JPRS ID: 10652 WORLDWIDE REPORT TERRORISM

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• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 26
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10652
12 July 1982
Worldwide Re or~
_ p
TERRORISM
FOUO .6/8?_
Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFOF~MATION SERVIC~
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_ JPRS L/10652
12 July 1982
WORLDWIDE REPORT
TERRORISM
FOUO 6/82
, CONTENTS
WEST EUROPE
FRANCE
Syria, Carlos, Yugoslavia, Swiss Ties Examined
(Jacques Duquesne; uE POINT, 26 Apr 82) 1
. Marbeuf: Identity of Woman in~ith Swiss Passport Sought
in Yugoslavia ~
~LE FIGARO, 4 May 82) 11
Savasta Relates Red Brigade Ties With PLO, French Network
, ~LE FIGARO, 4 May 82) 13
ITALY
~ Role of Paris Language School in Italian Terrorism ,
(EUROPEO, various dates) 15
'1Hyperi.on' School, by Marcella Andreoli
'Hyperion' Reply
~ Andreoli, NUOVA POLIZIA Replies,
by Marcella Andreoli
SPAIN
Terrorism in Spain--C~apier T
(EL TERRORISMO EN ESPANA, 1982) 30
Terrorism in Spain--Chapter 4
(EL TERRORISMO EN ESPANA, 1982) b9
Assassinations by ETA-M May Slow Work at Lemoniz
(Ander Lanaburu; C~'.:~tBIO 16, 17 May 82) 143
- a - [III - WW - 133 FOUO]
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FRANCE
SYRIA, CARLOS, YUGOSLAVIA, SWISS TIES EXAMINED
Paris LE POINT in French 26 Apr 82 pp 56-61
[Article by Jacques Duquesne: "The Or:slaughts of Fear"]
[Text] One dead and 63 injured in the incident on Rue
Marbeuf in Paris. Agonizing scenes. This dramatic
onslaught of international terrorism again increases
- the fear of the French people. It makes insecurity the
number 1 political issue. This gives new prominence to
the Defferre-Badinter controversy.
Here are four scenes from a Black Thursday.
The first is tragic, almost unbearable. At 9 am Thursday morning, a booby-
trapped car explodes on Rue Marbeuf in Paris, a few steps away from the
Champs-Elysees. There is immediate panic : cars burn, a gas line explodes,
a conflagration breaks out in a restaurant, shop signs and windows fall on
passersby who are running in every directiont panic-stricken and stained with
blood. The damage is considerable, debris is scattered over hundreds of
_ mc~ters; the hand brake lever from the boobytrapped car will be found in the
Europe 1 courtyard, far from here.
One woman, Nelly Guillerme, age 30, is dead. Near her a young man of 18
has almost lost a leg, torn off by the explosion, Sixty injured persons will
be hospitalized. At this hour, when the off ice crowd is on the way to work,
it is a miracle that there were not more victims. There is also an elementary
school of Rue Marbeuf which had just closed its doors.
I~rom all evidence, the instigators of the attack wanted to produce slaughter
in the very heart of Paris.
One other reaso~: nrompted them to pick this location. The offices of the
- paper AL WATAN AL ARABI (THE ARAB NATION) are located on the fourth f loor
of. the building at 33 Rue Marbeuf in front of wh ich the boobytrapped car waG
parked.
~ AL WATAN AL ARABI is not just any paper. It is located in Paris because it
k~ad to flee Lebanon due to Syrian threats during the civil war which ravaged
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the country in 1975. There was a price on the head of its owner, Walid Abu
Zahr, a Sunni Moslem Lebanese, in Dama.scus. Even in Paris, the paper was no
longer pLblished in peace: last 19 December, an expl.osive device ma.de of
three sticks of TNT was defused literally at the last minute in front of its
- premises. This did not intimidate the journalists: they had been the first
i~i the Arab world to dare to run an investigation by Jean-Louis Peninou in
L]:BERATION in February asserting that the assassination of Louis Delamare,
Fr~nch ambassador to Beirut, on 4 September 1981, had been ordered by Syrian
autl.orities.
The Shado~~ of Carlos Over the Palais de Justice
The second scene: whi?e the bomb was exgloding on Rue Marbeuf, an impressive
array of police was ialling into place around the Palais de Justice: mobile
� police, helmeted rolice wearing bulletproof vests, and even men from the
national securi~y force specialJy trained for hostage situations. This is
because the 30th summary co~:rt is preparing to sentence three persons of note:
they arP called "Carlos' friends." Protected by bulletproof glass, there is
~ the Swiss Bruno Breguet, age 31, previously sentenced to 12 years in prison;
Magdaiena Kopp, the small pale German with curly hair, well known by police
who track terrorists; and their Frencr accomplice, Michel Jacquot, a former
accountant linked to members of the movement for Corsican independence (see
LE POINT No 497). It was to obtain the release of the Swiss-Germa:i couple
arrested on 16 February for possession of a S-kilo bomb lacking only a detona-
tor, that Carlos, the orchestrator of many of international terrorism's
demented attempts, wrote to Gaston Defferre on 1 March. The letter was signed
~ with his fingerprints and was in the form of an ultimatum: if the government
- doe.; not let them go quietly (as other governments have already done for
other friends of Carlos), France will pa;~--in the form of deadly attacks, of
course.
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l. Bruno Breguet and his mother. A 5-kilo bomb.
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. As lt~e lc:~c~r had Leen revealed by a curious leak, the government was not
- able to give in. So, there they are, before the judges; but they are not
- saying anything. Except for Michel Jacquot who, mocking and vehement, intends
to free himself of responsibility.
But, now something unexpected and unacceptable happeiis. While the judge calls
for unusually light penalties--3 years minimum for Breguet, 2 years for Kopp--
the defendants' lawyer, Mr Jacques Verges, will deliver an astonishing
defense, if the term can be employed, in the vehement tone for which he has
heen knuwn in courts for close to 3 decades. "Whatever your opinion," he
shouts to the judges, "my clients will get out of prison and go home. You
know it. Their friends will not stop until they are released. And in a day,
a week, or a month, it will no longer be possible for the government not to
release them."
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2. Jacques Verges, interpreter of an ultimatum.
The observation is clear. But, never bef~re has a lawyer been heard to thus
internret a terrorist ultimatum before a Freneh court. Mr Verges' business
ubviously prevented him from going to Rue Marbeuf to see what an explosion of
sev~eral kilos o` explosives actually means. As ~_t ple as a whole and rer~ove it from politics in our
ccuntry,"2U
Ih spite of all this, a rejectior. of terrorism was not s spontaneous,
normal oosition in the Basque Country. In an extremely harsh editorial,
EL PAIS asserted that"the indifference with which certain segments
of the nationalistic Basque population, in spite of their obvious political
differences with ETA, look upon the murders committed by the terrorists,
is, ir. any event, terrifying. But if to this we add that a good nany
of the rank-and-file nationalists regularly attend church and receive
the sacraments, cenfession includec~, and that, in striking contrast,
the~~ always seem prepared to protest angrily when the victim has several
3asque fanily names, we can only begin to think that this emotional
illness is indeeri serious and that at least some of its viruses have
th~~ir origin in racism." The editorial also referred to a document
from the bishops of Bilbao and San Sebastian in response to another
note Erom the Interior Board of the Basque General Council asking the
Church to take a clear-cut stand on the issue of violence. The bishops
denied that their mission coul~ "be reduced to condemnati.ons," inasmuch
as they were endeavoring above all "te create convictions, to educate
individuals and groups and to change the hearts of inen." The bishops
therefore asserted that they would rather not "denounce ~pecific acronyms
or groups. EL PAIS called cn the two bishops "to leave the fantasy
kingdom of"self-complacency and empty ti~ords so that they could confront
the concrete problems of the kingdom of this world and pluck up the
courage to mention ETA by name. The paper concluded by saying that
in order to make "violence impossible, it does not seem as if the best
way is fer the bishops of Bilbao and San Sebastian to engage
in an exercise of moral metamorphosis and join the party that Po�tius
Pilate founded 2,000 years ago."21
ETA's attacks continued to focus on the members cf State Security Agencies.
On 13 January, two civil guards, Francisco Gomez Jimenez and Miguel
Garcia iayo, were killed on the stretch between Azpeitia and Azcoita
(Guipuzcoa). On the 15tn, another civil guard, Francisco Mota Calvo,
was slain in San Sebastian. On the 27th and 30th, respectively, two
civilians, Jesus Uleyar Lizeaga, a former mayor of Echarri-Ara�az (Naverre),
and Anzuela (Guipuzcoa) businessman Jose Artola Goicoechea were murdered.
Jan~iary's tragic toll was rounded out by Felix de Diego Martinez, a
, rc~tired civil ~uard who was killed on the 31st in Irun.
_ 'Chr Frc~nch Front
Ttie rolf~ played by France has emerged repeatedly during the lengthy
struggle against ETA. The French authorities' tolerance towards the
ETA's Rasque activist "refugees," which was explained in Franco's day
as a form of political exile, had become, oncedemocracy was established
in Spain, a rtsounding political scandal that no arguments could justify.
. 't'fi~~ Spanish Government's irritation occasionally reached the level
c~l in~i~;nation over the stubborn hypocrisy lhat French government leaders
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~aere displaying. Clearly, without the French "sanctuary" the battle
against ETA would havE been much easier, but the French hardly moved
a finger to rectify this scandalous situation.
- Early January 1979 provided an example of this stubbornness, Zeading
to a series of r~inor incidents. In a bid to resolve the problem, Spanish
Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja made an unscheduled trip on 12 January
to Paris, where he met for an hour with his French counterpart Je2n
Francois Poncet. Oreja c~as carrying a list of 127 presumed ETA members
who enjoyed political refugee status in flagrant violation of the Convention
, on the Refugees Statute, under which individuals responsible for certain
types of crimes (against peace, war crimes or crimes against mankind)
and the perpetrators of felonies cannot benefit from this status. It
also stipulates that refugee status will no longer apply when the circum-
stances that gave rise to it no longer exist.
- At the same time, Marcelino Oreja gave Poncet a dossier specifying
the activities that Basque "refugees" were engaged in on French territory.
It pointed out how the terrorist organization's staff and its incipient
administration had a comfortable base in the department of the Pyrenees-
Atlantiques, specifically in a few square kilometer area between Bayonne,
- Biarritz, Saint Jean de Luz, Hendaye and Guetary.
It was in France, ~ohich the ETA people entered and left with great
ease, that new c~embers were brought in, ideological instruction given,
training in the use of weapons and explosives provided, propaganda �
distributed, information analyzed etc. As CAMBIO 16 pointed
out, the French "sanctuary" was "a perr~anent center for refuge, retreat
and reorganization."22
In this sqiiaUble between France and Spain the semiofficial LE MONDE
- threw all of its weight behind the French position without making the
slightest effort to analyze Spain's arguments. After describing the
situation in Spain in the bleakest of tones, referring to the practically
en masse insubordination of the Spanish Armed Forces, LE MONDE devoted
a third editorial to our country in a little over 2 weeks. It accused
Spanish authorities (in connection with the attacks on Argala and Peixoto,
who were not expressly mentioned) of "lapsing into the Francoist error
of I~oking beyond the country's borders for a satisfactory response
to a tragic situation a political solution to which depends exclusively
on the Spanish Government." As far as the French paper 4~as concerned,
the solution was not to send r~ore policemen to the Basque Country,
but to hasten the home rule process as much as possible. This piece
of advice, coning as it did from the semiofficial mouthpiece of a highly
centralist country, though not without its own autonomy problems (Corsica,
Brittany 2nd the French Basques themselves), was an exar~ple of the
monur.~ental hypocrisy that LE MONDE has so often wallowed in. At the
, same time it termed Oreja's talk with Poncet "routine."23
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'('c~ EL PAIS this editorial resulted from "a simplistic analy~is of complex
issues" in a bid to "relieve the Quai d'Orsay" of "the slightest responsi-
bility for the explosive situation in the Basque Country." The Madriri
daily underscored that "the members of ETA looked beyond the
border not only for asylum for themselves but also offices for their
headquarters, depots for their weapons and banks for their money,"
and it ass~rtecl that "the desire [of the French authorities] to export
the entirc~ Basque problem to ~pain and not to seek out complications
in the so-called 'northern Basque Country' is one of the causes of
a highly complex and strongly divisive situation. France's move to
lft itself off the hook in the Basque affair," it concluded, "is not
~nly Car frcm credible but also and above all, immoral."24
Spaniards cvere not the only ones who saw the hypocrisy of France's
stand. IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA c~rote: "It is a fact that if ETA did
not have sanctuaries beyond the Pyrenees, it could not operate with
such impunity. Oreja is going to remind Paris that the friendship
between the two countries cannot be limited to what is written in treaties.
A Basque Governr~ent in exile still has its headquarters in Fr2nce
Idha~ ti~oul~' Erance and the French people say if Madrid harbore~ a Breton
Government in exile?"25
'I'he attacks on Argala and Peixoto, moreover, served as a pretext for
severa? pr~test demonstrations in Saint Jean de Luz, which prompted
clusings of the border and a nur,?ber of incidents.
As far as the Spanish police were cuncerned, the fact that ETA's "master-
minds" were in France prevented a successful concl~sion to the extremely
intense struggle that was being waged 2gainst the terrorist organization.
In the view of Manuel Ballesteros, the Bilbao police chief, the struggle
~oas "at its zeni~h, at its high point." During the first 50 days of
tt~e year, 31 arrests had been made, 3 information commands, several
support commands and one armed corunand had been broken up, and 3"people's
jails" had been uncovered. But the police had been unable to get to
the group's leacership, which had taken refuge in France, even though
the French Governnent had temporarily deported several ETA leaders
to the tocan of Valensole in the department of the French Alps.
Second General Elections
- FE~bruary was a month of intense political car.?paigning, leading up to
thr~ };ene~ral elt~ctions scheduled for 1 March.
(n a way, thcr terrorists wEre running in the electiens, because the
two Rasque "abc~rtzale" [patriotic] coalitions supported, respectively,
t~ie vie>ws of ETA's tcao branches. Officially, the organizational ties
were lacking, but the platforms were identical. Euskadiko Eskerra
(EE) [Basque I.eft] represented the stands of ETA (p-m), which was cor~pletely
L~~;ical bccause we know that its main component, EIA [Basque Revol.utionary
Pc~rtyJ, was a product of the Seventh Assembly of ETA (p-m). For its
p:irt, Herri Batasuna represente~ the positions of ETA(m). The famous
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TelesForo Monzon, a former minister of the Basque Government, who was
Herri Batasuna's number one congressional candidate fror~ Guipuzcoa,
was jailed on charges of "justifying terrorisn" in Nanclares de Oca.
Many thought that he :vas being given free campaign propaganda. But
could the government let a barefaced, insane defense of violence go
unpunished?
In any event, the terrorists did not declare an election truce. ETA
~ continued its killings throughout February,27 including a victim in
uniform, in this case a lieutenant colonel, Sergio Burrajo Palacios,
in Vitoria. For its part, ETA (p-m) got involved in the labor conflict
at the Michelin plant in Vitoria by kidnaping its manager Mr Abaitua
on 19 February. Although the union federations initially denounced
the kidnaping because "it harmed the interests of the workers," dissent
later arose within the Shop Committee. A week later, on the 27th,
the PNV, PSOE and PCE issued a joint declaration opposing "the existence
of supermen who set themselves up as representatives of the workers."
Mr Abaitua was finally freed on 1 March, election day.
His kidnaping was a good example of ETA (p-m)'s tactics of direct and
coercive pressure to assert labor grievances. Abaitua, who was regarded
as a sympathizer of the PNV, was interrogated to ascertain his involvement
_ in certain empleyer actions, in the style of the Tupamaros. Photographs
of these interrogation sessions, along with several shots of Abaitua
in the "people's jail" where he was being held, were sent by ETA(p-m)
to the Basque media.28
Eor its part, ~TA (m) stressed in statements to the Paris daily LE
MATIN that it was going to continue the struggle, "regardless of the
outcome of the elections," but at the same time it asserted that the
vote for Herri Batasuna "will give us an idea of how many strong supporters
we have." They also emphasized that they did not believe that their
actions would trigger a coup by the Far Right and they asserted that
they regarded themselves as "an example for the other peoples of Spain."29
But the two branches of ETA ~vere not the only active groups during
the election campaign. GRAPO also gave indications that it was alive
_ and w�ell: On 15 Eebruary a civil traffic guard was killed in Madrid,
and ~~n the 19th another civil guard was slain in Hospitalet (Barcelona).
Thf~ Far Right also boasted of its own violence. A few days before the
general elections, on 26 February, the secretary general of the Young
Rt~d Guard, the youth organization of the Spanish Workers Party (P'I'G),
Pina Lop~z Gay, was attacked and.injured by a group of extremists.
l3ii[ this was by no means th~ only thing that the Far E2ight did durin~;
tli~ c~mpaign. Assaults on people putting up posters, Molotov cocktails
hurled at tt;e headquarters of leftist parties and many other typical
extremist actions caused the UCD, PSOE, PCE and PTE to issue a communique
denouncing the National Union (a coalition grou ed around New Force)
"for the aggressive activities of its members."~~
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'i'li~~ I~�c~ i c~n r~~su 1 t ti wc~rc~ in many ways surprising. We are espec ial ly
intc~re~st~rd here in the outcome in the Basque Country, which put the '
parties of the abertzale Left in a magnificent position. The to:o coalitions
covering this segment of the political spectrum garnered 17 percent
of the registered voters in the Basque Country. Herri Batasuna, the
politic.~l "face" of ETA (m), got 137,~00 votes, which was much more
than expected. EL PAIS acknowledged that "this kind of election result
invalidated the de facto assumptions on which several of our assessments
of the Basque issue rested. Ous repeated assertions that ETA terrorism
ha~ less and less grassroots support have now, unfortunately, been
proven wrong, and our prediction that radical nationalism could
not garner more than 10 pPrcent of the total vote in the four provinces
has also been refuted by the facts." To EL PAIS, the results "call
for further thought as to the significance of a populist movement and
as to the conditions that have prompted not only organized murder but
also the social support that it is getting." After stressing its well-
~cnown stand of rounding out the required police measures with politic~l
steps, which meant that "the Basque Country Autonomy Statute nust be
taken up on an urgent and priority basis by the new Cortes," it ccncJ.uded
by assc~rting that "we reftise to acknowledge the possibility that the
irrationality, emotionalism and doctrinal rigidity of that movement
(Herri Batasuna) could not be rechanneled, for the benefit of democracy
an~ a peaceful solution, by a true system of self-government for the
Basque Country."31
The outcome of the elections in the Basque Country continued to cause
worrics in the ensuing days, especially when it was learned that the
Herri Batasuna legislators, three deputies (Telesforo P~onzon, Pedro
Solabarria and Francisco Letamendia) and a senator (Miguel Castells),
were prepared to use their status as members of Parliament as a sounding
bo~rd to "speak out against the situation in the Basque Country, even
in international forums such as the International Court of The Hague."
A spokesman for the coalition declared proudly that "we are the most
~ important national liberation movement in Europe and other regions
of the world," underscoring that "the Basque Country is, of course,
completely unique and has a movement that can in no way be compared
with other national revolutionary movements We have here," he
roncluded, "mc~re revolutionary possibilities than anywhere else in
thr worlc!."
~ 'I'o others, 1?erri Bat~suna's relative but important and significant
victory meanr, that ETA was going to be in Parliament, no more and no
less, even though the coalition's legisla~ors were not going to take
their seats in the Spanish Cortes "because we are not Spanish."
The c~nct~rn was p~rcc~ptible both in the two major nationwi.de parties,
UCD and PSOE, and in the PNV itself, which felt that "the solutions
b~ing souKht by H~rri I3atasuna are not at all realistic and frankly
drma~;ogic . "32
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These so-called solutions were simply the KAS demands, which we have
discussed in previous chapters and which consisted of a six-point election
platform:
1) Democratic freedoms, with recognition of the right to self-determinatiori
and the legalization of all political parties,33
2) Recognition of the full-fledged sovereignty of the Basque nation
and of its territorial integrity (including Navarre) in an autonor~y
statute.
3) Institutionalization of and priority for the Basque language.
4) The prompt democratization of local government.
5) Improvements in the living conditions of the working class.
6) Total amnesty, with the gradual withdrawal of the f.orces of public
order.
1'he concern ~f political circles was also reflected in the press, which
returned again and again to the issue. Through its editorial writer
Juan Tomas de Salas, CAMBIO 16 voiced the view that Herri Batasuna's
sole objective was to provoke "a civil war situation in the northern
part of the country." It talked about the "sad spectacle of freedom
and democracy turned into rubbish by a minority of visionaries" and
proposed that "the government's objective in the Basque question should
be to isolate the extremist Basque visionaries and to lessen the number
of desperate people who have given them their votes out of sheer irritation
over what they regard as the extremely slow process of autonomy for
the Basque Country. The only way to achieve this is by coming to terms
with Basque moderates on a wideranging autonomy."34
EL PAIS kept raising the problem of the "remarkable emergence of Herri
Batasuna on the Basque election scene." After pointing out that "the
conjecture that a minority of immigrant workers supported one or another
factions of the abertzale Left seems plausible" and that "Herri Batasuna
benefited greatly from the newly enfranchised 18-year old voters,"
it stressed "Herri Batasuna's unequivocally.populist nat~~.re." It also
wondere~d why such a major segment of th2 electorate supported a coalition
"that endorsed the objectives of ETA (m) and regarded its violent methods
as justifiable. We have no answer to this question," it conceded,
"but we do know that the answers given to this question before 1 March,
including thc~ ones voiced by this paper, are inadequate."
EL PAIS gave a positive assessment oE the role of moderate nationalism
as rF~prE~sc�nted by tht~ PNV, stating: "The hypothesis that the PNV was
playinK a'two-facEd gar~e' by straddling the fence in order to turn
ETA's actions to its own account, is false It erred in its campaign
tactics, because its silence and caution did it no good. But it did
not engage in double-dealing."
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? Va~ ~111V1[1L VUL VL'ILl
With re~ard to the Basque Left, it asserted: "Its reluctance to denounce
ETA (m) and its ideolcgical links to ~TA (p-m) did not do it much good
either." It concluded solemnly: "Something very serious and grave
is happening in the Basque Country, somethino that neither the government
nor the opposition have ~et succeee~ed in understanding."35
LA VANGUARDIA felt that the outcor,?e on 1 March "has confirmed a~'esire
_ for peaceful coexistence," which the Barcelona paper explained thus:
"The fact is that public opinien, no doubt deeply pained by the series
of crir~es perpetrated by the agents of terror, has realized that we
are r~itnessing a struggle by extremist, antidemocratic organizations
that cannot be eradicated easily in the near term." With regard to
the attacks that occurred right after the election, it stated that
"the vote of indignity and bloodstained gangsterism has once again 36
bc~e~n cast The murderers have reappeared with their deadly onslaught."
On 6 March, Brig Gen Agustin Munoz Vazquez caas murdered in Madrid,
and GRAPO claimed responsibility. On the same day, ETA (p-m) stole
1,000 kilograms of "goma-2" from an explosives depot in Pamplona.
Two armed commands with submachine guns and pistols carried out the
raid after storming the home of the depot guard. At the same time,
at the other end of the country, in Ceuta, a bomb went off, wounding
16 persons. The Moroccan Patriotic Front, a group that was unknown
beiore, claimed responsibility. Because of the incident the border
with Morocco was closed for several hours.
'!'ne terrorists were ~naking themselves felt everywhere, and the successive
steps in the process of democratic normaliz�tion (such as the 1 March
elections) seemed to be of no use in swaying them from their daily
mission of hatred and destruction.
'T'.ii.s grave situation was not altered by the municipal elections on
3 April, 1 month after the legislative balloting. Although the UCD
was victorious (30,214 councilmen versus 12,194 for the PSOE), the
:r:unicipal vote had to be interpreted as a tr.iumph for the Left, because
in pr.ovincial capitals and towns with more than 50,000 inhabitants
~.t was the clear winner, especially the PSOE (906 councilmen for the
PSOE, 802 for UCD, 422 for the PCE and 74 for CD).
In tht~ Basque Country, the municipal elections confirmed the consolidation
of 4erri fiatasim a, which wc~n 260 council seats. Jose Oneto wrote that
"although the abertzale victory that has made Herri Batasuna the arbiter
of the Basque political situation has inspired true terror in certain
governc~ent circles in Madrid, we cannot overlook the positive sic'e
~f the fGct that men who used to be in the underground and have supported
an armed struggle now hold positions ot responsibility at the local
lt~vel." The editor of CAt~BIO 16 felt that "the very mechanics of politics
will force the abertzales tc make realistic political proposals that
will ~;radually novc~ them away from ETA's extremist s[ands."37
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The evolution of events did, in fact, noderate the stands of the Basque
Left (85 councilmen) but achieved nothing with Herri Batasuna, whose
representatives continued to engage in the most insane radicalism.
Meanwhile, ETA (m) demonstrated with deeds that it still intended to
continue the armed struggle. On 9 March in Beasain (Guipuzcoa) it
kil.led Municipal Police Sargeant Miguel Chavarri Isasi, on the 16th
Iberd~ero employee Jose Maria Ma~oral Olegaga in Bilbao and on the
23rd in Vitoria police inspector Antonio Recio Claver. On 6 April
two civilians were slain: Pedro Fernandez Serrano in Pamplona and Juan
Diez Roman in Tolosa (Guipuzcoa).
The fear of a terrorism that seemed to be everywhere mounted still
further when on 15 March, the police published a lengthy note in which
it reported the arrest of the alleged r~urderers of Catalan industrialist
Jose Maria Bulto and Mr and rirs Viola. The police indicated that the
group's creator and ideologue was an old separatist, Josep Batista
i Roca, who had died a few months befere. He had lived in exile in
Great Britain for many years and from the time of the European war
had been involved in paramilitary groups workin~ for Catalan independence.
The charge leveled at this strange but well-known figure caused an
enormous stir in Catalonia, but no one was able to convincingly refute
the police version. Their report mentione4 the existence of a Catalan
People's Army, seen as an attempt to create an ETA in Catalonia. Other
reports also mentioned three small groups, People's Alert, Catalonia
and Liberty anc~ the Catalan Red Brigades, that were pre ared to undertake
an "armed struggle" to further separatist nationalism.~8 Fortunately,
none of these groups gave later evidence of its existence. A little
less thar. 2 years later Terra Lliure appeared, showing signs of activity
though not, for the moment, doing any killing.
New Government, Old Probler~s
- Three days before the municipal elections, on 30 March, Suarez was
selected as government president, thanks to the votes of Democratic
Coalition and the Andalusian Socialist Party, in a heated session in
which debate on the program that had heen presented was voted down.
The makeup of the new government was announced on the 5th. There were
no major changes; it was another Suarez administration that had to
tackle the same old problems.
One of these prohlems was the Bas4ue Country, to which, in turn, there
were various fac~ts: the statute, replacement of the forces of public
order (FOP), terrorism...etc. It was unquestionably the most serio~s
issue faring the government that emerged from the 1 March elections,
and it was only very slowly that the administration c~as able to develop
a suitable strategy in the struggle against terrorism.
M~~rtin Villa was replaced as interior minister by a military officer,
- Gc~n Antonio Ibanez Freire. The thinking was that the presence of a
military man would give the struggle against terrorism the momentum
it lacked. But the ensuing months were to prove th~t the new minister
woul~' be a failure, as he made several very unfortunate public appearances.
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a'vi~ vri'l.l.~t~L UJL' V1VLI
(n M:iy th~~r~~ wati an~~th~~r najor pers~nnel change in the battle against
t~�rrurism whc~n Conesa, the famous and controversial "superagent," was
replaced as the head of the extremely important General Headquarters
of ?nformation by Manuel Ballesteros, who until then had been chief
of police in Bilbao and a leading expert on ETA, which he had been
studying at least since 1974, when he was stationed in San Sebastian.
Two years later, Ballesteros became the head of the Single Antiterrorist
Command.
The persistence of the same old problems was borne out when on 8 April
in Dilbao a demonstration attended by more than 100,000 persons was
staged by all the Basque political parties except UCD and A? [Popular
Alliance). Its purpose was to protest not terrorism but, as its banner
proclaimed, "Errepresioaren Anorka" (against repression). The specific
demands were a return of Basqtie prisoners to tne Basque Country and
the withdrawa~l of the FOP from the Soria jail, where many convicted
or alleged ETA members were being held. At the same time, France's
half-hearted measures against the "Basque refugees" were protested.
A few hours before this demonstration "against repression," National
Police Sargeant Gines Pujante Garcia and National Police First Lieutenants
Miguel Orense Villamon and Juan Bautista Peralta Montoya were shot
and killed as the;~ were returning to the Loyala barracks in San Sebastian.
At the same time, a number of French establishments, such as the consulate
in San Sebastian or businesses, were being bombed. This was a way
to pressure the French authorities into not agreeing to the extradition
oi two ETA nembers, Miguel Goicoechea and Martin Apaolaza, who were
to be tried a few days later. As was to be expected,, they were not
~~xtradited, thou~ti they were kept in preventive custody.
Th~~ Basques were getting ready for "Aberri Eguna" ~the Day of the Basque
Fatherland) on Easter Sunday the lSth. As part of its bloodthirsty
preparation, ETA (m) killed Dionisio Imaz Gorostiza, the owner of a
small machine shop, on hSonday the 9th in Villafranca de Ordizia (Guipuzcoa).
The situation was tremendo~isly confused, and the confusion was reflected
in the press, whose analyses ranged from ambiguity to blind lashing
out. Such was an editorial in EL PAIS entitled "The Basque Country:
Only Negotiations Remain." In it the paper asserted that "frustration
is becoming caidespread in the Basque Country, where the people feel
that they were singled a~t for punishment by Franco and are misunderstood
by the democratic government." After this peculiar diagnosis in which
terrorism did not seem to co~nt, EL PAIS placed all the blame on the
Madrid guvernment, which "unforgivably kept falling into all of the
traps Lairge of disappearing durin~ these bleak days of terror and the
silent days afterwards, in which the onl;~ thing we know about you is
that you have onc~ again stopped sleeping."50
- GL PAIS, under the headline "The Strategy of Tension," wrote: "Spain,
~ like Itaiy, seems to have begun the diabolical chess game of the strategy
of tensicn, which is being played by utopian revolutionaries, renegades
from industrial society, mercenaries and international agents. The
thrt~ad r~?nning through this confused medley will for a long tine, if
not farever, be an unfathor~able mystery in which at best we can glimpse
shadoory interests centered on the perpetuation of wea'.c regines on the
Iberian Peninsula and, in general, in the western Mediterranean basin."
"'rhe fact is," it cor.tinued, "that with this bloodthirsty terrorist
strategv, the democratic philosophy has not, for its pz~t, developed
any strategy of centainmert, aside from the elementary refusal to 'take
the bait' of provocation that the terrorists now routinely offer."
Further on it talked a'uout the "irritating political enertia [of the
:~dministration~, which is particularly damaging to the search for an
autono~y soLuti~~n for the Basque Country. It concluded by asserting
that the continuation of our denocratic system "is conditioned by the
ef~orts ~f a political team that can wrest the country from its bewilderment
and incipient despair."51
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If we analyze it carefully, we will see that this is a symptomatic
editorial that has completely abandone~ the former idea that democracy
would put an end to terrorism. It also concedes a certain degree of
powerlessness in dealing with a phenomenon that it labels an "untathomable
. mystery," while stressing the need for progres.s en the Basque home
rule problem. It also rebukes government leaders suffering from an
"irritating political inertia."
Entitling its editorial "Democracy Is Not the Culprit," DIARIO 16 referred
to the recent debate on terrorism, saying: "Not even the most conservative
political leaders attributed this state of affairs to democracy. This
~ must be made clear: Democracy is not the culprit. Parliament is battlir~g
terrorism with the only weapons it~has. It must be supported."52
Under the title "Befere Democracy," ABC wrote: "Democracy has arrived,
and terrorism has not waned Meanwhile, in one way or another
our executive and legislative leaders continue to assert imperturbably
that they will not fall into the trap that terrorism has set for Spanish
democracy."
"We da nat ~aant to make this commentary a forum of charges against
democratic freedoms, but we do not want it to be an exoner2tion either
Nevertheless, we Spaniards must not endorse or accept imperturbability
as a guiding principle, as a watchword, as the key to responding to
the terrorist assault on our peace and on our lives.
"What democracy in the Free Western World would have tolerated and
rot immediately done something about the bizarre and immoral spectacle
of political parties that say they want democracy but that shirk their
commitment to defend it in the war against terrorism." It then termed
terrorism a"State problem," accusing the "leadership class," however,
of not being of the "mind and spirit" to see it that way. It concluded
by stating that "democracy exists for freedom and security; security
and lives do not exist for demecracy. We demand courage and order
because we want democracy, security and freedom."53
As we can see, the tone in ABC is different. It categorically rejects
the traditional assertion that "we will not fall victim to provocation,"
which EL PAI~ seems to still accept. In co..~arison to DIARIO 16, which
sees democracy as an untouchable premise, it places the freedom and
sECUrity threatened by terrorism "before democracy."
LA VANGUARDIA wrote the following: "Something is going wrong deep down
in the system, because careful, vigorous and reasoned action must be
taken before disaster strikes Peace is not a bls~sing that comes
free." ~t concluded by making an appeal for harmony.
As we ran see, all of these commentaries, written under the impact
and amid the em~tion of the awful bombings, are highly dramatic. Never
before hac~ the country felt so strongly about terr.orisr~, and the authorities
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rVn vrrll.lrw UJ~ ULVLI
were beinz, called on to do a~vay with it at all costs. The phrase "at
any price" oaas alnost, but not quite being uttered. Terrorism was
thus paving the way for a coup.
LNFORMACZOA"~FS, speaking out against the rightwing extremists who were
declaring the administration unfit to rule, noted that: "Democracy
is bein{s put to a harsh test, but there is no reason for democracy
tc be weak. We must dispel the false but all too often repeated notion
that freedor~ and authority are incompatible.'' Fewever, it also spoke
out against the administration, stating that "even at the risk of so~nding
monotonous, we must reiterate that it is giving the im~,.~55ion of paralysis,
of being s~~amped, ~ahich is, frankly speaking, worrisome.
Another EL PAIS editorial 2 days later graphically described the gravity
of the situation that had arisen. "Irresponsible jokes are being made
about the possibility of a coup d'etat; the slightest move by the sleeping
militar; lian is carefully watched; there is talk cf w2r among Spaniards
an~ of a return to the past. In a word, the couutry is ~iving in to
fear, provocation, dejection The Ear rightwing papers are, as
always, stirring up passions and are being unexpectedly echoed by the
spokesmFn of 'civilized conservatism' This is the just the atmosphere
Cor some sort of coup. The government remains silent."
It went on to say: "But the temptation to cembat terrorism with State
terrorism is the most dangerous trap into which public opinion cc ld
fall. We cannot exchange one kind of violence for another, one kinci
of fear for another, one kind of insecur~ty for another There
is only one possible response to the kind of situation we find ourselves
in: a political response."
Then came harsh criticisn ef the governnE~nt. "This is not a political
team," it said; "this is a group of self-willed friends who have
taken hold of Fower but do not kr.ow how to use it except for their
own self-satisfaction." It then asked: "What hope can thus be held
out to the Basques who do not agree either with ETA or the abertzale
~roups or the PidV? Is their any cause for optinism among these Spaniards?"
_ The Madrid paper returned to the obsession with a co~ip: "At werst,
another Operation Galaxia is ir~ the works. But even if it were to
~ succc~rd, which we doubt, ti~~ulu' it really be a valid solution?" It
' closed kith a~rave warning: "The fact is that a cloud of skepticism,
if not dtspair, is enveloping this society and that the government
is mainly to blame for it. There are even those who theorize that
Suarez has consciously engaged in crisis politics to strengthen his
grip on power. tnie o~ould rather not believe that The UCD, with
its presidt~nt in the~ lead, ought to offer Spaniards some sort of solution.
7'he only other possible alternative entails the destruction of the
government it561f.. The terrorists have unquestionably picked the right
time to act.
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The French press also evinced concern. "Even the president regarded
the new Spain of Juan Carlos and his ime minister, Adclfo Suarez,
as an amazingly sounri entity suffering~from a superficial localized
ill that could not, therefore, undermine the rest of the country
Unfortunately, things have not turned but as logic and reason would
indicate. Logic and reason are not the only components of Basque psychologp
It mentioned, in conclusion, the danger that "a fascist right
wing will rear its head, stirring all pf the lovers of law and order,
especially the military."S~
After assessing the situation and accusing the Suarez administration
of do-nothingism, LE MONDE said: "But what seems certain i5 that Saturday's
bombing will ta:ce Spain into the unknown."~8
The Congress of Deputies met again in plenary session on 30 May ~o
discuss the issue of terrorism. In the course of the session, rluring
~ai;ich Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez delivered a speech, a Congressional
Declaration on terrorism was passed.
- The declaration was signed by all of the parliamentary groups except
Democratic Coalitic~n and the M~xed Gro~p. It contained six points,
_ denouncing the recent bor~bings, pledging aid in the antiterrorist struggle
and condemning the attempts to prompt a lack of confidence among the
citizenry in democratic institutions.
For his parc, Suarez stresse3 that the recent terrorist attacks coincided
with the start of preliminary studies on the first autonomy statutes,
a few hours after Congress passed the security plan sLbmitted by Ibanez
Freire, and with the beginning of work on the constitution.
The spokesmen of the various parliamentary groups took the floor after
Suarez, and particular mention should be made of the categorical denunciation
of terrorism by the PNV's representative, Javier Arzallus. "All killing,
whether in a war or in an isolated attack, is barbaric," he said, stressing
the need to have the total support of the people in the struggle against
terrorism and noting, in this regard, that "the Chamber has perhaps
not been equal to the occasion." The latter reservation notwithstanding,
PNV had never before been so unqualified in its condemnation of terrorism.
The speeci~ by rhe spokesr~an of CD, Manuel Fraga, was particularly harsh.
He criticized the prime minister's speec:~, terning it "a pious address
oF fine-s~undir.g wo:ds." He went on to say: "The Span~sh psople have
be~e~n told something that i_nfuriates them: that this and only this is
the way it is."
'Phe bottom line on this tragic last week of May was politically very
significant. For now we can say that Suarez's political standing began
to decline at this point. From then en, the prime minist2r's performance
wzs marked by awkwarc~~iess, paralysis and confusion. Tre country got
the feeling that the top echelon of government was not in control and
losing its coay. Suarez holed bimself up in Mcncloa and lost his ability
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L'VL\ VL'1'lliltlL UJL' VL'ILL
to take the initiative. Hi~ former capacity to rise to the occa:~ion
when he was against the ropes was vanishing, and "Suarez's silences"
became alnost proverbial. It is true that Suare z also seemed pcwerless
Co deal with the other ma;or ~roblems plaguing the country (the economic
situaticn, autononies, etc), but it was terrori~~m that knocked him
out of the ring. '
The secon~ consequence was the er~boldening of th e rightwing extremist
groups and newspapers, which brazenly kept calling for a coup d'etat
that f~nally came on 23 February 1981. The combination of the two
elements could not h;~ve been more negative and worrisome. In fact,
nothing could be more ill-suited to stem ~he mounting pressures for
a coup than a government and a president that gave continual evidence
of being overwhelmed by evenes.
The Guernica Statute
The major political issue that the government h ad to tackle during
the spring of 1979 was the Basque statute. The draft version, called
tt:e Guerr.ica Statute, had finally been signed and accepted by all of
the Basque political parties except UCD. But doubts about the possible
unconstitutionality of the draft persisted, doubts that cvere underscored
at ttie mee~ing of thz joint Congress of Deputies-3asque legislators
cammittee. The difficulties ~etween Madrid and the Basque Country
were, in fact, heightened by a decree that declared that there was
a conflict of inter~st involved in being president of a pre-autonomy
body and a member of another such entity. This was a direct attack
on Carlos Garaicoechea, who had just been elected president of the
Basque General Co~nci? and was, at the same time, a member of the Foral ,
Parliar~ent of Navarre. In any case, Garaicoech ea did not resign from
either post.
~ These misunderst~ndings between the central government and the Basque
pre-autonomy institutions were heightened by a seriously worsening
law and order si.tuaticn in the Basque provinces and Navarre and by
the persistence of terrorism.
The starting point of this deteriorating situation was an antinuclear
demonstration on 3 June in Tudela (ilavarre) dur ing which a Venezuelan
waman, Gladys de Estal, died as a result of gunshot wounds caused by
the Eorces of public order. From that point on, in what ABC called
thE> "terrorist logic," there were numerous incidents, barricades were
rre~ctc~d and strikes were staged first in Navarre and then in the Basque
Co�ntry as well. The FOP bE~came the target of a car.?paign calling for
, tt~c~ir withdrawal ("Get them out!") and replacement by an autonomous
police~ force.
P'or several days terrorist actions were interspersed with FOP crackdowns,
both leading to deaths. On 6 June in Vergara CGuipuzcoa), ETA (m)
killed Luis Berasategui Mendizabal because he was thought to be a police
inEormer and an extreme rightwinger. On the 7th, ETA (m) murdered
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a rc�tirc~d infantry commander who worked in the San Sebastian city hall,
in 'C~>lc~s~ (Nnvr~rrc~). On the 8th in Renteria, a plainclothes policeman,
firir}; at pointblank range, killed a transvestite, Antonio Badillo.
The Far Right waded into the deadly chaos too, and on the same day
the AI~'E [Spanish National Action] planted a bomb in a bar in Zarauz
(G~:ipuzcoa). 'The incidents contir.ued in Renteria, and the police entered
city hall. Ttiere were further incidents and strikes, and in response,
more crackdowns with smokebombs and rubber bullets. A few days later,
on the 13th, ETA (m) managed to get into the Lemoniz nuclear powerplant
and plant a bomb in the turbine room that killed blue-collar worker
Angel Banos. Meanwhile, bombs continued exploding all over the Basque
Country, sor!metimes causir.g very serious damage.
~ Banos's death did not trigger any protest campaign, which showed that
l the abertzale groups were against violence only when it car.ie fror~ the
~ FOP. LA VANGUARDIA pointed this out in an editorial entitled "Second-
Class Deaths "Tc judge by the examples, the dea3 do not warrant "
consideration in and of themselves, but rather by virtue of who killed
them. When in an unfortunate incident that has not been suitably explained,
an antinuclear demonstrator lost her life as a result of a gunshot
in Tu~ela, enormous protest demonstrations were organized, culminating
_ in a general strike, and simply because the bullet had come from the
' weap~n o� a policenan. However, when shrapnel tore apart the body
of a man whose only crime was that he ~aas working,there was no visible
mo~rning or pro[ests, or strikes or denonstrations, nothing, because
his murderers were terrorists, the people who are trying to impose 60
th?ir ideas by scorching the earth and bathing it in blood and hatred."
ETA (p-m), which had been engaged in minor activities until that time,
set in motion in the summer of 1979 a battle plan along several fronts
that had all the earmarks of pressu:e tactics in connection with the
statute negotiations that were under way in Madrid.
The first move was to level threats at all central government officials
stationed in the Basqu~ Country. They were being asked "to resign
or leave the Basque national territory immediately." Otherwise, they
_ should consider themselves "condemned to death by the organization,
regardless of their degree of responsibility and independently of the
~ field in which they performed their functions."
Weighing the extent of this threat, the editor of CAMBIO 16, Jose Oneto,
wrote in his column: "ETF. is winning the psychological battle against
the State. The first victims of the Basque terrorist organization
were, so they say, well-knoran torturers under Franco. Subsequent victims
were mere policemen or civil guards, then individuals with links to
the Far Right. After th2t, citizens without any specific politicaL
ties and even worker activists hav~e been biting [he dust. Now, all
central government officials who do not leave the Basque Country have
been sentenced to die. Even so and even if the Guernica Statute is
approved as is, the ETA offens:ve will continue until the complete
independence of the Basque Country and the establishment of a socialist
= regime."61
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Perhaps never before ha~i a der.?ocratic mass medism stated sa categorically
that terrorism would not be halted or eradicated by means of any "political
measure," regardless of what it was. There would be no reason for
terrorism ta cease before achieving its ultimate goal: an independent,
socialist Basque Ceuntry. It was becoming evident that the policy
- of continual concessions was not going to achieve anything in return.
On.the oppesite er.treme there were those like i4ario Onaindia (who was
reelected secretary general of EIA at its First Congress from 14 to
17 June) wh~ thought that "with the statute will come peace." Some
days before the press had published a item accarding to which the EIA
wculd return to the armed struggle if the Guernica Statute did not
get through. Unaindia as~erted that "the EIA's process of birth is
irreversible. EIA ~aill continue to exist- and is not going to return
to ETA (p-m)." He stressed that "ETA (p-m) operates with complete
in~ependence. Our enly common ~.deological thread has to do with how
the revelutionary process must be brought about." With regard to the
statute, Onaindia was categorical: "The punctuation or terminology
can be changed, but the substance cannot be altered in the least."
The statute meant democratization. He saw the alternative this way:
"This is degenerating into something like Algeria, albeit with all
of the differences, but with the added danger that certain Basque .forces
lean towards a kind of fascism that regards everything Spanish as bad."62
In the meantime, the statute negotiations were running into serious
stumbling blocks. On 25 June UCD presented a thick document containing
"its reasons for disagreement" with the Basque Statute. A few members
of the party (P4inisters Joaquin Garrigues and Antonio Fontan and Miguel
' R. Herrero de Minon) recor~mended a more flexible "political reading"
to overcome the obstacles. Gabriel Cisneros, a member of the Constitutional
Committee, responded on behalf of the majority faction: "To set politics
against the law is tantamount, in the last analysis, to accepting the
supremacy of the jungle over a state of law." Certain political circles
predicted a permanent breakoff of the negotiations and then some sort
oE military intervention. This gives an idea of ~he gravity of the
situaticn.63
The Basque parties launched a pro--statutz campaign beginning on 27 June
with a massive demonstration in Bilbao. But ETA did not let up. For
example, durin~ a sniper attack on the National Police ba~racks in
Basauri, ETA (m) killed a comr~ercial agent, Diego Alfaro Orihuela,
and ETA bullets took the life of a CC00 [Workers Commissions] membnr,
Francisco Medina Albala, in San SeUastian.
At thE~ samE: timE~, thc~ purely political prESSUre reached an extremely
high lc~vc~l., DF:IA, the semiofficial mouthpiece of the �NV, said in
z 26 .Junc editc~rial entitled "The Last Car in the Last Train" ti~at
iE Madrid whittled down the draft statute, "the c:ollective frustration
oC a people would rE:ach its limit, and the Basque Country could become
anether Ulster." If this should come to pass," it continued, "there
wi11 be those or us who cuould defend civil disobedience to its ultimate
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c~nclusion. Others will have even more reasons than they have so far
t~:~cl t~ r~~~ffirm their choice of a gr.assroots armed struggle. The Basque
people are prepared to once again stann up to those who are bent
on denying them their rights as a national community." To DEIA, "direct
responsibility for our 'Ulsterization' will lie witih those whose emphasis
on what is Spanish ignores the reality of a c~ultinational State of
nationalities, peoples and regions tfiat hzve joined together in solidarity
of their own free wi:l." Further on, the PNV mouthpiece mentioned
those who "as a pretext" allude to the "possibility of military inter-
vention in the Basque Country." This rumor, which has been "disproved
as on other occasi.ons, always crops up on the eve of Pvents connected
wit~ the Basqce Country. If this were to happen, the 'Ulsterization'
would be caused not by Ehe Basque people's reac64on to unjust r~easures
but by the application of a military solution.
This ultinatum-like tone, which makes it so hard to tell exactly what
mere civil disobedience would consist of and how it would be different
f~om armed struggle, was Fartially toned down the foLlowing day, when
the Guernica Statute was described as "the watchword of the Basques
caho are wagering on a free, peaceful Basque Country" and as a"rarional
offer of peace by the Basque people to the rest of Spain. The Basque
Country has spoken; Madrid now has the floor."65
ETA (p-n) Against Tourisr~
As July drew near, ETA (p-m) began activities on a new front, tourism,
making the summer of 1979 a bloody one.
The ETA (p-m)'s sur.uner campaign began on 26 June when the police set
off a bomb.contairing 15 kilograms of gunpowder in Torrem~linos, right
on the Costa del Sol. Another bomb went off before the police were
able to interver.e, though it claimed no victims. The following day,
another e:cplosion in Fuengirola interrupted electric service. In Marbella
on the 28th, there were three explosions in just 3 hours. ETA (p-~r),
which claimed responsibility for these bombings, provided ieads in
some cases so that the police could detect the h;:mbs bef~re they went
off. It claimed that it did not want to cause any deaths.
This campaign against tourism, which continued through early July,
had been announced for some tir~e and, according to the British weekly
~EWS OF TH~' WORLD, was part of a plan that had been prepared by the
IRA and the Baader-ideinhof gang in addition to ETA. The German p~lice
denie~d any such links. There was also speculation, albeit without
oroof, that German terrorists who had entered Spain as tourists were
involved in these attacks. I.ater on, it was learned that several French
= women were acting as ETA agents. Inasmuch as amonal (compressed pow~er)
was the explosive used in almost every case, instead of ETA's traditional
"goma-2," the Spanish police did not rule out the possibility that
ETA (p-m) was making use of "action groups that might be close to anarchistic
communist views."66
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� v. � tv.~~~U a~~~al VL\L/
On 30 June, a bomb that went off at a beach near the Plueva Andalucia
Casino in riarbella's Puerto Banus, serio~isly burned a Belgian tourist
co~lple. The following day, the headline in the Gerr~an Sunday paper
BILD AM SONTAG read: "Tourists Bathed in Blood." Monday's BILD ZEI'iUNG,
: wi~h an almost five million copy edirion, bcre the headline "Spain
uuf" and these two subheads: "Vacation train amid a hail of bullets"
and "Gas attack, 80 Germans robbed at camp site." Another giant headline
read: "Mallorca: Five Slain at Hotel," referring to an accidential
fire at a Palma hotel. The ETA (p-n) campaign was begining to achiPVe
its goals.
On 3 July in Madrid, Gabriel Cisneros, a UCD deputy and a member of
_ the Constitutional Committee w2s the object of a attempted kidnaping
as he got our oE his car. As he fought free znd fled, he was hit by
several rounds of bullets that left him gravely wounded. ABC spoke
of the "all-out war" by ETA and stated: "If the presence of Gabriel
Cisneros on tt~is committee [the one working on the Bas~ue Statute]
was the sole reason or one of the reasons for this attack, then the
terorists are also trying to influence the content of the autonomy
statutes. To put it another way, violence such as this could r.3ise 6~
, doubts as to how uncoercedly and cleanly the statutes are being approved."
MUNDO OBRERO, which is still the PCE's daily mouthpiece, concluded:
"They wanted to kill Ga~riel Cisneros so i.hat the Guernica Statute
would not be passed, so that no statute would be passed."68
Meanwhile, the bor~bs kept going off on the Costa del Sol, the Costa
Brava, in Castellon and in Benidorm. The ETA (p-m)'s goals were spelled
out in one of its communiques: "If in the 24 hours following this communique
the FOP are not withdrawn from the Soria jail and the decision not
made to return all prisoners to the Basque Country, this organization
will continue planting bombs throughout the tourist arPas of the Spanish
State." Clearly, ETA (p-m) had shifted from the pubiicity and propaganda
coups that had characterized it so far to patently terrorist activities.
The connection between this campsign by ETA (p-m) and the debate on
the statute was obvious, moreover, because another communique in June
said: "ETA (p-m) is prepared to attack Spain's entire setup in the
Basq~e Country until such time as the Guer.nica Statute is approved .
...[which] along with the incorporation ~f Navarre and a decree of
amnesty for all Basque prisoners and exi~es, cvill be what will halt
its armed struggle."
In the meantime, debate continued in Madrid on the Guernica Statute.
The disc�ssions were taking place on two levels, inasmuch as the Cortes
was hashing over the joint working document while at Moncloa the rea.i
negotiations were going on between the administration and UCD, on Lhe
~ne hand, and the P~V on the other.
An agreement was finally reached on 17 Jul~, and early the next morning
tht~ committee put the final touches on its report, the news being made
public on the morning of the 18~h. "We now have a statute," was the
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I~~I I-pa~;~� hc�;~dl inc� in UI.JA. It also published a front-page editorial
_ in Basyur ("G};nn gogoangarri bat") and in Spanish ("La primera piedra
de la paz" [The Cornerstone of Peace]) in which it stated in a joyful,
hopeful tone: "All indications are that the spirit of the Guernica
_ Statute has not only been maintained. in the text of the agreement (including
mention of rlavarre) but in some instances has also been enhanced. The
Basque people are on the verge of regaining their national rights."
Then, after ~ondering the virtues of dialogue, it asserted that "Now
is the time to bury 'gona-2' and killings as a method of dissuasion,"
ad~ing immediately thereafter, hocaever, tl:at "though we can never forget
that institutional violence is still at times present in our land."
. It also went on to say: "At Chis happy hour it would not be fair to
forget those who died without having seen this d2y or those who are
still in exile or in prison." It cencluded by warning that "no one,
under any pretext, should try to frustrate our people's hope for peace."
Any comment would be unnecessary.
But these ambiguous words of peace were obviously not meant for ETA.
Once agreement on the stat~te had been rea.^.h~d, the military branch,
which had let up for almost a month, murdered Jesus Maria Colomo Rodriguez,
a waiter that it accused of being an informer, on 21 July in Villafranca
de Ordicia (Guipuzcoa) and on the 28th fired machine guns at a National
Police ~ehicle in Bilbao, killing lst Lt Mig~el Saro Perez and police
officer Emilio Lopez de la Pena. The following day in San Sebastiar.,
two civil guards, Sgt Maj Moises Cordero Lopez and recruit Antonio
Pastor Martin, were victims of another attack.
These actions were proof that, as s~spected, ETA (m) did not accept
the statute. Herri Batasuna, ETA (m)'s political voice, also expressed
~ its rejection of the statute through several pror?inent r~embers. Miguel
Castells declared: "This statute has been signed behind the people's
backs. We cannot understand how forces that consider themselves leftist
could have signed a rightwing pact." Telesforo Monzon told EGIN: "You
' will see happier faces on the Boards of Directors in Vizcaya and in
the ministries in Madrid than in the factories in Euskalherria and at
the modest gatherings of true Basque patriots." Nothi.ng had changed
i? the eyes of Herri Batasuna, which unlike other Basque parties, had
still not condemned the latest ETA (m) attacks.
DEIA haC this to sav about the most recent assaul.ts: "People in large
working class areas had the impression that the agreement on the Guernica
Statute could spell the end of armed violence or at least the start
of a long truce. Others who are more realistic about pol~tics were
net only not expecting a cease-fire but even felt that the armed violence
was going to increase. Unfortunately, realism has asserted itself.
The police officers who were machined-gunned to death yesterday are
the first victims of the statute." It later wonc'ered: "Is there any
way to understand violence an~ murder at this particular moment in
time? What justification is there ror a tiny group to arrogate represen-
tntion of an entire people and to impose the law of death just a few
w~~e~ks before thr referendum? Are they afraid of losing the battle
at thc~ ballot box? How eff.ectively can one struggle and call for amnesty
when death is claiming new victims?"69
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On ~hc� v~~ry samE~ day, AfiC came out against any new annesties: "All
possible annesties or all amnesties with potential political groun~s
have already been granted. The time has past when we can ignore the
shedding of blood and the commission of crimes. To grant the new amnesty
that Leizaola and Monzon are calling for would be tantamount to proclaining
that the future of Spain an~' its denocracy is going to be determined
net by the law but by the dictate~ of violence and terror. it wo~ild
Se the same as [...1 i~d�~~n~ the country over to the atrocious and
abominable dictatorship of extremist groups."~~
Dashed or.ce again was the hepe that a"political measure" (and tre
statute was a compendiur~ of all desirable political r~easures) would
_ put an end to terrorism. Signing with its bloodstained initials, ETA (r.?)
was communicating its decision to continue along the path of violence.
In contrast, things sE~emed to be on a better track with ETA (p-r~).
In doc~~ment the organization stated that the statute "is an import2nt
step towai�ds the independence of the Basque Country." adding: "We denounce
thc~ irrational, sectarian stand by Herri Batasun~ and certain so-called
Pro-Amnesty Groups, which are denying the Basque working people one
of the most important gains in their history."
The shift fror~ the summer campaign of terrc- to this constructive attitude
~aas d~e to negotiations between F,TA (p-m) and the government. The
tE:rrcrist organization was said to have promised the government to
halt its violence if the FQP were withdrawn from Soria Prison and if
Basque prisoners were transferred to the Basque Country. Apparently
involved in the negotiations was N?ario Onaindia, the secretary general
of EIA, a party whose ties with ETA (p-m) we are already familiar with.
Around that time Onaindia was in riadrid, where he entered the Congress
of Deputies and mac~e a comment that stirred up contreversy: "ETA is
~~aging a holy war with Madrid." He was acconpanied on this trip by
another member ef EIA, Garayalde, alias "Herreka," who, it was said,
might have been the person who actually negotiated with the government.
"Onaindia misleads and Herreka negotiates," went the saying.
Althaugh the government later denied, tr ~~~gh its official spokesman,
that negotiations took place, something rr. t have happened because
on 9 July the National Police left Soria P.ison, and in the wake of
rumors, it was announced on the 24th that the ETA members being held
there evould be transferred to Nanclares de Oca Prison in Alava beginning
in early 1480.
'Pli~~rc� k~~~s harsh ccnt:rontation on 14 July in Soria Prison between
the~ 30 or so political-military branch mer~bers an~ the more than 80
military branch Members. The bone of ccntention was the statute, and
this outbre2k of violence a~r~ong ETA personnel fcrced the National Police
to enter the jail once again ~o separate the two sides and restore ,
order.
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It was also learned that a dozen political-military branch riembers
m~~v~�~ ovc~r to thP military wing because they disagreed with their former
branch's acceptance of the statute. Outside the jail as well certain
(p-m) people, s~ch as the 14 memb~rs of the so-called "zone team,"
, joined ETA (m). ETA was once again being torn apart.
At the same time, a war of wor~s that occasionally became physical
was going on between the political e uivalents of ETA's two branches,
Herri Batasuna and the Basque Left.~~
But just when it seemed as if some progress had been made in neutralizing
terrorism through the pact with ETA (p-m), the unexpected happened.
On Sunday 29 July in Madrid, three ETA (p-m) bombs went off at
Barajas Airport and at the Atocha and Chamartin railway stations, causing
5 deaths and more than 100 wounded.72 A genuine climate of terror
spread throughout the country, which was taken aback by criminal acts
whose targets were railway stations and airports at a tine when millions
of people were going on vacation. This ~aas indiscriminate, widespread
terrorisr~, the most odious version of a blind violence that seeks only
to terrorize the masses and cause the collapse of life in society.
As could be imaginE~d, the press and political parties reacted strongly.
ABC set forth five principles: "When a group of people, be it large
cr small, finds that another group has declared all-out war on it,
it has to realize the following facts:
I) It is of no use to engage in the rhetoric that almost nothing is
happening
2) Camnaigns of verbal dissuasion are of no use
- 3) Condemnations and rebukes are of no use
4) Political concessions are of no use in dealing with terrorism
5) In a word, i:.: ~'ealing with an all-out aggressor, the only choice
is between total political victory or total physical defeat. It conclude~
by calling on everyone to mobilize.73
LP. VANGUARDIA was just as forceful, attributing ETA's latest moves
to its isolation. It commented on the remark by the old Basque socia.list
Ramon Rubial, who had recalled the "dirty war" tactics that De Gaiille
used to do away with the OPS. "He went on to say," LA VANGUARDIA
continurd, "that 'Of course a democract shouldn't say this.' This
mc~vin~; cummrnt rc~minds us that democracy is somethin~ fragile and delicate
thc~t must be d~fended tooth and nail. :he provocation of all-out war
that now seems obvious demands radical surgery if an assessment of 74
the situation shows that there is no other way to regain our health."
~
CAMBIO 16's editorial writer, Juan Tomas de Salas, wrote: "There are
no political measures against ETA, only police measures. t1o statute
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r~c~ VP P 11.1t1L U~n VLVLI.
will ever satisfy these apprentices of crime, and the high-minded or
fezrful should not fool themselves because independence would not put
an end to ETA either."75
DEIA reiterated its well-known line: "We are in favor of all the noble
objectives of our people (am~.esty is one of them), but we cannot accept
that these banners be monopolized by those who believe that the only
valid language is machine-gun fire or bombings, with or without telephone
warnings."76
The following day, ABC came out strongly against this call for amnesty,
_ which was also voiced hy EGIN, terming it an "undermining of
the principle of State authority." It went on to say that "unfortunately,
the PNV mouthpiece is providing evidence that the. agreement on the
statute w2s not even of any use in mitigating the moral equivocation
of the Basque nationalist Right. 1'he irre~ponsible call for a new
amnesty when Spa~n is being bled b~~ ETA madness is a very dangerous
complement to the terrorist aim o~ cutting the Basque people off, on
- a gut level, from the rest of their countrymen." It concluded with:~~
"Amnesty, yes, for the future victims of the grim terrorist reaper."
ETA (p-m), represented by three hooded individuals, called a meeting
~vith newsmen in early Aug~st "somewhere" in the Basque Country to try
and explain its stunning and lethal moves on 29 July in Madrid. In
a communiq~ie read to the newsmen, ETA (p-m) "deeply regretted the deaths
in Madrid" and asserted that the campaign of attacks was resumed "after
the breakdown of negotiations with the government." It was on that
very day that the administration's afficial spokesman, Josep rielia,
roundly denied the existence of such negotiations. ~it the same time, ~
ETA (p-m) announced that even if the statute went into effect, it would
not halt its armed struggle, "which will be tailored to the new political
conditions." "There will be no spectacular moves," the ETA communique
said, "but ttiere will be incisive involvement in factories, the citizen
movement, neighborhoods and culture, for example." It was the political-
military b:~nch's same old doctrine, the only change being the acknowledg-
ment of the statute."78
For its part, ETA (m) kept up the trickle of slayings throughout August;
eight murders showe~' that it was continuing along the same path of
terror.79
1
A 131c~w To CRAPO
CR11PC~, tli~~ oth~~r tt~rrorist group battering the democratic regime, was
ci~~alt r~ lic~rsh hlow i.n late July 1979.
As we~ have mentioned, the police attributed the bombing of the cafe
at 47 California to GRAPO even though it denied in an issue of GACETA
ROJA, a mouthpiece of the PCE (r), that it was involved. idany of the
m~~ss media had be~n emphasizing, noreover, that the Far Right could
h:ivE~ brrn respc~nsiblc~ Eor th~ attack, which killed 8 and wour.ded 40.
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'Th~~ polinsidcred German Gonzalez "a collaborator with the forces of repression,"
and given his membership in the Socialist Party, which reacted immediately,
they mentioned that this and other parties were callaborating "with
State terrorism."
The UGT and CC00 called a general strike. It was the first antiterrorist
general strike. Socialist leaders reacted strongly. Chiqui Benegas
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_ spc~kr of thc~ "nrw terrorist Eascism" and asserted: "We are not going
t>~'
EL PAIS addressed the issue in a much more complex and ambiguous manner.
After having questioned the timing of the prosecution requests ~"Let us
hope that that yesterday's vote is not remembered as an irrevocable
- political mistake," it said on 28 November after the requests were
granted, in an editorial oppo~ing the campaign against Bandres) and
having oppose.d the extension of the Antiterrorist Law of 4 December 1978
(its 5 December editorial), it commented on Ruperez's release, noting
several "pessimistic signs" such as "the persistence of a bloodthirsty,
absurd terrorism in the Basque Country the authoritarian regression
reflected in the offensive against Deputy Bandres, the unconstitutional
Decree-Law to extend the Antiterrorist Law and the requests to prosecute
Messrs Monzon and Letamendia It also remarked that "why not
come out and say it the decision to release a hostage safe and
sound without a police encirclement tinat would have made it inevitable,
gives us some small, though no[ trif~i~g, hope that some day ETA (p-m)
might .(a remote possibility that we cannot, however, rule out) abandon
the insane premises of its terrorism, violence and armed struggle and
accept the ground rules of negotiations, pacification and democratic
freedoms." Showing an enormous understanding for the terrorists and
sounding almost like Saint Francis, the Madrid daily went on to say:
"We know that it is very difficult to dismount from a tiger and that
an attempt to do so probably exposes the rider to the risk of being
devoured by the beast or shot down by the hunter." Further on, applying
the old saying that every cloud has a silver lining, it asserted: "In
his hazardous, involuntary and reprehensible voyage, Ruperez has probably
seen not the true face of the moon, but the sincerity, which is no
less real by b~ing warped, with which a few desperate boys experience,
from their own peculiar and errant angle, some of the effects on the
Basque Country of a government policy that has all too often been
irrelevant, timid and simply following in the wake of events."> �
We could say that as far as EL PAIS is concerned, the only one to blame
is thE: Kov~~rnment, while the rerrorists are the result of "the force
of events" and, therefore, condemnable but, however, pardonable and
t~ven understandable.
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Mc�:inwliil~, 1:'fA (m) kept remining people of its existence through its
~~;~~:il mrrh~ci