JPRS ID: 10637 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080011-6
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• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS V10637
6 Ju~Y 1982
Sub-Sc~haran Africa Re ort
p
FOUO No, 779
FBIS FOREIGy BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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JPRS L/10637
6 July 1982
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 779
CONTENTS .
ANGOLA
R~newal of Trade Ties With Brazi:l Discussed
(AFRICAN AF'F'AIRS, Jan 82j 1
CHAD
Kamougue Reportedly Undertaking Secret Negotiations With Habre
(dEL~tE AFRIQUE, 28 4pr 82) 3
. Goukouni Said To.Be Seeking A]liance Bet~een FAT, FROLINAT
(Ginette Cot; AFRIQUE-ASIE 26 Apr-9 1~tey 82) 4
- CONGO
~each-Congolese Trade Increases in 1981
= (MARC~S TROPICAUX�ET MEDITERRANEENS, 21 May 82) 7
French Aid to Agricultural Research, Mecheuization
- (MARC~S TROPICAUX~ ET MEDITERRANEF~TS, 21 May' 82) . . . . . . 9
Briefs
_ Regulatiaa~~ of Pnblic I~xkets u
OPfice of Industrial Development u
' Canadian Cooperaticm u
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
' . President Hopes for Increased Spanish Aid
(MA,Rf~ES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEIIQS, 21 May 82) 12
French Economi.c Cooperation Described
(MARCHES TROPICAUX Er MEDITERRANEENS, 7 r;~y 82) lk
Briefs
Discovery oY Quality Petroleum .16
, - a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO~
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ETHIOPIA
Solids,rity Committees With Cuba, DGR, Vietnam Formed
(Victor M. Carriba; PRELA, 12 Jun 82) 17
GABON
. Politiae,l Crisis Sai d To Be Persisting, Worsening
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 26 Apri9 May 82) 19

~ Preaident Lays Cornerstones for Mayumba Development Pro~ects
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEIIQS, 21 May 82) 20
Cacao Cultivation To Be Revived
(MARCI~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 May 82) 22
C~N~IA
1 Gambiaas Accept Formatioa of Senegambia in Principle
(David Sharp; JEL~TE AFRIQUE, 28 ?,pr 82) 24
(~iANA
Tribe~lism Issue Analyzed, Accepted Concepts l~odifiea
(AFRICAN A~'F'~,IRS, Jan 82) 26
GUIREA
Accomplishments and Prospects of Econoa~r Described
(MARCHES TROPICAtJX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 May 82) ................,28
Brie fs
Sek,ou Toure's Visit to Fraace 32
Presidential Election Results g2
I~A Industrial Sector Credit 33
IWRY COAST
Role of Scientific Research in Ecoaomic Recovery Examined
(Koffi Mamane; AFRIQL~ ASIE, 10-23 May 82) 34
MOZAbIDIQUE
Campaiga Against Police Abuses Produces Results
(AFRICAN AF'F'AIRS, Apr 82) 37
NLGER
Kountche Apparent].y Moving Toward Restoration of Civil Rule
(Siradiou Di allo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 28 Apr 82) 39
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SENEG~~L
Proposed Shipping Line Will Aid Exports
~MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR~TEENS, 21 Mey 82) ~+1
~ Briefs
Tw~o New Parties
' Agreement Signed ~2
Belgian Cooperation Program ~
~ Rice Sta'_ls Set Up ~3
~ Argentine Hydraulic~Equi~ment 43
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ANGOLA
~
i RENEWAL OF TR~"�~A TIES WITA BSAZIL DISCt1SSED
~ bondon AFRIGAN AFFAIRS in Eng~iah Vol 81, No 322, Jan 82 pp 15-16
[Text] The end of the slave trade between Brazil and Angola in 1860 practically
severed trading links between the two countries for over one hundred
I years. There remained an intermitten~ circulation of Portuguese capital from
Brazil to Angola and Mocambique, which involved a few wealthy Portuguese
famili~s. In tr,e other direction, profits fcom colonial banks were used to Snance
~ banking operations in Brazil. In the 1970s there has been a renewal of trade
~ between Brazil aad Angola, and Brazitian capital has begun to enter
~ Angola. Brazil's economic links with Angola have ~sveloped more rapidly than
i those with Mozambique, pardy because Brazil wished to diversify her oil
, imports. The presence in Mocambique of BraTilians, wha opposed the military
~ regime and assisted Frelimo in the struggle against Portuguese colonialism may
also have been a factor. The Angolan government, on its part, does not exclude
, economic relations with ccunL�ies like Bra2i1, whose regimes are ideologically
opposed to its socialist model, since it needs technology and capital from these
~ s~urces.
Brazilian exports to Angola have grown from nzgligible amounts in the early
seventies to S89 m in 1979. A breakdown of Brazilian exports for the years
1978 and 1979 shows that vehicles make up over half the total. Since 1979, a
wide varie~y of food items have been imported from Brazil ($28 m in
; 1979 j. Agricultural output fell after independence and foad now accounts for
about a quarter of Ar_gola's import bill. In the wake of the Portuguese
withdrawal, the food distributiar, system coQapsed. The food processing
industry is also in poc~r condition. Irl addition large scale immigration to Luanda
has forced the government to increase food supplies and other services to the
city. The Brazilian supermarket chain Paa de Acucar has a management con-
tract to assist state supermarkets in Luanda, and food is distributed through
people's shops and x huge jumbo supermarket. A private Brazilian construcdon
' and coresultanry company, Sisal, ha~ contracts of $210 m witfi thc Angolan
- National Directorate of Tourism and Hotels for the construction and improve-
ment of hotels.
Brazilian imports from Angola are small, but an agreement signed between
two state oil companies has'.ong term implications for the expar.sion of bilateral
trade. Petrobras, has a contract to buy 7,000 barrels of oil a day, and the value
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af oil exports in 1980 was 585 m. Petrobras, has a 17 5 per cent stake in one
concession and another is being negotiated. Petrobras is also to provide
technical assistance for Angola in all aspects of the oil industry. One way in
which Brazil has actively puraued closer relations with lusophone countries in
- Africa is through technical assistance. Here the P~rtuguese language gives
Brazil a first class advantage. Brazil is a leading exponent of South-South
- relations and advertises her `tropical technology'. The Brazilian government
has supported technical ccwperadon between developing countries
(TCDC). In 1980, Brazil set up a fund for the promotion of TCDC
activities. Such activities invol~e Africans visiang Brazil on study tours and
uaining programmes to familiarize them with Brazilian technology and know
how. In the longer run this serves to promote Brazilian technology and con-
sultancy services. In 1979, UNIDO conuacted a Brazilian consultancy firm to
carry out a survey of food processing plants in Angola, and a large scale project tQ
assist these plants will, if accepted by the :~ngolan goeernment, be carried out by
Brazilian companies.
COPYRIGHT: The Royal African Society and Contributors 1482
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CHAn
-i
~
KAMOUGUE REPORTEDLY UNDERTAKING SECRET NEGOTIATIONS WITH HABRE
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1112, 28 Apr 82 pp 26, 27
[TextJ What is Lt Col Wadal Abdel Kacier Kamougue looking for~ Vice president
of ~he Transitional National Union Government (GUNT) and, as such, number
two in the Goukouni Weddaye regime, the southertt leader never loses an
opportunity to evoke the need "to crush Hussein Habre's rebellion." Logical.
But this same Kamougue, when he leaves the capital (where, it is true, his
appearances are rather infrequent nowadays) to reach hie stronghold of Moundou,
c~riously multiplies statements that are strictly opposed.
Thus, he stated, on 17 April, that "everyone ia tired of the war," and that
it was urgently necessary "to work for peace." As early as 4 March, the
"Standing Committee responsible �or administering the southern zone" (political
administrative headquar~ers of the south, over which he presideesj, had
advocated, in a m~norandum, a"general cease-fire." No more, ~o less.
~ At Nd~amena, where Guy Penne, Mitterraad's adviser for African and Malagasy
affairs, ,just made a fly~ng visit on 18 April, Kamougue's attitude is
considered pretty demoralizing. Those on Habre's side, on the otheY~Iland,
arce r+abbing their hands, but without building up any excessive illuaions.
F'or no one is unaware in Chad that Wadal Abdel Kader Kamougue, even i� he
r~ales as uncontestc::?. master in three of the five southern provinces ~the two
Logones and Moyen-Chari), is very much opposed 3n Tan~ilet ana eepecially in
_ Mayo-Kebbi.
Moreover, his most recent stands have provoked a general outcry on the part
of several southern personalititea, such as his former companions Naiambaye,
Ngangbet and Kassire, who do not hesitate to advance the hypothesis of aecret
dealings between him and Hussein Habre. Lastly, it would be wrong to believe
that Kamougue, who carefully avoids participating directly in the clashes
between the GUNT troops and those of Habre, represents the only military
force south of the Chari: in fact, he controla directly only the forces of
the gendarmerie, the former members of the Chadian National Army (ANT, fortned
_ under Tombalbaye and Malloum) having preferre3 to keep themselves, for the
- momenC, "in reserve."
- COPYRI~~iT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982
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CHAD
GOUKOUNI SAID TO BE SEEKING ALLIANCE BETWEEN FAT, FROLINAT
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 26~+ 26 Apr-9 May 82 p 32
[Articie by Ginette Cot: "Kamougue's Conspiracy"]
' [Text] The vice president of the GUNT [Transitional.
National ~'nion Government] broke unanimity on behalf
of a rapprochement with Hissein Habre. But the FAT
[Togolese Armed ForcesJ deny him any right to apeak
in ttieir nam~.
While urgEnt threats are once again building up against Chad, Colonel Kamougue,
who claims to represent the south of the country, has ~ust broken the unanimity
demonstrated by the GUNT in its re~ection of Nairobi's dictate, in which,
last 11 February, a group of African atates had called on him to negotiate
wlth Hissein Habre.
On 4 March, the GUNT vir_e president, E�ithout even informing his government
in advance, issued a memorandum which he addressed to the OAU and the United
Nations, caLling for a ~ease-fire and an "overall political settlement." He
thus agreed with and supported the wishes of an OAU pressure group favorable
to the return of the chief of the FAN [Northern Armed Forces] to the Chadian
po~itical scene and, ultimately, the inatallation of a"muscled" dictatorship
in Nd~amena. For, in spite of the sidestepping and contradictory explanations
of the GUNT vice president, no one is deceived as to the meaning of his opera-
ti~n. Everyone knows that supported by~the United States, certain French
business and financial circles, as well as by the most reactionary A-frican .
states, ane~. ^onsiderably enriched by the revenue coming from the economic
- activity in 'che southern region of the country, which he has largely diverted
to his own benefit, Colonel Kamaugue is in the process of negotiating with the
FAN, with a view to an economic aliiance, and is working to destabilize, from
within, the coalition forces of the GUNT.
It goes without saying that these maneuvera have had serious conaequences in
the field, withaut creating confusion or sharpening the contradictions within
the government forces.
It is known how, while new arguments were thus furnished Hissein Habre's
supporters, the last government offensive.launched against the FAN turned
sharply at Oum Had~er. At the same time, if the resolutions of Nairobi III
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were for the moment kept in the dark, the OAU nevertheless is atill continuing,
through its present force on Chadian territory, to "work" in the same direction.
The staffs of the pan-African force would reportedly be indulging in dangerous
b.lackmail. I~ might thus have been decided that the government forces wou~d
no longer have the right to launch military offensives from places where OAU
soldiers have established themselves. At Ati, some 30 kilometers distant from
Oum Hadjer, occupied by the FAN, Zairians and Senegalese from the pan-African
force might threaten to leave the locality if government forc~a did not leave
the field.
Lastly, while, in spite of f inancial aid from France, the state coffer~--still
deprived of the revenues from the south--2re hopelessly empty, the hypothesis
of an economic blockade is far from being set aside. Everything is happening
as if it was the intention to drive the president of the GUNT and the patriotic
forces of the country to the brink of a fatal impasse.
However, paradoxically, the backwash provoked by the Kamougue affair has laid
the foundations of a possible clarification of the situation. Far from having
a following, as he expected, in his region of origin, the GUNT vice president,
whose initiative was immediately denounced as a"betrayal" by political and
military personalities from the south of the country, appears to be a man more
and more isolated and discredit.
At the conclusion of a meeting held from 31 March to 3 April last, the officers,
noncommissioned officers and enlisted men of the FAT--on behalf of whom Kamougue
signed the various Kano and Lagos agreements in 1979, and was named vice
- president of the GUNT--made public a resolution in which they deny the latter
any right to represent them and to act on their behalf or in their place.
In this document, the FAT states, in particular, that the standing committeP,
a deliberative and executive body set up in the south following the first
Nd~amena war in 1979 and of which Kamougue still claims to be chairman, is
doing a bad job of managing the public finances of the state, that it has be-
come unpopular and, in addition, no longer has any representativeness. The
FAT stresses, at the same time, the need for "an energetic takeover by men"
to meet the situation prevailing in the east of the country, occupied by the
FAN .
In conclusion, the FAT advocates a series of ineasures whose implementation might
facilitate a spectacular rectificatiox~ of the situation. It states, in parti-
cular, that the standing committee should be forbidden to use public funds and
calls on the GUNT to set up, in the southern zone, a joint territorial admin-
istration composed of soldiers and civilians.
~ Lastly, it demands representation within the GUNT by a military man other
' than Kamougue.
Like an echo, the FROLINAT [Chadian National Liberation Front], politically
reunified, published a statement on 3 April in which it denouced Kamougue's
initiative as part of a long-ongoing attempt to undernine the GUNT's authority.
At the same time, the FROLINAT welcomed the position taken by the FAT, which,
it pointed out, should serve as an example to all the forces not yet integrated
into the national army.
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It is in thia context, in which anything may yet happen--the worst as well
as the best--that President Goukouni Weddeye was willing to grant ue an
exclusive interview in IVd~amena last 3 April. As will be seen, the GUNT
president insists, in the cnurse of this interview, on the need during this
phase, in which it is a question of saving the country from the complication
of war and Che threat of dismemberment, to promote a solid alliance between
the patriotic forces of the FAT and the progressive-leaning f orces of the
FROLINAT. Indeed, only such an alliance may make it possible to foresee
a positive outcome.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Afrique-Asie.
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CONGO
i
FRENCH-CONGOLESE TRADE INCREASES IN 1981
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITRRRANEENS in French No 1906,:21 May 82 p 1346
[Text] French-Congolese trade increased spectacularly in. 1981: 137.5 percent
in one year (2.89 billion French francs, compared with 1.21 billion i.n 1980).
~ It was Congolese exports to France that rose the most in value in a year (up
486 percen.t), from 121.4 million French francs in 1980 to 711.7 million in
_ 1981.
French exports to the Congo rose 98.9 percent at the same~time, going from
1.09 billion francs to 2.18 billion. .
~ The trade balance remained favorable to France in 1981 and Paris' rate of cover
~ b~came much more reasonable than in the past (30G percent compared with 904
j percent in 1980).
i
~ Congolese Sales
~ The enormous growth in Congolese sales to France ia explained by the overwhelm-
ing predominance of oil (78 percent). TJranium also reappears in Congolese ex-
por~s, but these are ac~ually re-exports, with the metal coming from Gabon
� (Moanda mines).
In contrast, the other. exports dropped 15 percen~ in 1981 (].03 million French
francs, compared with 121.4 million in 1980). The value of wood exports
dropped 6 percent in 1 year, totaling 69.4 million French francs. However,
the relative sh~re of wood increased, making up 67.4 percent of all exports,
excluding uranium and oil. Wood sold abroad mainly includes rough timber and
some re-exports from the Central African Republic.
- French Exports
The dou~bling in value of French sales is not linked to any modification in
exports. In 1981, France sold the Congo machinery (388 million French francs,
up 150 percent on an annual basis); iron and steel (387 million, up 100 per-
cent); ocean and river navigation equipment (186.2 million, compared with 6.5
in 1980); electric machinery and apparatuses (180 million, up 183 percent);
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automobiles and cycles (154 million, up 110 percent); pharmaceutical producta
(101 million, up 28 percent). All these products make up 10 percent of French
exports.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982 ~
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CONGO
FRENCH AID TO AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH, MECHANIZATION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1906, 21 May 82 p 1346
[Text] On page 1286 of our 14 May 1982 i~sue, we briefly mentioned the grant-
ing of French aid to Congolese agriculture: two financial grants of 2 million
French f rancs (100 million CFA fraitcs) each, given through the FAC (Aid and
- Cooperation Fund).
The first agreement 3ust signed in Brazzaville concerns the first phase of
agricultural research completed~in 1981. It has ta~de it possible to equip
the Loudima power plant and to set up two regional branches at Kiadataba and .
Odziba. Above all, it made it possible t~ rebuilt the genetic resource pool .
for food production and also to obtain better yielde and thereby better meet
the food needs of the population. From 1977 to 1981, Freach participaCion in
the project amounted to 285�.5 million CFA francs. ~
, The pro3ect has two phases: The first, totaling 94 million CFA francs, should
' make it possible to set up the third regional branch at.Ewo, develop programs
undertaken in recent years and complete the training of ~natfonal~research '
workers called~ upon to take .the place of expatriots. ~ It .therefore .involves
technical assistance, training, ~quipment and~ certain operating expenditurea
(mainly analyses), the latter generally borne by the Congo. The second phase
will make it possible to complete equipping of the CTFT [Technical Center for
Tropical Forestry] 3n ~itro laboratory in Pointe-Noire, to be used for forest .
~ research.
The second agreement has to.do with development of amall-scale mechariiaation.
- In 1980, the diagnostic results of the experimental phase of the mechanized ~
farming project in the Congo, a project lasting a total of six years (1974-19
~ 1976, training pha~se; 1976-1978, e.xperimentation phase essentially based on
government farms; 1979-1980, pre-extension phase in rural areas and for which
the FAC f inancial aid was 326 million CFA) were drawn up. Their conclusione
made it possible to launch a taechanization program in rural.areas. This ~
grant, folZowing the opening of a 100-CFA-franc credit in 1981, is for the
second year of the development initiation program.
The economic advantages of,mechanization have been understood in the rural.
areas, which have for 2 years borne part of the expenses involved in operat-
ing machinery. In its'current phase, the Small-Scale Agricultural Mechanization
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Operation (OPMA) involveg the:sectors of Mindouli and Ri.ndamba in the region
of Pool and Bouenza and Mouyondzi in Bouenza. A study will be,undertaken to
redefine the role of inechanization within the framework of a~regional develop-
_ ment program so as to aet up cooperative atructures based on mechanization
(clsltivators or small tractors). ~ . ~
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
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CONGO
BRIEFS
REGULATION OF PUBLIC MARKETS--Within the framework of ineasures accampanying
the Congo's 5-year plan, three presidential~orders have ~ust been pnblished
in Brazzaville, the CON~OLESE INFORMATION AGENEY (ACI) announced on 12 May.
According to the ACI, these orders concern regulation of gublic markets, the
- powers and operation of the central management of~marke,ts. contracts concluded
with the government and the establislvnent of a central committee.for markets
- and government contracts. [Text] [Paris MARCI~ES TROPIEAUR ET MEDTTERRANEENS
in French No 1906,' 21 May 82 p 1346] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux ~t Cie Paris
1982] 11,464
aFFICE OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT--At the request of the People's Republic of
the Congo, the UNIDO (UN Industrisl Development Organization) representa~:yon
in France to strengthen industrial'cooperation and the promotion of invest-
ments has since 24 April 1982 hosted Franck~Fernand Dibas. Dibas, who was '
imdustrial adviser in the Ministry of Industry and Fishing, has just been
entrusted with the responsibility for setting up the Induszrial Developmeat
Off ice of the Congo, of which he has been named director. During his stay,
Dibas was to make the necessary contacta with the French inatitutions and
organizations concerned and become familiar with teehniques of promoting invest-
ments used in France. [Text] [Faris MARCHES.TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French No 1906, 21 May 82 p 1347] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris
1982] 11,464
- CANADIA~v COOPERATION--FoI_lowing the visit of a Congolese mission to Quebec
~.nd that of a Quebec missi~n to the Congo in 1981, Canada and the People's
Republic of the Congo have decided to take measures leading to the establishment
of assistance pro~ects in the mining, petrolewn, drinking water, forests and
- forestry industry sectors. To give concrete shape to the wish expresaed by
the Congo, Hydro Quebec has also provided its expertise in evaluating, selecting
and planning the layout for a transportation line, an electric power distribu-
tion network and the adaptability of certain materials on African terrain.
The Quebec Ministry of Energy and Resources has also offered its Congoleae
counterpart assistance in preparing the 5-Year Plan for mining exploration.
Finally, SOQUIP [expansion unknown] has accepted into a training program a
high Congolese official who is a hydrocarbons expert. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1221] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 115'IS
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i
, EQUATORIAL GUINEA
PRESIDENT HOPES FOR INCREASED SPANISH AID
Paris I~ARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAI~EENS in Freach No 1.906, 21 May 82 pp 1344-
- 1345
[Text] During the official visit which President Theodoro Obiang Mbazogo made
, to Madrid from 12 to 15 May, the dfscontent resulting from the deterioration
~ in relations betweer~ Spain and Eauatorial Guinea eince 1979 was closely exam-
' ined by the two partners.
According to the AFP correspondent in Madrid, the visit made it possible to
, clarify certain misunderstandings, without thereby solvin$ basic problems
i hindering relations between the two countries.
' President Obiang, who was received by King Juan Carlos and the head of the
Spanish Government, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, met with hia hosts to discuss the
continuation of Spanish aid. Estimated at nearly $110 million (in the form of
gif ts or loans at~very low interest) since the ouster of Macias Nguema in ,
j August 1979, the aid sh~uld remain at the same level for the next two years
' to come.
Bilateral discussions made it possible to clarify the status of Spanish tech-
nical advisers and to emphasize the desire of the govermnent in Malabo to at-
tract private investments.
The precise role of the Spanish technical advisers, long suspected by Malabo
of getting in the way of the authority of the Equatorial Guinean administra-
tion, remains the main stumbling block between the two countries, the AFP
says. Malabo recently refused the appointment of Chree Spanish experts who
would have had broad executive powers in the economic and f inancial fields.
Nevertheless, at a conference held on 14 May in Madrid, President Obiang
recognized that Spain "cannot send money to Guinea ~'or its development if it
j has no guarantees concerning the use of that money:" The Equatorial Guinean
chief of state therefore accepted the presence within his country's adminis-
tration of Spanish off icials who are to "study~the country's economic situa-
tion."
This concession was actually indispensable, given.the desire of the Malabo .
government to see private Spanish f irms contribute to the reconstruction of
Equatorial Guinea.
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"Spain does a great deal in Guinea, but it can still do much more," Presid~nt
- Obiang said at his presa conference, while giving asaurance that it would not
be replaced by France. Neverthelesa, diplomatic circles in Madrid do not
total~y rule out the possibility of a return of the Soviets to the forefront,
dESpite the role played by Moscow under the Macias regime.
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
11,464
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~
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
.
i
! .
FRENCH ECONOMIC COOPERATION DESCRIBED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1219
' [Text] As part of the economic cooperatiaa between the two countries, the
governments of the French Republic and Equatorial Guinea have drawn up a draft
agreement for the mutual promotion aad protection of investmenta. The agreement
' will be concluded for an initial 10-year period and is renewable unless can-
celed by either party.
Under its laws, each country recogaizes and encourages the investments made
by the other country's nationals and companiea within its territory and mari-
time zones. Such investments are assured of fair and equitable treatment,
in accordance with the principlea of international law. Such investments,
~ and their associated activities, are also granted the treatment granted to
' � most-favored-nation nationals and companies. However, such treatmeat does
not extend to privileges granted to nationals or companies of a third country
by virtue of its participation or association in a free-trade zone, a customs
union, a common market or any other form of regional economic organization.
I ~
Investments made by nationals or compaaies of either contracting country shall
en~oy, within the other country's territory and marit3me zones, full and complete
security and protection. Neither country shall take measures for expropriation
or nationalization or any other measure resulting in direct or indirect dis-
possession, except for reasons of public interest and provided that such mea-
sures are neither discriminatory nor contrary to a particular commitment.
~ The dispossession measures which could be taken must provide for payment of
~ prompt and adequate compensation for an amount calculated from the real value
j of the inveatments in question and based on a normal economic situation prior
~ to any threat of disposseasion. Such compensation is freely transferable. .
The agreement guarantees the free tranafer of interest, dividenda, profits,
earnings, fees for use of patents and trademarks, repayment of loane, proceeds
from assignment or total or partial liquidation of the investment, including
i appreciation of the capital inveated; transfers shall be made at the official
exchange rate.
~ Nationals hired or authorized to work within the other country's territory
~ shall also be entitled to the free transfer of an appropriate percentage of
their remuneration to their country of origin.
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In the absence of an amicable settlement of differences regarding i.nvestments,
the agreement provides for recourse to arbitration by the Intern~tional Center
for Settlement of Differences Regarding Investments (CIRDI), established by
the Washington Convention of 18 March 1965.
The agreement is intended to create favorable conditions for Fr.Qnch investmettte
in Equatorial Guinea and Equatorial Guinean investments in France by encouraging
transfers of capital and technology between the two countries.
~ Since 1979, trade between Frace aad Equatorial Guinea has had a poeitive balance
in favor of France. Its development since 1978 can be sum~arized as followe,
in millions of francs:
1g~8 1979 1980 1981
- French Purchases 4.3 2.5 1.5 5.4
French Sales 3.7 3.1 11.6 17�~
Balance -0.6 +0.6 +10.1 +12.3
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
~
BRIEFS
DISCOVERY OF QUALITY PETROLEUM--According to reports circulated in Madrid on
28 April, the petroleum from the aearby deposits on the island of Bioco, in
Equatorial Guinea, is of excellent quality, similar to that.of Libyan oil,
based on seismic and geologic surveys conducted by GEPSA [Guineo-Spanish
Petroleum Company], a mixed Spanish-Equatorial Guinean company. This field
was discovered a~ a depth of 70 m and is located within a sandq zone with an
area of 1,600 laa , extending toward the northwea~ern part of the island. How-
ever, the size of the reserves has not yet been calculated. According to GEPSA,
the continental shelf near the Muni River, where prospecting is being conducted,
also contains a deposit of high-quality petroleum. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1219] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11915
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~ ETflIOPIA
I
SOLIDARITY CO1rII~ITTEES WITH CUBA, DGR , VIETNAM FORMED
I PA121950 Havana PRELA in English 1850 GMT 12 Jun 82
[Report b~y Victor M. Carriba]
[Text] Addis Ababa, 13 Jun--The Ethiopia-Cuba Solidarity Committee wae
constituted here in a ceremoay held in the Ethiopian Committee for Peace
and Solidarity.
The new organization is chaired by Maru Tesfaye, miniater of housiag and
urban development, and made up moreover of the dean of the law faculty of
` the University of Addis Ababa, the managing director of the national air
; line (Ethiopian Airlines) and a member of the Internatioaal Relatione
~ Department of the Committee To Organize the Working Partq of the People of
i Ethiopia (COPWE).
~ The executive board of the new solidarity committee is also made up of two
~ representatives of the Youth Asaociation of Revolutionary Ethiopia, and
~ another from the Ministry of External Relations.
In the founding ceremony of the Ethiopia-Cuba Solidarity Committee, its
; chairman expressed the new entity's satisfaction due to the aetting up of
"this between both countries" and he atressed its importance for expanding
~ relations between.Cubans and Ethiopians.
~ .
i
For his part, the Cuban ambassador in Addis Ababa, Buenaventura Reyes,
expressed the gratitude of the Cuban Government to the Ethiopian peopl.e for
the constitution of the commitCee.
! The diplomat also referred to the threats that Cuba ia aub~ected to by U.S.
i imperialiem and to the Cuban people's decision to stand up to those attacks.
i "Ethiopia's support to Cuba, expresaed through the constitution of thia
committee, encourages ue to continue the struggle and to construct socialism
i in our country," said the Cuban ambassador.
i
; He added that "Cuba will always be at the side of Ethiopians and that an
~ example of that solidarity ia the recent opening of two roads built by Cuban
internati.onalist workera in the western part c~f this African country."
I
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The Ethiopia-Vietnam Solidarity and Ethiopia-Democratic Germany Solidarity
Committees, which are chaired by the ministers of public health and informa-
tion, Tefari Wonde and Yilme Girma, respectively, were also constituted in
separate ceremoniea.
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i
GABON
j
i
POLITICAL CRISIS SAID TO BE PERSISTING, WORSENING
Paris AFRIQUL'-ASIE in French No 264 26 Apr-9 May 82 p 40
[Text] Desp_Lte President Bongo's soothing statements, the political crisis is
persisting and worsening in Gabon, while conc~rn is growing in Libreville's
upper circles. Proof of this is seen in the tour--the first of its kind in
more than 10 years of rule--which Omar Bongo agreed to make to the interior
of the country, where in 3 weeks, last February, he visited the chief towns
of all the country's provinces. Officially this tour was aimed at enabling
the chief of state to ask directly about the grievances of the Gabonese
citizens. Indeed, what was going on, at one and the same time, was a flashy,
demagogic operation and an enterprise of intimidation. For, as always, the
( Gabonese president's speeches were punctuated, on that occasion, by generour
~ promises mixed with threats against those "degener.ates" who dared to take
the risk of abandoning the right road.
I In real.ity, Omar Bongo is aware that his regime is increasingly losing speed,
and he is so panic-stricken that he dist~:usts his own shadow. Everything
~ works toward demonstrating that the disturbancps which broke out last December
in Libreville were far from constituting a cycl.ical mishap. The politico-
social climate is becoming more oppressive, and repression is continuing to
strike blindly, even in the ranks of those who, until now, could have been
considered faithful allies or servants of the Bongo regime.
Only very recently was the attention of public opinion focused on these
faithful allies, with the arrest, betweenll and 16 March, of several persons,
among Chem, Samuel Nguema Mba, editor-in-chief of the Libreville daily �
L'UNION; Francois Ondo Edou editor-in-chief of Ilational Radio; Jean-Baptiste
Asse Bekale, ~ournalist from Radio-Africa No 1; Mr Ekoh, former national educa-
tion minister; Michel Ovono, mining engineer; and Marguerite Eya Nkeme.
According to some testimony, ~everal of these prisonera were horribly tortured.
Even though the Gabonese Ministry of Information has stated that this testimony
was born in "fertile and one-sided imaginations," it nevertheless confirmed
that these arrests had taken place within "the framework of the investigation
opened following the disturbances in December 1981." Disturbances caused,
according to the Gabonese authorities, by "manipulated" students. As if ta
~ believe that the "manipulators" were particularly numerous and that they
benefited from wide and deep ramifications in the system.
' COPYRIGHT: ].982 AFRIQUE-ASIE.
9434 19
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GABON
PRESIDENT LAYS CORNERSTONES FOR MAYUI~A DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
Paria MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1906, 21 May 82 p 1345 ~
[Text] On 5 May, President Bongo traveled to Mayumba in southern Gabon to
lay the cornerstones for a barytine plant, a tourist camplex, water an~ elec-
tricity supply programs and a miarowave relay teleco~mmunications system.
ELF Gabon [Gasoline and. Lubricants Company of France], which has ma~ or oil
operations offshore from Mayumba, W3.11 contribute through PID (Divereified
Investment Program) to the financing of these different pro~ects.
With respect to the tourist pro~ect, the choice of Mayumba is ~ustified by its
setting (50 kilometers of beaches). In July, the call for btds will be iesued,
constituting the effective startup~of work, as the feasibility~atudy was
satisfactory.
The establishment of a microwavQ relay syatem will cost 6 billioii CFA france
and financing will be provided by the Gaboneae Goverament, EZ,F Gabon and
Shell Gabon within the framework of the PID.
The SEEG (Gabon Power and Water Company) pro~ects include campletion of an
electric power plant (three generators), as well as a 13-kilameter-long
medium-tension network and a 14-kilometer low-tenaion sqstem. The Water
supply will be provided by a processing plant and nine outlets.
Working the b~~rytine will reQuire an investment of 4.5 billion CFA francs
and CODEMIN (Nyanga Mining Company) will be aet up by the Gabonese Govermnent,
- ELF Gabon, COMILOG [Ogooue Mining Company], the BRGM [Geological and Mineral
Prospecting 0�f ice] and an Amer3can mining firm.
The breadth o� the Mayumba development programs and their symbolic launching
at the same time are explained for partially politieal reasons, as Nyanga
Province has xecentl}~ turned out to be on~e of the most turbulent in Gabon.
In his 5 May ~peech in Mayumba, President Bongo spoke out againat those in the
province who criticized this series of pro~ects.
With respect to the Mayumba touriat pro~ects, the Gabonese newepaper L'UNION
pointed out that Georges Rawiri, first deputy prime minister of Gabon, min-
ister of transport, tourism and development of the terY3tory, Y?ad met with
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Jean Snoeck, n!.rector of marketing and Foreign relationa of Sabena. in Libre-
ville to discusa� the role which the Belgian company could play in the trans-
- port of European and American tourists for the Mayumba vacatioa aad.resoxt
village." The ~oint opsration of a Brussels-Libreville line by ?.ir~Gabon
~ and Sabena was also reportedly discussed in Libreville.
!
~ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
~
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. 11,464
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GABON
CACAO CULTIVATION TO BE REVIVED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 pp 1220-21
[Excerpts] As we noted briefly in our issue of 30 April 1982, p 1159, a con-
ference held i.n Oyem recently examined current problems of growing cacao in
Gabon and ways to revive national cacao production, which has only decliaed
since 1971, when maximum production of 6,000 tons was recorded.
Gabon's Third 5-Year Plan, which could not be carried out because of tlne finan-
cial crisis which developed in 1977 and the ensuing susterity policy, provided
for raising Gabonese cacao production to 15,000 tons annually. A more realistic
goal has now been set: According to participants in the Oyem conference, this
goal will be 10,000 tons in 1992, due in particular to the exte~sion of cacao
cultivation tc~ provinces other than Wo1eu-Ntem, to which it is presently limited.
Cacao growing has declined again today for reasons identical in principle to
- those which caused it to decline for the first time more than 50 years ago.
The population of Woleu-Ntem, where there are no forestry operations, was former-
ly sizable in comparison to other regions of Gabon. A dynamic farming population,
backed by constant government support, knew real prosperity thanks.to cacao.
Presently, following the economic pr.edominance of timber and then of petroletun,
the ensuing urban prosperity and the related rural exodus and the educational
effort, a disturbing decline in Woleu-Ntem's farming population can be observed.
Cacao p lantations have become outdated and the average age of planters has
~ also risen, currently 55 years old, since the vast ma3ority of inen between
the ages of 20 and 35 are drawn to the cit3es.
The action taken, at government prompting, by SONADECI (National Company for
Development of Industrial Crops) several years ago seems to have had only very
minor results, based on the remarks made during the Oyem conference: According
to some, SONADECI has suffered a partial failure. Ho~rever, it wae acknowledged
that the company had completed a good number of works, infrastructures in par-
- ticular, and that its actions would have to be backed with new investments.
In the compendi�~zm document which wi11 be submitted to the Gabonese Government,
- the conference participants pointed out two kinds of ineasures apt to increase
production: the creation of industrial blocs (6,500 hectares), wit'hin which
the wage-earning system would be practiced, and integrated zone operations
(village blocks of 3,000 hectares and 500 hectares of traditional plantations)
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utilizing groups of farmworkers in cooperatives. These two types of action,
i assigned to SONADECI, are expected to attract and keep young people on the
land, since raising the purchase price from the producer and varioue grade-
~ classification measures appear unable to bring about an increase in pro~uction,
which is stagnating at around 3,000 tons, although in 1981-82 the purchase
price of "superior" grade cacao is 320 CFA francs per kg (as opposed to 115 ~
francs for "scrap" grade).
Pricing is today consid~:red the way to keep young people on village plantations
and the Oyem conference participants considered various types of aid (for pullin~,
planting, housing) as well as indirect assistance fot pulling, field maintenance
and fungicides. Farm loans, repayable when the cacao is sold, are also recommended.
In his speech, the representative for Woleu-Ntem planters, Mr Samuel Anla,
~ noted that aid to planters should be gr.~nted~d~.re~tly, at least in the case
of those who are recognized to be owners of large plantations. He also hoped
that the planters would now be included in certain missions undertaken by the
general directors and experts in the case of visits to state-owned or cooperative
' plantations in countries such as the Ivory Coast and Cameroon. The~r:cou~!d
thus learn from the experience of plan~ers in those countries, which are large
- producers of cacao.
In sum, the conference participants reco~mmended the following basic measures:
the creation of agro-industrial blocs and village blocs; maintenance of current
assistance as well as strengthening the Center for Propagatio~ of Superior
Cacao Trees (CMCE) and ways to improve quality. Significant measures regarding
- the creation, improvement and maintenance of fields and roads, as well as
socioeconomic infrastructures, were also requested.
Looking over the list of Gabonese exports, cacao's contribution seems minuscule.
~ But Gabon is currently rediscovering its a~riculture, which has been neglected
for too long and which now appears to be a basic factor of socioeconomic balance
and of the country's real. development. This is why the Oyem conference, which
could mark a turning point in the development of cacao growing in Gabon, wi11
have to be followed with measures which will be a test of the national ability
~ to manage the agricultural problem.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
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,
� GANiBIA
~
' GAMBIANS ACCEPT FORMATION OF SENEGAMBIA IN PRINCIPLE
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1117, 28 Apr 82 p 31
[Article by our special correspondent David Sharp: "Scenes from Coafederal
Life"]
- [Text] "When the Senegalese want to annoy us, they
- speak French." '
"The curfew." My wife finds it fantastic. It has been months since I came
home after midnightt" Stretched out on a bench, the man looks at the lights
~ of the littl:e Gambian city of Jenoi approaching slowly in:the night. The
antiquated ferryboat which ensures the crossing of the Gambia River at
Farafenni--and which, accordingly, links Casamance to the rest of Senegal--
labors in the current with its load of trucks, beasts and paseengers. "Ten-
thirty. We should arrive in time at Banjul. Not that they would fire on us,
; but it is annoying to be taken away to the station by the Senegalese soldiers.
' There is always a penalty: cutting the lawa in tront of the chief's house
or ~umping in place for an hour at a stretch."
Not too bad, apparently, this curfew. Nor very menacing, the three or four
young soldiers seated beside us in the ferry, who ar.e obviously fighting
sleep. I ask them: "Are you far from home?" "Indeed not. We are from
Kaolack, a little further down the road. And then we all belong to the same
ethnic groups and speak the same languages as the Gambians."
To see these young Senegalese, disciplined, but also very relaxed, talk with
the local people, it is indeed ridiculous to believe that Senegal and Gambia
are two different countries. "Not that the Senegalese don't bother us
sometimes," explains my Gambian friend, who complains in particulsr about
the behavior of some customs officers: "When they want to annoy us, they �
speak to us in French. Now they know very well that we a11 speak Wolof!"
- But the majority of the Gambians certainly do not feel, as an occupation,
the presence of some hundreds of Senegalese soldiers sent to Gambia at the
end of July 1981, following the attempted coup d'etat against Sir Dawda
Jawara.
For Mbaye Mbengue, Senegal's ~ovial ambassador to Banjul, the problem, if
; there is one, would rather be on the part of the civilians. "Some af my fellow
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I t i~c~~N seem tc~ heve d~cidmd thaC the conf~ade~atinn tt~d ~lr~e~dy be~omd ~
Ee~~~," lie tell~ us. To put it plainly, the taxea and cuetome duCies imposad
on either side of the border are even less respected than~in the past. "That
shows that the people are often ahead of government plans," Mbaye Mbengue
~dds, with an amused smile.
Should we conclude from this that the confederation agreement, which became
- official on 1 February, has passed through like a letter dropped in Che mail?
"No," numerous Gambians explain. "We are entirely in agreement with the
- principle of confederation," affirms a young student from Brikama, who
readily admits to being an opponent, "but we wQUld have wanted to be
consulted beforehand."
With the approach of the Gambian presidential and legislative elections,
envisaged respectively for 4 and 5 May (J.A. [Jeune Afrique]{No 1111), the
handicap of the tragic events of July 1981 seems far from being lifted.
Obviously, for Sir Jawara's compatriots, it is much more a question of a
Gambo-Gambian matter than a Gambo-Senegalese problem.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982 .
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~
' (~iANA
, ~ TRIBALISM ISSUE ANALYZED, ACCEPTED CONCEPTS MODIFIED
Londnn AFRICAN AFFAIRS in Engliah Vol 81, No 322, Jan 82 pp 67-69
[Text] Since Independence, Ghanaian governments have faced a series of economic~
and political problems which have threatened to undermine their legitimacy and
pow~er. One response, employed even by those governments like the pcesent
one which claim to have no use for ideology, has been to identify `enemies' on
whom the blame can be put, or who can be used to divert attention from the
problems and provide a rallying point for national unity. The governments
hace had real choices as to the identification uf these enemies. The theme of
'external sabocage' has been frequently employed in the form of, for example,
~ attacks on foreign intervention, neo-colonialism, and the activities of alien
~ minority @r~ups in Ghana, notably the Lebanese and Nigerians. `Internal
~ subversion' has also bcen repeatedly identified, both in the form of cultural traits
like corruption, self-interest and ideological misguidedness; and in the form of
' attacks on particular groups like the civil service, `middlemen', mazket traders,
I and `the polidcians'. The employment of ideological attacks on communalism
~ and tribalism, and the identification of particular commuaal minorities as the
' main agents of these threats, is thus only one of several opdons available to
governments.
There has been a tendency in recent literature on African politics to blur the
distinction between the poliucal and the social. Poliucal tensions and policies
are assumed to reflect the `underlying' social structure; and the area of govern-
ment choice, options and initiative is thereby underplayed. By the same token,
it is frequently assumed that social cleavages must somehow naturally emerge as
politically salient, and if the evidence is not there, then the political manifestation
is said to be eithcr latent, cmergent, or imminent.~~s The literature on
Ghanaian politics has not in fact seriously examined the role of communalism in
, Rovernment ideoloRies, but to the extent that it has been discuss~d, the political
.
salience of the 'Ewe thceat' has b~en explained as a government response to the
Ewes' own political behaviour, deriving from their 'persecution complex', or
; their character as a'close-knit clannish group' and a`latently suspicious sort of
1'i. '1'hr tcndcnc}~ has becn evidcnt in both the pluralist and the 'political economy' literature.
e)nc ~~l [hc more obvious manifestations has been the frequency of assertions that the progretsive
~mmiscrauon of thc masscs must 'surely' pose a thre~t to the continuation of bourgeoise ehte rule in
Afnca, N�ithout the evidence of trends in this directior.. There are signs of this in the chapters on
Ghana, Gwnca, h�ory Coast and Libcria in Dunn, Wesr AJrican Staus. Also ue Ake,
Revolutionusti~ Pressures.
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people'. This is indeed the message of governmenf piopaganda; but-if is not
supported by the research which has beea done. It seems ~likely that the Ewe
are if anyching less `tcibalisdc' in their perceptions of themselves and others than,
for example, the Akan. More importantly however, it might be argued that it is
amongst the Akan groups rather than the Ewes, that a`persecution complex' may
be found, and that it is the emergence of discontent amoagst these economically
and politically dominant groups which provides the key to the development of
tribalism in government ideologies.
In an article published in 1979, Fred Hayward attempted to measure
`perceptions of weU-being' in Ghana by comparing objective and perceived
position and stacus.~~b He found that the objectively wealthiest aad politically
dominant groups, the Akans and the Ga, felt the most deprived; while the Ewes
and the most disadvantaged group, the northerners, felt reasoaably satisfied with
their lot. His explanation was that the dominant southerners had higher
expectations of bene6ts from government and economic growth, and thus
became most disillusioned when successive governments encountercd political
and economic problems. This conclusion seems to be supported by the Sndings
of Donald Rothchild, which showed t6e cnore disadvantaged narthem com-
munities to have the lowest expectations of, and be the least disiUusioned with,
central governmen~~~t
If indeed it is the Akan and Ga who have folt the most disillusioned and
unfairly treated in the 1970s, it would seem likely that it has been their attempt to
find explanations for the failures of the governments and the economy which lies
behind much of the ethnic scapegoating wluch has occuned and been
promulgated by the predominandy Akai, governments. Despite their apparent
disregard for northerners, the Akan groups could hardly isolate them as the major
- threat since their very `backwardness' belies the credibility of such an
allegation. Thus, if communal hosWities were ta be employed at all, the Ewes
were thc obvious target; not because of r~~ajo? objcc~ve disparities between thc
two groups, but more because of their very visibility aad similarity to the Akans,
which lent credence to allegations that they were disruptive rivals.
This particular target has been so frequeady employed because, compared to
other ideological enemies, it 6as the virtue of performing multiple fuactions at
apparendy low political cost. It promotes aational unity (and thence regime
support) against both a minority group and an alleged threat (secessionism) to the
_ . . - ~ _
nation's territorial boundaries. It serres to apparendy explain, and thua to
eith~r defuse or promote, elite rivalrits; depeading on how it is employed.
Finally, it has moral force because of the pejorative connotations of 'tribal3~m',
which all may safely condemn. The political cost appeazs to be low in that the
- use of the `Ewe threat' has not provoked a united hostile response from the target
group; pardy because of an Ewe sense of weakness which has engendered dia-
~ appointment and apathy rather than hostility, and partly because of the very
extent of Ewe integration into Ghana's social and political life which has both ~
muted the communal hostilities an~ inhibited the alienation which might other-
wise have developed. _
126. F. M. Hayward, 'Perceptions of Welt-Freing in Ghana, 1970 and 1975', Afncan Studies
Review, 22, 1, 1979, PP. 109-26.
127. D. Rothchild, 'Compuative Public Demand and E:pectatioa Patterns: The Ghana
Experience', Afn'tan Studut Reviesa, 22, 1, 1979, pp. 127~8. Rothchild'a data das not cover ~n
Ewe area of Ghana.
COPYRIGHT: The Royal African Society aad Contributore i982
CSO: 4700/1415
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GUINEA
ACCOMPLISI~IENT3 AND PROSPECTS OF ECONOMY DESCRIBED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 pp 1208-1209
[Text] During 1973-1980, the Guinean economy recorded, in current terms, an
average annual growth rate of +3.4 percent, which exceeded the increase in
population (+2.8 ~crcent).
The recovery of the Guinean economy, beginning in 1973, was exclusively the
result of the exploitation of two deposits of bauxite (Guinea Bauxite Compaaq
and Kindia~Bauxite Office, the latter under Soviet control), which provides
nearly 96 percent of export revenues. At the same time, exportable agricultural
production has collapsed.
In 1979, the agricultural sector (80 percent of the population) accounted for
40 percent of the gross domestic product (as opposed to 66 percent in 1968),
while mineral exploitation contrihuted 18.5 percent (4.2 percent in 1973),
~ industry and construction-public works accounted for 7 percent and the tertiary
' sector provided 31 percent.
Growth has slowed since 1978 due to the peak reached in mineral production,
the restriction of public investment expenditures for lack of adequate contri-
butions of foreign capital and the necessity of allocating increased resources
to offset the balance of payments deficit.
Foreign Trade
With the development of its mineral production, Guinea became the leading world
exporter of bauxite: 11.2 million tons in 1980, not counting ore converted
into aluminum locally: 0.7 million tons in exports.
For several years the balance of trade had a surplus balance. The development
of trade can be summarized as follows, in millions of dollars:
1976 1977 1978 1979
Imports 264 233 303 347
Exports 253 293 328 . 390
Deficit -11
Surp lus +60 +25 'K+3
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The estimated value of exports for 1980 was $457 million. Bauxite and altmminwa
accounted for more than 96 percent of Guinean exports and 78 percent of sales
were in convertible currencies, with the remaining 22 percent represented by
the production of the Kindia Bauxite Office, operated bq the Soviets, who are
entitled to set aside shipments for themselves under a clearing agreement.
Imports have increased sharply since 1972, from 3.8 billion sylis ($190 million)
to 6.6 billion in 1979 ($347 million), corresponding to 24.5 percent of th~e
gross domestic product assessed for 1979.
In value, petroleum products represented more Chan 20 percent of imports in
1979, while capital goods needed for Development Plan operations and for mining
companies declined somewhat; consumer goods represented a significant item
because of the inadequacy of agricultural production (100,000 tons of rice
and 20,000 tons of flour were imported in 1980).
Among suppliers, France is first (nearly 45 percent in 1980), followed by the
United States, USSR, China, Great Britain, etc. (In ite isaue of 12 March
1981, p 734, MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS published a study on: Franco-
- Guinean Economic and Financial Relations.)
Officially stopped in 1975, the exploitation of diamond mines (which seems
to have continued clandestinely) was resumed in 1980. About 6,000 carats were
exported in 1980, representing $1 million in value.
On the whole, exports of agricultural produce have declined considerably, being
limited to cabbage-palm almonds (15,500 tons in 1980), coffee (2,880 tons)
and pineapples (1,430 tons). Bananas, which Guinea supplied to the French
market before 1960, have completely disappeared.
The United States is Guinea's leading customer, followed by the USSR, France,
Canada, Spain, etc.
Deterioration of Balance of Payments
Although foreign trade, as a result of bauxite and aluminum exports (equivalent
to $450 million in 1980), showed a surplus, since 1975 the balance of payments
has shown a deficit of more than $100 million, reaching $120 million in 1980.
Thus in 1982, Guinea finds itself facing the problem of foreign exchange re-
sources. At the present time and until 1985, when mineral production should
~ register new growth, net foreign-exchange revenues are estimated at approxi-
mately $220 million, with $195 million from ba~ixite and alumintm? sales and
$15 million from exports of agricultural produce.
For the same period, annual foreign-exchange expenditures, which cannot be
reduced, repr~esent approximately $250-270 million, with $100 million for
petrole~nr? products, $100 million for imports of capital goods and $30 million
for imports of foodstuffs.
The deficit r.esulting from revenues and expenditures approximately corresponds
to debt servicing, two-thirds of whose ~overage is provided by renewal of
matured loans and one-third by short-term loans.
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' In late December 1980, the total outstanding foreign debt was estimated at
i
$1.5 billion, with an available margin of $0.2 billion not yet paid. The for-
eign debt includes contracted comanitments with Eastern countries, mainly the
USSR, whose percentage is estimated at more than half of the total indebtedness.
During 1980, Guinean use of available foreign loans was estimated at $70 million,
while servicing (interest and amortization) represented $95 million, including
clearing operations with Eastern countries. Excluding such clearing operations,
~ Guinea's drawings in 1980 amounted to $65 million, as opposed to $35 million
in payments.
The deterioration of the balance of payments appears to be long-lasting as
a result of increased debt servicing, due to greater indebtedness to Western
countries since 1976, granted in the form of inediimm-term co~odity credits.
Starting in 1979, the Guinean Government took various measures to get the
economy back on its feet: official authorization of private trade, formula-
tion of an investment code to encourage the establishment of semipublic corpora-
tions with foreign partners, monetary reform by changing the monetary system
without devaluation, 1981-85 5-Year Plan totaling $4.5 billion.
Rich Economic Potential �
At the present time, no semipublic corporation has yet been established and
the plan's measures imply extensive use of foreign credits and a large increase
in international aid.
However, Guinea's economic potential is one of the greatest on the African
continent: agriculture, livestock breeding, fishing, hydroelectricity, mineral
resources, etc. But Guinea seems unable to utilize such potential before
many years because of limitations deriving from its net a~ailshle foreign-
exchange resources and the nature of its economic sysrem.
The shortage of foreign exchange constitutes the ma~or obstacle to development.
The Guinean economy cannot presently manage to save any foreign exchange for
investment, whose financing can be provided only by further indebtedness,
but a higher and higher percentage of new indebtedness (estimated at 25 percent)
is used to pay for current imports and to cover the balance of payments deficit.
Exportable agricultural production apparently will not be able to grow before
several years, grain imports will still be necessary (rice and f lour imports
in 1981 represented about 10 percent of all imports, in addition to free food
assistance), imports of petroleum products are becoming burdensome despite
aid from several Arab countries and new development of the mining sector cannot
be considered before 1984-85. '
Favorab le factors include the renewed exploitation of diamond mines (diamond
exports should be significant starting in 1984) and the Mount Ntmba fron-ore
extraction pro~ect (15 billion tons of high-grade reserves of as much as 60
percent), whose implementation, under the auspices of U.S. Steel with financial
aid from the World Bank, should produce results only beginning in 1986.
:
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The nature of the economic system also constitutes an obatacle to development.
The Guinean economy is preaently a~uxtaposition of various airtight compartmenta,
without any connection or coordination. Thus the official government sector,
mining companies, the parallel commercial market and the rural self-subsistence
ecvnomy exist side by side with each other. The country is underadministered,
the public sector must be reorganized at varioue levels and become morally
responsible ia a spirit of awareness of the national interest. Moreover,
the state of existing infrastructures would not allow rapid expansion of
economic operations.
The strategy reaffirmed by the Guinean Government also does not encourage
foreign investment in semipublic corporations benefiting from a certain
econo,~ic liberalism.
Eventually, around 1990, a better overall balance can be expected with the
launching of ma3or new mining pro~ects. For the 1982-85 period, the burden
of debt servicing constitutes a major problem.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
11915
CSO: 4719/863
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4
;
E
l
~ GUINEA
~ ~
i
i .
~
~
j
I BRIEFS
SEKOU TOURE'S VISIT TO FRANCE--Ahmed Sekou Toure, president of the Republic of
Guinea, recently hinted during an interview granted to special correspondents
from the French gress that he would make an official vieit to France this
year. Such a visit, Sekou Toure easentially said, would be the beat opportun-
ity for dissipating all misunderstandings, while zestoring and etrengthening
~ trust between our two governments. The Guinean chief of state emphasized that
~ after a year of socialist government in France, "nothing important" has been
dane about relations between the Guinean a,:~ French parties. "However," he
said, "we still have hope for a better future br~~~se ;ve ~.lieve that the
president of the French Republic intends to invite us for a visit to the French
' people." The Guinean chief of state hoped in particular thait "relations of
sincere and lasting cooperation would be eatablished and solidified" between
the French and Guinean governmenta and between the French Socia~.ist Party and
the Democratic Party of Guinea. Relations between the two parties deter-
iorated 5 years ago following criticisms against Conakry regarding respect
i ' for hwnan rights. Previous to that time, relations between the Socialist
Party and Guinea had been good. Francois Mitterrand has-gone to Guinea four
; times since the country's independence in 1958. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPI-
~ CAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1906, 21 May 82 p 1338] [COPYRIGHT: Rene
~ Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS--On 14 May, the Supreme Constitutional Assembly
(ACS) of Guinea officially proclaimed the final results of the 9 May pr~siden-
tial elections, confirming the reelection of AYnned Sekou Toure with 100 percent
of the votes cast. According to the ACS, Atuned Sekou Toure obtained 100 per-
' cent of the votes cast, representing 98.82 percent of the 3,100,110 pereons
~ registered. In the last elections in December 1974, he also obtained 100 per-
cent of the votes, but the f igure then was 99.84 percent of the 2~436,129
~ persons registered. The ACS, recently set up in Guinea, has 600 members. It
~ is responsible for proclaiming the final results of the presidential elections
and for swearing in the elected ctiief of state. Sekou Toure began his fourth
~ 7-year term by clemency measures for a number of peraons held in Guiaean pri-
sons. However, neither the number nor the names of those chosen are known.
; [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1906, 21 May
82 p 1338J [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464
~
i
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IDA INDUSTRIAL SECTOR CREDIT--Guinea will make use of a credit from the Inter-
national Development Association (IDA, an affiliate of the World Bank) for
$19 million to revive its industrial sector by atrengthening industries of
- the private sector through the supply of credits, equipment and technical
assistance, improvement of the results of certain public industrial enter-
prises and increasing the capabilities of certain government agenc3.es to
establish a policy for the industrial sector. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1209] [COPYRIGRT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Paris 1982] 11915
CSO: 4719/863
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I
k NORY COAST
~
~
,
; ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN ECONOiMIC RECOVERY EXAMINED
~ Paris AF'RIQUE ASIE in French 10-23 May 82 pp 30-31
~ [Article by Koffi Mamane: "Scientific Research: Driving Power for Development"]
[Text] The Ministry of Scientific Research is plaqing a key role in the econo-
mic recovery policy being implemented by the Ivory Coast Gover~ent to lift the
country out of its economic crisis (AFRIQUE-ASIE No 264, 26 April 1982).
, Established in 1971 and headed by Dr Balla Keita since February 1981, the minis~
; try has become one of the prime movers of what is being called the "Ivorian
economic miracle."
I ~
Under Balla Keita, who for a long time performed the duties of director general
~ of scientific research, the ministry is on the way to becoming a true super-
; ministry, whose activities reach into many sectors as varied as agriculture,
' education, health and planning. In short, as Dr Reita himself puta it, ~his
ministry "is playing the role of coordinator between several departments."
, This young veterinarian, who was born in 1938, after outstanding atudies in
~ the FRG, was appointed director general of scientific research in the ministry
of the same name. Bella Keita was not long in bringing attention to himself.
For some, he is an innovative spirit; for others, he is an enfant terrible and
an authoritarian. In any event, shortly thereafter he went to New York to the
~ Ivorian office of UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Recalled to Abid~an
in November 1980, he was appointed by Chief of State Felix Houphouet-Boigny to
become a member of the political executive committee of the Democratic Party
of the Ivory Coast (PDCI-RDA [African Democratic RallyJ) before being named to
head the Ministry of Scientific Research.
Breaking what was becoming a tradition, Dr Balla Keita traveled through the
Ivorian bush, visited institutes and worked to make his department a houae of
~ glass: this eloquent man is open to the press of which he is the darling in
i Abid3an. Recently, he was asked to appear on "The Great Debate" program on
national television and was a huge success.
If scientific research is being called upon to play a pace-aetti~lg role in
economic recovery, that is because it is giving priority coneideration to the
pillar of the Ivorian economy, agriculture, which is founded on scientific and
technical bases. This prompted Dr Ball Keita to say: "In the cacao-coffee
i
,
i
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- sector, we have obtained fabulous results, considering the time it ha~a taken ue
r~, :irrivr ~+t chnt raint. Prc+du~~t~~n ~u~r~n~~~t Abau~ ~pt~.AAd ~a[t~ ~a~ y~~~.~~
A total strategy was implemented to end the atagnation which hae been threatening
- production for close to 2 years. Thus, inatead of annual growth of about 7 per-
- r,ent which characterized cacao-coffee production in the past decade, the 1981-
1985 Five-Year Plan anticipates an annu8l growth rate of 5.5 percent. On the ~
other hand, new varieties of products are under studq and, according to the .
authorities, pramise satisfactorp results. A hybridization of Ivorian robusta
coffee and arabica, which produces notably arabusta, should have a good future,
as its yield per hectare and its quality surpasa by far those products now being
grown.
The Ministry of Scientific Research has also developed lush varieties of manioc
and yams which now have a longer period of preservation and are processed on
site.
If, in a few years time, the Ivory Coast has stopped importing rice as the
result of rising production, according to Dr Keita it was because: "The quality
of river rice has been improved as well as its resistance to drought. There is
also reason to be satisfied with the results obtained in such varied sectors
as aquiculture, pisciculture and the fight against bilharziasis and rabies.
On another sub~ect--new kinds of energy--peas~nts are being initiated into the
~ use of biomass." (Biomass consists of vegetable and animal matter which can be
transformed into fuel.)
Peasants, a not unimportant factor, are shawing increasing interest in the
ministry's spearhead activities in rural circlee, namely the "technical com-
mittees" which bring together both technicians and agriculturiats who do not
- hesitate in criticizing and formulating solutions.
"We have shattered the myth according to which the African peasant has no
feeling for progress and science, which, I might add, is a racist myth," Dr
Keita emphasized.
Of course, if this ministry conducts research in all sectors, it is because the
state is giving it the funds to do so. Thus its budget was raised from 4
billion CFA francs to 15 billion CFA francs in 2 years. However, there is
above all a philosophy which transcends all national political choices. When,
11 years ago, Houphouet-Boigny decided to establish the Ministry of Scientific
Research, his action was greeted by a shrugging of shoulders. "A gadget for
the rich," "a privilege of the industrialized countries," were the camments at
that time in Africa, where to this day there are no ministriea of scientific
research per se, as this sector is generally placed under the ministries of
industrial or rural development. At present, in~the Ivory Coast, this ministry
is making every effort to a large n~anber of African researchers from other
countries. "For us scientific research is a way of lifting the Ivory Coast out
of the charlatanism represented by the construction of development through
improvisation and obscurantiam," Dr Keita said. Thus, some 60 research insti-
tutes are attached to as many development companies to improve vegetable pro-
ducts and to do the pre-familiarization work before moving on to "really large-
scale" production.
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Rural Exodus
It is true that this rese.3rch is doing great things for Ivoriane and, according
to Dr Keita, "aims to create the conditions for the scientific legitimatization
of the African continent so that we Grill lose our complexes vis-a-vie the
whites."
~It is also true that research has benefited from political stability and, above
all, from the coherence of political choices, which in other respects are much
debated. These political choices have resulted in the production by fewer than
6,000 rich planters of all Ivorian coffee and cacao, while small planters,
victims of unequal--and often unfair--competition are forced into rural exodus,
which is one of the results of national policy. This exodus basically affects
young people and results in an average age for planters of 50 years.
Keeping the young people in the countrqside is certainly one of the objectives
of the ministries of agricultury and scientific xesearch; however, their
success is not guaranteed. This is a general policq questionl
~
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AFRIQUE-ASIE
8143
CSO: 4719/957
~
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;
I
,
MOZAMBIQUE
i
~
- i
~ CAMPAIGN AGAINST POLICE ABUSES PRODUCES RESULTS
Lc~ndon AFRICAN AFFAIRS in English No 128, Apr 82 pp 31-32
_ - - - -
[Excerpts ] . _ : - - .
B ECAUSE of pubhc complaints, capitahst secret police in an attempt to
406 members of Mozambique's int~d~te and terrorize the
security police havE been sacked and popuL~tion.
18 anested. The sackings have not - Fo~fow
ng com`pT"au~~" om-~the
come all at once, but have been spread public, the Government felt the ur-
~ overmore than a year. The~?are partof
a unique `law and order' campaign. In ~der public~i~nntrol. T6is as
done
Mozambique, the phrase means that p~y ~ugh the `Offioe of Control
the police and army must ob~y the law, ~d D~scapline' (OCD). All mini~~ries
' just Wce anyone etse. ~ were reqwred to establish such offias
Every country seems to have bent ~,o years ago: They serve as ombuds-
- coppers' and soldiers who use their men to inveshgate public aomplaints.
guns and uniforms to abuse people. Some people must have doubted,
' Buttheresponsetothatproblemtellsa ~owever, if the SNASP OCD would
~ lot about a oountry. In Britain and really function. But its recent report
~ many other oountries, for examplc, makes it clear that it has.
~ when the public complain about
I corrupt or brtrta! police, the Govern- ~r investigating oomplaints from
~ ment often just jumps to defend the ~e OCll ordered the sack=
' lice and suppre4s the evidence. ~8 af 406 members of SNHSP --most
re, in the past year during which the law
alls for avilian reviews of the police and order' can~pa~gn has been in full
are vigomusly opposed. swing. The offences oover a wide
In Mozambique, the response has range: abuse af power, lack of respect
been just the opposite. President for the peaple, wsuse of vehicles, fal-
Samora Machel has publicly casti- sification of evidence, abandoning a
gated the police. Civilian control is to post to deal with private matters,
be increased, and the public are being ~~p~on, drunkenness, and
enc~uraged to deaouncx acts of destruct~on of o Ei hteen
corruption and disrespect for the have been arrested
and w'ill be tried-
people. In most oountries it is the most for mistreating prisoners or
secretpolice who usuallybeaome a law members of the public. ~
unto themselves. Machel is open
about both the need for a special
security polioe, and about its dangers. $,~,-h011t' ~ArVICe
; Mozambique's security poGce,
~ SNASP, was created. `to oornespond to SNASP's OCD has now established
the needsof the newphase of ow fight, a 24-hour telephone number for
' the intensification of the class struggle people who wish to make oomplaints
within our country,' the President m IvIaputo. Perhaps equally unusual,
' said. ~ the Government is not sunply waitinng
But-the president reoognized that for people to come to rt with
' some members of SNASP reproduced ~mplamts - rt is actually going out
I ~ the style and methods of work of the into neighbourhoods in Maputo,
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Beira, and other ci6es hold' public
meetings. Theae are chairei~Y higb
officials, and the public is eno~ura~ed
to denounce oorrupt or abus~ve
members of the pofice, savrity polia
and army. -
The meeting in the crowded
workers' suburb of Polana Canio~ in
MapuWrecendywas probablytypical.
It was led by the Nationsl -Police
Commander, Ahhiado Sitce, who
stressed that the oolonial police had
beaten and persecuted people, and
that this cannot be allowed to happen
now. It can only tx prevented, he sa~d,
if people speak out against the police
and soldiers who abused their power.
Then, in a strong statement, he
assured the audienoe that anyone who
spoke out would be protected from
repnsals. People did speak. The meet-
ing went on for more than four hours.
Darkness fell, but people tallced on.
-1i~Ieetwgs~LTce tius'~have taken plaa
all over the country, aad are e~tivt�
A number of policxmw have baa
arreatedor dismia~ed and presented to
the public at follow-up mee . But
~ even meetmgs si+e not enou~. The
Governmeat has aanouaad a whole .
range of ineasures to inc~ease civilian
control. Some are quite aimple. For
example, any polioeman or soldier
mnst s6ow h~s identity card if a.aked.
This will be an i~portant oontrol.
Perhaps most importsnt, loc~i and
oounty oouacils are to ~~rm polioe
committees, and local branc~ies of the
~ police, security policx, and a:my most
report ngularly to them. Theu oom-
miaees are. expated to prese~t and
follow u~ pubhc oomplamts, aad to
keep ageneral check on the sec~rity
forces. �
COPYRIGHT: 1982 African Journals Ltd
CSO: 4700/1431
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~ NI~ER
~
I
KOUNTCHE APPARENTLY MOVING TOWARD RESTORATION OF CIVII~ RULE
' Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1112, 28 Agr 82 p 75 ~
~[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "Soon Civilians?"
_ [Text] Toward a constitution prepared by all citizens.
Niger has taken a small step toward the "civilization" of power. In the
traditional speech he made on the eve of the eighth anniversarq of the taking
of power by the army (15 April 1974), President Seyni Kountche announced a
political decision which breaks with the practices current since the fall of
' Hamani Diori. The National Development Council, a body grouping all social
levels in the country, from country people to senior executives, by way of
youths and city workers, will not be a corporatistic type of cham~er.
Crownin~ the institutions of the Development Society (J.A. [3eune Afrique]
No 1110), it will be set up as a Constituent Assembly.
~ "The aim," the chief of state recalled, "is to associate all compatriots
with the responsible management of Niger's affairs." In this spirit,
precautions have been taken to avoid having ~he naw institutions become the
~ monopoly of city dwellers (intellectuals, tradesm~n, etc.), wi;.h regard to
whom the military remains somewhat mi~trustful. Thus, to allow for strong
representation by the masses, the country people in particular, 50 percent of
the seats will be occupied by members of the Samariya (youth associations)
~ and of cooperatives, which constitute, it should be recalled, the two pillars
of the Development Society.
What are the broad lines of the draft constiCution which the CMS (Supreme
Military Council, the highest state body) is getting ready to place before
the future Constituent Assembly? Is the CMS itself destined to disappear?
i What will be the major organs of power? These are some of the questions we
~ have the right to ask, the day after the chief of state's announcement.
I
' All the more since the authorities have always stressed their intention to
" set up "an original type of society, authen~ically Nigerien in~its values, .
its foundations and its practice." What is certain is that Col Seyni Rountche
is a supporter, undoubtedly prudent but convinced, of the normalization of
power, to say nothing of its return to civilians.
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Started scarcely 2 years after the army's accession to power, this process
appeared with even greater clarity in February 1981.
The eighth ministerial reorganization which took place on that occasion was
tto1: without significance. It marked the departure of important members of
the CMS; only two out of the 10 who had taken power remained in office. A
sharp preponderance of civilians was assured al the aame time. Col Seyni
Kountche would have wanted to go even further and entrust to a civilian the
prime minister's poat,. a decision which would have, more than any other,
sanctioned the wish to give civilians a share in power.
But, although commander in chief of the army, President Kountche is obliged to
take into account the resistance he encounters in the barracks. Being unable
to oppose directly those in the military who, having tasted power, no longer
intend to shnre it, he is bypassing them, by mobilizing the eans-culottes
and giving fhem the possibility of expressing thems~lves within the framework
of legal and representative institutions. Will he be better understood by
proceeding in that manner? It will not by easy. Nevertheless, the setting
up of a Constituent Assembly 8 years af ter the army's accession to power, is
a step in the right direction.
COPYRIGflT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982
- 9434
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{
' SENEGAL
~
~
~
! PROPOSED SHIPPING LINE WILL AID EXPORTS
! ~
, Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1906,.21 May I982 p 1335
[TextJ On 12 May, Senegalese ~r~ne Minister Habib,Thiam presided over a Cab- ~
- inet meeting for the second,t,~me in 6 months, a meeting~devoted to the est~-.
lishment of a single shipping campany. At the meeting, he recalled the reasons
~ behind such a move, emphasizing the need to promote Senegalese exports in
order to save on foreign exchange, revive foreign trade while ensuring its
security, and create jobs.
The prime minister conf irmed the establishment af a single shipping company,
to be responsible for operation of the two lines, the Atlantic and Mediter-
ranean, and made the following decisions: to ensure effective startup of the
new firm by 30 September at the latest; to open up the stock in the new Qntity
to all campanies in the sector recognized before 30 November 1980, dissolving
shareholding companies; to grant shareholder status to any Senegalese f irm
~ whose participation in the capital is at least 15 percent; to see that all
; shareholders in the single shipping line have previously liquidated their
debts and balanced their~books; and to use as the framework for constitution
~ of the company's capital tlie following proportions: government, 10 percent; ~
_ national owners, 65 percent;~related campanies, 15 percent; and private parties,
10 pe.rcent. ,
National shipping company oWaers and related companies will fairly divide up
the proportion of capital reserved for them.
In setting up the capital of the single company, priority will be given to
~ contributions in cash, while..not ex�luding those in kind whose appraisal must...
be fair. A foreign company'w31l~be designated as.technical partner of the new
f irm. It.will not compete with ~.t and the foreign f irm's experience wil,l be�
profitable for.entering other lines. The Ministry of Equipment will update
the profitability study of the new line, based on the.40-40-20 rule and on~bulk .
transport. The guidelines:of the new line on equipment must be precisely
~ spelled out and include only that which is useful and effective. Future
; activities of.the new unit must be reviewed and the line's capital must be ~
established based on them.
' COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982 �
;
I
~ 11,464
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SENEGAL
_ ,
BRIEFS
TWO NEW PARTIES--~wo new political parties will be recognized in Seneggl and
will bring to 14 the number of political groups in this country. They are
the Com~unist League of Workers (Trotskyist) and the Socialist Partq of the
Masses (which claims to be based on "scientific socialism"). [Text] [Paris
MARCAES TROPICAUX ET MLDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1206]
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11915
AGREE[~NTS SIGNED--The Senegalese chief of state, Mr Abdou Diouf, returned
- to Dakar on 28 April~following a 12-day tour which took him to Niger (accompa-
nied by his wife), Oman and the Federation of United Arab Emi�rates, with two
stopovers in Paris. During his Parisian stopover, Mr Abdou Diouf held talks
with French officials, in particular Mr Jean-Pierre Cot, minister for coopera-
tion and development, and Mr Guy Penne, special adviser to President Diitterrand
on Africau and Malagasy affairs. In Oman, the two chiefs of state decided to
negotiate and sign agreements for cultural and economic cooperation, for despite
excellent relations between the two couatries, there was no �o~mal legal frame-
work until now. Mr Abdou Diouf said that the Senegalese delegation has submitted
proposals to the Omani delegation and with the next visit of the f~ultanate's
foreign affairs minister to Dakar, the two delegations will be able to siga the
two agreementa which will constitute the legal framework for cooperation between
the two countries. In the case of Abu Dhabi, the legal framework already partly
existed, since Senegal had signed a cultural agreement with that country. Thus
it was a matter of proposing a plan for economic cooperation and a plan for
preliminary implementation of the cultural agreement. The principle of conclud-
' ing the agreement and the preliminary agreemen~ wae approved. In this instance
as well, Senegal submitted proposals to the Federation of United Arab Emirates
and discussions will begin soon to make it possible to negotiate and conclude
such agreements as quickly as possible. [TexC] [Paris MARCAES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1207] [COPYRIGAT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Paris 1982] 11915
BELGIAN COOPERATION PROGRE~M--A 3-year program for cooperation between Belgitnn
and Senegal was approved on 29 April during a meeting in Dakar of the Mixed
Commission for Cooperation, which the two couatries have established. It was
also decided that Belgiwn would make 16 drillings in Senegal as well as provide
a refrigeration system and processing installations for small-scale fishing
at Joal. According to the meeting's final~communique, Belgi~ will also provide
scientific and technical assistance to Senegalese agricultural, livestock-
breeding and renewable energy sources sectors. In the area of health care,
cooperation will continue under the basic health-care pro~ects of Pikine and
~2
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Matam. With regard to training, Belgium will continue to provide assistance
to the following projects: Advanced Teacher Training School, Institute of
Sciences and the Environment, Basic Institute of Black Africa (IFAN). A Belgian
expert wi11 also be assigned to the future National Institute for Rural Develop-
ment, which ahould be opening its doors soon. Belgium has also pledged to
~ provide scholarships to Senegalese, who will thus be able to gradually take
` over Belgian technical assistance. In the industrial sector, finally, a line
of credit will be granted to SOFISEDIT [Senegalese Financial Company for the
Development of Industry and Tourism] to enable it to continue its policy of
support for. small and mediimn-size busineases (PME). [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1207] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11915
RICE STALLS SET UP--The Senegaleae Government has given the National Distribu-
- tion Company of Senegal (SONADIS) the task of setting up rice stalls at the
main markets in Cape Verde and throughout the rest of the country on a gradual
basis. According to Tafsir Ibnou Diop, asaistant administrator of SONADIS,
the move is part of "the f ight against hoarding and speculation on basic .
' commodities." .Future expansion of the number of stalls wil~ camplete the
action of the 12 wholesale and amall wholesale outlets and.the.114 retail
branches which SONADIS has been opening up in.Senegal siaee 1965. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1906, 21 May $2 p 1335]
jCOPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464 ,
ARGENTINE HYDRAULIC EQUIPMENT--On 3 May, the "Rio Gualeguay," from the Argen-
tine ocean shipping line Elmu,:arrived at the port of Dakar fram Buenos Aires,
carrying the first 400 tons~of hydraulie'~equipment.purchased by Senegal from
the Argentine Republic within the framework of the�$15-million line of credit
~ granted to Senegal by the Argentine Government. The equipment includes wind-
~ mills, water pump$, water tanks and other accessories. The rest of the equip-
ment will come in two more shipments, with complete delivery scheduled by the
end of June. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERItANEENS in French
No 1906, 21 May 82 pp 1335-1336] [Ci~PYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982]
11,464
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