JPRS ID: 10653 JAPAN REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/10653
13 Ju~Y 1982
Ja ~ an Re ort
p p
~ cFeuo 41i82~
FBIS FOR~IGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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i~~?H ~?rr�ic�t,~i. t~tiN: ~~r~r.v
JYRS L/10653
13 July 1982
JAPAN REPORT .
(FOUO 41/82) .
. CONTENTS
MILITARY
Patterns of Strategic Thinking Analyzed ~ ~
(Kisahiko Okazaki; BUNGEI SHUNJU, Apr 82) 1
Changed Nature of U.S.-Japan Securiry Treaty Discussed
(Nobuo Kurokawa Interview; EKONOMISTO, 1 Jun 82) 16
ECONOMIC
- Areas of Friction With United States Studied ~
(NIHON KEIZAI SI~IMBUN, various date,s) 23
' Finance Ministry Plans 5 Percent Budget Cuts in FY 83
(MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 20 Jun 82) 41
~ Japan To Continue ASEAN Aid
~ (MAINICHI bRILY NEWS, 19 Jun 82) 42
ASEAN Wants EC To Take Bigger Role
(MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 19 Jun 82) 44
. Briefs
Industrial Output Decline ~ 45
- Farm Output To Rise . 45
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ~
Space Development Program in Dispute
- (NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBLTN, 9 Jun 82) 46
MITI Works Out Plan for Nuclear Fuel Cycle
(NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, 21 Jun 82) 48
JDA To Develop Optical Fiber Guided Missile
(NIHON KEIZAI 5HIMBUN, 17 Jun 82) 50
NTT Compiles Report on Future Effect of INS on Society
(NIHON KOGYO SHZMBUN, 5 May 82) S.L
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M'()R OMFI('IAI. l1tiM: ONI,Y
M 11.ITARY
PATTERNS OF STRATEGIC THIN~ING ANALYZED
Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Apr 82 pp 362-374
[rirst of serialized articles by Hisahiko Okazaki, former JDA councilor and
presently minister to the United States: "What Is.Strategic Thinking?"]
['I'ext ] Introduction
On the subject of Japan's national strategy, for the first time I feel that
somehow the discussion sho~uld not end in polemics.
Despite the many postwar debates on defense, with allowances for gains ar~d
losses of strength for both the supporting and opposing arguments, there is
hardly any meeting of the minds. This phenomenon has intrigued me for many
years, even making me wonder if there is some flaw in the democracy of Japan,
but in the course of listening to sociologists and cultural anthropologists,
I have learned that the Japar~ese people have somewhat of a weak line of
thinking with regard to ~ogical subjects.
From the stanc!point of designing and improving an established product, the
Japanese people can be said to be the world's greatest in displaying their
talents, but if they cannot feel with their skin, the Japanese cannot readily
understand; thus, if they are asked to build a structure with logical confor-
mance in a�:acant place, they w~ll show tendencies of being perplexed in the
midst of others. Worse yet, if construction is undertaken after a consensus
vote, then it is practically an impossible task.
- Japan's defense setup and its supporting doctrines were totally abandoned
with the surrender, and a fresh start was made. Because relations with the
former military were totally severed, the concepts were considered an~ew. And
regarding war, its time of occurrence, and the course of events, the thinkii:g
was that it may not occur for many years, so a considerable amount of logical
abstract thought became necessary.
~nd for this, we must backtrack to discuss such points as what are we defend-
ing'?" and "defending against what?" These questions per se are not trouble-
some, but there were tendencies on the one hand to formulate theoretical con-
sensus by dialog, like the Greek philosophers, but on the other hand to first
define an individual political stance and, for its justificution, to self-
propagate the structure of "logic."
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It~cently there have heen two situations wh3.cn have caused me to reanalyze what
is meant to the Japanese by logic.
One situation involved a noted political s~:ientist who shocked me with the
statement: "If Japan cannot furnish the d=fense effort that is expected by the
United States, it should not agree with the United States on the estimate of
the military situation in the Far East, which is the prerequisite." I asKed
him, "In other words, your estimate is that Japan, in its present state, can
muster a defense strength of a size that can counterbalance that of the poten-
tial Soviet threat?" And after parrying with him, I was doubly shocked to
learn that this is what he meant. His explanation was that, if such action
were. not taken, "the logical adjustment would be gone."
This cannot be thought of as "logical adjustment. Rather, with this sort of
thinking, in the present international situation,,'an objective Japanese defense
strategy taat can be considered to be adequate could never be formulated.
ncknowled~;ing the severity of international relations and lamenting the inade-
quacy oC military preparedness because of domestic limitat~ons are phenomena
ttlat have plagued all countries in both ancient and modern times. At the
U.S.-Japan high-level meetings held today, while recogriizing the severity of
the si~uation, Japan nas explained that it cannot attain the level expected by
the United States, but in the long run, honest?y citing such reasons as the
~ constitutional limitation, the need for national consensus, and the economic
situation will be healthy for the relationship of trust between the two nations.
T~ie other situation involved a noted economist who remarked: "In my estimation,
Japan's defense budget will eventually reach 1.5 or 2 percent of the GNP, and
as a result I think that Japan's defense system ~rI.ll be in good shape and that
cooperation with the United States will be excel~ent. However, I shall continue
. to emphasize 1 percent of the GNP. Unless a balance is maintained in this
manner, the grip on the defense budget wi.ll be lost, leading to unlimited and
huge figures."
Even while reasoning that the appropriate point for achieving balance can be
- reached, this individual instead thinks of hanging onto the o:her party to
achieve a balance for the entire country. While boldly tolerating the spiritual
insult of the accusation that your position is illogical," made by one who is
~ for attaining propriety, this indivirlual, would fulfill r_he role of assuming
the balance for the entire country. This might even be considered to be a
noble attitude; however, by holding on to this view, the concurrence of the
people, which is dependent upon logical adjustment, will never be achieved.
After all, by stating only that which everyone believes to be the whole truth,
national concurrence with objective adequacy will naturally spring forth mithin
wtiich the brakes can be made, based on true democracy. Such remarks as "truth-
- fully, this is the way, but if presented, the public will riot," or "the public
will be fearful of the Soviet Union, and the nation will become like Finland,
lead to a"sense of balance" because "nothing further should be said," but this
- is a mistrust of the people's judgment and a contradiction of the basic rule of
democracy. The late Etsusaburo Shiina had a favorite saying, "Of the people,
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the wise are foolish and the foolish wise," and the sincerity of the masses
cannot be ignored. By self-righteously manipulating information with an
elitist complex that "the situation is okay because I am an inte112ctual, but
the others will turn rightist," there is the ~'anger of missing the point.
Even by re~:iewing the above two situations, the feeling of hopelessness per-
vades on the di~ficulty of solving problems only through discussions that are
based on objective fact~ and logical adjustments here in Japan.
As a trial, I'd like to begin with Japanese history and geography, which are the
most basic realities in strategic theory. This means rendering a deliberate
stu3y of Japan's strategic environment by reveiwing Japan's history.
Uf course, my interpretation of history can lead to various counterarguments,
which I welcome. There will be some common ground, but the discussion will be
from the basic standpoints of history and geography, which no one can avoid
v~hen pondering Japan's security.
Even from the standpoint of the importance of intelligence ("Th~ Nation and
Intelligence, published in BUNGEI ~HUNJU), which is my pet theory, tl-~is is
thc frontal attack. It is true that "if the points at issue are all under-
stood, then it's the same as the issue's being half solved." Thus, if the
objective situation is minutely analyzed and evaluated, its counteY�measures
. will naturally be formulated.
In studying the big problem of Japan's national strategy, the conventional
methodology is to gain a complete understanding of the most basic subjectsa
Japan's history and geography.
The strategic environment of Japan, up until the modern era, was one of
stabiliza*ion, which is considered rare in the annals of world history.
But the situation of its Asian neighbors underwent all sorts of changes. As
for tne history of China, the 18th Chronicle accounts for the fall of the Sung
Dynasty, and the subsequent Mongol, Ming, and Manchu dynasties are covered in
the 21st Chronicle, which repeats tl~e rise and fall of governments. During
that period, aside from the conquest of the country by the gods' chosen
people, said to be in the days of prehistory, Japan was,not once subjugated
by a foreign invader, and the imperial lineage was never changed. Before the
war, this was historically viewed as being unparalleled in the history of all
~ n:itions, and the matter of this being one of the bases of Japan's ultranation-
;ili5m is still fresh in my memory.
~ 'l'iie ~~remodern era is defined as that period before the occurrence of two large
strategic environmentaZ events. One is China's loss of its dominant role in
the Far East, and the other is, as a re5u1~ of the incursion of the Western
~ powers in the Far East, the Wester.n countries' domination of the Pacific Ocean
and Siberia, which until then had strategically been a vacuum.
~s for the f actors which allowad for ~eace in Japan as an exception in the
environment of the premodern era, the ~eographical location of Japan is, ~aith-
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~ c,ul :~uestion, prominent; added to this were the peculiar nature of the Chinese
~n?pire and the role perrormed by the peculiar ethnicity of the people of the
Korean Peninsula during the same period. I hope to describe th~se events in
sequence.
An Island Country
As for geographical peculiarities, I shall ;iispense with such stock descriptions
- as Japan's being s~srrounded by water or hit by~many typhoons, which is common
knowledge, but in discussing Japan's geographical peculiarities it would be
instructive to compare the experiences of the Korean people, who closely resemble
the Japanese ethnically, with that of the Japanese people at historically about
the same time on the contin.ent.
'Co do this, it would be most practical to recount the Mongol invasion, which in
history was the single formidable invasion against Japan.
The Mongol invasion of Koryo was a totally unjust act, for at the time of the
annihilation of Khitan [the Tartars), which lay between the two countries, the
Mongols were allied with Koryo, but after the annihilation of Khitan, the Mongols
ordered Koryo to submit and furnish tributes, and the attitude and actions of
the messenger at the time were extremely insulting, for the Koryo king was not
even treated ~s royalty. Even so, Koryo was tolerant and maintained peace by
offering large tributes annually, but this was practised only during the period
when the Mongols attacked India and to the west of China and for gold, after
which, in defiance of the incYdent 6 years earlier, they began the invasion of
Koryo and executed a great massacre. Tokimune Hojo's s~ashing of the Mongol
envoy may be seen as an outrageous act that flaunted international etiquette,
but if the actions of the Mongols toward Koryo 80 years earlier were accurately
transmitted, it was either to submit and be treated like animals and Le pillaged,
or to resort to war. Cornered in a point of no return situation, it was a
reasonable choice to unify public opinion for resistance.
The ~overnment of the Koryo regime entrenched itself on Jianghua Island, and
the Mongol forces, which could not wage sea warfare, became disheartened at
- conducting a siege for 30 years. But outside of Jianghua Island, the Korean
Peninsula was subjected to violence and pillage by the Mongol soldiers, and for
30 years the people of Koryo we~e subjected to cruelties that defied description.
tlccording to the record of the invasion of 1252, "The Mongols captured 206,800
men and women, and those to be shot should not be counted. Lands traveled over
will be burned to the ground."
Citing the above as an example, a South Korean remarked: "Regardless of his
quibblings, a.Japanese person is indebted to his country, but this relationship
is lacking for South Koreans. Even in the above situation, the people were
forsaken. It follows that the people's outlook on nationalism will naturally
change. People from different countries will have a history, traditions and,
theref.ore, nationalism tha.t differ. Dissimilarities vis-a-vis right and wrong
~rc two seParate values, but the Japanese have a bad habit of mixing the two."
'l't~r fact that .Japan has not even once been subjugated by another race, compared
tc~ the cruelties suffered by the people of the Korean Peninsula, has been the
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basis for the optimistic and easygoing attitlide of the Japanese, 4espite the
severity of international politics.
I have received letters from various people on basic defense arguments, and
these letters indicate that those who hold the deepest fear of the Soviet
threat are the ones who e::perienced the occupation of Manchuria by the Soviet
~rmy at the time of the surrender. Bur because the vast ma~ority of thA
.lapanese people experienced only the U.S. occupation, their image of surrender
and occupation is a mild one.
"Learning from experience is only for the fool: others will learn from history,"
said Bismarck, but in reality what is difficult is not learning from history,
but learniag from one's countrymen during the contemporary period.
During the Mongol invasion, the people of Tsushima Island were captured, and
it was related that the women had their palms pierced and were strung alongside
the ships, leading to the conjecture that "mugoi," which means atrocious, was
: a homonymous derivation from "Mongoi," or related to the Mongols; however, as
with the experiences in Manchuria, this was not a totally national experience.
Even during the Korean War, when the American and Korean forces were driven to
the beachhead of Pusan, the people in Tokyo hardly reacted, whereas the feeling
of danger was reportedly heightened in northern Kyushu and Yamaguchi Prefecture;
some people regarded this as a throwback to the Mongol invasion. It is probably
true that the memorie~ of a war will linger for many centuries.
'I'he probability of an invading army's being totally annihilated by a typhoon is
really not great, but when historically the only two formidable invasions of
.lapan both met such disasters, then it is understandable why the Japanese are
so confident of being lucky. Nationalistic differences exist, ~ust as some
iridividuals are cor.fident of being lucky while others are not.
South Korea's high-level development start~d at the beginning of the 1970 decade,
and its actual performance up until October 1973 showed astounding.statistics,
such as a GNP which was 20 percent greater than that of the previous year and
inflation of less than 3 percent, but in October the Middle Eas~ war and the oil
shock occurred. I recall being deeply struck at that time when a South Korean
bureaucrat remarked, while looking skyward: "The people of South Korea have
tiever been favored by the gods. These events occurred just when South Korea had
started its high-level development."
I have even heard the remark that South Korea is unlucky in that, had the
Japanese surrender taken place 3 months earlier, South Korea would have been
spared being partitioned.
'I'licre is a vast difference with a people who hope for the divine wind to blow
~~medciy. I:ven now, tlte .Tapanese understand the expression of the severity of
the international environment, but they cannot grasp the true feeling. Their
aptimism is found in tl~e deep-rooted feeling that "things will turn out right."
~t a symposium on the 75th anniversary celebration of the Japan Society in New ~
York, an American scholar remarked, "The United States is not that vulnerable,
yet feels insecure, whereas Japan is vulnerable, yet shows no insecurity. What
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i5 ti~c explanation?" I thought his statement truly hit the nail on the head.
'1'I?e statement made by the .lapanese political scientist whom I mentioned earlier
is, unreasonable from the standpoint of the objective assessment of the Soviet
threat's being countered by Japan, but it is also accurate as a statement
reflecting the feeling that "like the Americans, the Japanese people do not
feel the threat of the Soviet Union." Whether or not a challenge can be made
to this statement of feeling is a separate problem.
Compared with the rest of the world, the Japanese people have an extreme lack
of experie~ce. An individual and a state both become wiser with experience,
and the fac~ that the Chinese and even the South Korean people look down upon
"the Japanese as being immature" calls for seif-discipline.
Yet it can't be helped if one lacks experience, and there's no other way but
� to learn f rom history.
There is no guarantee how long good fortune will continue, and there's no such
restriction that Japan will experience in the future only what has already
occurred in her past. Therefore it is essential to refer to the history of
all ages and countries.
~In the document containing a discussion between Hizennokami Tsutsui and Saemon
Kawaji on the policy toward Russia during the late days of the Tikugawa Shogunate,
with reference to the situation on the Russian entry into Sakhalin it was
written, There are no precedents on this matter in Japan. There is no other
way but to follow the example of the Tang Dynasty." The example given was
that the Han and Tang dynasties, when weak, adopted a po:.icy of appeasement
with the aliens and, upon becoming strong, conquered them, thereby inferring
that Japan can be friendly only until she gains strength. Even with this sort
of ~istorical theory, Japan was above having a doctrine of expelling foreigners
while operating Lnder a geocentric theory of Japan's being the center because
it had never received any contemptuous act by a foreign country since its
founding.
As for thoughts on strategic theory, the assertion that strategic theory means
the study and interpretation of military history is accepted popularly as the
orthodox way of thinking. Napoleon stated, "One should repeatedly read the
tactics of the great leaders from Aler.ander to Frederick." Sun Tzu and Clause-
witz compiled their historical experiences in abstract form, but in the case of
Clausewitz they were so full of German idealism that on several matters, doubts
suci~ as "some of the ideas are incomprehensible" were expressed by strategists
in later generations.
l:ven to this day, I have held the belief tY:at politics cannot be theorized or
quantified. Since war certainly is "an extension of politics by another means,"
as Clausewitz stated, it is the same as politics. Although I talk here of dis-
cussing a strategic theory, I have no intention whatsoe~:er of introducing a new
theory, and I only want to mull over and ruminate on war and the environment
surrounding Japan from the strategic viewpoint.
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Pax Sina
It is said that the long period of Japanese stability up until the modern era
was attributable not only to the geographical environment but to the interna-
tional order in East Asia, with the Chinese Empire as the focus.
The expression Pax Sina (the state of maintaining peace under Chinese supremacy)
ha~ never been used, but it can be said that the period in which peace was
maintainecl in Japan and the Korean Peninsula, because it worked effectively,
was far longer than the pe:-iod of effectiveness of Pax Romana or Pax Britannica,
and, ~r~oreover, was more stdble.
The first qualification of Pax Sina was China's overwhelming supremacy. The
mlgnitude of its land and population, cultural standard stemming from its long
l~istory, political strength, economic strength, and miiitary power overshadowed
any oF its neighboring countries. Chinese supremacy gave no room for argument;
unaware of this, sorne of the roguish countries that were absorbed by the Han
Dynasty, until later years, threw their weight around without k~iowing their
real ability, thereby remaining in history as examples of ignorance and self-
conceit.
The second qualification was the suzerain-clan relationship peculiar to China;
because of its complexity, requiring specialized research, I shall abstain from
deep involvement. With tl~e various races in the area, China generally stopped
at requiring suzerainty, and as long as China was not threatened, conquest was
not resorted to. Except for a short period, Japan was never subjected tu
suzerainty, but the blessing was that China did not favor mounting foreign
expeditions. '
_ When, at the beginning of the Meiji Era, Japan prohibited the ruler of the
Ryukyu Islands from paying tribute to the Manchu Dynasty, in tears he sought help
from the Manchus. Pianchu Minister to Japan Ho Ju-Chang counseled, "If Japan is
allowed to take the Ryukyus, it will seek Korea next. Right now, Japan is ex-
hausted from waging the Southwest War, and so China will succeed if it inter-
venes," Li Hung-chang replied, "A country which is absorbed in expeditions to
seek fame will win insignificant tributes from small countries." (Note: Wang
Yun-sheng, "60 Year History of Sino-Japane: Foreign Diplomacy." Same reference
work for Li Hung-chang hereafter.) Even at is time, war between Japan and,
China could have occurred if talks between t~.e two countries had failed and
China had used force, but China exercised self-restraint and the Ryukyu problem
was settled on the basis of Japan's fait accompli. This was an example of ti?e
or~;~inization oE Pax Sina.
Nevertl~el.ess, the Manchu Dynasty gradually began to lose its neighboring terri-
t~r.y and realized this loss during the final stage of Pax Sina. In 1885, after
the clash between Great Britain and the Soviet Union on the Afghanistan issue,
(:reat Britain asked for the lease of Keomunto, located south of the Korean
1'eninsula, with the intention of bottling up the Russian fleet in Vladivostok.
llsked for guidance by the Korean Government, Li Hung-chang replied: "That
isl.~ind is referred to as Arejima. Your country may think nothing of it, but at
c~ne time even Hong Kong had only a few fishermen's huts, while today it is a
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pr~minent center commandin~ a key position in the South [China] Saa." He told
Kc~rca to declinc the request, with the warning that if the ledse were thought-
lessly given, Russia and J apan would make similar requests. This judgment was
indeed correct, but then China itself should have been aware of it much sooner.
At ai.y rate, a large country possessing overwhelming strength knows about self-
restraint. If so, then it is a self-evident truth that stable peace can be
maintained.
Prevailing among scholars of international politics is the thinkinQ *_~a~ n:
effectivc means of maintaining peace is to have a balance of ~ower, but from
way back and up to the present, I have doubts as to its ipplicability to the
present world situation. It is true that there have been periods in which
peace was maintained by a balance ~~f power--such as in Europe during the 19th
century, Italy during the Renaissance and, according to the Chronicles of Lu,
with the Warring States of China, when several equally strong states formed a
confederacy, whenever possible--but in ea~h instance peace was maintained only
for several decades.
A truly long peace la~ts only w'hen there is an overwhelming difference in
strength, like the Pax Romana; I think the postwar Pax Americana was the same
kind of thing. For this reason, I have ~zen concerned recently about the
narrowing of the gap in strength between the United States and the Soviet Union.
But let us consider this topic later.
As for a large country's exerciGing self-restraint, this was not practised con-
sistently in t?~e case of the history of the Han race. Originally the Han race
had its base in the middle reaches of the Yellow River, and from there it con-
quered the different races in all directions and assimilated them. It is a
race that expanded by adding its couquests to its domain.
Ancient China saw its peak in expansionism with the era of the Han Dynasty.
The Han feudal empire struck at Mo Pai, subjugated Ling Nan, and conquered the
territories where most of the descendants of the Hat~ race presently live. As
for the Korean Peninsula, the northern half was conquered and, instead of being
made a tributary state, was divided into districts and provinces under direct
supervision.
Historical precedents are ind~~ed frightening. The Korean intervention by the
'Can~; founder was reportedly made in order to revive the district and province
system of the Han Dynasty. Iri 18$2, Chang Pei-lun advocated for an expedition
to ~~l~e east (conquest of Japan), but at the same time, in a letter to Li Hung-
ct~~ng, he urged the abolition of Korea as a country and its subjection into
districts and provinces, in the manner of the Han Dynasty.
[n other words, China of t}ie Han Dynasty was one of th~e conquering empires
Cound throughout history, and the only reascn the southern half of the Korean
I'eninsula and .Iapan were not c~nquered was because of the long geographical
distance.
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Resistance of the Korean Race
China's Choughts on the unworthiness of foreign expeditions were e~tablished
from around the Sui and Tang eras, when Japan appeared as a unif?ed nation, but
= it is not an exaggeration to say that the main reason for the establishment of
this thougnt w~s the resistance of the Korean race.
Cvents during that era can be u~:derstood by reading accounts of that period in
t'he abbreviated 18th Chronicle.
According to Emperor Yang of the Sui Dynasty, In the 7th Year of the Great
Achieven.en~, the emperor became a general, recruited soldiers, and attacked
Koryo. Several hundr~~ thousand laborers wor'~ed ceaselessly day and night to
ship rice, and the dead piled up like pillows. The masses w~re destitute, and
for the fi~st time, gangs of robbers operated." The rest was devo.ted to a
description of the rapid decline of the Sui empire, in the unique tempo of the
abbreviated 18th Chronicle.
T}~e military prowess of the Kokuryo at this time was indeed admirable. General
Gulchimundeok attacked, ~-hen deceptively escaped; he then lured the Sui forces
deep as far as Pyongyang Castle, and when the battle-weary Sui forces retreated
from the secure Pyongyang Castle and were halfway across the Changjin River,
the ~eneral attacked and won a great victory, reducing the expeditionary army
of 305,000 soldiers (reported to be a million) to a mere 2,700.
,
The conquest of Koryo by the founder of ttie Tang Dynasty was described in the
abbreviated 18th Chronicle as follows: "The expeditionary force captured 10
forts, brought 70,000 prisoners back to Tang, and beheaded more than 40,000
soldiers in three great battles; but 7,000 of their own troops were lost and
7 or 8 of every 10 horses died, and still the objectives were not fulfilled.
'Phe founder was deeply regretful and remarked that if Wei Cheng were alive,
he would not have approved the expedition." Thus, honor was restored to the
famous lord Wei Cheng, who had previously lost favor.
The founder of the Tang Dynasty was such a great leader trhat he is considered
to be the greatest among all the emperors in the hiGtory of China. Even in the
abbreviated 18th Chronicle, praises are lavi�had on him for his achievements,
character, and stature, but added to the conclusion of the chapter on the founder
is the statement: "At the time of the Eastern expeditian, taken in his decli-
nin~ years, he did not heed the admonition of Chu Sui-liang."
1'c,rn?~ deploring forei~n expeditions are found in Tu Fu. The thinking that
foreign expeditions are unworthy was established in China just a~out the time
c~f the befiinning of ~enuine international relations between Japan and the main-
land. 'Chis again, for .lapan, was an extremely fortuitous event.
i?xc:ellent Defensive Capability
'I'iie Koreans, in many respects, are a strange race.. First of all, they are an
:~xtremely introverted race, and historically they have never undertaken an ex-
~ pansionist policy. According to their records, Silla, during the five centuries
~if.ter its founding, was attacked by the Japanese o*~ 20 occasions. There was no
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record o( any pl~in by Silla to attack Japan. After the failure of the Mongol
inva5ion, on the contrary, the country was so h~avily ravaged by Japanese
pirates that this was considered to be one reason for the downfa~l of the Koryo
empire. It was on the defensive throughout, and the only offensive was the
Tsushima Island attack in 1419.
' Feelings of grievance were deeply expressed when patriot Park Chung-hi remarked:
"Our 5,000-year history, in a nutshell, is one of conservatism and stagnation.
Was there ever a time in our history when we crossed the border to rule others?
This sort of history is fit to be burned."
On the other hand, when it came to ~lefensive war, they demonstrated an amazing
capability.
Ranked alongside the previously described victory gained by Eulchimundeok of
Koryo over the Sui army was the victory gained by General Kang Kam-chan when
he confronted the invading Khitan force of 100,000 in the years 1018 and 1019
with the clever strategy of damming the river with cowhide, de.`.eating them with
- one swift action and leaving them with only a few thousand sur~.�ivors. Stated
_ in terms of Japanese history, it was comparable to the Japan Sea naval battle,
- and this significantly decisive victory has remained deep in the hearts of the
Korean people.
Also outstanding for its fighting ~~alor was the Silla army, which confr.onted
the Tang army for 7 years and survived without yielding victory to the Tang.
What is the explanation for all this? It is probably attributable to the mold
assumed early as a nation from among the various Eastern barbarian countries
and the ability to caage organized resistance against inva3ing forces because
of [the people's] high cultural level, but, as is often quoted in the treatises
and other writings of the great scholar Choi Nam-sun, who drafted the 3-1 de-
claration on the peculiarities of the Korean people, there is something special
about the belief in the purity of a race; in other words, in the exclusion of
- other races.
One is probably the difference in language. The languages of the people located
south of China and down to Thailand are of the same strain in tonal con5istency
with the Chinese sound, and are therefore easily assimilable with that of China,
wher~as the Korean language, like Japanese, has a monotone pronunciation and
cnnnot be mixed with Chinese. With this sort of people, the Han race would fare
b~~:~t by banishin~ them to the northern deserts, like the Huns an~ the Mongolians,
or, as happened to the Kokuryo people, to deport them to various sections of
China; otherwise, the best solution would be to maintain a suzerain-t7_.'~utary
,tate relationship.
On the other hand, this was a country with a geographical environment indispen-
sable to a part of Pax Sina, and so it was under terms from the standpoint of
international politics in which foreign conq_uests were unthinkable. Tt~e repar-
~itions tlle Kokuryo gained after defeating the Sui army were returned as tribute
to the Sui, as was the case with the reparations Silla obtained on achieving
victory in the Tang-Silla War. The same thing happened with the reparations
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Vic�tnam ~;ained when it repulsed the great army of the Mongols. Since an attack
- c~n China meant the conquest of more than 400 provinces and of eventual defeat
and death, the import thing was to reach peace at the earliest moment and to
establish a stable national relationship.
Because of such dangerous conditions, whereby defe~:t would mean destruction
of the race and a victory for the suzerain-vassal relationship, venturir_g out-
ward was almost unthinkable.
What Marshal Manner~eim, hero of Finland, stated during the latter part of the
Russo-Finnish War is the same thing: "Cease-fire is the supreme order. If
_ the Finnish Army collapses, there won't be any cease-fire." A defeat would
spell the destruction of free Fir~land, whereas the victory gained from heroic
resistance led to the so-called Finlandization. Such a vast difference in the
strength and size of countries can mean a suzerain relationship or the birth
of a form like Finlandization.
Such being the facts, a country having no plan or capacity to wage a foreign
invasion, but on the other hand having the will to fearlessly resist any threat
from the north, lies between Japan and the mainland. What better condit~ons can
be Eound for the security of Japan!
I tirmly believe that, even if the events have not surfaced in the pages of
history, there have been cases of the Korpan race's having saved Japan from
potential danger. If Kokuryo had collapsed and the Sui forces had overrun the
entire Korean Peninsula, imagine what could have happened. Prince Shotoku
said: "To the emperor from where the s~.:~ rises, to the emperor to where the
sun sets, I send calligraphy. In goo~ health." (Wang Yun-sher~g wrote that in
defiance to China, Japan said: "tieginning with what appeared in the eitterprise
for equal customs.") One cou:.d readily imagine the attitude toward Japan taken
i~y the angry Emperior Yang of Sui when he replied, "The writing of the barbarian
is impudent." Even after victory over the Sui forces, the strong Kokuryo ex-
tended vassal courtesie~ with tributes in order to maintain peace in the strate-
gic environment of Ea~c Asia, whereas Japan's naivete was fraught ~aith danger.
The same thing can t,e said about the resistance of the Koryo toward Khitan.
Because Khitan was !.iot inferior to the Mongolians as an expansionist country, ~
the possibility existed that the same thing that happened to the M~ngol in-
va5ion would occur if the Korean Peninsula had been totally conquered. At that .
time, the Toi bandits were connected with the Jurchen tribe along the maritime
province, wl~ich ha~.i been subjugated by Khitan. The extent of the connection
between the southern drive of Khitan and the Toi invasion was not known, but
Kyushu had been attacked, in the same year and with the flourishing of racial
activities in Northeast Asia the situation was filled with danger, and so it
is said that the Koryo resistance saved Japan.
'I'hi~ collapse of the strategic balance that Japan enjoyed under these conditions
c~~�curred after tlie Paik Chon River event, and during the 1,200 years up until
Clie modern era, there were only the 10-year period before and after the Mongol
inv~~sion ancl tlie 10-year period of Hideyoshi's expedition to Korea.
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~ti lur ti~~ Mongol invaston, least two of the conditions for maintaining the
balance with Japan were broken. One was the irrefutable fact that in the 1,200-
year history, this was the only time that a major power did not exercise self-
_ restraint.
The other reason was that the Korean Peninsula did not fulfill its role as a
buffer state. .
Actually, in the history of the Far East, this was the only time that the main-
- land China forcE~ ever rPached the southern section of the Korean Peninsula.
After the defeat at ?'ai?; Chon River, Japan prepared for the Tang invasion by
manning Tsushima, Ichig~, and Chikuji with military guards and signal flares,
and building forts in various areas. But after defeating the Paekje forces in
southern Korea, the Tang army went northward to meet and defeat the Kokuryo
forces, after which it was engaged in disposing of Paekje territory. Tt~en the
war between Tang and Silla began; just north of what is today's demarcation
(cease-fire) line, the Silla forces pinned down the Tang forces and thereby did
not permit them to enter the southern part of Korea. As related previously,
in the beginning the Tang empire was an ordinary expansionist empire, and there-
fore if Tang had conquered Silla, it is reasonable to imagine that Japan would
have been next. Even today, it is said that there are records on the repairs
of military ships for use by the Tang forces in striking Japan after Paik Chon.
It is said that the battle between Tang and Silla was a propitious event for
Japan that surpassed even the divine winds.
After that, none of t�e continental forces during the Sung, Khi~an, Ming, and
Manchu periods eve~r reached the southern part of the peninsula. The forces
during the Korean War went almost as far south as the Mongol invasion, and,
like the Koryo during the Mongol invasion, Syngman Rhee's government could not
put up a speedy resistance in the face of overwhelming odds and was driven by
the North Korean Army to the western half of the beach in the south, but after
that, the UN Forces held the beachl~ead at Pusan and counterattacked.
From this, therefore, [we can see that] if a major power on the continent with
expansionist thoughts or an ordi,nary major power with no scruples about sending
a foreign expedition should appear and, after the collapse of resistance in the
southern party of the Korean Peninsula, if the forces of that major power should
reach the southern part, the balance in the Far East would collapse and Japan
would be threatened with danger. What would then be cons~dered as a matter of
course would remain as a truth in Japan's strategic environment.
Ultimately we return to the strategic importance of the southern half of the
Korean Peninsula. I shall delve into the subject later, but prior to the Russo-
Japanese ~'ar, estimates as to whether Japan would truly engage in war with
Russia hinged on one factor, and that was whether Russia would advance to the
soutf~ern part of the peninsula. This geographical condition was tied in with
t}ie thinking during the return of Okinawa when the Sato-Nixon joint statement
mentioned; "The security of South Korea is essential to the security of Japan;"
.ind tllis is still valid today.
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~
Of course, seizure of the southern gart of the peninsula does not mean the
destruction of Japan, but the crucial situation for Japan would then begin.
~c�tu~lly, when the continental power is overwhelmingly strong and defiance is
clil~I icult, the Ic~tis oC the southern part of the peninsula as a buffer beeomes a
rec~listic situation, but in such a case, as with the Mongol invasion or after
the Paik Chon event, western Japan should be fortified ~nd the need would aris~
for mobilization preparedness throughout the nation. The inauguration of the
police reserve force, predece~sor of the Salf-Defense Forces, was ordered by
General MacArthur 2 weeks after the outbreak of the Korean War.
Past or present, it is the same, for in the event the naval and air bases on
the southern part of the peninsula should fall into the: hands of a nonfriendly
force, then the capacity for air defense for supremacy of the sea, and for
prevention of a landing, and in turn the entire defense setup, which Japan would
rave to supplement, would have to undergo a drastic change in both quality and
quantity from that of the present.
I,ack of Stracegic Thinking
Hideyoshi's dispatch of an expeditionary force to Korea was an example of an
offensive abroad emanating from Japan, and it has no direct bearing on Japan's
defense strategy, which is stri~tl.y defensive, so coverage of that will be
omitted until later, but one thing that must be pointed out is that, in the case
of both the expeditionary force to Korea and the Paik Chon event, Japan was
overconfident of its combat capabi:.;ty, while its strategy was astonishingly
crude; in other words, there was total lack of intelligence and strategy.
As for the use of Korea, Yukinaga Konishi had wanted to deceive Hideyoshi by
talking at an appropriate place, and Ming supporters had succeeued with their
plot; therefore, from the beginning Hideyoshi was blind, as far as strategic
intelligence is concerned, which was regrettable. But be that as it may, with
only a force of 150,000 troops, his strategy was just to keep advancing in order
to destroy the great Ming empire. Pitifully, this [strategy] lacked policy
and substance. At home, a Japanese force would display its abilities with a
superior field battle or siege, depending on the situation, but in waging a
full--scale war, it placed importance on its fighting capabilities and neglected
intelligence and strategy. At that time, a Ming spy wrote a report to the
Imperial C~urt that the Japanese possess dauntless courage, but in all matters
they lack planning ability--an unavoidable situatioa~.
According to historical records, the reason for dispatching a force to the Paik
Cl~on Itiver was merely, "Since ancient days, when help is sought, it is only
natural to render help." As [this force] was engaging the allied forces of the
~;reat Tan~; Dynasty and Silla, however, this explanation was obviously naive.
I:ven on the battle front, without considering the situation, the Japanese met
the 'Cang army head-on, using the tactic; "If we take the initiative and attack,
the enemy will naturally run away." If it should end in defeat, then it couldn't
be helped; but even afterward, nothing was done to cope with the international
situation. Strengthening the defenses of the western provinces after the defeat
w:~s to be expected, but Japan made no effort to take advantage of the fact that
:ifter the invasion, it took Silla and Tang 5 years to defeat Kokuryo, after which
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the. Tang-Silla War ra~ed for 7 years. Japan was in no mood to take advantage
~f it. rrom the standPoint of power politics, the opportunity was there to
mount ~i pincer attack with Tang against the archenemy Silla, but no sooner had
the Kokuryo been defeated than Dae Kak Woo Kim Kyung Shin of Silla made t?1e
diplomatic move of offering huge gifts as tribute to Japan, which was so
flattered that it abandoned its peninsula policy.
The Strategy of Fulfilling One's Duty
The end resulr was that Japan got a respite when Si11a and Tang fought each
other, and since it had maintained fYiendly relations with both Silla and Tang,
diplomatically the moves were said to be excellent, but it is hard to believe
that decisions were based on deep thought. In other words, after that, Silla
won it~ the Tang-Silla War, recei~�ed an imperial decree from Emperor Hsuan, had
its national boundary establis'-~::d south of the Ta Tung River, and no longer had
to kowtow to Japan, Silla negl~~~~ted maintaining relations with Japan, whereupon
.Japan uecame infuriated and prepared to send an expedition. The expedition was
abandoned after mobilization, but if the expedition had been sent, it would
have encountered trouble, because the Tang-Silla relationship was one of a
tioneymoon, ~nd t~e disturbance at An Lu Shan had been quelled, on top of which
the relationship with the Tang eould have been ruined.
When thz power rE~lationship is to Japan's advantage and the other country
blunders, Japan :is gleeful and does not send an expedition. But if there is a
turnabout in the power relationship and the other country assumes an overbear-
~ ing attitude, then Japan gets irked and wants to attack. There's no estimate
of the situation and no strategy, but only frightfully naive thinking.
It's a wonder that Japan has lasted for 1,200 years. Such a history would be
unthinkable with a country having a tough international environment. Even
today, this sort of historical tradition must 'ue in the background of concepts ~
that crop up periodically vis-a-vis the building of Japan's strategy, which
is centered on domestic affairs and is unrelated to the objective military
balance in the environs of Japan.
It is pointed out that, in general, the fault with the former military of Japan
was in not having the An~;lo-Saxon :.~pe of strategy of emphasizirig intelligence,
but in adopting the Ploysen-type strategy of the execution of duty. In other
' words, instead of fighting aiter determining whether victory was attainable,
the strategy involved how best to eYecute one's duty with the given military.
strength. The details wiil be omitted here, but during the Pacific War, be-
ca~rse of the utter disregard fur the differences in the combat strength of the
oppusing Forces and in the supply capabilities, several tens of thousands of
com~etent soldiers participated in thoughtless battles in the execution of
their duties and were killed.
Tn retrospect, the lack of regard for objective analysis may already have been
Present as part oE the thinking even at the beginning of the Pacific War--"that
of crossing the Rubicon"; this is attributable not only to the Ploysen influen~e
aCter the Meiji era, but possibly also to the Japanese race's being nurtured in
the favorable environment of an island country, to its being uncommonly inex-
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~>~~ri~~uc~~cl ccnnparcd wich the [rest of the] world, and to the naivete stemming
tliereCrom, wnich led to disinterest in foreign intelligence, and which in a
bigger sense resulted in a lack of strategic thinking.
It is said: "The world's strongest military force is one which consists of
American generals, German ofi:ic~rs, and Japanese noncommissioned officers."
Along with complimenting the average height of the Japanese people, this state-
ment is critical or the lack of strategic thinking based on intelligence--even
worse than the Germans in this respect--and therefore warrants self-disciplining.
(This series represents the writer's personal views and in no way reflects
the views of the government.) .
Strategic Significance of the Korean Peninsula
~"~i~S.im~F~~~~~~~ KeY:
-ti: -
"i _ (~e,~-~----- ~ 1. Sui
~ t~.'.~ �1
_ ; , ~ . ~ i ( 5 ) ~ ; ~'l~ ) 2 . Kokuryu
~ 2~ ~ ~6~ ~ ` ~ 3. PaE~cje
~ . . ~ 4. Silla
~ , ~7 I ~,7 / ~
~ ~ ,rt , l ie~ ~ 5 . Tang
I,. ~ I 6. Kokuryo
~ , _ z.,,,, ; ~ 7 . Paekj e
' ~,~7 ~J'~~ ~ ~~,~5) ~ ~ Silla
AI~6;E - 664 8 ; 9. Yalu River
.a n~~, ~ 2 ~ 3 r ~ ~li "sY: r;: a ~ ~ 10 . Tuman River
~ ~ t, ~ 1
~ 11. From Shanung Peninsula
` 1 p ~ ~ 12. Tang
o 13. Silla
~ 15) ,.1 ` 14. Khitan
( L'~~ ~14~ y ~ 15. Jurchen
~ f ` 16. Koryo
~ ~ ~ ; 17. Toi Bandits
~ 17 ) 18 , Yuan (Mongols )
~ ~ ~ 19. Koryo (Yuan)
r � .
~ ii 20. From Jiangnan
~~1~~ 21. PRC
s,,~'~~ ~lg~~ ~ fi~ j' 22. North Korea
' ~ ~ ; ~ ~ . . , : 1,. ~ + 23 . ROK
, ~ ~ ~ I.
,
, D ~ ~ ~ y. C O P Y R I G H T : Bun gei Shun j u
~ o v Ltd 1982
t , ~
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f ' :~t i.,Fi ~I ~ ~ - ~ (23)~
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~ (20) ~ ~l_~ r-~ ~ ;r
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_ ~t
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MILITARY JAPAN
CHANGGD NATURE OF U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY ~ISCUSSED
Tokyo EKONOMISTO in Japanese 1 Jun 82 pp 26-29
[Interview with Nobuo Kurokawa, Representative of the Foreign and Domestic
Policy Research Institute: "The Nature of the U.S.-Japan Security System Has
Changed"; date and place not given]
[Text] The Reagan military expansion line is developing and
the USSR will not yield an inch--it seems the danger of war
continues to increase. In.this situation, Nobuo Kurokawa
points out that the road Japan should take in the face of
i the qualitative changes in the U.S.-Japan security system is
to establish an independent defense concept based on disarma-
ment. Kurokawa was born in Kyoto in 1916. In 1943, he
graduated from the Army Academy. At the end of the war, he was
- army staff officer with the Sumatra Airborne Division. Since
1953, he has conducted research in international politics and
Japan's foreign relations and security policies.
What Japan ~hould Take Note Of
Interviewer: Tlie theory which permeates the Reagan military expansion line--
that of Japan and the United States sharing a military role--is popular. The
pressure from the United States has become fairly strong; how do you understand
the present situation?
Kiirokawa: U.S. Secretar~ of I?efense Weinberger visited Japan in April and left
behind rather strong statements insisting on fulfillment of the promise that
Prime Minister Suzuki made regarding the sealanes. We cannot be silent any
longer. It is necessary to reconsi~er thoroughly at this time Japan's previous
p~sLure of "yes sir, yes sir." That feeling is extremely strong at this time.
I~rom the perspective of military strategy, a second look at the Security Treaty
i5 necessar~.
Ln the long run, I want the people to know that Japan has not been carried one-
sidedly by the United States. My basic understanding is that we should take a
- liard independent look at the international situation, espeCially the inter-
national military situation, and not make our judgment from the position of
havin~; rel.ied on the United States for everything.
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Interviewer: When the international military situation is looked at, U.S.-
Soviet competition in nuclear arms development is still the greatest point.
- Kurokawa: Frankly speakir~g, I have a feeling of crisis that the danger of war,
whether limited or total, is little by little becoming a reality. I think the
Reagan administration is an administration we should be wary of. His policies
have changed very little from the time of his presidential election campaign
until hi~s announcement of plans for a military buildup in October; he had in-
tently emphasized the nuclear gap with the USSR, but since then it can be seen
that he ??as toned down the emphasis on the nuclear gap.
For example, we can look at the Laroque report carried in the newspapers in
January of this year. In short, my analysis is that the Reagan administration
does not truly think there is a nuclear gap, but rather that the Reagan admin-
istration's aim is nuclear superiority and that it takes the position that it
~ can deal with either a limited or a total nuclear war. I think that the United
States, of course, and the whole world can see that the U?iited States has
nuclear superiority.
I visited expert research agencies in East and West Europe both last year and
ttie year before in order to examine the "nuclear awareness" in both the Eastern
and Western blocs. I also met the director of the NATO information agency
and the former NATO military commander, and toured various U.S. strategic re-
search institutes. The result I obtained there was that in the 80's there is
a definite nuclear balance between the United States and the L'SSR, and that
the deterrent capability will not collapse.
- Despite such recognition, if the Reagan administration does develop some 17,000
new nuclear weapons over the next 10 years, it seems that .the danger of a
partial or full-scale nuclear war draws nearer moment by moment.
In terms of Reagan's understanding, the active deployment of Soviet intermediate-
range missiles and submarines around 1985 will be the most critical point, and
at that time the U.S. Pershing II ai~d missile deploytrent will not be completed.
Consequently, I think Reagan understands with a sense of crisis that this is
the best opportunity for the USSR to start a war.
At that point, with a strongly unified West, he will gradually try to press
llaru for completion of the encirclement of the USSR by the West. It can be
said that his aim is to diminish the USSR's desire for military expansion and
to make the USSR abandon its desire for military expansion.
interviewer: A movement calling for the unilateral character of the U.S.-Japan
tiecurity [system] to be rectified and made bilateral has appeared in both the
[?ilited States and .Japan. The danger that Japan will be pulled into part of
' tl~e U.S. anti-Soviet nuclear defense strategy is increasi~zg. Hasn't Japan's
r.ol.e in tlie U.S.-Japan security [system] changed qualitatively?
Kiirok~wa: Considered from the Reagan administration's position, in a situation
like tt~e present, in which there is excessive nuclear stockpiling and the li.S.-
~oviet mood for confrontation is increasing, the United States, after all, will
think about the security of its own territory first. Then, the result of the
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- U.S. attempt to avoid becoming a nuclear target of the USSR will be for the
United States to plan the dispersion of nuclear strikes and to form a plan to
bring about the isolation of the USSR. I think this is the most common stra-
= tegy.
In the past, the military target of primary interest to the USSR was NATO.
Because of that, since the time of the Lerlin blockade, the United States
strengthened its posture of lavishing military aid if war should break out
in Western European countries. It could be called excessive. Now, however,
the greatest interest for the USSR is an attack on the U.S. mainland.
When one thinks about that, from the viewpoint of the U.S. defense against the
USSR, the Pacific Coast is open and there is no defense line. No one has yet
clearly said so, but perhaps for the Pentagon it would be a grave threat if
five So~riet nuclear submarines were quietly submerged off the U.S. western
Pacific Coast--it seems they are doing so now. Moreover, because of such
short range, SLBM's, launched only 200-300 kilometers away, would reach the
U.S. mainland. Within 7-8 minutes, they could be dropped on the West Coast or
the East Coast; there is no defense for this. If five or six submarines each
launched an MI~tV, the entire United States would be destroyed in an instant.
� Assuming I were a responsible person in the Pentagon, this would in fact be
the greatest threat and would cause apprehension. Japan's politicians and
Defense Agency personnel have to look adequately at U.S. defense strategy.
The United States has such a major weak point. Therefore, I want it quickly
infer~ed that since the U.S.-Japan security [system] has qualitatively changed,
the sense of value of U.S.-Japan security has changed very much both for ,
.lapan and the United States.
Blockade of Straits Possible
Interviewer: How do the Japanese defense authorities see this?
Kurokawa: I think that recognition of this is practically nil. Such a concept
will not come into existnece. That is because Japan's thinking is that, as in
the past, .Japan will be supported militarily by the United States. Consequent-
ly, the Defense Agency and Se1f=Defense Forces say, "Who do you think is
responsible for Japan's 37 years of peace?" In short, they impudently say
this because we have clung to the U.S.-Japan security [syste~n] and, at the
same time, because of the Self-Defense Forces.
It is taboo to admit the qualitative changes in the U.S.-Japan security [system],
bec~use the reasons for the existence of basic self-defense existing in U.S.-
.la~~naese ties would be lost under the cloak of such an immovable concept.
Cenerally speaking, the present-day Self-Defense Forces cannot be trusted. Botn
5enior officers and younger men in the Self-Defense Forces come to my place,
and I tell them, "Keeping in mind Japan's geographical features, for example,
kceping in mind the Japan Sea, have yau ever independently [considered] any
developments even once, hypothesizing the use of weapons suited to these
Eea_tures? It is no good ignoring this and trying to barely defend Japan with
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11.S. weapons. Likewise, I will not believe you until you want to make such
rc~qucsts, because they are necessary for our own defense of our country."
Interviewer: It is said that the U.S.-Japan security [system] is more harmful
than beneficial. Concretely speaking, is there any danger that Japan will be
taken into the U.S. anti-Soviet nuclear encirclement net?
Kurokawa: This is what We~nberger said during his visit to Japan. We have
started to blockade three str.aits (Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima) besides the
sealanes. I think that if a tense situation occurred in the Mideast or Europe
between now and 1985, perhaps the United States Would make strong demands,
in all seriousness, for a blockade of the three straits.
The strait with the strongest possibility of being blockaded is Soya. This is
the shortest course to the United States for Soviet warships and submarines.
Likewise, conversely, Shishirita, Reibunto and the northern edge of Hokkaiuo
are topographically easy for the USSR to cover. If these were blockaded, the
Soviet Pacific Fleet would be completely useless strategically. Such a hypo-
thesis reflects a grave threat to the Soviet Union on the eastern front.
Therefore, fur Japan to carelessly participate with the United States in shutting
down the Soya Straits is nothing else than expressing hostility to the USSR.
This must be avoided. The United States will not hesitate to do it on the
strength of U.S.-Ja~an security.
Interviewer: But how do you think Japan should respond?
Kurokawa: I think the U.S.-Japan s~curity [system] has to be done away with
shortly. Moreover, I feel strongly that it U.S.-Soviet nuclear military ex-
pansion competition progresses feverishly, the harm from the U.S.-Japan security
[system] ~aill increase much more than the benefits. I think that as soon as
possible in the near future, we should do away with the provisions of the
iJ.S.-Japan security [system] to the extent that they relate to military aspects,
and that we shoul.d change to our own individual defense as an independent
nation.
In order to do that, we will faithfully defend the pacifism of Japan's consti-
tution by de~eloping a"hedgehog" defense with Japan's independent self-defense
structure on the firm basis of Japan's position in relation to geopolitics.
' Likewise, in order to prevent the nuclear destruction of the Japanese race,
,lapan itself has to politically create an3 substantially possess a"sense of
self-d~fense" that is not dependent on the power of a foreign country. Since
even the format of a special defense would be fine, I think Japan ought to have
a defense structure of its ~wn.
l made frequent speeches, especially about policies relating to security ques-
tions, Ec~r about 8 1/2 years as a policy adviser to the late Prime Minister
Mlsriyc~st~i ~hira. When I met Ohira for the very first time in 1973, Ohira said,
"l don't hav;: much confidence in myself concerning Japan's defense policies.
Won't you write something about that witnout any scruples?" And so I wrote
"'l'heory of New Japan's Self-Defense."
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From that time on, I have consistently thought that a self-defer~se which does
not know whether it is under U.S. direction or is a mercenary soldier is ~so-
lated from the people. If the Self-Defense Forces hypothesize a sel_`-defense
w:ir within Japanese territory, they cannot consider it cut off from the people.
During the Vietnam war, I spent some time in Indochina and investigated the
war in detail. The Japanese people should have the strength of those Viet-
namese to resist through self-defense. Since I have nabitually felt that we
could not fight off the mighty power of the USSR unless we were to bind Japan's
self-defense to such resistance, I wrote that. This was in no way a foreign
policy position like that of Masatsugu Ishibashi of the Japan Socialist Party,
nor was it a comprehei~sive policy.
We have to be wary of the world policies of a strong, intimidating country
like the Soviet Union. On account of that, we must somehow make Japan a
"l~edgehog." That is my fundamental thinking.
_ I?mphasis on Three Principles of Denuclearization
Interviewer: You say that we must abandon the U.S.-Japan security [system] in
terms of. its military aspects, but looking at the present political movements
- in both Japan and the United States isn't early realization of that difficult?
Kurokawa: Yes, and precisely because it is a period in which Japan-U.S.
economic friction has heated up. If there were a time when both could make
clear judgments, even though Japan would bring up the issue of doing away with
U.S.-Japan security, the United States would say, "Alright, let's do away with
- it." But there is a tense atmosphere over various problems, starting with
economic problems; moreover, to start talking about doing away with it at a
time when Reagan has clearly included Japan in U.S. world strategy would rub
U.S. sentiment the wrong way.
Theref.ore, through what kind of process and procedures would Japan do away with
the Security Treaty and get approval for its position? That would be extremely
t~nrd work for Japan. Since the reaction f-rom the United States would be ter-
r.ible if .lapan negotiated from a posture similar to that of the Socialist Party,
making demilitarized neutrality its objective, perhaps no one will take such a
bold course.
(n such a situation, the best way to avoid a reaction from the United States
wo~ild be for the ,Iapanese Government to fortify itself and negotiate with the
tlnited St~tes on the grounds of the three principles of denuc~earization. Do-
ing so would let the Soviet Union know that no nuclear weapons are placed in
.l:ip:iil 111c~, in turn, would soften the Soviets' viewing Japan with hostility.
Interviewer: As the dangers of nuclear war increase, the grassroots anti-
nuclear movement has become popular both in Europe and the United States as
well as in Japan. There is the viewpoint that these movements "benefit the
Kremlin."
K~irokawa: I would never underestimate them. There is evidence that r~ot only
the intel.lectuals b,~r, through a natural development, ordinary citizens, es-
pecially in Gurope, feel strongly about the danger of nuclear war. On the
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~~llic~r I~:incl, tt~e };ovcrnment frowns because it is a movement which interferes
wi~l? U.5. world policy, especially the 1 1/2 policy (commit military power on
the basis of 1 for a full-scale war, 1/2 for a local war). Nevertheless, the
voice of this grassroots movement has grown louder, even in the United States.
It is a moveme~zt in which Japan should originaily have taken the lead, but the
LDP government went around with its hands tied behind its back regarding the
movement because it was wary of offending the United States, since Japan`s
reliance an the United States is so great. I think it is a movement which
should be evaluated.
That is to say, I don't think the actual effect of this series of movements on
disarmament will have that great an influence on international politics, a~id
in particular on U.S.-Soviet politics.
The more I study the UN Disarmament Conference and the Geneva Disarmament
Conference, the more I cannot help but have a feeling of powerlessness in the
proposition Japan will put to the United Nations (a proposal developed by
Japan's committee for drawing up a proposal--headed by Chairman Zentaro Kosaka--
of the United Nations Association of Japan, Inc). However, we are still com-
pelled to do something. Moreover, I think we will make an appeal on the ~
auttiority of the UN conference, but we are repeatedly discussing how to give
a place in the proposal to the antinuclear voices and grassroots citizens'
voices and tiow to let these voices take root at the disarmament conference.
Interviewer: On the one hand, the U.S.-Soviet arms expansion race causes the
economic burden to increase, but from the economic viewpoint, isn't calling for
a halt completely out of the question?
Kurokawa: That is right. First of all, the USSR has not such inclination. I
think that in this century there is the possibility that the USSR's internal
contradiction~ will explode. However, it is not possible to apply pressure ,
from outside and force Soviet policy to char.ige. There can be no hope except
for a collapse because of internal contradictions. If outside pressure is to
be applied, there is no other way than to J_et the people feel hungry one by
one.
Consequently, as China pointed out, no one could understand what Reagan was
doing when he easily lifted the food and grain embargo against the USSR.
~cCually, what he has done has been irrelevant and inconsistent from start
to finish. ~
If he feels the USSR is a threat, why doesn't he move in a direction that will
allow the Soviets to invest large amounts of money in "Gosplan" (USSR Planning
Committee) and not make them invest in military expenditures? This is not
something that had been unsaid until China pointed it out. It hardly needs to
l~e ~aid by China; we have been saying that for a long time.
~tcirt !J~ tl~ Possible I)isarmament
lnterviewer: In the 20 April issue of EKONOMISUTO, Hiroyuki Maruyama, a re-
searcher on military questions, analyzed U.S. military thinking (Transformed
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11.~. Mi 1 it~~ry 'I'hinkin~;") znd pointed out that Reagan's aim is to gain victories
in b:ittl_es with the USSR one at a time in a long-term limited war not leading
to an all-out war, and to try to destroy the strategic balance. In that case.
= various options, ranging from a nonnuclear conventional war to a limited-
threater nuclear war, are being hypothesized.
Kurokawa: That is the logic behind both countries' constantly escalating both
qualitatively und quantitativ~ly. It is natural to think that war would change
from a conventional war to a nuclear war. In considering disarmament, that
possibility is greatest in Europe.
If a conventional war occurred in Europe, there are tactical nuclear weapons
in the regiuns where the Soviets would make their advance. If those tactical
nuclear weapons were about to be captured, those weapons most certainly would
be fired before that happened. If there are tactical nuclear weapons and cruise
missile bases when the Soviets advance, they will most certainly be fired, be-
cause they cannot be pulled back. The strategy considered by France's Mitter-
rand was a problem. After all, the Maginot Line was broken through in such a
manner. At that time, retreat was possible because there were no nuclear
weapons.
Now, however, nearly 5,000 nuclear weapons have been placed in West Germany.
When that many dre placed in the small area of West Germany, they cannot help
but fire the ~ZUClear weapons, since they would be there should the Soviets
charge in. Therefore, a war would occur most easily in Europe.
What I think is most interesting about Europe's disarmament is that the reason
~or it is the excessive military co~icentration there. To lessen the possibil-
ity of war in Europe, the advance capability of conventional forces would be
pulled back to European Russia. And in exchange for that, NATO troops would
return to their own countries.
In short, whzn one tries to control a certain region, one cannot control it
simply with nuclear military might. In the final analysis, one occupies a
region with conventional military forces first and then takes control. This
has not changed even today. The specific characteristic of nuclear power and
the specific characteristic of nuclear military power are that they can control
by the use of a threat. A threat as a threat is one kind of power, but although
that threat is advanced, this doesn't mean that definite control would begin.
A large advance capability accompanied by tanks and a conventional-war capa-
bility are still the basis.
Consequently, the start of a war in Europe would surely be a conventional strat-
egy. The sudden firing of nuclear weapons would be impossible. That is be-
cause firing nuclear weapons first would invite isolation by world governments.
`I'herefore, the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO would be dissolved simultan-
eou5ly. ~t the same time, the 15,000-man Soviet divisions stationed in ~ast
Cc~rm~iny nnd Czechoslovakia should be pulled back once and for all.
IC tt~is were done, since the threat of ground troops alone would not be that
~;re1t Eor the West, the United States would also say let's withdraw. I am
proposing that tliis should be done first; and then shall we start real disarma-
ment?
COPYIZIGH'P: Mainichi Shimbunsha 1982
9400 22
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~COilOTtIC JAPAN
AR~AS OF FRICTION WITH UNITED STATES STUDIFD
Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 30 Apr, 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 May 82,
[30 Apr 83 p 1]
[Excerpts] Five "Explosive" Cr;ses: Unemployment Rate, Market Share, Influ-
ential Enterprises Pinched, etc...
Textiles, steel, color televisions, atuomobiles, semiconductors--although the
list of items has changed one after the other since the early seventies, the
source of Japan-U.S. friction is never-ending. When attempts are made to
track when and under what conditions these frictions over export industries'
goods occurred, five crises come to the surface.
First Crisis: 7 Percent U.S. Unemployment Rate
Unemployment is high in the United States and the trade deficit with Japan is
large. Moreover, when the Japanese economy grows relying on exports, U.S.
dissatisfaction increases. Concerning the 7-year period from 1975 to 1981,
in examining U.S. irritation by means of three indexes, there were two peaks;
and in that period, there appeared strong U.S. demands of Japan concerning
individual products (See Figure 1)
The problem of dumping of color televisions and steel appeared in the period
of the first irritation in 1976 and 1977. Then, in the present period of
irritation, beginning in 1980, friction over automobiles, semiconductors and
communications equipment revived and came to the fore.
The fact that the U.S. unemployment rate reached 7 percent and the slump
reached serious proportions is the common ground in the periods of increased
U.S. irritation with Japan. Although the trade deficit with Japan is large
and JaPan's economy has grown by relying on exports, that alone is not the
reason for U.S. demands of Japan to become harsh. It is the U.S. unemploy-
ment rate which holds the key. When~unemployment ~umps up, dissatisfaction
with Japan explodes.
The Japanese government and business world hope that "if U.S. business
improves and the unemployment rate drops, the harsh treatment of Japan will
weaken considerably," and there is a basis for that hope.
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I~~llt 1)I~I~IC'1:11. I~til~ I1N1.1'
' '(17) ~ .
y~ ~
(1) 1~71 ~~~~fe~f ~~f ~f~
_ (2 ~ , , . ~
(3 a~ ~ ~ ;
s ' o ;
2 ~4~ ~ia~r~~r~r~ , , ~~i~~{ k{
~ , ~
' ; . i~ r~xtu
o �~~-i-v~o~
8~ 1 15 1 S~ l I, '19iR 1.
-1 ~ 1:.~1~:~ ,
-t ~70 (~(v v) (lw(v6) ~i~ ti;::r
% 0 (1~1 C(52~~\\\~~'�'
(1 ~ o@~ki~tt~�% 5U 100
(14) hr,r~i iz~~c?a-:-:.c=c+~.i;~ ~ri~
FA~M}(~~~~k 1:3Aq3l~'~sSL'1�:t~'cs~:U�RRR.
~t~pfptl~iE~l 16.~55~1~~ ? ;~IS:ti~~f7~vx'r
:3~D:# l:ff f�'^iCCf6M:~~9C~N15?*~ ~
SU,
Key:
l. Figure 2: Important Industry Products' Share of U.S. Market and
Export Ratio
2. Share of U.S. market as a percentage
3. Motor bikes
4. Group of nonfriction items
5. Calculators
6. Group of friction items
7. Color televisions (1976)
8. Steel (1977)
9. Cameras
10. Watches
11. Automobiles (1979)
12. IC's (1977)
13. Export ratio of Each product as a percentage
14. Calculated on quantitative base for various products. Trade friction
items are listed as they were in the year the friction occurred;
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nonfriction items are as they were in 1981. The share for some of the
items was estimated by NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN; steel includes the
European portion.
The opinion of Eishiro Saito, chairman of Shin Nittetsu, regarding the ste21
industry, which has reached the stage of live and let live af ter a 10-year
- period of friction, is: Aside from whether or not the U.S. steel industry's
slump is due to the influx of Japanese-produced steel, from the viewpoint of
Japan-U.S. relations up until this time, we must export with consideration
for our counterpart`s situ~tion."
Fifth Crisis: Invasion into Strategic Fields
The trade friction which has continued in steel, color televisions and auto-
mobiles for the present has focused on the form of artif icially "managing"
the friction finally with such measures as regulating the amounts. However,
it is the view of Yuji Masuda, chief researcher at the Economic Laboratory
of the Machinery Promotion Association that: "If exports are simply
moderated, future friction cannot be resolved."
The friction products have changed to more strategic, high-technology fields.
Besides this, since the tempo of technological innovation is extremely fast,
there is a great possibility that the ultimate situation will be one in which
they will receive a crushing blow and be destroyed if they lose in the compe-
tition with Japan.
It is semiconductors which have already reached the combustion point as the
number one "new type of friction." IC's ai:~ n~t only the bearer of the
electronics revolution embracing the who'le of production, but are strategic
technological commodities deeply connected wihh national defense, satellites
and aviation. The reason the U.S. national military establishment is asking
for exercise of the provisions of the U.S. commerce law and national security
with regard to Japanese-made semiconductors and is trying to curb imports is
perhaps because it is extremely afraid that Japan will gain supremacy in
this field.
Moreover, taking ultra LSI's as an example, because it is necessary, if
carried to the extreme, to reinvest plant and equipment for every step in-
crease ~n the degree of integration, it would be difficult to resurface if
the industry once falls because of this investment cycle. It is possible to
continue production with superannuated facilities if one is talking about
steel or automobiles, but this is not possible in the high-technology fields
where the tempo of technological innovation is fast. Therefore the competi-
tion is fierce.
The list of high-technology products, such as computers, aircraft, bio-tech-
nology and the like, which are seen as following semiconductors, have a high
strategic character, and it may be said that they possess the almost perfect
element for becoming the products of new friction.
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!~'()It ()N'1~1('IAL I)S~: ONI.Y
~ 1 May 8'L p 1 J
[Excerpts] Bitter Experience with "Curve Ball" Barriers; Out of Fear of
Retaliation, Difficu]_t To Complain
Within the protective measures surrounding the domestic market, if tariff
barriers are spoken of figuratively as the "straight ba11," then nontariff
barriers are the habitual curve ball..
Perplexed by Criticism?
Third-Class Mail (Postal Law)
There are publishing companies which cannot use this low-cost system because
they would have to print the wording of the third-class permit on both the
front and back of the publ.ication. ("Trade and Investment Barriers" in
Japan by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Industry)
The explanation of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications Postal Bureau
Business Office is: "Even the U.S. postal regulations are rather complicated.
We do not consider there is discrimination against foreign publishers, and
although it is said that Japan's regulations are nontariff barriers,~we
consider that is a desultory comment."
The third-class mail permit standards are prescribed by postal law and postal
regulations. There are many points on which foreign publishers are request-
ing changes, and one of those changes is the method of showing the permit.
They want to have stickers or stamps allowed in addition to a printed permit,
as in the United States. That is because if it is printed especially for
sale in Japan, the cost is too high. Whether or not the permit is received
greatly influences the price of the publication. For example, if a 100 gram
publication obtains a third-class permit, the cost is 28 yen; but if not, it
is 170 yen.
Office for Promotion of Treatment of Problems and Complaints for Open Market
(OTO)
"We have to give our names, addresses, everything. If one complains careless-
ly and is retaliated against, one's standing in Japan, built up with effort,
collapses overnight. It is possible for the OTO, set up to eradicate non-
tariff barriers, to become, in fact, a nontariff barrier. (U.S. enterprise
in Tokyo)
The explanation from OTO, the Economic Planning Agency's International Economy
rirst Section, is: "If the name is unknown, we cannot make contac~` even if
the complaint is handled. A public office should not retaliate, and we do
not think they do. On the whole, results are being obtained."
~ On 31 January this year, the government set up OTO as one measure fc,r
eliminating trade friction. It is housed in the Economic Planning Agency,
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and it has set up desks in 11 ministries and agencies. Complaints are coming
in at the rate of 12-13 per month.
"Accessories" Won't Pass?
Imported Cars (Drugs, Cosmetics and Medical Instruments Act and Hihh Pressure
Gas Regulations)
"In September last year, when I tried to import a Benz from West Germany,
Narita customs said the first-aid kit and fire extinguisher attached to the
Benz could not pass customs. Because I had heard the government had set up
OTO, I telephoned them. But they replied arrogantly and did nothing." (Mr
A, a foreign car importer)
The explanation from the Ministry of Finance, Customs and Tariff Bureau,
Import Section: "The automobile pa~sed customs, but since Mr A doesn't have
the necessary permits for two items in the first-aid kit, such as adhesive
plastic, and for the fire extinguisher, it still remains in a bonded area at
Narita."
Permits for the import sale of pharmaceuticals and import sale of fire
extinguishers are necessary. Import sale permits for the two items in the
first-aid kit, considered pharmaceutfcals, are required by article 22 of the
Drugs, Cosmetics and Medical Instruments Act, and the import sale permit for
the fire extinguisher is required by article 22 of the High Pressure Gas
~ Regulations. First-aid kits are equipment on all Benz cars; so other
importers, such as Yanase, remove the equipment from each car and pass cus-
toms. The fire extinguisher was put in on Mr A's orders. Mr A insists
that "both first-aid kits and f ire extinguishers should be considered as
part of the car and allowed to pass customs. Mr A's complaint was the first
right af ~er vT0 wa5 set up.
Sporting Goods (Authorization System)
"When I asked if it was ready yet, he said 'Don't rush me' and became angry.
I've been waiting quietly. I submitted the authorization application for
tennis balls more than 3 months ago." (Importer of U.S.-made tennis balls)
The explanation from the Japan Tennis Assoctation is: "We received authori-
zation applications from two U.S. companies. The authorization is close to
being given to one of the companies; ard we're in the midst of testing the
tennis balls of the other company."
There is much dissatisfaction with the sporting goods authorization and
recommendation system of Japan's various sports associations. The Japan
~ Tennis Association changed its regulation on authorizing only domestically
~ praduced tennis balls on 16 DecembeX last year, and opened its doors to
foreign made balls. Both Wilson, the number one U.S. manufacturer in terms
of the market share of tennis balls, and Penn, number two, are in the process
of applying for authorization. Importers are anticipating that "sales will
increase considerably when authorization is received." As for the problem
of sporting goods authorization, regarding metal softball bats, the
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All-Nippon Softball League opened the door to foreign-made bats on 1 February
ot this year. However, the United States is working on imprwement of the
authorization system for volleyballs and basketballs.
I~~Y. 82 P 1 ~
[Excerpts] Aluminum Industry Protection Theory; "Spell" of Economic
5ecurity Is Decisive Factor
It is anticipated that Japan's reliance on imported aluminum will be about
70 percent in FY-82; it is necessary to be sufficiently concerned about the
magnitude of the effect in the event instability comes about in imports.
Domestically possessing a stable source of supply is a primary factor in
deterring import price increases. Looking at the form of aluminum supply,
since domestic production is the most stable, it is necessary to retain
domestically a production capability of about 700,000 tons annually.
For a Stable Supply
The economic security theory of "domestically insuring a fixed quantity of
production for a stable supply" has started to be applied to various produc-
tions.
The United States has been critical in the following manner since last year.
Here are some recent newspaper articles which took up the efforts of the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which seeka the reorga-
nization of the aluminum refining industry which is suffering a slump.
These articles are worth reading because they suggest that Japan can use
various measures to plan for the maintenance of this one industry, which could
be taken over completely by imported products from the United States and
Canada without government protection. (Report from the trade subcommittee of
the U.S. House Budget Committee)
Indeed, various measures as pointed out by the United States were considered
in MITI's aluminum policies, which are in line with the suggestions of the
Indust:ial Structure Council's aluminum subcommittee (advisory organ of MITI)
in October of last year: 1) reduce domestic aluminum refining capability
from the present annual production of 1.1 million tona to 700,000 tons by
1985; 2) eliminate tariffs on aluminum ore which ref ineries import and apply
the lightened cost to a fund for doing away with plant and equipment; 3) con-
cerning the reduction of energy costs, maximum support and cooperation are
- hoped for from those involved, such as banking institutions and the energy
industry.
Why is protection of the aluminum industry necessary? I visited the Tomakomai
factory in Hokkaido, which is the main plant of Nippon Light Metal Co, Ltd.
The plant is located on the north side of Tomakomai harbor. When the raw
material bauxite is unloaded, it is moved to the aluminum oxide production
process where it becomes a semiprocessed product, and from there it is put
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into ttie electrolysis plant which produces the aluminum. It began operating
_ in 1969 as Japan's only full-scale refinery; it has the biggest facility
in Japan, with an annual production of 130,000 ton~, at an immense site in
excess of 2 million square meters; and it has left enough room for future
expansion. Light, rustproof, multi-use aluminum had hidden its high growth
character until ~ust before the first oil shock when tl?e plant began opera-
tions.
Now, there is absolutely no f eeling of a production plant's characteristic
enthusiasm in this plant. There are almost no lights on and only scattered
human silhouettes in the electrolysis plant, where there are four buildings,
- 25 meters wide by 600 meters long, lined up. No wonder. At present, only
' one out of the four buildings is in operation, and furthermore, production
is going on in only half of that building.
The 1,300 employees at the height of prosperity have been reduced to 800
employees now, and it has been decided to cut back 300 more employees. At
an annual production of 15,000 tons it is at one-ninth of total capacity.
Going along with MITI's policies, which aim at a national production system
of 700,000 tons, this plant has decided to scrap a 60,000-ton facility;
even so, a 70,000-ton plant will remain. If present production remains as
it is, can this plant really be independent under the 700,000 system?
"Well, we would like to merely maintain somehow the 70,000-ton facility which
will remain after scrapping the others," replied Takashi Mitsugi, plant
superintendent; he didn't say, "we can maintain." In short, there is not
guarantee this industry will recover simply with MITI's present~relief
measures.
- Very Low Competitive Power
It is generally said that it is necessary to use about 15,000 kilowatt hours
of energy in order to make one ton of aluminum. The Tomakomai plant made
efforts to curtail energy to the point where 13,500 kilowatt hours were
enough. Even so, nothing can be done about the cost diff erence where, in
contrast to Japan's energy cost of 16 yen per kilowatt hour, the U.S. cost is
2.5 to 6 yen per kilowatt hour. Japan's energy cost per ton is 120,000 to
_ 160,000 yen higher.
Even with Japan's superior production technology and efforts, a lead beyond
Japan's reach has already been opened up in terms of competitive power.
These are support measures on which the government and the involved industry
are unite~. Aside from the signif ication of helping a depressed industry,
when it is reduced to a matter of why it must be preserved by exhaustive
relief ineasures, the idea of those connected with aluminum is that, in the
final analysis, it converges on the following point.
"Aluminum is a necessity and we will be in trouble if Japar�cannot secure the
necessary amount when worldwide demand recovers. Domestic prices for the
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[orel~n product will rise sharply if domestic alum:tnum production is at
zero." (Masami Ogawa, managing director of the Japan Aluminum Federation)
1) u~~~l~~~~Z~~t:.b~l~~,I~~f~~'~~~
~~~ty'~ ~IF #%7 R3R$Ga�n ~ ~ h ~ 4 .Z ~ 4 .Z ~
~71 � -
~ ~ C~ ~ 0 . ~ 0
� ~71A (~i~i~) Oo O ~ O
f~ � (t~3A~1~) O O � �
2l~k xo~oT O o o O
rG ~,~:t4l~ o e O e
~ IL ~ ; t~u O ~ o ~ .
~ ~ ~~aho= 1 )O O o O
~ ~14~ e n ~ e .
0
o 0 0
~ ~ ~ ~ = e o ~ O
O Rfi~RQ O o O O
~ ,x cr~ ra~ -n e x ~
~ ~ o x O I
~d 1t 't' ,7
~y ~ IHASfxI= OO O OO O
~ 1' ~~ACxa e e O o
fi< � g 9:~. t~~(2 ) n o 0
~>m c~) e e o 0
?r aA ~ ~v~y~i~ e n O o
x, o o p e
t~ih
_ ~ 3}~ ~ ~~2 )e e ~ o
~ 25~CZ~an~+~~rt~~~~~~~i'~rqldA~:15JU~1~~C~4t.4Ql~~t~~~~~
Key: Figure 3:
1. In order to nurture one industry, it is necessary to protect all
industries.
2. Technological connection of ma3or industries
3. Degree of technological connection (Large: medium: m; small: o;
minute: O ; unknown: x
4. Material
5. Machinery parts, electronics and electrical parts
6. Mechanics
7. Mechatronics
8. Steel
9. Pig iron manufacture
steel manufacture (regular steel)
(special steel)
10. Ferro-alloys
11. Aluminum
12. Aluminum oxide production
Aluminum refining
Aluminum processing
13. Copper, lead, etc...
14. Mining
Ref ining
Processing
15. Salt electrolysis
- 16. Petrochemicals
17. First stage (raw material)
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Middle stage (monomer, polymer)
Resin processing
18. Nitro.gen fertilizer
19. Synthetic fibers
20. First stage (thread)
Medium stage (cloth)
2I. Paper pulp
22. Pulp manufac.ture
Paper manufacture
23. Ceramic industry
24. Cement
Glass
25. (From a report by the Industrial Structure Council's special subcom-
mittee on economic and security questions)
Certainly, such an economic security theory has a strange power to create an
"atmosphere" in which every industry needs protection, like a hypnotic spell.
However, there are interesting materials for breaking this spell. One is the
booklet, "Aiming at the establishment of economic security," recently pub-
lished by MITI.
"Standards" Are Ambiguous
"It is important to design harmony in commercial problems and to accommodate
requests for international cooperation by means of opening up domestic
markets as much as possible. It is inappropriate to discuss all agricultural
products in an identical way in the name of insuring food aecurity."
"In the case of production occupying an important position, isri't it rare to
have a situation of no international competitive power at all at some point
in time? Creating appropriate countermeasures in which production activity
of a fixed scale can exist within a set time may be said to correapond to
concurrence with market principles, looked at over the medium and long
terms." ~
Although difficult to express, the former statement is insisting that "it
is not good to preserve agricultural protection by waving the security
theory," and the latter statement is saying that protection of the aluminum
industry is justifiable from the standpoint of security" and is skillfully
using "economic security" in a proper manner. When I asked a MITI official
about this contradiction, he said, "economic security is an ambiguous
standard." It is extremely convenient to be able to use this at one's con-
venience in order to speciously theorize on policies.
The following occurred when Senator Danforth visited Japan in January of
this year. At a press conference after meeting with this senator, MITI
Minister Abe was critical, saying: The doctrine of reciprocity bill which
the U.S. legislature is considering is an ambiguous standard of activity
for opposition steps which the United States is about to take regarding the
large increase in imports. It is a dangerous bill which can be used
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arbitrarily. However, if MITI, which is essential, were to abuse the
ambiguous standard of economic security theory in order to protec~ domestic
industries, this also could be called a dangerous policy.
[ 4 May 82 p 1]
[Excerpts] Suffering from "Fellowship Society" Barrier; Vertical Relation-
ships Reign Supreme.in Sales
In Japan, the major enterprises have formed groups and are hindering the
advance and import of foreign enterprises. ("List of Japan's Trade Barriers,"
put together by the U.S. Department of Commerce)
Even the distinguished U.S. enterprise, Otis Corporation, which has more than
a 20-percent share of the world's elevator market, continues to fight desper-
ately in Japan. Its withdrawal was even being rumored. But af ter cooperat-
ing with the Sumitomo group and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co, Ltd,
which did not have an elevator company in their groups in 1973, Otis made a
comeback in less than no time. The present share in Japan, which had fallen
to the 2 percent level just before cooperating, is 7 percent.
"Nearly all Sumitomo Bank, Ltd and Sumitomo Reality Co, Ltd buildings are
using all Otis elevators." (Kareshige Nagashima, director of Japan-Otis
Company) This is the power of the giant groups.
In the 50-story Shinjuku-Nomura Building in the Shin~uku area of Tokyo,
completed in 1978, there are 24 passenger elevators; the elevators used
are made by four companies--eight each by Mitsubishi Corporation and Hitachi,
- Ltd; and four each by Toshiba Corporation and Japan-Otis. Those involved
say: "As for the Nomura Securities Co, Ltd, it could not help but consider
its connections with each group.
Old Relationships Viewed with Suspicion
The vertical system control by the ma~or manufacturers reaches as far as the
distribution stage and has worked in the direction of excluding foreign
goods. (EC's committee on reasons for GATT conference on Japan)
At a street corner in San Francisco, there is an automobile dealership with
too signs out front: one says "Ford," the other, "Datsun." When the owner
was asked, "Won't the manufacturers complain if you sell two manufacturers'
cars?," he gave a puzzled look: "Don't you sell Toyota and Nissan together
in Japan?" "We will handle any car if it's a car we can sell."
European automobile manufacturers have asked Japanese manufacturers to be
allowed to use their sales n works. Of course, the Japanese manufacturers
flatly refused. The Japanese ~nanufacturers say: "We put in the capital,
provided the land and nurtured ths sales dealership over many years. It is
selfish of them to ask to join our network."
The vertical formation has been appeared in many fields, such as home
appliances and cosmetics, although not to the same extent as automobiles.
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"Even in free markets like the one in Akihabara in Tokyo, our products are
pushed into the corner, since the major Japanese manufacturers send their own
salesclerks to help out." (Phillips Home Appliance Co, Ltd, a Japanese
corporation affiliated with the Netherlands Phillips Corporation)
Japanese companies follow the "buy Japanese" policy. This means that they
do not trust foreign-made products. (Testimony of Under Secretary of Co~nerce
Ormer before the legislature)
At the beginning of April, the West German publication HANDELSBLATT carried
an article headlined, "Thiessen Discrimiaated Against in Japan." The content
of the article was as follows. Thiessen Corporation a ma~or West German steel
manufacturer, had been continuing sales negotiations for automobile parts
(cranksha�ts) with Hino Motors, Ltd for a year and several months, but it
lost to a competitor even though it could match Sumitomo Metal Industries,
Ltd in quality and price. It is thought that this was the result of the
relationship of Japanese enterprise f ellowship.
President Tahler of Thiessen-Japan, Thiessen's Japanese corporation, grimace
and said: "At any rate, Japanese enterprises are cold toward imports." In
the latter half of March, he visited MITI's OTO along with other people
connected with the West German Embassy and the German Chamber of Commerce in
Japan, and protested that "raw materials are imported, but we are distressed
over the tendency of supplying only domestically manufactured goods."
Hino Motors took no notice, saying, "We have simply chosen the better terms.
This was no different than any normal business talks." But this reflects
to jdest Germany that "it is the result of giving priority to the long-stand-
ing relationship between Hino and Sumitomo." (Japan-German Chamber of
Commerce, Survey Department Director Schaper)
Japan's distrubution structure is extremely complicated because it is rooted
in long-standing human relationships, and U.S. manufactured goods have had
great restrictions imposed. (Report by trade subcommittee of U.S. House
Budget Committee)
Dissatisfaction with Substance of Wholesaling
M.K.Cheese is a cheese manufacturing and sales company that was created
through a 50/50 investment uy Morinaga Milk Industry Co, Ltd and Kraft
Corporation in 1970. Kraft took charge of marketing, such as planning and
advertising, and Morinaga took charge of sales. However, this three-legged
race did not do well because sales did not develop as expected. Kraft,
which saw that the "reason the world's number one Kraft cheese cannot sell
is there is a problem with the Japanese-style sales organization selling
wholesale," tried the American style formula of selling directly to retail
stores; but it did not go well because of defiance by wholesalers and retail
stores, and so it withdrew from Japan in 1977 with a parting shot of "we
cannot understand Japan's distribution structure."
There is foreign capital which repeatedly changed wholesalers and was
completely despised by the wholesalers, who said: "They disturb the humanity
and ~ustice of our fellowship," and sales dropped. "U.S. manufacturers
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cons [.clcr liow to sell tlieir goods, but in Japan it is more important to con-
sider how to have them sold." This is the conclusion finally reached by
Robert Connery, who has owned an import grocery business in Tokyo for 4 years.
~~~xaggeration." "A selfish claim for their own convenience." "They forget
their own lack of effort." Of course, there are many Japanese counterargu-
ments, but this "fellowship society," which the Japanese do not find particu-
larly strange, presents a thick wall to foreigners. In this, even though
the government removes import regulations, perhaps the situation will be:
"The gate is open but the front door remains tightly closed."
[5 May 82 p 1]
[Excerpts] Futile Shot--Tariff Reductions Earlier than Schedule; ~en U.S.
Department of Commerce High Official asked: "Was It in the Newspaper?"
About the time I visited the Department of Commerce in Washington, Mr A, a
high-level official, made the following comment:
"The Japanese government announced an earlier than scheduled reduction in
tariffs at the end of November last year. Actually, I didn't know that until
recently.
In November of last year, Prime Minister Suzuki advanced the schedule of
customs reductions which was planned for the 3-year period from 1981 to
1984 at the Tokyo round, and directed the Ministry of Finance to put it into
effect on 1 April 1982. This was a measure aimed at impressing the United
States with the Suzuki cabinet's determination to resolve Japan-U.S. trade
friction. There were 1,053 targeted items. He lowered the average duty rate
or? these from 8 percent to 6.75 percent. MITI exclaimed: "Since Japan is
giving this much blood, we think the United States wi11 evaluate it highly,"
But...
Reported Quietly in United States
I checked on whether the earlier than scheduled tariff reductions were
accurately reported in the United States and compared the reports with those
of Japanese newspapers. The Japanese newspapers I checked were NIHON KEIZAI
SHIMBUN and ASAHI SHIMBUN; and the U.S. newspapers were the financial publica-
tion WALL STREET JOURNAL, which reports the Japan-U.S. trade friction pro-
blems comparatively well, and the general publication the New York TIMES.
Since it is easy to put one's own subjectivity into it when looking at the
difference in content of the articles, I simply compared by measuring the
total space given to headlines, copy and photographs.
Japan: NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN: 370 square centimeters
New York TIMES: 0
Total: 610 square centimeters
U.S.: WALL STREET JOURNAL: 97 square centimeters
New York TIMES: 0
Total: 97 square centimeters
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The ratio is 6.3 for Japan to 1 for the United States. It seems that such
- a diff erence in Japanese and American newspaper reporting is behind the
Department of Commerce official's comment, "I didn't know that until
recently."
- Why were the earlier than scheduled tariff reductions, for which Japan must
make considerable sacrifice, only quietly reported in the United States?
PiITI official Kurihara recently gave the following example in relation to
Japan-U.S. friction. "When a U.S. election draws near, this "wolf" of
Japanese-directed criticism urges an opening of markets. This has been the
pattern for several years. It is necessary to throw a bone to this wolf,
but if possible, it is more efficient to throw a bone with some meat on it."
In saying this, Kurihara pointed out that two steps are necessary in order to
make the countermeasurers Japan is pushing effective: 1) the appearance
of giving what the other party wants or making it look like it has been given;
and 2) the calculation of the timing of the giving. Unless these two points
are given consideration, no matter how much Japan works out an opening of its
markets, it will be an "attempt sure to misfire" and it will all be a futile
shot.
Complete Reverse of Dramatic Effect
In terms of results, the earlier than scheduled tariff reductions set forth
by Japan are a futile shot. The first major factor was that not enough
consideration was given to timing.
The government decided on the earlier than scheduled tariff reductions on 30
November last year, at the time of the first cabinet meeting of the reorga-
nized Susuki cabinet. This was a total surprise decision and the reason it
could not help but be made was because there was no other way besides
brazening it out with the decision on an earlier than scheduled tariff
reduction related to all ministries and agencies even though the ministers
were unaware of the situation. (Leader of the Liberal Democratic Party) In
short, this decision was a shot fired after considering only Japan's circum-
stances, and not measuring thE effect of how the United States would evaluate
it. It is natural that there was no effect.
The second reason that the earlier than scheduled tariff reductions had no
effect was the lack of Japanese presentation. For example, at present, when
"such and such a white paper" is going to be announced by a Japanese govern-
ment office, they choose a day when there is no other major news, and explain
;e courteously to the mass media beforehand and elaborate a plan so that it will
be accepted to the greatest degree possible as news. However, this is also
exclusively domestic, and there is no indication they are cognizant of
foreign correspondents in Japan.
The staff of a certain public relations agency which aids in the news-gather-
ing activities in Japan for U.S. correspondents in Japan macie the following
commen t .
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- "Well, they purposely announced news of the formation of a cabinet and news
of the earlier than scheduled tariff reductions on the same day... . Compar-
ing the value of the news, it was evident that the news on the tariffs would
be blurred. This way of handling it was as much as to say we do not want
you to konw too much about the earlier than scheduled tariff reductions."
.~apan-U.S. friction is the current problem between the United States and
Japan. Cherry blossoms, Mount Fuji, Geisha girls are not enough to have the
_ United States understand presentday Japan. Etiren though it is an era in
which information about Japan is relayed to the United States on the same day,
Japan still lacks the wisdom of effectively relating its own ideas to the
United States.
[7 May 82 p lJ
[Excerpts] Absence of Key Persons Among Politicians; Without Pipeline,
Cannot Press for True Intentions
People holding important posts in the U.S. Government are divided roughly
into two kinds. The first is the brain group the President brings with him
from his home state. And the second group is of those appointed from among
l.awyers, consultants, lobbyists and scholars in the Washington area. Of
these, the number of people of talent in the appointed group is extremely
limited persons of above a certain level, such as those from the Brookings
Institute, the Democratic Party's think-tank, the Republican Party affiliated
American Enterprise and Georgetown University's Strategic Research Center
employed according to the government of th~ time.
If one keeps contact with the limited number of people from the environs of
Washington, some day they will become an influential pipeline t~ the U.S.
government. Of course, there are instances where individual friendships are
' formed with U.S. legislators and administration leaders and a pipeline is
developed by exchanging information periodically.
Former Prime Minister Kishi had a strong connection with the Republican Party
and had a strong pipeline to former President Nixon, who was vice president
at the time of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty revisions. Therefore, "at the
time of the Sato government, he had more influential power than Sato in
problems involving the United States." (Cabinet member at the time of~the
Sato government)
But even so, it is an old pipeline. F.`ven the MITI minister who performs the
role of new leader of the LDP and who is said to be a future party presiden-
tial candidate would not help but rely on the Kishi Pipeline.
Strauss, former special U.S. envoy to the trade negotiations, who was a
negotiation window at the Tokyo round (multilateral tY�ade negotiations) ut-
tered the following during his visit to Japan in early April:
"The friction has become more complicated than necessary because there are
no mediators in either Japan or the United States at present."
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A negotiator is not only someone who can mediate domestic issues, but who
can be influential with the United States and can speak his real feelings
with the other side. He can be called a key person. The more severe Japan-
U.S. friction becomes, the more noticeable it becomes that there are no
political key persons with a pipeline to the United States.
The few key persons who come onto the stage in the history of Japan-U.S.
friction are primarily private persons and bureaucrats.
In September 1978, when there was an off-year election in the United States
as there is this year, the Japan-U.S. agricultural products negotiations,
held in Washington as part of the Tokyo round, had tough going over the
import liberalization of ineat and oranges; af ter talking for 10 hours over
3 days, both countries announced a"breakdown." However, the next day, this
was modified to "a continuation of negotiations" and in December of that
year, they finally concluded with an expansion of the import framework.
Sony Chairman Akio Morita was the one who overnight changed the "breakdown"
into continuation of negotiations" by standing between the two men j-nvolved
in the negotiations, Strauss and Minister Nakagawa of the Ministry of Agri-
culture and Forestry. Morita is the one who newly introduced Strauss, with
whom he got along well after he happened to ride on the same plane in 1977,
and Nakagawa, with whom he was close throu~h the "Free Society Research
Association," a group of new leaders in the political world and young
- executives. And, Nobuhiko Ushiba, min:ister with responsibility for foreign
economy, who has a widespread reputation in the United States and who has
the trust of legislators, is the one who was able to bring the "continuation
of negotiations" to a "conclusion."
Why are Japan's politic:ians, who should be standing at the head of the
resolution of friction, not very zealous about creating these pipelines?
tioney is necessary to create a pipeline with the United States and it isn't
linked to election votes. So minor politicians repeat the "pattern of
returning home on Friday and coming back on Tuesday" from their election
districts, and influential people within the party, rather than creating a
pipeline with the United States, first of all, strengthen their real power
within the factions and influence within the party. So the common pattern
for politicians ~aho are said to have a relatively goud pipeline with the
United States, such as former Prime Minister Fukuda and LDP Secratary Nikaido,
is that when their aim of success has nearly acquired a firm footing, they
set about creating a full scale pipeline with the United States.
Organizations for le~islator exchange have come into being one after the
other--Japan-U.S. Legislators League, Japan-U.S. Legislatures Political
Council, and Japan-i1.S. Sunbelt Legislators League--but many are in the
situation of "havin~ the door open, but no business going on."
Voice of Self-Examination in LDP
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As may be expected now, a call for self-examination has begun to appear
within the LDP. A certain young Diet member has devoted himself to
admon~shing that this is not the time to be riding piggyback on the old pipe-
lines of private individuals and bureaucrats.
"With Japan-U.S. relations having become so strained, politics directed
solely to domestic issues up to now will certainly reach their limits. In
an era when Japan's moves are raising di~cord in the United States, it is
necessary for Japan to willingly probe and consider U.S. thinking. Just as
the United States helped Japan's revival after the war...".
Up to now, whenever Japan-U.S. friction has occurred, domestically, the order
of reac+.ton was from the industrial world and then the related ministries and
agencies; the Diet members did not mor~~e until just before the blaze.
Although politicians may have moved, they were only the spokesmen for the
industrial world which was about to be hurt by the friction. However, it is
necessary to deal in advance, quicking perceiving the true intentions of the
U.S. legislature and government--not take measures af ter the fact. To do
this, Japan cannot fail to create not only a formal diplomatic route, but
also pipelines at various levels.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbun 1982
9400
CSO: 4105/106
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ECONOMIC
FINANCE MINISTRY PLANS 5 PERCENT BUDGET CUTS IN FY 83
Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 20 Jun 82 p 5
[Text] The Finance '.1linistr~ has The soumes, however, ad- that even it public works ez-
decided to trim the ceiling ot mitted that seveu items of penditures caunot be cut by as
budgetary appropriations for expenditures, iacluding muchas5percentinviewofthe
nekt fiscai year, starting in national dF,iznse and economic g r o w i a g n e c e s s i t y o i
April 1933, by at least 5 percent cooperation with developing stimulating the national
- in principle irom the ailocations countries, v~ill be exempted economy, their total for fiscal
made tor the current Cscal from K~hat they call the "minus 1983 will not exceed that tor
year, it ~ as learned Saturday. ceilings." fisca119~'1.
Last year. the various Also to be exempted wiil be They [oresavr the greatest
ministries and agencies ot the expenditures related to pen- frictioa over budget com-
centrai government were asked sions and public works projects. pilation might arise o~�er
to limit their respective A huge shortfall in tax defenseexpenditures.
budgetary requests for fiscal revenues is foreseen for the The Defense Agency, en-
1982 to the same le~~els as in present [iscal year, after cowaged by repeated U.S. calls
fiscal 1981. another huge deticit in revenues for a considerable increase in
The circumstances oi the aas scored ~last fiscal year Japan's defense expenditures.
nalional finances today are ended March 31. bioreover, ~s reported planning to seek an
much more seeere than last ilotation of national bonds increase ot more than I1 per-
~�e~r, the soucces explained, designed to cover such deficits cent in de[ense appropriations
~�hile reporting the ministry's is becoming more and more nexttiscalyear.
decision to cut at least 5 percent difficult, the sources said. If the De[ense Agency's
irom the precailing levels. adding that efforts are req~est is to be fully respected.
The ministry is scheduled to therefore to be redoubled to it alone Would amount to an
present its final plan around the trim expenditures as much as additional expenditure of some
middle of Julv. possible next fiscal }ear. 260 billion yen.
It is seen that r~~elfare and ~~That's too much.'' the
educational expenses will bear Finance Ministr~ sources
the brunt ot the projected reacted. They want to limit the
budgetslashing. increase to around l00 billion
As to public w~orks projects. yen, equivalent to an increase
one of the seven exceptional of 9 peroent or so.
expend~tures, the sources said
Cul'YftIGHT: Mainichi Daily News 1982
CSO: 4120/318
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~CONOMIC
JAPAN TO CONTINUE ASEAN AID
Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 19 Jun 82 p 1
[Text] Singapore (KYODO)--Foreign Minister Yoshio Sakurauchi said here Friday
Japan will continue to provide economic assistance to five noncor~munist South-
east Asian countries which form the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN).
Sakurauchi told.foreign ministers of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia,
and the Philippines Japan will give positive support to the five nations' eco-
nomic and social development efforts.
"The ASEAN is the highest priority region in Japan's economic cooperation," he
said.
The Japanese foreign minister delivered the speech in an hour-long meeting
with his counterparts--Supphiah Dhanabalan of Singapore, Siddhi Savetsila of
Thailand, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja of Indonesia, Muhammad Gha2alie of Malaysia
and Carlos Romulo of the Philippines.
The ASEAN foreign ministers discussed with foreign ministers of Japan, the
United States, Canada, Austr.alia, New Zealand and the European Community on
Thursday, following a three-day meeting Monday through Wednesday between them-
selves only.
In Friday's Japan-ASEAN meeting, Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar delivered
a keynote speech and called on Japan to open its market wider to ASEAN coun-
tries.
Mochtar strongly urf;ed Japan to increase imports of tropical products and in-
dustrial goods, nrc~ng that Japan's imports from ASEAN countries are raw mater-
ials and oil at present.
Japan should contribute to development of inedium and small business corpora-
tions in the ASEAN countries, he said.
~ Sakurauchi told the ASEAN ministers that Japan and ASEAN have worked together
to further their mature partnership, which will mean a great deal �or stabil-
ity and development of Asia.
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1~l1N ()1~1~1('IAI. Iltil? ONI.Y
The meeting went into closed-door session after Sakurauchi's speech.
Sakurauchi explained Japan's efforts to stem mounting trade protectionism and
to open its market wider to imports, Japanese officials said.
The Japanese foreign minister, who flew into Singapore Tuesday, is scheduled
to visit Pialaysia Saturday and return home Tuesday.
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News, 1982
CSO: 4120/319
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LCONOMIC
ASEAN WANTS EC TO TAKE BIGGER ROLE
Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 19 Jun 82 p 1
[Text] Singapore (AFP-Jiji)--The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Friday called on the European Economic Co~nunity to play "a very im-
portant role" in international commodity issues, which are of vital concern
to ASEAN.
Opening tlie ASEAN-EEC dialogue session, attended by EEC Council of Ministers
President Leo Tindemans and Vice President Wilhelm Haferkamp, Thai Foreign
Minister Siddhi Savetsila stressed the importance of North-South interdepen-
dency as "fundamental to the world's economy and well-being.
"The South's call for a more equitable international econamic order is 3ust
and reasonable. It is aimed at creating North-South balance," he said,
adding that i:ts successful implementation would result in greater harmony,
which was essential to world peace.
Air Chief Marshal Siddhi said, "The community's recognition of the importance
of the stabilization of the international market for sugar, or the signing
of the international rubber agreement and of the international tin agreement,
are warmly appreciated b y ASEAN."
They are examples f.or other developed countries to follow, he said, in an
obvious reference to theYlegative attitude of the United States to the sixth
international tin agreement, which Washington decided not to sign�
Siddhi said ASEAN was th e fastest growing region in the world today, with its
aUundant natural resources and a market of more than 250 million people.
"But the full potential of our relationship can be realized only if you open
your market wider to our goods. We must be able to sell to you in order to
buy from you, and your investments should be accompanied by a bigger transfer
of technology," the Thai foreign minister said.
Tindemans said that the EEC-ASEAN collaboration constituted a"rema.rkable exam-
p l e" of work in su
p port of peace and international security between two group-
ings in different continents.
He noted that the cooperation was growing more natural and deeper every year.
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News, 1982
CSO: 4120/319 44
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ECONOMIC
BRIEFS
INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT DECLINE--Japan revised Thursday an April decline in indus-
trial output downward by 1 percent to 1.9 percent from March to stand at
147.3 against the 1975 base figure of 100. April shipments also decreased
2.8 percent from the preceding month instead of the originally pro~ected
drop of 1.9 percent to 137.5, the Ministry of Tnternational. Trade and Industry
said in a revised report. The April shipments represented a 0.9 percent de-
cline to mark the first yearly drop since May 1981 when the index showed a
1.3 percent decrease from a year before. MITI said the downward revision in
April output and shipments was necessitated by smaller production and ship-
ments of chemical fiber machinery, shovel bore equipment, tape recorders,
record players and auto bodies. Inventories in April rose 1.1 percent in
reality instead of the original 0.9 percent from the previous month to 117.5
due to inventory ircreases in the mining, coal, food, precision instriunent,
general machinery and other sectors. The inventory rate for April stood at
93.2 after seasonal adjustments, up 2 percent from a year ago. It was the
first year-to-year gain in the rate since July, 1981 when the indicstor of
inventories in relation to total output grew by 1.8 percent over July, 1980.
A MITI official noted that the transport machinery, metal product and electric
machinery industries sustained drops in both output and shipments in April
while the precision instrument, paper and pulp and chemical industries posted
gains in production and shipments. [Text] [Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in
English 18 Jun 82 p 5] jCOPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News 1982]
FARM OUTPUT TO RISE--Despite an expected decrease in the number of farmers and
the acreage of land under cultivation, Japan's total agricultural output will
record an increase of some 4 percent--the largest growth in the past four
years--in fiscal 1982, according to an estimate by the A.griculture, Forestry
and risheries Ministry. The ministry said the nation's farming population,
which totaled 4.88 million in fiscal 1981, was expected to decrease by about
4 perceat in fiscal 1982 ending next March, following a 3.6 percent drop in the
previous year. The total acreage of farmland under cultivation will also de-
crelse by about 22,000 hectares from 5,442,000 hectares in fiscal 1981, it said.
But agricultural production throughout the country in fiscal 1982 will show an
increase of some 4 percent over fiscal 1981, the ministry said. As a result,
Japanese farming households' income solely from farming will increase by about
G percent this fiscal year, far surpassing an estimated 2.6 percent growth in
the previous fiscal year, it said. The cost of fertilizers and farming equip-
ment will become stabilized in f iscal 1982 and demand f or farm products will
increase 1 percent following a 0.5 percent decline in fiscal 1981, it added.
[Text] [Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 20 Jun 82 p 5] [COPYRIGHT:
Mainichi Daily News 1982]
CSO: 4120/321 ~
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
SPACE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN DISPUTE
Tokyo NIKK.AN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 9 Jun 82 p 4
[Text] The Space Development Special Conanittee (Chairman Taro Nakayama) of
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has made "a proposal for space development."
With regard to this proposal, many space related officials heartily welcomed
the LDP's move to increase the space development budget, although they feel
that launching a military satellite may not be possible. It seems that the
issues on the revision of the Basic Space Development Program and the moving-
up of the space development programs may arouse arguments centering on the
Space Activities Commission.
The launching of commercial-use artificial satellites is entering an era where
the U.S. space shuttle and Arianne rocket of the European Space Agency (FSA)
will compete with each other for customers and enjoy the world demand
exclusively between themselves. The United States, curope and the Soviet Union
are the.only ones that can place 1-ton satellites into stationary orb its at
36,000 km above the earth. Therefore, it is undoubtedly a matter of grave
concern to Japan to b e left 10 y ears behind by ESA at this very moment.
With the current speed of development, it is unavoidable that the gap between
Japan and ~urope will grow wider, and the Science and Technology Agency (STA)
and the National Space Development Agency (NASDA) have a great deepening
sense of crisis about this.
Comparing Europe and Japan's space dev2lopment, opinion had it that Japan was
leading around 1978. In f act, it seemed that Japan was ahead of Europe
because of its rocket development program whicYe had made step-by-step prcgress,
f.rom the Lambda and the Mu rockets (both by the Tokyo University) to the
N-1 rocket, the N-II and the H-1 rockets.
ESA lias finished technological development of the Arianne rocket and 1-ton
satellite in whose development each country had a share. As of now, therefore,
Japan has clearly been left behind because it can launch satellites of only
350 kg. It is estimated that around 1992 or 1993 Japan could launch 1-ton
satellites if it~speeded up development. Compared to this, Europe will launch
1-ton satellites on a commercial basis next March.
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'I'I~~~ };ril~ bctween f:urope and Japan derives from differences in the establishment
c~ I~ ~;c~als and from tlie sequence of ~evelopment. One cannot ignore, however,
that it also derives from the fact that Europe centered its development on
independently developed technology while Japan imported almost all technology~
such as rocket production, artificial satellites and guidance systems, from
the United States.
We will have to wait until 1987 for a solely Japanese domestic space rocket
to be developed. At that time, the H-lA rocket with a second-stage liquid
oxygen and liquid hydrogen fuel rocket and a third-stage solid fuel rocket
and an inertial guidance system will be developed.
In addition, there is the problem related to developmental funds. Most of
the 2,700 artificial satellites that thP United States and the Soviet Union
have launched are used primarily for military and defense purposes. Therefore,
it is said that in these countries a great amount of funds is allocated for
space development in the defense budget. Besides, Japan's space development
budget is restricted to peaceful uses, with the amount barely reaching
100 billion yen in 1982. It is much too small compared to Europe's space
development budget, of which the science budget is estimated to be about
160 billion yen.
Most advanced space technologies using artificial satellites include communi-
cation satellites, broadcast satellites, weather satellites and earth
resources satellites, and th e use of these satellites is expected to expand
rapidly in future. The era of 1-ton satellites is quickly approach3ng, and
it is expected that the era of 4-5 ton satellites will come in 3-4 years.
Even if Japan starts development of a rocket for 1-ton satellites promptly
in FY 83, NASDA estimates that the development would take at least 9-10 years
and that an annual average 30 billion yen (a total of 300 billion yen for
10 years) for the rocket development would be needed on top of the current
budget. This is a pretty stiff demand, but it is certain that if Japan
undeniably lags behind in the space development race, it will suffer great
setbacks in the most advanced fields of communication, broadcast3ng, resources
detection and defense.
For this reason, as the LDP's Space Development Special Committee has proposed,
it is considered necessary to develop as quickly as possible a lift capability
suitable for the era of large-scale satellites and large rockets and to
establish a system through which Japan would not yield to others in the space
development race, as well as to promote space development and the improvement
of technologies.
COPYRICHT: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsha 1982
CSO: 4106/137 ~
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ~
MITI WORKS OUT PLAN FOR NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
OW230439 Tokyo NIH~N KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 21 Jun 82 Morning Edition p 3
[Text] On 20 June, the MITI announced a comprehensive program it had pre- ~
pared to establish Japan's own nuclear f uel cycle. The program, designed to
meet the requirements of the nation's nuclear power technology, which has
entered a commercialization phase, contains these salient points: 1) uranium
ore development and import systems centering on private businesses will be
established and new companies set up thereafter as 3oint ventures with over-
seas capital in Australia and other countries; 2) preparations will be
expedited to build land custody facilities for nuclear waste with low radio-
activity, and a reserve system will be introduced to grant nuclear fuel
processors tax exemptions for waste disposal expenses; and 3) an atomic power
international cooperation center will be inaugurated, tentatively in fiscal
1983.
The MITI also plans to work out the necessary rules to decrease Japan's
dependence on overseas facilities for uranium enrichment and reprocessing of
spent fuel. It is going to speed up coordination with the Science-Technology
Agency and related businesses on this pro gram. ~
"Nuclear fuel cycle" means a series of processes from the development and
refining of uranium ore to enrichment, processing, generating, reprocessing
of spent fuel, and waste disposal. While Japan's nuclear power technology
has entered a phase of full-scale preparations for commercialization from the
experimental phase, it still depends on overseas facilities for considerably
large parts of the cycle, as facts show. In order to promote the development
and utilization of nuclear power smoothly and with stability, it is required
for the nation to end its dependence on overseas facilities and establish a
nuclear fuel cycle of its own. This has become a ma~or task for this country.
The MITI pro gram lists measures to be taken, focusing on areas where the work
of making systems has been lagging. The ministry believes that Japan will be
able to establish its own nuclear fuel cycle by carrying the program into
practice step by step, beginning next year.
As a means of ensuring a stable supply of uranium ore, the ministry plans to
maintain a development-import system with private firms serving as its
nucleus. At present, Japan purchases 80 percent of its requirement for
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uranium--about 200,000 tons (on a crude ore contractual basis)--from overseas
under long-term contracts and only about 20 percent from Niger and Australia
in a development-import program. The MITI thinks that increasing the per-
centage of this development-import program is essential to a stable supply
of uranium. In this connection, it plans to continue and expand the program
by turning over the overseas uranium mining projects being uadertaken by the
Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (Donen) to Japanese
electric power and mining companies and putting them on a co~nercial basis.
The MITI's study calls not only for joint surveys and mining by overseas
subsidiaries of Japanese businesses and Donen but also for the establishment
of new companies with the capital ~ointly invested by Japanese businesses and
overseas capital, like the one in Australia, for instance.
As regards radioactive waste, the ministry plans to promptly work out con-
crete steps for disposing of those low-level ones emitted in large quantities
from atomic powerplants by keeping them in overland facilities. It will
expedite the selection of candidate sites for these facilities and put laws
and decrees prescribing the rules for overland custody in good order. In
building the facilities, the ministry says it will see that low-interest-
rate loans are made available from the Japan Development Bank and measures
taken for the development of the local areas concerned. As a measure for the
disposal of wastes produced in the stage of processing enriched uranium, the
MITI plans to take a taxation measure by exempting the expenses spent for it
from taxable objects.
The ministry also plans to inaugurate an "atomic power international center"
(tentative name) next year, if possible, to help developing countries in
building atomic powerplants and carrying out other projects for peaceful
use of atomic energy. This reflects Japan's consideration for a rush of
requests from developing countries, mainly those in Southeast Asia, for help
in building the foundation. Specifically, the ministry plans to render
cooperation in working out atomic energy development plans, training person-
nel, managing operations and putting laws and decrees in order. The MITI's
calculation is that through such cooperation, Japan will be able to expand
its atomic energy-related exports, currently limited to accessory equipment
and parts, to reactors or even complete plants. In addition to all this, the
MITI is also preparing for the establishment of a nuclear fuel facility
planning department under the Agency of Natural Resources and Energy.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1982
CSO: 4120/317
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SCtENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
JDA TO DEVELOP OPTICAL FIBER GUIDED MISSILE
Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 17 Jun 82 p 1
[Text] It was recently disclos ed that the Japan Def ense Agency (JDA) has b een
engaged in research on a new missile which uses optical fib ers in its guidance
system. Electrical wire manufacturers, including Furukawa Electric, are
involved in this JDA effort. Research on the new missile still remains in
th e basic stage, but if the missile proves ro be practical, JDA will launch
R&D efforts to produce a follow-on to the "Heavy MAT," an antitank and antiship
missile. Optical fibers have a larger transmittal capacity than copper cables
currently used in telephone circuits. They are also character3stically very
f ree from electronic interference. Therefore, they may come to be widely used
in the future in such major military equipment as tanks, airplanes and warships.
Th e new guidance system that the JDA is studying consists of optical fibers
and CCDs (charge-coupled dev3ces). A CCD is a semiconductor used as a new
electronic eye in VTRs for home-use.. It will be installed in the missile head
and will pick up target images. Th~se ima~es, converted from electronic signals
to optical signa.ls, will be transmitted to the controller of the missile,
who will be able to see the target as if he were watching a TV screen and will
b e able to correctly guide the missile to th e target.
Because this new missile uses optical fibers instead of wires and the "images"
the CCD picks up are transmitted through optical f ibers, the missile can even
be guided to targets hidden behind obstacles. Thus, this will be the birth
af an epoch-making weapon.
However, in order to use optical fibers in a miss ile, they have to b e made even
finer and lighter. It seems that JDA has entered into the technical study of
these aspects along with the study of how to increase the strength of fibers.
Large electrical wire manufactur,ers, such as Furukawa Electric, Sumitomo
~lectric and Fujikura Cab le Works, are working jointly with JDA in these efforts.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1982
CSO: 4106/138
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SCTF.NCI: AND TECHNOLOGY
NTT COMPILES REPO::T ON FUTURE EFFECT OF INS ON SOCIETY
Tokyo NIHON KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 5 May 82 p 1
[Article: "Industrial Reorganization in Various Fields; Work at Home, and TV
Conferences"]
. [TextJ As a result of the industrialization of equipment in the primary indus-
tries, including agriculture, and simplification of the circulation mechanism,
productivity has increased so rapidly that industrialization is underway in
various other fields. It was revealed on the 4th that a report that gathers
the expectations concerning this kind of "highly informationalized society" has
been compiled by the INS (intensive information and communication system) work
group of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (NTT) (president:
Mr Tsune Mafuji). This report deals with the impact on society if iNS is built
on a global scale; the report was compiled by culling the free discussions among
the young staff inembers of NTT. Although the bold assumptions made in various
places are not without questions, the report has already caught the attention
of the public, including those inside and outside NTT, as a document comparable
in value to the Japanese version of "The Third Wave" by Irvin Toffler (United
States), who predicted the fifth information revolution.
"Maturation" on a National Scale in the 21st Century
In predicting the impact of INS on society, the group assumed that if construc-
tion of INS is started in 1982 with an invcstment of 20-30 trillion yen for the
entire undertaking, the desired services can be provided to the person who
desires them in 10 years (1992) or 15 years (1997), and INS will "mature" on a
national scale in the 21st century, in approximately 20 years (2002).
Tn an INS society created under these assumptions, the industrialization of
equipment and the secondary industrialization of primary industries are quite
_ advanced, and the automation and informati~onalization of the secondary and
tertiary industries are well advanced. As a result, changes in the industrial
format will take place rapidly.
For example, in agriculture, an "optimum nature-utilization system" will be
realized. Diseases related ~o precipitation, temperature and density will be
controlled by predicting their outbreak period and their prevention and eradi-
cation periods. Increases in productivity will be achieved through such mea-
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sures. On the stock farms, an "unmanned feed system" will be in operation,
while in the ocean, "unmanned fishing boats and transport shigs" will applaud
big catches. It is figured that the foodstuff self-supply rate will be in-
creased significantly.
In secondary industries, take the fiber industry, for example. A consumer
will be able to choose a design pattern through TV image communication and
place an order directly with the manufacturer, who will produce it for you in
a robot-operated factory even if it is the only piece of work. In this sense,
the tertiary industrialization of secondary industries has already made pro-
gress. Using INS, a data base containing all sorts of engineering information
will be cons~ructed, and the engineering indsutry will be in full bloom. At
the same time, international INS should also have been established, and the
internationalization of Japan will have made further progress. Japan will
move in the direction of fewer country risks.
The changes in tertiary industries will be also quite significant. A"com-
pletely unmanned goods distribution system" that is controlled electronically
will have been perfected. If this transportation route is utilized effectively,
progress can be made in "compound industrialization," in which all aspects of
distribution, from manufacture to retail, are handled. As shopping at home
becomes widespread, the circulation mechanism will be transformed from the
"dark continent" into a simple one.
Information on shopping will also change from the traditional one-way traffic.
The consumer will be able to obtain the desired information freely whenever he
wants it. Thereiore, the big question mark will be the proper future of mass
media advertising. Home banking, called "at-home approval system," will become
widespread, and we will see the day when the traditional image of banks will
"vanish."
The fields which are to be affected most drastically include printing, pub-
liehing, newspapers, and broadcasting.
An "electronic printing technology" which will render the conventional print-
ing process unnecessary will be developed, so the printing industry will be
obliged to reorganize. Newspapers will be printed simultaneously everywhere
nationwide. Delivery of newspapers is also expected to become unnecessary as
a result of application of the ~acsimile.
INS will also have a role in easing the traffic hell. Working at home will
become very popular, and business travel will become unnecessary through in-
_ expensive TV conferences using the public network. Thus, the traffic volume
will decrease considerably.
Gstablisliment of Automatic Energy Supply System
I:nergy conservation also will be undertaken by INS. Local energy such as solar
and wind energy will be connected to the network through INS, and a system will
be establi~hed by which the required amount of energy will be supplied automati-
cally to whoever requires it. Moreover, overall energy consumption will be
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reduced significantly through the increased productivity and rationalized
traasportation and communication that INS will permit.
On the other hand, as for social life, an "at-home voting system" for political
matters and "CAI" (computer-aided instruction) will come into being and affect
our daily lives. The're~ore, the right or wrong of the present system will
become problematical. Furthermore, individual ways of thinking and culture will
be affected, and the realization of an INS society will pose new global pro-
blems, including numerous ~nternational problems.
However, the report also pointed out the negative a:pects of INS besides those
"good aspects" described above, and efforts need to be exerted to eliminate
these negative aspects during the process of building INS: For example, com-
puter crime, leakage of business secrets, invasion of privacy, outflow of
national secrets, etc. The report recommends that countermeasures, including
appropriate legislation, be established as soon as possible.
INS: Telephone, data transmission, and facsimile transmission systems today
use different modes of transmission. These systems will be combined and unified
into a single system through digitalization of the information. As a result,
various forms of communication will be able to be used freely by a single
network, and colorful services, including communication of images, will become
available. A new uniform charge system based on the amount of information will
be applied, and differences in charges based on distance will disappear. In
order to realize INS, NTT will, starting in 1982, construct a model system in
the Mitaka and Musashino areas of Tokyo. Depending on the results, construc-
tion of INS will be carried out in earnest starting in 1985.
Primary Industries Will Be Changed by INS as Follows
INSZ~~-~T~~I.~~~~~~a Key:
~a::~ ~ u~~
. ~ ~-x Q~~~,~ (1) Present condition
i , ~ `:4:~~~~~~ ; ~ ~ , c;, ~Jo t~_~~ (2) Finite land and resources
, ~ > . ;
I ~ . _
~ : i;::,~., ~ ~ . ) ~3) Problem points
~ ..~i.\^) C,7 N .x,~; ~ w ~J=~~.'~:
~~r~"~ s,~~.~;ti~ . 3);~ i'- rC~ (4) Low productivity; outflow
~"~~'Sy 3~ ; 36 of labor force to secondary
_ ~5) u,"=~-~�' ~ t ,
~ x ~'Y-==--- and tertiar industries
l~ ~ rt;+~:~:n ~.o ~ ~~`L~ (30) Y
r'�-~ ~ n ~.~}'~~A.�. r__
{ _~i (~~~i#,;,~~ L (5) Reduction in youthful
labor force
o ~~t~-Lv~� . ~ n ' ~ 37)
; ~a~ (6) Reduction ia resources
, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ � ~
~'~L y~: " .K _n. ~ ui~ (7) Supply uncertainty due to
~fy;~a,~r.i, 9 ~~;~~a?~)' ~
�t.:,i=� � - i resource nationalism (such as
~ ' ~ ~ ,~i ~3 '~'~Q~'~~~~ 200-mile claim, mineral re- ~
- ~
~ ~
, sources, forestry, etc)
(8) Capital and technical co-
(9) INS (including international INS) operation with industrializing
(10) Optimum r.ature utilization system t~ations
(11) Environmental control system
(12) Production management system ~16) Unmanned mining system
(13) Unmanned feed system (17) Various data banks
(14) Feed management system ~18) Newspaper and magazine as supplier of
(15) Unmanned fishing boats and transport ships information
53
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080027-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000540080027-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Key continued:
(19) Technical cooperation system
(20) Operation management system '
(21) Industrialization of agriculture, industrialization of equipment
(~2) Equipment industrialization of animal husbandry
(23) Ocean as stock farm
(24) Development of yet utilized marine resources (deepsea fishing, open-sea
fishing, Antarctic Ocean euphasia, etc)
(25) Gasification and liquefaction of coal
(26) Development of ocean floor resources (such as manganese)
(27) Efficient use of paper resources
(28) Assist development of industrializing nations
- (29) Increase in surplus labor force
(30) To tertiary industry
(31) Changes in industrial structure
(32) TNS society
(33) Stable supply and demand of resources
(34) Image of INS society
(35) Secondary industrialization of primary industry
(36) Increased self-supply rate
(37) Conservation of resources
(38) Assurance of stable imports
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Kogyo Shimbunsha 1982
9113
CSO: 4106/109 END
54
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080027-9