JPRS ID: 10547 USSR REPORT POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10547
27 May 1982
_ USSR Re ort
p
POLITICAL ANb S~CIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
(FOUO 16/82)
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a'va~ va ~ ~a.ar~a. vua. v~.a..
' JPRS L/10547
, 27 May 1982
USSR REPORT
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
. (FOUO 16/82)
CONTENTS
INTERNATIONAI~ .
Foraign Policy Views of U.S. National Security Council Aide
Scored
(N. V. Romanovskiy; VOPROSY ISTORII, Mar 82) 1
~Hypertrophied' Army Role in PRC Due To Distrust of Mas~
Spontaneity
~ (L. N. Gudoshnikov; SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PftAVO,
Mar 82) 6
NATIONAI,
Mistakes in Soviet Law Enforcement Analyzed
(N. N. Voplenko; SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PftAVO, Apr 82) 16
I7istinctive Siberian-Russia~ I,anguage Found by Scholar
(Editorial Repo rt) 26
- a - [III - USSR - 35 FOUO]
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INTERNATIONAL ~
FOREIGN POLICY VIEWS OF U.B. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCTL AIDE SCORED
Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII in Russian No 3, Mar 82 pp 27-42
[Article by N. V. Romanovskiy: "Ricbard Pipes Professional Anti--Soviet"]
[Excerptsl The political role of specialists on the USSR witfiin the U.S. govern-
ment machinery has increased significantly in recent years. Richard Pipes, the
author of a number of works on the history of Russia and the USSR, has risen
to the fairly high posit~on of aide to the U.S. National Security Council. His
political posture as a vehement anticommunist from the academic world" is
- familiar to a broad range of Soviet people from numerous publications tn the
Soviet press. Historians also have on numerous occasions been forced to refute
Pipes' at~empts to "rewrI.te" history, wfiether it was the problems of formation
of the USSR, the origin of the Saint Petersburg Union of Struggle for the Liber-
ation of the Working Class, the t:istory of the early period of the Russian
social democratic movement, or the problems of the Soviet and Russian intelli-
gentsia. The present article is concerned with tfie question: What kind of
historian of our country is Pipes, and wliat are fiis views on tfie problems he
cor.siders?
Pipes' frank and hostile anti-Sovietism permeates his statements on issues of
USSR foreign policy. This vehement anti-Soviet is truly at home in this area.
The author began dealing with these problems in the early 1970~s. At that
time he was a professor emeritus at Harvard University and director of the
Russian Research Center. In the United States fie was considered a"prominent
specialist" on Russian history. The scholar's academic position and reputa-
tion were subordinated to the ob~ectives of vigc=rous political activity and
~ backing up those circles who weze not pleased By tfie processes o.f. detente that
appeared in the early 1970's, who needed to incite anti-Sovietism, spur an the
arms race, and build up fear of "communist aggression." Pipes became a very
active spokesmar. for the "anti-detente" school. Since the early 1970''s Pipes
has appeared more and more often in popular, far from academic, publications
(army publications, ultraright publications, and publications directly linked
to special services).65 As an "expert" he takes pa~rt in committee work of
the U.S. Congress,65 attiaclcs the policy of detente violently, and fights for
- a hard line toward the Soviet Union (the Soviet press has already pointed this
out).
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In this cycle of publications by Pipes a large number of concrete issues,
both large and small, concerning the international situation, military aspects
of detente, and Soviet foreign policy fiave been toucfied in passing.
The position of the professional anti-Soviet was influenced b~tfi ~j~ tfie general
situation in the wor13 a~xd by the situation in Sovietology circles involved
with issues of Soviet foreign policy. It is comnon knowledge tfiat in this area,
in particular the question of tfie :;rigin of the supposed aggressiveness of the
Soviet Union (which is greatly exaggerated in the United States), two primary
' schools exist and compete with one another. The follower~ of one emphasize
the "national" aspect ("Russian" motifs), while the others stress the
"communist" principle.66 The debate between tTiem somet~mes becomes quite Tait-
ter. It was that way, in particular, ir, the early 1950's, at the heigfit of the
"cold war," when Pipes' teacher M. Karpovich was drawn into the battle.67
A dispute arose on these same problems in relation to Piges' foreign polt.cy
views.68 It is perfectly obvious that he is inclined to the "nationalistic"
version, employing the following initial criteria: "Russian foreign policy~,"
"Russian traditions," "Russian history," "Russian national character," and so
on. But Pipes also demonstrates an ability to dodge and use conflicting evalu-
ations.69 Pipes' "nationalistic" premise i~ ill-founded if for no other reason
than that the history of Russia is the hist'ory of a country uf multiple na-
tionaliti~~s. Limiting himself to the sphere of the ruling circles and th.eir
ideology, Pipes ignores the true creators of Russian history, the popular
masses, the struggle of the working classes, and tfie struggle of the people for
freedom, people's power, social justice, and the like. In general, he does
not see the history of the people, of the "lower orders."
The same thing should also be said about Pipes~ emphasis. on tfie historical roots
of Soviet foreign policy. "The roots of the Soviet regime go deep into Russian
history, especially the history of the era before Peter," he emphasized in
statemPnts before the sp ecial U.S. Senate Committee on SALT, while starkly
contrasting Russia to the west. In this way he constructs analogies between
the foreign policy of Tsarism and the policies of the Soviet Union.
If we attempt to define the methodological ~redo of Pipes in one word, it is
i anti-historicism. Fipes' schemes and anaolgies flagrantly distort historical
reality. He resolutely re~ects the idea that tfie October Revolution and the
Soviet order broke with the traditions of old Russia, and tTie idea that the
legacy of the autocracy cannot be applied as a key to interpreting modern times.
In general he sees no difference at all between old Russia and the Soviet Union.
"I believe that this idea is incorrect,r71 he writes about Che famous statement
from the "Manifesto of the Communist Party," whicfi characterizes socialist
- revolution as the "most decisive break" with the past.72 Soviet historians have
pointed out the anti-historical, anti-scientific nature of such parallels, which
are very widespread in bourgeois historiography, many times.73 The fact that
Pipes "believes" in the succession of traditions betw~een old Russia and the
Soviet Union does not change the real state of affairs. The foreign policy of
a particular state is determined by its social order. Our pol.icy is a policy
of peace and securing conditions for building communism.
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~OR OF'BICIAi~. USE CNLY
Pipes' preemptory, one-sided approach and refusal to consider ob~ective
reality are embodied fu]ly in his foreign policy excursfons into history. And
they are followed by the set uf trresponsible atatements usually.field in the
spirit of the "cold war" on such exceptior~ally important aspects of Soviet
foreign pol~cy and Soviet-American relations as the level of armament, the
ratio of forces between the USSA.. and the iTnited States, the relati~nshipR be-
tween developmer.t of military hardware and f.oreign policy, international rela-
tions in Europe and on other continents, and muc~i more. Pipes' views invari-
ably correspond to the objectives and fnterests of the most aggressive circles
of American imperialism.
Here is a typical example. The title of one of Pipest articles speaks for it-
self: "Why does the Soviet Union tT:ink that it can wage and win a nuclear war?"
(It is remarkable how this echoes tlte inte.rests of tfie present U.S. Admin~s-
tra:ion.) Pipes' reasoning is based on the same pseudohis~orical analogies
mixed with distorred figures on the Soviet armed forces. These fabrications
h~ve been solidly refuted from the Soviet side. In interview~ with the news-
paper PRAVDA and later the magazine DER SPIEGEL, and during tiis visit to West
Germany, L, I. Brezhnev stated clearly and unambiguouslyq as did D. F. Ustino~v
in his report devoted to the 64th ar:niversary of ~i~at October, that the Soviet
Union resolutely opposes nuclQar war, ~lobal or limited, and views such a mili-
~ tary clash Involving the use of n;~clear weapons as a catastropf~e for the human
race in which there could be r~o winners and losers.74 The inhumane cfiaracter
of statements about the possibility of nuclear war under contemporary condi-
~ tions was emphasized with complete su6stantiation.
Pipes addresses his "studies" in the field of Soviet foreign policy to influ-
ential circles in Washington. He aspires to the role of inen~tor. He cai.led
one of his statements a"crash course in applied Russian history for those who
make policp.r75 PipeS' irresponsibility is boundless. He bases his foreign
policy assessments and conclusions on semianecdotal statements, foolish aphor-
isms, bare statements, and d~.~rect fabrications. Anti-Sovtetism is the foundation
of all his advice and recommendations. Pipes'~"methodology," as we fiave seen,
offers the broadest opportunity for fabrications and distortions. He exhorts
the members of the SALT subcomn~ittee to believe that the Russians, supposedly
because of their national characteristics, have a general, historically inbred
"aggressi�:~n~ss,i76 and that the Soviet leadershtp is trying to establisii the
"communist world" by force.~~ In his blindness Pipes declares that the Soviet
order is "illegal,i78 and not jLSt in the historical sense but even in the
legal sense. His statement that "the Soviet population on the whole lives
werse than it did under Tsarism and in the early 1920's" is equally bare and
unfounded.79 He ia a professional anti-Sc.viet, and a pseudoscholarly one.
~ Pipes ignores th�a ~axpress~on of rhe will of Soviet people and vast statistical
data that testifies to a rise in the standard of living of Soviet people,
sucGesses in solving the housing problem, the steady rise in the level of edu--
cation, the consolidation and development of socialist democ~acy, and the
unity of the Co:~~munist Party and the Soviet people. Pipes' anti-Soviet
fabrications and slander are aimed at justifying the aggressive foreign policy
of the United States and sawing mistrust and hostility toward the USSR among
ordinar,y Americans. Pipes is a historian who has turne.d into a professional
~
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anti-Soviet. 'Chis metamorphosis, it seems, is instructive for Sovietology. ~
Outwardly this discipline resembles an iceberg: it give~ :~~e appearance of
a scholarly, scientific, and objective discipline~ but the underwater part is
the main part, and it is tied with the establis~iment, with tfie inperialist
special ser~~ices, with the most aggressive representatives of the ruling classe~,
and with their policy that is directed against peace and detente, against
peaceful coexistence between states witT1 different social systems, with a
policy that aims at social revenge and a global struggle against communism.
The example of Pipes also shows other cfiaracteristics of this category of
Sovietologists, such as their outdatedness, tTieir refusal to consider the
realities of the contemporary world, and their stubborn yearning to go back
in history. Sovietology is a very dangerous discipline for the cause of
peace, and the example of Pipes confirmst this completely. Pipest conceptions
r~efl~ct the class interest of the enemies of social~�sm, the worldview, ideology,
and politics of those representatives of this class which is leaving the his--
torical scene who are ready to sacrifice the entire human race to prolong
their domination. This is exactly why Pipes is ideally suited for the current
U.S. administration. H~s hostila~ preaching is evidence of the renewed vigor
of the aggressive, unprinciple.d imperialist circles.
FOOTNOTES
- 64. See R. Pipes, "Russia's Mission, America's Destiny. The Premises of
U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy," ENCOUNTER, 1970, Vol 35, No 4; Pipes,
"Why Russians Act Like Russians"; Pipes, "Soviet Foreign Policy: Back-
groun~ and Perspective," SURVEY, 1971, Vol 17, No 4; Pipes, "Wfiy tfie
Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," CONIMENTARY,
1977, Vol 64, No 1; Pipes, "~ovi~t ilobal Stra~eQy," CON~IENTARY, 1980,
Vol 69, No 4, etc.
G5. R. Pipes, "International Negotiation. Some Operational Principles of
Soviet Foreign Policy," Washington, 1972. This was Pipes' statement to
the Senate Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations.
The chairman of the subcommitteP was che well-known senator H. Jackson.
Pipes' "Why Russians Act Like Russians" was his statement to the Senate
_ Special Subcommittee on SALT. Pipes cvas the chairman of Team B, formed
in 1976 as a consulting committee for the Pree.ident of the United States
on the conduct of intelligence work abroad in order to develop a docu-
ment on the strategic objectives of the USSR which would supplement and
refine the report submitted hy the CIA (COMMENTARY, 1977, Vol 64, No 1,
p 21). We should also note Pipes' participation in the debate with
former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union G. Kennan ("Encounter with
Kennan. The Great Dehate. Pipes, R. Mr. X~s Revisions," London, 197;', �
pp 123-130, 165-167).
66. See Ye. Yu. Bougsh, "Mif ob 'Eksporte' Revolyutsii i Sovetskaya Vneshnyaya
P~litika" [The Myth of Exporting Revolution and Soviet Foreign PolicyJ,
Moscow, 1965; B. I. Marushkin, "Istoriya i Politika. Amerikanskaya
Burzhuaznaya Istoriografiya Soverskogo Obschestva'~ [American Bourgeois
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Historiography of Soviet Society], Moscow, 1469. pp 323-376; N. V.
~ Zabladin, "American Bourgeois Ideas of Soviet r'oreigh Policp and Their
Bankruptcy," VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, 1978, No 11, and otfiers.
67. See NEW YORK TIMES, 8 July 1951, p 8; R. Small-S~tocki, "The Nationality
Problem of the Soviet Union and Russian Communist Imperialism,"
Milwaukee, 1952, pp 346, 383-388. ~
68. W. Krasnow, "Richard Pipes' Foreign Strategy: Anti-Soviet or Anti-Russian,"
RUSSIAN REVTEW, 1979, vol 38, No 2; R. Pipes, "Response to Wladislaw G.
- Krasnow"; J. Geran Pilon, "Letter to tfie Editors," RUSSIAN REVIEW, 19$0,
Vol 39, No 4.
. 69. RUSSIAN REVIEW, 1980, Vol 39, No 4, p 536.
70. R. Pipes, "Why Russians Act Like Russians," p 52; R. Pipes, "Mr. X's
Revisions," p 126; R. Pipes, "Russia's Mission, America's Destiny," p 11.
71. R. Pipes, "Response to Wladis.?aw G. Krasnow," p 193.
72. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 4, p 446.
73. Marushkin, op. cit., pp 108-130. ~
74. PRpVDA, 27 October and 3, and 24 November, 1981.
75. R. Pipes, "Response...," op. cit., p 192.
76. R. Pipes, "International Negotiation," p 6.
77. R. Pipes, "Russia's Mission...," op, cit., p 7; R. Pipes, "Why Russians...,"
op. cit., p 53; R. Pipes, "International Negotiations," p 2; R. Pipes, ~
"Interview," U. S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT~ 1977~ Vol 82~ No 25~ p 44~
R. Pipes, "Soviet Global Strategy," p 31; U. S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT,
1980, Vol 88, No 9, p 33.
78. R. Pipes, "Why Russians...," op. cit., p 52; R. Pipes, "Soviet Globa~.
Strategy," p. 32; R. Fipes, "Mister X's Revisions," p 125.
79. R. Pipes, "Why Russians...," op. cit., pp 52, 55.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda", "Voprosy istorii.", 198[.
11,176
CSO: 1800/441
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INTF,RNATIONAL
'HYPERTROtHIID' ARMY ROLE IN PRC DUE TO DISTRUST OF MASS SPONTANEITY
Moscow SOVE~BKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVC in Russian No 3, Mar 82 pp 111-118
[Article by L. N. Gudoshnikov, sector chief at the Institute of the Far East of
the USSR Academy of Sciences, doctor of juridical sciences, professor: "On the
Political Regime in China"]
[Text] The petty bourgeois counter-revolution in China and the degeneration of
the PRC into an aggressive social chauvinistic state and an accomplice of imperial-
ism and raaction is one of the most tragic events of our day. In its time the for-
mation of the PR~ was greeted ecstatically by communists and by the progressive
forces of the entire world. It had completed a long revolutionary process in the
country, and many years of stubborn struggle against foreign imperialism and
domestic reaction. The defeat and expulsion by the Soviet Army of the Japanese
interventionists from M~anchuria made it possible for the democratic forces of
China, led by the coumiunists, to create a solid revolutionary base with USSR
assistance in the Northeast of the country. From here a powerful offensive by
the revolutionary armnies was deployed which led to the collapse of the reaction.ary
Kuomingtang regime that was supported by American imperialism and to the estab-
lishment of people's power on the entire territory of the country, with the ex-
ception of the province of Taiwan and several coastal islands where, with United
States~_help, the Kuomingtang cliaue dug in.
The process of the creation in China of a::~w statehood and of a popular democratic
regime could have been substantially iacilitated by the existence among the ~
Chinese communists of many years of experience in the construction of people's
power and, especially, by the possibility of making use of the comprehensive~
experience of. the advanced socialist countries and, first of all, of the Soviet
Union. Unfortunately, the Chinese people did not succeed in making full use of
the experience of world socialism because at the end of the 1950's Mao Zedong's
nationalistic line predominated in the Chinese l~adership. As for the ueilization
of the experience of the liber ated areas of Chinafl it received a very one-sided
development chiefly through the hypertrophy of the role of the a.::?y i� the
political structure of the co�n*:,~, while a great deai of the posi~:ive experience
in demo:.ratic construction in these areas was later conzigned to oblivion~
.

_ Nevertheless, the first seven-eight years of the existence of the PRC were connec-
ted with dEfinite successes in the creation and functioning of political insti-
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tutions of the ~ocialist type which had been consolidated in the 1954 PRC Consti-
tution, the 1956 Charter of the CCP, the charter documents of the single front
and other public organizations, and in a number of legislative and other normative
acts. However, by themselves those institutions were not able to effectively
oppose the "cultural revolution" which was carried out by the extremist wing of the
- Chinese leadership headed by Mao Zedong and which subordinated the armed forces to
itself. This revolutionary change was possible because of a special position of
the army in Chinese society and in the Ct-,inese state.
In China, the army is not merely a part of the state apparatus, along, for exam~le,
with administrative agencies, the courts, and so forth, but the officially de-
clared basis of the state. The army was long ago declared to be a mode~ for all
of society which is:steadily being militarized. This position of the army is
~ partially connected with its special role in the Chinese revolution: During the
course of the long struggle of the armed revolution with the armed counter-
revolution, the revolutionary army frequent~.y became the creator of party and publie
organizations and of agencies of people's power. A c~ntralized army organization
of the revolutionary forces arose much earlier than the centralized state system.
Beginning with the middle of the 1930's the top leadership of the CCP ccincided
in personnel with the co~and and political leadership of the army. The Military
Council (Military Commission) of the CC of the CCP occupied the position of the
' leading body in the party hierarchy.l In addition, the position of the army in
China was influenced by the militarist tradi::ions of the past, a fact which has
been admitted by the leaders of the CCP themselves. [1] But all of this in and
of itself did not yet predetermine the preservation of the traditions of mili-
tarization in the administration of the country anci in its life, including the
army's special position in the state. The pr.eservation of the special position of
' the army was a matter of interest, above all, for Mao Zedong who, like almos.t every
petty liourgeois political leader, gravitated toward military methods of the admin-
istration of the state and society. The "cultural revolution" was a st.izure of
power in the country by the most extremist and chauvinist wing of the Chinese
leadership which intended to make use of the enormous organizational and
mobilization possibilities of the new system for the historically most rapid
_ achievement of hegemonist Great Han ends. As a result of the "cultural revolu-
tion," popular democracy in China was in fact eliminated as a political regime and
replaced by a military democratic dictatorship of the social chauvinistic Mao
Zedong group.
At the same time, it should be noted that the "cultural revolution" was not a one-
time act, but the completion of a process of the seizure of power by the above-
named group. The process itself which reflected the struggle of two lines in the
leadership of the CCP had begun at the end of the 1950's, but its prehistory goes
back to the 1930's when Mao Zedong and his minions succeeded in striking the first
- serious blow against the party's internationalist forces. After the formation of
the CCP Gao Gang was removed from office and then killed, and this was followed
- by a campaign of the slaughter of cadres in connection with the struggle against
the "anti-party bloc of Gao Gang-Rao,Shushi" (1953), the campaign of struggle
a~ainst the so-called right-wing bourgeois elements (1957), and the punishment of
Peng Dehua, Zhang Wentian, and others (1959). As a result, the internationalist
forces in the CCP were greatly weakened. �
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During the noisy politi~al campaigns which followed one after another and which
were accompanied by mass repressia*?s, the Maoists in practice had demonstrated
their hostility to the real power of the people, their distrust in its creative
abilities and initiative and energy, and an open fear of the people's will. Be-
ginning with the end of the 1950's th~ere began to grow bureaucratic distortions
in the state and party apparatus of the PRC which were expressed in an endeavor
to militarize state and social life, to create a single hierarchical apparatus for
the administration of state and society, nullify the role of representative
bodies, emasculate the law, discredit the experience of the construction of social-
ism in the USSR and other socialist countries, and so fo~th. At the same time,
although they were subjected to strong distortion, formally the basic political
institutions of the PRC were preserved and could be used by forces in opposition
= to Mao Zedong.
This became especially clear when Mao Zedong entered into conflict with Liu ~
Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping ~ho were trying to carry out a great power policy without
the crazy ideas characteristic of Mao Zedong of the type of the failed "Great
Leap Forward" (1958-1959z and with the use of rational methods of administration
and economic management.~ Most of the cadres of the local and central apparatus
of the state, party, and public organizations were on the side of these leaaers.
Seeing that the real power was slipping out of his hands, Mao,Zedong at the head
of a group of close associates resorted to a monstrous action--the scrapping of
the constitutional bodies of the state and the charter bodies of the CCP ar~d of
public organizations. This scrapping was carried out by "support troops of the
leftists" who had been worked over psychol~gically in the Maoist spirit and youth
shock detachments of pupils which had been created outside of the framework of
the party and Komsomol, by young workers and employees--the Hongweibing ("Red
Guards")--who had been corrupted under the influence of Maoist prupaganda and
detachments of the Tiaofan ("Rebels") which joined them at the end of 1966 and
were active only at the first stage of the coup, later yielding their place to
soldiers.
The purpose of the coup was to have wider reprisals against the real and potential
(and sometimes imaginary) political opponents of Mao Zedong and his ent~urage. As
a result of the coup, not only was a new political regime created, but also a new
power mechanism which was alienated from society and in all of its elements
obedient to the working group. The army was becoming its chief component part.
The communist party was not eliminated altogether, but under the sign bearing its
name a new political organization was created--the uncomplaining executor of tre
designs of the "Great Helmsman," as Mao Zedong began to be named at that time in
the PRC official press. A similar fate was prepared for public organizations.
Both with rega.rd to the methods of its formation and to the methods of 3ts work,
the state apparatus became completely isolated from the people. But this is not
all--the coup led to a change in the state's basic goal which previously had been
formulated as the construction of a. socialist scciety. Now, although the
socialist slogans were not removed, the chief goal became the creation of a
mil.itarist power capable of making a claim at first to regional and, then, to
world hegemony.
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A military bureaucratic regime was established in China which was characterized
above all by the a1l-penetrating militari~ation of state and social life that
manifested itself in the ruling elite having its basis in the army and in the
training of the basic cadres of the power apparatus through the People's L~bera-
tion Army of China, in the spreading of the army system to labor processes, the
militarization of education, the universal establishment of a military-command
style in the work of state institutions and public organizations, and so forth.
This regime was also characterized by a bureaucratic isolation from the massF~s,
the complete ignoring of the will of the people, and an emphasis in rhe perfor-
mance of administration on a vast "ganbu" strata--professional bureaucrats
strictly subordinated on the vertical and se~ected through an especially
established procedure.
The establishment of a military bureaucratic regime in China was facilitated by
a mmmber of factors. Cultural backwardness, the preservation af feudal and
sem~-feudal traditions, and also, to a certain extent, the ideological influence
of militarist cliques which had L�~~en dominant for a long ~ime, and the influence
of China-centric ideas--all of this taken together facilitated the introduction
of military bureaucratic methods of administerxng the country and the suppression
and dispersal of democratic institutions.
At the same ti.me, the establishment of a military bureaucratic dictatorship in
China was not an inevitable consequence of the social conditions in which the
People's Revolution had been victorious in that country; indeed, it contra-
dicted the paths for the transformation of society which had been chos~n by the
Chinese people.
The consolidation and development of the gains of the revolution and rapid pro-
gress towards soci.~Iism could have been brought about by such factors as fidelity
by the leadership of the CCP to Marxism-Leminism, a stren~thening of the prole-
tarian character of power, and close relations and fraternal friendship with the
CPSU and USSR and with all of the socialist countries and Marxist-Leninist
parties, and with the world socialist system. However, the operation of these
factors was artificiaJly cut short by Mao Zedong and his followers. The death
of Mao Zedung, th~ departure from China's political scene of his closest en-
' tourage ("The Band of Four"), and definite changes in the life of the country and
in its political system did not, unfortunately, lead to the restoration of the
operation of these factors and, consequently, to d change in the political regime
among whose basic criteria are the character of the party, its role and policies
in society, the operational methods of state power, the r.eal possibility for.the
use of their rights and freedoms by the workers, and the state's foreign policy
orientation. [2]
Measures to create an effective apparatus for administering the state and society
have become an 3.mportant part of the domestic political course of the present
Chinese leadership. In additi~n, the path has been chosen of the fo:mal restora-
tion of the basic institutions of the political system which existed in the early
1960's, with the simultaneous elimination of a number of state and public in5ti-
tutions w':.Lch served Mao Zedong and his "orthodox" followers as weapons in their
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struggle for power and which were created by them during the course of or after
t11e "cultural revolution"; for example, the "revolutionary committees," the
~.nited apparatus of the party committees and administrative agencies, "depart-
ments for the struggle against capitalist roaders" in the public securi'cy
agencies, "schools of the Seventh of May," "theoretical detachments," the city
"workers' militia," and so f~rth. It is necessary to observe that some of the
tendencies of a return to the previous political system had already taken shape
during Mao Zedong's life: Thus, already in 1969 the restoration had begun of the
structure of the party whose committees and organizations, with the exception of
those in the army, had been smashed during the period of the "cultural revolution";
in the early 1970's the elimination was begun of +the "gongqianfa"--united puni-
tive agencies of the time of the "cultural revoli�~tion" which combined the functions
of ~ecurity, procura*.,or, and court agencies--and ~udicial agencies began to be
restored; in 1973 trade union, women's, and youth organizations which had been
dispersed in 1966 were restored to the provincial level, and so forth.
China's post-Mao Zedong leadership has accelerated this process and, at the same
time, has resolutely eliminated all of the political institutions which were
� created by its "orthodox" opponents. By the beginning of the 1980's, in its
organizational forms, the political system of the PRC had ceased to differ
essentially from that which existed before the "cultural revolution." Of the
component parts of the political system of the PRC, the greatest importance is
being received by the state apparatus which has the respons~,bility for the
basic part of the work to carry out the ambitious program of "four moderniza- ~
tions."3 At the same time, thi~ program has also been put at the center of the
work of the CCP and of public organizations. The new Chinese legislation is also
directed in the first place at its realization. [3]
A strengthening of the foundations of the political regime which is being formPd
is the basic content of the political-juridical processes which are taking place
in China. Above all, this is being served by the measures of the Chinese
leadership aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the sta*_~ apparatus and
strengthening the entire state machine and, especiaiiy, the agencies of security,
of the procurator's office, and of the courts. This bureaucratic apparatus is
formally based on definite legal norms which, in fact, serve as an external cover
for the repressive essence of the regime. In practice, the chief criterion for
the adoption by the political-juridical agencies of decisions cnntinues to be
the Maoist conception of the "correct resolution of contradictions within the
people" which permits anbitrariness in determining who should be put in the
category of "enemies.'t In establishing an alliance with the world imperialist
bourgeoisie which is aimed against world socialism, the Chinese leaders are
shifting their blow from the "remnants of the old exploiting classes" to
"counter-revolutionary" and "enemy agents" among whom are usually numbered
ideological and political opponents;of the authorities, and also everybody who
does not suit them. The trial of the "counter-revolutionary groups" of Ling
Biao and Qiang Qi was a typical example of judicial reprisals and the gluing of
arbitrary labels upon political opponents. [4]
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The repressive activities of the state apparatus are supplemented by corresponding
~ actions by the.armed forces which the post-Mao Zedong leadership also rsgards as
the chief support of the regime. Official Chinese reports have spoken many times
about thF use of regular army forces and units o~ the People's 1~Iilitia (fi~n-
bing) to "instill order," and, particularly, to suppress protest actions againsr
the polici~~s of the authorities. At an All-Chinese Conference on the Establish-
u.ent of Pub~ic Order in the Cities (November 1979) which was called by the
Beijing leadership the "special role" of the army in "establishing order in the
localities" was emphasized. [5] Concealing the punitive functions of the army
with the slogan of "the unity of the army and the people," Chinese propaganda
points to the necessity of making use of it in order to "consolidate a politi�-
cal situation of stabiiity and solidar~ty" and in order to "overcome difficult~ies"
in realizing the "four modernizations" program. [6] Translated from the
langua~e of propaganda, this means a more active use of the armed forces to
suppress dissatisfaction with the actions of the Chinese leaders.
On the whole, the present Beijing regime is characterized by a shift from the
amorphous Mao Zedong "line of the masses" to organized forms of carrying out
repressions which are stipulated by legislative acts which, in the words of the
Chinese press, are a"powerful weapon for striking against all counter-revolu-
tionary and criminal elements." [7] At the same time, despite procedural norms
which have bc~en introduced in a formal manner, the political process of present-
day China does not exclude punishment at mass kangaroo courts which represent a
violation of the elementary norms of legality. During the present period especial
attention is being devoted to the "regulation" of the agencies of public security
from which the demand is being made that they "turn the punitive sword of the
a~encies of the dictatorship" against various kinds of people who are united by
the labels of "counter-revolutionaries," "enemy agents," and also "class enemies."
Criminals whose numbers, according to the official data, have increased compared
to the beginning of the 1960's by 10 times are numbered by the Bzijing leadership
in the latter category.
During the course of this political maneuvering and struggle for power the
Chines~e elite made use in its interests of a widely advertised campaign for the
"democratization" of political life. However, soon after the consolidation of
the positions of one of the groups of Chinese leadership (the Deng Xiaoping
group) a process of the iiirensive curtailment of formal democracy began. In fact,
taking place in China is a strengthening of a far-flung system of all-embracing
control by the s~ate apriaratus over society. In order to consolidate the regime
tise is being made of th.e previously existing "cultural-revolution" and newly formed
security committees under the leadership of the agencies of public security
and posts at enterprises and institutions, and population committees and groups
which have been put under the control of neighborhood offices whose activities
are also controlled by the agencies of public security. Thus, a mechanism for the
control of the population is functioning which is analogous to the old Chinese
and Kuomingtang "baojia" system which was organized on the baGis of mutual
guaranty.
Simultaneously with the measures to strengthen the effectiveness o~ the state
apparatus, includicig the punitive policy being carried out by it, tne Beijing
leadership has also taken definite measures with respect to the CCP.
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After the death of Mao Zedong a..^.d the overthrow of the "Four" of his clr~sest
henchmen, the Chinese leadership took certain steps to increase t.`.~ yarty's
effectiveness as an implement for the realization of its political program.
These steps include a definite revival of ttie organizational life of the party,
the reforming of its leading bodies, the restoration of the branch sections of
the local party apparatus, greater attention to the issues of studies, and so
forth. However, the basic mass of party members in fact do not takQ part in the
activities of the party; this work is performed by narrow leadii~g groups in the
center and in the localities. Most of the members of the CCP .:re characterized
by a state of ideological stagnation, passivity, disorientation, and a lack of
understanding of the changes taking place. On the whole, the CCP at the present
time is ill-matched organizationally and ideologically, and, as before, a
po:.itical organization which is divided into factions and united and incited by
nationalistic aspirations. Certain steps by the.present Chinese leadership in
the direction of the "democratization" of intra-party life, and a formal return
to certain ~f the ideas of the Eighth CCP Congress (1956) should not be mis-
leading. Neither organizationally nor politically doe~ the CCP represent the
vanguard of the working class. Even after the death of Mao Zedong, the leader-
ship of this party proved to be incapable of returning to the ideological and
political platform of Marxism-Leninism. [8]
Striving to expand the regime's social base and to attract wider strata of Chinese
in the PRC and abroad into the realization of the "four modernizations" progr`m,
the Chinese leadership has galvanized the organization of a united front--the
People's Political Consultation Council of China (PPCCC). The Beijing leaders
gave it the task of uniting on a broad nationalistic platform "all of the forces
which could be united." The nationalistic bloc which is being created on the
basis of the organization of a united front has the task, according to the plans
of the Beijing leaders, also of serving for the unification on the international
arena "with all of the forces with which it is possible to unite in order to form
the broadest united front of struggle againsi hegemonism." In fact, this means
the incitement of hostility toward the Soviet Union, socialist Vietnam, and world
socialism as a whole.
The new charter of the PPCCC which was adopted by the first session of its All-
Chinese Committee of the Fifth Convocation (February-March 1978) has consolidated
the course aimed at a broader representation of the Chinese bou:?eoisie in the
agencies of the united front and the allowance of an illusory political pluralism
under the newly dragged out slogan of the "prolonged coexistence and mutual
control" of the CCP and the so-called "democratic" parties. It is not accidental
that the membership of the All-Chinese Committee of the PPCCC of the Fifth Convo-
cation included a substantial number of representatives, who had been invited
by the Beijing le3dership, of foreign (also from Hong Kong and Macao)
Chinese and "patriotic figures" wiio occupy half of the seats in the supreme body
of the united front. At the same time, the mass public organizations (trade
union, youth, and women's) were represented by only five percent of the delegates
to the Al1-Chinese Committee of the PPCCC.
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~ At the second session of the All-Chinese Committee of the PPCCC whi~h took place
in June-July 1979 the framework of the "revolutionary united front" was ex-
panded through the inclusion in it of all Chinese, regardless of citizenship
("all who love their homeland"). It was takea even further to the right by the
decisions of the C~nference on the Work of the United Front which was held in
August-September 1~79. At the conference the front was declared to be "a broad
political alliance of all socialist toilers, patriots who support socialism, and
patriots who favor the rEUnification of the homeland." [9] The very name af
the front was changed--it began to be called the "Revolutionary Patriotic Front."
In addition, mention is no longer made of what had earlier been recorded regarding .
- its being "under the leader~,hip of the working class and based on the alliance
of the working class and pea~:antry." Moreover, according to the new definition
of the front's composition, in order to become a member of it it is not even
necessary to acknowledge socialism as a political platform. The chief goal of
this organization is becoming the search for contacts with the Taiwan adminis-
tration and the enli$tment in the "four modernizations" not only of the domestic,
but also of the foreign Chinese bourgeoisie, the Chinese bourgeoisie of Hong Kong
and Macao. The Beijing leaders are attempting through the united front to
make use of its capital, experience, and knowledge for the realization of their
ambitious programs. Serious modifications in the politics of the united front
have led the Chinese leadership to the conclusion that it is necessary to review
the charter of the PPCCC which�was adopted in 1978. A commission for the develop-
ment of a new charter was created at the third session of the All-Chinese
Committee of the PPCCC in September 1980.
The modified policy of the united front is a part of a broad maneuver by the
Chinese leadership to strengthen the social base of the regime. This maneuvering
includes the removal of labels from the "black categories" of the population
(for example, from the former landowners and kulaks), and a flirtation with the
intelligentsia which is declared to be a"part of the proletariat." In the
policies with respect to the working class and peasantry a reorientation toward
its wealthier strata (skilled workers, wealthier peasants) is obvious. China's
ruling elite is not orienting itself, as i.n the recent past, toward the pauperized
masses of the urban and rural poor who are interested in equal distribution.
These masses continue to be a destabilizing factor in the domestic political
situation of the country. ~
This is all the more reason why the Chinese leadership is di.recting serious
attention toward the organizations of mass support for the regime and the ideolo-
gical brainwashing of the masses which under China's conditions are the trade
unions, the~youth, and women's organizations. At the same time, mass organizations
which were engendered or galvanized by the "cultural revolution" have been removed
from the political arena: For example, such organizations as the Hongweibings
and Jiaofan, the "conferences of representatives of the revolutionary workers,"
and the "alliances of bottom middle and poor."
The effecting in the interests of the ruling elite of the restoration to the
national level of the mass public organizations which existed before the "cultural
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revolution" has been accompanied by a criticism of the poiicies of the "Band of ~
Four" with respect to these organizations. At the Ninth All-Ck~inese Congress of
Trade Unions (October 1978) which tnok p?:,:e more than 20 yEacs after the con-
vocation of the preceding congress, the All-Chinese Federati.on of Trade Union~
which had been dissolved in December 1966 was recreated. Tne Maois~ s~~ps in ~
- its documents were combined with the re~ection of certain unpopular trade union
work methods which had become implanted during the time of Mao Zedong, and by
the restoration of the trade unions' tasks in organizing rest and improving the
well-being of the workers.~
However, in the chief things the present Chinese leaders are continuing Mao
Zedong's course of the "politicalization" af the trade unions; tha4 ir~, ~ne
subordination of all of their activitie~ to a single task--the ir.troduction among
the masses of the ideology and politics of modified Maoism. An rinalysis of the
directions of the present work of China's trade unions shows tha�~ in the basic
spheres of their activities they remain in Maoist positions.
The interest on the part of the Chinese leadership in organizing relations with
various strata and groups of the population, and its attempt to expand and cc~n-
solidate social support for the regime has alse been reflected in the materi:.~ls
of the congresses and activities of the women's and youth organizations.5 Th~is ~
bears witness to attempts by the Bei3ing leadership to list the~a strata and~:
groups in active participation in production work and public political activi,L-ies~
under the slogan of the "creation of a mighty China." The B~ijing leadership is
imposing modified Maoism as the "theoretical" basis of the activities of public
organizations and is attempting to consolidate the basic theses of the Maoist
political course as their long-term program orientation. The public organizatians
of the PRC are now acting as transmitters of the chauvinist and hegemonist
policy of Beijing.
As a result of the correction of a number of political and economic "excesses" of
the Mao Zedong course, the present modified Maoist regime is growing stronger.
Within the country its greatest strength is being used by the ruling elite for
the realization of its ambitious programs, and outs~;de of it in order to exacer-
bate the confrontation between China and the USSR and its allies and to deepen
Beijing's military-political alliance with world imperialism. [10] Such is
the foreign golicy orientation of the Beijing regime.
~
On the whole, despite certain changes of a"facade" nature, the political regime
in China essentially represents a modernized model of a military bureaucratic
dictatorship. There is every reason to suppose that its repressive character
will not only continue in the future, but will grow more cruel as the difficulties
- increase in implementing the Beijing leadership's ambitious plans connected witti
the creation of a mighty militarist power.
FOOTNOTES
1. There is good reason why, at the present time, the post of chairman of this
body is occupied by the actual head of the Beijing regime Deng Xiaoping.
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2. As is clear from the materiala which were published during the time of the
"cultural revolution,'' Liu Shaoc~i, in addit~ony did not agree with the policy
open confrontation with the USSR.
3. The program of the attainment by China of the level of the advanced countries
~ by the end of the 20th century is now recognized to be unrealistic in its
initial formulation and haa foranally been reduced to the task of achieving a
society of "modest sufficiency." The change in the formulation of the pro-
gram has not been, applied to the plans for the creation of a military
potential.
4. In the 1950's the united front was called the People's Democratic Front.
5. The Fourth All-Chinese Congress of Women took place in Beijing 8-17 September
1978 (the previous congress--in September 1957); the lOth Congress of the
Chinese Co~unist League of Youth took place on 16-26 October i978 (the
9th Congress--in 1964); there were also congresses of the Federation of
Chinese Youth and the Union of Chinese Students.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. rlao Zedong, "9elected Works," Vol 1, Moscow, 1952, pp 174-177.
2. F. N. Burlatskiy, "Lenin, State, Politics," Moscow, 1970, p 140.
3. L. M. Gudoshnikov and K. A. Yegorov, "On the New Legislation of the PRC,"
SOV. GOS. I PRAVO, No 11, 1980, pp 61-69.
4. K. A. Yegorov, "A Judicial Farce Under the Guise of the Establishment of
Legality," SOTS. ZAKONNOST', No 7, 1981, pp 66-68.
5. RBNMIN RIBAO, 9 December 1979.
6. Ibid., 15 January 1980.
i. BEIJING RIBAO, 4 January 1980.
8. "China: Certain Tendencies in the Domestic Situation," KOMMUNIST, No 3, 1980,
p. 102.
9. RENMIN RIBAO, 15 September 1979.
10. 0. Vladimirov, "The Sixth Plenum of the CP of the CCP and Beijing's Present
Policy," KOMMUNIST, No 12, 1981, p 86.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo", 1982
2959
CSO: 1807/74
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NATIONAL
MISTAKES IN SOVI~T LAW ENFORCEMENT ANA;~YZED
Moscow SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO in Russian No 4, Apr $2 pp 103-108
[Article by N. N. Voplenko, docent at the Volgograd Higher School of the USSR
Ministry of Internal Affairs, candidate in ~uridica? zciences: "The Reasone
for Errors in the Application of Law"]
[Text] An improvement of the work of the agencies which apply the law is a
necessary condition for a further strengthening of socialist legality. In this
connection, Soviet juridical science is faced with the problem of a comprehensive
study of the factors which determine legality and the effectiveness of the
application of the norms of the law. One of its important aspects is the question
of the reasons for and the conditions of the commission of errors in law appli-
cation. In the literature it has received a definite treatment with regard to
court and investigatory errors in criminal cases. [1, 2, 3] The fullest point
of view on this issue has been stated by I. L. Petrukhin who distinguishes three
groups of reasons for court errors and, correspondingly, three levels of knowing
them: a) reasons for errors which are connected with violations of the require-
ments of material and procedural law on the level of principles and concrete
norms; b) reasons for errors which are contained in the general conditions of
the performance of court business and in the level of the training of judges,
in the special characteristics of their awareness of the law, in their moral
qualities, in the conditions of their life and work, the organization of the
court system, the effectiveness of the activities of the participants in the
trial, in the influence of legal science on ~uridical practice, in the degree of ~
information support for the court system, and so forth; c) reasons which are
rooted in the state of the general types of the guarantees of legality: economic,
ideological, political, and juridical. [4]
One cannot but note the logical coherence and the internal harmony bf the above-
described view. At the same time, this conception is in need of a certain moder-
nization regarding errors as a generic phenomenon in the sphere of law applica-
tion. First of all, it is necessary to distinguish the causes and conditions, or
f.actors, which determine errors. Causes are immediate ~uridical phenomena which
give rise to an error and determine its character and place in the general system
of legality violations. They could be: a failure to reach the truth in an
investigation of the factual circumstances of a case, an incorrect selection and
interpretation of the norms of material or procedural law, a verdict's lack of
correspondence to the actual or legal basis of a case, and so forth. It is use-
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ful to call them the internal, or concrete, causes of errors in law applica-
tion.
_ Conditions should be und~:x�stood as the circumstances which are mediately
- connected with the errors which favor their emergence. They, as. it were, create
the general background and the circumstances under which the possibilities for
an incorrect application of the law increase. The following may be numbered
among such factors: the level of the professional training of the subjects of
law application, their moral and political qualit~.es, the specific conditions of
their lives and work, the dEgree of the organization and effectiveness of the
_ system of agencies, and so f~rth. These factors are the external causes of the
errors in law application.
The dialectic of the interaction between the causes and conditions of law appli-
cation errors consists in the fact that they are closel,y interconnected with one
another and are able to move into one another. For example, an incarre~ct selec-
tion and analysis of a legal norm as the concrete internal cause of an ~rroneous
application of law can in an individual case be connected with many conditions:
a large work load for the law applier, shortcomings in the selection and dis-
position of cadres, a lack of spec.ialization in work, the contradictoriness of
legislation, and so forth. And, on the contrary, every conditian which fosters
the emergence of errors in law application can manifest itself and activate the
action of several concrete causes depending upon the circumstances o.f the juri-
dical case and the subjects of the activity. Thus, the lack of a stable juri-
dical practice can be expressed in the following causes of errors in law
application: an incorrect assembling and evaluation of proofs, the incorrect
drawing up of the law application document, the erroneousness of qualification,
and so forth. In studyin~ this problem, all of this makes it possible, in our
view, to use a single list of factors which determine errors in law application
work.
A study of the special literature and of court and investigatory practice on the
topic, discussions wi.th those who apply the law, and questionnaire work with
them have made it possible to compose and test during the course of a sociological
study the following list of the most frequent causes and conditions of errors
in law application: 1) lack of clarity and contradictoriness of legislation;
_ 2) a lack of stable juridical practice; 3) insufficient 3uridical knowledge on
the part of the law applier; 4) the counteraction of interested persons; 5) un-
favorable work conditions; 6) shortcomings in the selection and dispositi~: of
cadres; 7) one-sidedness and incompleteness in the proof; 8) the comr~exity of
the procedural demands upon individual juridical action; 9) a heav; work load;
10) the lack of specialization in work.
~ The purpose of the study was to establish the hierarchical ~mportance o~c each
of the above-named factors in the general system of the ca.uses and con~itions ~
that promote the commission of errors in law application, Towdrd this end, law
appliers wEre asked to designate with figures the degre~e of importance of each
factor (first place, second, third, and so forth). Qu%stionnaire work was per-
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formed on the investigatory apparatus of the Administration for Internal Affairs
of Volgogradskaya Oblast, a group of investigators studyin� at the advanced
training faculty of the Higher Investigatory School of the USSR Ministry of
Internal Affairs (94 people), people's judges and m~mbers of the oblast court
of Volgogradskaya Oblast, and also a group of people's judges from the Bashkir
ASSR. In all, 327 law appliers (218 investigators and 109 judges) were questioned.
Of course, in a study of this kind it is only possible to establish the sub-
jective imgortance of each of the factors which determines law application
errors. At the same time, the high competence of the respondents makes such
replies extremely valuable.
In totalling up the results of the study it became clear that the subjective
importance of each of the above-enumerated factors is determined on the basis
of two criteria: the frequency with which ~he respondents mentioned or empha-
sized one or another cause of ~rrors, and the ranking of all of the causes for
errors in concrete figures. The point is that not all of the respondents named
the 10 causes proposed by us, but frequently limited themselves ~o pointing to
some of them. This resulted in the fact that the frequency of the causes noted
by the law appliers does not correspond with the total number of respondents
(327 people) and fluctuates from 103 to 244. As for the total sum which expresses
the ranking of each of the 10 factors, it fluctuates from 498 to 610. As a
result, the subjective importance of each of the factors is defined by a frac-
tion whose numerator is the total amount of the ranking indicators, and whose
denominator is the frequency with which each of the factors is mentioned. This
makes is possible to deduce uniform indicators of the subjective importance for
the law appliers of each of the ZO factors. They are obtained by dividing the
total amount of subjective preferen.ces by the number of times that each factor
is mentioned.
A large work load is named by investigators and judges as one of the chief
factors giving rise to errors in law application work. The idea that the
quality of the work of law appliers is dependent upon the amount of their work
load has already been expressed in the literature. Thus, according to data
cited by V. N. Kudryavtsev ; if among a group of judges who hear 7-10 cases a �
month there is an average of 1.04 annulled and 1.74 changed verdicts per year
per judge, with a work load of 20 and more cases these figures increase to 2.31
- and 12.96, respectively. [5] Data which establishes their employment in work
in hours testifies to the large work load of law appliers.
During the survey of the working conditions of law appliers they G?ere asked a
question regarding their satisfaction with their work and their position. Most
of those who replied expressed satisfaction with their work, taking note in it
of elements of search, creativity, and social importance. However, of the 327
investigators and judges, 70 neople (55 investigators and 15 judges) stated that
their work did not satisfy them. Excessive work and a disproportionate work
load for law appliers (46 people) were named as the basic reason. In this case,
we are talking about investigators and judges who expressed a desire to transfer
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to other work. At the same time, many of the respondents who stated their
- satisfaction with their work took note oi shortcomings in its organization, and,
among them, a large work load figured in one of the first places.
The lack of a stable j uridical practice occ~ipies second place in the scale of
factors which determine errors in the work of investigators and judges. This
_ factor is derivative to a substantial degree from the ability and persistence of
superior law application agencies in implementing the demands of unity in the
understanding and application of legal norms. From a broader point of view, it
- is a component part of the stability of legal regulation and presupposes the
- relative stability of laws and of the practice of their application, and the .
continuity of the work methods of ~egal application agencies regardless of the
replacement of concrete officials. [6] The fact that this factor proves to be
in second place in its degree of importance for law appliers was something of a
. surprise, and this determines its importance.
The stability of law application practice manifests itself most vivi3ly in the
unity of the legal qualification of juridical cases of the same type. During
the course of the study investigators and judges were asked to designar2 with
figures the hierarchical importance of the factors which promote correct quali-
fication. They singled out: 1) consultations with one's immediate chief;
2) the help of workmates; 3) the directive decrees of the plenums of Supreme
Courts; 4) monographic literature; 5) commentaries; 6) departmental orders
and instructions; 7) the procurator's opinion. It turned out that each of
the above-enumerated factors is perceived differently by the investigators and
judges. For example, for the investigators whose work position presupposes
relationships of subordination in the investigatory apparatus and in relation-
ships with the agencies oi the procurator's office the greatest value is
represented by such factors as: the influencQ of one's immediate chief, work-
mates, the directive decrees of the plenums of Supreme Courts, the opinion of
the procurator, and commentaries. The judges, on trhe other hand, give first
' place to the role of the directive decrees of the plenums of Supreme Courts,
and then to workmates, the immediate chief, and commentaries. The importance
of help from the procurator in the correct qualification of ~uridical cases is
clearly understated among judges.
Another important aspect in the establishment of a stable juridical practice is
the exp~rience of qualifying juridical cases on the level of oblast courts,
the investigatory departments of the oblast administrations of internal affairs,
and the oblast procurator's office. A concrete expression of the policy of
these agencies in the sphere of law application is represented by their acts of
control and supervision, concrete law application acts, and reviews o.f the
practice of hearing and resolving individual categories of cases. For this
reason, as additional causes of errors in law application, in addition to the
proposed list, many judges name: "the formalism of the oblast court," "the
unstable practice of the oblast court," and "over-insurance b-~ rayon and oblast
judges in matters of qualification." Of course, in such replies there can be
felt the "age-old" purely psychological critical attitude of lower agencies
toward superior ones; nevertheless, they demonstrate with sufficient accuracy
the role of oblast law protection agencies in establishing stable juridical
practice.
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Causes�and Conditions of Errors in Law ~ Total Amount of Indicator o�
Application Importance Factor'a
Frequency of Importance
Mention
1. Large work load 603 2.4
244
2. Lack of a stable juridical practice 523 3.1
166
3. One-sidedness and incompleteness of
the assemblage of proof 537 3.3
160
4. Vagueness, contradictoriness of 498 3.4
legislation 145
5. Complexity of procedural demands 610 3.9
upon individual juridical actions 153 ,
6. Insufficient jurid.ical knowledge 545 4.1
on the part of the law applier 131
7. Unfavorable work conditions 588 4.3
136
8. Opposition of interested persons 531 4.5
ly7
9. Lack of work specialization 575 5.3
107
10. Shortcomings in the selection and 562 5.4
disposition of cadres 103
One-sidedness and incompleteness in the assembling of proof as a reason for law
application errors is placed in third place. This testifies, in ur view, to a
sufficiently high level o� objectivity in the evaluation given by law appliers
to the results of thei.r own work. This cause, which is among the internal
causes, has been treated repeatedly and in detail in the literature. [3, p 63;
7; 8] In daily practice the one-sidedness and incompleteness of proofs manifests
itself in various concrete defects in the process of proof, and in an inability
by the law applier to correctly analyze and evaluate the factual circumstances
of a case.
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Fourth place for its degree of subjective importance was occupied by such a ~
factor as the vagueness and contradictoriness of the legislation. In their
replies to the question as to whether the.legislation in effect contained im-
perfect norms, the investigators and judges demonstrated a quite high level of
a critical attitude toward the law: Of the 327 respondents, only 46 expressed
their full approval of the operating system of legal regulation, while the
remainder (281) pointed to individual imperfections in ~he legislation which
hinder effective work. A careful analysis of these replies provides grounds for
critically evaluating them. The point is that most of the respondents only
stated the existence of imperfect norms in the legislation; however, they did
not point to concrete norms which could be characterized as obsolete, not usaful,
- and so fnrth. In certain replies, one feels a desire to become free from certain
procedural norms, and an endeavour to over-simplify the juridical procedural
form. At the same time, many replies con*_ain sensible proposals which have
been tested by many years of practice on improving the system of legal regula-
tion. This is witnessed, for example, by the critical analysis of the applica-
tion of Articles 16 and 334 of the RSFSR Civil Code which are realized in a
formal manner, and frequently in contradiction with the norms of morality.
Attention is called to the lack of norms which regulate the procedure for inter-
rogating an illiterate person, and aJso of norms: on halting criminal proceedings
in a case as a result of the sickness of the victim which prevents a determina-
tion of the severity of the injury received by him; on verifying testimony at
the site of an occurrence; and on the possibility of applying sanctions against
defendants who do not appear for a court session. Note is taken of the imprecise
and diffuse character of Article 206 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, of the diffi-
culty in delimiting a qualification in accordance with Part 2 of Article 108,
and Articles 102 and 103 of the RFSFR Criminal Code, and so forth.
The fifth place in the general hierarchy of causes of errors is assigned by the
investigators and judges to such a factor as the "complexity of the procedural
~ demands upon the performance of individual juridical actions." Note was taken
above of the discovery during the course of the analysis of the attitude of
law appliers to the legislation in effect of an aspiration to simplify the
procedural form, and a desire to rid oneself of the rigid schedules for the
performance of individual actions and of the complexities of procedure in so-
called obvious juridical cases. This tendency was also confirmed from a docu-
mentary study of concrete errors of law application. Thus, 51 percent of the
errors committed by investigators in the halting of criminal cases were expressed
in important violations of procedural law. [9] While establishing the real
importance of the problem of procedural form for the general dynamics of law
application errors, we, nevertheless, do not believe that a simplification of
juridical procedure is the only reliable and effective way to reduce errors.
First of all, the law appliers themselves showed that they experience more
difficulty in applying the norms of material law (175 people) than of procedural
law (88 people). Secondly, the character of procedural difficulties is such
that they decrease with an increase in the experience and professional expertise
of the law appliers. Thirdly, any underestimation of the role of the procedural
form and rejection of it means in practice a concession to legal nihilism and
' is capable of developing into violations of legality. For this reason, systematic
~
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~ studies by law appliers, a rise in the level of their professional e.kpertise,
the elimination of labor turnover, and the ensuring of the stability of legal
regulation represent an important direction in decreasing the nu.:.~er of pro-
cedural errors.
Insufficient legal knowledge on the part of those who apply the law is in
sixth place in the hierarchy of causes of errors. It is not difficult to see
that this factor is closely connected with others, particularly, with the "vague-
ness and contradictoriness of the legislation," "the lack of stability in
juridical practice," and others. If a law applier has an insufficient "baggage
of knowledge," then the existing legislation will, of course, seem to him to
be vague and contradictory, and the possibilities for the results of his work
being influenced by other factors which determ~ne errors grow. In evaluating
the role of this factor a definite amount of self-criticism was demanded from
the law appliers, since in their replies there was a tendency to give preference
to objective conditions: work load, the instability of practice, shortcomings
in the legislation, and so forth. All of this makes it possible to assume that
the true importance of this factor in the system of cause:~ of errors is much
greater than the law appliers themselves believe.
Seventh place is assigned to unfavorable work conditions. This includes the
social and individual psychological characteristics of the examination of juri-
dical cases, organizational-work and housing and domestic shortco~i:.gs which
hinder the effective realization of law application functions, and so forth. A
concrete expression of these conditions might be nervousness in the relationships
betw~en associates, a lack of the technical means needed for successful work,
personal troubles on the part of tlie workers, bad housing and domestic condi-
tions, and so forth. Factors of this kind influence the quality of law appli-
cation not directly, but indirectly, by creating the conditions for the commis-
sion of errors. In the questionnaire the investigators and judges classified
the f.ollowing among such conditions: poor work by the oi~anizational and
technical services and departments, unesthetic work places, a lack of coordina-
tion in the actions of different services, a lack of attention paid to young
specialists, interference by superiors in the procedural independence of the
investigator, and so forth.
Interesting information has been obtained as a result of quest~~ning law
appliers regarding their use of technical means. It turned out that investiga-
tors are more involved with technical means and make use of them more frequently
and more variously than judges. Of 203 investigator respondents, 86 make use
of technical means constantly, 107 use them sometimes, and only 10 people
admitted that they managed withaut them. Of 105 judges, 73 replied that they do
not use te~chnical means, and only 32 ?aid that they sometimes resort to them.
This, in our view, is an irdicator of a poor situation with the organization of
labo r in court agencies.
Providing workers punctually with legal information--the texts of normative acts,
codes, commentaries, the decrees of plenums of S~upreme Courts, departmental
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orders, instructions, and so forth--is also an important factor in creating normal
conditions for the application of law. As the study has shown, th3.s question
has been solved best in the court agencies. Of 106 judges, 95 replied that they
are provided with the necessary legal information, and only 11 not~d shortcomings
in information support. In the investigation agencies only 95 people out of 217
respondants evaluated the organization of legal information as satisfactory. I

] believe that the problem of punctually providing investigators raith legal infor-
mation has to be solved first of all by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.
In particular, it would be useful to create special legal i.nformation funds on
the level of oblast investigatory administra~ions for newly hired investigators.
Eighth place in the hierarchy of causes of law application errors is occupied by
such a factor as the opposition of interested persons: tele~hone calls, requests
by relatives and acquaintances, and even "pressure" from leading workers for
the purpose of a deci.sion being adopted in which certain people are interested.
Overcoming the intellectual, psychological, moral, and juridical obstacles which
are created by witnesses, victims, the accused, and other individuals who are
interested in the concrete outcome of a case is a frequent instance of such a
situation. Let us note that no serious a~~ention at all has been devoted to this
phenomenon in science, alth~ugh in the literature on court psychology there is
mention of the extremely unfavorable conditions under which an investigator
frequently has to work. [10] It is clear that not only investigators, but the
majority of law appliers have occasion to come up against the opposition of in-
terested persons. Overcoming this negative phenomenon goes beyond the framewoz�k
of a purely psycho.logical question, since the problem takes cn a rather broad
social importance. This is a result above all of the fact that the application
of law is a powerful activity in the regulation of social, including personal,
interests. Hence, the inevitability of overcoming conflicts and contradictions
between the interests of different people. It would seem that this problem should
attract the attention of such a direction of jurisprudence as the sociology of
law. The study which has been conducted has st,own that, in the opinion of inves-
tigators and judges, this factor causes more harm in the sphere of law.applica-
tion than the lack of specialization in work or shortcomings in the selection and
disposition of cadres.
The lack of specialization in work as a factor which gives rise to errors in the
application of law is in ninth place. The juridical literature has already taken
note of the positive influence o~ specialization upon the quality of law applica-
tion. [11, 12] The questionnaire, as a whole, confirmed this ~~onclusion. At the
same time, it testifies to the fact that law appliers do not s%e in a universal
and all-embracing specialization a radical means for improving the quality of the
examination and resolution of cases. The investigators and judges who opposed
specialization motivated their position by the fact that specialization leads to
"stereotypes" in work and narrows the professional interests of the law applier.
Of 317 respondant investigators and ~udges, 250 favored the wide introduction oi
specialization, 61 were against, and 6 expressed an indiffere:ce to this matter.
It is curious that judges were more resolute than investigators in their opposi-
- tion to the idea of specialization: of 109 judges, 33 were against, while of 202
investigators, only 28 were opponents.
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The last and tenth place in the overall hierarchy of the causes,of law applica-
tion errors is occupied by shortcomings in the selection and disposition of
cadres. I believe that this evaluation of this factor reflects the increased
level of the trainfng in recent years of cadres of law appliers, especially in
~ the courts and investigatory apparatus. The high professional qualifications ~
of the present-day law applier presupposes a constant improvement of knowledge
and skills, a study of the new legislation, and a generalization of the practice
of examining and resolving cases; that is, it demands systematic self-education,
and also studies at special seminars, studies at advanced training courses, in
graduate school, and so forth. In this respect, interesting replies were obtained
from the investigators and ~udges to the question as to whether they wished to
continue their education. Such a desire was expressed by 146 people out of 327
(111 investigators and 35 judges); 122 people (56 investigators and 66 judges)
believed that the educational level reached by them was quite satisfactory, and
59 people did not reply. One is struck by the quite large n~ber of ~udges who
do not see any necessity for a further continuation of their studies. This is
connected, obviously, with the age of the court workers (73 out of 109 have a
work seniority of 10 and more years). ~ao people expressed a wish to enter
graduate studies. As for the investigators, 20 stated they wished to enter the
Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 17 graduate studies, and the rest
were oriented toward studies in the a3vanced training system.
The problem of the selection and disposition of cadres of law appliers is not
limited, of course, to increasing their education. Of great importance is pro-
fessional selection on the basis of practical, political, moral, ideological,
and psychological qualities, the creation of conditions for growth in work and
the elimination of circumstances which give rise to labor turnover, and so forth.
What has been said means that superior law application agencies must constantly
give attention to a study of the above factors, and take measures to eliminate
the negative consequences of the causes of errors. I believe that the question
of the causes of errors in law application could become a special sub3ect of
discussion at a sitting of the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court for the purpose
of working out general recommendations.
The 10 basic above-examined factors which cause error;s in the application of law
be.long chie.fly to the so-called external conditions. But they have a tendency
to be transformed into the internal concrete causes of errors. For this reason,
the problem of the causes of law application errors has to be studied only in a~
complex of the external and internal factors which influence the application of
law. It is not to be excluded that in the individual spheres of law application
(social security, the administration of the economy, and so forth) there are
- specific causes of errors. The analysis of the phenomenon which has been under-
taken in the present article could serve as a methodological "key" for the
practice of branch special stu~iies.
_ s
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. G. Z. Anashkin and I. L. Petrukhin, "The Effectiveness of Justice and Court
Errors," SOV. GOS. I PRAVO, No 8, 1968, pp 59-67. ~
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2. I. L. Petrukhin, G. P. Baturov, and T. G. Morshc't?akova,."Theoretical Founda-
tions of the Effectiveness of Justice," Mosc.ow, 1979, 392 pp.
3. T. S. Gorskiy, "Scientific Foundations of the Organization and Work of the
Investigatory Apparatus in the USSR," Varonezh, 1970, 208 pp.
4. I. L. Petrukhin, "The Causes of Court Errors," SOV. GOS. I'PRAVO, No 5,
1970, pp 100-101.
5. V. N. Kudryavtsev, "The Legal System and the Strengthening of Social3st
Society," KOMMUNIST, No 9, 1981, p 77.
6. V. N. Kudryavtsev, "Law and Behavior," Moscow, 1978, p 119.
7. A. P. Derbenev, "Objectivity as a Legal and Moral Principle of the Work of
the Investigator," PRAVOVEDENIYE, No 1, 1977, pp 52-57.
8. Yu. Korenevskiy, "An Investigator's Pre~udice--The Source of Errors,"
SOTS. ZAKONNOST', No 10, 1969, p 22.
9. V. A. Mikhaylov, "The Procedural Order for Halting Criminal Cases at the
Stage of Preliminary Investigation," Volgograd, 1970, pp 95-96.
10. A. V. Dulov, "Principles of Psychological Analysis at Preliminary Investi-
gation," Moscow, 1973, pp 35-36.
11. P. K. Morshchakova and I. L. Petrukhin, "The Sociological Aspects of a
Study of the Effectiveness of Justice." In the collection: "Law and
Sociology," Moscow, 1973, pp 287-288.
12. N. V. Radutnaya, "The People's Judge. Professional Expertise and Training,"
Moscow, 1977, pp 75-76.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo", 1982
2959
CSO: 1800/469
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NATIONAL
DISTINCTIVE SIBERIAN-RUSSIAN LANGUAGE FOUND BY SCHOLAR
[Editorial Report] Moscaw VOPROSY YAZYKOZNANIYA in Russian No 2, March-April
1982, carries on pp 81-89 an 8,000-word article by A.I. Fedorov titled "The
Russian Language in Siberia." A linguistics specialist who works in
Novosibirsk, Fedorov wrotes that "the Russian langua~e in Siberia is the same
Russian national language but one which has many distinctive aspects" mainly
in its lexical fund but also in phonetics, morphology, and syntax. He sugges ~
that this is the result of the lengthy contact between Russians and other
~ groups living in Siberia. In the same issue of this 3ournal, there is also a
2,700-word review of Fedorov's book SIBERIAN DIALECT PHRASEOLOGY. This review
(pp 142-145) is by Leningrad scholar V.M. Mokiyenko, who questions Fedorov's
methodology and his conclusions.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "Voprosy yazykoznaniya", 1982
CSO: 1800/512 END
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