JPRS ID: 10571 VIETNAM REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 17
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500074417-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/ 1 ~571
7 June 1982
Wes~ E u ro e R e c~ rt
p p
~ CFOUO 36/82)
- Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCA~T INFOR(VIATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500070017-1
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materia ls from foreign-language
sources are translate3; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained. ,
Headlines, editoriul reports, and material enclosed in brackets
['J are supplied ty JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in ~he first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief., indicate how the original information was
processed. Where ~~o processing indica tor is given, the infnr-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclo:?ed in parEntheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.

= Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publicatiun in no way represent the poli-
c ies, views or at.titudes of the U. S. Government .
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED ~'OR OFFIC~IAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070017-1
~
JPRS I?/10571
~7 ~une 1982
~f
; WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 36/82)
CONTENTS ~
~ TERRORISM
P~tANCE
Diplomatic Ties, Interrelations, New Policies Examined
~ (Gerard de Viltiers; PARIS MATCH, 16 Apr 82) 1
~ FLNC Leader on Violence, Repression, Rationale
(Jean-Francois Luci ani Interview; PARIS MATCH, 9 Apr 82) 11
Possible Foreign Intelligence Service Tie in Barsiman~ov
Case
~ (Elisabeth Schemla; ZE NOWEL OBS~RVATEUR, 9-16 Apr 82 16
POLITICAI~
AUSTRIA
Kreisky on Foreign Policy, Relations W'ith Italy
(Bruno Kreisky Interview; LA STAMPA~ 19 Ma~r 82) 19
FRANCE
Change to Proportional Representatior~ Seen as Harmful
(Jacques Julliard; I.E NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR~ 9-16 Apr 82).. 23
~uiles on Election Results, PSF Plan s~ Mayoral Rac.e
(Kathleen Evin; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUF., 9-16 Apr 82)..,... 27
~ - a- ( III - WE - 15f1 FOUO]
~
FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540070017-1
FOR OFFICIAL USH: UNLY
~
~
, TERRORTSM
~
f
i '
aI
I
i
, DIPLOMATIC TIES, INTERRELATIONS, NEW POLI~IES EXAMINED
Paxis PARIS MATCH in F~ench 16 Apr 82 pp ~+8-51, ~ 72
[Article by Gerard de Villiers: "The Terrorist Plan for 1982"]
[Text] The antiterrorist experts no longer have any doubt.
France is threatened in the next fe~* weeks by a wave of
attacks which will be both specific and "randnm.1� War.has
been declared; a stealtY~y and underground wax, with .
- unpredictable but planned attacks.
`i'he five killed at th~ Capitole were eertainly not victims of tragic Pate but
of a premeditated act, planned to cause the maximum number of casualties, and
caxried out by one or more gerfectly trained estperts. Excluding the Rue
Copernic attack, this was only the second instance in FYance of an attack aimed
~j at killing, wi.thout any specific religious target. The first was the grenade
~ attack on the Saint-Germain Drugstore. The ~echnicaZ investigation has made '
it possible to trace this back to Carlos, the femous Illitch RamirQZ..
There followed the unsu~ces~ful attempt on the Paris Facchangs, whi.ch could have
: killed scores of people. It wa.s attributed to Direct Action.
- And now, the Capitole. ~
' Who is responsib~e?
�
Naturally, it is too early to be able to answer this questien. We must be sat-
isfied with what we already know. The explosive used was reportedly penthrite,
of Czech origin, used by Arabic and Armenian terrorists.
' There i~ the disturbing coincidence +hat this murderous attack was the sequel
to a chain of events which leads directly to the in'farlous Carlos. On
, 16 February, the police arrested two terroriats w~o w~re afiout to place a bc..ib
outside the Paris City Hall. Specifical]tiy, a bomb composed basically of
I ~
i
1
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000500470017-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
penthrite. One of the two was Bruno Breguet, a Swiss activist who had alreac~y
been sentenced in Israel for a bomb attack. His compenion, Ma.gdalena Kopp, is
the mistress ot' a friend of Carlos.
Ten days later, the minister o~ interior, Gaston Defferre, received an ulti-
matum from Caxlos, authenticated by his fingerprints. The French Government
must either release the twa terrorists within a month, or be prepared for a
series of bloody attacks. � ~
`1.'his ultimatum, which became known through a leak, expired on 27 March. On
29 March, at 2040 hours, a bomb contained in a black Samsonite suitcase
exploded in the luggage rack of a compartn~ent of cax 18 of the Capitole.
Then? These are the only facts we know. They are enough to cause great con-
cern to the experts in antiterrorist operations. For example, suppose we
_ accept the most pla,usible hypothesis, that the origine.tors were Carlos and his
men. Who is Carlos? ~
A Venezuelan from a good family, brought up with Marxism, and sent to Moscow
and recruited by the KGB, which introduced him to the Arab terrorist movement.
Carlos has never operated on his own account. At ane time, he was connected
to the Algerian services. He was "handled" by FLN Secretary General. Yayaoui.
However, this did not last, and at one point the Algerians even wanted to kill
- Carlos. The latter then moved into the Libyan orbit. This was the "time of the
~ OPEC incident in Vienna. According to certain indiscretely revealed informa-
tion, Carlos was ''handled" in Libya by Ahmad Shahati, chief of aperations for
(Amktab Tasfir Athaoui~ [sic], the brain in charge of organizing Libyan terror-
- is~t activities.
Then Carlos disappeared. It is known that he lived in Tripoli, Libya, at the
Palm Beach Iiotel, but he was no longer involved in "outside" operations,
limiting himself to instructing. At one time, it was even said that he was
- dead, but that was a false xumor.
C~.rlos went back into operation. The proof of this is last month�s ultimatum.
The real problem is to find out on whose behalf. The Li.byans? The
Palestinians of the Re,jection Front? Or the F2~ench terrorist groups? It has
been known since 1.979 that the Libyans clandestinely support the Movements for
Independence of Reunion and New Caledonia. A number of Basques and Corsicans
have taken sabotage training in Libya, including forgir.g of lette.rs, booby-
tr apped packages, psychological exploitation of attacks, etc. Beginning in
19 80, the bomb and automatic weapon attacks against the Directorate of Terri-
torial Surveillance (DST) and the ministry of cooperation left the same signa-
ture "Direct Action." Since then, the DST and the Foreign Intelligence and
2
- FOR OFF[CIAL USE ON[.Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R400504070017-1
~ FOR OFFICIAI. USI: ONLY
'
Counterintelligence Service (SDECE) have obtained proof that the Libyan ser-
~*ices have been in close contact with "Direct Action." It was those services,
among others, which provided the latter with the leaflets containing the .
charge: "F~om Gafsa to Nd,jamena, from D~ibouti to Bangui, it is the French
army which keeps order to protect neocolonialist trade."
; The serious aspect today is that the Capitole attack represents a complete
; change in the strategy of the terrorists operating in France.
Until now, there had indeed been numerous incide:~ts, particularly in Pa~is~ but
those actions, though carried out on French territory, had only been aimed at
foreigners,
This restraint had been due to the secret a~reement reached by the Frei~ch
Government with Yasir 'Arafat in ~975. An Elysee representative had met with
the Palestinian leader in Beirut and they had reached an agreement. The French
w~uld close their eyes to the travel o~ Palestinians through France and would
not prevent establishment of support networks. In return, the Palestinians
would refrain from any actian against French interests. The agreement was
scrupulously observed. ProoP of thi,s was the arrest and rapid release by the
French authorities of Abu Aaud, the organizer of the Munich massacre.
The negative consequence of this agreement was the transPormation of our
~ country into a kind ~f rear base for terroris~ts of all kinds, who--still with-
out attacking French interests--began to settle their persona,l accounts in our
capital.
' Today, ihe Capitole bomb incident may mean that the Palestinians and Libyans
~ regard this agreement as broken, and therefore believe they are in their right
to target French interests.
I Indeed, with the change of administration in France, a new factor did enter the
picture wit~ respect to the French intelligence services. Until May 1981, the
SDEG'E and the DST had maintained excellent relations with their Arabic counter-
parts: Iraqi, Moroccari, Tunisian, Saudi, and Jordanian. This was the result
of a policy decision at the highest ].evel to favor the Arab camp at the expense
of Israel, even though many members ~f the former French ma~ority had many
friends in Israel. However, some time ago the situation changed. The Arab
countries, hardening their intransigence against Israel, did not reaily accept
- Francois Mitterrand~s visit to Israel, the first visit by a French president
to that country. Nor did France's position on reconstruction of the Iraqi
"Osiris" reactor fully satisfy the Iraqis.
~
On the other hand, some members of the "Israeli lobby" within Francois
' Mitterrand's entourage showed their preference clumsily. This development
embarrassed the French intelligence services.
, 3
FOR OFF[CIAL USE Ol~lLY
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540070017-1
FOR OFFtC1AL USH: ONI.Y '
At the SDEG'E, which had..been put 3,n charge of extern~.l security, the new
director, Pierre Marion, went to a great deal oP effort to maintain the exist-
ing ties with his Arab counterparts. He was helped in this by his excellent
personal relations with many oP the Arab "Eapionage establishment" and by his
tireless activity: visits to the Arab countries, meetings, and contacts at all
levels.
In spite of this ant-like industriousness, it seems that some in~ormation net-
works, normally useful for pre--enting assassination plots, were not as active
as they should have been. The Arabs were refusing to talk. Also, there is a
difference between knowing and preventing. For several week~ ~he DGSE
[?General Directorate of External Security] had been sending nates to the
Elysee warning of the danger oP attacks. It could do no more. Of course, it
would be an exaggeration to say that there is a direct causal relation between
the change in policy and the Capitole attack. ~
However, we must not forget that terrorist attacks are never the'product of
chance and always have a speci~~c purpose.
Over a number of years we had maintained a precarious equilibrium with..the
most radical Arab militant movements. That equilibrium has been upset. This
fact, combined with the lax approach to terrorism which has prevailed in France
for a long time, has created a potentially explasive situation which could
produce other attacks which are theoretically "random" but in fact carefully
conducted with a specific ob~ective.
According to some intelligence experts, this ob~ective might be to politically
"break" the PLO by blaming it for bloody and unpopular attacks.
~ Already, in December, an attack almost took the life of Yasir 'Arafat. Two of
- his bodyguaxds were killed. Towaxd the end oY the year, there was a rumor in
~ Beirut that the Syrians wanted to get rid of him, that he was ass~uning too much
political and military importance.
- ~On the other hand, Pierre Marion~s services are now convinced that it was
really Carlos behind the Capitole attack. The DST does not exc:lude the possi-
bility that he was in France.
In tl.lis case, as I said, tne only question is: For whom is Carlos working?
In whose interest would it be to sa~otage the PLO?
The Re~ection Front? The Libyans? The Syrians?
4
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500070017-1
MOR nFFIC1A1. USF ONLY .
With the PLO destabilized, there would be a danger of the whole Middle East ~
catching fire, k'urther, who but the Soviet Union, of which 5yria is a main
! "client," is interested in maintaining tension in this part of ~he world?
,
The 5 dead and 27 wounded in the Capitole incident were perhaps the vict~ims Of
an inter-Arab quarrel. Tf this is so, others will follo~w.
, Before the war, no Frenchman wanted to die for Danzig. Now, some are risking
death for the PLO, without anyone ~,sking for their opinion.
What methods do the terrorists use, and what answers can we find? Jacob
BarsiTM~antov, who was assassina+~ed on Saturday by a terrorist who was certainly
in thi pay of the Palestinians, ~tas killed in the same manner as the previous
victims. In cold blood, in the presence of his wife and son, by five bullets
from a 7.65, two of which were fatal. The killer: a woman, alone.
The murderer will never be found. Just as the killer of the American diplomat
in the heart of Paris two-and-a-half months ago has not been found.
Lt Col G'haxles Ray did not know that he was going to die when he lePt his
residence on Monday, 18 Januaxy. It was 9 a.m. and, as every morning, Charles
Ra.y was going to his ~ob as assistant military attache at the U.S. Embassy.
Emile-Augier.Boulevaxd, in the 16th District, was quiet; the diplomat's car
- was parked in front of no 24. Before he had time to get in, a dark-skinned
man, with long hair, of oriental typea approached him and fired a shot point
- blank into the nape of his neck. He then left on foot and disappeared after
carrying out a decision prepared thousands of kilometers from Paris.
This is what is called in special services ~argon an "action homo'~ [personal
hit], that is, the final "solution" to an opponent whom you have no't been able
to neutral:ize any other way.
In the past 5 years tliere have b~een a series oP "personal hits'~ against . ~
foreign diplomats in Paris: 1~ay 1976: assassination of the Bolivian ambassador;
June 1976: assassination of the Chilean ambassador; Novemter 1976: attempted
assassination of the social counsellor of the Iranian embassy; December 1.979:
assassination of the tourism counsellor of the Turkish embassy; September 1980:
serious wounding of the pre~s attache oP the Turkish embassy; Jul,y 1980: kill-
ing of Syrian political re.fugee Salah al-Bitax at his own home; March 1981:
assassination of two Turkish diplomats; and, finally, in November 1981:
attempted assassination of Christian Chapman, the number-two man at the
, ~merican Embassy in Paris.
' None of the perpetrators have been arrested, and one might be tempted to ask:
G'hat havE the police been doing? That wo~ald be unfair, because, short of
' some unexpected development.. they axe powerless. In a"personal hit," every-
thing has been anticipated.
5
- ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500470017-1
M'UR OFFICIAl, l1tiE UNLY
In the Pirst place, there has been no previous contact between the victim ~nd ~
the attacker. The latter is brought to the attack location by accomplices,
who retrieve him afterwaxd and put him on the first plane. Often he does not
even speak the language o~ the country.
_ Nor does the weapon, even if it is recovered (which is ra.rely the case) pr.ovide
any lead. It is usually sent in a diplomatic pouch by a roundabout route.
Western intelligence services have long had proof that the embassies of Libya,
- Southern Yemen, Syria, and Traq are veritable arsenals of weapons for supply
to terrorists. For "personal hits," the latter favor 7.65 Berettas because
they are very short, can be easily concealed, and axe re~atively quiet. Since
the murders are co~itted at very close range, a large caliber is not useful.
When the weapon is not sent by diplomatic pouch, it is bought on site from gun
dealers through the support network.
It is also impossible to find out the identity of the killer. The ma,jority
come from the Middle East and return there. In Beirut, fake passports are
virtually sol~ tobacco shops. The intelligence services know, for example,
that there is a cl.andestine printshop in Beirut which prepaxes G~rpriot,
Maltese, Kenyan, and Mauritanian passports by the dozen. One of these was
used by the Copernic killer.
This is in addition to the blank Cypriot passports stolen regularly in
Nicosia; to the complimentary, often diplomatic, passports issued to
Palestinians by the Yemenis, Libyans, and Syrians; and the fact that a Bath
~ Party law in Iraq authorizes any Arab to claim Iraqi nationality using any na.me
he wishes.
However, all these murders have one element in common: what T will cali the
"Lebariese aura." The killers depart Prom Beirut even if their orders come from
elsewhere, and their actions are claimed by more or less phantom organizations
operating out of Lebanon. The murder of Lieutenant Colonel Ra,y was claimed
on the same day by the "Lebanes~ Revolutionary Groups," a totally unknown
organization.
It appears that this murder was in reality the final episode in a struggle
which had been going on for several months between the Libyan services and the
CIA. According to reliable sources, Colonel Qadhdhafi was hit during a shoot-
ing attack in Tripoli in December. He disappeared for a week, and when he
reappeaxed on televi:~ion his left arm was visibly immobilized. The attack was
reportedly carried out by Lebanese Shiites who had been "used." Qadhdhafi
wasted no time in answering, the experts say. One fact is not generally
recognized: Qadhdhafi is very well informed about his American adversaries.
His two advisers on terrorism are not Soviet or East German, but American: Two
. former CIA agents, Edwin Wilson and Frank Terpil, wh~ naturally are hunted by
6
FOR OF~'IC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R400504070017-1
FOR OFFICIAL IJSE ONLY
' the Americans. It ~ras they ~tho organi,zed the abduction of General Dozier in
Italy, "subcontracting" witIi the Red Brigade, who are very closely linked with
Libya; and the murder of Lieutenant Colonel Ray by a killer recruited in
Beirut.
Always Beiru~, the Copernic killer came from Beirut and returned there, The
killers of the Armenian ASALA are based in Beirut. The ?alestinian extremist
factions like Abou Nidal, members of the Re~ection Front, even though "spon-
sored" by the Syrians or the Libyans, are also based in Beirut. It provides
better ~ona~alment. For a long time Beirut has not belonged to ar~yone, least
of all the Lebanese.
In Beirut, ar~yone can be recruited to do anything. Some of the armed factions
. which proliferate there need money and advertise themselves as assassins for
' pay. For example, it is now almost certain that French Ambassador Delamare
was assassinated by order of the Syrian services who could not stomach his
involvement in efforts to reconcile the Lebanese. However, the Syrians, who
axe not stupid, hired the services of a"Shiite" death comriando. Nevertheless,
it all eventually beca.me known in Beirut.
However, the primary factor which makes Beirut the breeding place of terrorism
is that it is the largest weapons supermarket in the world. Your hotel porter
will offer you a Kalashnikov for $20, and grenades are used for paperweights.
It is the only place in the world where a normal femily will b~y a combat
weapan with a telescopic sight.
~ In this powderkeg there is a teeming multitude of little organizations who will
' change their title on request, who help each other, fight each other, infiltrate
each other, use each other, and all get their supplies from the same sources.
First, there are all the small Palestinian groups which claim to be part of
, the Re~ection Front and specialize in Anti-Jewish attacks: the PFLP of Doctor
Habash, the Abu Nidal group, and others. Although officiall,y disowned by
Yasir 'Arafat, they are in their element within the Palestinian domain, It
was they at the Copernic attack, and at the murder of Edwin Dowek and his wife
in Paris on 26 November 1980. Edwin Dowek was an Israeli who organized tourist
travel between Israel and Egypt. These Palestinians have carried out numerous
attacks in Europe, always against Jews, in Anvers and Vienna among other places.
, In I'rance they use extensive support facilities which enable them to carry out
_ their "missions" unimpeded. The man who placed th.e bomb outside the Rue
Copernic synago~ue was met by accomplices who gave him the explosive, took him
to the place, and subsequently put him on the first plane to Beirut with his
; false Cypriot passport.
I; Then there are the Armenians of the ASALA [Armenian Secret Army for the Liber-
ation of Armenia~, a clandestine Armenian organization which emerged in Beirut
~ around 1975 ~.nd has since carried out dozens of attacks on Turks to avenge
~ 7
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ON1.Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540070017-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- the Armenian genocicle by Turks early in +his century. The head of AS/~LA goes
under the name.Agop Agopian, but not much is known about him. However, ASALA
is very close ideologically to the Palestinian extremists.
Beirut has the strongest Armenian community in the wo~ld, which explains
ASALA's location there.
What about the Libyans? Officially, they are very discreet, and their services
operate secretly, never getting involved in a direct action. On the other
~ hand, there is proof that they supp~jr money, weapons, and passports to those
within their sphere of influence, all in Beirut. Those invited to train in
_ Libyan camps also leave from Beirut. Obviously, that training establishes ties
and makes it possible to later ask ~or services.
The Libyans provide to the Basque ETA logistic support without which the ETA
would no longer be in operation. They also give a lot of assistance to the
Irish IRA. The Liby~.ns' main opponents are thE Americans and the Jews.
Several of the attacks caxried out.by Palestinians have in fsct been r~mote-
controlled by the Libyan services.
Beirut also serves as a staging point for Iranian teams when the Ayatollah's
goverrmient does not want to be directly involved. The commandos who tried to .
assassinate Shapur Bakhtiar and who did kill on Avenue Foch the nephew of
Princess Ashraf, sister of the Shah of Iran, operated out ot Beirut. Cer-
tainly, there has not been and never will be proof of all these actions. They
are verbal commands, references, and there is no written trace. Often, the
killers are later themselves executed in one of the countless street battles
in Lebanon and the circle is complete. Also, it is extremely difficult to
know who has killed and why, especially because everything is so tangled up.
Take the Copernic incident. The explosive used was Czechoslovakian:
penthrite. It is a sophisticated product which you cannot simply b~}r in a
drugstore. All right. However, the police discovered that the explosive used
. by ~;:~P unidentified terrorists at the Armenian church in Paris wa5 also
penthrite. The Swiss police have p~oved that penthrite was also used in
' several Armenian attacks on Turks.
Moral: They are getting supplies from the same source. In the Coperni~^ case
it is more likely that the killer was supplied by the ASALA networks.
You ask me why the French police were not able to find out? Well, it is not
so easy. The present Armenian extremist groups are oPten descended Prom mem-
bers of the pro-Soviet Komintern or Armenians of the Mamouchian group which
fought the Nazis. These people have a long tradition of clandestinity and are
- very difficult to infiltrate.
_ 8
FOR OFF~CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R400504070017-1
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
Another interesting Pact: dn 22 July 1980, Salah el Bitar, a Syrian political
emigre--the S~rrian president had put a price on his head---was killed by a shot
in the head on Avenue Hoche. The weapon used was a 7.65. A settling of
accounts between Armenians and Turks. Old disputes.
- On 26 November 1980, a killer breaks into the travel office of the Doweks and
kills both of them. They were Jews who arranged tourist travel between Isra~el
: and Egypt. This time, the weapon was recovered. It was a 7.65 Beretta. The
; a.mmunition used in a11 three murders came from the same Czechoslovak batch.
This is a demonstration oP the permeability oP the vaxious terrorist networks.
One never knows, and they themselves do not know, for whom they work. However,
they all have or..e thing in common: their contacts with the intelligence ser-
vices of the Eastern countries--oP the Soviet Union and Bul3axia.
It is an obvious temptation to say; The people are all manipulated by the KGB,
_ which pulls all the strings and sends them out like human puppets to carry out
its evil tasks.
I believe the truth is a little more subtle and more complex, because you do
not manipulate the milit ant Leftist Christian as easily as a hothead Lef"tist
ready to put a bullet in your head for a passing smile.
Certainly, the Soviet Union bears a significant responsibility in respect to
. world terrorism, but its involvement is most of`ten indirect and accompanied by .
extensive precautions. For example, no recent example i~.known of a KGB
officer himself carrying out a"personal hit." For a number of years now, the
~ ma~or services have refrained from this kind of game: There are too many ways
to retaliate.
By contrast, in the obscurity of Beirut, when you scratch the Palestinian,
Armenian, or Libyan surface a little, you find evidence of the Eastern presence.
In the way of weapons, first of a11. The Soviets and the Czechoslovaks have
organized a huge arms traffic through the international traffickers based in
Northern Europe and even i~i the United States. The Russians sell their old,
- outdated weapons and the Czechoslovaks sell new material. It is all at low
prices, challenging any competition, and without an option to retnrn if not
satisfied. It is still astounding to see that a11, or almost a11, the weapons
used in terrorist attacks come from the East.
In Januaxy 1981, the grenade thrown under the car of a Turkish diplomat was
Soviet, the Copernic explosive was Czechoslovak, the RPG-7's used against the
Phoenix nuclear plant were Soviet, and the ammunition for the weapons used in
; the three murders was also Czechoslovak. All the Pal.estinian groups a.re
equipped wit~ Soviet guns, especially I~alashnikovs and RPG-7's, and with
, Czechoslovak explosives.
,
~ 9
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500470017-1

,
HOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
At another level, the collusion is even more obvious. The Soviets operate
in the long term. The ma~ority of the commander.s of all terrorist actions have
taken political or technical training courses at Czechoslovak camps or in the
Soviet universities for foreigners. The Soviet leadership concentrates on
inviting young people, through various organizations. They love young people.
During these visits, they discretely identif~r those most likely to be influ-
enced and invite them to come for study at Lumumba University in Moscow, for
example. Those who really become immersed and who agree to a direct contract
with the KGB will be "established," that is, they will be sent back an some
pretext in order to "whitewash" them. A perfect example: Tllitch Ramirez,
better known as "Carlos." Of~icially, expelled from Lumumba University; in
- fact, a KGB agent. His career is well known. The Libyan services at one
point wanted to get rid of him, for sordid material reasons. The Soviets ma.de
cle.~r that this wauld be regarded as an unfriendly gesture towaxd them.
Carlos would be allowed to continue to serve, He still serves. There will be
an operation in which the Soviets will not appear, but which they will have
organized.
There are dozens of mini-Caxloses in the small Palestinian or Armenian groups.
They tend not to be ungrateful to those who have helped, armed, and pampered
them. They ask only the opportunity to prove their gratitude.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 par Cogedipresse SA
9920
CSO: 3100/632
10
- FOR OFF[CIAL L'SE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500070017-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
i
TERRORISPi FRANCE
'i
i
j.
i
i
I
; FLNC LEADER ON VIOLENCE, REPRESSION, RATIONALE
- Paris PARIS MATC~~ in French 9 Apr 82 pp 44-47
[Interview with an FLNC leader by Jean~Francois Luciani]
[Text] The FLNC [Corsican National Liberation Eront]
is ready to fight to the finish. Sometimes re~ected,
~ but more often accepted by a large part of the popu-
lation, they number between 500 and 1,000 underground
fighters, who are totally convinced that victory--
that is to say the island`s indepencence--is now in
the muzzles of their guns and the bursting of bombs.
_ One of their leaders explains to Jean-Francois Luciani
why the Movement now believes in violence alone.
; [Question] You were unanimously condemned by public opinion after your attack
- on a Foreign Legion recreation camp during the night of 11-12 February, which
j caused one death. Even the Cor~ican nationalists withdrew their support.
i Don't you feel that you made a mistake?
I
[Answer] We have explained the ob~ ectives of the Sorbo-Occagnano operation:
- to neutralize the Foreign Legion and to destroy the buildings. What happened
is one of the risks run if there is armed resistance to our oper~cions. Of
. course, violence is not commendable, but it has ailways been our people's means
~ of resistance. In our country, the problem is not deciding whether violence
is moral or immoral, but deciding whether or not it is necessary. In Corsica
it is felt that violence is ~ustified when you are right. In 5 years of
special status, considering the increasPd colonization following the guarantees
, extended by the status, our people would be crushed, absorbed, drowned in
French assimilation, and permanently lost. Time is working against us and
leaves us no other choice. We are aware af this situation. Our problem is
not to find out whether our people will accept violence or not, but to explain
to them the danger which threatens them. If they realize the danger, then an
armed struggle is inevitable. Today this awareness has changed, in part be-
cause.of the illusion of change which the status promises, and the fulfill-
ment of personal ambitions hinted at by it. Our problem is to prove that
~ special status is not the change our people have been waiting for. The state
~ is currently benefiting from the clamp on our country's political, ~ocial,
and cultural life which it is maintaining with difficulty while awaiting
;
' 11
' FOR OFFICIAL iJSE ONLY
i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070017-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
special status. But this is not going to last. The unsolved problems will
resurface quickly.
[Question] ~n~hy are you making these attacks at this time?
[Answer] The French State and international opinion must be reminded that
following the political change in France, the Corsican national problem
remains unchanged; that we expect the new power, in the name of its political
principles and after its international stands in support of people f ighting
for their liberation, to apply the same principles to our people; in other
_ words, to recognize our national rights. We wanted to put an end to the
campaigns which were saying that the Corsican problem was solved, the nation-
alists dispersed, and the F'LNC in fragments. Furthermore, we struck on a
- day when Gorsica was receiving three ministers. Juc'ge for yourself.
[Question] Rumors corroborate the idea that you were saturated or infiltrated
by former unofficial police.
[Answer] If this were so, it would be easy for us to deny or to refuse
~ responsibility for this action. However, we assume complete responsibility
with all the politic~l consequences.
[Question] It is claimed that there ar~ two factions within the FLNC--one
pro-f ascist (Rightwing), the other Marxist--and that it will "ue the Marxist
faction which will take over the other.
[Answer] While we uu not claim any Marxist philosophy, we condemn and formally
reject any Fascist idea or action. These arguments are only poison which we
are obliged to ward off. Yesterday, we were Qadhdhaf i's rivals; today, we
must be Fascists, that is obvious. But, of course, we expected this.
[Question] Have you managed to build your movement?
~[Answer] Our ability to organize is growing daily.
[Question] Have you abandoned the strategy of a split?
[Answer] Despite everything, there is a change in France which we feel is
important for the French. Today what we call "French nationalism" is taking
on a new aspect. We are obliged to take this into consideration, and, on the
other hand, we must avoid serving the interests of the Right. Consequently,
we have reviewed our strategy, this is obviou3: the truce is proof of this.
But, this does.not mean that we have abandoned it, since we have responsi-
bilities with regard to our people. The interests of our people cannot be
sacrif iced to the success of the L~ft in France.
[Question] Do you st~.ll claim, as the National Liberation Eront in Algeria
did in its time, to exercise power through a single party?
[Answer] We refer y~u to page 46 of our little white book where it says:
"The task of the patriots united within the Front is to lead the political
12
FOR OFFI~,'IAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540070017-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
i
and military struggle until colonialism and the clans have been defeated,
and to restore to the people, and to them alone, the political, economic,
~ and cultural means to control their destiny."
[Question] Are you being financed or assisted by outsiders? �
[Answer] We have just one kind of support--our people's--and one kind of
assistance--the commitment and sacrifice of our activiste. Of course, we do
not refuse tlte political suppor.t of people who are struggling for their rights,
just as we give them ours.
[Question] What do you think of Francois Mitterrand's policy on Corsica:
general amnesty, special status, the means to control your own affairs, a
general assembly elected through universal suffrage; in short, a turnaround
which doesn't seem to be very well assessed here?
[Answer] This policy is limited only to increasing the traditional power of
those interest groups which are the "clans" in Corsica through a status about
which there is nothing special except its name, and to satisfying some
personal interests. Of course, there is the freeing of the prisoners! But,
at the same time, this is a trap. If we are speaking of generosity, then let
them grant us what they give the Palestinians or the Salvadorans: in a word,
the recognition of our rights as a nation.
[Question] How do you explain the fact that the government is not using
repression?
[Answerj We are not about to teach a Lef tist power what the rights of a
~ people are. The new French administration knows very well that special status
I is only a political maneuver to make the nationalist movement wait a little
longer, and that the Corsican problem has not been solved. It knows very
_ well,that it can only be taken care of by a true political solution. Accord-
ing to all evidence, repression does not solve anything. On the other h~nd,
contrary to what they want to make us believe, we do not think that the govern-
ment is convinced that Corsicans unanimously condemn violence.
[Question] Bomb attacks and violence can strengthen the camp which does not
want special status, and give the nationlist candidates an additional handicap.
[An~wer] Those who don't want the status are the first to condemn violence.
They only see the limited interest of their clan. We are speaking of the
rightwing clan as well as the leftwing clan; since, we must admit, part of
.he Left, the most representative part on the electoral level, does not want
the status. And the nationalists will be the political surety for a status
which limits itself to making Corsicans Frenchmen who are a little special.
We want to be full-fledged Corsicans.
[Question] Some nationalists want "worthwhile" violence. In other words,
they would like you not to intervene until they are politically strong enough.
What is your opinion?
, 13
I FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070017-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- [Answer] Those who speak of "worthwhile" violence are dreaming of an FL1i^
which is simply an armed extension under orders to a specific legal refoi~mist
policy. Making the FLNC just a group which sets off bombs is denying armed
struggle as a political means, in order to a11ow complete compromise with
and surrender to colonialism. It is denying the political leaders'hip of ths
FLNC. On the other hand, our position means that the armed struggle for ,
national liberation will be brought to term and that colonialism will rs '
defeated. Obviously, this is not done to reassure the fringe group of busi-
nessmen who are hiding behind the movement for legal sutonomy.
[Question] Other nationalists even hope that you will be "Zorro, the arbiter
of justice."
[Answer] If need be, this wish justifies the popularity of our movement.
But, if we are Zorro, then there is no question of leaving the political
initi,ative to just anyone. .
[Question] Don't you think that room to maneuver is tight for everyon~: ~he
government, the nationalists, the clans, and yourselves?
[Answer] That's true. But, we have one advantage: the firm belie� that we
are moving in the direction of history. A people marching toward freedom is
not stopped. To do this it~would be necessary to destroy them. The French
State does not have the political power.
[Question] You are hostile to the clan system. But, on the other hand, some
nationalists think that the clans represent a part of your culture.
[Answer] It is true that un a cultura]. level, the clan is the most traditional
Corsican form of expression. Corsican culture is a culture of the people,
"paisana," kept alive by the most disadvantaged social class, "i paisani," and
it is in this class that the clan, with its policy of assistance, is gaining
a foothold. But what we condemn in the clan is its political expression which
originates in its vocation of controlling the pawer of the state. The special
status will only reinforce this trend. Nothing can be done against these
political practices without cutting the colonial ties which bind us to France.
[Qu~stion] Doesn't the movement which is being launched--special status,
mor~.l.izing political customs--condemn you to vanish?
- [Answer] 'I'his would perhap~ be so if there really was a movement; but the
colonial situation remains unchanged. The electoral system will remain as
falsified as it was, despite the proportional vote. The power will remain
with the clans. The monopoliaing of the eastern coast by colonists has not
been questioned. The freeze and the occupation of the coastline are continu-
_ ing, real estate speculation is resuming. The economic dependence of our
country is becoming accentuated. The University of. Corsica remains poorly
adapted to the aspirations and requirements of our people. The Foreign Legion
is permanently installing itself. Our language and our culture are far from
bein.g rehabilitated and finding their place in education, public life and the
14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R400504070017-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL3'
cultural poliCy o~ our country. Colonization is increasing and becoming
standard. Since 10 May, construction of second homes has in~creased by 40
percent. And do not forget that Corsicans ~aill soon represent only half of
~ the islanl's population. See how far off the mark we are. Aa long a~ we
~ refuse to bring up the national aspect of the Coraican problem, no political
structure whatever will settle anything.
I
i COPYRIGHT: 1981 par Cogedipresse SA
9693
CSO: 3100/631
~
I
, 15
;
~ FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY
; ,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000500470017-1
FOR OFF'ICIAL UtiE ONLY
~
TERRORISM ~N~ ;
POSSIBLE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE TIE IN BARSIMANTOV CA3E
Pa,ris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 9-16 A.pr 82 p 42
[Article by Elisabeth Schemlas "Death of a Diplomat"]
[Text~ A series of questions~ all of which have to date gone unanswered, has
been raised by the most recent of all the terrorist ac~ts recently conunitted An
F~ench territory: .the murder on 3 April of Yacov Barsimantov~ the 4+2-yaar-o1d
- second secretary of the Israeli embassy, xho was killed by several pistol shots
fired by a xoman in the entrance hall of his residence.
In the opinion of Israeli Amba.ssador Me3.r Rosenne, the crime beara the mark of
the ~LO. He told the press so~ loud. and clear and sosexhat hastily (t,he police
- inv~stigation had not yet begun) immediately after arriving on the Anirder sceae--
a circumstance xhich did not allow time for reflection. The PIA issued. an
immed.iate denial, first in Beirut arui later through Ibxahim Souss~ its repre-
sentative in FSrance. Credit for the murder xas la~er cl~imed first by the
Movement of Arab Revo lutionary Briga,des~ an unknown organization, an~d subse-
quently by the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions, xhoae name ha~d been
evoked previously.
- This wa.sn't good enough~ hoKever: Ambassad.or Meir Rosenne persisted in his
accusations, xhich t~ere echoed in Israel by the most important ministers of the
Begin administration. Defense Minister Ariel Shason saw the murder of the
diplomat as a"violation of the cease-fire" in southern Leba,non; Minister of
Foreign Affairs Itzhak Shamir announced that Israel "will have recourse to
force to smash terrorism~ its leaders and its bases." The xorld ~s awaiting
Isra.eli reprisals--but what form w'ill they take?
Is the PIA really the guilty paacty. however? In Paxis, in response to the
- virulent statements of the ambassador, certain subtly distilled "intelligence"
indicated that Barsimantov had pro'bably been an agent of the Mossad (the
Israeli secret services). In Belgium~ Khere he ha.d been stationed before com-
- ing to France~ had he not been aesigned to "telecommunic~tions"?
It was believed that Barsimantov hard recently received threats, given the fact
that a noliceman xas on duty day an~d night at his residence. The surveillance
had been removed only a feN days before the crime--perhaps because the eecond
secretasy beli.eved he no longer had reason to be anxious, but more probably
16
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500470017-1
r
beca.use the gua.rds xere needed else~r~here to protect more important personages.
Lastly~ one xonders, is it not strange that emb~,say officials shoked up only a
few minutes folloxing tne dra,ma, and that they took possession of an attache
case, found near the body, and some papers foun~d in the clothing of the de=~
ceased?
The attack on Barsimantov, in short, xas proba,bly not a mani~estation of "blin~d
terrorism" but rather a"settling of acores" between secret ~ervices. In such
case it xas.p~robably the Syrians who xere behind the murder.
"What an extraordinary delusion!" Ambas~ador Meir Rosenne protdsted. "Bar~i-
ma.ntov never received any special protection. No attache case xae ever remaved.
from the scene. As for his identity documents~ his Dinera' Club card, and
certain other papers relating to his duties, it is true that xe did remove them,
by a~reement xith the F`rench ~olice. What could be more normal~" he asked, "in
view of the fact that he xas a diploma,t?" And, of course, xhat could be more
norma.l than to deny that Barsima,ntov Kas a"spy"?
One thing seems probable to the investigators, xho are accepting only the theory
- tha.t it xas a nolitica,l crimes namely, that neither the miniscule FYench terrar-
ist ~roups of the far Right nor those of the far Left appears to be implicated.
as organizations, in the case. The police had at the very outset undertook to
follow these two trails, but apparently returned empty-handed. One mu~t there-
fore be satisfied xith the determination that there are disturbing eimilarities
between this crime and those perpetrated on 12 November 1981 against Christian
Chapma,n, charge d'affaires of the America,n embassy in Paris, xho mira.culously
survived, and on 18 January 1982 against Charlea Ra,y, assistant military attache
of the same embassys
i. Al1 three attacks took place in front of the victims' residences.
2. All the weapons used xere 7.65 caliber pistols, and all the ammunition used
bore the Czechoslovak Geco trademark.
3. The crimes were committed by a man or a woman--acting alone and on foot--
who subsequently escaped into the croxd.
4. These ~+ere the same armed Leba.nese revolutionary factions that had claimed.
resnonsibility for the tko previous crimes. As of last Tuesday it did not
ap~ear impossible~ moreover, that Ra.y and Barsima.ntov were killed by the same
~eapon.
There remains one more questions Is, or is not, all of this connected in any
way with the bloody crime at the Capitole? Could it possibly prove to be one
more episode in that bloody chain of events ~rhieh Gaston Defferre ao much
feared following the explosion on the train and the repeated threata made in the
name of "Ca,rlos"? The opposition~ in any event, is losing no opportunity to
noint to "the laxi.ty, the weakness~ the tacit complicity of the g~overnment,"
shamelessly exploiting this somber series of events xhile neglecting to mention
the unsolved crimes of the preced.ing 7-year term.
17
FOR OFFICI4L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070017-1
F�oH oFFic~n~. ~,~N: c~Nt.v
The government intends to demonaisate its xillingness to turn the spotlight on
the past cases as well as those of the present. It has accordingly authorized
the examining magistrates in charge of the Curiel, Goldman and Copernic cases
(~ust as in the Ben Barka case) to inspect certain ~iles that had heretofore
remained secret. In this xay--as the Isra.eli ambassador himself acknoxledged--
the governn~nt has brou~t all its resources to beas during the past fex days.
The mere desire to solve a case is not always enough~ however. Today's govern-
ment leaders are discovering, in their turn, the delights of these investiga-
tions of terrorist acts committed by a master hand.
COPYRIGHTs 1982 "le Nouvel Observateur"
i o992
cso: 31oo/S69
. 18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500070017-1
~
i
i
;
! POLITTCAL AUSTRIA
~
~
KREISKY ON FOREIGN POLICY, RELATIONS WITH ITALY
PM210909 Turin LA STAI~A in Italian 19 May 82 p 5
~ [Undated interview in Vienna with Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky by
Piero de Garzaroli: "Kreisky Buffeted by the Storms"]
i
[Excerpt] Vienna--[Question] Herr Chancellor, why is there so little talk
about Austria, almost .to the extent of a conspiracy of silence against you?
Do you not consider this international lack of interest rather too demora-
' lizing?
[Answer] I have already said this on other occasions. I prefer Austria
to make the news ir~ the cultural or sporting fields rather than in politics.
We are a neutral state, and when one lapses into politics there is always
a tendency to provide misinformation about a particular coim.try. This is why
' we are not in the least interested in being the center of political atten-
i
; tion: sport and culture, or culture and sport, suit us fine.
~ (Question] But your recpnt invitation, to Libyan leader al-Qadhdhafi
prompted considerable uproar abroad, and here in Austria too there was no
absence of criticism and polemics. W::s it a good or a bad thing to have
him come to Vienna? In other words: Did the diplomatic results vindicate
the detente gesture?
' ~AnswerJ It was an excellent initiative, even looking to the future, inasmuch
; as it helped a little to brea~C the ice. It will take time to understand
its consequences. In my view there is no point in excluding someone such
' as al-Qadhdhafi from the group of democratic states. Indeed, it is impossible
to do without him when one is willing to accept several billions from
' Libya but then lacks even the courage, as the Austrians say, to "greet him
under the lime trees," in other words, to be seen with him.
I I consider such a stance rather ambiguous from the moral viewpoint: one
acr_epts money, but.... Of course al-Qadhdhafi holds and defends opinions
that are certainly not ours. In this regard, we already have some familiarity
' with communists and we must unfortimately also take into accoimt Latin
, America's many parafascist regimes. Therefore we cannot always choose our
partners.
! 19
~ FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500470017-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
In my opinion, one must add to all this Che fact that al-Qadhdhafi remains
someone with whom one can still talk, as long as one can inspire trust in
him. In the last analysis he is intelligent, and obviously a revolutionary
who has grown up under conditions different from ours.
[Questinn] So do you respect him?
[Answer] A1-Qadhdhafi is a noteworthy person and I am pleased to have
received him in Austria. Nevertheless, I do not intend to portray him in
tmrealistically rosy hues.
[Question] How do you answer Israel's constant ch arges ~that you have been
too pro-Arab and not at all pro-Zionist, bearing in mind that Austria was
one of the first Western nations to recognize the PLO?
[Answer] In my dual capacity as socialist and internationalist I am the
friend of all peoples, including those of the Middle East. My idea about
Zionism remains the same: There is no single solution to the problem.
One solution is of course to go to Israel, and this applies to all Jews
unable to exist as Jews in other parts of the world, who are entitled to
feel like free mea. However, one must not forget the coexistence of several
antagonistic currents within Zionism. Begin represents one tendency,
Nahum Goi.'.man another.
[Question] You are no admirer of the Israeli prime minister, but what is
your opinion of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Sinai? Will it help
resolve the Middle East crisis?
[Answer] I have never supported the Camp David accords because I believe
that one of the essential aspects of the Middle East problem, the Palestinian
problem, was not resolved there. It is moreover a problem at the center of
the Arab world of which we are now aware fr~m two aspects: Not only has it
remained imresolved, but no path to any alternative solution has been indicated.
On the other hand one must welcome every step taken toward peace. I would
add: Every small portion of peace obtained must be protected.
- [Question] I read something you said some years ago: "Austria has no
foreign policy, only its neutrality." Is this still true?
[Answer] In the past 25 years Austria has developed its policy of active
neutrality. What does it mean? It means that we have worked within the
United Nations. Especially within the Security Council, that we involved
ourselves in the Helsinki negotaations and in the Canctm North-South summit
and that we have adopted a stance on the Palestinian question--a stance
that has meanwhile spread throughout the world.
[Question] Some people argue that this neutrality is sometimes rather
unbalanced, as in the case of your scolding of the United States, the
friendship you have shown toward the Third world, your supplies of Steyr
light tanks to Argentina....
20
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R400504070017-1
I [Answer] No, it is not true. We have now suspended consignments of tanks
~ to Buenos Aires.
[QuestionJ Austria belongs neither to the EEC nor to any other bloc.
, What is your opinion of the slow and laborious progress of the u,nited Europe?
~ [Answer] There is no doubt that we are in the midst of a process of commtmity
~ integration which is advancing despite certain setbacks--a process whose
milestones are represented by the Council of Europe and the European
, Parliament in Strasbourg. The idea of the united Europe has now become the
motive force of our continent's political pragmatism.
[Question] What about East-West relations?
[Answer] The detente policy is experiencing a very critical phase, but we
are well aware that there is no option for Europe other than the path of
detente. This proves the role that belongs to Europe's minor neutral states
within the context of relations between the two alignments--a role which
has already emerged during the Madrid conference.
[Question] What is the secret of your "minor economic miracle," based on
the containment of inflation, low unemployment and the holding power of
the schilling?
[Answer] It is very simple: Tt stems from the coincidence of the interests
' expressed by the employers an~~ workers in agreeing on a realistic economic
~ and social policy. Despite the rather widespread opinion that such a pact
- is impossible, we achieved one by learning the correct lesson from our
~ history.
~ [Question] You are �referring to your model of so-called "Sozialpartnerschaft"
--a tmique model or restrained bargaining that cannot be exported. Is it
still working now that "Austria Felix" [h.appy Aus~ria] is beginning to feel
the pinch of the economic ~risis?
[Answer] We can in no way spare Austria the effects of the world recession;
we can only r,~ake them less burdensome. For the time being, by using a
so-called reformist policy--or, if you prefer, one based on Keynesian
liberalism--we.have managed to achieve stability in employment levels, in
prices and on the currency market. It is an excellent record, so I do not
: foresee a gloomy future for Austria.
~ [Question] Last, let us examine bilateral relations, which have long been
' tainted by the Alto Adige issue. Have you anything to say in this regard?
[Answer] With Italy? Commercially, things are very good. Politically--
and I must say this quite frankly--we have no other neighboring country
with which, even at the "tap levels," we have so few contacts as Italy.
Things are better with Hungary, much better with Ge rmany and Switzerland.
The exception is Czechoslovakia, with which relations have become somewhat
' frozen. I realize the anxiety that my remarks will prompt, but it is the
; truth.
I '
~I
~
21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540070017-1
FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY
[cluestion] Whose fault is it, bearing in mind that Italy still has to
repay the state visit to Rome by President Jonas 11 years ago?
[Answer] I would say at once that it is both cotmtries' fault. Perhaps
we have been insufficiently energetic, b ut it seems to me that not many
efforts are made in Italy either.
[Question] One final question: What do you think of President Pertini?
[Answer] I consider him an exceptional person: His vitality and resolve
are amazing. I would like to conclude with the following obsexvation:
At one time we were the vassals, a satellite, of Germany and Italy, a poor
, coLmtry and the invalid of Europe between the wars. All that belongs to
the past. Now we are nobody's satellite.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Editrice LA STAMPA S.p.A.
CSO: 3104/208 ~
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PGLITICAL FRANCE
~
CHANGE TO PROpORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 3ffid A3 HARMF[JL
?'aris T.~ I~OUVEL OBSERVATEUR in F'rench 9-16 Apr 82 pP 39-40
[Article by Jacques Julliards "The Siren Song of Proportional Representation"~
, ~Text~ Having observed silence during the cantoria.l campaign~ ~ancois Mitterrand
continued that policy after the votes Kere counted. This in itself was eloquent
comment, however, for it was interpreted as meaning that he intended to have the
parliament ado ot a change in the system of voting for the comin municipal
elections and perhaps (inasmuch as nothing has yet been decided~ for the future
legislaiive electior.s.
A return to proportiona.l representation has long been a paxt of the platform of
the Left. Over and above the considerations of 3ustice which are always invoked
in its support~ proportional representa.tion has the special feature of rendering
the political parties independent of eaeh other. There would be no need to be
; part of a coalition in order to receive one's due, for with 25 percent of the
total vote a party would always receive rougl~ly one-quaster of the seats. Under
the ma.jority-vote electoral system~ however, a pax~ty could very well be defeated
in every district in the second-round voting and find itself Kithout a single
' seat. Or on the other hand, with the aid of a withdrawal Sn its favor~ it could
score a clean sweep--and that was the Konderful surprise that aWaited the social-
ists last June.
Guy Mollet:s 3oomeran~
In summary, the ma.~ority-vote electoral system is the system of optimistic par-
ties and confident alliances, and proportional representation is the system of
cautious paxties and precarious alliances. Whereas the majority-vote system is
to suff`rage what the community property system is to maxriage~ the proportional
~ representation system can be likened to a legal sepaxation--and its inclusion
; (in 1972) in the "Common Program" of the socialists and communists spoke volumes
concerning the hidden agendas of both sides then and thereafter. ,
The district voting system has deserved xell of the republic, hoHever. Without
; harking back to the heroic da.ys of 1889, when its reestablishment enabled Minis-
~ ter of the Interior Const~,ans to smash Boulanger's plebiscitary initiative~ it
- is well--before going any farther--to recall that this system played an essen-
tial role in our contemporary political life by ensuring the stability of the
~ na,tiona.l institutions and compelling the Left to unite in order to win.
i
23
, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL.Y
It is known that upon his re~urn to poxer in 1958 de Gaulle decided--against the
ad.vice of many of his intima.tes, including Michel Debre--to reestablish the
two-round., absolute-ma,jority axrondis~ement voting system, which the Fourth
Renublic had repudiated. In so doing, the general Has yielding to the en-
t~eaties of socialist Guy Mollet~ who--following the example of Constans--re~
garded this type of election system as a verita.ble trump card. ensuring repub-
lica,ns against personal grovernment. Note the irony of history, however! The
ca,lculations of ~he greatest of experts axe sometimes foiled by the quiet
logic and subtle humor of universal suffrage. After having several times
voted for de Gaulle by referendum, the voters ga.ve him the same prize that it
xould give Mitterrand in 1981--a plurality which the operation of the txo-
- round voting system converted into an absolute majority. Guy Mo11et's ba~ain-
child ha.d boomeranged against him.
Without this providential intervention (which Kas lasgely unexpected)~ de Gaulle
Nould most certainly have been unable to resist the "Cartel of t,he 'No's
that coalition of his enemies of the Right and the Left which excluded only the
communists. The minority vote received. by the Gaullist coalition--36.3 per-
cent~--wa,s transformed into a ma.3ority of seats. The way wa~s barred to a return
of the Fourth Republic. I ca.nnot bring myself--not even retrospectively--to
- deplore this development. As much as the adoption of the principle of election
of the president of the republic by universal suffrage (on 22 October 1962), it
was the ma.jority-vote-style elect3on the fol].owing month (on 18 and 25 Nov~m-
ber) that provided. the "second foundation" of the Fifth Republic.
This election put in place what was to become one of the ba.sic pillars of the
systems the identification of the paxliamentary majority with the presidential
ma3ority. It was because he had failed to establish this amalgam on a durable
basis that Valery Giscaxd d'Estaing experienced. such difficulty in the closing
- period of his 7-year term in office. Not that de Gaulle himself adapted easily
to the yoke which he found himself wearing, partly a.ga,inst his xills for
although the system had the effect of attaching the deputies solidly to the
president~ it also tended. to make the latter dependent on the former. De Gaulle
found even the victory of his own party--under the aegis of Pbmpidou--in the
1968 "election of the great pa,nic" har.d to take. It wa,s to reestablish the
indenendence and preeminence of the presidential function that he ran in the
suicidal referendum of the folloxing yeax.
A Fig Leaf
But even if--all things considered--the ma~ority-vote electoral system has
deserved well of the Fifth Republic by giving it the ma3ority, it has no less
well served the Left by giving it unity. It wa,s, in fact, to esca.pe the disas-
tro~is consequences of the existing elsctoral system--which he himself had helped
to put in place--that Guy Mollet on 12 November 1962 ga,ve the starting signal
for. the "long march" which did not beax f~ui.t until 10 Ma,y 1981 xith the elec-
tion of Francois Mitterrand to the presidency. Tha~ day, in effect--to the
ama.zement of public opinion--the secretary general of the SFIO declared that as
' betKeen a communist and a UNR [Union for the Nex Republic~ Gaullist, one should
vote for the communist. Had Guy Mollet ceased to be anticommuniat? Not at
all. He had merely ceased to be suicidal--and it was in~deed to a slow death
~ Compared Hith the 3$ percent vote for the socialists in June 1981.
24
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500070017-1
- ~ FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
that the ma3ori~y--vote eloctoral system doomeci a disunited. Left. The only
courae remaining to the Left was to unite--at least as far as elections Kere
concerned.
' ~zfevita,bly, another 10 yeaxs had �to pass before this electoral "mutua.l aid
- society" was transformed (in 1982) into a genuine political alliance, and onlq
half that long thereafter before the alliance broke up (in 1977)� LWen after
the "era of good feeling" had. ended, hoxever~ there remained the electoral _
constraint and the~ common interest in avoiding disasters the ma3ority-vote
electoral system served. as a"fig leaf" for the Union of the Left and prohib~
ited the separated couple f5rom asking fo~c a divorce. As a pri~s--and under
the impetus of the presidential election--that system ofPered the Left victory
in 1981.
It xas certainly to respect his commitments that P~ancois Mitterrand deoided to
revise the laws regulating m~nicipal and legislative elections in France; but
it xas unquestionably on the basis of a r~cent aralysis that he deci~ied to do
- so at this time. First of all, it is advisable to assume that a mira,cle occurs
only once and that the stupidity of the Right--xhich not long a,go presented the
Left with an unpaxalleled victo~y--will not soon be repeated. In the light of
the cantonal elections one must acknowledge tha.t uhen the communista lose txo
votes one will undoubtedly go to the P5 (out of loya.lty to the I,eft) but Lhe
other xill revert directly to Chirac (for the sake of Pbu3adist continuity).
Under these cirewnstances the Left is ~.nything but assured of again receiving
a majority in the forthcoming legislative elections, and a ncajority for the
Right in 19~6 would guarantee a painful conclusion to th~ preaidential term in
office--one even more pa.inful than Giscaxd's Kas.
It is und.erstandable that Fra,ncois Mitterrand is not very anxious to be the
, first to test the most serious of the contradictions in the text of the consti-
tution--to discover what would. happen if the president found himself xith a
hostile, newly elec�ted parliament. There would be onl~ one solution: to ex-
pand his parliam~ntary base towasd the center, as P~mpidou had succeeded. in
d.oing by rallying Duhamel to the m~,jority in 1969 and. as Giscard had Iikewise
done with Lecanuet in 197~+� Toclay there is no longer any center, no longer
any reserve. The logic of the election process forces everyone to ehoose
betxeen the majority and the opposition. Only a proportional-representation
_ election would be able to reconstitute a c~nter--and therefore a nex reserve
= fox difficult times.
The esta.blishment of proportiana.l repre~enta.tion would otnriously not alxays
have an equal impa,et, depending on xhether it xas being implemented in munici-
pa.1 electiuns or in legislative elections. In the former case it t~ould indi-
cate only that the communists had become less and less acceptable as allies
and that the PS had chosen to abandon them to the unhappy fate to which the
appeared. to be destined, in the hope of saving its oxn skin. If proportional
representation were to be exten~i.ed to the legislative electiona, that xould on
the other hand be a veritable turning point for the 7-yeax term and xould
signify three thingss
First, that the Union of the Left is definitively dead. and tha.t under these
conditions each component of the union must take its chances individually,
unless it finds itself subsequently returned to power.
. 25
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000500470017-1
FOR OFF[C1AL USE ONLY
Second~ that xhereas a second victory by the Socialist Party appears to be out
_ of the question the risk of total defeat ia not. Under thes~ circumsta.nces one
would assum~ that it is better--through the instrumentality o~ p2oportional
regresentation--to ensure to the party the i.mportant role that ~rill safegua.rd
its electoral potential by reducing the possibility of a"depreciati~,n" (ax~d
1ikeKise of an "appreciation") i~~strength.
I,a,stly, that the president has resolved upon (or is resigned to) an increasing
dissociation--in proportion a~ his 7-year term goes forrrard--betKeen the
majority that elected him president and the parliamentary ma3ority. It is
perfectly conceivable that a gartial setback for the socialists among the
voters xould be accompanied. by a continuation of the support xhich the presi-
dent enjoys among the public. It is a possibility that the president cannot
_ disregaxd.
Claxity and Efficacy
"All discussion of inethods is a discussion of circumstances," Ba.chelasd said.
In fact, the belief Ss Kidespread in ~ance that individual election systems
do "wear out" and that it is therefore advisable to replace them periodicaYly.
~ The majorf.ty-vote system--whose principal function is to produce a coherent
ma3ority--should accordingly, after a quarter of a centwcy, be replaced by the
system of proportional representa.tions a system which is less capable of
distortion and more respectful of the equilibriwn of the forces involved. and
of the diversity of temperaments.
Tt is obviously possible to be $educed by this complex of political consider-
ations arLd theoretical axguments. I believe, fioKever. that it would be a dis-
service to the nation to return to proportional represezrtation. In a country
_ of a~luralist tra.dition (in contradistinction to a two-party tradition) such
as France, the ma~ority-vote electoxal system offers the double advantage of
claxity and efficacy. By obliging the p~rties to conclude agreements for the
secorid. round of voting, it offers the voters clea~r-cut alterna,tives and pro-
duces a ma.jority that is equa.lly cleas-cut. Proportional repzesentation, on
the other hand~ defers the problem of a ma3ority uirtiZ after the election aYxi
thereby dep~ives tne voter of his principe,l prerogative, which is to act as
arbiter. It xas not so long ago that the opacity of the existing institu-
- tions, together Hith the fragility and instability of the coalitions, combined.
- to threaten the existence of democracy itself. In that context de Gau11e's
- most important achievement xas not ending the war in Algeria but was~ first and
- foremost~ avoiding civil war and subsequently ezdowing F~ance xith stabZe insti-
tutions--or~ in any case, institutions as stable as the nation could tolerate.
The Left--which had at first comba,ted these institutions~ subsequently supported
them and in time benefited from them--nox has the grimorclial duty o~ preserving
them.
CO PYRIGHTs 1982 "le Nouvel Observateur"
10992
cso: 3100/569
26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R400504070017-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
POLITICAL ~N~
,I
QUILE'5 ON ELEGTION t~tESUI~TS~ P~F PLAN3~ MAYORAL RACE
Faris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in F~ench 9~16 Agr 82 p 41
[Interview with socialist deputy and 'number three' man in the PS Pau1 Quiles
by Kathleen E~?~n]
[F~ccerpt] [Question~ Why hold a semina,r for the party leadership immediately
after convening an executive committee and parliamentary xorking sessions?
[AnsWer~ The ta.sk of the PS executive committee xas to derive practical lessonss
from the cantonal elections. The seminar for the leadership should lead to the
- formulation of specific pz~oposals that xill enable the Socialist Pa.rty to play
its role to the hilt and, in a sense~ get its second wind. ~
In a.ddition to those of its tasks to xhich I shall refer as material tasks and
, which are obvious (the training of the active members, the organization of the
i federations, and so forth), the party has an important role to play on three
- levels--a role which it has, in certain areas, somewhat neglected during the
past year.
_ First of all, it has an ideological role. The PS is in the best position to
expl.ain the socialist program in all its aspects, and therefore to spell out the
ultimate purpose of the ~overnmental action. It is also, however, the only
organization able to comba.t the Right in the political arena and reply-~blox by
~ blow--to the latter's systematic campaign of denigration of the policy currently
being implemented.
Second, it has a programmatic role. We should strengthen our stud.y committees
xhich were reactivated following Valence, and formulate specific proposals in
- respect to economic and social matters and matters concerning civil rights and
foreign policy--and do so without regaxd to the positions adopted by the govern-
ment.
I.astly~ it has a role of mainta,ining liaison betHeen the government and the
~ people and betxeen the people and the government. We should explain, and
deferd, the government's policy but also transmit to the government the informa-
tion~ criticisms and evaluations offered by the French people and by Socialist
Party members.
27
FOR OFFICIA~, USE ONLY
,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R400504070017-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
tife must put a halt to the assimilation xhich is too often observed to occur
betKeen the party and the goverrunent. We must, in fact~ free ourselves from
our inhibitions. This semina,r will, I hope, revita.lize the socialist dynamic.
- [Question] You said--in addressing the executive committee of your party--thgt
these cantonaZ elections "could no~ be xon." Isn't it rather easy to make this �
kind of a posteriori "prognostication"?
[Ansxer~ In our program we had esta.blished a schedule for the "change"s 3
months to ma.ke the urgent reforms, 18 months to carry out more far-reaching
reforms~ and. a legislative session to consolidate these reforms. We ha.d,
hoHever, urxlerestima.ted. the extent of the various forms of resistance to our
policies. Indeed~ the first phase will not be achieved until the end of the
spring session of paxliament. The fact is that during this first period we
have become the ob,ject of dissa.tisfaction in various sectors~ among our adver-
saxies, who did not belleve we would carry out our prograan; amor~8 our Political
friends, yrho believe He are not mov~ng forrrasd fast enough; and among the un-
committed electorate who rallied to us betxeen 10 Ma,y and 14 June and nox find
that their own situa.tion has nonetheless not improved.
Certain errors on our part ha.ve amplified this predictable voter backlash.
First of all, the process of nomina.ting the socialist carididates did no~ always
turn out rrell: certain sections ima.gined thaic the PS label alone was suffi-
cient to xin election. Secondly, the ca.mpaign of the Right-�a systema,tic,
intelligent and well-organized camp~ign--caused. us to react `.n an uncoordinated
fashionc either too violently, which made us appear to be gui?.ty of partisan-
ship, or too mildly, which gave credence to the srildest rumors that were circu-
lated about us. Lastly, the truth is that certa.in measures and statements of
the government appeared. to be inopporturie, poorly prepared or poorly explained.
[Question~ Would you mak~ the same speech today--casting it in the same terms--
tha,t you made at the Valence congress?
[Answrer~ As a politician I have one serious faults I detest hypocrisy. To do
something without saying so is not my conception of politica,l action. For my
paxt~ I believe it is better to explain what one intends to do~ and to say why
one is going to do it, ina.smuch a.s I see nothing xmng in asking for the loyalty
of upper-level civil servants. That's the problem I brought up at Valence. It
is consistently the underlying ca.use--and with equal intenaity--of our current
difficulties. My only regret is that at Valence I apoke the taboo name oY
Robespierre, rrhich by its mere poxer of evoca~ion had. the effect of distorting
my message.
[Question~ Are you a candidate for the nomination for the offic~ of mayor of
Pa,ris?
[Answer~ I have regresented ?aris in the Chamber of Deputies for the past 4
years and am therefore in a good position to appreciate the misdeeds of the
Chirac system in the capita.l. However, it is the socialist party members of
Pasis and. the executive council of the party that xill nominate our candidate.
For the moment~ no one has taken sides. A. nwaber of conditions must first be
28
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500074017-1
FOR pFFIC1AL USE ONLY
met in order that the nominae xill have the maximum chance of defeating Chirac.
When all this becomes clear I ehall make my decision knoxn. I knox this
struggle will be difficult~ but I do not believe it is doomed to failure.
(~irac is conaidered to be a good. mayor. That is ti�ue. He's the beet mayor
Paxis has ha~.for a century--because he is the firet one.
COPYRIGHT: 19~ "1e Nouvel Observateur"
10992
csc: 3100/569 END
29
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070017-1