JPRS ID: 10596 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070042-3
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 42
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10596
17 J~ne 1982
~ Near Ec~~t North Africa Re ort
p
CFOUO 23/82~
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NOTE
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transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other charactieristics retained.
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- mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
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JPRS L/10596
17 June 1982
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 23/82)
CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Insufficient Translations Into Arabic Said to be Fundamental
Cultural Problem
(Amir Iskandar; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 23-29 Apr 82) 1
Briefs
Muscat, Aden Mediation Effort 5
- EGYPT ' .
NPUG Leader Discusses Positions Toward riubarak
(Khalid Muhyi al-Din Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,
23-29 Apr 82) 6
. IRAQ
Deleterious Effects of Pipeline Shutdown o*~ Syria Underscored '
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 23-29 Apr 82) 20
Housing Minister Comments on Recent Projects, Progress
(Fawzi al-Bindaci; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 23-29 Apr 82) 23
LIBYA
Qadhdhafi Presents His Version of Gafsa Incidealt
(Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi; JEUNE AFRIQUE, I2 May 82) 25
Women in Army Act as Qadhdhafi's Bodyguards
(Mohamed Selhami; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 1'L May 82) 27
- Oil Revenue Decline Calls for New Trend in Trade Policy
(MARCHES TKOPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 2 Apr 82) 3'L
- a- [III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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- rvn Vlr LL1HL UJ~ V1VL1
" TUNISIA
Noureddine Bouarrouj Discusses Communist Party Status
~ (Noureddine Bouarrouj Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE,
. 12 Apr 82) 34
Commando Operatiions Plotted in Libya Foiled
(Suhayr Belhassen; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 14 Apr 82) 39
- b -
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, .
INTER-ARAB Ak'FAIRS
I~~SUFFICIENT TRANSLATIONS INTO ARABIC SAID TO BE FUNDAMENTAL CULTURAL PROBLEM
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARAPZ in Arabic No 271, 23-29 Apr 82 p 61
- [Article by Amir Iskandar: '�So That We Are Not Hurt by the Drought"]
[Text] One of the fundamental problems facing contemporary Arab culture is the
problem of translation. It may not be offensi~~e to say that this fundamental
problem has not yet received the interest, the follow-up, the observation and the
support it deserves from official or non-official cultural organizations in our
Arab countries. [Nor has it received such interest and support] from those who
~ are employed in the field of culture in general.
In the years that followed the 1967 setback s~me factions that reject the West
assumed a position on the question cf translation; it was a kind of negative
_ intellectual reaction to the setback. The least that can be said about that
position is that it was harmful to the question of Arab culture itself.
Attitudes rejecting western colonialism on political and national grounds became
conf.used with a rejection of the West in general, including a rejection of its
cultural heritage and all its intellectuaL gifts in all their varied forms and
substances.
,
Suddenly interest in the question oE ancient Arab heritage became intense to the
point that some schools of thought were inclined to see in that heritage what
_ would be sufiicient for our present. They thought that ancient Arab heritage
would satisfy all our impulses for development and progress and would enable us
to catch up with the nations that had outstripped us in contemporary universal
~ivilization.
In many instances nervous emotionalis~n prevailed in both pasitions.
It is not true that all the West's cultural and intellectual heritage, that of
the past and of t!ie present, is colonialist or imperialist. And it is silly to
say that our heritage, notwithstanding its historical worth or its past intel-
lectuai fecundity, would be sufficient and that we can do witho~st the surprising
developments in our world that are taking place in the sciences, in the arts and
in literature.
IF it is si11y to imagir.e that we can turn inward amidst this ferment all around
,
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t~VlS V!'!'ll.lAt, U~r UiVl..Y
us, it is no less silly to imagine that we can separate ourselves from our own
identity, subsume it under that of others or lose it altogether.
Such delusions appear to be more like deceptive maelstroms which force those who
deliberately .or inadvertently fall into them to flounder and lose their sense of
dir~ction.
There is no ~eed then to repeat the statement that has become hackneyed because
of overuse or misuse. This statement is that we must be true to our origins and,
at the same' time, contemporary [in our outlook]. We T~ust have an informed
knowledge of our heritage; we must also have an informal and a thorough icnowledge
of the world around us. We must stop [alking day in and day out about the
importance of heritage. We must either go ahead and familiarize outselves with
our heritage or rediscover it, or we should stc~p talking every minute about the
importance of catching up with the age and go ahead and find out about it and
actually try to comprehend it.
~ Moving ahead toward knowledge, rediscovery or the attempt to comprehend fany
subject] is a phenomenon that means first and foremost knowing the fundamentals.
So far, despite a11 these stages during which translation flourished, the Arab
reader or Arab intellectual who does not speak ~r read foreign languages has not
~ become familiar with these fundamentals. Most of his knowledge has been confined
to the small branches, the explanations, the marginal notes, the commentaries or
the explications of these rudiments. There are numerous examples of this. In fact
they are too numerous to mention them here.
It may be enough for one to recall a few of these. What principal works can we
read in Arabic by major philosophers who influenced the course of human thought,
such as Descartes, Kant and Hegel? And yet, how many people talk about dialectics
and occasionally about Hegelian dialectics in particular? How many people even ,
~ include in their works one "text" or another by Hegel despite the fact that they ~
do not speak a foreign language? ~
The reason for this lies in the fact that people who de that read a book about
Hegel [for example], and sometimes [even] no more than an article or a translated
article in a periodical. Everything ends after that, and this "reader" then .
acquires the right "to write" about that great philosopher and even to criticize
- him.
Another example: What works can we read in Arabic by the great French poet,
novelist and critic Hragon? Nuthing but a few poems from his volume of poetry,
"Le Fou d'Elsa." Nevertheless, many people write about Aragon; they quote him,
and they learn Erom him. Once again the reason may be a study, a research paper,
- or an article written by a student, a researcher or a critic--or a translation of
any of these--in any periodicel. Nothing mobe. ~
A third example: This eime this is the school of thought which is known as
Structuralism. What can ~we read in Arabic about the principles of the philoso-
phers and scholars of that school? There is nothing. Nevertheless, there is a
great deal of talk about Structuralism by our intellectuals who do not read
Eoreign languages.
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A fourth example: One of the [present] trends in contemporary literature and art
research lies in [the school of] the sociology of literature and art. What are
the basic works that we can read in Arabic by the philosophers and scholars of
that school, such as George Lukash, Lucien Goldman, George Gerwitch, Michel
Zirafa and others? Nevertheless, one finds writers who cannot read one page in a
foreign language repeating like parrots, the term, "sociology of literature and
art" and the term, "sociologv of culture." The good natured reader is taken in by
, their false claims and considers them experts in these intellectual fields and
areas of criticism even though they've read nothing about these areas but a
translated article here or there, and they know nothing about this great
multi-directional school [oE thought] but paragraphs taken from this or [he other
book, which may have been mentioned in a study or a research work by this or the
other author.
- ~an all this be logical or acceptable? Can the Arab intellectual who does not
speak foreign languages or whose education did not pro~ide him with an oppor-
tunity to learn a foreign language have nothing more than [hese crumbs that are
left over to him by others? What can this meager diet [of knowledge] prociuce but
shortcomings, weaknesses or [edious pretense? After almost 170 years of the
efforts of Rifa'ah Rafi' al-Tahtawi and the school of translation he created in
Arab culture after the lengthy ages of decline, how can our store of Arab books
remain so impo~~erished, caring for nothing but images that move about like
shadows on the walls of our "contemporai�y" cave?
Some people are trying to put [he blame on Beirut. They are saying that the
consumer tendency which gained control over publishing activity there is respon-
sible for this shurtage in translations into Arabic, a shortage which has
prevailed and is still prevailing. They say it is this that created these
distorted Eigure~ of Fseudo intellectuals.
The truth is that tnis judgment is as incriminatory as it involves a desire for
self-exoneration by putting the blame on others.
I[ is true that a consumer tendency did assume control of all or some directions
in translations in Beirut; i~ is true that Beirut has sometimes offered what our
culture and our cultural evolution does not need; and it is true that Beirut's
printing presses and publish~ng hou~es refrained from offering what we most
~rger,tly need. But Beirut, nev~rtheless, has offered a great deal. In fact,
perhaps had it not been for Beirut, many writers and in;.ellectuals would not have
Elaunted many of these foreign names which t:iey literally afEix [o their books
and their talks.
In the Einal analysis Beirut is not responsible for the falsehood of these
pe'ople. Despite everything Beirut did no~ claim that it can take the place of
ot�hers; it did not claim that it was seizing or that it can seize their efforts.
Where then are the ministries of culture in many Arab countries? Where are the
_ oEticial and semi-official organizations that consider culture a service not a
commodity? They are non-ex~~tent in this regard. There are few, limited and
temporary exceptions: these :~ay be referred to specificaily in the efforts that
were made previously by the Egyptian Ministry of Culture, in the efforts that are
being rnade by the Iraqi Ministry of Culture and Information and in the efforts of
~ the Ministry of Information in Kuwait.
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Without going overboard or being remiss it must be said that all these efforts,
as measured by their fruits, fall far short oE ambitions. 'The territory of Arab
culture still needs someone who would break forth its rocks and unleash numerous
rivers to protec~ it from searing thirst and drought.
_ COPYRIGHT: 19$2 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
8592 ~
CSO: 4504/286
~
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
MUSCAT, ADEN MEDIATION EFFORT--dffiCisl Gulf sourCee told AL-WATAN AL-`ARABI
that the coming few weeks will witnesa, for the first time in the history of
the conflict between the Sultanate of Oman and Aden, the formation of a~oint
- council, possibly on the foreign ministerial levQl of the two countries. The
council would explore [the possibility of] putting an end to the long conflict
between the two sides. Furthermore, the council is conaidered to be one of
the positive outcomes of the medigtion undertaken for sometime by Kuwait and
- the United Arab Emirates under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
[Text] [Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 275, 21-27 May 82 p lE]
[COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI]
CSO: 4404/492
*
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EGYPT
~
_ *1PUG LEADER DISCUSSES POSITIQNS TOWARD ML'BARAK
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 271, 23-29 Apr 32 pp 24-27
(Interview with Khalid Muhyi al-Din, chairman of the Nat~ional Progress:Lve
- t~nionist Grouping Party, [NPUG] by Sa'~3 Fu'ad Zaghlul in Paris: "I Neither
Supp~rt Nor Oppose al-Islambuli'a Execution; Most Arab Leaders, Beginning
With al-ARad and al-Qadhdhafi, Are in Contact With Mubarak; We Are Working
for National t~egime That Atrolishes 'Ca~p David' and Complete Sovereign~ty
_ Over Sinai; Whoever Demands Elections in Egypt Now Does No*_ understand
Politi.cs"; date not specified]
- [TextJ Khalid Muhyi al-Din, chairman of the National Progressive Unionist
Grouping Party, [NPUG] is one of those who drew up the Free Uff~.cers Move-
ment Program as a leading member of the July revol~tion. He took part in the
armed underground res{at~r..~e against the British occupation and ~oined
numerous revolutionary organi.zati~ns in the Egyptian armed forces before
confronting al-Sadat. He is a leader who has participated in making the
laistory of revolutionary Egypt. In this role, he has been th~ leader of the
democratic trend.
- From his "opposing" damocratic positioY?, Khaltd Muhyi al-Din taiks to A1-
Watan A1-'Arabi today to say that he is "reformu?.ating his opposition be-
cause Husni Mubarak is not al-Sadat.`' The distinguishing feature of this
interview is that it is a"hot interviera" whose apontaneity r~veals more
than one fact not yet revealed from the start of Muhyi al-Din's experience
with the revolution to his experience with the severe opposition and ending
with his experience with the "moderate" oppositicn in which he has be~n
- engaging since the bullets of 6 October [assasaiaation of al-Sadat].
The interview, conducted in Paris, can be considered $ political docum~nt
that merits a calm reading in this current historic moment through which
Egypt is pASSing. ;
[Question] Let us start the interview with a question on the visualization
you had for Egypt's future when you were struggling to achieve naticnal
ir.lependence. What is this vieualization?
[Answer] The truth is that man goes through ~arious phases, the most
prominent of which are the phase of emotional nationalism and ~he phase of
thinking nationalism.
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- I have passed through both phases. In the emotional phase, I loved Egypt.
We hated the British and we believed that we had to use every means to expel
them. We believed, for example, in striking the traitors who cooperated with
the British. We then concluded that we had to unite with the forces who
believe in the great spiritual values and are willing to sacrifice. Our
entire goal was to urge people to rush to fight the occupation and to seek
to make sacrif ices. This is why I~oined the armed underground national
groups. After that phase, I grew older and came to reslize that patriotism
is both thought and knowledge, meaning that the homeland is n~t a social unit
but that the citizens are divided by classes with different intereats and
that the meaning of independence lies not ~uet in expelling the occupation
- army but also in building an independent national economy and establishing
social ~ustice. Therefore, to achieve actual independence and social ,justice,
we had to know the forces with an interest in realizing independence and
justice, those who wanted national independence to be realized, with its
absolute dimensions, and those in whose interest it was to have a super-
ficial independence. I learned a lot in that phase and, consequently,
entered the national arena of battle better prepared. As you know, I~oined
numerous armed underground organizations that had nothing to do with the
army and then ~oined the officers movement inside the army.
[Question] Do you mean the Free Officers?
[Answer] No, that movement was an organized underground military movement
connected with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood wanted this movement
to be a part of their organization but we refused so that the army could
- remain independent of the parties and the religious organizations.
[Question] In what year was that?
[Answer] From 1944 until 1947. We then abandoned that movement and formed
the Free Off icers Movement at the end of 1949.
Meanwhile, I had come to understand scientific socialism and the meanings of
independence, imperialism and struggle. By the time formation of the Free
Officers Movement was completed, I had matured intellectually. This matura-
tion had been helped by my studies and my college life.
[Question] You graduated from the Business College?
[Answer] Yes. Intellectual maturity developed as a result of the experience
- with the Egyptian national movement, especially since I had entered it as a
product of the labor movement ar~d the lettist moveme*!t, which gave the
national movement an advanced social content. Therefore, when the Free
Ofricers Organization wae formed, we drew up its program.
~`uestion] Who drew up the program?
~ [Answer] I and Ahmad Fu'ad al-Qadi wrote it at the time and 'Abd al-Nasir
approved it after reviewing it and introducing some modifications. This
- program was summed up in fighting colonialism and its supporters. We
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inserted the phrase "Anglo-American ^olonialism" because in the minds of the
Egyptians at that time colonialism was embodied ~n the British. For the
first time ever, disagreement srupted among the Free Officers over the phrase
"Anglo-American." Some officers believed that we ahould be content with the
phrase "British Cc.~onialism" and should omit the word American. But we were
eager to fight colonialism as a whole. To us, the colon~.alism occupying the
country was not necessarily tha only colonialism. Colonialism was the new
economic interests trying to invade the world and seeking to form military
alliances to protect itself. So we ~~cused our goals on fighting colonialism
and its traitorous supporters, ou forming a strong army that permitted the
promotion of soldiers to officers and on reali~ing social ~ustice and sound
democracy.
(Muhyi al-Din paused briefly and then added:) There is a point that people
don't understand well, namely, that our progr.am called for the formation of
a national front of the national forccs and partieF to fight colonialism, to
liquidate the occupation and to abrogate the 1936 treaty.
: [Question] This means that your pr.ogras did not 3nclude the idea of abol-
ishing the parti~s?
[.Answer] Listen, the text said "a front of the national forces and parties."
Som,~ [officers] said that some of the parties were not nationalistic. This
wc:a a controversial point. l~aturally, the revolution did not imagine that
i:: would rule directly. The goal of the Free Officers was to put the
popular forces in power, but they did not realize that the achievement of
- this end would be engulfed in difficu?.ties.
1
[Ouestion] When you initiated the revolution, did you have the idea of
establisring a full democratic life?
[Answer] Of course we had this idea in mind and we agreed with 'Ali Mahir to
form the cabinet after conductirng parliamentary elections in March 1953 to
restore democratic life. But 'Ali Mahir failed to mention restoration of
the parliament in his cabinet statement because he was thinking ~f staying
' ia power, aware that he would not win an election. The same happened wi.th
al-Sunhuri, Sulaysan Hafiz and the other advisers consulted by the Revolution
= Command Council. They all thought that any elections would bring al-Wafd
- back to pvwer. While we were discussing the agrarian reform law, those
advisers constantly warned us that if any new elections were held, al-Wafd
would return to power.
- [Question] What was wrong with al-Wafd's return to power. Wasn't al-Wafd
the party that had abrogated the 1936 treaty and permitted the people to
carry arms against the occupation forces, and was it not the party of the
_ popular ~asses? ~
[Answer] They imagined that al-Wafd woul.d obstruct promulgation of the
agrarian reform law, which the revolution considered :;ts backbone.
_ [Question] This law brought about revol~utionary change by liquidating
feudalism?
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~'i1R Or i:, (.I.AL t:SE Oi1i~Y
[Answer] Precisely. But the revolution did not know how to uae this law in
its favor, to bui'3 its party behind it, to wage the elections with this
accompli~hment, to win the ma~ority and to rule democratically. Regrettably,
such an ~chievement was obstructed hy the military character dominating the
~ Revolution Com.nand Council, in addition to the advisers' opposition to the
holding of elections. The advisers said to us: ~T~y should the revolution
hold elections that will bring al-Wafd back to power? They also said that
the revolution had ta achieve enormous reforms first and then hold elections
in thP long run. This was the path that l~~d to a lack of respect for the
constitution. At the time, Dr al-Sayyid ~abri and similar theoreticians came
up with the theory of revolutionary ~urisprudence and constitutional ~uris-
prudence. Consequently, the revolution decided to rule by itself and not to
hand power over to others. Thus the crisis developed. .
Najib Was Against Me
[Question] The Muhammad Na,jib crisis?
[Answer] No, Muhammad Na~ib supported this inclination. At the outset, he
_ was against me insofar as the democratic inclination is concerned.
- [Question] As far as I know, Muhammad Najib was the number one democrat in
the Revolution Command Council. Isn't it so?
[Answer] (Here Khalid Muhyi al-Din's voice rose to say:) No, no. Muhammad
Najib supported continuation of the Revolution Command Council in power and
extension of the transition period to mor2 than 3 years. Thia was his
opinion at the outset of the revolution when the masses supported him and
when he had good relations with the council members. Na~ib called for
extension of the transition period and not for the return of democratic life.
When differences erupted between him and the Revolution Co~and Counc~l ovpr
the distribution of power, and when he learned that the people were ~rith
him, he lined up with the democratic current and turned into a democrat.
But before that, he had stood against me and directed his blows at me.
[Question~ But (2 days earlier) he had said that he supported democracy as
the path to rule Egypt?
[Answer] "That is correct." Af ter hie initial position of hostility to
democracy, he adopted the democratic trend.
[Question] And you supported him in the March 1954 crisis?
[Answer] He is the one who supported me.
- (Muhyi al-Din paused briefly and then added:)
The truth is that at the outset, 'Abd al-Nasir was for democracy. But then
he settled the matter and chose the other path when he was told, "You will
fail if you want to introduce agrarian reform and establish democracy [at
- the same time]."
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Concluding this historical part of the interview, Khalid Muhyi al-Din won-
dered: I don't know why they were so afraid of democracy when the rev~~lution
en~oyed strong popularity? Khalid added: Any one [of them] nominatirag him-
self in the elections would have inevitably won the revolution's support.
Some people made them fear the idea of democratic government. This is on the
_ one hand. On the other hand, the Americans were against the return of
parliamentary life.
[Question] At the beginning, the Americans supported the revloution?
[Answer] Their relationship with the revolution was good because there was
an inclination at the outset of the revolution to establish good relations
with Washington. The revolution did not want to get involved in conflicts
with both the British and the Americans. At the time, the United States
was against al-Wafd and against parliamentary life. The American view was
that if parliamentary life were to be established in Egypt, the left would
gain strength. The Americans were as obseased with the issue of communism
~ then as they are obsessed with it now. In a discussion with the U.S. bnbassy
adviser at the time in the home of 'Abd al-Mun'im Amin, the adviser said: A
return of parliamentary life will open the path to the leftist forces to act
and flourish. For example, the Americans were against the appointment of
Fathi Radwan and Nur al-Din Tarraf to cabinet positions. When I told the
adviser that the two men were not communists but nationa~ists, he said in
- reply: Radical nationalists agree with the counnunists. But because the
re~oiution was a nationalist revolution in essence and becauae 'Abd al-Nasir
was a nationalist, he got no results 2ven though he went with them [Ameri-
cans] to the end of the road. The capital did not come. He issued for them
the foreign capital investment law and did a lot for them but the capital did
not come. There is no foreign power that will strengthen the economy of
another country. 'Abd al-Nasir f inally became convinced that he had to rely
on himself and that Egypt had to be i:ldependent and to play its leadership
rol~ in the Arab world. The United States wanted Egypt to be a part of its
strategic plan in the Western alliance. 'Abd al-Nasir understood this and
his response was that the area would defend itself with its intrinsic
strength and that Egypt would not enter into foreign alliances. Here began
the battle that brought 'Abd al-Nasir into his-h~storical confrontation with
the West and imperialism. This is what 'Abd al-Nasir should be accredited
with, this and the fact that he wras actually defending Egypt's independence.
Catastrophe
[Question] Did you feel disappointed when national independence was achieved
while the Free Officers were still holding the power and while they had
wiped out democracy in Egypt?
[Answer] On the issue of democracy, I would. like to point out the matter of
torture and the related issues surrounding it. The ma~or cases of torture
- taking place in Egypt involve the Muslim Brotherhood. I am against violence.
~ A group that resorts to violence must not complain of the official reactions.
Egypt's history abounds with such examples. We know, for example, "the black
soldier" and... Torture always follows assassination and assassination always
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leada to striking the democratic mcvement in Egypt. An assassin imagines
that he is committing a glorious act whereas, in my opinion, assassination
is not a glorious act. The result is that the police resort to violent mea-
sures, such as torture, beatings, arrest an~~ detention. He who resorts to
violence "must not say ouch," meaning that he muat not complain about
reciprocal violence inflicted on him.
- [Question] But this torture of the Brotherhood about which you are apeaking
has also been inflicted on the com~unists, the leftists and the entire left?
(Answer] No.
[Question] How? There are detainees who were in Abu Za'bal prison and saw
officer Mahuud al-Manash�iri, your colleague in the Cavalry Corps, being
tortured. Moreover, Sha.hdi 'Atiyah and Dr Farid Haddad, both communists,
died under torture.
[Answer] No. The torture against the left took place in al-Wahat in 1959.
[Question] And also in Abu Za'bal in 1955.
[Answer] During the 1959 torture, the entire left wae in al-Wahat. But
when 'Abd al-Nasir learned of the news, he dismissed brig Gen Isma'il Himmat,
the man responsible for the torture.
[Question] Yes, but the torture included the :leftist detainees as it in-
cluded the Brotherhood detainees, mea~ning that if there were democracy...
[Answer] Leave this issue aside. We are against torture. What ie wrong
with you is that you speak of democracy as an abstract. ;
i
~
[Question] Not at all. This is a fundamental and ma3or issue. '
[Answpr] Yes, fundamental.
[Question] If there had been democracy, it would have been impossible to
foil the revolution's accomplishments.
i
' [Answer] It is a grave mistake to throw everything on the shQUlders of ~
democracy. We do not approve of torture. But the vast accomplishments
_ achieved by ~he revolution and 'Abd al-Nasir have no equal in any Arab or
European country. I am not defending or ~ustifying but some of the extra-
ordinary measures can be understood in.the light of these accomplishments.
Moreover, 'Abd al-Nasir did not gain his power through conatituttonal
channels but derived it from aweeping popular aupport. Any person oppoaing .
_ him would have ended in isolation. Comparatively, the vast social changes
realized by 'Abd al-Nasir say that the~special measures that were taken in
Egypt amount to nothing. The other point is that 'Abd al-Nasir did not
liquadate his opponentc physically, and neither did al-Sadat. This is a
- fact. This is attri?:~.:ted to the fact that Egypt is an ancient country in
which the rules of state are firmly established.
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[Question] But 'Abd al-Nasir is the one who launched this tradition [presum-
ably of torture] while he was in power.
[Answer] Yes; he used to say: "Blood begets blood."
[Question] Some Revolution Command Council m~mbers believed in resorting to
physical liquidation.
[Answer] I know this. But the queatioa atill concerns the issue of democ-
racy. You are a democratic man and you must insist on clinging to democracy.
[Question] It is my opinion that the Arab world's catastrophe ar.d Egypt's
catastrophe are the absence of democracy. What we see in the Islamic world
is also surprising. It is surpri.sing that there ien't a single Islamic
= country with a democratic regime.
[Answer] The third World has its groblem with democracy. The middle class
c~nstantly drools for the Weatern system. It does not realize that the
Western system is not ~ust economic freedom but also p~litical freedom, re-
spect for the individual, freedom of expression, unionist rights and so forth.
It is a complete process. In our countries, this class imagines that if
economic freedom is realized and capital is concentrated [in a few hands],
the country will advance. This is untrue. Democracy is essentially funda-
mental and the citizen who feels the state's respect for hie dignity a^d his
rights becomea the aec:ret behind the people's progreas. This is an iasue
that needs no debating. So, over what are you arguing with me?
NPUG Is Opposition Party
[Question] Does this mean that you still cling to democracy?
[Answer] Is there any doubt about this? Without democracy and supremacy of
the law, the security agencies rule.
[Question] Great. Egypt is without democracy today. So what do you say?
[Answer] What do you mean by "without democracy?" ,
[Question] It means that there is no "democracy" in Egypt.
[Answer] What do you mean? You must explain.
[Question] Rule is individual, public libertiea are banned, there is no
- parliament and the present People's Assembly ia rigged...and...
[Answer] (Here, Khalid interrupted me and said with emotion:) I re~ect this
debate and I am sorry that it is taking place at this level. Liaten every-
thing in lif~ is relative. I am a~man who, in al-Sadat's time, headed a
party that opposed his policy. The head of state considered the opposition
traitorous, atheist and infidel, considered whoever attacked the Egyptian-
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Israeli treaty a man attacking the holiest of sanctities, whoever criticized
the open-door policy a"Marxist" and whoever spoke agains~ imperialism a
"man with a complex." We were surprised to find in al-Sadat's successor a
, man who considers it nataral that some in the country would support the
treaty and some would oppose it, some who would support the open-door policy
and some who would oppose it, without being unpatriotic. This man has
established relations with them [opponents] and through this relationship
we have been able to secure the release of a large number of detainees and
to reinstate journalists aud university professors in their ~obs. We do
~ not claim that what has happened is a change or a fundamental solution to
the issue of democracy. But a new climate has developed and this climate
foretells that the opposition forces can play a better role than before. We
do not claim that the issue has been completely solved and we do not imagine
that in the climate of the past 3 to 4 years any elections could have been
held without ending in favor of the rightist and reactionary forces.
[QuestionJ Are the people rightist?
[AnswerJ This is my viewpoint: Whoever demands immediate elections does
not ~inderstand politics. Again, whoever demands elections at present does
not understand politics. To hold elections, liberties must be secured for a
period of 2 years [before the elections], for example.C; This does not happen
overnight. We will struggle to achieve democracy. We are in the arena
exerting pressure and we are struggling to change the conditions so that the
elections can take place under new conditions and be re~l elections in which
~ the popular forces can win.
[Question] But President Mubarak has said: No elections, no constitution,
no amendment and no abolition of the suppression laws.
[Answer] Let him say what he wants. How long will he say it? ;
[Question] Perhaps throughout his presidency, whose duration we do not know.
[Answer] It is obvious that you are against him. Frankly, I am not.
[Question]. Why?
[Answer] Under his presidency, the national forces find a better opportunity
to act and to move. The party's movement in Egypt is better under Mubarak's
presidency than it was under al-Sadat's. With all the imposed restrictions,
I am moving better and I will publish AL-AHALI.
. (Question] Will it follow the same line it followed before?
[Answer] This is none of your concern. I will publish my paper and if the
public doesn't like it, that's a different s~tory.
[Question] What I mean is" Will AL-AHALI be published as an opposition
paper?
[Answer] What else, a supporting paper? An opposition paper, of course.
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[Question] Will Mubarak permit opposition?
[Answer] It doesn't concern me whether he permits it or not.
[Question] Will ~u attack Camp David?
[Answer] Of course I will attack Camp David. Can a newspaper be issued
without a sound line, meaning its own line? I cannot abandon my line and I
have not given up by opposition to Camp David. But I am now reformulating
my opposition in a manner compatible with the new aitustion. Today, if the
Israeli forces withdraw and you talk to the Egyptian citizen about Camp
David, he will not understand you. You must make him underatand that what
you oppose in Camp David are the restrictions stipulated in the treaty.
What Withdrawal?
[Question] Do you believe that the Iaraeli withdrawal from Sinai is a real
withdrawal?
[Answer] This is an issue that I have already discussed but you want to
- wrench from me statements that do not serve the national movement. I am
sorry.
[Question] This is not true and you are not the type from whom a statement
is wrenched.
[Answer] The NPUG position, exgressed in all the party's statements, is
still againet Camp David. But I am not againbt Egyptian terrizories being
returned *_o Egypt, even if returned incompletely and at high cost.
[Question] With incomplete sovereignty and under U.S.-Israeli military con-
trol. Isn't that so?
[Answer] We understand this. But does your question mean that I should ask
them to stay and not withdraw?
[Question] No, it means that you should not give the people the impression
- that there has been an evacuation and that Sinai has been liberated.
[Answer] No, an evacuation has actually taken place.
(Question] What evacuation is this?
[Answer] The people must struggle to expel the U.S. troops.
[Question] This means that the sovereignty is diminished?
[Answer] But we know that it is diminished.
[Question] Will you tell the people, for example in AL-liHALI when it is
published, that the sovereignty is diminished?
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rox o~ri:.~i~i, u5~; ViVLY
[Answer] We have geen saying this repeatedly.
[Questio~] But it is said that you have supported Camp David an3 said that
it is a fait accompli. Is this true?
[Answer] There is no such a~hing as fait accompli and we have never sa3d
this.
[Question] Thank God.
[Answer~ I am only sorry for the Egyptians living abroad. They don't know
how to struggle and "they cling to a few words " We know that sovereignty
over the Sinai is incomplete and the government knows, and knows perfectly
well, that it is incomplete, they say: Let the Israelis get out "and then I
will come and smash..." I want to build a strong and independent national
rule in Egypt.
[Question] Is this possible under the.current conditions?
[Answer] Yes, it is possible.
[Question] How, when all the state leaders are pro-Sadat?
[Answer] (Once again Khalid Muhyi al-Din gets emctional and says:) You are
not politicians. You are not politiciana. Go to your homes and we will
struggle. We will struggle to build in Egypt a national rule that knows how
to deal with the U.S. forces, with Iarael and with the world. If national
rule is not established, our cause will.aot succeed.
, [Question] And if the regime does not pez4ait you to struggle?
[Answer] Does struggle ask for a permit? Did al-Sadat permit us?
[Question] Then you will embark on a confrontation with the regime?
[Answer] You want to wrench from me the word confrontationl
[Question] This is not true. I only want to understand and you are not one
from whom words are wrenched.
[Answer] I am not reassured by this interview of yours.
[Question] Why?
[Answer] Because I say and stress that Mubarak's situation ia different
from al-Sadat's situation and, therefore, I must deal with him differently.
If I fail to do so, then I am no politician.
[Question] Mubarak has changed the situation from what it was in al-Sadat
time only superficially.
[Answer] This is another issue. My opinion is...
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. LY
[Question; What I mean is that he is different from al-Sadat only in the
J veneer but the essence of the polic~ is the same.
[Answer~ (Khalid a~.swers with emotion:) You don't serve Egypt and you don't
serve any movement. You only wish to say that Mubarak is al-Sadat, man!
[Question] Not at all. We want true democratic ru?a through which we can
~ establish national rule. This undemocratic regime will not permit...
[Answer] I have said that we will atruggle as we have already struggled.
Strug~le is not waged with a permit from the ruler.
What Are Y~ur Goals?
[Question] Briefly, what are your goals in the current phase as a political
party?
[Answer] Our present goal is to mend the Egyptian economy so that it can
stand on its own feet and to establish an independent national government
that is not part of the U.S. strategy. It is posaible to realize this
because the president of the republic has said it and I will hold him
_ accountable accordingly. [We want] a strong national rule that stands on
firm grounds and that can make Egypt play a national and pan-Arab role in the
area and in the world. Consequently, I will overcome all the restrictions
contained in the treaty and beat them with a...
[Question] Good. Do you consider yourself an opposition party now?
[Answer] I am an opposition party. A few days ago, President Mubarak said
that the NPUG opposes all of the state's main policies but it is a national
party..
[Question] Is this the new thing that you want to point out?
- [Answer] What new thing?
[Question] New, meaning different from al-Sadat who did not recognize the
opposition.
[Answer] Mubarak deals with us in a new way and we also deal with him in a
new way, but he hae not aaked ua to change our position.
[Question] A final question, why have you supported execution of the death
sentence against al-Islambuli aad his colleagusa?
[Answer] I neither support nor oppose. It is not a task of a political
party to interfere in a court sentence.
(Question] But this is a military court.
[AnswerJ But it is.a ~udiciary system. Sentences have been issued for and
against the NPUG. ~It is not the party's task to comment on judiciary
seMtences.
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If what is wanted is abolition of the military courts, these courts are a
part of ~he country's law. Our party only demands a~olition of the death
sentence for political cri~es. This is part of the party program. However,
we do not consider assassination a political crime.
- [Question] Political assassination?
[Answer] There is no such a thing as political as3asaination.
[Question] In the past, you participated in political assassinations.
[Answer] I was wrong and I admit that I was wroag. I am against solving
political problems with assassination. Our party condemned al-Sadat`s
assassination. I respect the court ruling. I,don't kuow what I would have
done if I were i.n the position of the head of the state. This ia why I have
made no comment. I have neither supported.onr opposed. These are court
sentences. �
[Question] But isn't blockage of all the legitimate outlets through which
the people could defend themselves against the dan~;era of al-Sadat policy a
' justification for al-Sadat's assassination?
[Answer] W}:en all the outlets are blocked, the people still have a means..
- Had the Islamic movement acted politically with the political oppoc~~{~n,
it would have produced for Egypt resulta that would have been many times
better than the results produced by the assassination. Had the Islamic
movement met with the opposition political forces in a real front and had
it struggled at a popular level, the meeting would have produced a lot
greater effect than that produced by the 6 October bullets. Therefore, I
~ don't believe that bullets change history. Political action is what changes
history. If the religious movement replaced violence with organized
political action and if it would meet with and open up to�the political
forces, the results for Egypt would be a.lot better than reaorting to vio-
lenc~ and force.
- [Question] But the Islamic forces...
[Answer] I support the view that the Islamic political current must find
for itself the channels to express its thought.and posit{.on because this
current is a reality in the country.
[Question] Did you not join this current in entering the national fr~nt or
coalition?
[Answer] Some of its figureheads did but the organized Islamic political
movement is not with us. If the religious political forces would understand
the value of political action, if they would underetand that no current will
impose its opinion on the other currents and if they would turn democratic
and admit that their opinion is not necessarily the best opinion and that
political action is carried out in the in+terest of all, then positive
results would be achievod.
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[Ques~ion] This means that the Islamic organizations have referred to ally
themselves with you?
[Answer] I cannot say that they have refusea. They believe that Egypt can
b~ saved in one way only, namely, by the rule of the Koran and the Islamic
Shari'a, i.e., by the Koran and the Sunna, chst anything else is infidelity
and that their path to achieving this rule ie t~hrough iorce. But they did
meet with us on opposing Ca~ap David and some manifestations of corruption.
But full political cooperat~on is nonexistent. Had they cooperated and
engaged with us in the political struggle againet al-Sadat's policy, the
- pirture would have been different fram ~rhat it is t~day and they would not
have had to resort to bulleta.
This is why our party has condemned al-Sadat's assassination and why it
respects the court sentences, without sunporting or opposing.
I Am Not Mubarak's Messenger
[Question] As you know, Khalid al-Islambuli's father hae been in detention
since his son shot al-Sadat. You also know that he was not allowed to see
his son for brief moments even at the hour of execution. How would you
~ describe a regime that follows this inhuman and illegal path?
[Answer] I don't know. Why do you want to involve me in these issues? 1
want to know what it is thay you want?
[Question] I want you to denounce the denial of a chance for a father to
see his son prior to the son's execution. I even want you to denounce the
arrest of al-Islambuli's father, who is being punished for what his son
committed whereas the Egyptian and world constitutions and lawe say that
punishemnt is personal.
[Answer] This is not part of a political party's work. You can ask the
human rights groups.
[Question] Can you mention some of your stands in opposition to Presiden~
Mubarak's policy?
[Answer] We continue our oppoaition. An example is the Israeli book fair
held last Janaary. We urged the citizens to boycott the fair and dis~riLuted
5,000 copies of a party statement urging the boycott. When the Egy~tian
Government abstained from voting in the UN on tha issue ~f Iarael's annexa-
tion of the Golan, we issued a atatement opposing that position. When
President Mubarak announced that he would viait Israel but not Jerusalem, we
asked him not to visit Israel and said to him: Your refusal to visit
_ Jerusalem, is a positive act but it is better to refuse to visit Israel. On
the issue of the border disagreement and the ca11 for the fo~mation of an
arbitration committee, we said that these are sacred borders that no man has
the ri~ht to concede and on which there can be no arbitration. The gist is
that insof ar as President Mubarak's regime ia concerned, we oppose it in a
new way and with a new approach dictated by the new circumstances. People
cannot understand that things have changed in Egypt.
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[Question] They have changed in form only.
- [Answer~ What is wrong with form? Is it bEtter or worse when the head of
state meets an opF~osition party chairman and tells him: I have been com-
pelled to take such and such.a position?
[Question] Of course it is better than al-Ss~at but perhaps the.new formula-
tion and approach in your poeition are within the framework of political
support far the regime?
[Answer] What is it that yau w~nt? I am not pleased with this interview of
yours. You want to exploit it and force words...
[Question] No. I only wsnt to make sure that you are an actual opp~nent.
People say that you have become a supporter of Mubgrak..
[Answer] Zet them say it.
[Question] And that he has sent you to a number of Arab capitals on
political missions to be discussed with their politicians.
[Answer] He has not sent me and he cannot send me. I am not Mubarak's or
anybody else's messenger.. I have made a statement saying that I cannot
represent Mubarak. I cannot repreaent hj.m because I don't know what he wants.
I told them my opinion of Mubarak. Thie ia what I have said.
~ [Question] Again, ha~ he sent you as hia emissary to eome Arab capitals?
[Answer] This has not happened. E~en if he has, then what ia wrong with
this? I would have conveyed his viewpoint without taking the responsib ility
for it. Mubarak sends his own men. By the way, most of the Atab leaders,
beginning with al-Qadhdhafi and ending with Haf iz al-Assad, are in coatact ;
with Mubarak. ~
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8494 i
CSO: 4504/291
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IRAQ
DELETSSIOUS EFFECTS OF PIPELINS SHUTDOWN ON SYRIA ~1NDEbtSC~ED
Paris AL-WATAAI AL-'AaABI in Arabic No 271, 23-29 Apr 82 pp 56, 57
/Article: "Shutdown of the Baniya$ and Tripoli Lines; Iraq Is Not the O~nly
In jured Party"/ ~
/Text/ What are the economic dimensions of the Syrian goverament's decision to
shut down the two oil lines that tranaport Iraqi crude oil to the outlets of
~Baniyas in Syria and Tripoli in Lebaaoa?
Since shipping in the Shatt al-'Arab waa suspended, Iraqi oil has been exported
through three ports on the Mediterranea:z by three pipelinea, passing over Turkish
territory, Syrian territory to Baniyae and Syrian and Lebanese territory to
Tripoli. .
About 550,000 to 650,000 barrels are exported daily through the Turkieh line. Be-
fore they were closed, the other two ?ines piped about 250,000 barrela a day. If
they had been operating at their fuJ~l c.apacitp it would have been poesible to ex-
~ port abouC 600,000 barrels a day thYOUgh ;hem. Thus Iraq would have managed to
reach the level agreed upon at the latest GvPEC meetinge in Vienna on 19-20 Maxch
1982, which was 1.2 million barrels a day.
In addition to the volume exported through the ports, Iraq, through the lines,
provides Syria with its needs for light crude oil to operate the Hums refinery,
and it provides Lebanon with all the crude oil necessary to operate the Tripoli
refinery with the ob~ective of supplying the local market with volumes of refined
oil.
It is worth pointing out that Syria is an oil-producing cauntry and is a member
of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Bxporting Countriea, but that its oil is
heavy and low quality. �
While it exports heavy crude oil, it importe light oil. Syria's moet important
heavy oil customer is France. The French oil companies' imports in 1981 came to
abo~t 1.2 billion French francs (about $220 million in 1981 prices). France alsb
_ imported $120 million in refined petroleum producta (from the Hums refinery).
Iraq was the country exporting light oil to Syria.
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These are t~e data; let uF look at the repercussions.
Syria's meaeure was aimed at atriking ~ut at the Iraqi economy in a period when it
was bearing the burden of defending the baeic national cause. However, Iraq is
well known for its planning. The 2Ainistry of Planning in Baghdad is one of the
most im~nrtant, capable and well en~~wed of ministries; therefore, one need not
raorry that this country can create alteruate solutions.
The first available possibility is to increase eaporta via the Turkish line. In
t~is manner it would be possible to increase the export volume from 600,000 barrels
a d~~y to 800,000.
The second poas~~:.Lity is to conduct oil barter between Iraq and ita fraternal ,
Gulf .;i~ states, which are all standi'.ng alonside it. 'I'his bartering Would be aimed
at mee~ing Iraq's cou~itments to im~urting countries through quantities of Arab
Gulf oil, provided t:iat Iraq repay tlle bartered amounts when circumstances so per-
mit. .
The third possibility is the medium-range one. One aspect of that is that an ad-
ditional line should be laid alongaide the T~rkiah one. Tt?e other aspact is that
a pipeline should be laid through Ruwait to the Red Sea coast and another one
through Saudi Arabia. The Iraqi minister of petroleum, Mr Tayih 'Abd-al-Karim,
previously revealed thes~ two plane to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI before the Syrian govern-
ment declared its measures.
As a result of its government's decree, Syria will loae revenuea from the transit
- of Iraqi oil over its territories; these are estimated at a quarter of a million
dollars a day when the two lines are operating at fnll capacity. L~kewise, Syria
will lose .:he light crude oil thaC it receiv~d from Iraq on verq auitable terms.
The government would like to compensate for this,light crude deficit through
Iranian oil. The Syrian and Iraqi governments signed a barter agreement ~ahen a
Syrian delegation headed by Mr 'Abd-al-Aalim Rhaddam recently visited Iran. This
agreement stipulates that Syria is to be sugplied with the crude oil it requires
in exchange for various Syrian exports of a equal value. This need ranges from
- 140,000 to 16U,000 barrels a day, or no n?ore than 8 million tons a year.
Repercussions in Lebanon
One odd discrepancy is that the day the Syrian government announced the decision
to shut down the Baniyas and Tripoli oil lines, the Lebanese government aubmitted
the draft of an urgent law ta the Chamber of Deputies calling for ratification of
the agr~>ment it had reached with the Iraqi government on 16 November 1981. Per-
haps it would be t~eneficial to present the verbatim text of the Lebanese cFficial
viewpoint as contained in the atatement made on the justifications for the agree-
ment:
"On 16 November 1981 an oil agreement was concluded in Baghdad between the govern-
ment of the Aepubli~: of Iraq and the government of the Itepublic of Lebanon con-
sisti.ng of three appendices, a technical appendix and two exchanged letters
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' related to the tranomittal of Iraqi oil via the pipea of th~ o~l farilit:.cs Yn
~ Tripoli on Lebanese territory and the provis{on of Iraqi crude oil to ~.eba~on =or
- purposea of domestic consumption.
"This agreement res�ames the pumping of Irsqi oil to Lebanon and througii it to the
- outer world through the outlet of the oil facilities in Tripoli followi~g a su~-
~ pension that has lasted about 6 years.
~ "Thi.s agreement ~rill gu.arante~ ~hat t~:~ trfpoli refinery ia continuously supplied
with all its crude oil requir~ments a~ appropsciate prices. It will guarantee
~ Lebanon additional financial revenuea ae well as allowing Lebanon to continue to
~ be a basic crude oil export center in the eastern area of the Mediterranean, with
the consequent strengthening of its atatus that will result from that in various
leve Ls. "
Lebanon will lose all these benefits "thanks to" ~.he latest measures, as if they
i had not even been willing to let it raise its head a little to take a vigorous
breath.
- COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
11887
_ ~50: 4404/447
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rvn vrr~~...iAi, u~e vivLY
I~Q
HOUSING MINISTER COI~A~NTS ON RECENT PROJBCTS, PROGRESS
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 271, 23-29 Apr 82 p 58
/Article by Fawzi al-Bindari; "The Iraqi Housing Minister: The Repair Shop Is
Active and These Are Our Projecte"/
/Text/ The Iraqi minister of housing and redevelopment, Mr Muhammad Fadl Husayn,
said that no adjustments have been made in the Iraqi development plan in the course
of the war; if there have been adjustments, these have been aimed at accelerating
_ some projects.
Minister Husayn replied to five questions from AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI during his recent
visit to Rome:
/suestion/ What is the volume of housing and development in Iraqi today?
/Answer/ The construction, housing and development sector occupies special im-
portance in the Gurrent development plans, in three important sectors, which are:
1. The sector of roads, bridges and civilian airports: In recent years, the
initiative has been taken to carry out lsrge projects in this area.. Currently the
expressway project that extends from the Ruwaiti border via Basrah, al-Nasiriyah
and Baghdad, branching off to the Iraqi border with Jordan and the border with
Syria, is under construction; this is 2,200 kilometers long and its cost is~
estimated at about $3.3 billion. Work on it began more than 2 yea~s ago. There
are more than 50 bridges now under construction on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers
and their tributaries. As regards sirports, the Baghdad airport, which has been
given the name Saddam Husayn International Airport, is on the verge of being
finished while work on the Basra airport will be campleted the next 2 years.
2. The building sector: This sector involves the construction of big government
buildings such as universities, higher institutes, hoapitals and ministry buiid-
ingso The construction work on these buildings is active and ongoing and is
making progress, in view of their importance in the cultural, health and social
fields,
- /3./ As regards the housing sector, the ministry has carried out studies which
took ~any years in which it estimated actual and future housing needs in Iraq.
- It pursued a policy of reliance on the: private sector for the bulk of the
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construction of suitable dwellings for citizena. The goverim~ent 4ffers material
assistance in the form of interest-free laans to be paid off in instalments over
_ long periods of up to 25 years, while the competent government organizations are
= providing the buildings and services needed for the residential areas at govern-
- ment expense.
The final part of the plan is carried out in the cooperative sector and it enjoys
great support from the government in the form of inatallatione or loans to build
housing complexes for its dependente in the industrial and oil sectors and the work
the minfstry's General Houaing Orgaaization is carrying out.
/guestion/ Most countries in the World are suffering from a housing shortage today;
does such a shortage exist in Iraq, especially in the light of the circumstances of
the war that is going on?
/Answer/ Yes, but to the point where it doea not constitute a ahortage. There is
a need for housing units at the present time. The revolution is most earnestly
striving to cover these needs. The main obstacle ia the lack of building materials,
- because the building materials factories do not have the capacity to cover all re-
quests; also, the Iraqi manpower required for this sort of project does not exist.
To counter these obstacles, the government proceeded to construct larga cement and
other building materials plants some years ago. The gavernment is also seriously
seeking to introduce modern technology with the objective of reducing the labor re-
quired, on the assumption that it will seek the aid of Arab workers to meet any
deficit that occurs. �
/Question/ Have you set out any plans for postwar redevelopment?
/Answer/ Once the war ends, imnediate measures will be taken to make the necessary
repairs in the border towns.
/Question/ You have met with a number of officials of the Italian governa?ent here
in Rome. Do they have an understanding of the juat nature of the Iraqi war?
/Answer/ The Italian officials have a good underetanding of the Iraqi position.
I have found a sincere d.esire on their part to have peace reign in this part of the
world, in view of the effects thia war is having on the interaational economy.
/4uestion/ What are the prioritfes of the 5-year development plan?
/Answer/ Priority is being given to developing the Iraqi economy, especially in
the social, health and cultural fields and the transport and coum~unications sec-
tors, as well as to developing and exploiting natural resourcea in a balanced
manner while providing the ing~ediente for defending the nation's soil and provid-
ing an adequate aaaunt for these projects. Two large dams are now being built,
the Mosul Dam on the Tigris Biver and the al-fladithah Dam on the Euphrates. These
two dams will help control water resources and regulate their use, ae well as gen-
~ erating electric power. ~'he cost of work on the two dams will cane to $12 billion.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
11887
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- LIBYA
QADHDHAFI PRESENTS HIS VERSION OF GAFSA INCIDENT
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 May 82 pp 52-53
[Statement by Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi to an unnamed Palestinian leader; date and
place not specified]
[Text] Qadhdhafi has ~ust conf ided something very strange
to a Palestinian leader who was reproaching him for his
changes in attitude toward Tunisia.
Palestinian: Colonel Qadhdhafi, you signed the agreement for a total and imme-
diate merger with Bourguiba in D~erba on 12 January 1974 and then, by returning
to Bourguiba the document signed on that date, you agreed 8 years later, on
23 February 1982, to waive your right to go through with that merger.
� You armed and organized an expedition--this was the Gafsa incident in January
1980--to overthrow the Bourguiba regime. ~ao years later--in January and Feb-
- ruary 1982--you took the initiative of visiting Tunisia twice in 2 months and
of concluding cooppration agreements. ,
Qadhdhafi: I signed the merger agreement with Tunisia in D~erba. But what
you do not know--and what no one wants to believe--is that in D3erba, I was
not the one who wanted an immediate merger. Bourguiba himself, Masmoudi, and
all the Tunisians present, especially those who tried immediately after that
to make Bourguiba change his mind, were much more enthusiastic and in a much
greater hurry than I was. They persuaded me: it was not I who talked them
into it.
As far as the so-called Gafsa incident is concerned, that has been wrongly
blamed on us. It is true that the armed Tunisian commandos started out from
our country, and the financing and weapons were supplied by Libyans. But our
responsibility stops there, and I readily admit that our responsibility was
seriously involve~.
But it is unfair to say that we were the cause of that incident, because the
- instigator--the one who wanted it to happen and asked for my help--was
- Boumediene. He is dead, but his associates who organized the affair with us
are very much alive. I am so furious that we are the oniy ones mentioned in
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connection with that incident that for the first time, I am going to give
names and circumstances.
Boumediene went home from Tunis furious one day. That must have been in Jan-
uary 1978.1 He had had an altercation with Aedi Nouira, who was prime minis-
ter at the time, and Abdallah Farhat, the minister of defense.
I think they had re~ected his request that they condemn the intervention in
the Sahara by French Jaguars2 and that they also cancel the visit to Tunisia
by the French chief. of staff.3
Over the telephone, I felt that Boumediene was in a cold rage. His voice was
trembling. What he wanted was to teach a lesson--to show that his will could
not be resisted with impunity.
He told me: "I am sending you three trusted associates. Assign people of the
same caliber to work with them in setting up an operation. Tunisia must be
made to tremble and Nouira must be overthrown. I will take care of the politi-
cal side of it, and we'll talk about it again."
It was Slimane Hoffmann, Dr Taleb Ibrahimi, and a third man whose name I have
forgotten who came to see me on Bonmediene's behalf. And I was wrong to agree
to provide the supplies for the operation.
Dr Taleb Ibrahimi is the very man, I think, that the Algerian Government in-
tends to send to Tunis as ambassador.
1. Boumediene's last visit to Tunisia took place on 15 and 16 January 1978,
and it is true that it resulted in a very sharp exchange between Boumediene
on the one hand and Nouira and Farhat on the other.
2. On 12 and 13 December, and again on 18 December 1977, Boumediene spoke of
it as "carnage."
3. That would be Gen Guy Mery, French Armed Forces chief of staff at the time.
He arrived in Tunis on Boumediene's heels--on 17 January 1978.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982
11798
CSO: 4519/176
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LIBYA
WOMEN IN ARMY ACT AS QAD~IDAAFI'S B4DYGUARDS
Paris 3EUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 May 82 pp 42, 44-46
[Article by Moh,amed Selhami]
[Text] "One, two! One, two!" With their Kalashnikovs held tightly across
their chests, they 3ogged up under the orders of a warrant officer. They were
returning in a sweat from target practice, and on some of them the mascara was
running. Makeup has its reasons that drill does not understand. I was told:
"These are our shock commandos."
So there before me were those "Amazons" frrnn among whom Qadhdhafi chooses his
bodyguards! Soldiers like anq others: good at marksmanship, agile, and un-
failingly loqal to the guide of the revolution.
The impressive women's military academy is located on Omar-al-Mokhtar Avenue,
Tripoli's most important thoroughfare. The ramparts were so thick and high
that I had the f eeling I was ia a fortif ied castle. To enter, I naturally had
to obtain ministerial authorization. It was on a Sundaq morning in spring
when I presented myself at the academy's huge gate. The sentinel, a woman
- soldier with weapons and a walkie-talkie, gave me a hard look, then peered at
my identif ication card. "Okay, you can go in!" As I was starting my car, she
put her mouth to the walkie-talkie. I was greeted by a lieutenant in the Lib-
yan Army, about 1.75 meters tall and stout, with long hair over broad shoulders.
On her head was a paratrooper's pink beret. She was wearing a khaki-colored
uniform with no insignia to indicate her rank. Nothing but a medallion of
Qadhdhafi pinned to her chest. Hayat made an effort to smile: "Are you the
reporter brother who works in Paris?"
Chest forward, the lieutenant invited me to follow her, and we made an in-
spection of the premises under the curious and amused eyes of the residents.
The hive was buzzing. Apparently, Hayat was the queen of these rather special
bees. I began to daydream as I contemplated those graceful silhouettes. Was
I really in Tripoli, where I had become accustomed to seeing only men? What
a startling contrast! On my arrival at the airport the day before, I had re-
fused to enter a taxi driven by an imposing Libyan man, a veritable colossus
with a chilly smile.
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The "shock commandos" sunounded the mast fzom which the green flag of the
Jamahariya was flqing. Theq sang the national anthem, then dispersed. They
were gone,long enough to ctiange uniforms, and then those same young women re-
assembled under the direction of Lieutenant Hayat. They lined up in columns
of two and answered roll call. Strict orders were given not to leave the
~cademy: Golonel Qadhdhaf i was going abroad, and some of them might be going
along--as~bodyguards.
Recruitment standards for those women are very strict. The maximum age is 25,
and at least the thfrd year of secondary education is required, but entrance
to the academy is by competitive examination. And a real aptitude for sports
is demanded.
The academy on Omar-al-Mokhtar Avenue currently houses about 50 residents.
Military instruction covers all three branches (land, air, and sea). Qadhdhafi
himself chooses his bodyguards, and he is not stingq with pay, which amounts
to approximately 5,000 dinars per month (1 dinar = 20 French francs), pZus
hazardous duty pay and travel allowances.
Tourya, who is a graduate of the Omar-al-Mokhtar academ}?, has been assigned to
the president's off ice for 3 years. On duty 24 hours a day, she watches over
her leader like a hen guarding its chicks. "I don't dislike my ~ob. It was
_ my choice--a fanatical desire that came over ~e as I was reading the Green Book." i
She agreed to meet me in a Tripoli restaurant, but arrived an hour late. It
didn't matter. In Libya, aa is known, time takes its own sweet time. Tourya
had visibly been running. Out of breath, she managed a"Hi" that ended in a
sigh. So there she was, the "Amazon" of the green revolution. All Tripoli
admires her for her beauty, but above all, obviously, because she is Qadhdhafi's
bodyguard. Her vnlform f it her like a glove. Tall and brunette, she smiled. I
- I greeted her with restraint: one has to be careful of ~~umors in Tripoli. And
besides, flirting would be playing with fire, since the restaurant was swarming
with people. I even noticed about a dozen soldiers.
The restaurant was pleasantly decorated: paneled walls, tables with sparkling
white tablecloths, plates of discreet pink, and brass sparkling under the neon.
The sea could be seen through the wide windows. The sun lit up the port, where ,
many ships were flying foreign colors. About 50 freighters had been waiting I
for months to urload their cargo.
Tourya readily listened to what was said to her, but she said little about her
~ activities as a bodyguard. She wore light makeup and a simple hairdo. She did
not look her 25 years and in fact has neithzr the time nor the inclination to
play mannequin.
She said: "For me, there is only God and Qf~dhdhafi."
She could not understand the amazement of her Algerian sistera when the colonel
visited his counterpart and "brother," Ct~adli Bend~edid, in February. The news-
paper EL-MOUDJAHID found the presence of those Amazons on a very official visit
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- strange. A picture of her enen appeared on the newspaper's front page. It
was an event to give Algerian women something to chatter about.
~
But let us go back to October 1979. In tnat montih, an international symposium
on the Green Book was held in Benghazi. The participants--about 100 men and
women--had come from all over the world to spend 3 days debating Mu'ammar
Qadhdhaf i's Third Theory. The problem of women occupied a large place in the
debates. "We made you man and woman and then peoples and tribes so that you
would know each other. The best among qou in God's eyes is the one who is most
devout." That verse from the Koran was at the heart of the discussions.
One woman attending the sqmposium claimed: "It wonderfully illustrates the
equality of the sexes," and she went on: "This verse is addressed to men and
women in general. The promised reward is splendid: the best among us is the
one who is most devout, without distinction as to sex."
In other words, Qadhdhafi is not the "phallocratic misogynist" that Westerners
like to imagine. Tourya will not soon forget the symposium in Benghazi, which
for her was a revelation. It was reported on television, which broadcast long
~ excerpts from the debates in which a woman, Fahina al-Bittar--a Syropalestinian
_ university graduate who had taken refuge in Libya--attracted special attention
with these words in particular: "The Third Theory regards equality as a sacred
principle. It respects woman's natural role and opens up to women the paths
to emancipation."
. Qadhdhaf i, who presided over the session, was satisfied and waYmly contratulated
her. He said, "Ordinarily, those who speak present a misinterpretation of the
theses in the Green Book."
The symposium was a triumph for the Libyan chief of state. It made him popular
with a million Libyan women. So much so, in fact, that on more than one occa-
sion, a number of them demonstrated tli~ir attachment ~o the guide by shouting
slogans and applauding. But also by making commitments.
It should be remembered, incidentally, that military training in Libya is com-
pulsory for women and men under 50 years of age. Those concerned register with
the people's committees, which assign them to barracks where they learn how to
handle weapons and also learn--if they do not lrnow already--the principles of
the famous Third Theory. Training lasts from 3 zo 6 months, with a refresher
course every year. The armp general staff claims that the women are more studi-
ous than their male counterparts and adopt the Green Book's ideas more easily.
Are they as efficient militarily? Unlike the men, many of whom took part in
the campaign in Chad, Libyan women have never participated in a war. But it
could happen. Qadhdhaf i drEams of an army of inen and women who can be mobilized
in less than 24 hours. It is a ma~or preoccupation with the chief of state to
_ double his army's strength, which currently stands at 70,000. According to
Tripoli, that is an excellent means of making the Jamahiriya "a great military
power in Africa." Since Libya's population does not exceed 2 million--half
men and half women--recruitment of the so-called weaker sex seems to be the
solution. "I want an army as strong and disciplined as the one on the other
- side," confided Qadhdhafi to one of his associates as he stood in the Syrian
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section of Kuneitra facing Israel (on 24 August 1981). He had insisted on
visiting the "martyr city" of the October War (1973), despite the reluctance
of his host, Gen Hafiz al-Assad. The Syrian chief of state told him repeatedly:
"I cannot be responsible for your safety or that of your bodyguards." Sur-
rounded by his women, Qzdhdhaf i chose danger. And danger is indeed what seems
to go the hea.ds of the Libyan women. Aware then of their importance, they
lifted their heads.
When Tourya proudly entered the restaurant beside the sea with her boots bang-
ing on the tile floor, the customers who we*-e chatting while listening to a
cassette by Oum Kalthoum became quiet. Why should she care, now that she is a
soldier? The time of oppression is finished! Patriarchal power is finished!
Long live Qadhdhafi!
Fouzia, another Libyan woman, did her best to prove to me that the type of so-
ciety wanted by the chief of state is the best possible. Fouzia is also an
"Amazon," but her weapon is a ballpoint pen, not a Kalashnikov. She is editor
in chief of the weekly JAMAHARIYA and also secretary of the "revolutionary
press," and Qadhdhafi himself suggests ideas for articles to her. Every time
the presiden~ travels, she goes along. Talking to me in the Hilton Hotel in
Tunis during Qadhdhafi's most recent official visit, she told me: "Many people
are mistaken. Libya is presented as a militarized country, and that is false."
When I expressed surprise at seeing so many artned people--especially women--on
Tripoli's ~treets, Fouzia lost her temper.
"You think like a European!" And I was sub~ected to a long speech on the equal-
ity of sexes in the Jamahiriya as well as on the pacifism of $11 those armed
women.
On Tuesday 23 February, I was at the Sfaxa Hotel in Monastir, still in Tunisia.
Along with others, an "Amazon" with her finger on the trigger of her submachine-
gun was guarding the leader's apartment. Everyone was all keyed up. The trip
from Tripoli by road had been fatiguing for Qadhdhaf i and his party. And espe-
cially for the bodyguards, who had had to stay permanently alert to prevent any
incident.
The colonel was in his room. Carrying my suitcase, I was heading for my room
in the seznidarkness and silence of the corridor when a sentry's challenge gave
me a start: "Halt!" And I admit that for a brief second, I was afraid. Can
one ever be oure with these women? Everyon~ fears them. Including the minis-
ters!
� The barrel of the submachinegun was still pointed in my direction when another
bodyguard stepped behin~ me. I tried to explain why I was there. It was wasted
effort. Before continuing peaceably to my room, I had to wait until a Libyan
colleague passed by on his way to his own room. "Thank you, sisters," I said
in a loud voice. "Sh!" said the woman with the submachinegun, "The 'kaid''
(chief) is sleeping." And both of them stayed on duty there until daylight.
When do they sleep? And when do they eat?
I was told the next day: "They eat by turns. Among themselves. Never with
the other members of the delegation." But it also happens that sometimes they
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are ir_vited to share a meal with Qadhdhafi. What stimulation then! And what
3oY!
At the ~onven*_ion Hall in Tunis during the meeting with students (see JEUNE
_ AFRIQUE No 1105), when Tunisian television cameras kept showing closeup shots
of them, they were almost as big a hit as Qadhdhafi.
And at the palace in Carthage, where they guarded the door to the White Room
while the Libqan chief of state was talking with his Tunisian counterpart, Mrs
Bourguiba was filled with admiration for those remarka.ble vestal virgins. The
president's wife asked them to pose for pictures with her. They hesitated for
only a brief second. And then one could suddenly see that they also knew how
- to smile! Mrs Bourguiba tamed them with small pats on the cheek and little
taps on the shoulder. I was very careful not to imitate her. One can never
be too cautious.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982
11798
CSO: 4519/176
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LIBYA
OIL REVENUE DECLINE CALLS FOR NEW TREND IN TRADE POLICY
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 905
[Text] For some time now, British exporters have been concerned over their
increasing difficulties in getting paid for their exports to Libya. Ship-
owners and freight handlers report that it is taking them more and more
time to get through the administrative formalities in Libyan ports and,
more particularly, in Benghazi where, they say, the situation is becoming
worse every day. They feel that the only explanation for the slow pace
at which the administrative services inspect merchandise and documents is
that they are deliberately trying to delay paying for the imports. This
is because of the decline in oil revenues. The decisions adopted recently
by OPEC and the ensuing price war indicate that one should not expect a
- reversal of this trend in the near future. In fact, Libya's production
of crude oil dropped by 900,000 barrels a day in 1981. This last February
_ it pumped some 600,000 barrels a day, while the ceiling which OPEC set for
that country in Vienna is 750,000 barrels a day.
In its monthly bulletin of February-March 1982, the French-Libyan Chamber
of Commerce* voices the same co~cern in view of a recent freeze on payments
of import licenses affecting all the suppliers of the Jamahiriya and ~
operating at three levels: at the fiscal administration level (foz the
release of fiscal quietus receipts),.at the level of the Central Bank
(which systematically refuses to authorize transfers at amounts even
below 500,000 dinars; 1 Libyan dinar is approximately equivalent to 20.5
French francs) and at the level of the bank involved. The French-Libyan
Chamber of Commerce ascribes the freeze to the fact that Libyan authorities
want to take stock of their imports in terms of goods and money and, based
on the results, they want to establish their priorities. Therefore, it is
expected that they will soon adopt a policy of austerity which could result
in some contracts being canceled or deferred and in Libyan accounts probably
being subjected to a rapid auditing.
This financial freeze, the French-Libyan Chamber of Commerce adds, accom-
panied by the appointment of new officials at all levels as a result of the
*Headquarters: 9, Rue J.F. Leca, 13002 Marseilles; Secretariat: 2, Rue
Beauvau, 13001 Marseilles
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elections to the general People's Congress, reflects the deterioration of
the Libyan economy in *_he second half of 1981.
The trend of Libya's policy is to cut back on imports and contracts concluded
with foreign companies and to seek ways of settling its accounts either with
payments in the form of crude oil or by other means, such as allocating
- contracts to companies from countries which purchase oil or giving pref er-
ential treatment to countries which grant loans to Libya.
France can hardly increase its purchases of Libyan oil because it has
already signed long-term contracts with other countries, because its
domestic consumption has sharply declined in the last 2 years (dropping
by around 30 percent) and, f inally, because its reserves exceed demand.
The French-Libyan Chamber of Commerce goes on to point out that, on the
one hand, the Jamahiriya is very firmly determined to turn to other forms
_ of payment which will require its partners to be much more flzxible than
previously and will involve oil purchases or credit agreements and that,
on the other hand, it is going to establish a more strenuous competition
between the various countries operating in the Libyan market and eliminate
those which do not accept the above-mentioned payment facilities. The
French-Libyan Chamber of Commerce continues: "~o sets of ineasures must
be seen as very serious warning signs: 1) a nonmandatory request issued
to Libyan agencies by the authorities which supervise them to produce
specific technical proof if they want to acquire goods, supplies or services
from France during this first part of the year; 2) a request issued to
some French companies to postpone their shipments, a measure which will
undoubtedly be accompanied by a real and general freeze of payments."
"Over the last few years," the French-Libyan Chamber of Commerce concludes,
"French-Libyan exchanges involving consumer goods, equipment goods and
technology have increased sharply. It would be very unfortunate if all
the accumulated efforts of the French companies we.re to be lost and France
- supplanted by other countries."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.
8796
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.Y
TUNISIA
- NOUREDDINE BOUARROUJ DISCUSSES COMMUNIST PARTY STATUS
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 263, 12 Apr 82 pp 18-20
[Interview with Noureddine Bouarrou3, member of the Political Bureau of the
Tunisian Communist Party--7th Congress, by Hedi Dhoukar; date and place not
_ spec-!fied: "Legalization: A Fool's BaYgain"]
[Text] On 21 March, the Tunisian Communist Party [PCT]
held a meeting at the Mutual Benefit Society on the 26th
anniversary of Tunisia's independence. Without doubt,
the arbitrary ban imposed on that party in 1963 prevented
its nornial development within society and the maturing of
its views through contact with the masses. The ban was
also undoubtedly a basic factor that, 20 years later, has
operated in such a way that the party's return to legality
is occurxing under equally abnornial conditions--under
various pressures that cannot help but affect the cohesion
of the party's ranks and its credibility among the working
class and in the popular perception. It is for that
reason--and also because we are impelled by our concern
to clarify a debate distorted by official organs, whether
they belong to Destour or its opposition--that we havE:
~ asked Noureddine Bouarrou3, PCT--7tP~ Congress leader, to
set out for us in an interview his ideas about and analysis
of the communist party's situation in the present context
of the "~emocratic opening up of the political spectrum."
[Question] In your opinion, the PCT has become hostage to the PSD [Destourian
Socialist Party] and the liberal coalition. On what do you base this ~udg-
ment?
[Answer] I continue to think that by recognizing the PCT and making political
room for the liberal opposition, the Destourian Party has unfortunately
succeeded in imposing on them the thankless task of countering the left-
wing opposition on all issues. By dint of wanting at all costs this phoney
opening'up of the regime, the PCT finds itself naturally led to use methods
that start with intolerance in the face of argument and silence concerning
the existence of other commimist opinions and end with adopting the ways
of the Destour itself--that is to say, resorting to brute force, as was the
case when I was violently expelled, along with my comrades, from the meeting.
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[Question] Nevertheless, during the meeting Mohamed Ennafaa brought up the
case of t~e imprisoned Islamists whose release he called for, and he empha-
sized that there exists another opposition--aside from the MUP [Popular
Unity Movement], the PCT and the I~IDS (Move~ent of Socialist Democ~ats, led
by Ahmed Mestiri)--even though he did not identify it.
[Answer] Among the liberals and Mohamed Ennafaa, the demands for the re-
lease of the Islamists have become merely a standard piece of discourse,
repetitive and ritualistic which has never led to the slightest concrete
action on their behalf, whether in the form of a meeting, demonstration,
petition or any slightest real step. This attitude is all the more hypo-
critical since the PCT's current leaders are well aware that the mass arrests
of Islamists began the very day of the party's legalization.
One cannot help observing, moreover, the similarity of the contradictory
stand of Mohamed Ennafaa and his liberal friends with that of the govern-
ment. They have never been embarra~sed about pretending to talk about
democracy while being silent concerning the events that, about a week before
Ennafaa`s coming to Paris, took place in the village of Bkalta. The village
was cut off by government forces, and persistent rumors reported several
wounded and even dead among the population, which was said to be opposed
to the expulsion of a mosque's imam.
With regard to opposition movements, Mohamed Ennafaa also categorizes them
the same way as does the government, and he takes into consideration only
the authorized movements such as the I~IDS and the MUP II (Popular Unity
Movement, led by Mohamed Belhadj Amor). When he refers to the others, he
maintains an aloofness so as not to be associated with them.
As for the communist party specifically, its present leadership, which is
opportunistic, has decided to ignore the existence of a split, however
official and widely known it is in Tunisian political circles. This is be-
cause that leadership, following the exa~tple of the Destour, feels that
Tunisian co~nunism must have only a single representative in the country
and that all those who have been expelled from the party have nothing left
except the duty to remain silent. In this regard, the Destour, which has
eliminated several of its members in successive actions, has provided the
example for this type of intolerance. Furthermore, the opportunistic leader-
ship of the PCT seems to be legitimizing, as it were, its ignoring of a com-
munist opposition by the fact that the government, which does not agree to
freedom of organization, has given that leadership exclusive rights to
recognition.
[Question] Is that a reason for speaking of the current secretary general,
Mohamed Harmel, in one of your texts as a creature of the PSD and the
liberals and for denying the present leadership of the PCT any legitimacy?
[Answer] You will not find that term "creature" in the words we have used
for the simple reason that it does not fit the situation. Mohamed Harmel
is more the beneficiary of a choice that before becoming the PSD's was that
of the MDS liberals prio'r to their formation into a political movement.
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- Contacts and talks with the MDS--this is an acknowledged fact--fell exclusively
to Comrade Harmel, who was himself chosen as a valid negotiating representa-
tive by Ahmed Mestiri and his 1rIDS friends. Other newspapers carried on
from the liberals by granting the privilege of an interview to Harmel alone,
- though at a time when Mohamed Enafaa was still the first secretary of the
party. Later, with the appearance of the liberal papers EL-RAI, DEMOCRATIE
an~ LE MAGHREB, Harmel really did take first place in the eyes of a public
opinion that was not very well-informed about the PCT`s internal profile.
And, when the party decided to submit a request for authorization request
of a newspaper, it was done by Harmel in his own name.
This marked preference of the government's fo.r Harmel as an individual--
Harmel has, it is true, put his energies into saying reassuring things in
favor of the system of government, and partict~larly the presidential system--
took concrete form with the authorization to publish a newspaper and, after
_ that, with the lifting of the ban on the party, announced to Mohamed Harmel
at the time of an audience that President 3ourguiba granted him.
During this period, the liberal press, for a start, put up trial balloons
on the rise of Harmel to the position of secretary general of the party.
Ennafaa's name was permanently overshadowed. Finally, it was during a press
conference that party activists learned that an 8th Part;;~ Congress had been
held of which the order of the secretaries had been reversed.
[Question] Is that not a reference to a national party conference held in
- 1980?
[Answer] The national conference question was a proposal we had made in
1977, along with a certain number of comrades, with a view to try ing to
find a solution to the crisis in which the party found itself as a result
of its proliberal tag-a-ong tendency. The conference was to give rise, in
theory, to a debate that would have made it possible to find a minimum plat-
form common to all communists. It would have averted the split,. which was
already emerging, following the repeated pawer plays against several figures
of the expanded Central Committee and the Political Bureau opposed to the
proliberal orientation.
Unfortunately, the stubbornness of Harmel and his friends accentuated the
harmful aspects of that orientation, leading the party to adopt positions
that we had already found very distressing since they labeled as anarchists
the young and innocent victims who were trapped by the Destourian militiamen
and fell under the army's bullets.
This stance worsened further when the party, at the time the men of the
_ Gafsa commando group`'were arrested and before there was any trial, called
them "mercenaries," as the Destour press was writing. That press was
attempting to lay the groundwork for their death sentence.
- This stubbornness of Harmel's in leading the party into the fold of the
liberals and into consensus with the government definitively wrecked the
unitory national conference in which we were meant to parti^.ipate. The one
to which Harmel is referring at present is only a conference, which first
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established the split within the party and which expelled all those w~-~o did
not follo~w this proliberal course, including several incumbent members of
the expanded Central Committee and Political Bureau.
All things considered, this conference, as important as it was, did not have
the prerogatives of a congress, as things stand. How was this conference
turned into a congress? There is the real problem, and it remains unresolved.
I suppose, for i~ part, that Harmel, uncertain about his policy and about
its adoption by the party, tried to avoid holding a congress, although
tradition requires that when a communist party comes out of a period of
being underground, it sets itself as a first objective the holding of a
regular congress.
The ambiguity mainta~ined in this matter evades the statutory problems, and
it~sanctions, outside of any rules and outside of a congress, the elimination
of several members of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau elected
by the 7th Congress.
_ [Question] Certain communists, who are not all following the line, seem to
feel that there is no other answer for the PCT than to ensure its legal
existence in order to hope to one day play a more effective role in politics.
[AnswerJ It is true that certa~n activists think that legal status, in
- view of the means it can put at the party's disposal, might initially justify
- an attitude of flexibility, while waiting for new conditions to be met be-
fore asserting firmer opposition stands vis-a-v:is the government. That is
the view that motivates many activists who have rejoined the party, even if
they continue to have great reservations concerning its current line. On
the basis of the party's historical experience, however, we should reject
in advance the fool's bargain that lies in renouncing our actual political
objectives for a course of compromises and self-censorship just to preserve
legal status at any price. In fact, during the colonial period, legal ~
status--instead of helping the party to take root as it had thought it would
perhaps be able to do--made the party marginal in relation to the masses
and the anti-imperilaist movement that was stirring. It is that experience
that we do not want to repeat.
Moreover, recent events show how harmful formal legality is, because the
party, from the start of its legalization, has chosen to retreat instead
of affirm its positions of principle. This has led the party to be a mere
pretext--supposed evidence of nonexistent pluralism--that the government has
made sure to exploit to its advantage. From renunciation to compromise,
the party, instead of establishing itself, could not help but lose its
credibility and become an ob~ective ally of the government and its liberal
allies.
[Question] You seem to accuse the liberals in particular by implicating
them in the entire recent evolution of the s3tuation in the country. On
what do you base such a judgment?
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[Anawer] In the first place, I am thinking of the responsibility that
devolved on them in the elimination of the progresaive orientation of the
1960's, whatever its errors and inadequacies in other respects. I think
that it is liberal pressures, comhined with those of the multinationals,
that wE~re the origin of the 1969 power play and the adoption of the capi-
talist orientation that has pltmged the country into an economic, social and
political crisis the consequencea of which were the bloody days of January
1978 and the January 1980 tragedy at Gafsa.~
[C~uestion] In his speech at the Mutual Benefit Society, Mohamed Ennafaa
pointed clearly to the "new bourgeoisie" as the principal enemy, while
- declaring that his party was not against the private sector. Do you agree
with that strategy?
[AnswerJ At the start of independence, a watchword was accepted in the
party: advance the struggle against the "system of government's newly
privi.leged persons," which included an ecanomic and a political condemnation.
For communists and other left-wing patriots, this watchword had an essenti-
ally anticolonial meaning: i?~ referred to newly privileged persons in con-
nection with colonialization's men and their collaborators. One must em-
phusize in this regard that, as in any revolution, when the privileges of
the old traditional classes are threatened, thoae classea pretend to put
the people on their guard against the greed for riches and power of the
new upstarts.
Gxperience shows, however, that new and old upstarts are in complete solid-
arity when one raises the fundamental issue concerning their economic
privileges.
It is for that reason that Hedi Nouira--a classic representative example
o� the upstart bourgeoisie that grew a little rich before independence and
very rich afterwgrds--and Ahmed Mestiri--who, beyond his personal fortune,
~ which may well be modest, is still a spokesman for ~he traditional bour-
geoisie wt~ich has switched over to the modern sectors--have presented only
one solitary liberal economic program.
So, to introduce a distinction as Ennafaa does, is to seek, consciousoy or
unconsciously, to justify the alliance with the I~IDS which is itself allegedly
the representative of a less dangerous bourgeoisie.
Nowadays, it has definitely become necessary to nationalize entire aections
of the private sector if we want to embark on a policy of genuine develop-
ment. We are thinking in particular of the banking sector and of insurance.
Without their being really taken over by the State, no serious prospect for
development is possible. The problem of the private sector is all the more
serious today because it is linked to foreign policy choices that deliber-
ately fit in with a pro-American and pro-Western orientation and are reflected,
on the Arab world level, by the building of a Tunis-Riyadh-Rabat axis directly
involved in American strategy in the region.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Afrique-Asie
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TUNISIA
COMMANDO OPERATIONS PLOTTED IN LIBYA FOILED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1110, 14 Apr 82 p 30
[Article by Suhayr Belhassen: "Bad Remake"]
[Text] Was there almost a repetition of the unfortunate "Gafsa affair"
after a 2-year interval? We recall that on 27 January 1980 a commando
group from Libya made up of opponents of the Baurguiba regime attacked
a mining town in the south of Tunisia to try to undermine the government.
During the night of 21-22 March 1982, another commando group of six
young Tunisians carrying arms and explosives was arrested after entering
Tunisia through the mountainous Kasserine region on the Algerian-Tunisian
border: the same type of commando's; the same itinerary, the same
- objective. .
This time it was a Bedouin woman who gave the alarm. At dawn on 22 March,
she left her hut to attend to her business. On the usually deserted heights
she saw men coming out of an abandoned hovel in the distance. Intrigued,
she informed her father. He notif ied the National Guard, which soon
intercepted the commandoes and sent them to Tunis. E~nd of operation.
It remained to be discovered how it was organized. It didn't take the
Tunisian authorities lbng to find out.
Six unemployed young Tunisians had emigrated to Libya in search of work.
They soon realized that Qadhdhafi's country hadn't much to offer them
outside of the military training camps set up to train an Islamic Legion
made up of immigrants and Arabs opposed to existing regimes. They learn
to use weapons in Libya with the Palestinian resistance, or in the ranks
of the Polisario, before being recruited by Amara Dhaou Ben Nail. Condemned
to death in absentia at the time of the Gafsa commando trail, this 57-year-
old Tunisian opponent of the existing regime took refuge in Tripoli, where
he directs the Progressive Front for the Liberation of Tunisia (FPLT),
also called the Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Tunisia (MRLT).
But a lot has changed since Gafsa, both in ~nisia and in Libya. After
Qadhdhafi's visit to Tunis on 23 February, the FPLT may have thought it
could not longer count on Libya's support. Did Dhaou decide to stake
everything on a last effort befare things turned against him? He was the
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one who made the contacts with the main participants in the "Gafsa affair,"
and he knows how to get arms into Tunisia from Libya through Algeria. He
has had plenty of weapons since Gafsa, as well as money and men. This
undoubtedly explains the fact that several operations resembling the Gafsa
bne have been hatched in Tripoli. Bad habits acquired in the secret
service--which usually has a lot of freedom of action--are not easily lost.
At any rate, starting on 13 March, two Tunisians with special access to
Qadhdhafi--Abderrahman Tlili (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1107) and the governor
of Tunis, M'Hedeb Rouissi--were sent to see the Libyan leader. The latter
disclaims all knowledge of the operation.... The Libyan secretary of
foreign affairs, Abdelati Obeidi, upon being received by [TunisianJ Prime
Minister Mohamed Mzali, said the same thing as his head of state. So what
happened? At the time of the "Gafsa affair," Algerian complicity was
proven. The commandoes arrested on 22 March probably followed the same
route used on 27 January 1980. Depressions in the Kasserine Mountains
offer easier points of entry than the Tunisian-Libyan border, which the
Gafas commandoes had already judged impractical.
But why, people in Tunis are wondering, is Algerian territory so
penetrable?
On the morning of 23 March, Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs Beji
Caid es-Sebsi asked the Algerian ambassador to call on him. On 24 March,
in Algiers, the head of the Tunisian diplomatic corps discussed the affair
with President Chadli, who also expressed surprise.
One thing seems certain, in any event: the Tunisian secret service was
not completely caught short by this affair; they knew that terrorists
pass through Algeria. This is why surveillance has been reinforced at
key points along the Tunisian-Algerian border.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982
9855
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