JPRS ID: 10574 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10574
9 June 1982
Near East North Africa Re ort
~
CFOU~O 22/82~
Fg~$ FOREIGN BRGQ.~CAST IOVF(~R~IIIAT:ON SERViCE
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~ JPRS L/10574
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~ 9 June 19~ 2
~ NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
~
~ (FOUO 22/82)
~
i
~ CONTENTS ~
~ INTER-ARAB A~'FAIRS �
; Old Rivalries Override Recent Agree~pent Between Two Yemens
i (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 9-15 Apr 82) 1
~ Br ~ef s ~
~ ~
~ Deterrent to Isra~li Attack 5
_i
~ ALGERIA
~ Economy, 1982 Plan Seen as Promising Despite Problems
p
~ (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 16 A r 82) 6
I IRAN
-i
Saddam Husayn Seen Endangered by Khomeyni
(Jacques Buob; L'EXPRESS, 26 Mar - 1 Apr 82) 11
' French Journalist`s Book on Iran Reviewed
; (Bahi Muhamma.d; AL-WATAN AL-'ARt~.BI, 26 Ma.r - 1 Apr 82) 13
~
JORDAN
~
Stock Exchange Developing ~apidly
! (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 16-22 Apr 82) 21
~ SUDAN
'Paris Club' Agrees to East Dpbt Payment Schedule
~ (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, Mar 82) 25
~
~ Oil Deposit Potential, Extraction Delay Weighed .
! (MARCHES TROPICAtJX ET MEDITERRANEEI3S, 26 Mar 82) 26
i
i Sugar Ref ineries to be Overhauled
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAIIEENS, 5 Mar 82) ~i
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Electrification Program.for 15 Provincial Communities Aescribed
"''(MARCHE~ TROPICAUX ET ~vDITERRANEENS, 5 Mar 82) 28
Briefs ~
Saudi Oil Shipments 29
Agricultural Projects for North 29
Egyptian Oil Shipments 29
TUNISIA
Foreign Minister Discusses Maghreb, International Relations
(Baji Caid Essebsi; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 2-8 Apr 82) 30
Brief s
Exploitatton of Offshore Oilfield 35
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~ INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
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~ OLD RIVAI,RIES OVERRIDE RECENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN TWO YEMENS
~ Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in A~abic No 269, 9-15 Apr 82
' jArticle: "~oundaries of the Maneuvering Between Bullets and Kissea"]
jText] Just as if the two parts of Ye~en are reaffirming their belief in
! certain Arab political traditions, ~ust 4 months ago President 'Ali Nasir
i Muhammad and 'Ali 'Abdullah Salih ended their meetings in San'a by exchanging
'i fraternal kiases and announcing a new historic step "toward the union of the
; two parts of Yemen." During the lasC week of Mar~h armed conflicts broke out
i on the border between the norCh and the south aad the situation teetered on
~ the brink of war once agaia. A fraw ~hort weeks between union and fighting
~ were enough for the kisses to turn iato continuous "unionist" shawers of
bullet~.
' To be fair we must say th at Arab traditions are not alone reaponsible for that
drama~ic switch in the course of the di'~a~.ogue between San'a and Aden. It was
-I old disputes which exploded recently t}iat themselves had been carefully erased
among the pages of the historic announ~cementa, the ~ oint constitution and the
- projected~union which had emerged from the previous "unionist" meetings.
! The main question constituting the substance of the disagreement is the issue
I of the National Democratic Front jNDF,j in North Yemen. San'a claims that it
is South Yemen that is the primary sc~urce of support for the front that con-
trols areas of North Yemeni territory gd~acent to the border and that has
been imposing an uneasy political ciimate on North Yemen since the spring
' of 1979. Adan maneuvers around be}weea announcing itis connection with the
I . front and denying this connection although from time to time it plays up a
" statement that the situation in Ta'iz is a purely northern affair that is no
i business of the South.
.i
Dropped Negl3.gently
i '
~ During the~meeting last D ecembFr between P~esident 'Ali Nasir Muhammad and
I Eresident 'Ali 'Abdullah Salih, the dialogue took a somewhat odd course. The
~ basic issue on the agenda was ~he need to reach an undarstanding on broad-
I
~ casting the agreement tt~at had been signed betwean the two countries a whole
year earlier, an agreement in which they pledged to abstain from aupporting
, any military, political or informational ar.tivity arising from either country
and directed toward the other.
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At the conclusion of the negotiations, the two sides agreed on announcing the
earlier agreement and the PDRY radio played the tunes of the lost union be-
_ tween the two parts of Yemen throughou~ a whole.aionth without a halt, while

~ the North expressed cautious optianism, awaiting Radio Aden's confirmation that
the South had actually signed an agreement in.this regard.
However, this agreement that had been a fund~mental issue in the negotiations
between the two presidents was negligently dropped from the statements ~f
Radio Aden, which again merely played up the statement that the NDF had been
and would continue to be an internal northern ~ffair.
- However, why did that issue, which appeared to be merely a matter of foran,
assume such ma~or proportions in the dialogue be~ween the two countries
recently?
In urging Adan to unveil the old agreement~ the norther~ers. were trying to .
notify the front indirectly that the government of South Yemea was t~cting
behind its back out of its own interests "as a state," not to mention Lhe
fact that a pledge such as that one the two presidents agreed to announce
tacitly acknowledged that ths south was actually supplying th.e NDF with arma
and supplies and providing it with atrategic geogrsphic depth for its military
operations. However, 'Ali Nasir overcame the dilemma, for a71 p~aa~:ica]
purposes continuing the doub 1e game: make enc~less promises to San'a to stcp
supporting the front ~o as ~Oe Gulfscountriesfwhich wererworkingetodcalm~~hen
ment in i*_s relations with th
situation in the area and, at the same time, continuing to support the front
secretly in its operations against the San'a government, retaining some
maneuvering room in bilateral relations b?tween the two countries.
In other words, 'Ali ~:asir Muhammad's promises were aimed at preserving Adan's
relations with the Gulf countries while his support of the front was designed
to continue to put pressure actualla.ablevto achieveisome pr gress~whi h~
players of the game, he was Y
appeared encou~:~iging at first glance.
Whence the Conspirators?
On 14 February, the San'a government and the NDF leadership reached agreement
on a ceasefire which appeared to be a continuation of the "understanding"
which had been rewoven after the meetings of `Ali Nasir Muhammad and 'A1i
'Abdullah Salih. However, afte~ signing the agreement, the front proce~ded
to prepare a new plan for n~oving ita operati~ns into San'a this time and
intensive negotiations began between Sultan 'Umar, secretary generaQSi~i~ e
~ front, ation
whichJhad brokenrawaycfromrthe NDFeataanrearlierastage.
organiza
' In mid-March, there was an announcement in San'a about the discovery of a
conspiracy to engage in sabAtage inside the country while diplomatic sources
in Beirut stated that "the conspiraCors had been launched from South Yemen."
A week after this, NDF sourcea announced the termination of the 14 February
' agreement while it was reported that the Yemeni fighter-bombers had been shot
down by SAM missiles whileen~tf llowingnthetdeathnof~thercommanderrof a North
- border between the two Yem
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Yemeni tank position in Juban, near the to~n o.f Daaiat, during an attack
_ launched by the PIDF in the f irs t week of 1~Iarcli .
The vorCex begins anew: operations by the front fol~owed by an assemblage of
- tribea in Dhamar urging the government to form a people's army to oppose the
activities of the front. Then there are appeals for self-control from
- President 'Ali 'A~dullah Salih, perhaps in anti~ipatioa of reaching a solution
w_'.th Aden. �
; "Solutions," But No Solution
Hawever, the proposed "solution~s" will not emerge with a possible solution.
- The nature of the front's ob3ecti,ves and its Arab relationa more than one
_ bc~bytrap sufficient to blast any agreement along the lines of what happened
to tt-.e 14 February agreemerst or the 31 January 1980 agreement.
This is because the front announced on ~.6 March 1979 its program which i~c~.udes
"working to form a coalition government in which the front would partic:ipate in
ruling North Yemen." The issue ~hen is direct participation in power. Be-
cause it is easy to predict that the f orces which govern San'a today cannot
coexist in a single coalition government with the united DIDF, the slogan of
sharing power wila. inevitably turn into the s~.ogan of holdir~g power unilater-
~ ally.
In the case of Yemen, the wisdom of "going back to the source" does not always
appear to b e relevant. In reali.ty, there are two real sources of the front's
activ:~ties: first is the direct southern support and second is the situation
inside North Yemen itself. Because dealing with sources.of this type always
results in succe3sive frustrations, one has to cope with the results without
tuuching on the underlying pre.~nises an.d here, in a nutshell, lies the Yemeni
political dilemma. Deali.ng with the South after the talks of last December
resulted in a statement by Che North Yemeni prime tai~cister that union was
' certainly on its way and that the new uni�ied enCity which would b e born would
fa11 in the middle of the distance between the political thrusts of the two
YPmens, that isr in the middle of the distance between the Marxist direcCions
of the Aden government and the (at least) non-Marxist directions of Che Saa'a
government.
While talking about "the middle of the distance" ia always disrepu~able
because of the consequences which are divided among both, in the case of Yemen,
it is an ill omen. North Yemen lies between deep currents pulling it in
different directions. It is a neighbor of bath Saudi Arabia and Aden whose
differences in political and ideological positions require no introduction.
Inside Yemen, the distance between the intellectuals of the cities and the
Labor and professional unfons on the one hand and the tribes of the border
areas on the ~ther i~ also one that is ~~.fficult to di~vide up among the two.
It is true that the issue here is not one of North Yemen alone but when
talking ab out North Yemen, the violent political currents surroundtng it
spring to ~Willshavelaadecisivetpriority~ingdetermining theecourseiofythis8ri
issue which .
small country.
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This element in particular is r.esponaible for the fact that the tide of dom-
estic political opposition in North Yemen subsidea only to become ac::ive once
again. Pa�rties exist though they are 1ega1].y banned. Yolitical organ~,zations
- are active and their members move.under.the eyes and esrs.of .the ~u~horities.
Nevertheless, any decisiQn for a confrontation is put off for reasons that
_ would require a lengthy explanation.
Palestinian M~diation
In brief though the map of Yemen is small, it carries more than can be borne
� by a small area in "the sCrategic heartland" between the Red Sea and the Gulf
of Adan. There is no easy, or even poasible, solution, at least at the
_ present moment, for the intractable Yemeni diffare~cea.
In its recant mediation efforts, the PLO may aucceed in quieting the situation
on the northern and southern borders but it will not succeed in sclving the
~ Yemeni issues which, in Y.heir intermeshi~g aud complpx3.t.y, resemble "the
~ antics of Goha." This is precisely what is forcing President .'Ali 'Abdull~h
Salih to consider playing all possible carda of pressure on Aden, including
the Gulf card. However, does Fresident Salih rea~ly want this?
There is a view that holds that the Yemeni prssident is not per~uaded as to
' the necessity of liquidating the lef tist opposition because it helps him to
cover up some of his policies that might not be pleasin~ to certain Arab
- parties. Th~n there is another view which holds that he cannot wipe out this
opposition, it having strengthened its power to the point that it is untouch-
ab le militarily. Between these two views, there are those whc.expect another
' meeting between President 'Ali Nasir Muhs~aomad _and Presiden~ 'Ali '~Abdullah
Salih with the PLO possib ~y interceding to set it up.
With a meeting of t~:e two 'Ali's be sufficient to resolve the Yemeni enigma
or will it last as long as the Ma'rib Dam of old?
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
83b7
CSO: 4404/437
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INTER-ARAB A.FFAIRS
BRIEFS
DETERRENT 1'0 ISRAELI ATTACK--Informed Western circles have noted that the
long range artillery which Palest3nian and Lebaaese nation~~ist forces
:~ave concentrated in fortif ied areas in South Lebanon have served as a
deterrent to prevent Israel from underCaking a direct land invasion into
southern Lebanon through Sa'd Haddad's enclave. Numerous Western circles
have estimated that the number of long range 130~n and 155mm artillery
pieces in the hands of the PLO has reached at least 48, of which 23 were
there prior to the ceasefire period. The rockets, which include Katyusha
and Grad among others, have the capability of covering more than 270 sites
and Israeli settlements throughout the western Gali'lee. Firing can be
~-.~~rried out at close intervals with the aim of destabilizing the rea.r
po;;itions of the Israeli army and disrupting its supply lines. Estimates
by Western observers stated that SAM 7's anc~ SAM 9's, some of which were
launched sgainst Israeli planes during recent raids, may play an increasing
role in diminishing the damaging effec.ts of such raids. Israeli planes
cannot avoid these advanced types of miss3.les as they tried to do by
launching b~.lloons filled with hot gas to 3ivert the heat-seeking missiles
from their targets. [Text] [Paris AL WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 272,
30 Apr tu 6 May 82 p 18]
CSO: 4404/46?
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ALGERIA
~CONOMY, 1982 PLAN SEEN AS PROMISING DESPITE PROBLEMS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No i901, 16 Apr 82
~ pp 1018-1019 .
[Article: "The A1gQrian Economy in 1981-1982--Some Encouraging Outlooks despite
a Disadvantageous International Economic Situation"]
[Text] In 1981, the 2nd year of the 5-year plan, the timid start made in 1980
was continued; but it cannot be said that cruising speed has now been reached.*
To be sure, the essential theme of the plan is a redefinition of pri~rities,
and these 5 years should make possible, in additicn to greater fulfillment of
social needs and satisfaction of private consumption demand, a greater mastery
of the production apgaratus that Algeria provided itself with during the
1970's; many decisions have been taken in this direction--decentralization, re-
structuring of the enterprises, campaign of reform to combat waste. Some new
projects, with a total value of DA 80 billion, or more than 20 percent of the
5-year program, have been written into the annual plan. But in the sectors
considered the priority ones-~housing, hydraulics, education and occupational
training, health--as well as in the indus~rial sector, few of them have been
effectively launched, and the fulfillment rate has remained low, even though
79 percent of the equipment credits has been used. Thus the operations remain-
ing to be carried out under the heading of the previous programs, estimated in
December 1980 at DA 243 billion, come to DA 291 billion at the end of 1981 (not
including the rebuilding of E1-Asnam).
In macroeconomic terms, though, the overaa.l results are considered satisfactory
in view of the international situation, even though they are short of the tar-
gets set. Gross domestic product, at current prices, totals DA 158 billion, as
against 138 billion in 1980 and 109 billion in 1979. This growth corresponds
to an increase of 2.9 p~ercent in volume (2 percent in 1980), and its low level
as compared with the 8-percent average growth anticipated by the plan is ex-
plained by the drop in production of hydrocarbons. If it were not for the hy-
*[de note that at the end of last year, on the occasion of President Mitter-
rand's visit to Algiers, we published a series o� articles dealing with the
Algerian economy and its development within the framework of the 1980-1984
~ 5-year plan as well as with the principal aspects of Franco-Algerian cooper-
ation: the issues of 27 November 1981, pp 3168-3170, and 4 December, pp
3213-3221.
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drocarbons, growth would be 7 percent, and therefore closer to the.targets:
the plan provides that GDP not including hydrocarbons should increase by 9.7
percent per year; in 1980, it had grown by 8.3 percent. Finally, to take just
the production of the transformatian industries, the result almost corresponds
to the forecasts: 11.3 percent, as against 12.3 percent.
For the other sectors,r.he production increases announced are as follaws:
water, electric power, gas--9.2 percent; mines and quarries--9 percent; agri-
culture--3.5 percent; building construction and public works--5 percent. In
this last-named sector in particular, the accomplishments were not up to the
hopes: of the `~0,000 housing units expected per year, only 20,000 were built.
We recall, though, that priority was given to the program to put up 20,000 pre-
fabricated houses to rehouse the victims of A1-Asnam. On the other hand, some
framework agreements were made with various foreign countries--Great Britain,
Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia--for construction of about 80,000 housing units,
and as a result of Michel Rocard's visit to Algiers in January, the possibility
of constr4ction of 50,000 housing units by France has been raised. But the few
contracts signed so far, and relating mainly to c~snstruction of prefabricated
buildings, are far from reaching these figures.
With regard to the other macroeconomic variabl2s, it can be said that gross do-
mestic formation of fixed capital as expresse~ in constant prices has stag-
na.ted. Nonetheless, it represents 42 percent of available resources. The rise
in retail prices, estimated at 16 percent, eroded the apparent strong growth
of private consumption expenditures: in terms of volume, the latter increased
by 4 percent. In Z980, this rate was 8 percent. The average rate for the 5
years is supposed to be 8.5 percent. Thus the fight against the rise in prices
remains a primary concern to the Algerian authorities; the finance act for 1982
raises from DA 2.3 billion to 2.9 billion the credits intended for price main-
tenance for basic consumer products.
The voluntary reduction of oil production, in accordance with Algeria's delib-
erate policy to preserve its deposits for a longer time and to decrease sales
of crude so as to increase sales of refined products, was accentuated in the
course of 1981 by the refusal to lower the price per barrel despite the inter-
national situation. In the opinion of the specialists, the 4-percent deErease
in production in relation to 1980, announced in the daily press on the occasion
of the debates on adoption of the 1982 finance act, is considerably underesti-
mated. Production of crude is evaluated at 37.5 million tons, as against the
45 million tons expected, and production of condensates is evaluated at 8.9
million tons, in conformity with the forecasts. In 1980, the total was 51.5
million tons.
~ As for production of gas, which is up slightly, it is reported to have reached
45 billion cubic meters, ~ut the exports of LNG ~liquified natural gas] were
considerably short of the forecasts: between 8 anrl 9 billion cubic metera in-
stead of the 24 billion programmed.
Despite the drop in the quantities sold, export revenues, initially estimated
at DA 55 billion, are reported to have actually come to DA 61 billion--a result
lower than the forecasts but more than 20-percent higher than 1980's receipts,
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essentially because of the rise in the rate of the dollar. The surplus in the
_ balance of goods and services is reported as DA 9 billion.
Althougn no figure is officially cited, Algeria is said to have reduced the to-
- tal of its external debt--servicing of which cuFrently represents about 25 per-
cent of its exp4rt receipts--for ~he second c~nsecutive year.
The 1982 ~nnual Plan Sets Some Ambitious Objectives .
The uncertainties currently weighing on the hydrocarbons markets constitute an
additional constraint against fulfillment of the 5-year objectives, and the
forecasts of hydrocarbons export receipts uaed as an hypothesis in determina-
tion of the 1982 plan remain very circumspect: DA 57 billion. The agreement on
the price of LNG, ir.volving 9.5 billion cubic meters, has been made between
Paris and Algiers since then, to be sure; b~,:t the negotiations with Italy, in-
volving 12.5 billion cubic meters, are still at an impaese. Azid oil produc-
tion, despite the quota increase obtained by Algeria at the last meeting of
OPEC (750,000 barrels per day), in exchange for a price-per-barrel drop from
$37 to $35.50, is reported to have fa3len below 500,000 barrels per day
(700,OOQ barrels per day in 1980).
The general program of imports for 1982 is set at DA 66 billion, which is up
18 percent over 1981. About DA 20 billion is reportedly to be devoted to pur-
chase of equipment goods (in~luding 7 billion for purchase of prefabricated
buildings), 20 bil.lion to intermediate goods, 15 bi:.lion to consumer goods, and
the rest to services. If this program is carried out completely, and if the
hypothesis of a decrease in receipts is confi~med, the trade balance will be
negative.
The Algerian authorities, aware of the uncertainties weighing on their external
budget and of the internat bottlenecks--the operators' failure to get projects
~ nnder control, long delays in getting things moving, insufficiency of opera-
tional capacities--that have up to now slowed down the rate of fulfillment--
nonethe:ess are setting some ambitious objectives for the 1982 annual plan,
which is rightly considered decisive for satisfactory execution of the 5-year
plan. Gross domestic product should increase by 12 percent in volume--which,
in view of the current downward trend in production of hydrocarbons, appears
difficult to achieve. Apart from hydrocarbons, production should increase by
10.5 percent. The rates forecast for Che various sectors are as follows:
transformation industries: + 14 percent; building construction and public
works: + 12 percent; agriculture: + 5 percent. ,
As in 1981, S1 percent of available resources will be reserved to private con-
sumption, but 45 percent, rather than 42 percent, will be devoted to capital
formation.
The investment credits provided for the annual plan by the 1982 finance act are
DA 97.8 billion, as against 89.5 billion in 1981. Industry, with DA 36.8 bil-
lion (37.6 percent), obviously takes the linn's share of this program. Next
come the social infrastructures (DA 19.7 billion, 20.1 percent); regional de-
velopment, including ~the program in aid af the disast~r-struck wilayas (11 bil-
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The 1982 Annual Flan
_ (in millions of dinars)
. 1982 1981
Industry 36,800 38,140
including:
hydrocarbons 14,450 15,533
Agriculture-hydraulics 7,705 7,081
including:
agricuZture 4,U00 3,611
hydraulics 2,800 2,700
forests 7~0 600
fishing 185 170
Economic infrastructures 10,064 7,120
~ including:
communications 4,304 2,880
telecommunicazi.ons 1,000 1,000
storage and distribution 4,300 2,780
industrial zones 460 460
Transport 2,447 2,350
. Contracting ~irms 5,800 3,880,
Social infrastructures 19,690 17,342
including:
urban planning and development 1,200 180
urban hous:.ng 5,800 6,000
rural housing 2,900 2,900
education 5,900 4,800
training 1,$00 1,700
tourism 500 500
health 1,000 ii50
other 590 612
Regional development 10,900 9,857
including:
special programs, including the
disaster-struck wilayas 4,960 5,377
urban-modernization plans and com-
mune development plans 6,000 4,480
Administrative infrastructures 1,300 980
Miscellaneous 3,100 2,700
Totals 97,806 89,450
lion, 11.2 percent), the economic infrastructures (10.1 billion, 10.3 percent),
and agriculture and hydraulics (7.7 billion, 7.9 percent).
The carrying-out of this new investment program supp~ses a growth of more than
38 percent over the expenditures actually r~ade in 19E1, and the growth rates
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- necessary in order to catch up on the lags in the priority sectors are even �
higher.
More than ever, r.he accent is therefore placed on the search for better effec-
tiVeness of the existing means for realization: multiplication of regional en-
~ terprises, development of training action, better coordination of supply pro-
grams, and restructuring of the national companies, to which the finance act
devotes DA 8.5 billion.
- Each of these companies of considerable size, which resulted from the industri-
alization policy of the 1970's, ~as been governing, from Algiers, a broad sec-
tor of a~tivity. They will henceforth be split up into smaller units, easier
to manage. The production and marketing functions will be separated; there
will be a new entity for each type of production. Marketing offices will be
- established in each of the regions--central, east and west. The Council of
Ministers, in a recent meeting, determined the s=te of the headquarters of
these new companies, most of which, though, will cantinue to fun~tion in A1-
giers or in the nearby outlying areas, until the new infrastructures to accomo-
date them are installed.
A key year for fulfillment of the 5-year plan, 1982 comes during a difficult
- international economic situation. While Algeria has won an initial success by
signing, on 3 February, the agreement that will enable it to deliver, at a
~ price favorable to it, about 7 billion cubic meters of LNG to France, and later
9.5 billion m3, the uncertainty that weighs on its external revenues is not
thereby eliminated. The negotiation between SONATRACIi and the Italian ~NI [Na- ~
- tional Hydrocarbons Agency], to which the political officials of the two coun-
- tries have assigned the closing date of 15 April, remain of the highest impor-
tance. If a price corresponding to its desires is agreed upon, President Chad-
li's Algeria will have won its bet on the upgrading of the value of gas. It
' will be able to take a more serene view of a reduction in its salas of crude--
- corresponding, at any rate, to its medium-term options. The Italian contract,
- added to those already signed with Belgium and France, as well as some ~~maller
supply contracts, will raise gas exports to more than 25 billion m3. These ex-
~ ports will to a large extent be able to ta?:e ov~r from oiI in the financing of
development. '
Meanwhile, in addition to the prudent hypothesis in the matter of external rev-
- enues that has prevailed in the working-out of the annual plan, the quest for
greater effectiveness on the internal level and a certain austerity will make
it possible to approach the objectives set.
Already, the first months that have passed in 1982, with, on the external lev-
~ el, the signing of the agreement on the price of the LNG sold to France, and on
the internal level, the restructuring'of the enterprises, together with the
rather favorable balance-sheet for 1981--a trade-balance surplus, and a de-
, crease in the external debt despite a disadvantageous international economic
situation--augur well for the furure.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
11267
i CSO: 4519/168
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(
I
IRAN
I
i .
i SADDAM HUSAYN SEEN ENDANGERED BY KAOMEYNI
;
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 26 Mar-1 Apr 82 p 85
, [Article by Jacques Buob: "The Ztao Fronts of the War"]
; [Text] The Iranians celebrated Nowruz--the Persian New Year--in their own
~ way: by launching one of their largest offensives since the beginning of the
i war against Iraq. In the sector between Dezful and Shush, the Islamic Repub-
~ lican Army went all out. Tehran, believing it sees a tottering enemy, wants
' to press its advantage. Iraqi President Saddam Husayn does have some warries.
I In the past 18 months of the fighting, stalemated and deadly, successes have
~ been rare. Last month, hawever, Baghdad's traops succeeded in penetrating
the Iranian lines which had been cutting their communicatio.~s in the border
' ~rea of Bustam. A pyrrhic victory, because in exchange for the thousands of
~ Iranians killed, the Iraqis lost at least as many. A butcr.ery. Moreover,
in the end Bustam stayed in the hands of the Khomeyni faithful.
The time appears to have come for Saddam to have done with a war in which he
~ had wanted to be victorious, but which is little by little exhausting the
~ country and exoding his power.
; The economic situation has steadily worsened ever since the beginning of
hostilities. The Iraqi deputy minister for oil admits that it will take at
' least 5 years to repair the war destruction. The petroleum industry, particu-
~ larly the sea terminals, have been heavily damaged. Total damages are "impos-
' sible to estimate." Crude oil production has fallen from 3.4 million barreTs
~ a day to 900,000.
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, which for 18 months have spent more than
~ $20 billion to support Iraq's war effqrt and development projects, are now
, dragging their feet. Under the pressure, Iraq has already been forced to
i cancel 40 percent of its civilian development program.
Riyadh and the emirates would lil:e to see Saddam Husayn commit himself to the
path of negotiations. There~is a fear in the region that an Iraqi defeat,
; or a dragging on of che confl.ict, could result in the fall of the Baathist
I regime and the emer~ence in Baghdad of an Islamic republic that would be close
- to Tehran. ~
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Such a situat~:.on would radically change the very fragile geop~olitical equilib-
rium in the area. Riyadh does not want this; neither does Was~hington, which
is pleased, by the way, with France's policy of selling ar~o to Iraq.
Another topic of concern for Saddam: the Damascua:-Tehra.n axis, strongly
reinforced after the visit to Iran by Syrian MinisL~~ ::f Foreign Affairs 'Abd
al-Halim Khaddam. Iii addition to agreements on close cooperation, the two
capitals reportedly signed a secret military agreement involving large deliv-
eries of arms to the Iranian regime.
Such an alliance, which would inevitably have Moscow's support, k�ould change
the factors in the conflict considerably. The Iranians would then be able to
depend both on Syria, for a regular supply of Soviet arms, and on Tsrael, which
looks out for them in the marY.cets for ammunition and American spa,�re parts.
Moreover, Damascus can at any time apply the threat to close tne Iraqi oil .
pipeline which runs t~ the Syrian port of Baniyas. That would mean asphyxi-
ation for Saddam.
First Step Toward Negotiations?
It is in this rather unfavorable context that we approach the fateful date of
6 September, when the seventh summit of r~onalined countries is due to open
in Baghdad. Saddam Husayn is due to become president of the movement fcr a
3-year term, replacing Fidel Cast~o--an opportuniCy which the Iraqi head of
state cannot pass up.
But can such a meeting be held in a country at war, and, moreover, a war against
another member of the organizatian? Iran and Syria are already demanding that
the conference be transferred to Djakarta, in Indonesia. Or simply ~anceled.
A snub would strike at Saddam's most treasured asset: his prestige. And,
through t~at, his political future.
Therefore, a first step toward negotiations? Iraq has agreed to the formation
of a commission assigned to decide which of the two opponents took the initia-
tive to start the war. However, this concession obviously will not satisfy
the imam of Tehran, who sticks to his demands: unconditional retreat of the
Iraqi troops and payment of extensive war reparafiions.
It seems that Iraq officially made proposals to this effect to Sekou Tou.re
of Guinea, who is chairman of the Islamic good offices commission. However,
would this be enough to persuade Khomeyni? Since he now sees his troops
gradually regaining the ground lost in the first days of the war, he intends
to pursup to the end his political-mystical objective: to bring down Saddam.
So that the war martyrs of Shiism will not have died in vain.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 s.a. Groupe Express
9920
CSO: 4619/86
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i
IRAN
~REN~H JOUKNA:.IST'S BOOK ON IRAN REVIEWED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 267, 26 Mar-1 Apr 82 pp 44-46
[Review by Bahi Muhammad of book, "Irano Nox" [The Gloomy Night of Iran] by Marc
Kravetz; Grasset; other publication data not available]
~ [Text] Babies suckle th~ bullets of Pasdaran.
Opium becomes [he new religion of intellectuals.
Khalkhali is the foundation of power.
_ How far has Iran gone after 3 years of being ruled by Khomeyni and his supporters?
~1arc Kravetz, a French journalist, who like many people in the West was very
enthusiastic about the over[hrow of the Shah's regime, provides what is almost a
complete picture of Iran on the inside. After six trips ta Tehran during which he
~ met with Iranian leaders and citizens, Kravetz provides that picture in a book
~ entitled "Irano Nox" [The Gloomy Night of Iran]. Bahi Muhammad presents a review
~ of this book that underscores its highlights. �
~
I
The death of myths and superstitions is the only death that is never announced
officially and ceremonially. Therefore, it is not curious at all that the myth of
~ the Khomeyni Revolution is still prevalent in some circles and that clowns and
cheering audiences do not know that they are crowding together aroun~ a cadaver.
This was my impression after reading a book by French journalist Marc Kravetz. The
book which was recently published in Paris is entitled "Irano Nox" [The Gloomy
Ni~ht of Iran]. ~
A ErieE statement must be made about the author before we go into his equally
awesome and terrifying book. He belongs to the generation of French citizens, who
, are now in their forties, who gained political awareness during the Algerian war
of liberation. Thi~ observation means a great deal in any attempt that is made to
Glassify and understand his position.
Marc Kravetz was a member of the National Alliance of Students of France. To be
specific, h~ was a member of that faction which sided with the Algerian National
Liberation ~ront in its demand for full independence. At that time this was con-
sidered high treason. After that he became one of the leaders of the students' and
' workers' uprising in May 1968. ~
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Thc .iuchur then was at the center of these changes. Ln the aftermath of
revulutionary dreams being articulated as projects, Kravetz found himself wi~h a
gruup of his collpagues establishing the daily newspaper, LIBERATION. It was on
behalf of tt~is newspaper that he went to Tehran on 16 January 1979, that is, 1
month before Khomeyni went there. His last trip to Tehran was in the summer of
19$1 according to an agreement wi~h the monthly magazine, ACTUEL which is super~
- vised by a group of young journalists who belong to the liberal French generation.
_ What is important is that the writer does his best to be objective and impartial.
Therefore we sometimes find him admitting that he cannot understand one phenumenon
or that he is ignorant of another.
The author takes us from the image of crowded processions and the millions who had
come to greet Khomeyni on the day he returned to Iran t4 candlelight processions--
the candlelights of the revolution. These were being extinguished one after the
other, destroying thereby thP obsessive dreams and turning the revolution once
again into an illusion.
Through this book we pause in front of a number of figures and ordinary daily
stories to shed light on some facts about this gloomy night of Iran.
The author talks about an Iranian fighter called Parviz whon he had met during the
uprisi.ng that ended with the overthrow of the Shah. At that time Parviz had not
- joined the organization of any of the numerous political and ideological trends
that were then widespread in Iranian youth circles. It was Parviz who led the
French journalist, who had come to Tehran during the days of the popular uprising,
- to several places in the capitai. Parviz became fond of Kravetz, telling him more
than once that he was not aligned [with any orga:~ization] but that his hatred for
- the Shah was profound and that he joined others i.n demonstrating and crying out
against the Shah. Kravetz talks about Parviz because ha found no trace of him on
hi.s recent trip to Tehran, and he takes this opportunity to tell us the story
_ oi this man whose fate became a model for what happened to many people like him
- in Iran.
~ The author drew us a picture of the personality of Parviz in two situations.
The first was when this yo~ng chemical engineer was spending most of his time
outside work in processions and at rallies. He w~as taking part in the endless
debates that ended only to begin agafn depicting a picture of Iran's future and
- new regime. The life of Parviz during that golden period was a continuous
celebration in the street, at home and with friends. This radiant picture of the
life he was living was identical to that of anotherc the collective picture of the
life which millions of Iranians were living after the Shah's departure was no less
radiant. Everyone imagined that he will be living in paradise, and everyone
, believed that the age of sanctions and proscriptions had gone forever.
The other side of this young Irani.an was an expression of the stage of despair
that followed that of enthusiasm which was mixed and charged with hope. The author
skP~ches for us the fol~owing featurea:
"Parviz invited me once to attend his 30th birthday. He was extremely sad. His
fiancee Sherine had gone to London, and h~ had not yet ~decided to join her. I saw
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this man whu had been ea~er and enthusiastic: w~r�ry had turned him into a mere
desperate persan. For his bixthday Parviz had brought together a group of friends
in the home of. one of his triends. There was an artist among them who had been
- forbidden during the Shah's administration f rom holding any art showing, and he is
still forbidden today from doing so. In addition, there were 10 other persons`.
Then it was time'for [taking] opium. Although the cultivation of opium is offi-
- cially forbidden, it still constitutes one of the primary sources of Iranian
wealth after oil. In the context of the general chaos that prevailed in the
cuuntry opium growers were able to produ~e in the summer of 1981 enough opium to
equal five times the usual annual production. Therefore, pure good herain'�is
available in large quantities in Tehran's popular neighborhoods for 30 francs per
g~am. However, the middle class prefers the opium that is sold in installments for
1,800 riyals (120 francs)."
At this point the author pauses in the picture he is sketching of this character,
a~~d he lets us imagine that character and imagine others like him surrounded by
clouds of opium smoke, locked into moments of sorrow and disilusionment. Marc
Krevitz then tells us that his Iranian friend had said that, "Opium is the new
religian of intellectuals." We find out on this occasion and from a quick
reference made in the course of describing the new daily routine in TehYan that
one kind of kitchen utensil, especially pressure cookers are no longer available
in the Iranian capital. People have been grabbing everything that can be used to
distill and make alcohol ever since the regime decided to ban the consumption of
alcohol. We also find out on this occasion that the Khomeyni committees, which are
supervised by a number of clergymen, are selling the -alc4holic beverages they
confiscate on the black market and are reaping tremendous amounts of money from
that.
- Yasmin: Dashed Hopes
The second character that appears in the pages of the book whose physical, psycho-
lo~;ical and emotional features are sketched for us by the author is a woman in the
prime ot her life called Yasmin. This young, beautiful, ambitious architect was
1`ike Parviz; she was enthusiastic about this revolution that had overthrown the
- St~ah and his regime.
_ Here are the passages in which the author describes thi.s Iranian woman:
"Yasmin was simultaneously experiencing enthusiasm and despair throughout the days
~f the revolution. Her rejection of the Shah's regime was paralleled only by her
fear of the religious parties, especially that of Khomeyni. However, she used to
~ntertain the hope that the new regime will not prevent her from working and will
qot force her to take the veil because it will need all its citizens and its
intellectuals. However, her hopes were dashed.
"Yasmin was trembling; sha was resentful and depressed. Now she wants to disappear
altogether from the picture. She wants to retire: she does not want to see or hear
~ anything. Today, she fears for herself and for the future of her country. She
fears for her dreams and her friends. She fears for Iranian women and liberat
intetlectuals. She was s3ying, 'They will no[ let me keep my job.' ~
"Yasmin used to refuse distinction bestuwed upon her among women in the harem.
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~
Nevcrtt~eless, she used to say that it was the harem that allowed wamen to form a ~
community where they learned how to live with each other and to create bonds [of
friendship] rhat wo~ld not occur to anyone. .
"However, after a lengthy waiting period, Yasmin did not find a single glimmer of
hope, so she chose to leave hEr country despite the tact that she could have lived
in Tehran on her family's fortune. However, after a number of her friends were
arrested, after others were executed and after those who escaped managed to
escape, Yasmin decided to leave because those who were left alive in Iran were
dragging their sorrows and their miseries as though they were a strange class of
the human species on its way to extinction.
The Story of a Child
The third imuge is that of a woman, a poet and a child.
The woman, whose name the author did not declare, was a dancer during the days of
the Shah. Today, in Khomeyni's admfnistration she supervises the torture of
- prisoners and detainees in Evan prison in north Tehran.
The poet is Sa'id Su~tan Pur who was always in prison in the Shah's administra-
tion. He and his wifa were arrested on their wedding night by the Revolutionary
Guard, and he was executed 2 months later with a group of young people who were
not over 20 years old.
But the story of the child is as follows:
"The old woman who was our hostess said that ttie Revolutionary Guard, the Pasdaran
went into a neighboring house to search it. A child had been born in that house.
One of the guards placed the barrel of his gun in front of the new born infant who
began to suckle it.instinctively. Then the guard pulled the trigger."
Khalkhali Is the Foundation of Power
Among the other incidents related by the author is the story of Sadiq Khalkhali
- going to the city of Mahabad, the capital of the Kurdish district in the summer of
1979. At that time Khalkhali was the chairman of the so-called Islamic Revol~t-
tionary Courts. Before his visit the city had been the scene of bloody battles
between Kurdish rebels and government forces. When he arrived surrounded by a.
whole crew of executioners, the city was completely.occupied by tt~e Pasdaran and
by the army. Khalkhali's well-known reputation for bloodshed had preceded him to
Mahabad because he had passed by other Kurdish cities such as (Bawah) and
(Sakzumarban) where he had taken the lives of scores of citizens for di.fferent
- reasons. Iiowever, this man's pursuit of his hnbby for bloodshed was no easy matter
in the city oE Mahabad. The simple reason for that was that before departing from .
the capital of their region and leaving it to the forces of Tehran, the Kurdish
rebels had taken along 400 Pasdaran and army prisoners. They announced that they
would respond in kind to any death sentence issued by Knalkhali and carried out
against any resident of the city. Khalkhali understood this talk, and he did not
linger in the city. Instead, he decided he would go back to Tehran immediately.
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At cf~r~ l:~~t moment. however, Khalkhali thought he would look into some ordinary ~
t i I~~S. A~~~on~; these f iles was une that had to do with a[case of] simple theft t~om
o.ne oi che stures. The plaintifF was accompanied by a merchant who was hi`s
neighbor and who had gone along as a witness. It seems that at the outset
Khalkhali was bored with his examination of the file until he discovered as lie
interrogated the witness that he was a Baha'i. He then told him immediately, '~Y'ou
must adopt Islam right away. Otherwise, you will have to pay a head tax of 1~3~f0
(tuman)." ~
_ The witnsss who"~had' suddenly become a defendant refused to adopt Islam and said
- that he did not have that sum of money to pay the head tax. Faced with the mer-
chant's refusal to abanc:An his religion and adopt Islam, Khalkhali ordered his
Qxecutifln, and the sentence was car~ried out fmmediately.
'~�he author relates that in front of the Islamic Court in Tehran he saw score~ of
women sta~ding together r~ear the wall of the court. A little later he reveals that
these women wPre the wives and sisters of those who had been detained, kidnapped
or missing, people of whom there had been no trace for months. [The author reveals
t'hat] the wall of the court had turned into a scene for protesting arbitrary
kidnapping and executions, [In this respect] it was liks May 1 Square .in Argentin~
where the wives of people who are missing under the military regime there gather.
Quoting a witness the author adds, "Anyone can gc into any house and arrest the
owner of Chat house on behalf of an imaginary or a real committee. He may [even]
execute that person. People who wPre arrested often refuse to reveal their true
identities to the Revolutionary Courts because they fear that the Revolutioiiary
Guard will r.ake their revenge on their families and their children."
- It may be that the anly innovation which Khomeyni's regime contributed to the
_ classical practices of dic[atorships is the fact tnat it exposed its crimes to the
general public.
It would be diffic�~lt to find a dictatorship in this age--despite the fact ~that
this age abounds in horrors--that goes as far as the Islamic Rep~iblic has gone. In
i;ts tutal exposure of the machinery of repression thia lslamic Republic is Islamic
and a republic only in name. This experience allows us to observe in an experimen-
tal fashion how tyranny is born and how it is fostered and nurtured until it
spreads its influence over all society. Discussions with the opposition are
non-existerit in Khomeyni's movement. The only fate for those who oppose is murder,
! ~utilation and dropping out of existence.
Spy on Your Children
The tyranny of Khomeyni's regime has surpassed that of the worst dictatorships and
Fascist regimes. Not only are execution sentences carried oue, they are also shown
on telpvision. People do not disappear from the political scene for "health
reasons," because "they have been charged with other missions," or because they
resigned or conspired as is the case in other well-known dictatorships. People
drop out of sight because they invoked the wrath of "the new god" who cast them
intu hell. '~here is no room here to go into thi~ shift that was introduced by.the
Khomeyni movement into the theatrical nature of the crimes of dictatorships. This
was a~i idea inspired by the story of a young woman called Zahrah who confessed on
the small screen. This young woman admitted that she had been arrested three
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tia~es. She was arrested the first time after a traffic accident. She had learned
how cu drive a motorcycle in connection with her work in the organization of
freedom fighters. The second time she was surprised by guards who kidnapped her
irom an ~rdinary gathering or demonstration. The third time she was arrested by an
organization called the Anti-Corruption Office, and she was questioned at length
about her unseemly behavior. She said in her confession that she now understood
everything and that she wanted to expose a devilish organization called
Mojahedin-e IChal.q because its members wanted to create division between fathers
and sons and between men and their wives. They wanted to prevent people from
praying, and the condition they set for accepting anyone's commitment [tu their
organization) was that he kill his brother or one of his relatives who was a
member of Khameyni's guard. She also accused her colleague of leading her into
sin. This tpievision program went off the air when sentence was pronounced.
Nothing that Zahrah said interceded for her; she was sent to the gallows.
The author casts doubts about the veracity of such confessions and states, "Infor-
mation indicates that it is rare for a defendant to be that cooperative with his
executioner." Then he states that weeks after that while the main news bulletin
was being broadcast, another interview was broadcast. This was an interview with a
young man who had been condemned to death. That event culminated the propaganda
campaign that had taken place under the slogan, "Parents, spy on your children!"
That scene which the author of "Irano Nox" talks about toured the world and was
broaJcast by all television stations in Europe under the title "Dialogue between
an Islamic Mother and Her Son." It is one of the rare images of horror in the
history of the media. By distributing that interview Iranian media agencies wanted
to provide evidence for the popularity of the existing regime. However, many
people still do not believe what is happening in Iran because retusing to face the
truth allows une in most cases to maintain a sense of safety and confide?ice.
The problem actually. goes beyond the field of foreign and domestic propaganda; it
cunstitutes one of the salient landmarks of Khomeyni's policy. Informing� on
others, which is clearly and unequivocally forbidden by the Koran, becomes a
religious duty in the opinion of Iran's ayatollahs. And Mr Hadi Ghafari, who is
described as the primary official for the group, Altah's party relates with pride
and vaingla~y to the author that he can give him scores of examples of parents
informing on their children.
Ever since Khomeyni turned informing on others into a religious duty and his
propaganda agencies have been publishing daily news about spying operations that
take place in a family context. During his term as Ali Khameyni's successor in the
position of imam of Tehran mosque, Hashemi-Rafsanjani, speaker of the parliament
- delivered a speech that was broadcast live. In that speech he praised the virt~es
oE mothers who do not hesitate to.spy on their sons.
The author will indicate that a few days after his arrival in Tehran the Tehran
press talked in detail about a bazaar merchant who was executed for harboring a
number oE freedom fighters and helping Chem financially. This man was eliminated
because his tather and his brother had inEormed on him.
Since we are talking about informing on people, let us recall the author's descrip-
tion of Iranian reactions to it. He says briefly, "Iranians realized that each
- citizen was under direct observation and that putting a whole city under emergency
measures was not necessary to terrorize it."
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H~wever, the ayatollahs were not satisfied with this; they also used taxic~bs:
News spread with lightning speed in Tehran; the news was spread in the form of' a
rumor stating [hat the Khomeyni committees had purchased or confiscated all
taxicabs and given them to members of the Allah party. The authoriiies had
previously annourlced more than once that they were dissatisfied and displeased
- with the conduct of drivers. They executed scores of them, and people who~ua~d
this public means of transportation knew that the driver sitting behind the
steering wheel could be a spy fur the regime.
Taxicabs thus ceased to be a means for communicating and exchanging opinions, airid
they became only a tool for transportation and espionage.
The author relates the point of view of persons of all classes, ages, groups and
,
natio~ialities. They all agree about one thing: they are critical of the regime.
Montazeri: a Talk about Sex ~ ~
. The author relates this [enlightening~ picture about Hoseyn Montazeri, the more
fortunate successor of Imam Khomeyni. Kravetz says, I saw him for the first time
when he was speaking at the lJniversity of Tehran after Khomeyni appointed him imam
oi the Friday prayer in the capital. This was after the death of Ayatollah
Taleqani. I was taken first of all by his stature. I had never seen a clergyman
- lead a prayer service while carrying a weapon in his hand. It was later explained
to me that this practice dates back to the early days of Islam. Montazeri spoke as
he held in his left hand a rifle with a long bayonet.
His n~otions were somewhat acrobatic, and his words were loud and shrill. Suddenly
the Kroups oE worshipers broke up in laughter that lasted for quite some time.
I tried to understand the reason why the worshipers had laughed. Former president
- and chieE~ of staff oti Iran's forces Abol Nasan Bani-Sadr was among the worshipers.
' Nowever, many of those who were present refused to translate for me what Imam
Mo~itazeri had said. They were bashful; but then one of them dared to translate the
imam's statements, and he told me that he had been talking about sex for half an
hour. He said that he was ~iving examples from his own personal life to show that
ttie Wise Almighty God had created needs [in His creatures] and ways for satisfying
those needs. The ima~n said that sex was natural tor creatures. [He said] just as
we lead a ewe to a ram, we must get giris to marry as soon as they reach puberty.
Who Is (Fardist)?
Perhaps one ot the most curious stories mentioned by the author was that about
Khomeyni's intelli~ence agencies and their bloody struggles for power. In the
author's upinion these intelligence agencies have four or five divisions: SAVAMA
is the Islamic version of SAVAK; the intelligence branch of Pasdaran; the
intelligence [division]of the Islamic Republican party; and the intelligence
[division] of the committees. All these intelligence agencies are struggling over
a mineEield in which other organizations with mysterious powers are also opera-
ting. Examples of these organizations are the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution
or the Feda'iyan Islam under the leadership of Khalkhali. No one in this or the
other ar~;anization knows who his enemy or his friend is; none of them knows the
bouiidaries that separate anti-terrorist action from the strugglE of competing
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parties iur power. Every agency, every department and every system is taking
precautions against others, and no one knows on whose behalf and in what capacity
an agency operates. Looking at the Iranian authority from its ugly police side we
_ see ttie image ~f a multi-headed monster with these heads always snapping at each
other. Not all the heads are known, but there is one head in their midst in front
oE which we should pause a little. This is that of Hoseyn (Fardist) because he i~
truly a bewildering figure.
This man is one of the Shah's oldes[ servants. He was a palace inspector, and he
was responsible for the emperor's security. The emperor treated him as a member of
the family, and (Fardist) was privy to all the secrets of SAVAK (the Iranian
~ intelligence agency in che days of the Shah). Until the last day of the Eormer
regime he [ook part in the meeting of the chieE of staff which was attended by
U.S. Gen Huyse;., President Jimmy Carter's envoy who had come to Tehran to find out
abouC the ability of Iranian generals to withstand the at~acks ot the Khomeyni
Revolution. On the day of the final defeat it was rumored that (Fardist) had
deiected with his weapons and his belongings Lo the enEmy's [camp]. It was said
that he had been relaying information to Khomeyni for some time.
Today, however, i[ is the most curious of stories that is being circulated about
Hoseyn (Fardist). It is being said that he was the one responsible for SAVAMA,
_ Khomeyni's intelligence agency, and that he was the one who supervised assass:na-
tion operations agains[ the opposition abroad. One cannot know at this point what
is true and what is Ealse. We can at lea~t say that at the point when Islam was
- being universalized, when the punitive law was being applied and when the morals
oE the Maktabis (a term used to refer to Khomeyni's followers) were being
- commencled, it was at this time in particular that we noticed that the old Persia
- had not been fdrgo[ten at all and that the delirium of the Middle Ages sometimes
knew how to deal with the most distressing facts of this century.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
8592
CSO: 4604/26
1
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. JORUAN
- STOCK EXCHANGE DEVELOPING RAPIDLY
Paris AL-~TATAN AL-'AItABI ia Arabic~ No 270, 16-22 A~r 82 pp 59-6U
[Article: "Jordan's Stock Exchange: After a Difficult Birth, FaBt Growtn;
and a New Nucleus For a Common Aaab Fac~change"]
~ [Text] Amanan AL WATAN AL-' ARABI--Since th~ establ,ishme.lt of industriea and
corporations in Jordan about 40 yeaxa ago trading in stocks was Iimited to
the companies the~mselves~ inaemuch as an employee ia. each compa~y would
register the names o� those who waated to buy etocka and were looking for
~ a seller or vice versa:
. The procedurea were carried out in. accordance wi.th the p~rticular policies
~ of the company and the responsible employe~.
The procedure developed fnto a syatem of sm,a7.1 offices epecializing in
' stock trading. But these officee treated the ci.tizena a.~bitrszily~ and
~ set whatevez pricea they considere~ appropriaCe et any particula.r time.
~
When the government first considered establiahing a stock exchange in 1965
st~dies ind.icated that the voluem of trade would be extremelq limitedf and
there would be no point in establ,ishing it.
' Despite studies carried out in the 197'0's some officials in the field of
banking and economics were not the least b~.t optimistic about the euccesa
of thia market.
But after a difficult delivery the market was born, although no one wae
' betting that it would survive for very long. In early J~nuary 1978 the
exchaage opened for business to stockholdere and inveators. The special
officea were closed~ and atock trading was forbidden outside of the
~xchange.
The infant's growth aurpriaed even the fore3,gu experts who had participated
in the studies. The volume of trading~~umped, from about 5.5 million
- Jordanian dinars in I978 to approximately 75.5 million dinars in 1981.
" Observers expect these figurea to ~wnp this year to about 140 millioa dip,ars~
' ingsmuch as the floor of the exchange aometimes sees stock trading
activities of 1 million dinara ~Er day. Tha.t makes one week's tradiag
~ ~ equivalent to a full year's worht when the market fi.rst opened. ~
,
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; What Has the Market Accompliehed?
But what hae this entity accomplie?R~d~~`-f~, fonr qears?
The answer comes from exchange officials who confirm that the market has
participated in the implementation of econa~mic developa~ent programs and has
had a series of accomplishments.
1. It provides adequate liquidity for both savers and inves~ors~ ~nd enables
new and alrea~y establiahed companies to raise capital by malcin.g data
continually available, and bq publiehing the prices of the registered
stocka which will be traded on the exchange.
Val~e ~o_f S~,ha~es
T~,
raded, Volum,e_ of
Shares Traded ~
(I.n Jo~dsn3$~t. Dinat`~)_
5,.615,891 2,G29,152 1978
15~,843,�159 6,534,900 1979
~ 41,431,076 17,898~885 1980
75,~416,527 29~231~085 1981
_ Volume and Value of Shares Traded oa the Stock Exchange in Jordan During
the Last 4 Years
2. The daily publication of trading prices can help investore and savers
avoid losaes. The exchange provides th.e time and place for authorized
brokers to announce their customers' buying and selling orders with
complete clarity to all the other tradera, without the right to any kind
of monopoly. In that way citizens will be treated on an equal footing
and they ~an base their decisions on the amae data available to everyone
at the same time.
To accomplish these two important goals the Affi?an Stock Exchange operates
within two basic apheres~
- [1.J Operating as a traditional atock exchange by providing a suitable
trading floor and continuous publication of information and prices related
to trading in the stoc.kb listed with it. ~
_ [,2~] Serving as a regulatory organization with regard to the iasuing of
stocks in the kingdom. This reqnires the exchange to ~versee the information
published by the public stock companies in general, and epecifically during
the initial stage, when these cotapaniea make a public stock aubscription
offering to the investing public. To accomplish this the exchange has
pre~ared a form indicating the requirements fox preparin,g a prospectus for
offering stocks and bonds, Any prospectus �c,r stock or bond issues will
con.tain important financiaL and non-financial in,forma.tion whi.ch will help
the [potential] subscriber reach a decision which wi.l~l either justify
investing in these securities or cause him to abstaia from them.
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Since the establiahment of the exchange th~ �ollowing featurea have beea
achieved in,stock trading methods:
Correspondi~g offers to buy and sell have been ir_.troduced on the floor of
- the exchange,~~Broviding a fair and appropriate ~ri~a for the securities
being traded.
Information on.th.e public atock com~anies is cont~inua,lLy being ~eleased.
~'E~.is appli.ea to new ator�k issue8~ thr.ough a p~ospectus which. now must be
prepazed, i~ accordance wi.th th.e exchange'a req~uir.ements~ and ta secuxit~es
- trading, and has instil.led. con�id,ence in in,vestors.
- Confidence in atocka ~nd liquidity have been achieved inaamuch as Jordanian
securities are gs good ss banknotea to a~anara who can. at anq time exchange
- them for cash.
Investors in stocks are pravided protection through.mon.i.toriag~ regulation,
registration and atandardization o� the stock trading activities which take
place on the exchange �loorQ and through.con,tinuous mpnitoring of prices.
Brokers, too, are monitored to ascertai,n, the. exten,t of their compLiance
with required trading proceclurea, and to ascertai.~ the qpality and probity
of their activities.
Profits have become available to the largest section, o� the Bopulation by
expanding the number of sharehol,ders in publ.ic stock com~anies.
Liquidity is provided to the public. stock comgan.ies by facil.itating the
underwriting o� their securities when they float them.for publ.ic
subscription.
I The Broker Syatem
There are 16 brokera on the Amman Stock Exchange suthorized to engage in
buying and selling on behalf of their customers and their portfolios,
The brokexs receive commisaions from their customera at the rate of 0.65
percent on transactins under 20,000 dinars, a~,d. 0.5 pE~cent o� amou~ts above
- that. The exchange takes 20 percent of the brokers' commisaion.
There are 72 public stock companies liated on the Amman Stock Exchange with
~ declared capital of about 28 million Jordanian dinmrs. These companiee are
classified by sector as follows:
- Industrial companie~ ; 32, with declared capital of about 180 million
dinars; financial companies (banks and financial i.nsti,tutions) ; 14~ with
dealared capi,tal of appzoximately 70 mi,l.lion, di.n~ars; insurance companiea:
14, with.declared capital of ap~roximat~ly 4 million,dina,rs; aervice
; companies: 1,2, with.declared capital o� about 27 million dinars.
, 23
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. It ia clear that the volume of trading durixlg previous yeara has multiplied
continuously. For example, the volum,e of trading in 1.981 surpassed the
total volume during the 3 previous yeaxs:
With regard to the exchange's accomplishments in regu.latin,g investment in
_ newly issued stocks in what is known as the new-iasue market, the exchange
~ has in large messure coatributed to the succeasful coverage of new issues
in the new-issue marke~. 7.'iiis may be seen, in the success rate public stock
companies have had i,n covering n,ew stock o��erings, i.nasmuch as at ite
highest this rate was 9 times the value of the of�eri.n,g, svmething th.e
Jordanian atock exchange had never before seen..
~ As an indicatio.n of that 18 companiea floated their stock for public
subscriBtion during 1981. Of these, 14 were newly-formed companies~ and
4 were old companiea that increased their capital by offering their stock
- for public subscription.
A total of 31,625,000 shares we~e �loated by thoae companies at a tota7.
value o� 72.74 million, dinars. TY?ese ahares were covered for 82 m.il.lion.
Of these companies, 7 are industrial,, 4 are service compan,ies, and 3 are
insurance companies.
FoLr existing companies have undertaken to increase their capital by
floatin,g stock for publ,ic subscription. I~ the fi.gures for the value of
stock floated during 1981 are compared with the figures fo~ stock
offerings in previous years it will be seen that the total value of
stock floated and covered during 1981 is eq,uivaleat to the total value .
of stock floated during the 3 previous years together.
In conclusion, the exchange will devel.op, and it will, enter the world of
closed circuit television. Citizens wi11 be able to view atock pricea on,e
after another in commercial banke and elsewhere.
- The exchange is contacting other Ar~b stock exchanges about allowing them
to trade Jordanian stock~, and is expressing readiness to accept Arab
stocks in the A~aan Stock Exchange. Will th~s step help to create a
common Arab stock exchange?
- COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL WATAN AL-~ARABI
91,23
CSO: 4404/435
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~
SUDAN
; 'PARIS CLUB'AGREES TO EASE DEBT PAYMENT SCHEDIILE
. Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1898. 1'~,r $2 p 845
~Text~ The western countriea have agreed to grant Sudan an "extensive" re-
arrangement of it~ state foreign debt to permit it to achieve economic recov-
ery, the French minis~;er of Economy and~Finance announced after a two-day
meeting of the "Pa.ris Club" on 10 and 11 March. A~ meeting of Sudan's credit-
ors, held at the suggestion of Khartoum and the I~'. had taken place at the
end of January. The official communique indicatee that the 13 countriea "ap-
J preciatedthe recovery efforta" undertaken by the government of the Democratic
' Republic of the Sudan, and noted "with satisfaction" thea.t the Sudaneae govern-
- ment was implementing an economic and financial program tl~at had been approved
by the International Monetary Flxnd on 18 February 1982.
~ Wi~th the intention of achieving recovery of a critica.l economic situation~
President Ja'far Numayri had decided in November 1981 on a 12.5 percent devalu-
ation of the national currency, and a steep increase in the prices of sugar
(+62 percent) and petroleum producta (+35 percent).
I
~ Sudan's foreign debt is estimated at around 3 billion dollars, and several wea-
tern countries committed themselves on 28 January to iaeue 350 million dollara
to Africa's moat extensive country to make up the deficit in its balance of
payments.
This time, the rearrangement decided upon, as specified in the "Pa:ria Club"
official communique, applies to the payments.due on the loan originally to run
for over a year, and payable from 1 July 1981 to 31 December 1982 under con- ~
tracts signed before 1 January 1981. Reimbursement of theae ~ayments due will
_ take place over a 10-year period, with a/~~-year grace period.
The "Paris Club" meeting, chaired by the director of the Treasury at the French
_ Ministry of the Economy, Michel Camdessus, included representatives of the
; Federal Republic of Germa.ny, Auatrie, Belgium, Canada, Denmark. the IInited
States, France, Italy, Japan, Norwa~y, the Netherlands, the IInited Kingdom, and
Swizerland, and observers from Spain and 3weden, as well as the INIF', the World
; Bank, the secretar~.at of UNCTAD, the EEC, and the OECD.
~ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
12149
j Cso : 4519/157
~ 25
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SUDAN
OIL DEPOSIT POTENTIAL~ EXTRACTION DELAY WEIGHED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR.ANEEIVS in French No 1898, 26 Mar 82 p 8l~5
~ Text, In our 20 November 1981 isaue (page 294~), we tried to evaluate oil
research in Sudan, but the question of Sudan's real potential in this domain
remains unanswered.
In the middle of summer, 1980. ~'P recently recalled, four welle producing
15.000 barrels a day had bEen diaeovered i.n the aouthwest Sudan, not far from
Juba., by the American company Chevron. In an interview published by the daily
Kuwaiti newspaper AL-SIYASAH, the Sudanese oil miniater, Muhammad Sharif
A1-Tuhami, had estiwated at the time that his country would be able, "within
a reasonable period of time, to produee and export the crude oil and thus solve
a certain number of economic prablems."
Now, 20 month$ later, certa.in experts in oil circles are wonderi.ng if the mini-
ster's optimiam was not too great, while others still think that Sudan has a
great ftizture to look forward to. In support of their reservations, the former
note that construction work on the Kosti refinery, 350 kilometers south of
Khartoum, ha.s still not been started, nor for that matter work on the oil pipe-
line linking the wells that have been discovered to that refinery. The overall
cost of the projected infrastx~ueture is estimated, it ia recalled, at nearly
1 billion dollars~ of which 800 million ia for the refinery alone. With Chev-
ron financing !~0 percent of it.
On the other hand. the more optimistic ones think that the American company.
having discovered deposits "far greater" than the estimated 30,000 ba.rrels a
day, would now like to give up the Kosti refinery and enlarge the one at Port-
Sudan, to haue�good conditions for exporting wha.t will not be consumed locally.
In support of their thesis, the latter experts, on the basis of "reliable in-
formation," point out tha.t the materiel recently brought into Sudan by Chevron
is "considerable." Moreover, about 90 new engineers and technicians are said
to have arrived in the country the last few weeks.
Both groups agree that the American company's real or apparent inertia is alsn
related to the very poor situation of the c~il market. All the oil companies
present in Sudan, and Total Exploration in particular, are complaining about
"very difficult" working conditions, especially poor fuel-oil distribution and
thefts on work-sites. Until the market picks up again, the~companies have
therefore chosen to keep a low profile, and are mai.nly intent up~n maintai.ning
their presence until a better time comes.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
26
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i . .
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(
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~
swaN
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~
~
~ SUGAR REFINERIES TO BE OVERHAULED
I
, Paris MARCHES TROPI~AUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1895~ 5 Mar 82 p 677
[Text] The Sudanese Goverrunent would require nearly $100 millian to overhaul
and modernize the four sugar refineries of the public sector: Sannar, A1-Silaya,
Junayd and New Halfa. This figure is b~sed on a study made by the large Dutch
~ firm, HVA [expansion unknown]. AcGOr~ing to this studq, the investment to be
; made would be as follows for each r.efinery (in millions of dollars):
_1i Sannar: 37.15, with 21.74 for farm and transportation equipment for the planta-
tion and 15.41 for plant equipment.
A1-Silaya: 37.05, with 20.9 for farm and transportation equipment, 16 for the
- plant and O.I6 for training.
~ Junayd: 9.13, with 2.73 for farm and lifting equipment, 3.52 for milling equip-
~ ment, 0.37 for boilers, 2 for spare parts, etc.
' New Halfa: 9.47, with 2.42 for farm and lifting equipment, 2.33 for milling
i equipment, 2.22 for boilers, 2 for spare parts, etc.
I Several financial institutions have been approached, including in particular
FADES (Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development) r~nd the World Bank.
' The German Government has already allocsted DM 33 millton under its annual aid
to cover the investments required at Junayd and New Halfa. Since the World
' Bank has stated that it is pr~pared to finance the hiring of a special consultaint
for the Ministry of Industry, FADES is studying the possibility of taking over
the remaining financing for the refineries of Sannar and A1-Silaya (approximately
$75 million).
The construction site of the fifth refinery, at Melut, should also be taken
over, following an agreement made with the Belgian ageracy for insuring foreign
i trade, by tihe National Office of Guaranty Commissione. The Melut refinery,
j � whose construction was begun by the Belgian company UCMAS [expansion unknown],
i could not be completed because of excessive nonpaymenta by the Sudanese Governti[ent.

-9~ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux e� Cie Paris 1982
~
-I ~ 11915
i CSO: 4519/147
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SUDAN
ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAM FOR 15 PROVINI;I'AL COIrII~IUNITIES DESCRIBED
' Paris MAFiCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEN3 in French No 1895, 5 Mar 82 p 677~
[Text] In our issue of 11 December 1981 (p 3299), we listed the major features
of the electrification pro3ects underwaq and the outlook for the qear 2000 in
Sudan. To this panorama should be added the.development~ plans of the Public
~ Electricity and Water Corporation, wh�.ch provide for the installation, between
1980 and 1986, of 36 new diesel generat~rs with a, total capacity of 146 MW
[megawatts] for 15 provincial communities.
The distribution of these new plants is as follows (number of plants x MW):
Khashm A1-Qirbah 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 Financing
' I:hashm A1-Qirbah 2 x 5 1 x 5 Not Found
Kassala 4 x 1 1 x 3 Partly Danish
'Atbarah 2 x 5 1 x 5 Not Found
Shandi 1 x 1 Danish
Du~qulah ~ 1 x 1 Danish
Port Sudan 3 x 5 1 x 10 French
A1-Qutaynah 2 x 0.5 Not Fo~ind
Malakai 2 x 1 1 x 1 Not Found
Waw 1 x 1 1 x 1 Danish
Juba 1 x 3 1 x 3 World Bank
A1-Ubayyid 1 x 3 Arab African Bank
Umm-Ruwabah 2 x 1 Not Found
Danish
Al-Fashir 2 x 1 1 x 1 1 x 3 ~
Nyala 2 x 3 French
Kuraymah-Merowe 2 X 3 ~~n
2 x 1.5
Total (MW) 66 11 16 13
' *The Nyala project (9 MW total) is financed for 40 million French francs under
the French-Sudanese agreement of 1981. Alsthom-Atlantique and CEM [Electro-
mechanical Equipment Company] have bid on this pro~ect.
- COPYRIGHT: .Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
11915
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~
'
- SUDAN
BRIEFS ~
SAUDI OIL SHIPMENTS--Saudi Arabia will supply free oil to Sudan to cover its
needs for 3 months. These oil ahipments, which have already started, are the
first result of the tour 3ust completed by the Sudanese minister of energy and
mining, Mr Muhammad Sharif Tuhami, to the Persian Gulf states. The leaders .
of those five states have also agreed to consider emergency aid to Sudan to
enable it to overcome its economic problems. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
- ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1894, 26 Feb 82 p 612] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Paris 1982] 11915
AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS FOR NORTIi--The $18 million which the Internat3onal Develop-
~ ment Association (IDA) granted to Sudan in January is intended, through the
Agricultural Bank of Sudan, to finance the program for outfitting three agri-
cultural areas in the country's northern province. These tliree areas, Umm Ruaba
(86,000 unirrigated hectares), Abu Hamed (6,720 irrigated hectares) and Dongola
(14,600 irrigated hectares) are composed of small private farms. The pro3ect
will have the fo llowing main features: Irrigation equipment ($3.8 million):
- Abu Hamed, 780 diesel engines (4-16 horsepower), 390 pum4ps; Dongola, 680 diesel
engines and 340 pinnps. Farm equi~ment ($500,000): 30 tractors (30-50 horsepower),
~ 30 disk hs~rrows, 650 backed harrows, 50 platform scales. Vehicles ($1 million):
; 8 cars, 3 4 x 4 station wagons, 35 4 x 4 pickups, 12 5-ton trucks. Office and
residential buildings and equipment ($2.2 million). Technical assistance and
training ($1.9 million): 168 expertsJmonth. Other operational purchases ($4.6
million): insecticides, seeds, sacks, fertilizer, spare parts, etc. The pro~ect's
total cost, including the local portion, is $35 million. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1896, 12 Mar 82 p 730] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11915
EGYPTIAN OIL SHIPMENTS--Egypt has supplied Sudan with 150,000 tons of oil in
the last 2 months. These shipments w�ere made when Sudan was experiencing a
serious shortage of fuel, whose prices have increased from 30 to 40 percent
following the elimination of budget subsidies for these products on 10 November.
According to Sudanese President Njmeiry, one-third of the countrq's foreign ~
exchange revenues were used to pay ehe oil bill and Sudan's balance of trade
showed a deficit of $65 million in 1981. [Text] ~'aris MARCHE~S TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1896, 12 Mar 82 p 730] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Paris 1982) 11915
s ~ .
; CSO: 4519J147
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TUNISIA
-i
FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES MAGHREB, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Faris AL-WATAN AL='ARABI in Arabic No 268, 2-8 Apr 82 pp 36-37
[Interview with Ea~i Caid Essebsi, Tunisian minister of foreign affairs, by
al-Hab ib al-Salimi: "Ba3i Caid Essebsi, to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI: There is No Use
in Returning to Fez at Present; Iranian Intransigence Behind Continued War"]
~ [Text] Tunis--What would Tunisia's position be should the OAU finally approve
membe rship of a Sahara Republic and how does Tur~isia draw up the features of
; its new foreign policy amidst the feverish international polarization compet-
ing for the Arab Maghreb? Ba~i Caid Bssebsi, the Tunisian minister of foreign ~
' affairs, says: We are concerned about the OAU and we cannot approve its en-
croachments. We stand stubbornly against any foreign military presence in the
+ area. We have had this interview with the minister:
' The OAU, with the major rift from which it is suffering, was the aub3ect of the
! first question. The Tunisian minister of foreign affairs said: Tunisia is one
i of the founding members of the OAU. Naturally, Tunisia is strongly attached to
this organization and to its survival so th~~ it can render the services for
which it was founded. There is no doubt that this organization has gone
~ through difficult periods in the recent past and has experienced internal dif-
ferences, some of them marginal and some fundamental. I believe that you are
referring to the differences of opinion that emerged in Addis Ababa recently
at the convocation of the latest session of the GAU Council of Minist~rs.
Tunis ia's position has been clear. Inasmuch as it is attached to the organiza-
tion, Tunisia is also eager for the proceedings of thia organization to take
place in accordance with the chart~r and aceording to the spirit of this char-
ter. I believe that this is an ethic that must exist among all o.f the organi-
~ zation members so that the organization':s activities will be beneficial and
' clear. It is our belief that the lateat OAU Council of Ministers session, held
~ in Addis Ababa, witnessed a deviation from this rule and a resort to offhanded
' and crooked ways that do not honor the organization and that even damage its
credibility, its influence an~d its role. This is why Tunisia adopted a firm
' stance, first by advocating the use of reasan and the adoption of a wise posi-
tion to protect the organization from tremors and upheavals, and perhaps even
from disintegration. Tunisia pointed out all the irc$ractions it had noticed in
' the actions of this organization's General 3ecretariat. Because the appeal
voiced by Tunisia fell on deaf ears, Tunisia decided to suspend its participa-
' tion in the session held in Addis Ababa out of its desire to draw attention to
the serious situation and to express its polit3cal resolve not to be carxied
~ away by the currents that do not serve the organization'~ interesta.
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[Question] There are indications that the Arab Maghreb has begun to draw the
~ main attention of the superpowers. Can Tunisia, by virtue of its relations
with the area's states and by virtue of its neutral policy, protect the area
- from the international conflict?
[Answer] Tunisia is well knawn as a nonaligned country. It is against polari-
zation because it believes that polarization is harntful. But this does not mean
that Tunisia has no friendships with the Western and Eastern countries. A
strong friendsiiip binds us to the United States and to European countries be-
cause we have interests with these countries. We are also tied by friendship
to the Soviet Union, with which we have economic dealings and diplomatic ex-
- change. Our relationship with the Soviet Union is based on mutual respect.
Thi~ is our political line. Tunisia is an Arab country with African and Medi-
terranean dimensior~s and it always seeks to act within this framework through
the friendships it has, be they friendshigs within this or that sphere. What
remains to be said is that Tunisia works to keep its political decisions inde-
pendenL. These political decisions must, of course, be realistic. A state~-
man's decisions must be effective and purposeful. We have~been extremely suc-
cess~ul in this regard.
This is our viewpoint in Tunisia. We will safeguard it and wiZl seek to follow
the same policy at the level of the greater Arab Maghreb. However, the presence
of certain h~t issues, whether we like it or not, is bound to attract the inter-
~ est of the two superpowers and of the ma~or powers. The struggle of the two
superpowers is everywhere. This struggle can, of course, find in our regional
differences a sphere of competition embodied in the struggle for our area. This
is wnat has happened. .
Special Sensitivities
[Question] Tunisia is aware of the dangers of a foreign military presence in
the Arab Maghreb and is exerting efforts to bring the views closer to each
other. But these efforts have been re~ected by Algeria (Algeria's position
toward Mohamed Mzali's statements in Paris regarding the Western Sahara).
Will Tunisia alter its efforts to bring about ths rapprochema~nt or will it
stand by its previous proposals?
[An.swerJ First, there is no [foreign] military presence in this area, God be
thanked--not in Tunisia, in Morocco, in Algeria or in Mauritania. There is no
foreign military presence. There is an attempt at polarization. We acknowledge
this but hope that our area will remain far from the heat of the international
struggle. This does not mean that there is no foreign military presence in the
Mediterranean basin. Our position toward this presence is clear. But the
Maghreb territories are free of such .a presence and we hope this situation will
continue until God inherits the aarth and those on it, and He is the best of
heirs. It remains to be said that there are issues that create special sensi-
_ tivities, such as the Western Sahara issue to which you have referred and which
generates sensitivities among some of the area's states.
In Tunisia, we abide by the principle of nonintexvention in the affairs of
ot~lers. We also accept no intervention in our affairs. This does not mean that
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we ~re not interested in what happens in the Arab Maghreb countries. We are, ~
interested in the stability of this area and in seeing peace prevail in its
various parts. We hope and strive for amity to dominate the rela*_ions of all
of the area's countries. This is one of our duties. Tunisia alwa;s seeks to
lessen any tension that may devel.op in one country's relations with another, and
we will continue to do so because we believe that it is in Tunisia's intereat
and in the ~nterest of the area's countries colle~tively. The rule in politi-
cal action is that this action always evokes viewpoints and reactions because
of numerous considerations. Special sensitivities develop ~rom time to time.
We regret this and assert that we have no wish to play any leadership role in
this area. What we do is always for the good of all. The future will show
that Tunisia gets involved only for the sake of what is good and out of its
desire to serve the general interest of the area.
Relations With France
[Question] It seems that the French premier's visit has not achieved the goals
expected by Tunisia and that French-Tunis2an relations are going through a
critical phase. Was the recent French-Tunisian meeting in Paris, in which you
participateds able to restore relations between the two countries to their pre-
vious condition?
[Answer] I disagree with what you have said. However, the reports published in
some papers justify what you have concluded. The French premier's visit to
Tunisia was a visit of friendship and a working visit and it did achieve its
goals by the mere fact that it took place. France meant to express its f.riend-
ship for Tunisia and the importance it attaches to Tunisian-French relations
- through that visit. We thanked the French Government for this expression and
a~~preciated this initiative for it. The first visit made by the French premier
o~utside of Europe was the visit he paid to ~nisia. Therefore, there is no
place for talking about negatiue aspects in the meeting. The most important out-
come of the visit is the fact that it did take place. Our relationship with
France is excellent and at a satisfactory level in our opinion, and in the
opinion of France itself. The recent convocation of the Joint Higher Tunisian
French Co~nittee in Paris and the talks held on the occasion of the convocation
of this committee, whether at the level of the two ministers of foreign affairs
or with the French premier, are another indication that the relations between the
two countries are at an acceptable level. Tn every dealing there are aspects
that requi~:e dialogue, concerted efforts and profound thinking. Our relation-
ship with France dates way back and, God willing, will continue to be sound.
We are eager to see this relationship prosper. This is what we see at present.
After the talks, I personally returned from France with very good impressions.
I am satisfied with the outcone of the talks, especially since we had not ex-
pected of the talks more thax~ what could be realistically expected. Our rela-
tionship with France is good, has improved and is likely to improve further in
_ the coming years. What I want to stress now is that we have felt political re-
solution on the part of the French Government to enhance and develop the rela-
tions in all the fields, especially in the sphere of supporting Tuni,,ia in the
~ struggle for gr~owth and progres~l that we will continue to wage in th~~. forthcom-
' ing sixth pZan.
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[Question] Will Tunisia play a role to speed up convocation of the Arab s~it
in Fez and when will this s~it be held?
[Answer] The first round of the Fez summiit has been held. We have thought
about postponing the meeting to strengthen consultations, to crystal~ize think-
ing and to study the plans that will be presented to the conference. The sum-
mit is an itnportant event that brings together the Arab heads of state. The
Arab and world public expects decisive results from this s:~nit. Therefore,
it is beneficial to study all points of the a~enda carefully before we resume
- the meeting. I do not believe that there is any use in convening the confer-
ence under the present circumstances. Deliberation, consultation and study
are a must. When all the circwnstances for the success of the second round of
the sunenit are present, then the time will be right for convening it. I see
no benefit in holding this summit at present or in the next few months.
= Iranian Intransigence
[Question] The efforts to put an end to the Iraq-Iran war have failed. Do
you think that the mediation being conducted by the Islamic Co~mittee will bear
fruit and what will Tunisia's position vis-a-vis the Iranian intransigence be
in case the Islamic efforts fail?
- [Answer] We must not lose hope, especially since a sound solution can be ~
reached only through the agreement of the two warring parties. The Iraq-Iran
war is regrettable and we have been pained by it because it is taking place
between two countries that are supposed to cooperate and to unite their forces
to confront the Zionist enemy. We have great hope that each side will find
its way to a dialogue and that reason will prevail over emotion. Tunisia has
encouraged all of the conciliation efforts exerted in this regard, be they
efforts exerted at the level of the Islamic Organization, of the nonaligned
countries or of the international com~u~:ity. It is regrettable that none of
these efforts has borne fruit. To tell the truth, there is intr~nsigence on
the part of the Iranian side because Iraq has repeatedly expressed its readi-
ness �or dialogue and for a compromise and has agreed to all these mediation
efforts. But the Iranian side has clung to its position of re~ection. What
- is also regrettable is that the.continued war has created distressing compli-
cations, such as Israel's support for Iran. It is the duty of all of the Ara'o
countries that can influence Iran, and I am not going to name any particular
country, to exert efforts to push Iran toward negotiation and a peaceful solu-
tion, especially since nobody wants the solution to come at the expense of
this or that side. The hoped for solution is the solution that guarantees the
legitimate rights of each of the two sides.
[(~uestion] Do you think that Egypt will return to the Arab fam.~.ly after
25 April?
[Answer] It is difficult to say. But what we can assert is that we welcame
such a return. This is the duty of every sincere Arab who regrets Egypt's
withdrawal and departure from Arab consensus because Egypt is the biggest Arab
country, whether in terms of population or of cultural and civilization. It
is the duty of every Arab to hope for Egypt's return to the Arab ranks becaLSp
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such :s retc~rn eonstitutes a great gain for the Arab na.tion and strengthens
- tniQ natio~ in all respects. But the circimnstances for this return must be
present. It is only being realistic to admit that Egypt's recognition of
Israel and its conclusion of peace with Israel pose a problem for which a
_ solution must be found, because we should create the proper circumstances for
- this return.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-'AftABI
8494 ~
CSO: 4504/273
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TUNISIA
BRIEF5
EXPLOITATION OF OFFSHORE OILFIELD--In a com~uaique issued in Rotterdam at the
- beginning of the month, the She11 company indicated that it would begin produc-
tion at an oilfield in the Mediterranean 42 km from the Tunisian coast from the
supertanker "Murex" (21Q,000 tons), which will be permanently moored al.ong the
Tunisian coast. Shell stated that it opted for this tanker, equipped with
necessary facilities and installations, because a platform linked to the coast
by a pipeline would have made exploitation of the field unprofitable. Produc-
tion will amount to 10,000 barrels (1 barrel ~ 159 litres) a~aYanaCthedTunisian
Shell, which will be cooperating with the Italian company Agip,
Shell
firm ETAP (Tunisian Petroleum Activities Enterprise) on this pro~ect.
also statedTextt thPaTi8e~CHES TROPICAUXiETdMIDITeSERRANEENS in French No11905,
barrels. [ ~ ~
14 May 82 p 1265]
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
CSO: 4519/184 E~
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