tactical documents in actual
combat operations as well as trends and directions in the development of surface tac-
tics.
Specific examples drawn from actual combat situations illustrate the dependence of
success in combat upon the organization and then provision of combat and special sup-
port, effective cooperation in the course of operations and the relationship between
the level of ship crew training and morale and the tactical methods employed by their
commanders in battle. In these examples we can look as well at the relationship be-
tween the tactical methods and procedures employed to accomplish an assigned mission
and the ideological temper and communist conviction of ship commanders; aggressiveness,
courage, steadfastness and selflessness in battle and the quality of party political
work and the level of political consciousness and understanding of his responsibility
to the socialist fatherland on the part of each member of a ship's crew. In looking
at this aspect of experience accumulated in the course of the Great Patriotic War,
L. I. Brezhnev has declared that "party political work with personnel and their ideo-
logical temper has always been and remains a powerful weapon for our army. The force
of this weapon has been tested in the fire of battle. And it strikes terror in our
enemies even today.i1
During the war, Soviet naval surface vessels destroyed 7 submarines (damaged more than
10)9 10 destroyers and destroyer escorts (7 damaged), 8 landing ships (11 damaged),
12 mineweepers and minelayers (2 damaged), 5 boats of different kinds (23 damaged)
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tl~e tact that beginning in 1~42 small ships and boats from bases located near the front
line were the only active components of these fleets. Ships of the Northern Fleet
guarding our external and internal aea lanes and operating in enemy sea lanes in Va-
ranger Fjord constituted an exception throughout the entire war. Forces of small ships
and boats redeployed in the wake of the advan~ing troops alone participated in combat
operations during the Soviet Army's strategic offensive of 1944-1945. As a rule, they
operated in tactical cooperation with fleet aviation, which had now been reinforced
and assigned missions in the naval sector. The tasks of our surface ships in this
period of the war cons:~ ed primarily in clearing mines from areas in which our ships
were operating, landing amphibious assault forces in support of offensive ground opera-
tions, providing direct f ire support to ground units and operating in sea lanes with
the objective of disrupting the evacuation by sea of retreating enemy forces.
Also playing an important role in the war were the vessels of our river flotillas,
which provided support for ground forces in crossing water obstacles and water trans-
port, lamded assault forces in the enemy rear and provided f ire support to forces op-
erating in riverine sectors.
In discussing and analyzing the combat experience of the Great Patriotic War, we en-
tirely justif ied in asking ourselves the question: after the passage of so many years,
should we really be looking so closely at the actions of one particular commander or
another who was leading his military unit not infrequently in the contradictory, con-
flicting and confused conditions of actual combat, when he would have been intensely
hard-pressed for time and acting under the threat of enemy action? From the point of
view of the study of military affairs I think this is necessary. In analyzing one
military action or another we are not diminishing the role of any of its participants.
In combat there is no one who would not realize at least a fraction of his combat po-
tential. In all combat operations everyone did everything he could, but the results of
an operation depend upon many factors: the state of training of the ship commanders and
crews involved, the correlation and type of forces taking part in an engagement, knowl-
edge of the situation, the state of a ship's weapa:~s and equipment, the morale-building
preparation and psychological state prevailing prior to an engagement etc. If there
was any component upon which depended the outcome of an engagement which was not fully
realized, we must find the reason so as to make the most effective use of a specific
combat experience to improve the combat skills of our commanders.
In discussing the specific nature of a commander's actions under battlefield conditions,
M. V. Frunze stressed the following: "The Red commander must learn as completely as pos-
sible to master the method of thinking, the art of phenomenal analysis to be drawn from
Marxist doctrine. This method reduces essentially to the fact that, for us, there can
be nothing absolute and ossif ied; everything is in a state of flux, everything is con-
tinuously changing; and any means, any method can find application in a given situa-
tion. The commander demonstrates his art in being able to choose from among the var-
- ious means at his disposal those which will yield the best results in a given situa-
' tion at a given time.i4
Illustrations drawn from actual combat situations permit us to discover what consti-
tuted the basis for a commander's selection of one solution as opposed to another.
Conclusion
The illustrations we have been looking at show that, depending upon tactical-opera-
tional conditions and the physical-geographical factors involved, naval surface ves-
sels would carry out either the basic mission involved in given combat operation or
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:,~,~1 I 1 :~,~xi 1 i.~ry vE~asel ~(5 damaged) and sank 24 enemy transport ships with a total
>::~.1:~~.~:?i?~�L ui 4~,1'~7 t.` liowever, in evaluating the role our surface vessels played
in the war we cannot restrict ourselves to looking only at the magnitude of the losses
they inflicted upon enemy ships. We have also to give attention to the specific nature
of the conditions taking shape in the course of the war r~hich dictated the use of main
naval forces in support of ground forces, which bore the brunt of the task of defending
the country against the aggressor.
Over the course of the war the navy executed more than 110 amphibious landings on
enemy shores, successfully repelled enemy attempts to land forces on Soviet shores,
defended internal and external sea lanes and riverine routes, over which was trans-
ported more than 117 million tons of military and civilian cargo, provided reliable
seaward cover for the flanks of ground forces $gainst attack by enemy ships, gave sys-
tematic f ire support to forces of coastal fronts engaged in both offensive and defen-
sive operations and accomplished a number of other missions. Beneath the surface of
these facts lie thousands of combat runs, numerous encounters with fascist surface
ships, submarines and aircraft, engagements with shore batteries and minefield break-
throughs. During and after the war~navy minesweepers had the task of eliminating the
mine hazard from the Baltic, Barents and Black Seas as well as from the Volga and the
Danube, which required enormous expenditures of manpower and resources and a demonstra-
tion of mass-scale heroism and courage on the part of our navy mine specialists.
For exemplary performance in execution of military missions as well as for the courage
and steadfastness of their crews, many ships and forces were awarded military orders,
redesignated as Guards and given other honorary designations. For personal bravery
and skillful leadership in combat operations, some 100 surface-vessel personnel were
awarded the highest award the motherland can bestow--the title of Hero of the Soviet
Union, 37 of them from torpedo boats, 13 from destroyers and destroyer escorts and
48 from other types of ship, the valiant North Sea boat crewman A. 0. Shabalin being
awarded this high title twice.
The scales and the nature of surface-vessel combat operations, as well as, to a certain
extent, the tactics employed in these operations, were governed by the strategic and
operational situation in a given theater of military operations and by the composition
of our naval forces and those of the enemy.
In the situations prevailing in 1941-1942, surface vessels participated actively to-
gether with ground forces in the defense of our naval bases at Liyepaya (Libava)3,
Tallinn, Khanko [HangS], Kronshtadt, Leningrad, Odessa, Sevastopol' and Murmansk.
The tasks of our surface vessels during this period consisted primarily in providing
artillery support to ground forces, landing tactical assault forces on the flank of
an attacking fascist German army and providing operational transport and seaward de-
fense of the flanks of our ground forces. Our naval aviation was at that time being
extensively employed in ground-force sectors. In these situations our ships had fre-
quently to carry out their missions without air cover and in the face of intensive
operations undertaken by Hitlerite aircraft. Our ships therefore undertook their
operations primarily at night. A11 types of ships paxticipated in these battles. After
losing their bases in the Baltic in 1941 and at Sevastopol' in 1942, ships of the
Red Banner Baltic Fleet concentrated in the vicinity of Leningrad, ships of the Black
Sea Fleet in ports along the Caspian coast. This virtually excluded any possibility
of deploying surface vessels of~the' Red Banner Baltic Fleet into the Baltic Sea and
ships of the Black Sea Fleet into western part of the Black Sea. This accounts for
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missions in support of other forces. In cooperation with naval aviation and coastal
artillery they destroyed combat and convoy transport ships, carried out artillery and
torpedo attacks upon enemy ships and vessels in ports and bases, served as landing
craft in landing amphibious assault forces, operated as submarine hunter-killer ships,
carried troops and cargo when these missions could not be carried out by transport
ships and performed a wide range of tasks in a mine-clearing role.
In carrying out their supporting missions, surface vessels provided antisubmarine,
antiaircraft, antiboat and antimine defense in escorting submarines, convoying trans-
port ships, screened them in coastal waters against attack by shore artillery and con-
ducted reconnaissance at sea to provide defense against amphibious assault landings
and reconnaissance of enemy-held coasts in support of assault landings by our own navy.
In cooperating with ground forces, surface ships carried out, independently or 3ointly
with other naval forces, attacks on airfields, artillery batteries, control centers
and communications facilities protected by heavy and field fortif ications and concen-
trations of enemy men and equipment. They also provided protection and defense of sea-
lanes and river routes used for operational transport and transport ship crossings.
From analysis of examples characterizing ~oint operations involving surface ships and
ground forces we can draw the conclusion that in coastal aectors .:f a front and in a
naval base and port defense system, active combat operations on the part of surface
ships constituted an indispensable condition of successful ground-force operations.
In supporting the operations of other naval forces (submarines, naval infantry, shore
units (chast')), surface ships themselves required a full range of combat and special ~
support: reconnaissance, camouflage and deception measures, antiaircraft, antisubmarine
and antimine defense and navigational safety measures. Examples demonstrate that the
effectiveness of surface operations depended to a considerable degree upon the quality
_ and completeness of the support they received. Throughout the entire war, the most
important kind of ship support proved to be defense against air attack, which ships
could not always provide for themselves.
The experience accumulated during the Great Patriotic War confirmed the correctness of
the basic principles governing the conduct of combat operations by surface ships con-
tained in documents on tactics prepared prior to the war, primarily in the 1937 Field
Manual for the Naval Forces of the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army]. According
to the requiremenis contained in this manual, the basic characteristics of surface-
ship tactics were as follows:
- decisiveness in operations to accomplish missions assigned in combat;
- thorough situational analysis and mission concepts based upon a solid foundation of
calculations;
- concealment of preparations for execution of mission and the achievement of surprise
during execution;
- rapid execution in all phases of a mission;
- careful organization of cooperation between the different types of forces involved
in the interest of the grouping carrying out the main mission;
- thorough preparation for execution of a combat mission.
The basic directions in the development of surface tactics over the course of the war
included a gradually growing trend toward the use of massed forces, systematic increases
in all forms of operational support for forces performing the main mission, improved
. ~
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cooperation between ships of different types of naval forces, with aviation primarily,
and the development of ineans and tactical methods of employing new types and models of
weapons in combat operations.
Maintenance of reliable and continuous control of ships at sea on the basis of contin-
uous contact between ships and the control stations of force and strike and tactical
group commanders was an indispensable condition for the achievement of victory and the
successful accomplishment of a combat mission.
The experience of the Great Pat.riotic War demonstrated that the selection of ineans of
conducting combat operations and the tactical methods employed in an operation is gov-
erned by not only tactical calculations, but also by the high level of ideological
convicrion of our commanders, their selfless devotion to the cause of the Communist
Party and our socialist motherland and by their desire to accomplish their assigned
mission under any conditions.
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the main organizing and directing force in
the Great Patriotic War. It inspired the Soviet people to the struggle with fascism
_ and provided the country with wise and unfailing leadership in this critical period of
its life. Communists were to be found in the front ranks of its fighting men. They
spared neither their blood nor their very lives for its victory.
In carrying out their combat missions, our naval commanders, most of whom were commu-
nists or Komsomol members, as a rule employed active, offensive tactical methods. The
best results were ach ieved by those commanders and crews to whom was alien any mindless
adoption of stereotypical operational decisions or an inclination to temporize, to take
a wait-and-see position in the course of an operation. The victors proved to be *hose
commanders who acted resolutely, demonstrated initiative, boldly forced the enemy to bok
to their will, to their conception of how the battle involved should be fought, who
tried to prevent the enemy from being able to execute a timely maneuver and to employ
his weapons, exhibited creativity, innovativeness, artfullness and keen judgement and
who maintained an unshakeable confidence in the power and strength of their ships'
weapons and crews.
The achievement of surprise in launching an attack played an important role in winning
victory in combat. Surprise was achieved by depriving the enemy of warning, executing
deception measures, taking account of psychological factors and employing new tactical
methods and types of weapons possessing tactical characteristics previously unknown to
the enemy. A number of examples show that surprise in launching an attack was achieved
by undertaking a combat mission under adverse weather or navigational-hydrographical
conditions, conditions in which the enemy believed naval operations to be impossible or
at least highly improbable. This confirms the view that has it that at the basis of
successful naval combat operations together with good fire and tactical training lay
a high state of naval training on the part of borh ship crews and ship commanders and
an ability to navigate and employ weapons effectively under conditions in which the
enemy would consider this unrealistic. A1so playing an important role in operations
against enemy ships and aircraft were skillful combination of f ire and maneuver and an
ability on the part of commanders to exploit to the full the maneuver capabilities of
their ships, which was demonstrated most clearly in combat boat operations along patrol
lines, in attacks on convoys by torpedo boats and in landing amphibious assault forces.
Exploitation of the manuever capabilities of a ship is inseparably associated with a
category of naval art such as swiftness of action. This made it possible to achieve
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an advantage over the enemy in the process of deploying_ships prior to an engagement,
take up a more favorable position from which to employ weapons, seize the initiative
in the course of an operation and then to impose one's will upon the enemy. Rapid
execution of a planned maneuver played a dacisive role in achieving success in torpedo
boat attacks, landing the early waves of an assault force, attacking enemy installa-
tions along his coasts and boats in his ports and bases and in evading attack by enemy
weapons.
Analysis of the actions commanders took shows that.the decisions they made in combaC
were governed not only by the 1~eve1 of their tactical training, but also by their
ideological maturity and their readiness under the conditions of actual combat to be
independent, to demonstrate personal heroism and courage in making decisions, fre-
quently entailing risk but dictated by circumstances, and to assume full responsibility
for the results of the implementation of those decisions in combat.
Experience associated with the execution of force-level combat missions testifies to
~ the enormous role the staffs of these forces played in preparing for combat operations
and assisting force commanders with control of subordinate elements during an opera-
tion. During the phase of preparations for combat operations, staff personnel per-
formed a great many tasks in the way of collecting intelligence information and under-
taking situational analyses, conclusions drawn from which formed the basis upon which
the force commander then developed his concept of the operation. There are a number
of examples which demonstrate that errors in evaluating the enemy had serious conse-
quences and caused un~ustified losses. It was to a substantial degree upon the expe-
rience a force commander and his staff officers had had in determining the true capa-
bilities of subordinate elements under specific conditions, assigning them their mis-
sions and in preparing battle-related documents that depended the effectiveness and
realization of cooperation, the reliability of their control in the course of an opera-
tion and, in the final analysis, the execution of the combat mission itself. Of utmost
importance in the ship or force commander's work in preparing for execution of an as-
signed combat mission was foresight [predvideniye] and, on the basis of.this foresight,
forecasting [prognozirovaniyeJ of the situation and enemy tactics to be anticipated.
In situations involving active enemy resistance it was of great importance to insure
the combat survivability of ships executing the primary mission. Combat survivability
(the capability of a group or grouping of ships of withstanding enemy attack, main-
taining f ighting efficiency and accomplishing their assigned mission) was achieved
primarily by allocating the full range of supporting forces required by the situation
involved and by organizing the cooperation among these forces and between them and
ships executing the primary mission dictated by the situation. The organization of
these combat operations was most effective in the case of Northern Fleet torpedo boat
atta.cks on convoys in support of f leet aviation, in minesweeping operations undertaken
by Red Banner Baltic Fleet minesweepers in the fall of 1943 and during the campaign of
1944 and in landing amphibious assault forces during the strategic offensive carried
through by Soviet forces over the period 1943-1945.
The war years saw combat training continue aboard ships and within units (chast').
It was oriented toward the execution of an assigned combat mission and so made it pos-
sible to focus trainees' attention even more closely upon the special characteristics
of the situation in which the mission was to be carried out and to work out the most
probable variants of operations to be undertaken under one or another set of combat
conditions. In the case of the nonrated and rated personnel, as well as of warrant
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officers, this training was conducted in the form of drills, with the officers in the
form of group exercises and staff drills with the participation of cooperating ships
and units. In individual cases requiring especially close operational cooperation be-
tween ships, aircraft and shore units and subunits (podrazdeleniye), tactical exercises
were conducted in which the ships involved would actually put to sea and engage in com-
bat firing. Experience accumulated during the war demonstrates that, even under combat
operational conditions, properly organized combat training was a most important precvn-
dition of successful accomplishment of assigned combat missions.
There is no place in tactics for any stagnation in thinking, in the general tactical
means and methods of operation applicable in all situations. Experience gained during
the Great Patriotic War confirmed this repeatedly. The appearance among enemy forces
of new weapons or his employment of new tactical methods required an immediate reaction,
the development of new models of shipboard armament, a change in the way we organized
the use of our own forces and immediate improvement in the tactical skills of our ship
and force commanders and staff and directorate [upravleniye] officers. The war con-
firmed one of the most important principles of Soviet military science, namely, that
no types of weaponry, not even the most advanced or sophisticated, will by themselves
bring victory. That required the development and continuous improvement of the modes
and methods by which these weapons were employed. But victory in combat in all cases
went to the man who had mastered his weapon and the tactics involved in its employment
in the given situation and who was at the same time wholeheartedly convinced of the
rightness of the cause he was defending.
Thanks to the CPSU's unflagging concern for strengthening our country's defense, the
revolution in science and technology has generated rapid developments affecting both
the men and the weapons and equipment employed in battle at sea. This has led to
fundamental changes in the tactics used in conducting today's naval warfare. We have
seen sharp increases in the spatial scales on which it is waged, the requirements im-
posed upon both the combat and special support forces involved in an engagement and in
the complexity and importance of control in all phases of the execution of a combat
mission. The appearance of missiles on surface ships has expanded the range of tasks
they have traditionally performed.
Increases in the effective range and power of shipboard weapons have sharply increased
the degree to which the successful accomplishment of a combat mission depends upon the
speed and accuracy with which data on the enemy are transmitted, the organization of
communications between cooperating forces and the quality of control. We have also
seen substantial changes in the methods commanders and staff personnel employ in plan-
ning and organizing for an engagement. Present-day conditions require that we *_ake a
substantially larger number of factors into account than we had to in the last war.
Despite the fact that present-day ship and force commanders and staff officers dispose
of a variety of electronic equipment capable of modeling a situation, analyzing the
information generated, synthesizing a range of operational variants upon the basis of
this information and then selecting the optimum from among them, this equipment cannot
supplant the living thoughi:, will, intelligence and creativity of the human commander
or take into account and consider many of the factors discussed in connection with the
decisions and actions commanders took in specific combat situations.
It would be virtually impossible to model all possible variants of situations a ship
commander might encounter in the course of an engagement or a force commander in con-
trolling his forces from his control station and then to incorporate these variants in
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the logic of a machine. Equipment will not replace the thinking of the commander as
the author and organizer of battle. The formula "tactics are the commander's weapon"
thus remains as valid as it ever was. The commander has been and remains the link in
the chain of control without which victory is impossible. A naval engagement today
will still consist essentially in a f ight between two opposing groupings. Tactical
principles such as massing of forces, anticipating the enemy, surprise in attack~
swiftness of execution and tactical cooperation between a variety of forces thus re-
tain their importance. To apply these principles in combat is the task of the com-
mander. While with the appearance of new types of weapons and equipment in the naval
inventory the content of these principles has changed, it is still of practical value
to look at them in the context of wartime experience, since that permits us to follow
the process of applying theoretical principles and the requirements of tactical docu-
ments under the conditions of actual combat.
FOOTNOTES
1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [On a Leninst Course.
Speeches and ArticlesJ, Vol 2, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p 51.
2. A number of ships and transport ships are listed here, the definite sinking
of which was confirmed by data of both sides.
3. The names of geographical places and population points are given in contem-
porary spelling, their old names are given in parentheses. In examples
where the same name comes up several times, the old name is cited only the
first time.
4. M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, Voyenizdat,
1950, p 190.
COPYRIGHT: Voyenizdat, 1981
8963
cso: 1801/112 END
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