JPRS ID: 10550 USSR REPORT TRANSPORTATION

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060063-1
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10550
28 May 1982
IJ~SR Re ort
p
TRANSPO~RTATION ~
CFOUO 3/82)
Fg~$, FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATIO~V SERVICE
C~
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NO~E
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JPR3 L/10530
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~ 26 May 1982
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; USSR REPORT ~
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' TRANSPORTAT I ON
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' (~ac1o 3/s2~
~ CONTENTS
, RAILROAD
~ Overview of Railroad Syete~as' Development~ Problems
(Vasiliy Selyunin; DRUZHBA ~VARODOV, No 11, 1981) 1
~ Book Diecueaea Locomotives, Rolling Stock
~ (Vitaliy Aleksandrovich Raknv; LOROMOTIVY I
; MOTORVAGONN~tY PODVI2HNOY SOSTAV 'LHELEZHYKH DOROG
i SOVETSKOGO SOYUZA 1966-1975~ 1979) 25
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~ Photograph of Magnetic-Field-Drivei~ Device Publiohed
i (SOVIET UNION, No 4, 1982) 29
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~ _ a_~ [lII - USSR - 38d FOUO~
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OVERVIEW OF RAILROAD SYSTEMS~ DEV~LO'PMENT, PROBLEMS
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~ Moscew DRUZHBA NARODOV in Ruaefan No 11, 1981 pp 178-192
~ [Article by Vasiliy Selyunin: "Z'he Nerve Cent~;r of the Ecoaomic System"]
~ [Text] The Dery Same
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~ Our railroad transport ia truly the living nerve center of the national
~ economyo Today the railroad workers can be criticized and blamed f or many,
i if not all, of our individual economic failures. According to the experte,
the loss result:ing from unsatiafied demand for transport in induetry alone
has reached more than 6.5 billion rubles a year. Agriculture's loases from
; the same cause ar~ more than 4 billion rubles. And in general there is now
I hardly an economic functionary who does not have complainta against transporto
~ And the criticism is justified. And yet....
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~ Along with you we are ~ustifiably proud when our country reachea the level
I of the United States or surpasaes it in reapect to a~y? important indicators.
~ So it is when our railroads are ahead of the Americana in their development
! during an entire era. I think that the railroad workers of the United Statea
i scarcely ever attain our parameters. Per kilometer of track we transport
; more than six times the amount of freight the Americans do. The total extent
; of the mainlines in our country ie only 5/12 as inuch but the freight turnover
~ is 2.8 times as much. With only 11 percettt of all the world~s steel tracks
~ at their dispos~l our railroad personnel carry out more than 50 percent of
; the world's freight turnover. Insofar. ae theae astronomical figures on
! shipments are legitimate then in thie case the complain te can be directed not
i against transport but ite customersa
; Our railroad transport ia miraculoua in one more respect. It ia incredibly
; economical from the aCandpoint of.capital outlays. It ie these outlays which
~ conceal the profound reasona fe: the very hig~ ratea of increase of a'hipments
and are at the root of the curr~nt d3fficulriea.
~ Although freight ransport legitimately refers to the realm of phyeical pro-
j duction it clearly doea not create any new output. Z'herefore, during any
period the econamics of any country is considered the more effective the lesser
; tihe proportion of expenditures for transport and there ia a correspondin~ in-
~ crease in the assets directed into the construction of plants~ factories and
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housing and into agriculture. Of course, this rule ho~.ds tr~e onlv until the
shipments begin to deter the development of the whole economy.
What assets has the country invested in this key sector? In the prewar five-
year plans from 10.2 to 10.'1 percent ~f all the capital investments went for
the development of the railroads. In the 1946-1950 period this proportion
fell to 7.7 percent; in the next, the fifth ~ive-year plan, it was 4.9; in
the sixth 3.4; in the seventh 3.2; in the eighth 2.7; in the ninth 2.6; and
in the lOth 2.7o It is something to think about that of every thousand rubles
released for the development of the economy only 26-27 rubles go to the rail-

~ roads.
- Whereas before the war th e investments were approximately equal to the inv~est-
ments in all of agriculture, now the railroade obtain only a fraction of the
funds that the rural areas get. In the 34 postwar years t~e railroads ab-
sorbed 57.3 billion rubles--agriculture spent approximately the same amount
in the last 2 years.
It would be hard to even describe the state our economics would be in if the
railroads always "devoured" the prewar ~roportion of the investments. As we
know, in the 1976-1980 period 634.1 bi"ilion rubles were invested in construc-
tion. On the basis of the prewar norm about 67 billion rubles of th is amount
w~uld accrue to the railroads but in actuality they ebtained approximately 17
billion. The saving amounts to about 50 bil~ion. I would point out by way
of comparison that this is approximately the amount of the state outlays ~in
1975-1979 for all the housing construction. We will therefore be correct in
saying that it is to a considerable extent due to the fact that the railroad
workers made do with modest funds that 80 percent of the urban population
will now live in separate apartments.
However, under these conditions the trad~.t3onal methods of development of
transport were hardly acceptable for us. After a11, throughout the world a
simple method predominated: conetruction of ever newer railroads. Well,
what about us? It may appear paradoxical but 100 years ago there were more
railroads b~;t~~ in our country than there are r.ow. Here are the figures.
In the 1866-'1876 period the average yearly growth of the raiiroad network
was 2,740 kilometers and from 1976-1980 the increase, also in yearly average,
was 700 kilometers. In the last 8 years of last century (18g3-1900) the
length of the railroads increased by 2,740~kilometers yearly. This record
has never been surpassed. In our most recent history we see a rather con-
stant decline of railroad constructi4n from average yearly figures of 1,593
kilometers in the 1919- 1945 period to 829 kilometers in the 1946-1979 period.
The rates of construction ahowed an especially sharp decline in the postwar
period. We have already ascertained with you the reason for this; it was
precisely in this period that the proportion of the total volume of invest-
ments assigned to railroad transporti fe11 off rapidly.
I would like to unequivocally caution against a superficial view of the c~m-
parisons cited. It ~aas precisely in the period of riecline of railroad con-
struction that there were achieved fantastic increases 3n the productive work
of railroad transport; whereas in 1950 the freight turnover of the railroads
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amounted to 602 billion ton-kilometera, in 1980 it wae 3 trillion, 435 bil-
, lion, A 5.7-fold increase!
An essentially new solution was found which made possible a manifold increase
in shipments with minimum coats. I am referring to the general plan for
- converting the railroads to electric and diesel locomotive traction in place
of the steam locomotive traction. We have already discussed the colossal
, saving in capital investments. But as far as transpert coats are concerned,
~ur railroads can safely be considered the world's most efficient. Ttius,
the savings in operational expenditures in the 1a55-1975 pQriod amounted to
~ 80 billion ~ubles~
I However, sooner or later the easily scces9.ible reserve for Lhe inc.rease of
, transport had to come to an end. We approached this point in the lOth Five-
Year Plan, although, to be perfectly frank, the program for the replenishment
of transport could have been carried out more energetically than was the
case. In the last five-year plans the planners almo~t made it a rule not to
satisfy the urgent needs fcr the na.tional economy in this sector; from yea*~
to year they eliminated funds not ~ust for the ~onstruction of railroade but
for the relatively inexpensive program for the development of tranaport.
~ Whereas in the Seventh five-year plan 11,OU0 kilometers of railroada were
~ elecCrified, in the eighth five-year plan it was 9,000 kilometers, in the
- ninth 5,000, and in the lOth 4,800 kilometers. Don't think that the need
~ for them fell off. As it is, less than one-third of the tracks were electri-
~ fied and, if we count only the overloaded lines, only about 50 percent of
~ them anyway. ThPYe was al~a a gradual decline in the rates of replenishment
i of rolling stock. Production of diesel locomotiv~es fe~l from 1,485 aections
i in 1965 to 1378 in 1980 and production of electric locomotives from 641 to
; 429 respectively. In 1973 there were 71,800 freight cars made; in 1980 the
number was 63,000.
' The results did not keep us waiting. In the Ninth Five-Year Plan the freight
turnover of the r3ilroads increased by almost 30 percent and in the lOth Five-
Year Plan '~y only a littlP over G percent. In the 1979-1980 period we saw a
direct regression: we shipped less fre~.ght than in 1978. Transport began to
~ retard the whole nat~,onal economy. I believe that it would not be an exag-
~ geration to say that it is today the country~s No 1 problem.
~ Lven if we choose the correct course of action, the situation ean by no meana
be normalized sooner than after two five-year plans. Some other solutions are
needed--quick and definitive ones. What specifically are they?
We are trying to approach the problem �rom another angle--how to reduce the
very need for the movement of freight withaut doing damage to the national
economy.
1' Our railroads transport more than the entire rest of the world and nearly
three times as much as the United States. Is this good or bad? I daresay
' that it is a superiority we need not be proud of. You do not smear all the
i ton-kilometers on bread ins+tead of butter and you do not use them in place of
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metal in the production of equipment. In principle, it is desirable to reduce
the shipments to a minimum. Is this possible?
In this area it is first necessary to destroy some existing mytk?s. There is,
for exampla, an opinion such as the follawing. It ia not surprising th~t in
the United States the amount of railroad transport is somewhat lesa than
ours - they have developed motor vehicle transport to an extraordinary exteat
and this will assume the excess load. Is this so? I added up the freight
turnovex for the two types uf transport (according to the 1978 data). In
the United States the railroads and motor vehicles handled about 2.3 trilli~n
ton-kilometers and ours more than 3.8 trillion. I may add this: pipeline
transport is better developed in the USSR and that, of course, relievea the
railroads of some of the load.
A~other plausible myth is that the territories of our count~y are, they say,
enormous and freight has to be hauled for distances which are inconceivable
in the United States. Let us a$ain consult the statistical handbooks. In
1977, the ave rage distance of railroad shipments in the USSR reached 895
kilometers; in the United States it was 906 kilometers. We are'now trying
to compare not the ton-kilometers but simply the tons of freight transported,
no matter for what distan~e.
According to this statistic, in 1950 the railroads in the USSR transported
834.3 million tons and those in the United States 1320 million. That's how
it was. By 1977 the picture had changed radically. Our figures were 3.7
billion tons and the United States 1.38 billion. We had 2.7 times as much.
If we take into account the fact that our gross national product is ati11
less than the American, then it comes out that for every unit of output
produced we have to have many times greater volume of transport than the
United States. And not ~ust thE United States.
On the basis of th e statistical. handbooks it is easy to compute the yearly
volume of transport per capita. The picture is this: in the US3R--14.4
tons, in the United States--6o3 tons, in the countries of the European
Economic Community--3.6 tons, which includes England--3o1 tons, France 404,
and the FRG--5.7 tons. Why is it we are always transporting and transporting
and are unab le to call a halt.
And the point is this. Although recent years have seen the beginning of a
ma.rked turn of the economic sys~em toward effectiveness, there are being
, generated definite changes for the better in the use of the resources which
can be felt with the hands, so to speak--raw materials, materials, manpowero
For transport resources, however, the savinga are sti11 not tangible oneso
'Itie attitude of the operational workers toward transport xesources is atill
indifferent in respect to something almost gratuitous like the air. This
kind of psychology developed over the decades and the conditions which rein-
force it continue today. This phenomenon merits a fundamental ex~mination.
A simple example. In the United States the cost of coal doubles when it is
transported 600 kilometers. Before applying fio a distant supplier, the cus-
tomer correctly considers, not whether to buy the fuel at a greater cost_ but
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at a nearer source. With ue the cost of the coal doubles when it is trans-
~ ported 4,000 kilometers. 1'he payment for the transport is essentially
figurative: the rate ~.s 1/6-1/7 of the American rate. And the result, for
example, ia that the electric power stations find it more advantageous to
' bring in Sibe~3~n coal from the Donets Basin than to consume local coal. And
' they bring it in.
~ Some consumers suggest a temptingly simple solution: it is necessary to raise
the rates and to incorporate in the economic mechanism the rule expressed by
' the adage; "Beyond the sea a heifer is a quarter kopeck, but a ruble for
transport." Doing this inv~lves no labor at all, After all, in the planning
operation the cost of goods and services is determined, not by the market--
it is generated, according to Marx, by the state. I am sure, however,
that whatever the price for the transport, the planners did not assign it
and the consumer is not disturbed by it. The increased costs will be in-
corporated in the consumer's plan. His profit ~vill obviously be iower but so
be it, the plan for profit will reinstate it to inclLde the new transport
costs. In sho rt, the enterprise is completely indifferent as to the size of
the outlays for transport3ng the materials and finished products to be con-
sumed.
Very well, but how about the state? It is not a matter of indifference to it!
~ However, what does the state represen` in its capacity as a user of the rail-
roads? To plan milliona and millions of ~hipments from above is as realistic
; as to establish in a single economic organ a producta list for all the output
' produced in the country, a list which numbers 12 million typea of products.
Nor has a task like that gotten to be suitable for transport. But in that
' case the real directors of the traneport resource are the departments. In.
~ this instance the manager of any of these can rightly say "The state is I."
i Un j us t Communications
Our administration of the economy is structured in the form of a vertical
hierarchy: enterprise--industrial association--ministry. The top links issue
- the orders, the lower ones cArry them out. The command function is only con-
ceivable within one's unit; in the "foreign" ones there are other commanders.
There are no dependable methods of influencing the partners of a"foreign"~
eparchy. Each department therePore tries as much as possible to lock the
ecoiiomic relationships within its own ranks and to eliminate or at lesst to
limit the contacts beyond the confines of the syst~m. A plant in Vladivastok
; would rather conclude a contract for the delivery of cast material, for ex-
' ample, not with a neighbor who is ~ust an enclosure away but with a Minak ~
enterprise of its own ministry. It is safer this way--in which case one can
complain to the ministry but one can't expect any~hing from a neighbor. In
: perhaps no other sector of the national economy can bureaucratism inflict as
~ much harm as this does on transport.
~ Let us consider the shipments--well, at least prefabricated ferroconcrete.
_ The enterprises of 200 departments manufacture it, each for iCself with de-
liveries organized according to the rule: "From a particular supplier to his
own consumer."
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Ti~e outcome of this I determined from the reports of the Sverdlovsk Railroad.
Construction materials occupy first place am~ng the products shipped. M~ore
than 2,000 cars with prefabricated ferroconcrete go forth from there every
month to a11 the krays and oblasts of the country. Does the Central Ural
perhaps have surplus capacities for this output? No. In turn, the customers
who use the services of the Sverdlovsk Railroad cbtain uw re than 3,000 cars of
reinf orced r_oncrete a month. From where? From all the country's regions--
from the Amur ~o the Kuban' and from Arkhangel'sk to Central Asia, that is,
precisely from the areas to which prefabricated structures are shipped from
the Central Ura1. In one year the average distance of the shipments of
reinforced concrete increased from 720 to 906 kilometers. And for the en-
tire network of railroads it increased during the five-year plan period
from 597 to 756 kilometers.
Attached to Gosplan USSR is an interdepartmental commission for the rational-
ization of shipments. For 10 years the associates of the commission advised
the manufacturers of prefabricated ferroconcrete to exchange the output with
their neighbors and not drag it through the whole country. But it was a
voice crying in the wilderness. In May 1980 the commission shifted from
persuasion to action: it forbade the shipsnent of reinf orced concrete for a
distance more than 800 kilometers. You would not by any means call this
limitation harsh. If, let us say, one department ships floor slabs from
Moscow to Leningrad and another department ships precisely the same slabs in
the opposite direction from Leningrad to Moscow, then under this rule these
- actions do not come under the control.
However, see what has been started here! In the transport department of
Gosplan, I got hold of a batch of protests. They were literally cries from
- the department souls. The management of the Glavtyutnenneftegaz [Main Ad-
- ministration of the Tyumen' Oil and Gas Industry] telegraphed as follows:
''AZ1 the associations of the main administration are located more than 800
kilometers distant from the suppliers of reinforced concrete." All! This
is the substance of the communications. And they went on with threatst
" Don't rescind your decision, they say; it would disrupt the construction pro-
gram in the most important oil region. There are scores of protests like
~ these. Listen, for example, to V. Gusev, the deputy minist~r of industrial
construction of the Ukraine. He tells how the world will collapse if there
is a halt to the transport of prefabricated structures from the Ukraine t~
the Far East and the zone of the BAM [Baykal-Amur PMainlin~]~
And we are after all not talking about some unusual products. No, but about
the most common or specific structures and suthorization was given in advance
to ship them any distances. The deputy minister of the coal industry, Ye.
ICrol', took advantage of this clause in the new regulations. He did not
dispute the limitation set up. The deputy minister simply included it in the
list of exceptions, that is, structures which you do not exchange at the
neighb ors--all the most important products which are now being shipped on the
command of the Ministry of the Coal Industry--crosspieces, railroad slabs and
foundation blocks for forest marshlands and platforms.
On the ministry's comom~nd they transport prefabricated struc~ures from
Vorkuta--to whereever do you think?--even to the southeastern part of Yakutiya.
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I happened to~be in the final points oi ~he itinerary. The raw material for
the production of reinforced concrete ls in general inexpensive; it is the
labor which is mainly the basis on which it is rated. And in polar Vorkuta
the labor is exclusively the labor of the railroads--they have set up there
a regional coefficient for wages and northern additions. ehis means that
structures become "golden" even before they are shipped.
Let us now take a look at the station of destination. In south2rn Yakutiya
the Minugleprom (Ministry of t:ie Coal Industry] is building a high-productiv-
ity coal pit and the new city of Neryungri. According to the recent plan,
, the project entails approximately 3 billion rubles, including nearly 2
billion assigned to construction and installation work. You don't have to
be a specialist to understand that setting up such a.colossal complex in an
uninhabited distant 13nd is inconceivable without a solid construction in-
dustry base. As it is, I found in the archives of the Minlegprom two sur-
prising documents. In March 1974 Deputy Minister V. Belyy approved an agree-
m~ent which prescribed the investment of 80.5 million rubles in a production
base for the future construction pro~ect. Apparently this amount seemed ex-
cessive and in June 1p74 when the same V. Belyy signed the assignment for the
planning of the base he ordered the planners to limit the amount to 65 million
~ rubles. To what extent were these crucial decisions justified? You do not
_ deceive life; it has always arranged tl:ings according to their places. Ac-
cording to the.current plans, the cost of the base will reach nearly .5
_ billion rubles. I asked the deputy min~.ster to explain this miscalculation.
. "We did not intend to set up a base for the entire volume of work," was
, V1 adimir Vasil'yevich's confident reply. "Otherwise the construction people
- would have fussed with it and there would have been no time left for the basic
projects. To save time, it is better to supply the materials from other re-
gions. "
As you see, they are supplying them.
And stiortly thereaftc_r, opposite the flc~w of structures proceed~ng to
Yakutiya precisely the same pr~ducts began going in the opposite direction.
I learned about this from the article by V. Kamenev, the chief of the Neryungri
GRES Construr_tion Administrati~n, in the 1oca1 newspaper INDUSTRIYA SEVERA.
This administrarion is subor~iinate to tYie Minenergo [Ministry of Electric
Power] ar: -~long with the Yakutuglestroy [Yakut Coal Construction Administra-
tion], it is taking part in the deve~opment of the Southern Yakutsk complex
and is building precisely this large electric power station. It is taking
part in this a11 ri~l-,t but, as can be seen from the article, it does not want
to know the neighbar nor equally the corrnnan intexesCs of the region.
The regional electric power station is being built 13 '~ilometers from the
future Neryungri. However, the powar engineers do not plan to live in it
and they are expediting the construction of the temporary settlement of
S~rebryanyy Bor close by the GRES. "Without our ~wn base," writes V. Kamenev,
"it will be difficult for us to develop large-panel home construction, which
offers the most effective solution for the housing problem. Minenergo is now
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"reviewing the matter of constructing in the settlement of Sere~ryanyy Bor a
- home construction plant to be put into operation in 1981."
And this despite the fact trat Yakutsk party obkom first secretary G.
Chiryayev several times argued in the central press that there is no need
for the coal people and the electric power people to erect two home con-
struction combines side by side; they need to set up one large combine in
parts. It is as if everything was decided an8 bureaucratism turned up and
climbed over the same gates.
At the time of my meeting with him personally, the chief of Neryungrigresstroy,
the author of the article which took me by outright surprise, explained the
position of his department to me. According to him, the electric power people
did not in general oppose cooperation. At the outset of the construction in
a joint agreement the deputy ministers of the coal industry and of electric
power engineering declared their intention to set up a common production base
and they stipulated shared participation in the expenses and the sharing of
the future output. But the time limits passed and nothing was done--the coal
people did not build anvthing. And the combine had to instal.l its own home
construction unit.
So that the position is an uncoordinated one. It is not difficult, l:owever,
to predict the future course of events: the power engineering builders will
finish the electric power station and will depart for another place. They ~
will, of course, not yield the production base to anyone else and th~y will
begin to ship parts from Neryungri to somewhere at the other end of the
earth.
As we see, the timid attempt of the planners to bring efficiency to one of the
most massive-scale freight transport operations encountered--let us call
things by their names--the obstruction of the departments. Do not therefore
be in any hurry to re~ oice over the figures on the increase of shipments as
shown in the summaries of the TsSU [Central Statistical Administration]--they
indicate payment for bureaucratism rather than success in the economy program.
Let us look now at the shipments of another large-volume freight--timber. I
will again begin with a history in which I was a witness ;~nd to some degree a
participant.
Timber and the MPS or the Tactics of the Oatrich Wings
As many as 353,000 cubic meters of wood are going to waste in Chunskiy Rayon,
Irkutskaya Ob lasto For the most part this is the best timber in thQ world--
_ the celebrated Angara pine. Tt has been written off as wood and is now
rotting, poisoning the natural environment. Back in 1976 the newspaper
SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, where I work, twice wrote about the barbaric
destruction of timber in the Chuna basin. At the site the then Minister of
the Timber Industry N. Timofeyev was visited by responsible workers of Gosplan
and Gossnab USSR. The minister issued several orders and assumed personal
control of the matter. And whereas, despite this, nothing was done to allevi-
ate the trouble, the events therefore ceased to be under his~, control.
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Why did the wooti became superfluous? For whom was it really earmarked? But,
of course. The forc~er minister attached a large woodworking combine to
~ Lesogorsk and assigned a group of timber organizations to it as suppliers.
But putting the timber procurement capacities into operation was aow not so
~ difficult. Building a modern enterprise for processing fihe wood was a more
difficult matter. And it turned out that the starting of the basic shops
; was delayed for 6 years and during all these years the pracurement w~rkers
duly felled timbero
~ The combine was final?y put into operation. There were new capacitias for tk~e
production of shavings: the latest cutting machines, conveyers, automatic
~ machines. All this in addition to the output. Because what kind of output
' will there be if the shavings valued at 16.58 rubles per cubic meter go en-
tirely into the boiler furnaces?
"There is no other solution," V. Moldavchuk, the gen~eral director of the com-
' bine explained. "According tn the plan, the stoking must be done with saw-
dust and there is not enough of ito"
In the meantime the combine is literally swamped with mountains of sawdust.
I stayed for a while at one dump. Dump trucks kept coming and throwing off
~ the amber�-colored frei.ght and the bulldozer efficiently punches out new ap-
proaches. And two combines can be heated by this product!
However, it is apparently simpler for the c4mbine ~o feed the valuable shav-
ings to the furnaces and, although it is as light as fluff, the output will
; scarcely yield more energ3 than is expended for the production of it. ?n
general the combine remembers well the celebrated tugboat on which all the
~ . steam we:t into the horn. Actually, only the production of ahavings is even
' in operation. Of the four woodr~orking shops one is in operation. An eight-
i frame plant has be~n started up but there has been no increase in output.
~ The reason is the same--there are not enough people. Take note that the sup-
pliers of the conbine--the timber organizations of the Lesogorskles timber as-
sociation--are speeding up procurement precisely so as not to lose the lumber-
~ack personnelo But there is no one to remind them and the Irkutsk timber as-
sociation Irkutsklesprom has not found any better way to reduce the plan for
~ the combine. The enterprise requires ~uat half of the wood procured for it.
_ In short, the Knot around the Chuna center is being dra~~n ever tighter.
One other example. In Ust'-Ilimsk the Minlesb~~nprom [Ministry of Timber and
' Paper Industry] USSR is setting up a timber industry complex. The first
~ capacities have gone into operation. Years and years have gon? by and the ac-
count fcr reprocessed wood is mounting to millions of cubic m~ters. In the
~ meantime the min'.strp 5 years ago developed timber felling uaits here for the
supporting comple~c--nine timber organizations procure yearly about 3 million
cubic meters of output. The upper and lower warehouses, the roadsteads, and
the transshipment bases are clogged with old wood and hundreds of thousands
i of cubic meters of timber are lying along the Ust' Ilimsk--3ratsk routes.
I .
i
~ .
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The timber is rotting and the number of new procurement pro~ects is increas-
ing; according to the plan the Ilimskles [Ilimsk Timber A,ssociationJ is sup-
posed to increase the procurement to 3.05 mi7.lion cubic meters; of these 2
million cubic meters have not been distributed either formally or on paper--
no consumers have been tound f or them. In short, the Ust'-Ilimsk center has
now been added to the Chuna group.
Why the prucurement of wood wh ich is definitely superfluous? Or to ask in
another way: what method is being employed to coordinate the plans for the
felling and consumption of timber?
Let us say we are planners with you and we are faced with the following al-
lotment; The ?rkutsk timber organizat3on Irlcutsklesprom in 1.980 was obliged
to .ieliver to the consumers 21..5 million cubic meters of timber and by the
beginning of the year the above-norm reserves there reached 4 million cubic
meters. This output should be sh~.pped out without fail; otherwise it will
rot. How much new wood must be procured? Very simplq, the difference
between the deliveries and the balances, that is 17.5 million cubic meters,
isn't that so? No. This means that about 4 million cnbic meters will be
procured beforehand�to no purpose. The Irkutskles association is now unable
to prevent this absurdity. V. Filippov, the chief of the planning division,
says sadly;
"I was visited by Leontiy Yevtushok, the general director if Ilimskles. He
asked that we reduce the plan for felling. This timber is rotting and soon
we will be converting into firewood there 200,000 cubic meters of select saw
logs. And I explain to him that this is our plan for the year and I am
obliged to divide it precisely to a T. Let's say I reduce your assignment.
Whose do I increase? The Chuna basin? Thus the situation there is no better
than yours.
From 1976 on the executives of the industry began sending every year to
Gosplan of the Union requests to reduce the procurement amounts. In October
1979 then First Deputy Minister G. Stupnev suggested that the timber felling
in Irkutskaya Oblast and for the ministry as a whole Ue reduced by 1.5 million
cubic meterso The request was a modest one--as we determined with you, it
necessitated in this regard reducing the felling by precisel.y 4 million cubic
meters. G. Stupnev's suggestion was all the more sensib le in that no one
would suffer; the industry as a whole :~as obliged to tulfill the plan for
deliveries to consumers by shipging wood which has accumulated on the Chuna
and at Ust'-Ilimsk.
The letter got to the timber industry division of Gosplan USSR. And, as V,
Shabatura, a responsible worker of this division, informed me, Chey even re-
joiced there; it seems that in Irkutskaya Oblast there are reserves of wood
which have not been counted in the plan. Very good! Let's include them in
- the plan of deliveries and we will not begin to reduce the volume of new
cutting;~ on the whole, we will have more resources and after all, the national
economy does not have enough of this very timber. To put it more simply, we
added another 1.5 million cubic meters to the plan for the shipment of wood
from the Chuna and Ust'-Ilimsk without making it unrea].~stic. .And with the
best intentions,
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The distribution and deliveries of wood are being managed by the Soyuzglavles
[Main Administration for Interrepublic Deliveries of Timber]---a subdivision
of Gossnab USSR. I visited P~ Reutov, the chief engin,~er of this main admin-
istration. We dropped hints to each other and Pavel Grigor'yevich himself
made a visit�to the Chuna. In short, the conversation took place in a
friendly, warm atmosphere and yet I made no mistake as I showed him a Zerox
copy of the wood balance sheet for Irkutsklesprom. It was apparent from this
document that the 3.7 million cubic meters of timber wh ich are to be procured
have in general not been diatribute d; there are no consumers for them and
this output can be removed from the felling plan without causing any pain. �
The speaker~s eyes glittered with greed.
"Give me your paper. So -o, it was signed by Belkin, the deputy chief of
Irkutsklesprom. An official document. Thank you. We will look for the re-
sources; there are millions of cubic meters of undistributed timber there.
Now we will get them into the recurd."
"For heaven's sake," I tried to reason with the chief engineer~ who was dial-
ing the telephone vigorously. "Sure, it's easy to distrib ute the resources on
paper. But af ter all, the wood will have ta be shipped on the railroad. Over
the year you will be able to ship less than 4 million cubic meters from here.
Not a progressive assignment. What sort of miracle are you counting on?"
"The timber is needed. We will write it into the plan for the railroad people.
Let them fulfill it. One must have faith in the plan," the speaker snapped
ou~.
Faith is from the field of religion. And the plan would do b~tter based on
judicious calculations. But let's get back to the Chuna business. When the
story of the spoilage of the timber came fio light, the ministry found a solu-
tion of sorts: since the local cotnbine is not able to process the wood We
will send it to the west by rail.road. We have set up for this purpose a
special office in the Lesogorskles timber association and over it the as-
sociation Chunales. But throughout the years the railroad has supplled at
_ best 80 percent of the planned railroad c~ars. Since the plans for procurement
of timber are b~ing fulzilled more accurately, the reserves of wood are con-
tinuing to increase in volume.
The failure at the Chuiia is not an exception. In front of m,e is a batch of
letters which came in to the ministry. It is distressing to read them.
"I~kutskaya Oblast is clogged with timber, which is becoming wholly unsuit-
able. On t}-.e Iya River in places the sunken logs are lying four deep. It is
essential t~ stop procurement until the perishing goods have been shipped out."
So writes Irkutsk resident B. Tsvetkov. "The timber procured is being made
into firewood. Why should I push it if they are sawing the timber, floating it
and unloading it at the coast~and here it's rotting." This is written by 20
lumberjacks from the Yenisey timber transshipment base. "The timber which has
~ grown for more than 100 years has been cut by us, divided up and thrown into
the scrap heap." This is reported to the ministry by 32 workers of the timber
point Splavnoy in Arkhangel~skaya Oblast. .
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, The reason is the same everywhere~-no cars.
,
I got hold of the data for the period beginz~3.ng in 1970: not once were the
railroad people able to carry out the plan for shipments. Whereas in 1975
the amount transported comprised 142.5 million tons of output which were
distributed via Soyuzglavles, in 1979 the amount was only 110 million
tons.
And how is the transport division of the Union Gosplan handling the matter
under these circumstances? In 1980 it approved an assignment for the ship- .
ment of timber with an outright increase of 30 percent as against the pre-
ceding year. What does this mean and how do you account for the miracle
there?
"No," Yu. Polyanskiy, a specialist of the division which supervises the ship-
ments of timber, explained to me. "The executives of MPS have actually been
pressing for a reduced plan but we showed them that the carrying and traf- .
fic capacity of the roads will enable us to fulfill the stepped-up variant
of the assignmento
"We argued," V. Zubarev, the chief of the transport planning administration of
MPS declares dejectedly. "The plan is realistic if we are diverted from the
actual situation. We will not transport a single log but the requirements for
other freight are also increasing. Moreover, the plan is realistic if the
locomotives dan't break down, if the customers stop delaying the cars above
the norm, and if there are no d3sruptions in the repair of the tracks.
And the speaker went on listing "ifs" for several minutes more. Of course,
life changed everything to suit itself: for Soyuzglavles there was even less
freight transported in 1980 than in unsuccessful 1979. Let's trace further
the position of the transport division of the Union Gosplan. In 1981 for the
shipment of timber it estab lished an assignment with a 34 percent increase
over the.preceding year. According to the appraisals of the MPS planners,
they will actually only be able to transport to the customers of Soyuzglavles,
not 140, but only 110 million tons. The draft plan for 1982 again calls for
the transport of 140 million tons. I believe it is evidenC that as in the
past the spoilage of autput is predetermined. The woodman's ax has still
not been concerned with the trunk and the wood is still stretched out to the
sun by the treetop, but the tree is already doomed to perish without any bene-
fit to the people. And the better the procurement workers begin to fulfill
the plan the greater the proportion of the output that will rot.
No, I repeat: the figures, dreadful as they are, do not make much of an im-
pression. You have to see it with your own eyes. I traveled by railroad from
Irkutsk to Tayshet and from Tayshet to Bratsk. On each siding where there is
~ a point for separating the switche~ from the window of the car the heaped up
millions which somehow lose their reality in the summaries of the reports.
a For kilometers on boi:h sides of the dividing point there stretch the stacks
of wood. Near the point the wood is b lack and rotted--even 10 and more years
ago they could not ship it because there was already no place for it nearby.
The further away from the point, the fresher the abandoned wood. The
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Novochunka siding. The gigantic pilea of abaadoned gooda. As far as the �
eyes can see there are stumps. Among the stumps the fence of a transformer
substation.
In the settlement of Veseloye not far from Lesogorsk I met with lumber3ack~~
brigade leader Vikror Tkachevo A aremarkable figure of a man--at: that time
_ (the winter of 1980) the timber in.dustry had only~ six ~rigades which fulfilled
their five-year plan and one of 'chem was ht~, Tkachev's. You do not say
anything; he had achieved his fame by hie own efforts. We talked when he had
just come in from his shift (and the shift meant time on the road, 12 hours in
all, no less. Near Lesogorsk the timber had already been cut and they had to
carry out procurement 200 kilometers from the railroad lin~e). Completely
fatigued, the brigade leader nodded with sleep and surely must have tho ught:
When will ttiis ~damned correspondent leave me alc~ne. But I put o~ more un-
usual question to him and, let's face it, not a good o~. Why was he in a
hurry to fulfill the five-year plano He had cut more timber than all the
rest; was he new going to undertake to procure even more, and why? He cannot
answer and he does not see what they see and talk about in every household:
this felling is unnecessary; the goods will sell ~ust the same.
The conversation produced no results. Viktor had other concerns--he was pre-
paring a triumphant report for the newspaper. Moreover, Takchev senaibly ad-
vised that I meet with driver Nikolay Gore].ov; he, he said, will send the re-
ports on the spoilage of national goods to all quarters. I looked for Gorelov
at the meeting of the settlement soviefi (he is a ~~puty). When the deputies
learned what it was about they 3nterrupted fihe meeting to talk with the
roving correspondent--he would suddenly come to their aid. But what could I~
' do to help? They told me that at Razdol'noye settlement the floated timber
. had accumulated in a boom and the logs could not be floated further to the
loading place on the railroad--the lower warehouses were clogged with wood
and there was no place to unload any new product. T'he timber in the boom
! rots within the hour--the stench remains even though the lichen has been re-
moved. From time to time they open the water gate and discharge the rot into
the water to let it float somewhere~ And so for him, Gorelov, there was the
, memory of the floated timber rotting three times and being replaced here and
this is no trifling matter--the storehouse holds about 100,000 cubic meters
of wood. Gorelov is one of the natives. He remembers that the depth of the
Chuna River goes to 5 meters. Now there is not even half a meter--the s ilt-
, covered logs are lying there in several rows. How about the fish? Better
not ask.
The reader may ob~ect; but is there narrow administrative authority there?
Yes and, not having from year to year obtained the wood earuaarked for them
by the plan, the consumers begin to cut it themselves and to haul the timber
for themselves. In the Chuna region, where the sawed Angara pine is rotting,
~ the so-called self-procurement workers practice their trade. The rural con-
struction workers of Kazakhstan maintain three timber organizations; the
, Crimean and Poltava organizations send logs to the Ukraine, Mintransstroy
[Ministry of Transport Construction], Bratskenergostroy [Bratsk Electric
Power Construction], Rossel'khoztekhnika [All-Rusaian Association for the
Sale of Agricultural Equipment], etc., have their own procurement
'
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organizationa. Every year they stock as much as a million cubic meters~ which
is comparable with the program of the specialized association Lesogorskles.
This is one region. And on the basis of the map of Irkutskaya Oblast as a
whole one can study the geography of the country~-there is hardly any ob-
tast, kray or republic which is not represente3 in the Baykal region by its
awn procurement organizations.
As a rule these organizations operate in a wasteful manner. On the same
Ch~a the cost of production of a cubic meter of wood goes up to 45 rubles
among the self-procurement people while it is 8 rubles less at the enter-
prises of Lesogorskles. Their production is one-third that of the enter-
prises. But the wages there are much higher and understandably the lumber-
jacks flock to them from the subdivisions of the specialized ministr;~. One-
third of the apartments of the Lesogorsk woodworking combine are occupied by
residents who have gone over to work for the "competitors."
It is hard to imagine a more preposterous picture: all over Irkutskaya Ob-
last there are stacks of timber which they have not bQen able to ship. So
why are the self-procurement workers cutting more? Why not give them the
finished product? The timber people have made this suggestion for many years
in a row but it gets stuck in the supply links. Who is putting the spoke in
the wheel?
"I am opposed to this," Soyuzglavles chief engineer P. Reutov bravely con-
fessed in his conversation with me," and you can so record it. Last year the
consumers received two-thirds of the amount due them on the funds. And no one
here will raise a hand to deliver the finished wood ov~r and above the funas
when the legitimate consumers have not been sat3sfied."
As the ancients said, the world ma.y crumble but the law must prevail. A mil-
lion cubic meters of Chuna timber have already been r~duced to rot and the
next million will take its turn. The customers who have funds will not care
about these resources--they cannot be transported. Similarly, the supply
people will not in gei:eral look out for the consumers but for their own peace
of mind. In truth, if no one takes the responsibility, who will be to blame
for disruptions of deliveries~? The railroad. It is not fulfilling the
shipment plan and you should inquire of it. And if the timber is sold
locally? Then the output is not getting to the legitimate customers through
the fault of the supply people--they have "squandered" the resources.
Objectivity prompts us to note that in the Chuna region the self-procurement
people nev~ertheless once sold more than 300,000 cubic meters of wood. But
- which wood? That which had been lying there not less than 2 years.
"It is not suitable as timber," explains one of the purchasers, chief engi-
neer of the Yesil' sector A. Oshkin. "Still we shipped it to Kazakhstan;
perhaps they can use it for fence boards. Of course, they did not reduce the
procurement for themselves.~~
What happens is interesting: some years they are u~~able to transport excel-
lent timber and other years they have been shipped rotted timber. How did
they manage this? Did they drag the gooda by the neck?
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"For us this ia no problem," Oshikin reassured me. "Every self-procurement
organization is a rich proprietoro We, for example, belong to the Turgay ob-
last agricultural administratioli:. It has its own railroad car quota--I g~t
as many as I need. They will refuse someone else and give them to tne; you
cannot manage without timber.
It's easy to understand how all this self~activity disorganizes the trans-
port work. Soyuzglavles does its best with the transport of the weod procured
by the timber industry. It may have its flaws but it tries to introduce
rational routing schemes and to prevent cross hauls. But, in addition, ap-
' proximately 60 departments procure about 100 million cubic meters of output
~ for themselves and they sometimes transfer it according to the most absurd,
irrational tratnsport schemes. These shipments are alien to Soyuzglavles;
it takes no part in them. .
Let us try to get the generaLized data. Let's look at the monthly plan for
the delivery of railroad cars for timber. Sverdlovsk Railroad senda timber
freight to all the other railroads of the country; this includes 72 cars
which go out every month to the Urals and all the way to the Far East. In
turn Sverdlovsk Ra3lroad receives 15 cara of timber a day from Siberia. Ia
� the course of a day 633 cars with timber arrive at Moscow Railroad but this
railroad itself sends more than 150 cars with aimilar freight to areas out-
side its confines, including even the TAM. And so it is for each railroad.
Of course, no two types of timber are alike and som~ grades also have to be
shipped in the direction of the flow. Iiowever, tell me, if you please, what
kind of eucalyptus-boxtrees grow in the Moscow forests that you can't get
more of anywhere else. With this kind of arrangement there will always be an
insufficient number of cars.
The only true salution of the problem lies in elimination of unnecessary ship-
ments whenever transport is unable to keep up with the deliveries. In the
meantime the timber shipment plan evolves spontaneously-~with minor correc-
tions it absorbs the suggestions of a hundred departments each of which is
preoccugied with its own interests. The planning principle is manifested
only in the fact that the interdepartmental commiss ion for L�he r,ationaliza-
tion of transport, by antQdating, tries to elimina.te obvious absurdities.
Practically nothing comes of this--the plan has taken shape and how do you
bring order into deliberate anarchy? And who wi11 listen to the commiasion?
In 1980 its timid assignments for curtailing unnecessary shipments were 40.2
percent �ulfilled. Commission Chairman V. Biryukov recently frankly
acknowledged in the press: "The experience of the USSR Gosplan's commis-
sion for the rationalization of freight ehipments indicates that in the
yearly planning there has been relatively little curtailment of irrational
shipments." Why? It's very simple--the departmeats are stronger than the
commission.
, Is it Necessary to Transport Coal to the Donbass?
The situation on the railroads is complicated by another circumstancet in
the economic system there are needs that are ao compelling that satiafying
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them r~�quires that we diasipate the already scarce transport resources. In
this �regard we have to scrutinize the transport of another mass-scale
freight--coal.
From the supply plans and from the shipment reports I extracted dozens of
- routings which~ f rom a common sense standpoint are impossible to explain.
In 1980, for example, 16.7 million tons of Kuznetsk, Pechora and Karaganda
- coal were brought in to ~he Ukraine and at the same time 13.9 million tone of
Donetsk coal were s~igrP~ out to other republics. Fuel from the Kuzbasa is
being brought into Arkhangel'skaya Oblast and Pechora and Inta coal extracted
nearby is being sent to ~he southern part of the country. Coal from Ekibastuz
is delivered to th e Serov GRES in Sverdlovskaya Oblast and fuel extracted 43
kilometers from the GRES in the Bogoslovskiy deposit is ahipped to ~umen',
Tambov and Kirov. In 1980 they ahipped 4 m3111on tons o~ coal from thz basin
near Moscow to various points along the way to the Donetsk Basin and instead
Karaganda, IIcibastuz and Kuznetsk coal was shipped to the center of the
country. Tailings from the concentration of Pechora coal are shipped from
Cherepovets to the Kurakhovo GRES (near ponetsk)--opposite the direction of
the flow of the Donetsk fuel. I could continue with other examples like
these.
I recorded only the shipments which are officially deemed inadmissible; for
the most part they are even forbidden by this same interdepart~ental commis-
sion attached to Gosplan USSR. However, those forbidden by one subdivision
of Gosplan are authorized by another link of it, namely the division of fuel
balances and distribution plans. In the distribution of allocations this
division ind~.cates every year precisely what coal is to be shipped where.
Why is this? Ya. Gamlitskiy, the chief specialist of this division, began
the conversation with a question almost philosophical in nature.
"What are these irrational ship~ents? Take note that they are shipments
which one could dispense with under these specific circwnstances."
And he went on to make the simple point even more simple. Is it possible
today to eliminate the delivery of Donetsk coal--well, let's say to the
Center, the Igu~ovskiy GRES opposite the flow of Siberian coal going to the
Donetsk Basin? No t in any case! Kuznetsk coal is lumpy and there are no
crushers at the electric pawer station. Neither the Donetsk nor th2 Etuznetsk
coal can be sold for everyday needs--the first is too fine and the chunks of
the ~econd are excesaively large. At the same time the Mosco~a are-a produces
coal; it is transported to the European regions and in its place they of
course have to b ring another fuel to the Moscow area basin. And so in each
case without fail there are found reasons why nothing can be changed under
"these specific circumstances" and the irrational automatically becomes
rational.
In line with the routings formally banned, the division of balance sheets in
1980 authorized anew transport for neither much nor little but for 95 million
tons of coal or one-seventh of the total. In 1981 the picture was the same.
Authorization was in the form of an exception, as stated in the documents.
But what kind of exception is this if it is repeated 10 years running and the
rule is not observed even once?
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"Yes, you will ultimately grasp the fact," Ya. Gamlitskiy explains, "that in
supply they proceed from the real situation. One can and should ask the
' power engineers why they did not receive the crushers at this Igumnovskiy~
GRES although a decision to this effect was taken back in 1965 and why they
disrupted many other assignments for curtailment of unnecessary shipments. ~
However, it is a necessity today to provide the enterprises with the fuel
which they are capable of consuming the most economically. We are the
division of balances. And in the balance sheets the receipts and expenditures
must jibe not simply with respect to the number of tons but also as to the
' types of coal."
~ I understand. How can one help understanding? But then we will pose another
~ question: are the balance sheets being adhered to? Not by any means. In
1980 underdeTiveries to the consumer� comprised 16 million tons of coal.
Isn't this because transport, already overloaded, is dragging 95 million tons
of a certain coal on the forbidden routes? ~
This would be good even though the consumer obtains the fuel he wants. But
after all this is not the way it happens. A recent survey by the specialists
of the Energoset'/proyekt [A~.1-'1^'~n State Planning and Scientific Research
Institute of Electric Power Networks] produced the f ollowing statement:
"Only a negligible number of coal electric power stations regularly burn the
; planned fuel." It went on to give examples: The Zaporozh'ye GRES uses 17
~ types of coal, the Partizansk GRES 19 types from 12 deposits, the Kurakhovo
GRES 26 types from all the basins, etc. Indeed, the operating schedule would
have to be changed daily. And the cause is again to be found in transport:
it does not have to wa~t till the station is on the verge of a shutdown to
~ be meticulous in this regard.
I Well, the balance sheets are for you too!
I A long time ago Gosplan and Gossnab USSR became aware of the anomoly pertain-
' ing to the shipments. Three years ago in a~oint ~rder they directed that a
schedule be drawn up for a normai freight flow for coal to replace the hope-
lessly outmoded one which is bogged down by innumerable exceptions. Since
that time the Soyuzglavugol [Ma~.n Administration for Interrepublic Deliveries
of Coal], the organization responsible for fulfillment (this supply main ad-
ministration plans the delivery of practically all of the coal in the country)
has already suggested three variants for such a document but the quality of
these variants leaves something to be desired. The draft of the schedule, for
example, fails to count the average distance of the shipments. '
I It is not surprising that the last, the third, variant was also turned down
by the MPS. Professor Ye. Nesterov, the head of a sector of the.NIIMS
[Scientific Research Institute for Communica~ions] checked the plan against
the orders of Gosplan and found that the scheme for rational freight flows
~ included all the forbidden routes. The specialist also wrote about this in
! his report. The official in charge of the preparation of'the plan, chief en-
~ gineer A. Soldatenkov, took offense. In the complaint he addressed to Gossnab
he writes; "The remarks are set forth in an insulting tone which is inad-
missible for.business correspondence. In un~uatifiably derogating the
~
~
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"intensive work of the collective of Soyuzglavugol' on the freight flow
schemes T. Nesterov uses such expressions as 'they ship where they want to,'
'the ink was not even dry,' 'for 3 years in a row Soyuzglawgol' has con-
- tinued its inferior preparation of schemes for normal freight flows,'
etc."
This is the truth. The old professor has the unpleasant habit of calling
things by their names, as for example calling bureaucratism red tape and
not a profound study of the issue, as it,is referred to in the rules of r~-
fined philolog,y. In short, the stylistic complaints of the chief engineer
of Soyuzglavugol' are ~ustified. As for any slanderous criticism of the
main administration collective's intensive work on the freight flow
schedules, they are definitely not true. . In general, no work like this has
been done by either this busy collective or any other renowned collective
of Soyuzglavugol'. Consequently, there was noone to blame.
My conversation with A. Soldatenkov took place in June when expenditure of ~
fuel is of course not as great as in the winter. Aleksandr Petrovich opened
the amber book with the daily record of reserves,at the ma~or consuiners.
The Barnaul TETs had a fuel reserve for 12 hours and the Tolyatti TETs for
18 hours. Nearly all the electric power stations of the Center had reserves,
not for days, but for hours of operation. The electric power stations and
coke-chemical plants of the Ukraine have been operating "f rom wheels." And
what if the train with coal does not arrive on time? Today the enterprises
,will shut down. And what about the extinguishing of the coke furnace bat-
teries? Tomor.row the metallurgical plants will be next. .
Fortunately, Soyuzglavugol' has not allowed anything like this. But at what
price? Without regard for the distances they transported coal fo,r the cur-
rent needs and for the reserve. All summer, until the time came for ship-
ping the harvest, cars for coal were shipped out of turn while neglecting
the delivery of many other national economic goods. There was simply no
other solution--if they do not establish winter reserves of fuel in the warm
months, then there will not be any befo;ce then. And nonetheless they will
not fully succeed in the undertaking. Does this mean that the railroad peopLe
have blundered again? No. Simply that while there are unnecessary shipments
there will always be a shortage of cars. After all, coal constitutes one-
fifth of the number of tons of freight transported on the railroads.
The Institute of Complex Transportation Problems under Gosplan USSR compiled
a broad grogram for the rationalization of shipments of coal and many of thp
suggestions can be implemented without substantial costs. ThQ scientists of
the NIIMS worked out their own draft schedules: with deliveries of 523
million tons--this is the bulk of the coal extracted in the country in a year--
the average distance for the shipments may be reduced by 108 ka,lomet~rs, that
is one-seventh of the current figure. Some forward-looking ideas were ad-
vanced by the specialists of MPS. And there are some other plans. But all
the practical suggestions were turned down by Soyuzglavugol'. In the official
document the chief of this main administration, I. U1'yanov, explai.ns his
position in this way: "The various avenues for the use of coal and the di-
versity of quality and assortment generate the need for transport even in thz
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~ "context of the difficulties connected with transportation. Heating capacity
= cannot be a criterion for the interchan~eability of coal products."
= Undoubtedly the consumers (and specifically some electric power stations, be-
- cause the controversy mainly concerns them) would have to have some new type
~ of fuel devised for them although after all, even today tliey obtain any fuel
they like, only not that prescribed in the plan. Buz the system, which is
oriented for lessening t8e distance of the shipments, would have made the
consumers toe the maric--they probably would not have dragged out for 15
years the fut~le talks about the installation af crushers at the Igumnovsk
GRES. The variant suggested by Soyuzglavugol' definitely relieves the cus-
tomers of such cares.
After examining the draft of the scheme, the interdepartmental commission ~
eliminated some of the irrational routes. But only some of them. The final
variant retained many dozens of nevertheless rather wasteful coal routes. In
them, as in the song, train after train will go off.
What Day Lies Ahead
We have reviewed the shipments of the three busiest types of freight--build-
ing materials, timber and coal. We can still analyze the routes involving
ore, pig iron, steel billets and oil. The conclusion will be the same. As
many case of wasteful use of transport resources as we took the
reason is either bureaucratism or favoritism and anything more.
I think tiiat, as a first step, the following measure would be useful: the
central planning organs would establish transport quotas for the departments
and the latter in turn for the enterprises. Indeed it is hard to understand
why the planning organization, on the basis of harsh allocations, distributes
electricity and metal under shorter limits and employs no measure or norm
only for the transport resource, which is most in short supply at the
present time. It would be better to set the'quotas off against bureaucratism
than aga~inst the current bans on irrational routings and the yearly plans for
rationalization of the shipments. Let's say Minugleprom [Ministry of the Coal
Industry] wants to deliver to Yakutiya structures from Vorkuta--for health
purposes but it then has to economize on other shipments because it must
stay stz�ictly within the limit: the transport resources have been dis-
tributed and there is no place to get the additional amounts. It is wonder-
ful that the movement for ecanomy of the transport ~esource has already be-
gun and h.as begun from below, so to speak, with the customers themselves: .
the CPSU Central Committee recently approved the L'vov system for effective
utilization of railroad cars. The work of the L'vov enterprises would get
universal support if quotas were established for shipments.
A year ago the idea of this kind of limiting was also expressed by many other
letters wriCten to the newspaper SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA. We here re-
ceived some sharp criticisms and, as is not strange, not from the ministry
workers, but from the planners. The director of the Planning Institute for
Complex ~ransportation Problems (IKTP), B. Kozin, considered our idea wrong:
thp result, he said, will be.that the plans of the industry sectors wi1T be
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subordinated ta the potentialities of the railroads whenever it is necessary
to develop transport to an extent calculated for full satisfaction of the re- ~
quirements of the national economy. Zhis opinion was expressed in a letter
to the editors sent t~y A. Zotov, the director of the Gosplan transport
division.
It would not be bad, of course, to also increase the shipments in the forth-
coming period but after all the~re was practically no increase all through the
lOth Five-Year Plan period. Can i~ be that the specialists have a plan which
would change the situation for the better?
Yes, they do. This document in front of ine is the plan for development of
railroad transport in the llth Fi~ie-Year Plan (1981-1985). In due course the
MPS board approved the plan worked o~it. .
Among the great number of ineasures the one that can be considered the key one
in the plan is the construction of second tracks and two-trsck additions on
the mainlines with heavy freight loads. It would have been wrong to at-
tribute this strategy to the MPS management as a whole. No, this is the pre-
dominant direction of the minds at work in the transport subdivisions of
Gosplan of the Union and in science. The IKTP is functioning as the ideolo-
gist there--Director B. Kozin and his deputy A. Mitaishvili wrote as follows
in the journal PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO (No 5 dated 1979): "The operation of
the ma~or portion of the shipments in the future requires the building of
new lines and second tracks." This idea the MPS board also developed as part
of the draft for the five-year plan.
So, this business as outlined is correct and reliable. The second tracks are
increasing the traffic capacity of the road three-fold and even more. 'The
new lines are so much better. However, what does all this come to? It re-
veals in this regard the coordinated character of the planned program. Z'he
development of railroad transport in accordance with the llth Five-Year Plan
requires 40.5 billion rubles even if we do not count the outlays for the BAM
and the metros. We will say outright that this amount is unrealistic. If
such funds were assigned to other industries they would hardly be able to put
them in operation: there would not be sufficient either construction
capacities or equipment. Actually approximately half of the MPS requisition
has been satisfied in the llth Five-Year Plan. And to go about this cor-
rectly it is not necessary to clutter the plan with assignments which will
absolutely not be fulfilled.
But let us assume for a minute that the original MPS intentions have been
realized. Will the transport situation then be ra~ically improved? Let us
consider this. According to th e data of the MPS, 80,000 kilometers of the
network are now being used with an increased permissible load level. And ac-
cording to this ministry's plan, 10,000 kilometers of second track5 are
slated to be built. Of the 80,000 kilometers 10,000 are urgently neededl
If they adhere to this stratiegy, the transport situation will be normalized
in eight five-year plans. If we consider that they wi11 actually be able to
lay only 5,000 kilometers of second tracks in Lhe 1981-1985 period, then it
comes out that the entire program will be realized sometime in the ~iddle of
the 21st century.
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Such historical�periods wi11 not serve us. As far as the building of new
lines is concerned, they will after all be laid primarily in the form of
sidings with an exit for the existing overloaded mainlines. The new rail-
roads will not only fail to relieve Che existing network but will actually
complicate its operation even more.
Where, however, lies the solution? I suggest that we listen to the opinion
of the distinguished specialist who has studied the problems of transport
for many years, the previausly mentioned Professor Ye. Nesterov, a doctor
~ of economic sc~.ences. In 1976 we published with Nesterov an arti~cle en-
titled "Transportnoye Obespecheniye Pyatiletki [Transport Provisions for
the Five-Year PlanJ." In all honesty, my personal participation was modest--
but the meticulous professor felt that it involved more than simple p.r.oof-
reading and he,placed two signatures~under the published article. T'.~e
article predicted difficulties in the fulfillment of the lOth Five-Year Plan
because it was based on an unsatisfactory estimate of the transport factor. .
Nesterov's prediction proved to be correctly oriented in that it confirmed
an important decree on transport already adopted in the course of the five-
year plan--this key economic sector received additional resources.
On the threshold of the 11th Five-Year Plan I briefed Professor Nesterov on
the MPS plan and expressed my doubts about the effectiveness and practicabil-
ity of the proposed program. The specialist confirn?ed my misgivings but in
his opinion the situat3.on is by no means hopeless. Nesterov proposes his
own variant for a solution of the problem. Here is the crux of it, briefly
s tated.
Transport can be increased either by running more trains on the mainline or by
- increasing the weight of each train. In the aforementioned article from
PLEII~TOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO IKTP executives B. Kozin and A.~Mitaishvili declare;
' "At the present time on the railroads there are limited reserves for increas-
ing the traffic capacities of the railway network through increased weight of
the trains." The MPS is in full agreement with this opinion: the ministry
has projected for the next five-year plan an increase of only 60 tons in the
average weight of a train.
This does not amount to anything. The average train weight is now hardly
more than 2,800 tons. By world standards this indicator i~s unsatisfactory.
Moreover, even in our country back in 1935 the Kurgan branch line ran a train
weighing 11,400 tons and successful tests were carried out on other railroads.
Quite recently two locomotives brought a"ten thousander" from Ryazan'to the
capital and in the last fEw months the movement of such trains on the Moscow
Railroad has become more or less r~gular. This work was approved by the
party Central Committee.
And yet this initiative has not ob tained the desired proliferation among us.
The conditions are not suitable for it. A weight of 6-7,G00 tons requires a
station track 1,700 meters long and a weight of 9-10,500 tons a length of
2,550 meters. And the station track length we have adopted is 850 and 1,050
meters. Obviously, the "heavyweight" will not~fit into any one station; its
head and tail occupy the main track and consequently no train, be it freight
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or passenger, can pass it. The aperation of every "heavyweight" requires ex-
ceptional efforts on the part of all the traffic services. When there is
hooking or unhooking of cars on such a train at the stations of dispatch and
- arrival they have to use the main track so that the losses of time for
switching operations may eat up all the profit. If a breakdown occurs en
route all the lines will be clogged.
The difficulties can be eliminated if we lengthen the station tracks to 1700
meters to adapt them for the operation of double trains and to 2,550 meters
when we run triple trains. It is in this and in the development of the entire
station operation that we will find the chief transport reserve. Let us con-
sider this again briefly. We will assume that the next five-year plan will,
- as the MPS contemplates, encompasses the building of 10,000 kilometers of
line b ut not in the form of second t racks but rather in the form of lengthen-
~ing of the station tracks and augmenting of the number of them. Then, by
virtue primarily of a sharp increase in the weight of Che trains we will be .
. able to eliminate the excessive load from the yards of the railroads with an
cverall extent of 80-100,000 kilometers. In other words, we would evolve a
normal situation on all the currently overloaded mainlines. Not on one-
eighth of them, as would ensue from the MPS variant, but on all of them.
Of course, 10,000 kilometers of lines in the five-year plan cons titute an un-
realistic amount both in this and in the other variant. But half of this can
and should be attained. If that is done, the situati.on will be normalized on
40-50,000 kilometers of mainlines out of the 80,000 now operating with over-
loads. Thi$ means that a fundamental improvement in transport will be
achieved in a maximum of two five-year plans and not over many five-year p:lans
as would be the case if we depend on Che construction of second tracks.
,
There is a relationship between the overall length of the s tation tracks and
the traffic capacity of the roado Stemming from this relationship is a strict
mathematical correlation. The more cars app~icable per kilometer of station
track the lower the sector speed of the trains on the road and the less the
average run of the locomotives. And, what is more disagreeable, the greater
the saturation of the s tations with cars the more marked the reduction of
the speed and run. Thus, in the lOth Five-Year Plan the sector speed showed
a decline of 2.8 kilometers per hour and the run of the locomotives a de-
cline of 40.2 kilameters a day. On the roads with electric traction these
indicstors fell off even more drastically. At a certain point of this satur-
ation we see the onset of the so-called paralysis of the road--the stations be-
come clogged, they are unable to either receive or dispatch trains, and ship-
ments cease.
This is ny no means hypothetical. The scientific figures are confirmed by ex-
perience. In 1479 a critical leveX of congesti.on was r~ached on a number af
roads--14.5 cars per kilometer of station tracl~. The amounts of traffic be-
gan to fall off rapidly there. They succeeded in remedying the situation when
they removed the unnecessary cars from the overloaded roads and brought the
stations' saturation with them to a permissible level. However, we al1 know
the consequences of the congestion from the summary compiled by the TsSU ~Cen-
tral Statistical Administration] USSR: in 1979 shipments on the railroads de-
clined. ~
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i What guarantee is there that something like this will not be repeated? In.-
~ deed, from 1970 to 1979 the congestion of the station tracks increased by 35
i percent. If this rate is maintained then in 10 years it will reach 14.5
; cars per kilometer, that is, the amount which led to the 1979 paralysis of
� the overloaded roads. This is an average for the railroad network. But ~he
i
~ congestion is not dis tributed evenly. The transport bottleneck may arise in
~ less than 10 years. It is quite plain that if the key lines are clogged, the
; others will of course not ship.
; Nesterov cori;ectly predicted the transport difficulties in the lOth Five-Year
Plan. I'm afraid that he is also correct now in his current alarming
prognosis. It looks like the stoppages on the railroads, which made their
: first appearance in 1979, wi11 become a chronic thing. We sai_d above tha~ in
~ ~ the 1980-81 fall-winter season the consumers ob tained far less coal than us-
~ ual. Where ~id the fue? go? Part of it was "on wheels": against a norm of
10.8 ma.llion tons for train trips, in September of last year the consumption .
came to 18.3 million. If you consider that the daily delivery comprises.
about 2 million cons, then it'~ easy to arrive at the fact that the freight
was en route an average of 9 days instead of 5. In other words, the cars and
~ locomotives requiz�ed a year. ago for the transport of fuel were already 1.7
times the amount called for by the norm. ~
' Let us compare the average daily loading of cars in the country during the
last years. In January 1980 the number of cars loaded was 5,000 less thari
in January 1978, in February the decline reached 7,500, in March 9,600, in
April 5,700, in May 7,300, in June 9,500 and in July 8,900 cars. These are
the dynamics for 2 years. But the negative processes operate so rapidly
that they are now in evidence in shorter periuds. For example, in Ju1y of ~
last year (1980) the naily average shipment was 7,700 cars less than in
February. Abundant July proved to be less successful than snow-plagued
February!
Nesterov's idea is clear: discontinue cons truction of second tracks (except
for sectors with large slopes) and e mp,loy the manpower and means made avail-
able for the :lengthening of station tracks and for development of the sta-
tions. This variant is patently not one of the easy ones. In many cases the
stations are located within the confines of a city and there is no room to
expand them. This means that they will have to be dismantled and relocated.
However, there is at any rate no alternative solution.
The strategy suggested by the Ministry of Railways does not prevent these.�
troubles and for this reason alone cannot be adopted.
The idea of first-priority development of the station operation received di-
rect and v~.gorous support at the 26th Party Congress. In the review report
of the Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev declared with special emphasis: "It
is important to concentrate on the deve lopment of the s tation tracks--~they
. provide an economical and rapid means of increasing the traffic capacity of
the railroads."
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This solution is, I believe, a crucial one for the next five-year plan. But
tlte matter is of course not limited to this one measure. ~In accordance with
L. I. Brezhnev's suggestion we have begun the preparation of a long-term com-
prehensive program for the development of transport.. Even before this program
was approved by the CPSU Central Committee a decree was adopted on "Measures
for improving the work and for the full development of railroad transport in
the 1981-1985 period." The ongoing five-year plan provides--among other
fundamental measures--for a rational distribution of the productive forces,
the introduction of optimum schemes of freight traffic flows and the
plimination of crosshauls. The increase in average distance of freight trans-
port is to be brought to a halt.
The transport problem must be resolved and undoubtedly will be resolved. It
- is already evident that we are on th~ right track in this regard.
COPYRIGHT: "Druzhba narodov", No 11, 1981 g. '
7962
CSO; 1829/86-A
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; RAILROAD �
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~
, BOOK DISCUSSES LOCOMOTIVES, ROLLING STOCK
Moscow LOKO.MOTIYY I MOTORVAGONNYY PODVIZH~iOY SOSTAV ZHELEZNYKH DO&OG
SOVETSKOGO SOYUZA 1966-1975 in Russian 1979 (sigaed to press 28 No.v 79)
pp 2-4, 212-214
[Annotation and table of contents from book "Locomotives and Motor Coach
Rolling Stock of the Soviet Union's Railroads, 1966-1975" by Vitaliy
Aleksandrovich Rakov, Izdatel'stvo "Transport", 8,000 copies, 213 pages,
with tables and illustrations]
[Text] UDC 629.42(47+57)
This book describes the design peculiarities and charac-
teristics of clirect and alternating current electric
locomatives, diesel engines used with electric and
diesel motor coach tra~ns, plus w~de-gage r~ilway motor
cars,~butlt by domestic and foreign plants from 1966
through 1975. This book can be considered to be a con-
tinuation (part three) of the previously published (in
1955 and 1966) bpoks LOKOMOTIVY ZHELEZNYKH DOROG
SOVETSKOGO SOYUZA and LOKOMOTIVY t M!OTQRVAGONNYY
PODVIZHNOY SOSTAV ZIiELEZ~KH DOROG SO~ETSKOGO SOYUZA.
This book is intended for engineers and technicians
involved in operating, building and improving locomo-
tives, as well as for readers interested in the
_ history of railroad technology.
Table of Contents .
From the Author 5
Introduction 6
Chapter I. Main Line Al~ernating Curren~ Electric Locomotives
1. VL60k, VL60r Electric Locomotives and Their Mqdifications.......... 9
2. VL80k, VL80.t, VL80r Electri'c Locomotives 15
_ 3. VL80v Electric Locomotives 24
4. VL80a Electric Locomotives 28
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S. VL40 Electric Locomotives 29
6. ChS4 and ChS4t Electric Locomotives 32
7. Sr1-3000 Experimental Electric Locomotive 38
Chapter II. Main Line Direct and Direct-Alternating Current Electric
Locomotives
1. VL8 Electric Locomotives 40
2. VL10 and VL11 Electric Locomotives 43
3. VL12 Electric Locomotives 49
4. ChS2 Electric Locomotives 51
5. ChS2t Electric Locomotives 55
6. ChS200 Electric Locomotives 56
7. VL82 and VL82m Electric Locomotives 59
8. VL8v-001 Experimental Electric Locomotive 64
9. VL22i Experimental Electric Locomotives 66
Chapter III. Main Line Diesel Engines
1. TE3 Diesel Engines 68
2. 2TElOL, 2TElOV, TEP10 and TEP10L Diesel Engines 72
3. M62 Diesel Engines 78
4. TG102k and TG16 Diesel Engines 80
5. 2TE40 Diesel Engines 83
6. TE109 Diesel Engines 84
7. 2TE116 Diesel Engines 86
8. TE114 Diesel Engines...... . 88
9. TEP60 Diesel Engines 89
10. TEP70 Diesel Engines 93
11. "Kestrel" Diesel Engine 96
Chapter IV. Electric Trains
1. ER2 Electric Trains and Their Modifications 98
2. ER22 Electric Trains and Their Modifications 106
3. ER9p Electric Trains 111
4. ER9a Experimental Electric Train 114
5. ER200 High-Speed Electric Train 115
6. Sr3A6m Electric Trains 118
Chapter V. Electric Motor Cars for Subways
1. Ye Electrie Motor Cars and Their Modifications 122
2. I Electric Motor Cars 134
Chapter VI. Diesel Trains and Railway Motor Cars
1. D1 Diesel Trains 138
2. DR1 Diesel Trains 141
3. DR2 Diesel Trains 143
4. AR1 Railway Motor Cars 145
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5. Experimental Turbojet Car 146
6. ASla Railway Motor Cars 148
Chapter VII~ Switching and Industrial Diesel Engines With an
Electrical Transmission
1. TEM1, TEM2, TEMS Diesel Engines 150
- 2. TEM6 Diesel Engines 155
3. TEM7 Diesel Engines 156
4. VME1 Diesel Engines 158
5. ChME3 Diesel Engines 161
Chapter VIII. Industrial Diesel Engines With a Hydraulic Transmiasion
1. TGM]. Diesel Engines 164
2. TGM23 Diesel Engines 166
3. TGM3 Diesel Engines 169
4. TGMS and TGM6 Diesel Engines 171
5. TGM4 Diesel Engines 174
6. TGK2 Diesel Engines 175
Chapter IX. Switching and Industrial Electric Locomotives
1. YeLl Electric Locomotives ...............e.......................... 177
2. YeL2 Electric Locomotives 179
3. VL26 Electric Locom~tives 180
4. D94 Electric Locomotives 182
5. ETG-001 Electrothermal Locomotive 1$4
6. EK13 Electric Locomotives 185
7. EK14 Electric Locomottves 187
Chapter X. Traction Units
1. YeL10 Traction Units 189
2. OPE1 Traction Units 191
3. PE2 Traction Units 194
4. OPE2 Traction Units �197
5. OPElA Traction Units 199
Conclusion 200
Bibliography and Recommended Reading 204
Vitaliy Aleksandrovich Rakov LOKOI~TIVY I MOTORVAGONNYY
~ PODVIZHNOY SOSTAV ZHELEZNYKH DOROG SOVETSKOGO SOYUZA
(1966-1975gg.)
Reviewers: B.N. Tikhmenev, A.S. Nestrakhov, B.D. Nikiforov,
Z.M. Rubchinskiy, V.S. Vladimirov, Z.M. Dubrovskiy, M.A.
Kostyukovskiy, A.I. Korolev, L.I. Menzhinskiy, Ye. N.
Rogova, I.L. Timofeyev, B.S. Shvaynahteyn, D.B. ShibayQV,
_ . I.B. Shreder
27
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Editor: N.P. Kiseleva
Technical Editors: L.V. Vorob'yeva and L.I. Shirokogorova
Proof Reader: A.N. Koneva
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Transport", 1979
9887
CSO: 1829/196
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;
,
; RAILROAD
~
~
PHOTOGRAPH OF MAGNETIC-FIELD-DRTVEN DEVICE PUBLISHE~
Moscow SOVIET UNION in Engliah No 4, 1982 p 44 .
~ [Text ]
~
I ^ -
i
i
; , ,:t`�
i ~ r,,~
; ..~M~;
~ ,f ,
' :;i,:'~''' ~
z__
~
~
; [Caption] Work has cont~nued in the USSR on the development o� a means of
' transport driven by a a4agnetic field,. In the phQtograph: a pilot model of
, the magnetoplane designed at the USSR Research, Development and Technological
InsCitute of Electri~: Locomotive Building in the town of Novocherkassk.
~ The designers wil~ continue work o n the pro~eot aad hope to make a 500 kph
~ inter-urban ground service available on this basis.
~
COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Union", 1982
~ CSO: 1812/84 E~
~
~ 29
;
; FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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