JPRS ID: 10517 USSR REPORT POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS THE BASMACHI: ORIGIN, ESSENCE, COLLAPSE BY A.I. ZEVELEV ET AL.

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JPRS L/1051~
14 May 1982
U SS R Re ort
p
POIITICAI AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
.
(FOUO 14/82)
THE BASMACHI: ORIGIN, ESSENCE, COLLAPSE
by
A.I. Zevelev et al
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JPRS L/10517 '
1
14 May 1982
TEiE ~AS~IACHI: ORIGIN, ESSENCE, COLLAPSE
c~ouo i4/sa)
Moscoai BASMACHE~T~O: 'HOZNIK.NOti~ENTYE, SUSHCHNO~m' , RRAKH in Russian
1981 (signed to press 21 ~iug 81) pp 1-231, 244-246 ~
jBook by Aleksandr Tzrailevich Zevelev, Yuriy Aleksandrovich Polyakov,
and Aleicsandr ivanavicfi Chuc~unav entitled "The Basmachi: Origin,
Essence, Collapse", Tzdatel~stvo "Nauka", 10,000 copies, 244 pages;
passages enclosed ~n slantlines printed in italics]
CONTENTS
Annotation.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~����~~~~~a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~��~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~� 1.
Introduction 1
- "Former Slaves Became Free" 14
A Land Where Lawlessness Ruled 14
Dawn of a New Life 17
Imperialist Intervention and Civil War 24
Counterrevolutionaries and Interventionists Unleash War 24
Fighting Turkestan 35
The Basmachi Fergana Front 41
Areas of Basmachi Concentration: Ablyk, "Matchinskoye Bekstvo" 72
Basmachi of Bukhara and Khorezm 74
Enemies of Peaceful Labor 83
Successes and Achievements of the Toilers of Central Asia 83
End of the Fergana ~asmachi $7
Bukhara: The Struggle Continues 99
- a- IIII - USSR - 35 FOUO]
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The Enver Pasha Ven~ure 104
The Chieftains Refuse to Lay Down Their Arms 115
In the Sands of the Kara Kum
144
A Dying Enemy Is Dangerous
Incursions by Ibragi~Bek 144
Rout of the "Predators of the Desert" 156
168
Conclusion
Appendix . . 177
203
Footnotes
- 238
- Abbreviations and Acronyms
9
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ANNOTATION
[Text] This book deals with the heroic struggle of the toilers of Central As ia
aga inst the basmachi enemies of the revolution and progress and hirelings of
international reaction. The authors trace the stages of this struggle, reveal
the sociopolitical roots of the basmachi, their antipopular essence, and show
that defeat of the basmachi bands constituted a convincing demonstration of the
the triumph of Lenin's nationalities policy and promoted further strengthening
_ of friendship among th~ peoples of the Soviet Union.
INTRODUCTION
The words "basmach" and "basmachestvo" have become historical terms for the peoples
of our count�ry. But people of the older generation, particularly those living in
Central Asia, recall years when these words were repeated with pain and anger, with
hatred and indignation. Contained in th~se words are years of difficult struggle
against a vicious, dangerous and cruel foe. Contained in these words are the asb:s .
of villages burned to the ground, trampled fields, the crackle of machinegun
bursts, and rifle shotis, thousands of people killed and tortured, hunger, death, and
ruined lives.
The word "basmach" derives from the Turkic verb "basmak," which means to pressure,
to oppres , to coerce. For the peoples of Central Asia the term "basmach" signifies
brigand, bandit, robber, oppressor. For centuries people who have chosen ~the
raiding of trade caravans, briganda&e and mur,ier as their "profession" were called
basmachi.
Af ter the October Revalution, when the Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen, Kirghiz, Kazakh, and
Kara-Kalpak working people took power into their own hands, with the assistance
of their Russian brothers, and groceeded to build a new life, the term "basmachestvo"
acquired a quite specific social and political content. Basmachestvo be~came one of
the most acute forms of class struggle by the overthrown exploiters against the
victorious revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat, against the pawer of the
working people.
' The feudal and clan-tribal eliee, the reactionary seg~:ent of the Muslim cler~;y,
and the emerging national bourgeoisie in Central Asia organized and guided the ac-
tions of the basmachi. Basma~chi leaders espoused openly counterrevolutionary, anti-
- Soviet slog~ns, setting as their goal the overthrow o f Soviet rule, restoration
_ in Central Asia of the s�~remacy of the ~xploiters, and ~letachment of Centra~ Asia
from Soviet Asssia. The cause espoused by t~e basmachi was of a clearly-marked
na tionalist character, inciting hatred toward Russians and everything Russian.
At the same time they promoted discord among the various peoples of Central Asia.
Nationalistic propaganda �aas interwoven with extensive utilization of religious
prejudices.
The basmachi inevitably joined forces with the Russian counterrevolutionaries;
- basmachi detachments established contacts with and conducted joint actions with
- Russian White Guardists.

~
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' As enemies of the revolution, socialism, and progress, the basmachi enjoyed the full
support of international imperialism and reactionary elements in neighboring
countries. Camel caravans crossed the border and made their way across mountain
passes and sun-scorched deserts, laden with heavy bales containing rifles, machine
guns, and cases of ammunition.
. British and American agents, operating on the territory of Afghanistan, Iran, China,
and Turkey, supplied the basmachi with weapons, ammunition, and money. They took
direct part in organizing and forming basmachi detachments. Basmachi bands, when
defzated in combat, would withdraw across the border and, after resting and
recouperating, would once again invade Soviet: soil.
The actions of the basmachi were accompanied by savage acts of terrorism, wiaich
assumed extremely cruel forms. The basmachi bands left behind them a trail of mass
reprisals against the civilian population and savage acts of execution. Thousands
of Go~unists and Komsomol members, rural and urban activists, girls who had dared
to cast aside the paranja, and youths who had resolved to learn to read and write
died a martyr`s death at the hands of the basmachi.
Burning industrial enterprises and warehouses to the ground, barb aric destruction
of railroad stations, peaceful villages and irrigation works, looting and driving
off livestock all this led to a catastrophic decline of productive resources in
Central Asia.
The struggle against the basmact~i, which was a part of the civil war dramatic,
savage and intense demanded considerable efforts and sacrifices on the part of
the Soviet people. This struggle is fully entitled to be included among the
- h~roic pages of our history. It cantains a great many examples of courage,
staunchness and military valor on the part of Soviet officers and men, sel.f-sac-
rifice and dedication to the ideas of the revolution on the part of ordinary people
of all nationalities, who were selfles~ly defending a righteous cause.
Success in the struggle against the basmachi depended not only on victory in combat
but also on the daily activities of the working people of Central Asia, led and
- guided by Communists, in building a:~d consolidating Soviet national statehood, con- _
sistent implementation of revolurionary socioeconomic measures and a Leninist
nationalities policy, rebuilding and development of the economy, and a rise in the
cu1*ural level of the people.
The activeness of the warker masses of Central Asia, which were overcoming age-old
backwardness, were becoming liberated from the opiate of religion, were rejecting
the nationalisti,^ slogans of the bai [property ow;~ers in Central Asia] and their
minions, cor~stituted the decisive factor in the ultimate defeat of the basmachi.
The historical experience of the peoples of Central Asia confirms the correctness
of Lenin's thesis that "that people will never be defeated in which the majority of
workers and peasants have recognized, f elt and seen that they are defending their
own, Soviet rule the ru3.e of the working people, that they are defending that
cause the victory of which wi11 secure for them and their chitdren the opportunity
to make use of all the benefits of culture, all that which has been created by
man's labor."1
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Standing in opposition to the obscurantism and wild fanaticism of the basmachi was
dedication to the high ideals of sor.ialism and progress; political consciousness
stood in contrast to intel~.ectual darkness and ignorance; countering violence and
cruelty was socialist humanism, which include~3 a desire to assist the wavering and
the erring, as well as proletarian firmness toward implacable enemies.
The friendship of peoples and their fraternal mutual assistance prevailed over the
endeavor to fan the flames of nationalistic passions and to evoke hatred among
working people. The ~efeat of the basmachi signified total victory of the ideas
of proletarian internationalism.
The struggle against the basmachi constitutes a lengthy historical epic. It lasted
~ about 15 years, sometimes dying down, and then again flaring up with renewed force.
Beginning in 1917, immediately following the victorious October Revolution, ;and
reaching a high point during ~he civil war and the first postwar years, basmactri ac-
tivities subsided in the first half of the 1920's. Remnants of basmachi bands,
taking refuge abroad, temporarily ceased their activities.
At the end of the 1920's and beginning of the 1930's, however, basmachi detachments,
penetrating our country from abroad and direct~d by international imperialism, once
again disturbed peaceful labor in a number of areas of Central Asia.
The history of the struggle against the basmachi thus encompasses a considerable
chrono:.ogical prriod and includes a large group of problems which are inseparably
linked with the history of consolidation o~ the socialist revolution, socioeconomic
and cultural rF:iorms in the republics of Central Asia.
To this we must oa~ the following: the enormous diversity of geographic, economic,
historical and other conditions in Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva led to a situation
where the cause of the basmachi, while containing common counterrevolutionary and
anti-Soviet aims, at the same time was manifested in a number of localized events,
each of which contained a great many specific features.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the social-class nature of ~the basmachi
_ movement, to reveal its true inspirers and organizers, to present the heroic history
of the struggle with the basmachi by the Red Army and the working people of Central
:~sia, inspired and unified by the Communist Party, and to present the principal
events in the history of the dr~feat of the basmachi. The authors, basing their
presentation on the achievements of Soviet historiography in this problem area,
have sought to reflect the g~neral patterns and features of the class struggle,
the distinctive features of its manifestation i n the specific conditions of Central
Asia, and to show the fact that the bssmachi were historicaZly doomed and the in-
evitability of their final defeat.
~ For a long period of time the basmachi seemed to represent a specific phenomenon,
characteristic of the special conditions of development of the socialist revolution
in Central Asia. The experience of the 1960's and 1970's, however, has shown that
phenomena similar to those of the basmachi have occurred in a number of developing
countries of Asia and Africa in which progressive reforms were being carried out.
~ Just as the basmachi of the 1320's, inspired and supported by international im-
perialism, they represented desperate opposition on the part of reactionary feudal
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~'V~~ Va~~ ~a.rAL a~�.7+. v1~L.~
and clan-tribal elements to a~ny and all progressive measures from agrarian reform
to a literacy movement. In spite of all the differences of circumstances of time
and place, one can easily detect that same support onthe p~tof international reaction,
thos~ same social roots, that same explQitation of backwardness and ignorance, that
same religious fanaticism, that same hatred of everything new, those same savage,
barbaric forms of struggle against an activist defending the new system of government,
with the peasant who has proceeded to till the landowner's soil, with the teacher
and the actor, and with the woman wi~o has dared expose her face contrary to age-old
prohibitions....
The struggle of `he united forces of international imperialism, Chinese hegemonism
and domestic counterrevolution against progressive reforms in Afghanistan has become
- the most vivid manifestation of reactionary activities analogous to those of the
basmachi. It is not surprising that the Afghan counterrevolutionary bandits, armed
with Chinese assault rifles and U.S.-made chemical grenades, are often called
basmachi in the press.
* * *
Examining the history of the struggle against the basmachi, the authors drew on
numerous assessments, conclusions, instructions and theses on Central Asia, con-
tained in the works of I. Lenin, his companions-in-arms, and in documents of the
CPSU and the Soviet State.
The Leninist scientific concept of history of the USSR, one component part of which
is the history of the peoples of Central Asia, theses on the logi.cal nature of the
victory of the socialist revolution in the eastern part of our country and on the
p3ths of transition by the working people of Central Asia from feudalism to social-
ism, bypassing the stage of capitalism, the strategy and tactics of the struggle
for consolidation of Soviet rule in the former colonial outlying regions of Russia,
as well as a Leninist description of the civil war in the USSR, its essence, stages,
character and social significance, as well as the distribution of class forces in
that war, constitute the methodological foundation for investigating the history of
the basmachi.
Lenin's appraisals of prerevolutionary Turkestan are also extremely important for
understanding the essence and class nature of the basmachi. V. I. Lenin sci-
entifically defined the place and position of Turkestan in the structure of czarist
Russia. On the basis of synthesis of a vast amo~uit of factual material, he came to
the conclusion tha*_ Turkestan, just as the southern part and the southeastern part
of European Russia, as well as the C~ucasus, ~.ad been transformed by imperialism
into a colony of Russian capitalism, that the vassal states of Bukhara and Khiva
were "also akin to colonies."2
V. I. Lenin did not, however, limit himself to this conclusion alone. A study of
numerous materials (literary, statistical, demographic, and others) led him to con-
clude that Turkestan szood at the precapitalist stage ~n its level of development,
that feudal-patriarchal relations prevailed in the life and affairs of the peoples
of Central Asia.3 At the Second Comintern Congress he stated that the most im-
portant characteristic feature of Turkestan was the fact that "precapitalist
relations still predominate there."4
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V. I. Lenin analyzed the class structure of Turkestan society, which proceeded
from precapitalist production relations. On the basis of a comprehensive analysis
of the economy of Central Asia, V. I. Lenin concluded that the toiling peasantry
comprised the principal worker masses in that region.5 It followed from this that
the main thrust of the struggle in Central Asia would not be against capital but
against the influence of the feudal-patriarchal legacy, against ~:udal oppression,
and against carryovers from medieval times.6 This did not mean tha!: Lenin had
failed to note a deep-lying process of "diversion of the population From agriculture
to industry" and the birth of a national proletariat in that region. Of important
theoretical and methodological significance in this regard is V. I. Lenin's con-
clusion on the inevitability of class differentiation of the Turkestan k~shlak
[village],7 These ideas were of decisive significance for investigating ti~e pre-
conditions for revolution in Central Asia and for studying the history of t'he
emergence and ulti.mate defeat of the basmachi.
Following the victory of the socialist revolution, V. I. Lenin commented in a letter
entitled "To the Communist Comrades of Turkestan," which contained fu~?~damental
instructions on ways to implement party policy in the unique conditions of Central
Asia, that the establishment of correct mutual relations between the Russian people
and the former oppressed peoples of that outlying region would be of enormous im-
portance for all Asia and all the colonies of the world, for billions of people.8
Establishment and consolidation of an alliance between the Russian worker class and
the working people of local nationalities were to play a most important role in con-
nection with this. V. I. Lenin discussed this in detail at a meeting of the
delegates to the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the
Peoples of the East.
No less important in the conditions of postrevolutionary Turkestan was liquidation
of the patriarchal-feudal legac.y preserved in the social relations of the local
population. J.n order to achieve more successful accomplishment of this task, V. I.
Lenin recommended employing "/indirect/ ways, techniques, means, and methods... for
a transition from /precapitalist/ relations to socialism,"9 finding special ways
and forms of approaching the masses, and including them in the mainstream of build-
ing socialism. Lenin's ideas on the possibility of bypassing the capitalist stage
of development for the backward former colonial outlying regions of the Russian em-
pire and the entire colonial East, on transition by their peoples from feudal-
patriarchal relations to socialism, and on the forms and methods of building so-
cialism ir~ the Soviet East exerted enormous influence on the course of societal
development. These ideas were advanced by V. I. Lenin in his reports at the
8th Congress of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)J, at the Seccnd
All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, on tt~e
commission on the national and colonial questions at the Second Congress of the
Communist International, in his article entitled "On Our Revolution," and irl other
writings.
Further developing the idea of K. Marx and k'. Engels on the possibility of certain
peoples bypassing the capitalist stage of developmeZt and synthesizing the ex-
perience of the first years of Soviet contruction in the national republics, V. I.
Lenin pointed out that "with the assistance of the proletariat of leading countries,
backward countries can pass to a Soviet system and, via certain stages of develop-
ment to communism."10 We should particularly stress that Lenin invested broad
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meaning in the statement "~ssistance of the proletariat of leading countries," and
particularly the existence of nations and even one nation of dictatorship of the
proletariat capable of rianelering support to underdeveloped peoples.
V. I. Lenin did not limit himself to theoretical elaboration of the possibility of
building socialism by the peoples of the East. He pointed to political and
economic ways and means of accomplishing this task.
In order to bypass capitalism in making the transition from feudalism to socialism,
it is necessary to overthrow the rule of the exploiters, to establisli worker-peasant
rule, and to secure the assistance of the proletariat to those countries which are
building socialism, in the economic and cultural advance of their peoples, and
particularly in the building of centers of industry, forming of indigenous
proletarian cadres, cooperative agriculture among the peasantry, and implementation
of a socialist cultural revolution. V. I. Lenin pointed out that in backward
countr~es there is no need to develop capitalism in order subsequently to liquidate
i.t.
The movement of backward countries toward socialism along this path constitutes an
objective law and pattern of societal development dictated by the era of
proletarian revolutions and the liberation of colonies and semicolonies from the
yoke of imperialism. The problem of transition by peoples backward in their
development from precapitalist relations to socialism is a component part of Lenin-
- ist theory of proletarian revolution and the building of socialism.
V. I. Lenin advanced the idea of peasant Soviets, adapted to the precapitalist
structure of society. hi his report at the Second Comintern Congress (July-August 1920)
V. I. Lenin came to the ingenious conclusion that the peoples of Central Asia, just
as other backward peoples, consisting in their majority of peasants, "can excellent-
ly assimilate the idea of Soviet organization and implement it in a practical
manner." "The idea of a Soviet organization," he continued, "is simple and can be
~ applicable not only to proletarian but also to peasant feudal and semifeudal rela-
tions. 11 V. I. Lenin concretized these ideas at the Eighth All-Russian Congress of
Soviets (December 192J). Discussing the establishment of new Soviet republics
Bukhara, Azerbaijan, and Armenian, he noted: "These republics are proof and confirma.-
- tion of the fact that the ideas and principles of~Soviet rule are easily understood
and are immediately implementable not only in industrially developed countries, not
only in countries with such a social supporting force as the proletariat, but also
- with such a foundation as the peasantry."12 Lenin called the Bukhara People's
Soviet Republic a peasant-soviet republic.l3
Of particular importance for understanding the history of the successes of the
Soviet Government in the struggle against the basmachi were V. I. Lenin's ideas on
the necesstiy of finding "transition stages," special paths and forms of approach to
previously oppressed masses, of including them in the mainstream of building so-
cialism, of convincing with methods which are understandable and acceptable for them.
He emphasized that one should carefully take into account all the specif ic features
of development of a given people, the unique traits of a people's way of life,
religion, and customs, that it is necessary to proceed in such a manner that each
and every toiler, even the most backward, perceives socialist tasks as his own
vital concern. In 1921 Lenin reminded the Turkestan Communists of an important
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obligation to show regular and maximum concern "for the Muslim poor, their or-
ganization and enlightenmeiit."14
Also meriting particular attention is another instruction given by V. I. Lenin to
the Communists of Turkestan in 1919 at the Second All-Russian Congress of Com-
munist Organizations of the Peoples of the East. He recommended that they be
guided "by general Communist theory and practice" and "apply this theor~ and
practice" to the unique condir_ions of Central Asia.15 Further developing these
ideas, in 1921 V. I. Lenin called upon the Communists of the republics of the
Soviet East not blindly to copy the tactics empl~yed in the conditions of the
RSFSR but independently to study the reasons for and uniqueness of these tactics
and "to modify them in a thoughtful manner applicable to different concrete condi-
tions,"16 "to apply not the letter but the spirit, the sense, the lessons of the
experience of 1917-1921."17
Lenin's legacy contains exceptionally valuable theses on activities of the party and
soviet authorities in Central Asia, which are of fundamental significance for under-
standing the forms and methods of class struggle which developed in the new histori-
cal conditions. Having substantiated the thesis that replacement of precapitalist
with socialist production relations is a difficult process, that it is connected
with the maturing of requisite objective and subjective preconditions, V. I. Lenin
advanced a most important thesis, the essence of which is the fact that there will
occur in the republics of the Soviet East at the ini~tial staoe "a slower, more
cautious, more systematic transition to socialism."18 Warning the Communists of
Turkestan about the complexity, difficulty and responsibility of the tasks facing
them,19 in a letter to representatives of the party Central Committee in Turkestan
V. I. Lenin developed his ideas on the specific features of implementation of the
new economic policy in conditions of Turkestan, a policy aimed at strengthening the
alliance between the worker class and the toiling peasantry, and at revival of the
region's economy.20
V. I. Lenin, having laid down the foundation for Marxist investigation of history
of the civii war in Central Asia, showed how one should approach study of the his-
tor.y of the struggle against the basmachi.
Leninism contains a classic definition of the essence and aims of civil war, the
distribution of opposing class forces in civil war, the forms and methods of
struggle. V. I. Lenin repeatedly addressed the question. In "Ttie Russian Revolu-
tion and Civil War" (September 1917) he pointed out that civil war "is the most
acute form of class struggle."21 In the course of the c~ass struggle economic and
political battles, repeating, accumulating, expanding, becoming more acute,
reach ttie point of "transformation of these clashes into a struggle with weapon in
hand by one clas~ against another class."22
V. I. Lenin appraised the civil war in Central Asia as a component part of the
civil war throughout the country. He stated in a speech at a combined meeting of
the V'rslK [Al1-Russian Central Exe^utive Committee], Moscow Soviet, Moscow facto-~
ry-~~Lant committees and trade unions on 29 June 1918: "Murmansk in the North, the
Czechoslovak Front in the ~ast, Turkestan, Baku and Astrakhan' in the Southeast
we see ~hat almost all the links in the ring forged by Anglo-French imperialism are
interconnected."23
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ruK ~rr~~~,a~ ~~c v:~~f
Proceeding from his gpneral conception of imperialist intervention,24 V. I. Lenin
emphasized that the undisguised British intervention in Turkestan was also a com-
ponent part of the overall imperialist plans to dismember Russia and that im-
perialist conflicts were clashing in Central Asia just as elsewhere. He wrote:
"The :~ypocritical phrases of Wilson and the Wilsonists about 'democracy' and 'al-
liance of peoples' are laid bare with amazing rapidity when we witness seizure of
the left bank of the Rhine by the French bourgeoisie, the seizure of Turkey (Syria,
Mesopotamia) and part of Russia (Siberia, Arkhangel'sk, Baku, Krasnovodsk, Ashkhabad,
etc) by the French, British and American capitalists when we see the steadily
growing animosity over division of plundered booty between Italy and France, between
France and Great Britain, between Great Britain and America, and between America and
Japan."25
V. I. Lenin linked the struggle in Turkestan with the overall aims of the inter-
ventionists and domestic counterrevolution to strangle Soviet rule throughout our
country. He exposed the atte~pts by international imperialism to transform
Turkestan into a colony, t~ detach its peoples from the peoples of the land of the
Soviets.
- V. I. ?..~nin substantiated in a scientific manner the causative factors behind the
victory of the working people of the land of the Soviets in the civil war. Lenin
stated at the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples
of the East: "Revolutionary war, when it genuinely involves and interests the
oppressed worker masses, when it makes them conscious of the fact that they are
struggling against the exploiters... such a revolutionary war generates energy and
the ability to work wonders."26 V. I. Lenin pointed out that convincing the masses
through their own experience of the correctness and viability of party policy is of
enormous significance for victory in war. He believed that one of the decisive
causative factors in victory over external and domestic counterrevolution in the
former colonia? outlying regions was implementation of the principles of proletarian
internationalism and practical implementation of the party's nationalities policy.
In connection with this V. I. Lenin stated: "It is particularly necessary to be
cautious in regard to various nations, for there is nothing worse than a nation's
distrust."27 Appealing directly to the Comnrunists of Turkestan and to the of-
ficials of the RKP(b) Central Committee Turkburo in connection with discussion of
the Turkestan question in the party Central Co~ittee in 1921, V. I. Lenin stated:
"...It is extremely important /to eann/the trust of the indigenous population; to
earn it 3 and 4 times over; /to prove/ that we are /not/ imperialists, that we shall
/not/ tolerate a/deviation/ in that direction."28 V. I. I.enin emp~hasized that a
correct nationalities policy in Turkestan "is a question of worldwide importance,
worldwide without any exaggeration," and that it would have enormous significance
for our "Weltpolitik."29
OE great importance for understanding the content of the party's campaign to resolve
the nationalities question in Central Asia are the RSFSR SNK [Council of Peop]e~ Camris~
s:~Jdec:ree dated 8 October 1919 on establishment of the Turkestan Commission,
signed by V. I. Lenin, and his letter "To the Co~?unist Comrades of Turkestan." Of
great theoretical and methodological interest is an RKP(b) Central Committee �
Politburo draft decree, signed by V. I. Lenin on 22 June 1920, on the tasks of the
Communist Party in Turkestan. Nine days prior to this, on 13 June, V. I. Lenin had
made frank and firm comments on the draft decree, prepared by a Central Committee
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F'OR OF'FICIAL I
commission. They are grounded on the idea of broadening the rights and obligations
of Turkestan soviet and party agencies and all-out enlistfient of the worker masses
of local nationalities in building a Soviet State.30 In parzicular, the draft
decree provided for equalizing land ownership by Russian settlers and the working
people of local nationalities by expropriating unlawfully seized land from the
kulak-colonialists and expelling colonialist-counterrevolutionaries from the
_ republic.31 V. I. Lenin specified that the activities of the Communist Party of
Turkestan should be directed toward liquidating the colonial and patriarchal-
fe~dal legacy .
On 29 June 1920 the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo adopted on the basis of
Lenin's draft decree four decrees on the tasks of the RKP(b) in Turkestan.
V. I. Lenin stressed the enormous international significance of victory in the civil
war in Central Asia. At the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations
of the Peoples of the East, he stated: "I believe that the fact that the Red Army
has emerged victorious, its struggle and the history of its victory will be of
immense, worldwide significance for all the peoples of the East."32
Lenin's ideas pertaining to Central Asia provide a methodological foundation for
studying the history of the defeat of the basmachi. Lenin's approach to analysis
of Central Asian realities is an example of rigorous historicity, an objective
and party approach in investigating the history of the class struggle in Central
Asia.
In 1921 V. I. Lenin specifically addressed the question of the basmachi and the
fronts in the Fergana. It is evident from the letter to A. A. Ioffe that he was
requesting detailed materials on the basmachi and the fronts in the Fergana, em-
phasizing that he needed "facts and the precise decisions of the TurkTslK
[Turkestan Central Executive Committee]" on these matters.33 Lenin linked
handling the matter of the basmachi with unswerving practica~ implementation of the
party's nationalities policy; measures pertaining to fu.rthe.r struggle with the
basmachi were to be grounded on thoroughly studied facts and materials.
V. I. Lenin's attention toward the basmachi question in a period when the civil
war had already ended in the country's principal regions attests to the fact that
the party and government leader was maintaining an attention focus on this unique
phenomenon of the class struggle and was taking part in elaboration of ineasures
aimed at crushing the basmachi.
* * *
Lenin's scientific conception of the class struggle and dictatorship of the
- proletariat, as well as the nationalities question is embodied and further
developed in the proceedings of Communist Party congresses and conferences, and in
tlie writings of CPSU leaders.
Documents of the 7th (April) All-Russian Conference of the RSDRP(b) [Russian
~ Social Democratic Workers' Party (of Bolsheviks)], the 7th, 8th, lOth, and llth
party congresses are particularly valuable in examining the problem of defeating the
basmact~i .
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rvn vr~ :...~na.
The 7th ((1pri1) All-Russian Conference of the RSDRP in 1917 adopted a resolution
written by Lenin, containing the following points of party nationalities policy:
on the right of nations to separation and the advisability of such separation at a
given moment, on regional autonomy and establishment of unified proletarian or-
ganizations in Russia. The conference pointed out that the advisability of
separation of individual parts of Russia would be determined "completely in-
dependently in each individual case, from the standpoint of the interests of so-
cietal development as a whole and the interests of the class struggle of the
proletariat for socialism."34 "The interests of the worker class," stated the
conference resolutions, "demand merging of the workers of all the nationalities of
Russia in unified proletarian organizations, political, occupational, cooperative-
educational, etc. Only such a merging in unified organizations by the workers of
the various nationalities enables the proletariat to wage a victorious str+aggle
against international capital and bourgeois nationalism."35
The conference resolutions are fundamental in examining matters connected with the
struggle agairmt the "Kokand Autonomy" and in settling the question of the party's
struggle against nationalist-deviationists, for ideological-organizational consolida-
tion of its ranks, and for establishment of a unif ied Turkestan Communist Party.
The 8th RKP(b) Congress, which adopted the second party program, demanded the fol-
lowing in the area of national relations: In order to overcome the distrust on the
part of the worker masses in oppressed countries toward the proletariat of the
nations which had been oppressing these countries, it is essential to end any and
all privileges of any ethnic group, to achieve full equality of nations, and to~~36 '
acknowledge the right of separate statehood to colonies and unequal nations.... i
The resolutions of the 8th RKP(b) Congress indicated that correct resolution of the i
peasant and nationalities questions played a primary role in the struggle against ~
the class enemies in the predominantly peasant outlying regions with a multinational !
t
population. ~
Proclaiming, on the basis of the congress resolutions, firm implementation of a ;
policy of a strong alliance between the proletariat and the middle peasants, the
Turkestan Communist Party sought to draw the middle-peasant masses of the multina-
tional peasantry over to the side of the Soviet authorities and to detach from
the basmachi and the counterrevolutionary Cossacks that segment of the middle
peasantry which had been provoked and incited to turn against the Soviet authorities.
Of great importance for the Turkestan Communist Party, just as for the entire party,
was the resolution of the 8th Congress on the military question. In the specific
conditions of the initial phase of the civil war in Turkestan, where elements of a
guerrilla movement were particularly strong, and where in some units the election
of command and political personne~ was still being practiced, this congress resolu-
tion signified intensification of the struggle to establish a disciplined regular
army, capable of crushing the interventionists and domestic counterrevolutian.
The resolution of the lOth Congress of the RKP(b) entitled "On Current Party Tasks
in the Nationalities Question 3~ and the 12th Congress resolution entitled "On the
Nationalities Question"38 have direct application to the history of Central Asia.
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Of particular importance is that part of the resolution of the lOth RKP(b) Congress
which deals with the degree of capita~ist development of the peoples of Central Asia,
the significance of the experience of the socialist revolution for these peoples,
and dealing with federation, and where the congress formulates the party`s current
tasks regarding the nationalities question. The lOth Party Congress stressed that
the great achievements of the October Revolution had undermined the old ethnic
hostility, had given the Russian warkers the trust of their brothers of different
nationalities, and had "brought this trust to an enthusiasm, to a willingness ta
fight for the co~on cause."39
The 12th RKP(b) Congress demonstrated the great importance of the military alliance
of peoples which had bsen establishe~ during the years of the civil war: "The vic-
tory of the Soviets and consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat con-
stitute that base, that foundation on which fraternal cooperation of peoples in a
common political union can be built."40
The resolutions of the lOth and llth party congresses contain a Marxist definition
of the essence of deviations toward great-power chauvinism and local bourgeois na-
tionalism.
V. I. Lenin's letter entitled "On the Question of Nationalities or on 'Autcnomiza-
tion'," sent to the Politburo, was read to the delegations to the 12th Party Con-
gress. Pursuant to Lenin's instructions, a number of fundamentally important
changes and addenda were incorporated into the draft congress resolution on the
nationalities question. Advancing and substantiating the idea of establishment of
the USSR, Lenin appealed for a determined struggle against nationalism and pointed
out that genuine internationalism is tested by how resolutely actual inequality of
peoples is liquidated.
Thus the resolutions of the lOth and 12th party congresses, which took place after
the civil war ended, arm the historian with fundamental theses on root questions
pertaining to the course and results of the civil war.
Frank and firm assessments of the problems with which this book deals are contained
in documents of the Communist parties of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm, and of
party executive agencies of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. The tasks
of the struggle against the basmachi at various historical stages were specified
in accountability reports to party congresses and in special reports (for example,
at the Sixth Congress of the KPT [Communist Party of Turkestan]).
* * *
The history of the civil war in Central Asia is dealt with in the writings of V. V.
Kuybyshev, Ya. E. Rudzutak, I. V. Stalin, M. V. Frunze, D. A. Kunayev, and Sh. R.
Rastiidov.
, Articles by I. V. Stalin entitled "A Current Task," "To the Soviets and Party Or-
ganizations of Turkestan," "Our Tasks in the East," plus certain others, written at
the behest of the RKP(b) Central Committee and RSFSR Narkomnats [People's Commis-
sariat for Nationalities Affairs], specifically formulated party tasks which during
the civil war years were carried out by local party and soviet organizations in
Turkestan.
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Cuided by the instruction:s of the RKP(b) Central Committee and V. I. Lenin on the
necessity of developing special methods for the campaign to consolidate Soviet power
in the East, I. V. Stalin specifies three ma-Ln tasks: the struggie against vestiges
of colonialism and local bourgeois nationalism, implementatian of the principies of
Soviet autonomy, aid organizational-ideological strengthening of the Turkestan Com-
munist ~arty.41
When they were in Turkestan, M. V. Frunze, V. V. Kuybyshev, and Ya. E. Rudzutak42
frequently presented reports and gave speeches at meetings of party activists, con-
ferences, and at gatherings of the republic's workix~g people. In addition, they
jointly wrote a number of appeals to the peoples of Central Asia and the servicemen
of Turkestan, which are of considerable interest for understanding the essence of
the basmachi.43
Clearly expressed in the writings of M. V. Frunze, V. V. Kuybyshev and Ya. E.
Rudzutak dealing with Central Asia is the,idea that ideological-organizational
strengthening of the Turkestan Communist Party can be achieved only in an uncom-
promising struggZe against great-power chauvinism and local bourgeois nationalism.
The most important Lask of Turkestan's Bolsheviks in the process of this struggle
should be li.quidation of all manifestations of ethnic inequalitq and extensive
recruitment of the working people of local nationalities to active p~rticipation in
all areas of governmental and cultural-poliCical affairs.
- The Red Army came to Central Asia to assist the peoples of Turkestan in their
struggle against the united forces of the White Gu~rdists, basmachi and British
interventionists. It would be able to accomplish its liberation mission if
representatives of the working people of the indigenous nationalities of Central
Asia, which czarism had in the past not trusted with arms, are recruited into its
ranks. In a report presented at the Fifth Regional Party Conference (January 1920),
V. V. Kuybyshev pointed out that recruitment of working people of the indigenous
nationalities into the Red Army was directly linked with the question of national
self-determination. Exposing the great-power chauvinists and local bourgeois
nationalists, M. V. Frunze and V. V. Kuybyshev upheld the internationalist prin-
ciples of building armed forces in Zurkestan.
The struggle against the basmachi could be successful only on the basis of unity
and combining combat operations by Red AYmy units with political work among the
Uzbeks and other indigenous nationalities, aimed at enlisting them into the active
struggle against the basmachi bands. These ideas were clearly formulated by M. V.
Frunze in his appeal to the working people of the Fergana Valley.44
A most important task of Turkestan's economy was reestablishment of the devastated
cotton growing industry. M. V. Frunze, V. V. Kuybyshev, and especially Ya. E.
Rudzutak linked the restoration of cotton growing with the necessity of providing
raw cotton to the textile industry of the RSFSR and of raising the living standards
of the peasants. Ya. E. Rudzutak substantiated Turkestan economic policy in the
war years in his report at the Fifth Regional Party Conference and in several other
speeches.
Key problems of the history of the peoples of Central Asia are discussed in the
writings of L. I. Brezhnev. The most important questions pertaining to building a
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nation and state in the USSR and the forming of a new social and international
_ community the Soviet people are stated and resolved in his reports, speeches
and articles. L. I. Brezhnev pointed out that in our country the nationalities
question, in the form in which we inherited it from the prerevolutionary past, has
- been settled completely, finally and irrzvocably.45 Vital theoret~Lcal problems of
proletarian and socialist internationalism and problems of ~trengthening the
friendship among the peoples of the USSR are elaborated in the book.s of D. A.
Kunayev and Sh. Rashidov.46 Their writings also define the directi~ns of
development of. historical research in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
The works of ~:rominent party leaders not only contain valuable factual material
but also methodologically arm the investigator in interpreting fundamental questions
_ pertaining to histor,y of the civil war in Cen~ral Asia.
The historical experience of the struggle against the basmachi is discussed in
speeches and wr..itings of party and government officials of Central Asia: K. Atabayev,
Yu. Akhunbabayev, I. A. Zalenskiy, A. Ikramov, T. Ryskulov, N. ~urakulov, F.
Khodzayev, and others.47
,
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r~K urr~~~A~ u~~ .rvLr
"FORMER SLAVES BEC~1ME FREE"
~ A Land Where Lawlessness Ruled
Central Asia stretches thousands of kilometers from the Caspian Sea to Lake
Issyk-Kul', from the Aral and the K~zakh steppes to the Pamirs. On the East it
borders with China, and on t~ie South with Iran and Afghanistan.
Central A~ia contains an amazing diversity of natural, ethnographic, socineco-
nomic, and historical cond;tions. 8andy deserts stretching thousands of versts,
and majestic ranges of lof~y mountains crowned by glaciers.... Lifeless takyrsl
- and oases whicl~ astound the visitor with a fabulous wealth of flora and fauna....
. Swiftly flowing rivers and the mirrored surface of salt lakes...~ The whimsical,
intricately-patterned tiles of the beautiful buildings of Samarkand, Bukhara,
and Khiva, and the manotony of squat duv3ls, adobe dwellings and impoverished
kishlaks [villages~....
Before the Great October Socialist Revolution the greater part of Central Asia
was encompassed within Turkestanskiy K ra y,2 with a population of approximate-
ly 5.25 million.3 Turkestan covered an area of approximately 1.8 million
square versts, equal to twc thirds of the territory of European Russia. The
territory of Turkestan was lar.ger than that of Germany, Austro-Hungary, Italy
and France combined.
This was a multinational region. Uzbeks, Kirghi~, Kazakhs, Turkmens,Tajiks,
and Kara-Kalpaks lived in this region, but no nationality comprised an over-
whelming majority. Ru~sians, Ukrainians, and representatives of other peoples
of European Russia began settling in Turkestan in the latter half of the 19th
century, chiefly in the cities. By 1917 they comprised approxirately 4 per-
cent of the region's population.
The lands of the Bukhara emirate and the Khiva khanate were situated in the
Amu Darya basin, from the Afghan border to the Aral Sea. Whi'e Turkestanskiy
K r a y was a component of the Russian empire, Bukhara and Khiva ~ere vass al
states, which maintained r~lative independence in their internal affairs.
Census counts were not taken in Bukhara and Khiva. It was believed that on the
eve of the revolution approximately 3 million persons were living under the
rule of the emir of Bukhara, while the Khiva khan had 600-900 thousand subjects 4
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At the beginning of the pre.ent century Central Asia's indus~ridl centers,
which were few in number, had as neighbors areas in which a clan-tribal system
prevailed, and cities a thousand Sears old contained newly-built railway
stations. Densely-populated valleys alternated with uninhabited mountain
ranges, and centers of ancient agricul~ure with an elaborate system of irriga-
tion works alternated with barren steppes across which nomadic hexdsmen
wandered.
Turkestan was a backward region. The overwhelming ma~ority of the population
engaged in agriculture. Factory industry was of a typical colonial character.
It was represented chiefly by small enterprises engaged in the primary process-
ing of agricultural raw materials (cotton ginning, oilseed processing, leather
tanning, etc).5 Railroad shops and enginehouses began to be built in connec-
tion with railway construction.
Dekhkan peasant farmers, who comprised the majority of the region's population,
were the vic+tims of double oppression by the local bai and the czarist
colonialists. By 1917 64.5 percent of settled farmers owned 2 desyatinas (d=
1.09254 ha] or less, that is, fell within the poor-peasant category. Approxi-
mately 15 percent af the dekhkans iiad no tillable land at all, and 35.5 percent
had no working livesto ck. The peasants were becoming impoverished and falling
into servitude to the bai and the usurers.
The overwhelming majority of nomadic herdsmen (almost 34 percent of all house-
holds) were also living in great penury: 11.2 percent of the nomads possessed
no livestock at all. At the same time the feudal-bai elite (siightly more than
3 percent of households) owned 30-40 percent of the stock.
The lot of the emerging Central Asian proletariat was not an easy one. Except
for the skilled-labor segment of the railway workers, the majority of worke~s
were toiling for pennies and working in the most difficult conditions.6 The
majority of the railway workers were Russians, while in industry there were 70
representatives of local nationalities (chiefly Uzbeks and Ta~iks) for every
100 Russians.
Working conditions were truly barbaric. Here are two examples. V. V.
Zaorskaya and K. A. Aleksander, who made a epecial study of factory-type enter-
pris~s in Turkeatan, wrote that the length of the workday was virtually un-
specified, that people worked from dawn to dusk.~ In December 1909 the news-
paper TURKESTANSKIY KUR'YER described a cotton ginning mill as follows: "In the
mill building, in the ginning department, there is always an incredible
amount of dust in the air; there are 3-4 hanging-type lanterns wit#~ candle
stubs for the entire mill buildin~, and this is considered illumination; as a
- consequence workers are forced to grope their way through the darkness through-
out practically the entire mill, holding a bit of cotton wadding in their
teeth to filter the dusty air as they breathe in.... Every week there occurs a
worker accident at practically every one of the mills, resulting in serious in-
jury and sometiunes death."8
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cvn vrr?~.ar+~. a..~a. ..,~a.~
Ttie population of Turkestanskiy K r ay lacked elementary political rights.
Czarist officials treated representatives of local nationalities as "aliens,"
as'~econd-class citizens," and burdened them with unbearable taxes.
- The cultural backwardness of the population was staggering. The people were
illiterate almost to a man. In the few schools which did exist, classes were
taught primarily in Russian, while Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kirghiz, Turkmens,and
Kazakhs comprised an infinitesimal percentage of those enrolled in school.
There was not even the faintest semblance of a modern health care system in the
region. Doctors practiced only in the cities, while in the kishlaks there
- was absolutely no medical care in the modern sense of the word. It is not
surprising that the coffinon diseases of man were widespread trachoma,
scabies, malaria, tuberculosis, guinea worms, and favus. Occasionally
epidemics of typhus, smallpox and dysentery would break out.
The despotic medieval states the Bukhara emirate and the Khiva khanate
were even more backward in all respects. Time seemed to have come to a stand-
still here. Social and societal re.lations were of a stagnant feudal character.
In the Bukhara emirate more than 85 percent of land under cultivation belonged
to secular and ecclesiastical feudal lords and emir officials. In the Khiva
khanate almost 95 percent of irrigated land was in their hands. The dekhkan
toiled under the burden of feudal exploitation. He surrendered a large part of
his harvest to the emir or khan as a feudal tax, and he bore the burdens of
corvee labor and numerous other obligations. In Bukhara more than 50 different
types of levies and taxes were exacted from the peasants.
Bureaucrats did not receive a regular salary. All officials from provincial
governors (khakims and beks) to the lowliest copy clerk (mirza) lived off '
the general public. Coercion, despotism, extortion and bribery reached
enormous dimensions under such a system. This barbaric system was based on the
despotic rule of the emir and khan, a rule of frightening and ruthless power.
People were subjected to public execution in the cruelest forms for the slight-
est offense, not m mention dia~bedience: offenders would be cast down from
high minarets o n t o stone slab~, ar hung on hooks. Thousands of prisoners
languished in underground prisons zindans swarming with poisonous snakes
and scorpions. Cutting off the tongue was a common punishment.
Outstanding Soviet writer and scholar Sadriddin Ayni, who spent his youth in
Bukhara, portrays a public punishment on Bukhara's Registan. He relates how
courtiers of the emir cantered out onto the crowded square by the Palace of the
Emirs. "The horsemen were all asparkle in their silken, gold-cloth and satin
gowns, belts studded with gold and silver disks and coins. Daggers in gold or
silver sheaths swayed from their belts." Grooms running alongside the stirrups
pushed aside the common people in their threadbare gowns and drove back the
beggars. Covered with favus scabs and ashes from head to foot," the beggars
were without trousers or shirts "a rope girdled their wai.st, holding a
tattered rag in place of a frontpiece, while a dirty, torn gown hung from
their shoulders...."
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The ~omman3er 4f the guard "prince of the night" called for the "execu-
tors of the emir's wrath" the executioners. A orisoner was led out. His
hands were tied behind his back. The executioners ripped off the prisoner's
gown and proceeded to beat his bare back with cornel-wood sticks. "At each blow
skin would adhere to the stick, and blood would spatter out from the wound in
all directions. After the 75th lash... the persons holding the prisoner flung
his battered body onto the ground...."
The condemned man's hands were bound in front of him. The prisoner was led
_ up to a pit in the ground. "One of the executioners, brandishing a small
cudgel, appruached him in a leisurely and businesslike manner. Swinging his
cudgel, he struck the prisoner in the shins. The prioner fell face down into
_ the black Glay. The executioner grabbed him by the beard and forced his head
into the clay. The second executioner drew from a stieath a shortish knife with
a narrow blade. After dispatching the prisoner, he wiped the blade clean on
the condemned man's gown and returned it to its sheath."
Standing behind the glass door of the Ark (palace), the emir was observing the
execution.9
Tne peoples of Central Asia had no national statehood. They were administra-
tively disunited. A portion of the Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens were residents of
= Turkestanskiy Kray, others were subjectsof the Bukhara e~?irate, and still
others of the Khiva khanate.
The czarist government preserved and promoted disunification of the peoples of
Central Asia and sought to keep them in darkness and ignorance. The Muslim
clergy was enormously influential. Religious traditions and medieval customs,
passed on from generation to generation, had taken deep root in the masses.
Women were relegated to the status of slaves and had no rights whatsoeve=.
The paranja a black robe which fully covered the face was a symbol of the
status of women in those years. A Muslim woman not wearing the paranja was un-
thinkable in prerevolutionary times....
Dawn of a New Life
Double oppression national and social made life unbearable for the work-
ing people of Central Asia. Conditions in the region were becoming ripe for
a revolutionary, liberation struggle.
There was only one road to national and social liberation. This was the road
of socialist revolution, under the guidance of Russia's worker class and its
party, the Co~unist Party. But the Russian proletariat could carry out its
historic mission, overthrow the rule of czarism and the bourgeoisie, only in
alliance with the toiling peasantry and the multimillion masses of oppressed
nationalities. In such a country as Russia, revolution inevitably had to in-
volve the working people of all nationalities. Without this it could not
count on success.
Therefore V. I. Lenin, preparing the party for a determined assault on capital-
ism, tirelessly stressed the necessity of an alliance between the revolutionary
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. . .
proletariat and en~laved peoples. "...We must /link/ the revolutionary
struggle for sociaYism with a revolutionary program on the nationalities
question,"10 he wrote in 1915.
The situation in Turkestan worsened sharply during the years of World War I.
From 1915 through 3917 land under crops shrank by almost a million desyatinas.
In 1917 the gross harvested cotton crop totaled 7,845,000 poods as compared
with 14,900,000 in 1916 and 20,51$,000 in 1915.11 Prices on manufactured goods a~
foodstuffs jumped sharply.
~ When the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia took place in February 1917
and the strongh~ld of the autocracy fell, the Cotmnunist Party appealed to all
working people to continue the struggle. The workers of Russia, heeding
Lenin's appeal and setti.ng a course tc~ward socialist revolution, were strength-
ening the alliance with the oppressed peoples of the outlying regions, who were
beginning to realize that theirs was a common path with the Russian workers and
peasan*_s the path of struggle, both against the Russian imperialist
bourgeoisie and against "their own" counterrevolution.
A great many facts attested to the growing unity of the working people of the
various nationalities throughout the country, a unity under the red banner.
This process also enveloped Central Asia.
Here are some examples. We are in Tashkent, on 1 May 1917. The working
people are celebrating their holiday. Throughout the city work comes to a halt,
commercial establishments close down, and streetcars grind to a halt. Demon-
strators Russian workers take to the streets. But they are not alone.
The Uzbek working people have also ~oined the May Day demonstration! The
columns of demonstrators merge, marching together through the city; 3oint
political rallies are held, at which both Russians and Uzbeks speak.
A revolutionary political rally is held in the Kazakh village of Merke, in
Auliye-Atinskiy uyezd. A person who was present at that rally relates: "...A
throng of Muslims appeared in the distance... led by red flags bearing freedom
slogans.... The Russian populace proceeded toward them and, when both groups '
came to a halt, the scene was so moving that tears of joy poured from the eyes
of many; freedom songs rang out on both sides, after which their (the par-
ticipants in the demonstration) aspirations were pro~laimed with shouts of
'hurrah'."12
The Provisional Government a worthy successor to czarism refused the
peoples equality. The names of the administrative agencies in Turkestan
changed, but the working people did not receive any rights. The Turkestan
Committee, an agency of the Provisional Government which replaced the governor
general's administration, continued a policy of national oppres~ion.
The masses saw as the only answer an increasingly more vigorous struggle
against national-colonial oppression, for freedom and equality.
The national bourgeoisie stood as an obstacle on the path of the liberation
movement of peoples. Bourgeois nationalists sought to seize control af the
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movement. They wanted peoples to be isolated and ~~et apart; they greatly
feared establishment of unity between "their" working people and the Russian
proletariat. Seeking to perpetuate the exploiter system, they hated the
revolu~ion. This hatred was leading them to form a de facto alliance with the
great-power Russian bourgeoisie and was nudging them toward a deal with it.
The Central Council in the Ukraine,'Shura-i-Islam" and "Shura-i-Ulema" in
Central Asia, "Alash" in Kazakhstan, the Dashnaks, followers of the Musavat,
and Georgian Mensheviks, under the cover of the "national flag," fcught
desperately against the revolution and betrayed the interests of their peoples.
They claimed to support national equality, however, and made every effort to
demonstrate their allegiance to the ideas of freedom and equality. At first
the bourgeois nationalists succeeded in gaining the support of a certain part
of the population ir~ the national regions, including in Central Asia.
The Bolsheviks of Russia stepped up their activities among the oppressed
peoples, uniting them under the slogan of proletarian internatior.alism, and
arousing them to struggle against the Russian and local exploitr:rs, for na-
tional and social liberation.
The struggle of Russia's worke- _~ass was crowned with a great victory. Power
went into the hands of the working people on 25 October (7 November) 1917.
The Great October Socialist Revolution became a revolution for all the peoples
of Russia. Participants at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which
proclaimed Soviet rule= included represe~ntatives of the overwhelming majority
of gubernias and cities, as well as en~ioys of the principal national regions.
Delegates from the Ukraine and Belorur;sia, Revel and Dvinsk, Baku and Tiflis,
Tashkent and Kazan', Izhevsk and Sarunsk, together with delegates f_rom
- Petrograd, Moscow, the Urals, and Siberia, convening in the white-columned
hall at Smol'nyy, in free declaration of their wishes, ushered in a new era
in the history of mankind.
The storm of revolution smashed the chains which had fettered the peoples of
Russia. The immortal lines of the Peace Decree and the Land Decree were
followed by the moving words of the Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of
Russia. The liberation of the peoples of Russia from bondage "shall be car:-ied
out resolutely and irrevocably," the declaration stated. Four terse points in
the declaration embodied the dreams of peoples:
"1) Equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia.
2) The right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, in-
cluding separation and formation of an independent state.
3) Abolition of any and all n~ational and ethnic-religious limitations
and restrictions.
4) Free development of the national minorities and ethnic groups in-
tiabiting the territory of Ru~sia."13

~
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l' Vn Vl ~~~..~A~+ v.~a. ~/t ~~LJ l
Millions of people who until recently had been deprived of all rights ap- '
peared before the ~orld as fighters and builders, inspired by the Bolshevik
truth, awakened to a new life, realizing that national equality is inseparably
linked with social liberation. Ruling nations and oppressed nations had ceased
to exist in Ruasia.
The socialist revolution gained victory comparatively rapidly in the majority
of areas of Central Asia.
Following the example of the Petrograd workers, revolutionary sailors and
soldiers, the working people of Central Asia, led by the Bolsheviks, took power
into their own hands. At dawn on 28 October 1917,whistles blowing at Tashkent's
railway shops announced the beginning of an armed uprising against the
Provisional Government. The counterrevolutionary troops of General Korovichenko
were defeated after four days of pitched battle. Soviet rule was proclaimed in
the main city of Turkestanskiy Kray Tashkent. ,
The Soviets seized power almost simultaneously in a number of other towns
Kushka, Krasnovodsk, Termez, etc. In the course of the next few weeks Soviet
power gained victory in Dzhizak and Samarkand, Merv and Charjui, and sub-
sequently in the cities and towns of the Fergana Valley.
Russians and Uzbeks, Turkmens aid Tajiks, Kazakhs and Kirghiz worked shoulder to ;
shoulder in the struggle for establishment of Soviet rule. Uzbeks railway '
workers, tramway workers, etc fought selflessly against the counterrevolu- . ~
tion in Tashkent. "The workers of Tashtram, Russians and Uzbeks," recalled ;
Shamurza Khalmukhamedov, a participant in the uprising, who was working at the ~
time as a st~eetcar conductor,'tose up as one against the bourgeois Provisional ~
Government."14 At the decisive moment in the Tashkent armed uprising, armed ~
Uzbek volunteers fought their way out of the old city and came to the aid of ~
the workers who were fighting off fierce enemy attacks on the railway shops. ;
The thoughts and feelings of the working people were expressed by a resolution
issued by the workers of an industrial enterprise, adopted in December 1917.
"We, Muslim workers at the Khodzhayev Plant," the resolution stated, "have unan-
imously resolved to support by all the means in our possession the worker
government the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies and we extend to
it a fraternal calloused hand which has been exploited for more than 50 years
b�~ the kulaks, bai and government officials henchmen of Nicholas II. We
~zxtend a hand to the Russian proletariat, whom we benighted Muslims view as the
true defender of the worker and toiler class, which has liberated us from the
government official's whip and the bai's fist. We march shoulder to shoulder
with the Russian proletariat and protest against attempts by the bourgeoisie to
disunite us.... We understand quite well who is our friend, and who is our
foe, and we shall not swallow the bait offered by the servitors of tYc~ old
regime."15
By the spring of 1918 the red banner of Soviet rule was waving over the
principal areas of Central Asia from Kushlca to the Aral Sea, from the Fergana to
the Caspian.
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Th~ exploiters were still in power, howPver, in the Bukhara emirate and the
Khiva khanate. The masses there we.re not_ yet adequately prepared to assault the
old regime. They finally achieved victory in 1920.
The dawn of a new life was beginning on the territory of Soviet Turkestan. In
November 1917 the 3d Regaial Congress of Soviets elected a Turkestan regional
council of people's commissars. Soviets began gradually ~pp~aring in
rural localities as well volost', kishlak, and aul soviets. Historic docu-
ments of Soviet power were published in the locai press Lenin's peace and
land decrees, the declaration of rights of the peoples of Russia, and the ap-
peal "To All Muslim Toilers* of Russia and the East." The Turkestan Sovnarkom
[Council of People's Co~nissars] endeavored to be guided in its activities by
these documents. It informed Petrograd that it was setting for itself the task
of implementing the decrees of the Soviet Government.
The Fifth Congress of Soviets of Turkestan (20 April-1 May 1918) proclaimed an
autonomous Soviet republic.
"1. The territory of Turkestanskiy K r ay," stated the document adopted
at the Congress, "is hereby declared to be the Turkestan Soviet Republic of the
Russian Soviet Federation. The Turkestan Republic shall include the entire
land of Turkestan within its geographic boundaries, excluding Khiva and
Bukhara....
2. The Turkestan Soviet Federative Republic, while governing itself
autonomously, recognizes and shall coordinate its actions with the central
government of the Russian Soviet Federation."16
Soviet authorities in Turkestan nationalized industrial enterprises, establish-
ing a socialist structure within the economic system. An 8-hour workday was
immediately adopted. New laws were promulgated in the area of social in-
surance and labor protection, new courts were established, and measures were
taken to organize free medical care and establish a system of public education.
_ Work began on building up productive resources and developing the ecoaomy. On
17 May 1918 V. I. Lenin signed the RSFSR Sovnarkom decree entitled "On Alloca-
tion of 50 Million Rubles for Irrigation Projects in Turkestan and Organization
of These Projects."17 ~
Socialist construction was taking place more and more extensive in ~he cities,
towns, communities, and kishlaks of Central Asia, involving millions of working
people. A bright future lay ahead for these masses, w~o had until quite recent-
ly been downtrodden and deprived of rights. For the first time in history they
_ had the opportunity to build a new life, to build with their own hand,, to
build for themselves.
*[used here and henceforth to render the Russian term trudyashchiyesya, which
extend5 to peasants and other "workers" to whom the term rabochiy, "worker,"
does not apply.~
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ruK vrri~,~w~. UJG v~...~
Following the October Revolution V. I. Lenin advanced the task of "raising18p
the lowest strata of society to take part in a historic building process.
This task was being successfully accomplished throughout the country, including
in Central Asia.
The "lowest strata" toiling Uzbeks, Tajirs, Kir~hiz, Turkmens,Kazakhs, and
Kara-Kalpaks proceeded with building a new life, shoulder to shoulder
with the workers and peasants of the entire country. They boldly joined the
tanks of fighters for socialism and welcomed the victorious revolution.
Their mood was expressed by Sadriddin Ayni in the famous "Freedom March":
0 slaves! Rise up from the dust,
Illuminating the world with the Red Banner!
Cast down the yoke of submissiveness and fear
The d_wn of freedom has broken.
We shall scatter dejection and grief,
We shall dissipate falsehood as smoke,
Through the boundless expanses of the entire world
We shall estab~ish justice forever.lg
His words were seconded in the far-off Pamirs by one of the few inhabitants who
knera how to read and write, Mukhabbat Shakh-zade, in a poem dedicated to the es-
tablishment of Soviet rule in mountainous Badakhshan:
i
...Former slaves have become free, ~
The weary have straightened their shoulders i
The traces of sorrow are filling with dust.~0 ;
i
The socialist revolution in Turkestan was a component part of the socialist ~
revolution in Russia. The Communist Party was able to create an allia nce of
working people (for the most part peasants) of different nationalities with the ;
Russian worker class. New opportunities, unprecedented in history, opened up
for the peoples of Central Asia to transition to socialism, bypassing the
capitalist stage of development.
Due to a number of historical and economic conditions, however, the socialist
- revolution and the building of socialism encountered additional, specific dif-
ficulties in Central Asia.
The camp which was hostile to Soviet rule contained, alongside Russian factory ,
owners and bankers, local exploiter strata: feudal lords, bai, the bourgeoisie,
the reactionary Muslim clergy and their nationalistic counterrevolutionary
parties ("Shura-i-Islam," "Alash," and others). Soviet rule was op -
posed by representatives of the kulak-colonialist elite and the colonial ad-
ministrative edifice. The officer and kulak stratum within the Cossacks
(Semirech'ye, Orenburg, Aral) also sought to destroy the achievements of the
revolution. The former exploiter classes Russ:ian ar.3 local indigenous
proceeded to form a united alliance, in spite of the fact of certain con-
flicts between them.
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Although Soviet rule had removed the underpinnings of ethnic hostility,
czarism and the Great-Russian bourgeoisie had left in Turkestan "a darkness of
animosity toward and distrust of the Great Russians."21 This distrust, which
had been taking root for decades and which had been rekindled by nationalists
af ter the October Revolution, could not be eliminated immediately. Counter-
revolutionaries made use of it for the struggle against Soviet rule.
,
One must also bear in mind the fact that the ~eftist Socialist Revolutionary
Party, which shared agencies of Soviet authority in the Turkestan Republic on
a parity basis with the Bolsheviks, utilized for their own purposes the in-
adequate ideological and organizational conditioning of the Bolshevik organiza-
tions of Turkestan.
While in the central parts of the country the left Socialist Revolutionaries
remained in executive Soviet ager.cies only up to the Treaty of Brest Litovsk,
in Turkestan, as a consequence of their influence on a certain segment of the
workers, not to mention the petit-bourgeois strata of the population, they
participated in the activities of the Soviets during the entire year 1918 and
at the beginning of 1919. The left Socialist Revolutionaries, sometimes
openly, but for the most part covertly, assisted the class enemy in the
struggle against the dictatorship of the proletariat.
The dominance of feudal and patriarchal-clan relations impeded class differen-
tiation and growth of class conscinusness on the part of the working peop?�~.
To this was added the economic backwardness of the region, the small numbE.,s
and weakness of the national proletariat, the dominance of the Muslim religion,
and enormous cultural backwardness.
It was more difficult to establish an alliance between the proletariat and the
peasantry of other nationalities than with the peasantry of the same nationali-
' ty. It was more difficult for backward peoples, which had not gone through
the stage of capitalist developmen~t, to proceed toward socialism than ~or
developed peoples.
All this could not halt the advance of the revolution, but it made the
struggle for victory more lengthy, complex, and intense.
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IMPERIALIST INTERVENTION AND CIVIL WAR
Counterrevolutionaries and Interventionists Unleash War ~
The socialist revolution took place with the support and active participation
of the overwhelming majority of the population of Russia. But the classes and
social strata which had previously been in power proceeded to engage ~tn a
tenacaous struggle against the victorious revolution. These were landowners
and capitalists, as well as a substantial segment of czarist officialdom and
the officer corps.
Over the course of a century czarism created unique, privileged military ;
- cadres Cossack troops. Very large in number, they settled over a vast ter- ~
ritory (on the Don, in the Northern Caucasus, Southera Urals, in Semirech'ye, ;
in Siberia and the Far East). Of course a sharp sociopolitical stratification 4
was also taking place among the Cossacks the toiling Cossacks took the side i
of the revolution, but the Cossack leadership elite initially succeeded in ~
leading a certain segment of the toiling Cossacka against Soviet rule. I
osed the revolution Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim ~
The higher clergy opp �
as did the feudal and semifeudal circles in the national outlying regions. ~
Finally, the rural bourgeoisie the kulaks also took an openly anti-Soviet :
position.
The Second Congress of Soviets had barely ended when fighting began on the ap- .
proaches to the revolutionary capital. Former premier kerensky, fleeing �
Petrograd, fomented an insurrection. Together with General Krasnov, he
gathered together several military units and proceeded to march, with the ob- ,
jective of "pacifying" the victorious wnrkers and peasants. The troops of
Kerenski and Krasnov got as far as the close approaches to Petrograd, but they :
were defeated and thrown back by revolutionary workers, sailors, and soldiers.
During the first half of 1918 numerous counterrevolutionary underground organiza- ,
tions plotted conspiracies, insurrections, sabotage, terrorist acts, and en-
gaged in anti-Soviet propaganda. The enemies of the Soviet Republic were work-
ing energetically to form military forces. The so-called Volunteer Army was
organized in the Northern Caucasus, made up of officers supporting the monarchy. ;
It was headed by czarist generals M. V. Alekseyev, L. G. Kornilov, and ~
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A. I. Denikin. Anti-Soviet detachments were formed in Cossack-settlement
areas. '
- Swift crushing of the first attempts by the counterrevolution to unleash a
civil war (the rout of Kerensky-Krasnov at Petrograd, Dutov in the Southern
Urals, and Kaledin on the Don) convincingly demonstrated that the Soviet
authorities, supported by the overwhelming majority of the population, pos-
sessed immeasurable superiority over the forces of counterrevolution.
Nevertheless armed resistance by counterrevolutionaries did not cease. This
was due to the fact that the capitalist nations, engaging in an anti-Soviet
intervention, were opposing the Soviet Republic. The Kingdom of Romania oc-
cupied Bessarabia. British, Japanese, and U.S. interventionist troops were
put ashore in the Soviet North (Murmansk, Arkhangel'sk) and in the Far East
(Vladivostok). At the end of May 1918 the Czechoslovak corps mutinied on the
Middle Volga and in Siberia. Operating jointly with Russian counterrevolu-
tionary forces, the White Czechs captured a number of cities and towns along
the Volga and in Siberia, cverthrowing Soviet rule there.
The interventionists established a regime of terror in the occupied regions.
Communists, Soviet and trade union officials were thrown into jails, concen-
tration camps, and shot.
. Fourteen nations of Europe, North America and Asia took part in the anti-
Soviet intervention. A principal role was played by the major capitalist
powers the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan. And although
during the year following the October Revolution the capitalist world was
split by the continuing war between the Entente on the one hand and Germany
and its allies on the other, the groupings of belligerents were warring
against the Soviet Republic. German and Austro-Hungarian occupation of vast
areas of Russia interwove with the Anglo-French-Japanese-American interven-
tion.
All land and sea lines of communication between Russia and the outside world
were cut. The imperialists established an almost total blockade of the
Soviet Republic. The interventionists united with the White Guardist counter-
revolutionary forces. They supplied them with money and arms and conducted
joint military operations.
By the middle of 1918, when the intervention by the Entente and White Guard
actions began to be conducted on a large scale, the brief respite period of
peace received after the Treaty of Brest Litovsk came to an end. The Soviet
Republic found itself drawn into a war against a foreign invasion and domestic
- counter revo lution. The fate of the peoples of Russia depended on whether the
Soviet Covernment would be able to fight off the onslaught of its enemies and
- defend the cause of the revolution.
The flames of the war forced upon us by the imperialists blazed throughout the
country. A fierce struggle against the interventionists and White Guardists
was raging in the North and South, in the West and East.
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~�vn vt'~'~~..~M~. vuL:. V1rL~
- In the su~uer and fall of 1918 the "Volunteer" Army seized a large part of the
Northern Caucasus. Generals Krasnov and Mamontov fomented a Cossack insurrec-
- r.ion, occupied Donskaya Oblast, and proceeded to advance on Tsaritsyn and
'Joronr~h. The Czechoslovak mutineers and White Guardists occupied the whole of
Siberia and a number of cities along the Volga Samara, Sbmbirsk, and Kazan'.
The young republic was surrounded by a flaming ring of battle fronts. The red
banner of the Soviets now flew only over the comparatively small territory of
Central Russia.
The Soviet State was being put to a severe test. "The greatest honor and
greatest difficulty of being the first socialist detachment in the struggle
against world imperialism fell to our lot,"1 stated V. I. Lenin in July 1918.
The situation in Turkestan was particularly difficult. That region's economic
backwardness and the specific features of the sociopolitical conditions, which
have been discussed above, made the resistance of the exploiters extremely
fierce. ~
Anglo-American imperialism dearly wished to see the overthrow of Soviet rule
- in Turkestan.
Central Asia attracted the foreign imperialists for the same reason that any
co~.onialist casts a covetous eye on foreign seil minerals and agricultural
raw materials (primarily cotton), cheap labor, the region's strategic position,
etc.
To understand the role of the Anglo-American imperialists in unleashing civil
war in Central Asia and in organizing the basmachi, we might draw attention to
certain facts from the history of their penetration into this region. This
penetration followed the classic scheme. First there appeared in Central Asia
"specialists" in "study" of the culture, ways and customs of the "natives,"
instructors in processing of cotton, development of livestock raising, con-
sultants in geological prospecting and railway route surveying, archeology,
etc, as well as journalists and tourists. They would collect and process in-
formation of an economic, political and military character and would send the
collected data on to their masters, who were generously financing their cul-
tural-educational and philanthropic cover activities.
In addition to "KulturtsaeQer," Turkestan attracted businessmen and
entrepreneurs, as well as diplomatic officials, who sought to establish ex-
tensive contacts with the colonial administrative authorities, the owners of
cotton plantations and cotton ginning mills, and the owners of coal mines and
oil wells. It was they who sounded out the ground for obtaining oil con-
cessions, contracts for building railroads, constructing irrigation pro~ects,
etc. And finally, at the end of the last century and the beginning of the
present century, the first foreign commercial and industrial firms began to
appear in Central Asia.
U.S. and British capital sought with particular persistence to get a foothold
in the pearl of the region the Fergana Valley. American and British com-
panies obtained stock in the principal business activities in the Fergana
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Valley. In 1909, for example, the Hoover and Urquhart oil companies purchased
the Maylisay oilfield from Russian entrepreneurs and established the "Fergana
Oil Company."
An American by the name of William May, who settled in Andizhan in 1912, was in-
volved in the Fergana "Turkestan Trade-Industrial Compaay." At his initiative
the company established direct contacts with U.S. industrialists;2 the U.S.-
owned Vacuum Oil Company established a warehouse in Kokand; the Santo Petroleum
and Trade Company, established in 1898 in Fergansk.aya Oblast, was financed by
the Russian General Petroleum Corporation, established ~n London and operating
under British laws; the Chimion Petroleum and Mial~ig Company, established in
1905, was also connected with British capital. ltao thirds of the fixed
capital of the Central Asian Kyzyl-Kiya Coal Company belonged to the Saint
Petersburg International Commercial Bank, which had ties with British, French,
and German capital.4
Shortly before World War I, a branch of the Singer Company was opened in Russia,
with SO million rubles of stock capital. This company maintained representa-
tives, warehouses and stores in almost all the cities and towns of Turkestan.
The conclusion that "the Singer Company's entire vast agent network in
Turkestan did not deal so much in selling sewing machines as in espionage ac-
tivities: the company's agents collected information on the type of occupa-
tions of the population, on the conditioa of the roads, on the size of crops
and livestock herds, on industry and trade"S is quite valid.
Establishment of an extensive network of banks in underdeveloped countries
played a special role in the economic expansionism of the U.S. imperialists.
One of the largest banks in Central Asia the Russo-Asian Bank (established
in 1910, a successor to the former Russo-Chinese Bank, established in 1896),
was closely linked with U.S. financial capital (especially with (Vanderlip) and
Hoover); branches were opened in Tashkent, Samarkand, Kokand, Andizhan,
Margilan, Namangan, Bukhara, Novyy Urgench, Ashkhabad, Merv, and Kerki. These
branch banks contnol]ed the activities of practically all the cotton plantation
owners. The bank acquired a large part of the stock of the Kokand-Namangan
and Tokmak railroads, the Russian Petroleum Company, the Kokand Electric Com-
pany, and the Central Asian Oil Company.6 It was also involved in railroad
construction, in particular construction of the Andizhan-Osh line. Construc-
tion of the Fergana Railroad, which took place during World War I, was sub-
sidized to a considerable degree by U.S. capital.
Following the victory of the October Revolution, the imperialists refused to
abandon their plans of colonial enslavement of Central Asia. They ~re aware of
Turkestan's strategic and geographic gosition. The fact that the ~egion ad-
joined Afghanistan, Persia, China, and India as well as its revolutionizing in-
fluence on the peoples aEthese countries could not help but concern the Anglo-
American colonialists. Closely contiguous to the enslaved East and containing
potential resources for the struggle against imperialism, Turkestan was a
bridge, as it were, linking Soviet Russia to the colonial countries. It was
awakening and calling on oppressed peoples to engage in a resolute struggle
against colonialism, and through its own experience confirmed the necessity and
possibility of destroying this scourge of mankind.
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~ V~~ V~ ~ ~~.~~~u vVa~ V{{~I�
The imperialists' anxiety increased in connection with the first successes
achieved by the young Turkestan Republic in building socialism and co~ence-
ment of accomplishing the tasks, advanced by the Communist Party, of transform-
ing Turkestan into a model republic, into a beacon of socialism in the East.
The consolidation of Soviet power was a deadly threat to the domination of
imperialism in Asia. The imperialists were hoping that, by strangling Soviet
rule in Turkestan, thEy would protect their colonies from Russia's revolution-
izing influence.
In conditions of the commencing civil war Turkestan was also needed by the
imperialists as a bridgehead enabling them to establish a continuous front of
intervention and counterrevolution in the sauthern, southeastern, and eastern
parts of Russia. They figured that armed opposition activities in Turkestan
would force the Soviet Government to deploy considerable military forces into
the region, thus weakening the decisive fronts of the Soviet Republic. The
close proximity of the nation's borders enabled the imperialist forces to
carry out a direct armed incursion, to coaduct aggressive subversive activities,
and to offer every assistance to the counterrevolution.
The basmachi became the shock force of the counterrevolution in the anti-Soviet
struggle which developed in Turkestan.
Near the end of November 1917 Central Asian counterrevolutionaries Russian
and local capitalists, merchants, usurers, feudal lords, the Muslim clergy, and
and nationalist politicia~s proclaimed Turkestan's "autonomy" and formed.
their own "government." The town of Kokand, situated in the Fergana Valley,
became the seat of this "government." Rokand was one of the region's commercial
and industrial centers and a stronghold of t~he Muslim clergy (it contained 382
mosques and 42 medreses [Muslim secondary and higher schools]; there were ap-
proximately 6000 ministers of the Muslim religion in. Kokand); the leading
forces of Turkestan counterrevolution made their way to Kokand after the
victorious October Revolution.
The program of the Kokand "government" called for reestablishme,nt of the Kokand
khanate and organization of a Ceatral Asian caliphate. It also called for
restoration of all types of feudal and capitalist ownership, stripping women
of their rights, reestablishment of the shariah courts, as well as the laws
promulgated by Russia's bourgeois Provisional Government.
Advancing the slogan of "Turkestan autonomy," the exploiter classes were seek-
ing to use for their own purposes the aapiration of the masses toward na-
tional independence. They advocated autonomy only because this was advan-
tageous to them, because the struggle against the power of the toiler masses
could be concealed behind national garb.
The Kokand "autonomists" were supported by the Bukhara emirate and the Khiva
khanate, the Turkestan Socialist Revolutionaries aad Measheviks, the members of
the local "Union of the Russian People," Turkestan Zionist organizations,
and former officials of the Provisional Government. They also established con-
nections with the Kazakh and Bashkir nationalists and with the Ukrainian Rada
~Gouncil], which recognized their "government" as the sole legitimate suthority
Ln Turkestan.
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The "autonomists" also worked in close alliance with other counter.revolutionary
forces, including with czarist Cossack atamans such as A. I. Dutov,~ and with
White Guardist generals the bitterest enemies of any autonomy for the
peoples of Russia.
All this convincingly characterizes the class nature and political thrust of the
"Kokand Autonomy." The "Kokand Autonomy" was created not to defend the national
interests of the peoples of Central Asia but for struggle against Soviet
rule, rule of the toiling people.
British and U.S. military-diplomatic circles very actively supported the
Kokand "autonomists." On 15/28 January 1918 the British Goverament sent to
the U.S. Goverament a memorandum on the need for intervention against Soviet
Russia and on supporting White Guardist organizations and "governments in the
southern and southeastern parts of Russia."8
Colonel House, a friend of Wilson, explained ia commenting on the sixth of the
"14 Points" that one of the reasons f~r occupation of the Siberian Railroad
by U.S. troops was to support "autonomous governments in Russia's Southeast,"
including, as is evident from the text, the "Kokand Autonomy."9
U.S. President Wilson drafted a program for bringing an end to Soviet rule, for
territorial dismemberment of Russia and easlavement of the toilers, in which a
certain role was also assigned to Central Asia. In Wilson's "14 Points" and
in commentary on them by House and L ippmann, Central Asia is viewed as a
future U.S. colony. We read in the sixth point: "There is no information which
would enable one ro form an opinion on a correct policy toward Muslim Russia,
that is, in short, toward Central Asia. It is quite possible that it will be neces-
sary to grant to some power a limited mandate to govern on the basis of a
protectorate."~-~ This point was confirmed in an expaaded variation of this
document, apprnved by Wilson as an official program for the U.S. delegation at
the Paris Peace Conference.ll
The vague wording "government on the basis of a protectorate" in actual fact
meant an attempt to turn Central Asia into a U.S. colony. Addressing the
Paris Peace Conference in 1919 on ~the question of a mandate system, Wilson ex-
plained that a mandate system would ap~;?y to "German colonies, territories of
the Turkish empire, plus other territories." When asked what he meant by
"other territories," Wilson replied: "The former Russian empire," or a~re
precisely the Caucasus, Centr.al Asia, an~ other regions.12 On a geagraphic
map prepared by the State Department for the U.S. delegation, the regions
which were proposed to be detached from Ressia included Central Asia, which
came within the U.S. zone.13
Great Britain showed particular interest in overthrowing Soviet rule in Cen-
tral Asia. First of all this was due to fears on the part of British imperial- ,
ism over the fate of its vast colonial possessions and its desire to incor-
porate Turkestan into the British empire. General Dunsterville, leader of the
British interventlonist mission to Baku and Transcaucasia, acknowledged that
by seizing the territory of Turk stan and Baku, the British were attempting to
close the door to Central Asia.l~ Un 4 March 19 18 A. J. Balfour, Britain's
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foreign minister, stated that the British Government was devoting considerable
attention to Asiatic Russia.25
During the holding of the Paris Peace Conference, British agents in Turkestan
were attempting to put together a delegation of bourgeois-nationalist elements
and the reactionary Muslim clergy for a trip to France, in order to advance
demands "for liberation of Turkestan from the Balshevik yoke." British ruling
circles were also ready drawing up a presentation for the "Turkestan delegation"
in Paris. It included the demand of recognition of the "national self-deter-
mination of Turkestan on the basis of the principles laid out by.Wilson. The
British Government promised to support these demands.16 Concealed behind all
this was the idea of turning Turkestan into a colony. In case this plan
failed, the British imperialists were planning to set up a kingdom in Central
Asia, headed by the emir of Bukhara, Seyid Alim-khan.
The Britisn Government was planning on using in Central Asia its considerable
mil'itary forces stationed in the Near and Middle East. At the beginning of
1918 a British general stated: "We must consider the possibility that it will
be necessary for British soldiers to staad security duty in the oases of Merv
and Samarkand."1~
The British consulate in Kashgar (initially D. McCartney was serving as consul,
and subsequently i,t Col P. Etherton)was sending agents, arms and money to
Fergana. Representatives of the British military command also arrived there
from Meshhed (Iran).
The struggle ag~nst ti~e "Kokan~d Autonomy" became one of the first pages of the
civil war in Central Asia. It was here that the basmachi entered the scene as
an active force of Central Asian counterrevolution. Irgash, a former criminal,
, who had gathered together a substantial band (up to 1500 men) of declasse
elements, became chief of militia in Kokand. One of the leaders of the
'autonomy," Mustafa Chokayev, comaented that Irgash's detachments comprised the
military support of the Kokand "government."
A book by J. Castagne entitled "Les basmachis" was published in Paris in 1925.
In 1918 its author had been engaged in archeological excavations in Turkestan.
This was not his principal activity, however. Therefore his book contains a
great deal of information on the Turkestan counterrevolution, and particularly
on the basmachi. "The Kokand Autonomous Government," writes Castagne, "fearing
- the threat of the Bolsheviks, began negotiations with the basmachi and invited
them to enter its service.... Irgash was the first to respond to this appeal:
this highwayman and convicted criminal had gathered together an impressive
band made up of professional thieves."
Later (in 1919) Ataman Dutov sent a personal message to Irgash. In this mes-
sage the leader of this band of cutthroats was called a"valiant leader of
glorious Fergana dzhigits [yoi~ng men, skilled horsemen]." Dutov appointed
Irgash to the rank of sotnik [Cossack lieutenant] and appealed to "Allah and
his great prophet Muhammad" to come to the aid of "the true protector of the
interests of Russia in the Fergana."18
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No less colorful a figure was another leader of the basmachi kurbashi
Makhkam-khodzha. A notorious criminal, who had been sentenced in 1913 to 12
years at hard labor for robbery and murder, he was distinguished by a highly
refined cruelty.
The bands of Makhkam, Akhundzhan and other kurbashi, while performing the
political function of supporting the Kokand "Gavernment," were at the same time
robbing nearby villages. As the struggle became more intense, the basmachi
proceeded to engage in purposeful acts of terror. In the environs of Kokand
they began mass annihilation of supporters of Soviet rule, particularly those
who refused to obey the "government's" decree ordering mobilization into the
army of "autonomists," those who had not surrendered to the basmachi their
horses, food, etc.
At the beginning of February 1918 the "government" decided to consolidate its
position. To accomp".ish this it was necessary to sei.ze the Kokand fortress,
the telegraph office, and to destroy the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies. Auring the night of 12 February "autonomist" forces for the most
part basmachi moved on the fortress. The Red Guard, however, repulsed the
assault. The basmachi fanned out through the town. Blood poured in the streets
and in the homes: everybody suspected of pro-Soviet sympathies was ruthlessly
annihilated.
On 1/14 February 1918 the Turkestan Sovaarlcom declared martial law in
Ferganskaya Oblast and declared the railroad in a state of siege.
In organizing the str::ggle against the basmachi, the Soviet authorities were
supported by the workers and the dekhkans.
In December 1917 mass meetings, political rallies and congresses of workers
and toilers of the old city were held in Taehkent, Samarlcand, and in Kokand. At
these meetings it was declared that the "autonomous goverament" consisted of
representatives of the exploiter classes and therefore should not be sup-
ported. At the Samarkandskaya Oblast Congress of Soviets, delegates from
Khodzhent (now Leninabad, in the Tajik SSR), Dzhizak, Ura-Tyube and Kattakurgan
reported that the toilers in the localities "do not recognize the autonomous
government and trust only the Soviet authorities."19
In December 1917 a congress of Uzbek proletarian organizations of Syrdar'inskaya,
Ferganskaya, and Samarkandskaya oblasts convened in Tashkent. The congress
voiced a protest against establishment of the "Knkand Autonflmy."
At the beginning of February 1918 Red Guard detachments from Skobelev (now
Fergana), Perovsk (now Kzyl-Orda), and Andizhan came to the assistance of the
Kokand Military Revolutionary Committee. Of particular signif icance was the
arrival in Kokand of a Red Guard detachment from Tashkent and detachments
previously sent against the White Cossacks.
The Military Revolutionary Committee formed in the new town of Kokand, made up
of representatives of the Kokand Soviet and railroad workers, headed by
Bolshevik Yefim Adrianovich Babushkin, was accomplishing an enormous amount of
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FuK urrt~~n~ u~~ u~~~Y
work.20 Mumindzhan Shakirov was a member of this committee, delegatad from
the Muslim trade unions.
The Kokand "Union of Muslim Toilers," headed by Yusup Powr Shamsutdinov,
Taehpulat Urazbayev and others joined in the struggle against the autonomists,
under Bolshevik guidance. Ya. R. Gililov, who had b2en sent from Turkestan in
October 1917 by V. I. Lenin personally to "agitate among the local population,"
was also in Kokand.21
Repeated attempts by the Irgash detachmeat Co capture the fortress encountered
the unbending staunchness of its defenders, headed by Ye. A. Babushkin.
At this time Pavel Gerasimovich Poltoratskiy, one of the top officials of the
Turkestan Communist Party, arrived in Kokand. At the Turkestan Congress of
Muslim workers, convened in Kokand at the end of December 1917, he stated: "We
are not against r~t!i:~: Rom�' for the poor, but we are against bai autonomy.
saized power fro~ ?:i.. ~ussian bourgeoisie not in order to hand it over to the
Muslim bourgeoisie. We seized power for the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers
Deputies. We have worked and are continuing to work to recruit the support of
the Muslim toilers."22
Disagreements arose among the "autonomists." Represenainedethefupper"hand."
an extremely reactionary nationalist organization 8 ~oy~yev and
The "Ulemists" removed the former leaders of the "autonomy"
Chanyshev. On 18 February Irgash was appointed head oi the "government." A
basmadli cutthroat head of "governanent"! The actions of the counterrevolu-
tion had truly become a tragicomic farce.
Irgash, who also appointed himself "com~ander in chief," once again attempted
to take the offensive, but again without success. The Red Guard took the of-
fensive on 20 February. Street fighting lasted more than four days. The
basmad~i hose ted1andthisadetachmentspscattered.~Irgash fl d�withga small group.
soundly def a
He was followed by other kurbashi.
A resolution adopted on 3 March 1918 at a general meeting of Uzbek workers and
toilers of Kokand, held following the rout of the "autono~.sts, stated:
"..We Muslim toilers and workers curse all autonomous adventurists and
recognize the heSSovi tsrofrWorkerntSoldierisPeasant1iDekhlcansand Muslim e
authority of t
Worker Deputies."23
One of the participants in the February fighting recalls that "following the
liquidation of the Kokand 'autonomists,' the prestige and authority of the
Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies increased to an even greater degree,
and the Muslim toilers rank~ed themselves evea more solidly behind it."24
The Basmachi played a unique role in the Khiva khanate.
Dzhunaid Kurban Mamed, knowa later under the name Dzhunaid-khan, began basmachi
activities here long before the revolution. Cruel, greedy, cunning and am-
bitious, Dzhunaid and his detachment made bandit raids on neighboring tribes
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and robbed Uzbeks and Kara-Kalpaks. In 1911 he murdered his own brother and
appropriated his property. He succeeded in uniting several Turkmen tribes
under his authority and in establishing an armed detachment which was quite
large by Khiva standards.
- In 1915-1916 Dzhunaid made several raids on Rhiva, attempting to seize power
and at the same time robbing the populace. At that time Russian troops as-
sisted the khan of Khiva. Dzhunaid was defeated, withdrew into the saads of
the Kara Kum and subsequently made his way to Iran.
The situation changed considerably after the revolution. Counterrevolutionary
circles saw in Dzhunaid a suitable ally for the struggle against the toilers,
against Soviet power which had emerged victorious in Turkestan. Colonel
Zaytsev, who commanded Cossack units in IQiiva and who was an active White
Guardist, established contact with Dzhunaid.
In January 1918 1600 armed horsemen uader the command of Dzhunaid-khan en-
tered Khiva. Isfendiar khan of Khiva, submitted to Dzhunaid and nomiaally
remained on the throne.~s Dzhunaid became dictatar of Rhiva.
Thus the basmachi were elevated to the rank of governmental authority. Es-
tablishment of the Dzhunaid-khan dictatorship strengthened aad activated
coc~nterrevolutionary forces. Soon the Rhiva khan-basmacM counterrevolution
became a military offensive.
In the meantime the flames of civil war were buraing increasingly more
strongly in Turkestan. For an extended period of time Turkestan was cut off
from the central regioas of Russia by the blazing battle froats.
The Orenburg Front arose on the northwestern avenues of approach to Turkestan.
It was formed in July 1918 as a result of an insurrection against Soviet
authority by the Orenburg White Cossacks, led by Dutov, their seizure of
Orenburg and the withdrawal of Red Army d~tachments under the command of
G. V. Zinov'yev in the direction of Tashkent. Turkestan's link with the
central part of the country by the only rail liae at that time to Central
Russia, running east of the Aral Sea, vi.a Aktyubinsk and Orenburg to the Volga
(through Samara), was cut. Another route via Krasnovodsk and the Caspian
Sea to Baku was also closed.
In July 1918 anti-Soviet insurrections flared up in the towas of Zakaspiyskaya
Oblast in Turkestanskiy Kray. The Socialist Rsvolutionaries, Mensheviks and
Turkmen nationalists seized power in Ashkhabad, Kizyl-Arvat, Merv, aad
Krasnovodsk. Soviet Government officials fearless commissars P.
Poltoratskiy, Ya. 2hitnikov, V. Teliya, S. Molibozhko and others were shot.
Thus the Transcaspian Front was formed.
On 12 August a column of military vehicles painted in camouflage colors
crossed the border at Artyk Station. British troops had entered Soviet soil.
The interventionists (under the command of General W. Malleso~ occupied
Ashkhabad and other towns in the Transcaspian.
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I'UK Ut'NlI.IAL UJC. U1~iLY
The undisguised British intervention in Turkestan was a component part of the
overall interventionist plan of struggle against Soviet Russia drawn up by the
Entente. After the fall of the Soviet Government in Baku at the end of July
1918 and the appearance of British occupation troops t6ere early in August,
the hostile chain encircling the Soviet Republic remained unlinked only in
one place in Turkestan. With the beginning of British intervention in the
Transcaspian the chain girdling Russia closed, as it were.
The White Guardist newspaper GOLOS SRIDNEY AZII stated on 17 August 1918 that
the interventionists would not be satisfied with seizure of the Caspian: "They
assuredly have more extensive missions. Our common task is to wipe out the
Tashkent nest and remove anything blocking th~ Samara-Rrasnovodsk line. The
strategic importance of this great rail line is immense. It closes the British
Baghdad front with the Volga, Czechoslovak, and Ural fronts." That same news-
pap~r also openly discussed U.S. plans for intervention in Turkestan, utilizing
~he Vladivostok-Samara and Samara-Krasnovodsk rail lines. W. Churchill wrote
that anti-Bolshevik governments protected by Allied troops had become es-
tablished in Russia's outlying regions.26
In the Semirech'ye (territory of the present Kazakh SSR) the officer elite in
the Cossack villages of Kopal, Sarkand, Topolevskaya, Abakumovskaya,
Arasanovskaya, and others had mutinied. They were given assistance by the
White Guardist troops of the'Provisional Siberian Government." A Semirech'ye
Front was formed.
The four Turkestan fronts were not isolated combat sectors. Both their
emergence and the ultimate ob~ectives pursued by their organizers attested to
the fact that they were not only interlinked but alao were being guided by a
single director.
Domestic counterrevolution had merged with the imperialist intervention.
On 29 July 1918 V. I. Lenin, ana.lyzing the country's military situation in mid-
1918, defined the Turkestan situation as follows: "...Some of the cities in
Central Asia are in the grips of a counterrevolutioaary insurgency with the
obvious participation of the British, who have consolidated their position in
India and who, having seized total control of Afghanistan, have long since
established for themselves a base for expanding their colonial possessions,
for strangling other nations, and for attacks on Soviet Russia."27 The
"Turkestan Alliance of Struggle Against Bolshevism" (this counterrevolutionary
organization is called the "Turkestan Military Organization" TVO in
many books), established in the spring of 1918 and unitiag White Guard officers
and czarist officials, was operating in an alliance with local bourgeois
nationalists.
The interventionists and White Guard were laying siege on Red Turkestan from
all sides. They were greatly assisted by armed basmahi detachments, which were
active in many areas.
The civil war in Turkestan was a component part of the civil war which was
raging through the Soviet Republic. The course and outcome of the armed
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conflict here would be determined by the overall military-political situation
of the Soviet Republic and by the development of the combat operations of the
main forces of the Red Army on the decisive froats.
During the years of civil war Soviet Turkestan was like a besieged fortress.
The courage and heroism of the worker class and the toiling dekhkans of
Turkestan, displayed in combat against their enemies, earned the recognition
of all the peoples of the Soviet Republic. �
The fact that Soviet Turkestan, cut off from the central regions and fighting
- under extremely difficult conditions against the united forces of the inter-
ventionists, White Guard aad nationalist counterrevolutionaries stood its
ground and fought off the onslaught of its enemies, says a great deal. It
attests to the vital strength of the Soviet system and the deep bond between
the Soviet Government, the Communist Party and the masses. How far from
reality are the claims o= bourgeois falsifiers that Soviet government was im-
posed upon Central Asia from the outside and was not supported by the toilers!
It is inconceivable that Soviet power in Turkestan, if it lacked a boa~d with the
the people, could have emerged victarious in such incredibly difficult condi-
tions. Even manifest enemies of Soviet rule were forced to acknowledge the
steadfastness of the toilers of ~he Turkestan RepubYic. For example, in an
- anti-Soviet emigre volume entitled "Smena vekh" [Chan~e of Landmarks], pub-
lished in Prague in July 1921, we read: "...Suffice it to point to the fact
of existence of the Turkestan Soviet Republic in 1918-1920, a fact which has
been given little thought up to this time. Totally cut off from Moscow, sur-
rounded on all sides by the forces of Kolchak, Dutov, Denikin, and British
occupation troops, and lacking transportation, fuel and bread, the Bolsheviks
in Turkestan succeeded in holding power to the very end, for a period of a
year and a half."28
Fighting Turkestan
The heroic struggle of the Soviet people, led by the party, against the in-
~ vasion by interventionist troops and the White Guard counterrevolutionaries
went on for more than 3 years.
The interventionists and White Guards were advancing from all sides. There
were months when three fourths of the country's territory was in the hands of
enemy troops. The Far East, Siberia, the Urals, a large part of the Volga,
Transcaucasia and the Northern Caucasus, the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Don,
and a number of gubernias in Central Russia experienced the burden of foreign
and White Guard occupation. The hostile armies were threatening the capital
of the republic, Moscow, and had drawn close to the cradle of the revolu-
tion Red Petrograd. Holding Soviet Russia in the ring of a blockade, the
imperialists were endeavoring to strangle it with the bony hand of hunger.
But no difficulties could crush the will of the Soviet people. Workers and
peasants from all parts of Russia rose up in a patriotic war against the in-
terventionists and White Guard. The party transformed the country into an
armed camp. It directed the battle front and the home front of the Soviet
Republic, built a heroic army and a reliable, solid home front.
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rvn vrri~~Ai, wc vi~~~
Tl~e toilers of multinational Central Asia made a large contribution to the
- common cause of victory over the enemy. For a large part of 1918 and 1919
Turkestan was entirely cut off from the central areas of Soviet Russia. The
- Turkestan Republic was fighting off the onslaught of its enemies on several
fronts. In the North, along the rail line li.nking Turkestan with the
Central Region (north of the Aral Sea), the White Cossacks and Kolchak forces
were advancing. In the Northeast (east of Lake Balkhash), fighting was in
progress on the Semirech'ye Front. In the Southwest (west of the Amu Darya),
the Red fighting men of the Transcaspian Front were battling the British in-
terventionists and White Guard, who had seized a large part of Zakaspiyskaya
Oblast.
The rulers of the Bukhara emirate and Khiva khanate were active participants in
the anti-Soviet struggle. They turned their territories into counterrevolu-
tionary bridgeheads and on several occasions undertook undi.sguised armed
forays against Soviet Turkestan.
The actions of the counterrevolutionary forces in Central Asia were coordi-
nated and guided by imperialist circles.
At a British cabinet meeting held on 13 November 1918, Lord Milner, represent-
ing the war ministry, stated that the interests of the British empire de-
manded that Bolshevism be wiped out "in areas east of the Black Sea." He ex-
plained that he was referring to "the Caucasus, the Don, and Turkestan."29
Several bases were established on the territory of Iran, Afghanistan, and
China, from which all counterrevolutionary activities against Soviet Turkestan
were directed. Particularly notable among these nests of counterrevolution
were Meshhed (Iran) and Kashgar (Western China). The headquarters of General
W. Malleson's British forces which were occupying the Transcaspian became one
of the centers of organization, support and supply of the Central Asian counter-
revolution. The plan for combating Soviet rule in Turkestan drawn up by
Malleson called for mounting a number of successive attacks by British troops
and basmac~ii detachments, as well as organization of uprisings by 1oca1 na-
tionalists and Russian White Guardists i n the major cities of the Turkestan
Republic. According to this plan, anti-Soviet insurrections were to be or-
ganized in Tashkent, Samarkand, and in the towns of the Fergana Valley; the
Fergana basmachi were tasked with capturing Tashkent and other towns in
Turkestan.30
British and American agents were sent into Turkestan. U.S. Consul Roger
Treadwell arrived in Tashkent in May 1918, bearing credentials signed by U.S.
President Wilson. Treadwell immediately commenced vigorous anti-Soviet ac-
tivities. He united around himself all foreign missions and representations in
Turkestan; at his instructions, they stepped up espionage and subversive ac-
tivities directed against the Soviet authorities. F. Kolesov, chairman of the
Sovnarkom of the Turkestan Republic, noted in a telegram to the RSFSR Sovnarkom
that "Turkestan is being flooded with ambassadors and consuls of the various
powers."31
In the spring of 1918 a special group was formed in Delhi to conduct subversive
activities in Turkestan. It included Ma~or (according to other sources
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Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel) F. M. Bailey, Captain (according to other sources
Major) L. W. S. Blacker, and former British Consul in Kashgar n. McCartney.
They arrived in Tashkent in August 1918 as an official British mission.
The "mission" soon established close contacts with Treadwell and, under his
direction, begun conducting subversive activities against Soviet rule through
many channels. Subsequently Treadwell recalled this in a lecture presented in
Hongkong in 1928. He stated that "in 1918 I was in contact with British
Colonel Bailey, who had been sent from India via Kashgar to Tashkent to
gather intelligence."32 In Bailey's book "Mission to Tashkent," published in
London in 1946, the author discusses in detail Treadwell's leadership role in
subversive anti-Soviet activities.
The true objectives of the "mission," as Lieutenant Zaytsev, who had been in
contact with it, later stated, consisted in "preparing for and organizing an
armed uprising in Turkestan against Soviet rule and in supplying the insurgent
detachments with money and arms from British bases close to Turkestan (Meshhed,
Kashgar, Afghanistan). The mission was invested with broad powers and
_ authority in regard to performing these missions."33
At the end of the 1960's Soviet historians working in the Indian National
Archives (in previously closed-access files of the British colonial authorities)
discovered a classified report by $ailey on his espionage activities in Soviet
Turkestan in 1918-1920. This report contains many facts on Bailey's contacts
with the basmachi, Irgash in particular.34 Bailey wrote: "Soon after my ar-
rival (in Tashkent Auth.) I made contact with whom I believe was the head of
several anti-Bolshevik organizations."35 He was evidently referring to the
head of the "Turkestan Alliance for the Struggle Against Bolshevism." The
members of the "mission" agreed to :~rovide the "Alliance" with guns, rif.les and
considerable financial assistance. The "Alliance" in turn immediately made con-
tact with the Fergana basmachi leaders.
People from the "Turkestan Alliance for the Struggle Against Bolshevism"
Colonel Zaytsev and Colonel Kornilov (the brother of General L. G. Kornilov)
went to the basmachi with a group of military instructors, with the in-
tention of undertaking reorganization of the basmachi b3nds, in order to con-
solidate them into a 10,000-man mounted cavalry corps consisting of 2
divisions (8 regiments) with 2 mountain horse artillery batteries. In addi-
tion, they proposed to form infantry rifle units. The basmachi army was to
total approximately 25,000 men. Organization and training of the basmachi were
to follow the model of Cossack units.36 The basmachi were assured that Great
Britain would supply them with everything they needed to fight the Soviet
authorities. The Bailey "mission" pledged on behalf of their government to
furnish the basmachi with arms: "a) fro~n Chitral-Gilgit across Mustagh Pass to
Kashgar, and from there via lrkeshtam and Osh; b) from Peshawar through the
Khyber Pass, and on through Afghanistan and Bukhara."37 The British represen-
tatives gave assurances that everything would be "shipped as needed and in
sufficient quantity."38
The basmachi army was assigned the mission of participation, together with
ottier counterrevolutionary forces in Turkestan, in a combined plan to
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- overthrow Soviet rule. The basmachi were to make their way to Tashkent
through the Kendyr-Davan Pass in the Turkestan range; across the Murza-Rabat
Steppe, bypassing the mountains, and then on to Chinaz and across the Syr
Darya. This information is confirmed by materials contained in Bailey's
report.39 '
Arriving in Fergana, at the beginning of October Zaytsev held a meeting with
the basmachi kurbashi, who gave full approval of the British imperialists'
plan. A unified basmachi army was not established, however. This was due
primarily to the fact that plans to enlist the toiler masses in the basmachi
bands failed to pan out. Colonel Zaytsev himself subsequently wrote about this
in a frank manner: "Talk to the effect that the grateful local populace was
offering material support to the basmachi bands proved to be an outright lie."~
Nevertheless assistance given by imperialist agents and the White Guards
enabled the basmachi to consolidate and subsequently to step up their activi-
ties.
In the meantime the basmachi detachments of the Khiva dictator Dzhunaid-khan,
who was working in close collaboration with the interventionists and White
Guard, had begun open military actions against Soviet Turkestan. Lieutenant
Khodzhakuli-khan paid a visit to Dzhunaid-khan on the instructions of the
British command authorities and the Transcaspian White Guard. He brought with
him from Ashkhabad 3000 rifles and a large quantity of a~unition.
Between mid-September 1918 and the end of March 1919, Khiva detachments
mounted a number of raids into the territory of the Amudar'inskiy Division
(an area of the Turkestan ASSR situated on the border with the Khiva khanate).
Late one November night in 1918, Dzhunaid's basmachi crossed over onto th~e
right bank of the Amu Darya and laid siege to the administrative center of the
Amudar'inskiy ~P~~nt~ Petro-Aleksandrovsk (now Turtkul').
Dzhunaid issued the ultimatum that if the town did not surrender, the entire
population, including infants, would be massacred. The basmachi plundered
villages in the vicinity, drove off horses, camels and sheep, hauled off grain,
cruelly tortured prisoners, and murdered peasants and artisans. The small
Turtkul' garrison, however, assisted by armed workers and volunteers
Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kazakhs, and Kara-Kalpaks fought off the attacks of the
basmachi. Participants in the heroic defense recall: "Only women, children
and the elderly remained in town; everyone capable of using a weapon had gone
out to defend Turtkul'."41
Sustaining heavy casualties, at the beginning of December Dzhunaid-khan with- ~
drew.
As already noted, for many reasons the struggle with the interventionists and
White Guard assumed a particularly difficult and intense character in Central
Asia. An extremely unfavorable strategic situation a protracted lack of
direct communication with the country's central regions and the impossibility
of obtaining military and economic assistance from there placed Turkestan
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r
in an exceptionally difficult predicament. An acute shortage of manufac-
tured goods and foodstuffs was felt in the region. All available resources
wete utilized for the defense effort. Turkestan`s few workers were fighting
on the various fronts.
There was a shortage of cadres in the localiCies for extensive party and
Soviet activities aimed at consolidating Soviet rule. Some local officials,
lacking adequate political maturity, experience and knowledge, made mistakes.
But our enemies imperialist agents, White Guardists, feudal-clan strata,
the reactionary clergy, and nationalists were steppi.ng up their activities,
- exploiting economic difficulties, the backwardness and ignorance of the masses
of the indigenous population. Growth of the basmachi became possible under
these conditions, creating in a number of areas of Central Asia a serious
threat to the rule of the toiling people.
On 15 January 1919 the Turkestan Republic's representation in t4oscow,
acting on instructions from Tashkent, reported to V. I. Lenin the situation in
Turkestan and requested that he take i~ediate measures "on the Orenbu~g Front
- in order to link up with the Turkestan troops as quickly as possible. ~
At this time counterrevolutionary forces were organizing insurgencies and con-
spiracies in the cities and towns of Turkestan, with the aim of preventing
unification with Central Russia. On 19 January 1919 an anti-Soviet insur-
rection broke out in Tashkent, during which 14 Turkestan commissars were
brutally murdered Turkestan Communist Party and republic government leaders,
including V. D. Votintsev, chairman of TurkTslK, V. D. Figel'skiy, chairman
of the Sovnarkom [Council of People's Commissars],N. V. Shumilov, chairman of
the Tashkent Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, V. N. Finkel'shteyn,
A. Ya. Pershin, and M. S. Kachuriner. The insurrection was put down thanks to
the staunchness and courage of Tashkent's worker class.
On 22 January 1919, carrying out V. I. Lenin's instructions, Red Army divi-
sions, advancing from the direction of Samara and with the active participation
of the ~med forces of the Turkestan Republic, captured Orenburg. The first
enemy encirclement of Turkestan was brought to an end, and Turkestan was
linked up with Soviet Russia.
In spite of the brief duration of Turkestan's linkup with Central Russia
(from January to April 1919), the government of the RSFSR and the RKP(b)
Central Committee gave Soviet Turkestan enormous assistance in soviet and
party organizational development and in organizing defeat of t~e counter-
revolution.
On the instructions of Ya. M. Sverdlov, on 25 January 1919 a group of party
and Soviet officials was dispatched to Turkestan.43 On 1 February 1919
Ya. ;t. Sverdlov sent off to Tashkent a telegram containing the message that on
the instructions of the Central Committee, another group of Soviet and party
workers was leaving for Turkestan. It also stated that the party Central Com-
mittee and the Sovnarkom were taking "measures to strengthen Soviet rule (in
Turkestan Auth.) and to increase the army's combat effectiveness."44
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rvn vcr~a..~na, a..,a: JI\L~
On 12 February 1919 a Special (Temporarq) Co~ission on Turkestan Affairs
� was created by decree of the RSFSR SNK. Commission members included Sh. Z.
Eliava (chairman), A. S. Kiselev, and P. A. Robozev.
The RKP(b) Central Committee and Soviet Government also gave Turkestan con-
siderable economic assi~tance at the beginning of 1919.
The situation in Turkestan took asharp tura for the worse in the spring of 1919
in connection with Kolchak's offensive.
~On 11 April the White Cossack Army of Ataman Dutov captured Aktyubinsk.
Kandagach and Mugodzharskaya stations were abandoned.... Soviet troops were
withdrawing to Aral'skoye More Station. Once again Turkestan was encircled
by its enemies.45
In the latter half of 1919 Turkestaa's military-political situation changed
radically. By that time the Red Army had routed Kolchak and was pushing the
enemy eastward. In August 1919, at the initiative of V. I. Lenin, the Eastern
Front was divided into two fronts the Eastern and Turkestan.46
The Turkestan Front was established on 14 August 1919. Outstanding Soviet
military leader M. V. Frunze assumed command of the front. P. I. Baranov,
Sh. Z. Eliava, and (somewhat later) V. V. Kuybyshev were named members of
the Revolutionary Military Council. In the latter half of August and at the
beginning of September 1919 the front's troops launched an attack on Kolchak's
Southern Army. At 1435 hours on 13 September, at Mugodzharskaya Railway
Station, located betweeii Orenburg and the Aral Sea, troops advancing from the
north linked up with units of the Aktyubinsk Front which were defending the
approaches to Soviet Turkestan. Military telegraph operators tapped out the
words of a priority message sent by M. V. Frunze and Sh. Z. Eliva to V. I.
Lenin in Moscow: "The troops of the Turkestan Front congratulate you and the
Republic on this joyous news."47
The blockade of Turkestan had come to an end. The link between this country's
central regions and Tu=kestan was permanently restored.
Units of the Turkestan Front completed liberation of the Transcaspian
(Krasnovodsk, last stronghold of the White Guard, fell in February 1920) and
wiped out (at the beginning of April 1920) White Guard forces in the
Semirech'ye.
After the railroad was restored to service, trains set out for Tashkent carry-
ing the goods needed by Turkestan. Soviet Russia, itself in the clutches of
hunger and in critical need of manufactured goods, unselfishly shared its
meager reserves with Red Turkestan. The toilers of Turkestan in turn dis-
patched to the proletarian center trains loaded with cotton and freightcars
filled with dried fruits. On 11 October 1919 M. V. Frunze 3oyously reparted
to V. I. Lenin that track repairs were completed and that the first train
loaded with cotton had arrived in Orenburg.48
To assist Turkestan in consolidating the Soviet system and to ensure cor-
rect implementation of nationalities policy, the RKP(l~) Central Committee and
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Soviet Government formed a Commission on Turkestan Affairs (Turkkomissiya) and
dispatched it to Central Asia.On 8 October 1919 V. I. Lenin signed a pertinent
VTsIK and RSFSR SNK decree. The party Central Committee instructed rhe
Turkkomissiya to exercise "top-level party oversight~~49d supervision in y
Turkestan on behalf of the RKP(b) Central Co~ittee. The Turkkomi.ssi a,
consisting of Sh. Z. Eliava (chairman), M. V. Frunze, V. V. Kuybyshev, Ya. E.
Rudzutak, I. Bokiy, and F. I. Goloshchekin, proceeded to engage in diver-
sified activities promoting consolidation of the Soviet system in Central Asia.
In I3ovember 1919 V. I. Lenin addressed a letter to "Comrade Communists of
TurkestarA." "Establishment of correct relations with the peoples of Turkestan,"
wrote V. I. Lenin, "is now, one can state without exaggeration, of enormous,
world-historic significance for the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet
_ Republic.
"The position of the Soviet Workers' and Peasants' Republic toward weak, former-
ly oppressed peoples will have practical meaning for all of Asia and all
colonies throughout the world, for billions of people."50
V. I. Lenin called upon local Russian Communists to make every effort to es-
tablish friendly relations with the peoples of Turkestan and to prove by deeds
the sincerity of their motives and their desire to eradicate all traces of
colonialism in the interests of the struggle against world imperialism.
V. I. Lenin pointed out that such a policy should be a model for the entire
East.
Lenin's letter played an important role in uniting the broad masses of the
indigenous nationalities behind Soviet rule and the Communist Party. V. I.
Lenin's instructions played an enormous role in organizing the struggle
against the basmachi.
Of enormous significance for the entire subsequent life of the peoples of
Central Asia and the entire Soviet East was Lenin's report at the Second All-
Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East,
presented soon after dispatch of the letter to Turkestan (22 November 1919).
The leader of the proletarian revolution explained how the theses of Marxism
should be applied to the unique conditions of the East, where the main enemy
is carryovers from medieval times, and where the peasantry comprises the
principal toiler masses.sl It was essential to accomplish all-out strengthen-
ing of the dictatorship of the proletariat by combining overall class in-
terests with the specific national features of the peoples of Central Asia.
Ttiis was the general situation in Central Asia in 1918-1920. Without knowledge
o� this situation it is impossible to understand the history of the struggle
against the basmachi during the civil war years, its specific features and
sta~;es.
The Basmachi Fergana Front
The I'ergana Valley.... One of the most ancient centers of civilization in
Central Asia and one of its most fertile and densely-populated regions. This
vast (covering an area of approximately 20,000 square kil.ometers) basin,
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situated along the middle course of the Syr Darya, is surrounded practically on
aIl sides by mountain ranges: the Chatkal on the aorth, the Fergana on the east,
and the Alay and Turkestan on the south. Swiftly-flowing rivers, running out of
these ranges, provide water to orchards aad crope, pastures, groves of walnut
and cherry plum trees. The Fergana is also rich in commercial minerals.
As a result of enemy actions, for a mmmber of years this fertile region was the
arena of savage, bloody, ruinous fighting.
Let us examine some of the socioeconomic and political factors and geographic
conditions of Ferganskaya Oblast.
Following the annexation of Central Asia to Russia, Ferganslcaya Oblast52 by
right became Turkestan's number one cottoa growing region.53 Intensive
development of cotton growing led to radical changes ia the economy and social
composition of the population of this region. An important result of the
development of co~ercial cotton raising was the fact that the economy in kind
was drawn into money-exchange relations. As a result of this the process of
differentiation among the dekhkans became intensified, and a substantial por-
tion of the peasants were dispossessed of their land. All this attested to
emerging capitalism.
Tables prepared by Uzbekistan economists ~n the basis of figures from the
survey materials of Senator Palen indicate that in the volosts of Ferganskaya
Oblast included in his survey 38.5 percent of households had less than one
desyatina of land, and 24.4 percent of these households averaged 0.24
desyatina. The above enumerated households occupied 4.8 percent of the total
land acreage. Half of all the land was concentrated in the hands of the bai,
who comprised not more than 10 percent of all landowaers.54
On the eve of the Great October Socialist Revolution the process of dispos-
session of the toiling dekhkans from the land additionally intensified. This
is persuasively attested by figures from the 1917 census. According to these
figures, land ownership in Ferganskaya Oblast was as follows:55
Grouping of Households by Average Landholding, Total Quantity, X
Landholding, Desyatinas desyatinas
Households Land
Up to 1 0.42 51.0 9.8
From 1 to 3 1.71 30.1 23.4
From 3 to 5 3.65 9.1 15.2
From 5 to 10 7.0 6.3 20.3
From 10 to 20 13.4 2.5 15.3
20 and more 34.7 1.0 16.0
Figures on individual uyezd~ in Ferganskaya Oblast present an even more
graphic picture. In Andizhanskiy Uyezd, for example, 145 large bai landhold-
ings totaled 7224 desyatinas, while 9008 dekhkan household possessed only
3042 desyatinas. In this uyezd 90.5 percent of households were chayriker
[sharecropper] landholdings averaging half a desyatina, the owners of which
were forced to work for the bai for one fourth of the harvest.56 In
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Namanganskiy Uyezd 68.1 percent of the delchkan households owned from 0.5 to
1.5 desyatiaas of 1and, while each bai landholding was at least 25 desyatinas 57
From the above figures one can conclude that in Fergansk.aya Oblast a large
group of bai owned the bulk of the land.
Together with this, there was particularly noticeable here a process of co-
alescence of the Russiaa merchant-usurer bourgeoisie with that group of bai
which was engaged in cotton trading and usury. A local urban commercial and
. industrial bourgeoisie was also beginning to appear. In Andizhanskiy Uyezd,
for example, Mirkamil' Muminbayev owned 5000 desyatinas of land as well as a
number of industrial enterprises; his wealth was estiaated at 14-17 million
rubles.58
The Muslim clergy wielded enormous influence in the Fergana. Suffice it to
say that there was a mosque for every 325 persons, while for Centra7..Asia as a
whole each mosque served 700-1000 persons, aad in prerevolutioaary Russia a
parish served a population of 10-12 thousand. There.were 15,000 ministers of
religion in the Fergana. The reactionary Muslim clergy, extensively utilizing
Islam, made every effort to arouse the basmachi.
One should also bear in mind the consequences of settlement policy in the
Fergana. The czarist governmeat, in establishiag Russian settlements, pursued
the objective of obtaining support for the struggle against the toilers of
indigenous nationalities. It figured that each settlement should replace a
battalion of Russian troops.59 The first party of immigrants arrived in the
Fergana in 1891, and the f irst Russian settlement was established at the
Kurshab urochishche [a n isolated terrain.featur~]. By 1914 there were 50
such settlements. A considerable amount of irrigated laad had been taken away
from the indigenous population. A powerful kulak .stratun a base of support
for the autocracy in Central Asia was established in the Russian settlements
thanks to the czarist authorities.
- Thus an analysis of just a few aspects of the economy of Ferganskaya Oblast and
the social makeup of its population indicates that on the eve of the victorious
October Revolution there existed a particularly sr_rong element of the ex-
ploiter classes there. The wealthiest among these (Mirkamil' Muminbayev,
Temirbekov, Abdumansur Mangbashi, Usman Kari Uma.rov, Kudrat Khozrat, and o~hers)
were among the organizers of the basmachi and offered them material and other
assistance.
Ferganskaya Oblast, the most populous in the Turkestan ASSR, was the center of
the cotton ginning, coal mining and petroleum industry of all Central Asia.60
At the same time Russian capitalism was making every effort to impede the
growth of industrial production in the Fergana. Therefore the process of
proletarianization of peasants experiencing financial ruin dragged on in the
Fergana, while pauperization of the peasants was proceeding rapidly.
In 1913 there were more than 15,000 industrial workers in the Fergana Valley,
including 3517 Russians, 9247 Uzbeks, 519 Kirghiz, 845 Ta~iks, and 1252
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representatives of other nationalities.61 In addition, 35,000 workers were
employed at industrial-co~ercial establishments, in cottage industry and
handicraft activities, and in storage and warehousing activities.
Interethnic relations were extremely complex in the Fergana. As many as
20 different nationalities were living in the valley: Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Tajiks,
Kazakhs, Russians, Ukrainians, Uigurs, Tatars, Armenians, Bukhara Jews, etc.
The colonial policy of czarism also left a sad legacy in the area of ethnic
interrelations, aggravated by the fact that the peoples living in the Fergana,
just as throughout Turkestan, either were still living in the Middle Ages or
had recently embarked upon the road of capitalist development. The organizers
of the basmachi also took advantage of all these factors.
The process of establishment of Soviet rule in Ferganskaya Oblast dragged on.
In the Fergana power was not taken over by the Soviets from the agencies of
the Provisional Government until 6 December 1917, while in Tashkent and other
areas of Turkestan Soviet power was victorious in November 1917, and the
Third Regi,mal Congress of Soviets (15-22 November 1917) proclaimed transfer of
power to the Soviets throughout the region.62
Five days before the convening of the Third F~gional Congress of Soviets, on
10 November 1 917, the Ferganskaya Oblast Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and
Peasants' Deputies,headed by rightist Socialist Revolutionaries, came out
against establishment of Soviet rule, declaring tha.t questions involving the
region as a whole should be settled prior to convocation of a Constitueat
Assembly by the region union of municipal and zemstvo administrations.63 The
leader af the Fergana Mensheviks and editor of the oblast newspaper ZNAMYA
SVOBODY, Pavlyuchenko, spoke out at the congress against establishment of
Soviet rule in the Fergana and throughout Turkestan.
At the oblast congress of soviets which was convened at the beginning of
December 1917, a bitter fight erupted with the Socialist Revolutionaries and
Mensheviks on the question of recognition of the Turkestanskiy Kray Sovnarkom
and on transfer of all power in the localities to the Soviets of Workers',
Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies.64
In the cities and towns of Ferganskaya Oblast all authority was not transferred
over to the Soviets until the end of December 1917 and beginning of 1918; in
hokand on 25 De~ember, in Namangan on 7 January, in Skobelev at the beginning
of January, e tc. Soviet rule was established much later in the majority of
kishlaks in t he Fergana.
The oblast Sovdep [Soviet of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies]
elected in December 1917 following establishment of Soviet rule in the Fergana
proved incapable of operating, as a result of sabotage by the Mensheviks and
Socialist Revolutionaries. In March 1918 Ye. A. Babushkin, leader of the
Kokand Bolsheviks, sent a telegraph message to the Sovnarkom of the Turkestan
Republic tfiat the oblast Sovdep "is not doing its job and should be dissolved in
short order."65
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The oblast congress of Soviets which was convened in March 1918 voiced op-
position to organization of an oblast Sovdep on the grounds that the uyezd
Sovdeps were allegedly sufficient.66
, In the localities the old volost administrations frequently fuactioaed in
= parallel with the Sovdeps. In some cities the municipal dumas and the so-
called public safety committees were not disbandedo67 Oa the eve of the
October Revolution the public safety committees were merged into the Namangan
and Osh Soviets, as a result of which the soviets were cluttered with czarist
bureaucrats, nationalists and other hostile elements.
An oblast Sovdep was finally elected on 8 October 1918. It adopted a decision
not to establish so viet executive committees in the localities, but to or-
ganize committees of the poor.68 Establishment both of Sovdeps and committees
_ of the poor, however, proceeded very slowly.
Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, Dashnaks,69 White Guazds and bourgeois
nationalists, who had here and there managed to make their way into important
positions, made every effort to wreck the work being doae by agencies of
Soviet authority in the Fergana. In September 1918 the Fergana Bolsheviks
reported to V. D. Figel'skiy, chairman of the Turkestan Republic Sovnarkom,
about the destructive efforts of the "leftist" Socialist Revolutionaries
against Soviet authority.~~ A report on the situation in the Fergana
presented at a meeting of TurkTslK on 15 May 1918 stated: "Mensheviks and
rightist Socialist Revolutionaries, who have become ensconced in the Skobelev
Soviet, are undermining Soviet authority lilce worms. The soviet is passing a
great many enactments which are destroying the authority of the Soviet Govern-
ment.... Total anarchy is reigning in the volost. There are no soviet or-
ganizations. Volost administrative officials are instituting shariat
judicial rule.... Bolshevik-Communists are being most foully persecuted. The
- facts about declaration of regional autonomy are being distorted."~1
Not only socioeconomic and political factors led to the situation where
Ferganskaya Oblast became a basmact~i center during the years of civil war. An
important role was played by the fact that the "Kokand Autonomy" was es-
tablished in the Fergana, in the old part of Kokand, at the end of November
1917. It is not surprising that the first basmachi bands, headed by Irgash,
one of the "rulers of the atatonoiay," and a former common criminal, emerged from
the bosom of the "Kokand Autonomy." In addition, the "$overnment" of the
"Kokand Autonom~' proclaimed in one of its declarations that all armed
elements on the territory of Turkestan, including common criminals, were given
amnesty and invited to join t~e ranks of the "national army."72
The following fact is also of certain interest: at the time of the collapse of
the "Kokand Autonomy," certain leftist Socialist Revolutionaries, who were
in command of Red Guard un.its and other detachments, allowed a substantial
portion of the "autonomists" to escape into hiding, in spite of the fact that
they had considerable military force at their disposal. One of the partici-
pants in the struggle against the "autonomists," Bolshevik P. Yeliseyev, wrote
about this in his memoirs: "Due to shortsightedness, and perhaps criminal
action as well (by the leftist Socialist Revolutionaries Auth.), the bands
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rv~c vrria..u+a, a.~c v,�i~
were permitted to escape.... With such force (on the side of the Soviet
authorities Auth.), I was sure that not one autonomist would be able to
get away."73
Gathering together his basmachi band and seeking to enlist Uzbek toilers into
the ranks of the basmachi, Irgash exploited mistakes regarding the natioaali-
ties question, which had been made chiefly by the Dashnaks and leftist So-
cialist Revolutionaries when crushing the "autonomy."
Finally, the fact that Fergaaskaya Oblast was situated on thefrontier enabled
the basmachi bands to obtain weapons and ammunition from China, Afghanistan,
and Bukhara, and to escape into hiding following their defeat.
Irgash fled into China soon after collapse of the "Kokaad Autonomy" and the
first clashes with Soviet troops. Some time later he returned to the Fergana
Valley with a band of 500 men. The band had obtaiaed weapons and equipment
from reactionary circles in Afghaaistan and from the emir of Bukhara. Seven
small gangs joined Irgash in thP Fergana, including Khal-khodzha's band, which
consisted for the most part of common criminals who had been convicted at
various times for murder and robbery. It is not surprising that Khal-khodzha's
basmachi were distinguished by particular savageness. In one kishlak Khal-
khodzha's band brutally tortured a dekhkan who had decided to speak the truth
about the basmachi. They severed his tongue, ears and nose. The basmachi
punished another dekhkan, who had dared go to prayers without a chalma [turban],
by fashioning a mold of dough on his head and filling it with boiling oil.
Since basmachi bands had begun to unite behind Irgash, aad since he had ex-
perience in forming more or less regular detachments, Fergana counterrevolu-
tionaries were placing their hopes primarily on him. Several defeatss however,
inf licted on Irgash by volunteer and militia detachments, undermined his
reputation. Madamin Akhmetbekov (Madamin-bek) became the favorite of the
Fergana counterrevolutionaries. At an undergrouad meeting he was named chief
of all the basmachi of the Fergana Valley.
Madamin-bek, just as Irgash, was sentenced in 1913 to 14 years at hard labor
for criminal offenses. During the days of the "Kokand Autonomy" he served as
chief of the Margilan militia and,with the assistance of the Sociali$t
Revolutionaries, remained in this position for some time afterwards. Madamin-
bek put together a fairly large band and undertook aggressive actions against
the Soviet authorities. He also enlisted into his detachment Russian White
Guard officers, who served as military instructors. Soon eight rather large
bands joined up with Madamin-bek. He undertook a considerable effort to gain
control over the bands of Irgash and Islamkul. Madamin was not sparing with
promises, offering Irgash honorable positioas. But Irgash and Islamkul them-
selves dreamed of leading the Fergana basmachi. Madamin called himself '~uler
of the Fergana, and commander in chief of the Muslim artned forces "amir
al'-muslimin." �The clergy of Bukhara and the Fergana surrounded him and his
myrmidons with the aureole of "fighters for Islam" and defendera of the im-
poverished.74
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The basmachi terrorized the population and murdered party and soviet officials.
They nurtured particular hatred for the industrial workers Uzbeks, Tajiks,
and Kirghiz, who were uniting the toiler masses. In a short period of time in
the first half of 1919 the basmachi murdered 100 Uzbek Communists from the
Andizhan old-town party organization.75 Half of the Ruvinskiy [Ruvasay] party
organization were killed.76 Tir~e kurbashi Rhal-khodzha massacrec~ almost all the
members of the trade uaion formed in Osh in 1918.~~ At the end of 1919 Irgash
_ killed in Chust 200 poor dekhkans and workers who were actively supporting
measures instituted by the Soviet authorities.
Mass murders of workers and Communists of local nationalities comprised an im-
portant part of basmachi terrorist activities.
The basmachi ravaged towns and villages and robbed the innocent inhabitants of
towns and auls.78 In addition to outright robbery, basmachi kurbashi imposed
taxes on the civilian population in the form of bread, rice, and horses,79 and
demanded women for their dzhigits. According to the figures of Fergana Front
Headquarters, the taxes extracted b y~ the basmachi from the civilian popula-
tion e~oceed~ed by 25 times the taxes paid under the czarist regime.80 The
basmachi blockaded industrial centers and other cities, making it difficult for
them to obtain food and water.
The basmachi also sought to disrupt rail transport operations, on which the
vital activities of the Turkestan Republic so much depended. They were hoping
that the destruction of rail lines would create insurmountable obstacles to the
shipping of cotton, which was needed by the country's entire textile industry.
Attacks on the railroad began to be carried out on practically a daily basis.
Basmachi bands would frequently attack industrial enterprises, especially
cotton ginning mills. They demolishe~ irrigation systems and hindered farm
work. Hunger and destitution raged in the fertile Fergana Valley.
Alarming reports traveled one after the other from the Fergana to Tashkent.
_ "The band of the notorious robber Irgash is operating in Kokandskiy Uyezd. The
population is terrorized,"81 telegraphed oblast military commissar
P. Buravlev on 30 July 1918. "Basmachi have attacked Sharkov kishlak...";82
Madamin has entered Old Margilan...";83 "Basmachi have attacked the town of
Chust"; "A band has attacked Grunch-Mazar Station";84 "Battle with basmachi by
Dordok kishlak. Enemy lost 58 men";85 "We encountered a frightful scene in
Sharikhan: bodies of Russians littered the streets, 24 in all, homes and
shops had been looted, with all goods of value talcen, such as cloth, wheat,
flour, rice, livestock, as well as various household goods...,"86 D. Ye.
Konovalov, commander of railway detachments, wrote :n his report to main
operations headquarters.
~ The Red Army's first engagements with the basmachi (in July 1918, for example,
against detachments of Irgash in Kokandskiy IIyezd) ended in failure,87 which
was due to unskillful organization of military operations. Small (100-150 men)
detachments operated against the basmachi, without a unified plan or common com-
mand. The discipline and combat training of some detachments was poor.
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l V~~ V~ \~~.~A~. ~V~ J~~V�
The basmachi movemeat in the Fergana had picked up steam by the end of 1918.
The basmachi were displaying particular activeaess in Rokandskiy, Namanganskiy,
and Andizhanskiy uyezds. In September they engaged Red Army units in more
or less large skirmishes at Gorchakovo Station and in the Old Margilan area.88
Top authorities of the Turkestan Republic mobilized all resources to overcome
the basmachi threat. The Supreme Military Board for Defense of the Republic
headed by V. D. Figel`skiy, chai~an of the Turkestan Republic Sovaark:om, ar-
. rived in Fergana in December 19I8; in order to take effective measures on the
- spot to combai the basmachi.
An Operations Staff for Direction of the Struggle Against the Basmachi was elected
at an oblast Red Army congress in Fergana on 7 December 1918.89 Uyezd opera-
tions staffs were also formed.90 The Co~unist Party was supported first and
foremost by the workers of the Fergana. Those areas of Ferganskaya Oblast
where large detachments of the proletariat were concentrated Kyzyl-Kiya,
Sulyukta, Chimion, Fedchenko, and Kokand marched in the vanguard of the
struggle against the basmachi.
The Kyzyl-Kiya Bolshevik organization, which contained 250 persons in its
ranks at the end of 1918,91 divided the workers into three relief units, one of
which was in position at all times in trenches dug around the mines. As a
rule the miners kept their rifles with them at all times, even when going down
into the mines on a work shift. A cavalry detachment was organized at the
mine, which protected the residents of neighboring kishlaks. Aetachments of
Kyzyl-Kiya miners were detailed to assist the garrisons of uyezd towns in the
Fergana. V. D. Figel'skiy wrote of the Kyzyl-Kiya people that they "are ready
at all times to swing into action at the request of the Soviet authorities."92
"The Kyzyl-Kiya mines," the newspaper IZVESTIYA, organ of TurkTslK and the
Turkestan Communist Party, stated on 6 December 1919, "are in truth an armed
camp."
A 200-man worker detachment to combat the basmachi was formed in Chimion at
the beginning of 1918.93
The proletarian detachments designated to fight the basmachi cootained Uzbek, Kirgh3z.
and Tajik workers. They were particularly numerous in the Kyzyl-Kiya, Chimion,
and Sulyukta detachments. The number of workers of local nationalities in-
creased in the course of struggle against the baemachi bands.
Ttie participation of toilers of the indigenous nationalities in the struggle
against the basmachi fostered strengthening of friend~hip among peoples. From
the miners they acquired revolutionary ideas, a spirit of collectivism, and
proletarian internationalism. All this was o� decisive significance not only
for defeating the basmachi but also for consolidating Soviet power in Central
Asia.
Former prisoners of war also fought alongside Russians, Uzbeks, Tajiks,
Kirghiz and Kazakhs in the Fergana proletarian detachments. One of the or-
ganizers of the former prisoners of war was Hungarian worker Emil Baku, a
Chimion oilfield worker. In Chimion he ~oined the ranks of the Communist
Party and was elected deputy to the workers' Soviet.94
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Red Guard detachments from the major cities of the Fergana also took part in
the struggle against the basmachi. Notable among these detachments was the
Kokand detachment. It contained Kokand railway workers, workers from cotton
ginning mills and members of the Union of Muslim Toilers. According to the
figures of the Kokand Soviet, more than half of the detachment members were
Uzbeks, Kirghiz, and Taj iks. Al1 Communists able to bear arms were assigned
to the Kokand Red Guard detachment and party druzhina [detachmentJ. At the
request of the Bolsheviks, the Kokand Soviet established a military-political
headquarters for Kokandskiy Uyezd, which directed the struggle against the
basmachi.95
The Andizhan detachment was commanded by Georgiy Mikhaylovich Bil'din, leader
oF the city's Communists and former worker at the Namangan Machinery Plant.
At the end of 1918 a detachment was formed in Margilan of workers from the
cotton ginning mi11s (487 m e n).96 A Red Guard detachment was operating
actively in Alty-Arykskaya Volost, made up of Uzbek and Tajik volunteers.
They were commanded by Abdurakhman Mad'yarov, chairman of the volost revolu-
tionary committee.
Party druzhinas, formed in many cities of the republic, were a solid support to
Soviet power in the struggle against the ba~smachi. In addition to Russian Com-
munists, they included Uzbek Co~unists and representatives of other local
nationalities. In Kokand and certain other cities of the Fergana, party
druzhinas were formed exclusively of Communists of local nationalities.
In addition to the Fergana units, detachments f'rom other oblasts and cittes of
the republic, chiefly frcim Tashkent, took part in the struggle against the
basmachi.
The basmachi movement gained strength following the crushing of the counter-
revolutionary insurrection in Tashkent in January 1919. The imperialists and
domestic counterrevolutionaries from this point forward began placing their
main hopes on the basmachi.
By the beginning of 1919 two principal basmachi centers had become defined:
1) the grouping headed by Madamin-bek (Skobelevskiy, Andizhanskiy, and
Namanganskiy uyezds),9~ and 2) the grouping headed by Irgash (Kokandskiy
Uyezd).98
In the spring of 1919 basmachi mounted bandit raids in the Osh, Dzhalal-Abad,
Namangan, and a number of other areas of the Fergana Valley. The bands of
Madamin-bek, Irgash, Kurshirmat, and Aman-Palvan were active in the Fergana.
By the end of March 1919 their total numbers exceeded 7000 men.
The fighting for Namangan went on for 7 days. The bands of Madamin, Kurshirmat,
Rakhmankul, Aman-Palvan, and Akhundzhan were attacking the city from four dif-
ferent directions. Basmachi dismantled the tracks on the rail line linking
Namangan with Kokand. They captured the old city, looting and perpetrating
acts of violence. Namangan armed workers and Red Army detachments which had
arrived from Skobelev, Kokand, and Samarkand dislodged the basmachi.
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Substantial basmachi forces had massed in Oshskiy Uyezd. From here they mounted
mounted raids into the Dzhalal-Abad and Andizhan areas. ~wo volosts
Naukatskaya and Kapchagayskaya were entirely in basmachi hands.
In connection with growth of basmachi numbers, TurkTslK, pursuant to party
regional committee instructions, at the beginning of February 19 decided to send
into the Fergana an Extraordinary Commission for the Struggle Against the
Counterrevolution in the Fergana. The commission's mandate stated that it was
authorized to take extraordinary measures to wipe out the basmachi, to re- .
organize the Fergana operations headquarters and military units, to introduce
a field court martial, and to suspend the operations of administrative agen-
cies.99
On 24 February the com~ission published an appeal "To Red Armymen and Red
Guardsmen on the Territory of the Fergaia," calling upon them to carry the Red
Banner with honor and pride and to fight courageously against the basmachi.
The appeal stressed that there should be"no acts of coercion or insult toward
the poar Muslims,who are comrades of us Europeans. On the contrary, the Muslim
should be given comprehensive material and moral support."100
In connection with the fact that the Oblast Operations Headquarters was unable
properly to direct the struggle against the basmachi, which was becoming in-
creasingly more complicated with each passing day, on 3 February 1919, at a
combined meeting of Fergana party, soviet and military agencies, it was
decided to establish a new headquarters of the Fergana Front, headed by the
commander of the front, M. V. Safonov. On 5 February the commission ratified
this decision. ~ao front command groups were formed: the Osh-Andizhan, and the
Kokand-Namangan.
mhe Fergana proletariat armed themselves both for the purpose of defending their
enterprises and mines and to take part in military operations against the
basmachi. A report from the Extraordinary Commission to TurkTslK stated: "The
entire Fergana is an armed camp."101 The 22 March 1919 issue of the newspaper
NASHA GAZETA stated: "In many localities factories have shut down, since the
workers and employees have been mobilized to arms." The struggle against the
basmachi. in the Fergana was gradually becoming a struggle of all the people.
Emergenc}� measures to mobilize forces against the basmachi were urgently needed,
since at the beginning of 1919 there occurred increased coordination of the
operations of all ccunterrevolutionary forces opposing Soviet power in Central
Asia.
~ The basmachi received extensive financing from abroad. In February 1919 the
British consul in Kashgar handed over 100,000 rubles to the former czarist
consul to pass on to the basmachi kurbashi. Russian merchants residing in
Kash gar and White Guard elements who had fled there from Turkestan allocated
155,000 rubles for the basmachi, on the advice of that same British consu1.102
The basmac:hi were supplied with weapons and ammunition, and intensified pan-
Islamic propaganda was conducted among the basmachi.103
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In the spring of 1919 the Turkestan Coffinunist Party undertook a number of ac-
tions to expose imperialist agents ~ho had been infiltrated into the republic.
Of great importance was disclosure of the true countenance of Treadwell and
Baile}?. When the Turkestan Cheka [Extraordinary Commission] obtained sub-
stantiated information that these persons were the principal directors of anti-
Soviet actions by basmachi bands which were being organized in the republic,104
Treadwell was placed under house arrest by decision of the RSFSR Narkomindel
[People's Commissariat of Foreign AffairsJ. Zn March 1919 the U.S. Government
ordered him recalled ~rom Turkestan.105 gailey, however, went underground.
Bailey discussed this move with Treadwell, devotin~ particular attention [o
the possibility of estadlishing direct contact with the basmachi.106 ge re-
mained in Central Asia until the end of 1919-beginning of 1920.107
By the beginning of April 1919 Soviet forces in Turkestan, inspired by the
overall success of the campaign against Kolchak, won a decisive victory over the
firi.t i~ti i.nterventionists, forcing them to abandon tlie Transcaspian region.. With-
drawing, the interventionists took with them cotton, oil, livestock, costly
Turkmen rugs and other valuables which they had plundered during their almost
12-month stay in Central Asia.
The struggle against the colonialists by the toiler masses played a decisive
role in the collapse of plans to enslave the peoples of Central Asia. The
Narkomindel's representative in the Turkestan Republic, Bravin, wrote in his
report for March 1919 that the local toiler population trusted the Soviet
authorities and that they had no desire to come under the yoke of the British.
"They know the British well," he noted, "from what has happened in Afghanistan,
Persia, and India. They are even less pleased at prospects of coming under the
control of any of the l~cal. khans."
Failure of the Briti^'~ intervention in Turkestan was promoted in large measure
by the situation prevailing in Afghanistan at the beginning of 1919. The emir
Khabibulla, a henchman of the British, was killed there on 20 February. The
new emir, Amanulla, declared Afghanistan an independent state. In April 1919
he sent a delegation of emissaries to Soviet Russia to conduct talks with
V. I. Lenin. The events in Afghanistan could not help but cause concern on
the part of the British imperialists over the state of affairs in neighboring
India, and influenced their decision to withdraw from Turkestan.
From this point on, British imperialism devoted even greater attention to the
basmachi. British military personnel were observed on the Soviet-Chinese
border, in Kashgar (in the vicinity of Tashkurgan). Piilitary installations
were being constructed here under their supervision.109
The counterrevolution was attaching prime importance to further expansion of
basmachi actions. This is attested by the fact that a special mission con-
sisting of two generals and two British officers was sent from Kolchak's head-
quarters t~ the Fergana,110 and the fact that Madamin-bek was conferred the
racik of colonel.lll Thus the basmachi were being given de jure recognition as
a component part of_ the overall Russian counterrevolution. The tasks of this
mission were revealed in a letter written by the chief of Kolchak's general
staff to the former consuls in Kul'dzha and Chuguchak dated 8 October 1919.
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"The military mission," the letter stated, "has been assigned the task of es-
tablishing close contacts and relations with representatives of friendly powers
in order that, with material support on their part... partisan detachments can
be organized of the inhabitants of some of the areas of Turkestan to combat the
local Bolsheviks."112
~ April 1919 was marked by large-scale basmachi operations, which were a com-
ponent part of th~ campaign of the Entente which was launched in the spring,
the ma.in role in which was played by Kolchak's army. These operations were
coordinated with counterrevolutionary uprisings in Turkestan aimed at over-
throwing Soviet rule.
The complicated situation in the Fergana demanded that emergency measures be
taken. D. Ye. Konovalov, deputy commander of the Fergana Front, traveled to
the Osh sector to organize the struggle against the basmachi there. Lacking
large forces but actively supported by the population, he was able to conduct a
number of large-scale operations, in the course of which he inflicted ap-
preciable blows on the basmachi in the area of Osh and Dzhalal-Abad.
In April the basmachi suffered defeats in Andizhanskiy and Skobelevskiy uyezds.
_ A detachment formed by Yuldash Akhunbabayev, deputy chairman of the Dzhoy-
Bazar Sel'sovet [Village Soviet] in Skobelevskiy Uyezd, distinguished itself in
the fighting. This 34-year-old poor dekhanin, for whom the October Revolution
openei up a new life, fought with weapon in hand for the happiness of his people
against their enemies the basmachi. Subsequently Yuldash Akhunbabayev
became "all-union elder" [vseuzbekskiy starosta]--chairman of tlie Uzbek SSR
Central Executive Cou~ittee.
On 11 April 1919 the forces of Madamin and Osipov were surrounded and defeated
between Kokand and Serovo Station. Only 63 men from Osipov's bands managed to
escape and fled to Bukhara with their leader. Madamin-bek's forces were also
badly mauled. Many kurbashi (Akhundzhan, Tuychi, and others) stated that they
were surrendering to the Soviet authorities. They went over
to the side of the Red Army. An important role was played by the
amnesty offered to basmachi who would surrender, announced by TurkTslK
on 7 May 1919.
On 9 May 1919 TurkTslK, the republic Sovnarkom and Narkomnats issued a
proclamation entitled "To the Toiling Muslim Population of ~he Fergana", ex-
plaining the substance of the amnesty.113 The TurkTslK and Sovnarkom Special
Extraordinary Commission for the Struggle Against the Basmachi, under the
chairmanship of K. Ye. Sorokin, one of the leaders of the Turkestan Republic,
traveled to the Fergana. The commission was instructed to implement the act
of amnesty.114
The purpose of the amnesty was not only to isolate from the basmachi that
segment of the toiling population which supported them but also to reestablish
agencies of Soviet authority wherever they had been destroyed by the basmachi.
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In June 1919 a decision was made i~ediately to arm party members and es-
tablish new fighting druzhinas. Not only Communists but also
nc~n-party, poor dekhkans were enlisted in these druzhinas. Uzbeks, Russians,
Kirghiz, Tajiks, and Kazakhs representatives of all the peoples inhabiting
the Fergana Valley fought shoulder to shoulder in the druzhinas.
The mood prevailing in Turkestan at that time was precisely e~ressed by
representatives of the kishlaks of Urmitan and Revat in Fal'garskaya Volost,
Samarkandskaya Oblast. They stated the following in a resolution on fighting
the basmachi (June 1919): "Expressing complete willingness and desire to as-
sist in the struggle against the bandits not only by supplying foodstuffs but
S also with weapon in hand, we earnestly request (from the Soviet authorities
Auth.) that you issue whatever weapons possible, both firearms and cold
steel. If there are not enough weapons to go around, we shall accompany the
detachment carrying stones, in order in some way to help smash the robber
bands."115
Toward summer's end fighting in the Fergana again heated up. Contributing to
this was uniting of the basmachi with other counterrevolutionary forces. In
particular, a deal was reached between Madamin-bek and the leaders of the
counterrevolutionary "Peasant Army."116 This "army" was formed in the course
of the struggle between the Russian peasant settlers and the basmachi, chiefly
in the Kugart Valley. Command positions in the'peasant Army" were seized,
however, by counterrevolutionary elements. Soon its military council became
entirely kulak, and former czarist general A. A. Mukhanov was named chief of
staff. Cossacks from the Semirech'ye joined the ranks of the "Peasant Army."
On 1 September Monstrov, the "army`s leader;' and Madamin-bek signed an agree-
ment calling for joint actions against the Soviet authorities. Unification
of the basmachi and the "Peasant Army" resulted in establishment of a united
front of the Muslim bai and clergy on the one hand and Russian kulaks and
White Guard on the other.
The question of joint actions by the "Peasant Army" and the basmachi against
Soviet rule cannot be viewed as an isolated episode of the civil war in
Turkestan. Archival documents indicate that counterrevolutionary forces with-
in Turkestan attached great importance to this unification and that it was
organized with the objective of engineering an overthrow of Soviet rule
throughout Turkestan at the moment the Red Army was approaching the borders
of the Turkestan Republic, in order to divert to the Turkestan front sub-
stantial forces from the decisive fronts. This is indicated by the date of
this unification (September 1919), the methods and forms of struggle against
- Soviet rule.
Tlie united basmachi and kulak forces totaled 20,000 men117 and were armed
- with two cannon, 13 medium and 11 light machineguns. White Guard officers
proceeded to reorganize the basmachi bands.
Toward the end of the summer of 1919, on the eve of unification of Turkestan
with ttie central regions of the country, the Fergana basmachi had become
stronger and presented an even more serious threat to the Soviet authorities.
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By mid-August 1919 the main forces of the basmachi had massed in the Andizhan
sector.
Party and soviet agencies, jointly with the command authorities and the
Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkestan ASSR, took additional measures
to organize resistance to the basmachi. The Revolutionary Military Council of
the Fergana Front (Bolshevik D. I. Spasibov, chairman) was formed in August
1919. This council carried out a number of important measures in a short
period of time. First and foremost, it consolidated scattered small detach-
_ ments into a single striking force, forming two regiments (a cavalry and an
infantry regiment) and an artillery battery.
The Rewoyensovet [Revolutionary Military Council] of the Fergana Front, how-
_ ever, lacked the time to form large combined units. The city of Osh, against
which the enemy was planning to mount a first concentrated attack, contained a
garrison of 300 bayonets and the small Pamir border guard detachment.
On 1 September bands surrounded Osh and presented an ultimatum to its defenders.
Rejecting the ultimatum, the garrison held off the basmachi in 48 hours of con-
tinuous fighting.
Seeing that the city was not yielding, the White Guard and basmachi decided
to flood it by diverting mountain streams anto town. The situation was as fol-
lows, as the defenders described it: "The fort was half flooded with Later....
The water caused part of the wall to crack, and it was about to collapse. In
order to reduce the pressure of the water, we were forced to work in the water,
building dikes and opening breaches in the fortress wall. Taking no time out
to rest or sleep, personnel manned the firing ports in the fortress walls."118
The Osh fortress fell on the third day. Only a few commanders and men suc-
ceeded in making their way to Andizhan. !
Occupying the city, the basmachi and White (~ards immediately proceeded to rob
the civilian population. Ten million rubles and precious stones were removed
from the national bank.119
Several days later the basmachi succeeded in capturing Dzhalal-Abad. The fall
of Osh and Dzhalal-Abad greatly complicated the situation in the Fergana Valley.
Following the capture of Osh, the enemy proceeded to advance in the direction
of Andizhan, Skobelev, and Namangan.
On 15 September 1919 a meeting of basmachi leaders was held in Old Margilan,
headed by Madamin-Bek, Russian White Guardists, and local bai. They dis-
cussed preparations in Ferganskaya Oblast for a general uprising, which was
to merge with the basmachi offensive against the oblast's major cities. At
tt~e meeting it was decided to seal off the Fergana from the rest of Turkestan,
r1~i1y bv destroying rail, telephone and telegraph lines.120
The offensive was conducted chiefly against the oblast's large cities. The
basmachi organizers and leaders apparently realized that they could not bring
an end to Soviet rule as long as Soviet authority was preserved in the cities
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and as long as the worker class exerted guiding influence on the dekhkans. The
attempt by the basmachi to mount an offensive on the cities of the oblast was
also aimed at undermitning the strengthening alliance between the worker class
and the dekhkan toilers.
In addition to military operations on the basis of the decision adopted in
Margilan on 15 September, Madamin-bek and Monstrov began disseminating through
_ the Fergana all kinds of leaflets and proclamations directed against Soviet
authority. In one of these proclamations they called for the convening of a
Constituent Assembly , at which they promised that half of the seats would be
given to Muslims.121
The Fergana Bolsheviks mobilized ail resources to crush the counterrevolution.
Political rallies and meetings were held in all the oblast's towns and
garrisons, at which resolutions were adopted expressing readiness and willing-
ness to defend Soviet rule.
_ On 7 September the following resolution was adopted at a meeting of the
Skabelev garrison: "Having heard a report by the commander of the Fergana
Front and having discussed in detail the status of the Fergana in connection
with the Dzhalal-Abad events, we Red Armymen of the Skobelev garrison declare
that headquarters of the 'Peasant Army,' entering into an alliance with the
bandit bands of Madamin-bek, is seeking to stir up the toiling peasantry of
Dzhalal-Abad. But we Red Armymen refuse to respond to this act of provocation
and call upon the toiling peasantry of Dzhalal-Abad to march shoulder to
shoulder with us, for truth is on our side, for we are not replacing the rule
of labor with the rule of capital."122
The worker class of the Fergana and the overwhelming majority of the toiling
- dekhkans joined with the Red Army in the fight against the united forces of
[he basmachi and the White Guard. On the instructions of the Ferganskaya
Oblast Party Committee, the Rewoyensovet of the Fergana Front decreed that
all Red Guardsmen in the oblast were to be entered onto the ro'is of the Red
Army.123 On 11 September 1919 the command authorities of the Fergana Front
reported the following to Tashkent: "...Practically all work has come to a
tialt; everybody's efforts are focused on defense of the republic."124
The heroic defense of Andizhan began in mid-September. The enemy's forces
exceeded by fourfol.d the strength of the Andizhan garrison. On 17 September
1919 the basmachi ~;o~enced an assault on the city.
On one of the first days of the defe~e a city-wide emergency party meeting was
called in [he park of former mill owner Ruzi-Akhun. The following item stood
on the agenda: "De;fense of the city against the attack of the White Guards,
kulak bandits and basmachi." The adopted resolution stated that all Com-
munists were [o be d~cl~ared mobilized and placed on full fighting status.125
The Andizhan party organization126 also mobilized the non-party
toilers of the new and old city. New fighting druzhinas and Red Guard detach-
ments were formed of workers from the Besh-Bosh Mill, railway workers, and
workers from the oilseed mills. Instrudors S. K. Kuzy-Akhmedov,127 Abdul-Aziz
Khusanbayev, and others ~ave military training to the Communists of the old
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~ V~\ V~ ~ ~~.~~\V ~~v v. ~V �
city. A defense headquarters was established, headed by one of the leaders
of Andizhan's Red Guard units, V. N. Sidorov, aad V. A. Skuba, a battalion com-
mander of the 2d Fergana Regiment.128
Barricades fashioned of bales of cotton were being constructed in the tawn, and
stores of wa~ter were being accumulated. Several wells were dug, since the
basmachi had cut off all the main aryks [irrigation ditch, canal] which had
supplied the city with water. Trenches were dug around the city beginning on
the first days of September.
During the days of the siege, the Andizhaa Chelca discovered and neutralized an
underground counterrevolutionary organization linked to the basmachi and the
White Quards. The basmachi had been hoping that they would be able, with the
assistance of inembers of the underground and counterrevolutionary propaganda,
to provoke an uprising against the Soviet authorities, especially in the old
part of Andizhan.129 These plans came to naught. The old town, together with
the new town, became a unified fortress.
The defense of Andizhan was talcing place in extremely difficult conditions: the
- city was acutely short of food, drinking water, arms and ammunition. Mirzo-
Kasym Akhmedov recalls: "Our daily ration was 200-300 grams of bread and 2-3
spoonfuls of buckwheat porridge."130 ~other participant in the defense of the :
city also describes the extremely difficult conditions of daily life for the ,
city's defenders.131 ~ _
The Andizhan party organization undertook a number of ineasures to disintegrate ;
the enemy's ranks. Agitators were dispatched to the enemy's camp, who worked
both among the basmachi and amoag the "Peasant Army." Peasants from the
villages of Ivanovskoye and Mikhaylovskoye left the Andizhan siege forces as a ;
result of Bolshevik agitation.132 ;
I
The defense of the city was directed by the party organization, headed by ~
G. M. Bil'din, chairman of the Andizhan Uyazd-city party committee. Detachments
formed of townspeople fought bravely ehoulder to shoulder with the Red Army-
men. The fighting men of the Co~unist druzhina were placed in the most
difficult sectors. Townspeople who laclced weapons evacuated wounded and
brought ammunition and food. G. M. Bil'din died a hero's death in one of the
skirmishes.
The Andizhan garrison and the townspeople held ~ff the enemy onslaught for 6
days and nights. Their courage and steadfastness were rewarded. On 22 Sep-
tember the Kazan' Composite Regi~nt imeni Gintsburg, uuder the command of
A. P. Sokolov, M. V. Safonov's detachment, and the mounted detachment imeni
Third International, under the command of party member E. F. Kuzhelo, arrived
to aid besieged Andizhan. The arriving unfts attacked the basmachi without a
pause. The fighting raged on for 48 hours unabated. The resistance of the
basmachi was broken on the third day. Their thinned bands proceeded to with-
draw from Andizhan in disarray. Red Army uaits and volunteer detachments or-
ganized pursuit of the retreating enemy. D. I. Spasibov, chairman of the
Rewoyensovet of the Fergana Front, was killed in action on 24 September. On
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26 September the basmachi abandoned Osh, and on 30 September Dzhalal-Abad.
Madamin-bek and Monstrov took refuge in the Gul'cha mountains.
Thus when Turkestan became linked up to the central regions of the couatry, a
serious defeat had been inflicted on the basmachi through the heroic efforts of
the Red Army, the worker class and toilers of the indigenous nationalities, and
a new plan to overthrow Soviet rule in Turkestaa had been thwarted.
The basmachi continued the strug~le, however. They decided to disrupt
celebration of the second anaiversary of the Great October Socialist Revolu-
tion in the worker communities, cities aad tawns. On 7 November 1919 basmachi
attacked many communities. Particularly stubborn fighting took place in the
Chimion oilfield.133
In the fall of 1919 the organizers of the counterrevolution undertook emergency
measures to step up basmachi activities, since at thie time Denikin was ad-
vancing on Moscow and needed the support of all counterrevolutionary forces.
They decided to hold a secret meeting of leaders of the basmachi and the
routed "Peasant Army," with the participation of representatives of the
reactionary Muslim clergy and the nationalist bourgeoisie. In October 1919
former czarist consul in China Uspenskiy, a henchman of the British, en-
tered Soviet territory from Kashgar. A meeting of basmachi kurbashi and
White Guardists was held on 22 October in the border village of Irkeshtam.
A"Provisional Fergana Government" headed by Madamin-bek was formed for the pur-
pose of uniting counterrevolutionary forces. White Guardist Monstrov was
named commander in chief, and former czarist general Mulchanov was designated
his deputy. An attorney by the name of Nansberg, who was a British spy, cotton
trader Khakim Azizkhaaov, and other political adventurists were named to the
"gove rnment . "
Ties between the British imperialists and the basmachi became even stronger
following formation of the "Provisional Government." British intelligence of-
fered every possible support and assistance to the puppet government. Weapons
and ammunition were sent from Kashgar to Fergana via Colonel Etherton.134
At the end of October (or beginning of November) 1919 an Anglo-Afghan delega-
tion consisting of British intelligence officers and Afghan feudal lords
_ traveled clandestinely to the village of Kara-Tepe (Ferganskaya Oblast) to
meet with Madamin-bek. First they visited sevesal basmachi detachments. The
delegatioa provided money to the basmachi. Basmachi prisoners and defectors
testified that following the "arrival of the Afghans entire detachments were
formed of the sons of bai, well dressed and with the finest mounts."135
Following the Irkeshtam meeting the "Provisional Fergana Government," with
the assistance of Russian White Guardists and British officers, attempted to
gain the allegiance of all basmachi leaders, to end the personal discord
existing among them, and to draw up a common plan of struggle against Soviet
rule.
On the last days of October 1919 all the important basmachi kurbashi con-
gregated in the kishlak of Aim for a unique kurultay (congress).136 Also in
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attendance were representatives of Great Britain, the Bukhar~ emirate, a~n~
Turkestan bourgeois-nationalist groups. Pursuaat to the decisions reached
at the kurultay, the approximately 150 bands which were operating in the
Fergana at that time were consolidated into four large combined units under the
command of Madamin, Irgash, Khal-khodzha, and Kurshirmat.
Following unification, the basmachi again commenced mounting attacks on Osh and
Dzhalal-Abad, on nearby kishlaks and Russian settlements, robbing and terroriz-
ing the dekhkans. At the end of November 1919 approximately 5000 basmachi
surrounded a detachment ~f the Kazan' Regiment which totaled only 122 Red Army-
men. Some of the soldiers were killed in the savage fighting, while the
basmachi brutally tortured the survivors. They threw the mutilated corpses in-
to the Karadarya River.
But resistance [o the bands was growing. Chimion oilfield workers, together
with the garrison, repulsed a basmachi attack. On 22 November 1919 the united
forces of Madamin-bek and Khal-khodzha, totaling 1400 men, moved on Dzhalal-
Abad and neighboring Russian communities. The local residents met the first
basmachi attack. Having repulsed it, they launched a counterattack together
with a small Red Army detachment which had arrived on the scene. Eighty
basmachi remained on the battlefield.
Following the final joining of Turkestan with the country's central regions, a
new stage began in the struggle against the basmachi. By year's end from 40 to
50 relatively large basmachi bands were operating in the Fergana Valley, each
of whicti contained f rom 100 to 200 men. There were also several larger ~
basmachi bands. In addition, dozens of smaller detachments were rampaging I
throughout the valley. All these bands were in constant movement, shifting
from one uyezd to another.
Prior to the arrival in Turkestan of representatives of the RKP(b) Central
Committee, the RSFSR Sovnarkom and the VTsIK (Turkkomissiya), "there was no war
as such bein fought on the Fergana Front... Only a chase after an e lusive
adversary,"1~~ wrote the chief of staff of the 2d Turkestan Division in
Navember 1919.
Ttie Fergana Valley, to use the expression of one of its prominent in-
vestigators, Academician Middendorf, was a"trough among surrounding mountain
masses."138 Mountains ringed the valley, leaving only a narrow gateway, 10
versts wide, at the western end near the Makhram fort. At the other end dif-
ficult, rugged mountain trails led into the valley.
The few cities of the Fergana were situated for the most part in the middle of
- the valley. The valley was intersected along its entire extent by numerous
says (rivers), aryks, marshy paddy fields, and planted tree stands.
The encircling mountains, which separate the valley from the other regions of
Turkestan, a high population density and highly-dissected terrain created
favorable conditions for the basmachi and made combat operations difficult for
Red Army regular units. Actually there was no continuous front in the Fergana
Valley; engagements would occur unexpectedly at various locations and would be
of brief duration.
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Upon studying the situation in the Fergana Valley, the Turkkomissiya reached the
the conclusion that it was necessary radically to alter the tactics of combat
against the basmachi.
At the same time it adopted the decision to make every effort to step up mass
political-explanatory work among the inhabitants of the kishlaks and auls of
Turkestan explanation of the essence and reactionary schemes of the basmachi,
the goals and tasks of the Soviet authorities. It is not mere happenstance
that M. V. Frunze stressed in one of his first orders: "The difficulty lies
not in overcoming the enemy militarily th~t is not very difficult for us
the difficulty lies in ensuring that the entire multinational Muslim toiler
population understand that the basmachi are also their enemy and that struggle
against the basmachi is the sacred taek of the toiling people."139
- Henceforth the political, economic and military measures of the Soviet authori-
ties were tied into a single, coordinated unit> Considerable attention was
f~cused on correctfng mistakes made by local authorities, who did not always
take into consideration the specific features of the economic system and
customs of the people~ of Central Asia. Party agencies intensified scrutiny to
ensure strict observance of Leninist principles of natioaalit3.es policy,
directed local authorities to treat the religious feelings of the population
in a deferential manner, etc. In addition to political rallies and meetings in
the cities, towns and kishlaks, as well as discussions i~n chaykhana [tea-
_ houses], the Turkkomissiya recommended employing such a form of agitation as
conducting discussions with elderly Muslims and hoaored residents of kishlaks
and the old sections of towns and cities.140
Tlie Turkkomissiya also strengthened the party organizations of Ferganskaya
Oblast. Reregistration of all members of the oblast party organization was
conducted, and its ranks were purged of alien and hanger-on elements.
Party organizations proceeded to work actively among young people. Komsomol
ranks grew rapidly. By January 1920 Turkestan Komsomol had a membership of
6000, most of whom were young men; 25 percent of the Komsomol members were
young people of indigenous nationalities.
Alongside extensive agitation work, the Turkkomissiya, pursuant to the in-
structions of the RKP(b) Central Committee, undertook vigorous measures to
strengthen agencies of Soviet authority in the Fergana and to achieve ex-
tensive enlistment of toilers of the indigenous nationalities into the build-
ing of a Soviet society.
Since the basmachi leaders were operating for the most part in rural areas, a
course of policy was adopted which aimed at creating solid support among the
dekhkans. Also of great importance was correct implementation of food policy
and offering of material assistance to the toiling dekhkans.
On the instructions of the regi~ml committee of the Turkestan Communist Party
and the Turkestan Republic Sovnarkom, detachments were formed in all cities,
towns and large kishlaks situated in areas of basmachi operations, the detach-
ments being formed of party, Komsomol and trade union members to protect their
city, town or village.
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rvn vrra~.a~sa, v..a.: v.~a,~
Prominent Communists distingui.sYed themselves in the struggle against the
basmachi, including B. Usmankhodzhayev, A. Mad'yarov, S. Arifbayev, K. Muradov,
A. Isayev, and I. Alimkulov. Many Communists (Rhodzha Palvaa, Khasan Saib,
Khodzha Mamadzhan, etc) gave their lives in this struggle.
New tactics in the military struggle against the basmachi consisted in the fol-
lowing: Red Army units, upon occupying localities of operational and economic
importance, would form highly mobile detachments in these localities, which
would mount raid actions against the ba~machi, who lacked operational aad food
supply bases, forcing the enemy to accept open combat at locations where it
was easier to wipe out the enemy with the aid of mobile reserves.
Revolutionary committees were established in large communities in which Soviet
garrisons remained. The public, feeling the support of the garrisons behind
them, began taking more active part in the struggle against the basmachi. The
Ferganskaya Oblast Revolutionary Co~ittee noted in its report for November
1919 that the majority of the indigenous population had a favorable attitude
toward the Soviet authorities aad were willing to support them.141 Therefore
the basmachi were deprived of the possibility of cutting the cities and towns
off from the kishlaks and of disrupting food supply to the cities; streagthening
of bonds between the cities and kishlaks was leading to increased influence by
the urban proletariat on the dekhkan masses.
Soviet troops did not limit themselves to mounting a single attack but con-
tinued pursuit of the enemy, cutting off his avenues of retreat. Larger mili-
tary forces were being massed in the Fergana Valley with this objective.
By the beginning of 1920 the 2d Rifle Division (N. A. Verevkin-Rokhal'skiy
subsequently lieutenant general served as division commander), 12,340 men
strong, with 52 machineguns, was deployed in the Fergana. Of particular im-
portance was arrival in the Fergana at the beginning of 1920 of the lst Volga
Tatar Brigade (brigade commander Yu. Ibragimov, later A. A. Tal'kovskiy),
which had been formed in Kazan' by decision of the RSFSR Narkomnats and which
had distinguished itself in combat on the Eastern Front. The Tatar brigade was
sent to Turkestan on the personal instructions of V. I. Lenin. The Turk-
komissiya recommended that a1T Fergana party organizations make use of the
arrival of the Tatar brigade to conduct a large-scale political campaign
directed toward explaining to the locai toilers the nationalities policy of the
Soviet authorities and for all-out conduct of agigation and propaganda work
with the aid of brigade political personne1.142
Th~ Turkestan Front Rewoyensovet and the Turkkomissiya formed a brigade mili-
tary council, giving it broad authorities. Ya. Chanyshev, the Tatar brigade's
military commissar,was named council chairman, with Rakhim Rakhimbabayev,
ctiairman of the Andizhan Revolutionary Committee, party uyezd committee
secretary Gumerov, and R. Islamov, TurkTslK representative, named as members.
Highly-mobile detachments were formed of Communists and personnel from the
Tatar brigade, and also contained representatives of local party organizations
and progressive youth. These detachments traveled practically throughout the
entire Fergana Valley; many political rallies, meetings and conferences were
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held, at which the nationalities policy of the Soviet authorities, the ideas
and goals of the Co~unist Party were explained to the toilers.
Preparing for aggressive operations against the basmachi, party and soviet
agencies did a great deal of work in the area of forming ethnic units. As a
result, three ethnic cavalry regiments and several other units, representing a
total strength of 4500 men, were deployed on the Fergana Front. The In-
depen~ient International Cavalry Brigade, made up of former prisoners of war,
also took part in the struggle against the basmachi as a Red Army unit on the
F~rgana Front. The brigade was commanded by E. F. Kuzhelo. It mounted at-
tacks on the basmachi in the Kokand, Namangan, Andizhan, and Osh areas.
Combat operations against the basmachi were directed by M. V. Frunze. V. V.
Kuybyshev arrived in the Fergana in February 1920 t~ handle direct organiza-
tion of the struggle against the basmachi bands.
The initiative on the Fergana Front was firmly st?ifting over to the Red Army.
During the first months of 1920 (from January through March) several operations
were successfully conducted, ending in the defeat in detail of a number of
large bands.
At the beginning of January 1920 the main forces of the Red Army and volunteer
detachments were put into action against Irgash's band, which had dug in at
its base fortress of Bachkyr. But the ancient walls failed to save the
basmachi. Red Army units and volunteer detachtnents took the fortress by storm.
At the same time an attack was launched against Kurshirmat in the Gul'cha-
Irkeshtam sector. Kurshirmat sustained heavy casualties, but succeeded in
withdrawing with r~manants of his band into the high-mountain ~?lay Valley,
which contained avenues of egress to the border.
The rout of the Irgash and Kurshirmat bands threw ths ranks of the Fergana
Valley basmachi into disarray. Some bands, cornered by advancing Red Army
units and volunteer detachments, opted for capture over total rout. The 500-
man Khamdam band, the 450-man Makhkam-khodzha band, and the 600-man Akbaraliband
surrendered together with their leaders.
Disintegration began in the bands which continued to resist. Many disenchanted
dekhkans deserted from the basmachi bands and surrendered to the Soviet
authorities. More than 900 men gave themselves up just between 20 January
1I1(I 2 February 1920; many of these joined volunteeer detachments. Madamin-bek,
attempticig to improve the situation, again commenced aggressive actions, but
was routed by the Tatar brigade. Having lo$t 200 horsemen, he fled across the
Syr Darya.
Tlie leader of the Fergana basmachi began truce talks with the Soviet authori-
ties. At the same time he was attempting to take advantage of the lull in
the figtiting to move the remaini.ng bands into the mountains. The Fergana
_ Front Rewoyensovet, while entering into talks with Madamin-bek, did not cease
orRanizing pursuit of the enemy. Madamin-bek was forced to capitulate. On
6~larch 1920 he signed an agreement with the Red Army command authorities which
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� V~~ V~ ~ ~~.~l~~v J~\L~�
specified his total submission to Soviet authority. On 12 March 1920 Madamin-
bek's 1200 mounted warriors ceased resistance.
The successf~l ca~ai~ against the basmachi in the ear1Y months of 192fl coincided with
brilliant victories won during that sawe period bq the Red Army on the main
fronts of the civil war on the Southern Front over the army of Denikin, and
on the Eastern Front over the reamants of Kolchak's forces.
In order to consolidate the successes achieved in the struggle against the
basmachi, the Turkkomissiya, jointly with the Turkestan Front Rewoyensovet and
the Soviet Government of Turkestan, proceeded to rebuild factories and mills in
the Fergana, began construction on a rail spur from the Kyzyl-Kiya mines,
began utilization of neglected land, began cleaning out the aryks, shipping
cotton to the Center ;central region of the European part of the RSFSR], etc.
The dekhkan toilers of the Fergana, just as throughout Turkestan, saw with
their own eyes that the Soviet authorities were unswervingly i~plementing a
nationalities and agrarian policy aimed at improving their situation.
The most important of the political measures carried out at that time was re-
establishment in the kishlaks, under the supervision of the party regional and
oblast committees of the agencies o f authority which had been destroyed
by the basmachi.l~i3
At the end of March 1920 elections to local soviets were held in a number of
localities in Ferganskaya Oblast.
On 2 April 1920 the Turkestan Front Rewoyensovet issued a decree ordering
indemnification of the public for loases sustained as a consequence of req-
u isitioning of property for the needs of the war effort (horaes, camels,
wagons, etc).144 Extensive assistance began to be given to the public,
which had suffered from the basmachi raids. A fund of 50 million rubles
was established for this purpose. A network of tea and food relipf stations,
shelters, medical care facilities, and hostels for persons withou.t shelter was
organized throughout the Fergana.
Peace in the Fergana did not last long, however. A new basmachi wave erupted
- there in the summer of 1920. M. V. Frunze characterized it as "rebirth of
the basmachi front."145 The revival of the basaa?chi was due to the fact that
ttie basic conditions which had engendered the class struggle, which assumed
the form of armed combat, could not yet be entirely eliminated by this time. In
particular, the exploiter classes of Central Asia and the reactionary Muslim
clergy attempted to use any pretexts to keep the basmachi flame from becoming
extinguished. In addition, the imperialists of the Entente were making
preparations for a new anti-Soviet campaign. Placing its principal hopes on
White Poland and Wrangel's army, the Entente was at the same time attempting to
organize against Soviet rule combined actions by all counterrevolutionary
forces in the outlying regions of the Soviet Republic. The Central Asian
basmachi comprised one of these forces.
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In the Fergana the plans of the agents of imperialism were connected with the
name of Kurshirmat, a former aide of Madamin-bek. Following the surrender of
Madamin-bek, beginning in April 1920, Kurbashi ~ho were continuing the struggle
against the Red Army began to gather around Kurshirmat.146
The counterrevolution was continuously seeking to unify the basmachi forces
under the direction of a single leader. As soon as any one of the chiefs ad-
vanced to a"leader" position, he would immediately be gi~en every possible
support and assistance. Such was the case this time as well. Kurshirffiat
received financial assistance, plus a magnificent title to enhance his
"authority." At a meeting of Fergana kurbashi in July 1920 he was named, as
_ Irgash before him,"amir al'-muslimin" [com~mander of the Muslims].
In mid-May 1920 the Fergana once again became the arena of savage struggle.
Attempts to persuade the kurbashi to surrender voluntarily were unsuccessful.
Concentrated in their bands were the most reactionary elements and common
criminals, veterans of numerous murders and robberies. Nevertheless the
Soviet authorities continued in their efforts to end the bloodshed. In May
- 1920 with the assistance of Madamin-bek, they succeeded in getting a truce
- envoy from Kurshirmat's camp to meet for peace talks. At the same time a
delegation was sent to Kurshirmat, consisting of regimental commissar S. L.
Sukhov and Madamin-bek. But Kurshirmat refused to engage in peace talks and
handed over S. L. Sukhov and Madamin-bek to the tender mercies of his
myrmidons. On 14 May 1920 they were beheaded in the Tamasha urochishche.
The kurbashi Akhundzhan and Parpi, who had previously surrendered, once again
came over to the side of the basmachi.
By midsummer of 1920 approximately 30,~ basmachi had massed in the Fergana.
They included many dekhkans who had been deceived or forced to jcin the bands
by threats. This category of basmachi would seek to leave the bands at the
~
first opportunity.
The large scale of basmachi operations in the Fergana Valley once again made
this region an arena of acute class struggle. Following Kurshirmat's brutal
execution of Sukhov and Madamin-bek, naturally all peace talks were halted.
A TurkTsIK decree placed the entirety of Ferganskaya Oblast under martial law.
M. V. Frunze and Sh. Z. Eliava arrived in the Fergana in mid-May 1920 to take
over direct supervision of the struggle against the basmachi.147 An enlarged
session of the party oblast committee was held immediately after this, at
which matters of stepping up party work in the oblast as well as the struggle
against the basmachi were discussed.148
After receiving an on-the-spot briefing on the situation, M. V. Frunze tele-
graphed V. I. Lenin: "...Firm and decisive measures are essential; otherwise
the Fergana will be lost for an extended period of time."149 He reported to
V. I. Lenin that the main forces of the Turkestan Front had been sent into the
Fergana.150 It is true that these were not very large forces but, operating in
a close link with the masses and in solidarity with volunteer detaclunents, the
Red Army comprised a cementing nucleus of the people's armed struggle against
the basmachi.
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. . . . . ~ . . .
M. V. Frunze visited all the principal areas of the Fergana where the struggle
_ against the basmachi was being conducted. Talking with commanders and men,
the toiler population, party and soviet officials, and addressing numerous
political rallies and meetings of workers and dekhkans, he inspired them for
the struggle against the basmachi. Acquainting himself in detail with party-
soviet work, he gave assistance to local organizations with his advice, cor-
rected their mistakes, and guided their activities.
During M. V. Frunze's stay in the Fergana, preparations began for executing
the order issued by the Turkestan Front Rewoyensovet which called for mobi-
lizing toilers of indigenous nationalities into the Red Army.
It was decided to issue an appeal to the toilers of the Fergana to become ac-
tively involved in the struggle against the basmachi. V. I. Lenin pointed out
that when a threat to the republic arose, the party considered it to be "its
duty to appeal to the worker-peasant masses and to describe to them the dif-
ficult situation which has developed. We appealed to them and indicated on
whom the salvation of Soviet Russia depends and what exertion of energy is es-
sential in order to focus all resources on one specific task."~51
An appeal entitled "To the Muslim Population of Ferganskaya Oblast," signed by
M. V. Frunze, was made public on 24 May. "Comrade Muslims!" the appeal stated.
"We, representatives of Soviet authority, appeal to you, the residents of the
cities, towns and auls of the devastated, blood-soaked Fergana.... You must '
come en masse to the assistance of the authorities in wiping out the basmachi.... ;
= Hasten your gathering into a harmonious fraternal family under the Red Banner I
of Soviet rule."152 ;
~
The appeaZ, printed in the local languages, was widely disseminated (more than ~
20,000 copies). ~
~
Frunze su~?oned to the Fergana an agitation train operated by the politi~al .
directorate of the Turkestan Front. At his suggestion, agitation-organizer ,
courses of instruction were set up in the Fergana for representatives of the
kishlaks; persons enrolled in these courses "should very shortly become
bearers of the ideas of Soviet rule among the kishlak population."153
At the beginning of 3une a special politprosvetotryad [political education
detachment] was formed in the Fergana, to work among the people of the kishlaks.
The men of the politprosvetotryad, among whom was pioneer of Soviet Uzbek
poetry Khamza Khakim-zade, an ardent orator extolling Soviet rule, assisted
the Red Army not only with words: they frequently took direct part in combat
actions.
In rtay 1920 the regional Komsomol committee issued an appeal to young people to
become actively involved in the struggle against the basmachi. "All organiza-
tions have responded to the appeal of the RKSM [Russian Young Communist League]
regaonal co~ittee calling for mobilization for the Fergana Front," reported the
newspaper IZVESTIYA. "Many comrades are requesting tu be sent to the front.
Volunteers are coming from the most remote localities."154
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Ye. ti. L'14nasbayev, M. I. Nazarov, and M. Yu. Yuldashev were among the leaders
of the Kokand Komsomol and organizers of the struggle against the basmachi.
Kokand Komsomol member Abdulla Nabiyev, who organized a scout detachment of
Uzbek Komsomol members and who performed important tasks fox the Red Army
command authorities, dis~layed a model of selflessness.
As a result of the mobilization aFpeal, instead of 9350, 11,475 toilers of
indigenous nationalities reported to the induction stations of Ferganskaya
Oblast.
Taking into consideration experience to date in combating large basmachi bands,
on 15 *~fay 1920 M. V. Frunze ordered commencement of military operations on a
wide front. The main forces concentrated in the area of the principal
basmachi bases in the Alay Valley. A composite group operated here, consisting
of two regiments and an ethnic Kirghiz battalion. The composite group was com-
- manded by E. F. Kuzhelo. A mobile detachment was formed in the Fer_gana Valley
proper.
All party and soviet agencies were mobilized for the struggle against the
basmachi. In the interests of more precise coordination of operations, ad-
ministrative functions in Ferganskaya Oblast were temporarily turned over to
tt~e military cotmnand authorities.
The Red Army units had the task of pursuing the bands until they were complete-
ly destruyed, even if it became necessary to operate outside of their as-
signed area.
E. F. Kuzhelo's composite group operated in the most difficult and critical
sect~~r. On 25 May 1920 the group departed from (~~1~ and headed into r.he
motintains. The first engagement with the basmachi took place on a mountain
pass. The bandits had taken up positions there in adv~tnce and had fortified
_ them. But they were unable to withstand the onslaught of the Red Armymen and
retreated up a gorge leading to the Alay Valley, into the Sufi-Kurgan area.
On the morning of 29 May, however, when the detachment's advance guard ap-
peared at Sufi-Kurgan, the basmachi would not accept battle and hastily witr.-
drew toward the Alay Valley. The basmachi leaders considered this area in-
accessible to Red Army units. The rarefiPd air required special training for
adaptation. One would tire rapidly. Tenacity, persistence, stamina and
- belief in victory, however, gave the commanders and men additional energy.
For two weeks the Red cavalrymen relentlessly pursued the ba~machi. Neither
thc accustomed conditions nor the difficult passesand gorges saved the enemy.
Part ot the basmachi forces was defeated in detail in the Alay Valley, while
part escaped across snowy passes into other areas.
~1 romposite detachment under the command of P. M. Paramonov, setting out from
~ukancl on 30 ~iay, conducted several successful operati~ns against the basmachi
bc~cids uf Sali-Maksun, Aman-Palvan~ and Atakuza.
The succe:.ses or the Soviet troops greatly inf~uenced the attitude of the local
po}~ulace. 'Tt~e dekhkans gradually lost the fFa.r caused by the basmachi acts of.
t~rrorism and came out increasingly actively against the bandits. The basmachi
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~'\/n Vf~'lti,~H~. a...~a; �/.\L~
did not feel secure even in the most remote areas of the Pamirs. Unhappy with
the constant requisitions and coercion, t.he toilers themselves were matcing
preparations to put an end to the basmachi bands. On 26 June 1920 the dekhkans
of mountain kishlaks held a clandestine meeting. The following day a volunteer
detachment made up of local villagers attacked a stronghold containing a bandit
base and seized stores of weapons and ammunition.
In July 1920 Kurshirmat attempted to launch an offensive. He came down out of
the Alay Valley, intending to cut the Kokand-Fergana and Andizhan-Namangan rai~
lines. This raid was a failure, however. In four large operatiors (in the
Gorbua-Yaz"yavan, Angichek-Bulak-Bashi, Shaarikhaii-Zarkent, and Yaz"yavan-
Minbulak areas), Soviet troops, with the support of the local population,
dealt the basmachi decisive blows. Remnants of the basmachi detachments fled
in the direction of Balykchi-Chinabad.
Thus within a short period of time the Turkestan Commission of the VTsIK and
the RSFSR SNK, the Central Committee of the Turkestan Communist Party, and the
Rewoyensovet of the Turkestan Front, with the direct participation of party,
government and military leaders (V. V. Kuybyshev, M. V. Frunze, Sh. Z. Eliava,
- etc), succeeded in mobilizing the toiler masses, uniting their efforts with
the operatians of the Red Army, and thwarting attempts by the basmachi to
launch an offensive.
In August 1920 party and soviet organizations elaborated new measures for
wiping out the basmachi bands. It was decided to establish a military council
in the ~'ergana, transferring to it all civil administration.155 On 12 August
the question of combating the basmachi was also discussed at an oblast con-
gress of the Fergana party organization. The necessity of stepping up the
struggle against remnants of the basmachi bareds was also incorporated in the
resolutions of the Fifth Andizhan Uyezd-City Party Conference, which was held
at this time. In August TurkTslK and the Rewoyensovet of the Turkestan Front
granted the Ferganskaya Oblast Military Council emergency powers to combat the
basmachi.156
Carrying out its assigned task, the Fergana Military Council proceeded to
implpmen[ special me3sures. In addition to stepping up political ~education
efforts among the toilers, it introduced, in particular, a system of hostages
bai, mullahs, and relatives of basmachi still at large.
At the same time the famed brigade of Red Communards and ethnic volunteer units
of ~irghiz and Kazakhs, which had arrived from the Center, were sent into the
Fer~ana.
~ Basmachi activity did not diminish however. Their actions at the end of 1920
coiitnined a specific feature, expressed in the fact that they were aimed at
undermining economic life in the Turkestan Republic. Precisely at this time,
when Turkestan's economic relations with the country's central regions were
developing and growing stronger, the organizers of the basmachi were endeavor-
ing to inflict maximum damage on the economy, in order to impede the economic
recovery of Turkestan and thus to weaken the economy of the country as a
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whole. The basmachi were assigned the mission of depriving Russia's textile
industry of cotton and of leaving Turkestan without coal, oil and foodstuffs.
For this reason their efforts were directed chiefly toward the destruction of
industrial enterprises, mines, oilfields, rail lines, telephone and telegraph
lines, irrigation works, cotton and foodstuffs storage facilities.
In the past acts of arson by basmachi bands on cotton ginning mills, destruc-
tion of rail lines and attacks on oilfields and mi.nes had as a rule been
sporadic, from occasion to occasion, while now acts of sabotage were assuming
a massive character a.nd were being carried out according to a plan conceived
and worked out in advance.
The following t~ble contains a summary of basmachi raids on the Fergana Rail-
road and cotton ginning mill burnings in July-October 1920:
Number of Length of Demolished Tracks Number of Cot-
- Raids and Telegraph Lines ton Mills Hmed
- July 14
August 11 32 versts 9
- September 17 31 versts 15
dctober 5 2
Sources: Central State Archives of the Soviet Army, Fund 110, List 3, File 522,
sheets 16-18; USSR Central State Archives of the October Revolution,
F~nd 130, List 4, File 786, Sheet 37.
- At the beginning of August, according to incomplete figures, the basmachi
burned up 100,000 poods of cotton, 33,000 poods of raw cotton, and 12,000 poods
of seed grain just in Andizhanskiy Rayon.15~
In October raids were mounted simultaneously on the Shurab coal mines and on
the Chimion oilfie1d.158 At the beginning of November six basmachi bands
attacked the Sulyukta coal mines, the republic's second most important,
- located in the southern part of the Fergana Valley. Basmachi also surrounded
the Pos'yetovka area, where a cotton wool mill was under construction,159 and
attacked the Santo oilfie1d.160 In mid-November basmachi attacked the
ozokerite fields near Mel'nikovo Station, as a result of which operations in
these fields were shut down.161 Significantly, at this same time basmachi
operating in th~ Turkmen and Kara-Kalpak areas mounted an attack on the
fisheries on the Muynak Peninsula in the Aral Sea. This once again confirms ~
that basmachi operations were being directed from a single central head-
quarters and were being carried out according to a unified plan. We could
also cite a number of other examples. All of them indicate that during those
days when the White axv~ies were defeated, counterrevolutionary forces were
undertaking attempts to retard or thwart our country's movement onto the path
of building socialism.
Having analyzed information on acts of economic sabotage, the Turkestan Front
Revvoyensovet undertook a number of ineasures to protect industrial installa-
- tions and rail lines. The party kraykom [regional committee] instructed
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rvn ~rr~~~P?~ t~JG V:~L~
local organizations to org3nize, with the assistance of command and political
personnel of military units, party druzhinas and territorial battalions to
aid the Red Army . Such units were formed in Koka.nd, Andizhan, Namangan, and
other cities.l6Z
At the beginning of September 1920 ri. V. Frunze stated in a conversation with
V. V. Kuybyshev:'i consider it essential... to place under arms the entire
worker and white-collar population of this oblast, with the exception of
ttiose performing vitally essential functions. This measure, providing
assistance to the military in the foimof workers acquainted with the enemy's
tactics, will in my opinion make it possible to achieve results in short
order."163 M. V. Frunze's instructions were carried out. Mills, oilfields
and railways, protected by Red Army detachments, party druzhinas and other
worker class security units, began operating more or less normally.
An important role in mobilizing all manpower and resources to defeat the
basmachi was played by the resolutions of the 5th Congress of the Turkestan
Communist Party and the 9th All-Turkestan Congress of Soviets. Of particular
importance were congress resolutions pertaining to continued enlistment
of representatives of toilers of indigenous nationalities into agencies of
governmental authority.
Following these congresses, important measures in the area of the nationali-
ties question were carried out in Turkestan, promoting defeat of the basmachi.
These included the following: nativization of the edifice of government, ex-
tensive enlist~ment of representatives of local nationalities into the government
structure, adoption of teaching in the mother tongue of the pupils and students
in the schools, and use of the languages of the nationalities of Central Asia
(alongside the Russian language) in co~ercial office and administrative ac-
tivities. A report by M. S. Iseyev, secretary of the Ferganskaya Oblast Com-
mittee of the KPT, dated 12 February 1921, noted that "a number of political
campaigns have been conducted since the 9th and Sth congresses, resulting in
the fa~t that the basmachi are gradually beginning to disintegrate."164 In ad-
dition, the 9th All-Turkestan Congress of Soviets decided to send 10 percent
of the congress delegates into the strexggle against the basmachi, while the
Stti Cungress of the KPT mobilized a number of delegates for political work in
the Fergana. Following mobilization of the KPT Central Committee, 100 Com-
munists, representatives of local nationalities, left for the Fergana Frant.
In October 1920 the 'Pu~icbyiu~u [Turkestan Bureau] of the RKP(b) Central Committee
decided to send into the Fergana half of all party workers who had come to
Turkestan from the Center, including at least 20 graduates of the Coumnunist
liniversity imeni M. Sverdlov, who had been sent to Turkestan by the RKP(b)
Central Committee.165 On 20 October 1920 the Orgbyuro [Organization BureauJ
or the RKP(b) Central Commitee decided to send party officials to the Fergana
for permanent-assignment party work.166
Tiie activities of par~y organizations produced appreciable results: the local
toiler population began joining people's militia detachments and militia
assistance detachments which were being formed at this time. These detach-
mtnts became quite active in 1921.
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In his address at the Fourth Conference of Gubemia Chek.as on 6 February 1920,
V. I. Lenin stated that "A substantial majority of ~torkers and peasants in
those outlying localities which were under the yoke of the White Guard, the
greater their numbers, the more firmly they have come over to our side."167
These words apply in full measure not only to the workers but also to the
dekhkans of Turkestan. The Oblast Congress of Soviets of the Fergana, held in
August 1920, affirming the participation of the local population in the
struggle against the basmachi and in the local soviets, informe~ V. I. Lenin
of these facts, which were important for the Fergana and for all of Turkestan.
The "Koshchi" (poor peasant] unions, established on the basis of the resolu-
tions of the 5th Congress of the KPT, began playing a significant role at this
time in the struggle against the basmachi. Their members actively participated
in self-defense detachments and in volunteer militia units.
The struggle against the basmachi in the Fergana was alleviated at the end of
1920 by two most important circumstances: by the victory over the main forces
of the interventionists and White Guards (the rout of [Jrangel' and the
armistice with Poland) and by the victory of the people's revolution in
Bukhara (September 1920).
Our enemies refused to capitulate, however. The nationalist counterrevolution
and the basmachi leaders worked out a plan of establishment of a coalition of
all counterrPVOlutionary Muslim elements in the East to combat Soviet power.
On 7 November 1920 Kurshirmat, who called himself "the chief kurbashi of the
Fergana Islamic army, the Bashkir nationalist I1'darkhan Mukani, and the
Kazakh nationalist Dzhunazakov appealed to Dutov168 to join this bloc and to
begin supplying the basmachi with arms, ammunition and instructors for the
purpose of organizing a new basmachi army.169 This counterrevolutionary ven-
ture, however, proved to be just as unsuccessful as its predecessors.
- An end to fighting on the civil war froi:ts made it possible to redeploy ad-
ditional military units to the Fergana. By the end of 1920 several rifle
brigades and cavalry regiments arrived there from the Semirech'ye and the
former Bukhara Front. At the same time the Fergana Army Group was established,
under the command of G. V. Zinov'yev, and subsequently of P. I. Baranov,
member of the Turkestan Front Rewoyensovet.l~~ It saw action in the Namangan,
Fergana, Kokand, Andizhan, and Osh combat sectors.l~l
Fierce engagements were fought with the basmachi in the Namangan, Andizhan, and
Osh areas. Basmachi bands in the Andizhan-0sh area totaled approximately
1500 men. The 15th Independent Dungan Cavalry Regiment was operating against
this force. The band lost 150 basmachi killed in an engagement on 30 November
1920 and fled into the Bulak-Bashi and Gorbua areas.
Comba[ operations against basmachi bands were also conducted in the vicinity
of Kokand. There were more than 1000 basmachi in this area. In two engage-
, ments the bands lost approximately 120 men. The remainder, unable to with-
stand the onslaught of the Red Armymen and volunteers, dispersed into small
groups .
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A battle raged for four days and nights at the Dzhalal-Abad rail~ray station.
Enjoying a substantial superiority in numbers, the basmachi surrounded the
station. The handful of Red Armymen were in aa exceptionally difficult
plight. Food and water supplies ran out. They were runaing extremely short
of a~unition. On the fourth day the enemy began launching continuous assaults.
r1t that moment when the Red Armymen had run out of ammunition and the basmachi
were attacking from all sides, an armored train appeared on the horizon. It
scattered the band with artillery and machinegun fire.
Armed clashes with basmachi bands continued in the Fergana Valley throughout
the entire month of October 1920. The bandit units were disintegrating under
the a~tacks by the Red Army and volunteer detachments. Faced with this situa-
tion, the basmachi kurbashi of the Fergana Valley, with the participation of
agents of foreign intelligence services, held a 2-day conference, in hopes of
uniting their forces and jointly finding a way out of the predicament. At the
cost of great efforts, success was achieved in recoaciling the two basmachi
leaders of the Fergana Kurshirmat and Muetdin at this meeting.
Red Army units and volunteer detachments continued pressing the bands in the
Fergana Valley. In October-December 1920 practically the entire territory of
Ferganskaya Oblast was cleared of basmachi. Remnants of the shattered bands
took refuge in the Alay Valley.
The Turkestan Communist Party realized that the successes against the basmachi
on the battlefield had to be consolidated by carrying out economic measures.
An important role in the s~ruggle against the basmachi was played by a
TurkTslK decision, adopted at the initiative of the Turkkomissiya, to abolish
the food monopoly in Ferganskaya Oblast and to open bazaars for free trade.1~2
On 25 December 1920 an oblast conference of dekhkans was convened in the
Fergana, at which reports on the following topics were presented and dis-
cussed: 1) the current situation; 2) land reform; 3) tasks of food commissars;
4) tasks of public education in the village; 5) the struggle against the
basmachi; 6~ economic development; 7) organization of a union of toiling
dekhkans.l~ The resolutions of this conference and their implementation
fostered mobilization of the dekhkans for the struggle against the counter-
revolution.
In the summer of 1920 the government of the RSFSR allocated substantial funds
_ to the purpose of boosting the Fergana economy. Turkestan was allocated 150
million rubles for rebuilding the irrigation system o~ the Fergana, which had
been demolished by the basmachi, and for restoration of cotton growing. In ad-
dition, money was allocated for the purchase of 5000 poods of seed grain and
for purchase abroad, primarily in China, of livestock for distribution to the
dektikans. Another important measure was opening up of the border with China
for unrestricted import of grain and livestock into the Fergana.
The government of the Turkestan Republic in turn substantially reduced
government taxation of the dekhkans, while those kishlaks which had suffered
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heavily were fully exempted from payment of taxes. The toilers of the Fergana
were given large-scale assistance in supply of foodstuffs and manufactured
goods.
_ The military-political measures talcen by the Turkestan Communist Party and the
Turkestan Front Rewoyensovet ia the summer and fall of 1920 resulted in
_ the total defeat and scattering of many basmachi bands; this made it possible
for the front command authorities to make part of their forces available for
the Western Front and thus to contribute to the defeat of the White Poles.
The situation of the basmachi who were operatiag in m4untain areas worsened
with the onset of winter. The Red Army, with the active support of the
population, prevented the bands from remaining long in kishlaks. The kurbashi
undertook attempts to penetrate iato populated localities but, encountering
resistance, would once again withdraw into the mountains. On 24 November 1920
Red Army detachments launched another attack on the forces of Kurshirmat and
Aliyar, which were attempting to break through into settled areas. As a result
the basmachi fled in the direction of Sokh, where they were again overtaken
on 25 November and scattered into small groups.
In November 1920 more than 1200 basmachi, who had been taking refuge in the
southern part of Kirghizia, concentrated in Narynskaya Volost, with the in-
tention of living off the local population. On this occasion as well, how-
ever, they were unable to carry out their plans. A Red Army detachment ar-
rived in Narynskaya Volost to protect the local population. It hit the
basmachi encampment with a surprise attack. Hand-to-hand fighting ensued, in
which the basmachi suffered heavy casualties.
In the first half of December 1920, following several successful operations,
two bands were destroyed and the Parpi band, which totaled more than 2000 men,
was thoroughly mauled. Ya. A. Mel'kumov's 9th Brigade routed Kazakbay's band
and inflicted a defeat on the band of Aman-Palvan. Kurshirmat's force with-
drew into the Alay Valley, closer to the border.
_ By the end of 1920 basmachi numbers had been sharply reduced in comparison
with the beginning of the year. They roved about the Fergana Valley, for the
most part in the adjacent mountain ranges. Driven out of the densely-populated
areas, they were deprived of their principal bases of food supply. The in-
habitants of the kishlaks and auls refused to provide the bands with feed and
foodstuffs. Increasingly less frequently were the basmachi successful in tak-
ing food supplies by force. They were hindered in this endeavor not only by
th~ Fed Army and the volunteer detachments, but also by the dekhkans them-
selves. Frequently the inhabitants of kishlaki and auls united at their own
initiative and offered resistance to the basmachi.
In the kishlak of riayli-Say the weaponless peasa~ invited basmachi into their
hort~es, and then on signal disarmed them one by one, seizing 37 rifles and
32 horses. Such examples are not isolated. But the principal form of
strc:ggle by the population against the bands was their ~articipation in
volun[eer druzhinas, militia and self-defense detachments. By the end of
1920 they contained more than 15,000 residents of Ferganskaya Oblast.
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rvn vrr�~wi, aJ~c vi~a.i
At the end of 1920-beginning of 1921 the Soviet nation, having defeated the
main forces of the interventionists and White Guard, began shifting over to
- peacetime construction.
The long-awaited peace did not yet ensue, however, in the Fergana Valley.
Inspired by external reactionary forces, the chieftains of the basmachi bands
refused to lay down their arms. Years of difficult struggle against the
basmachi still lay ahead for the Fergana.
Areas of Basmachi Concentration: Ablyk, "Matchinskoye Bekstvo"
In addition to the r^erg~na Valley, in 1918-1920 basmachi detachmeats were
operating in the Angren River valley near Tashkent and ia Samarkandskaya
Oblast.
In the Angren River valley, an important grain and rice producing area, which
played an important role in the economy of the Turkestan Republic, the basmachi
bands of Ashurmat and Rakhmankul appeared in the villages of Ablyk, Pengaz, and
Ashava, located 80 versts southeast of Tashkent, presenting a direct threat
Lo Tashkent, the republic's political and military-administrative center.
Seizing the Kul'davan and Kendyr-Davan passes, which link Tashkent with
Ferganskaya Oblast, the basmachi secured their rear and obtained f reedom of
maneuver.
Local party units assumed the brunt of the struggle agaiast the basmachi.
Party druzhinas of Communists from nearby commnunities in Tashkentskiy Uyezd:
Pskent, Buki, Muratali, Telyau, and Ablyk, as well as detachments of Tashkent
Communists and workers were dispatched to the area.
Another dangerous focal point of basmachi activity developed along the upper
reaches of the Zeravshan, in a rugged mountain area, beyond the Oburdon pass,
among the sheer cliff s of the Zeravshan and Turkestan ranges, in the north-
wes*ern part of contemporary Tajikistan. The reactionary clergy and bai were
particularly strongly entrenched in this area, skillfully exploiting the
ignorance of the population, clan-tribal traditions and ties. The entire area
bore the name Matchinskoye bekstvo (the Zeravshan is called the Matcha along
its upper reaches; the area's administrative center, a large kishlak, bore the
same name). In Novemb er 1918 the bai in this area, headed by the local bek
[ft:udal ruler], massacred a small Red Army detachment and established their
owt~ rule. Cour.terrevolutionary elements planned to turn the Matchinskoye
bekstvo [Matcha beydom] into an "independent state."
Although the scale of activities of the Matcha insurgents was sma11,1~4 Matcha
was of enormous importance to the counterrevolution, for it played the role
of binding link between the Fergana basmachi and the Buk~ara emir, who was
backed by the British imperialists. In addition, the Fergana basmachi
utilized the Matcha area as a place to regroup their bands and as an avenue of
withdrawal into Bukhara territory during an offensive by large Red Army forces.
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Having seized power in the Matchinskoye bekstvo, at the beginning of 1919 the
basmachi leaders attempted to gain control over the neighboriag kishlaks. The
basmachi proceeded to raid them and rob the local populace.
A small Red Army detachment was dispatched to Matchinskaya Volost. Its actione
were little effective, however, siace it was able to hold back the basmachi on-
slaught only in certain sectors. Appeals issued by the Red Army command and
local authorities to the basmachi to stop the bloodletting were unsuccessful.
The Matcha basmachi became more aggressive. Dekhkans were fleeing to Samarkand
and Pendzhikent to escape from these terrorist activities.
The Samarkandskaya Oblast party committee mobilized Communists to fight the
basmachi in the Matcha. An international detachment was formed in the fizst
half of 1919. In May 1919 Muslim bureaus wzre established in alI uyezd and
city party committees in Samarkandslcaya Oblast, which proceeded to conduct ex-
tensive political work among the masses.
In the meantime the basmachi kurbashi announced the establishment of an in-
dependent state, called the "Matchinskoye belcstvo." This venture the
creation of a"state" consisting of remote mountain kishlaks with a population
totaling several tens of thousands pursued two obj ectives: to enhance the
authority and prestige of the chieftains and to obtain material assistance from
reactionaries abroad.
In addition, the basmachi leaders declared that their bekstvo was "popular"
(an experienced stage manager's hand could be discerned in their actions), and
in order to show evidence of this they staged "voting" by the population when
various decisions were made. Employing the threat of arms, the basmachi
herded the dekhkans to assembly points, where the "balloting" took place. A
delegation which was to be sent to England for "couasel" and "assistance" was
also elected in this manner.
British authorities held talks with the delegation, figuring to obtain a
bridgehead for aggression in Central Asia. They gave approval of creation of
the ":~Iatchinskoye bekstvo" and promised generous aid. In the summer of 1919
the delegation returned to the Matcha. The promised support went to the heads
of the basmachi leaders. Operating from their refuge beyond the rugged
mountain passes, the basmachi mounted raids and robbed the population in the
surrounding areas. The residents of the kishlaks in Fal'garskaya Volost were
particularly frequently raided.
In September 1919 the Matcha basmachi launched an offensive toward the city
of Pendzhikent. Taking advantage of the fact that the main Soviet military
forces were in other areas of Central Asia. they captured 13 kishlaks. A 150-
man Red Army detachment arrived from Samarkand to assist the toiler population
on ttie upper reaches of the Zeravshan. The Samarkandskaya Oblast party com-
mittee issued arms and ammunition to the people of the kishlaks which were
frequently subjected to attacks by the basmachi bands,and also sent instructors.
The de[achment and local dekhkans liberated a number of kishlaks.
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At the same time measures were taken to defend the kishlaks of Ura-Tyubinskiy
and Khodzhentskiy uyezds. Small mi1 itary garrisons and volunteer detachments
covered the passes leading to the Zeravshan Valley.
At the same time the Red Army command authorities aad 1QCa1 ageacies of Soviet
authority, seeking to avoid further bloodsbed, made one mvre attempt to
eliminate the basmachi base in the Matcha by peaceful means. Following
negotiations, the Matcha leaders agreed to disarm aad pledged to stop raiding
the surrounding areas, but they failed to keep their promises.
In January 1920 the basmachi again proceeded to conduct offeasive operations.
Following engagements which had variable success, they withdrew beyond the
mountain passes.
Once again truce talks began. Finally on 12 July 1920 a peace agreement was
signed between the Red Army co~and authorities and the Matcha bek. But the
truce again proved fragile. The basmachi particularly stepped up their ac-
tivities in September 1920, when the populatioa of the Bukhara emirate rose up
in rebellion. The victory of the popular revolution in Bukhara foreordained
the defeat of the basmachi in the Matchinskoye bekstvo. A sp~cial new detach-
ment under the co~and of one of the heroes of the civil war, P. M. Paramonov,
was formed in Samarkand. The Samarkandskaya Oblast Executive Committee
declared Ura-Tyubinskiy Uyezd, where the kurbashi Kholbuta, notorious for his
ferocity, was on the rampage, to be under martial law. A total of about 20
bands were operating in the areas of Samarkandskaya Oblast, each of which con-
tained from 70 to 700 basmachi.
At the end of September 1920 Red Army units fought in the Matcha for a period
of 20 days, hitting the basmachi hard. The basmachi were not completely wiped
out in the Matcha, however, until 1923.
Basmachi of Bukhara and Khorezm
The rulers of Bukhara and Khiva were able to hold on to their thrones for
some time following the victory of the October Revolution. In the conditions
of the civil war and foreign intervention, the Bukhara emirate and the Khiva
khanate became hotbeds of counterrevolution and an interventionist bridgehead.
As already noted, the Fergana, Matcha and other basmachi received enormous as-
sistance from the ruling circles of the Bukhara emirate. Bukhara sent the
baswachi arms and money, and offered refuge following defeat. Dzhunaid-khan,
the dictator of Khiva, repeatedly attacked the towns of Petro-Aleksandrovsk
and Nukus, which were situated in the Amudar'yinskiy Division of the Turkestan
ASSR.175
The anti-Soviet activities of the rulers of Khiva and Bukhara hastened the col-
lapse of their despotic regimes. The masses rose up to overthrow the basmachi
dictator Dzhunaid and the emir of Bukhara, henchman of the British imperial-
ists. In this struggle the toilers of Khiva and Bukhara, led by Communists,
relied on fraternal help from the Russian people and the assistance of Soviet
Russia.
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The toilers of Khiva were the first to achieve victory. In November 1919
there began a popular uprising against the dictatorship of Dzhunaid-khan. The
insurgenta ~ppealed to the Soviet Government for support. A delegatioa of
Khiva insurgents arrived in Petro-Aleksandrovsk. Oa 4 November the Soviet of
Workers' and Dekhkan Deputies telegraphed an appeal to Tashkent, addressed to
the TurkTslK and the Rewoyensovet: "The proletariat of Khiva has risen
against Dzhuaaid-khan; f ighting is in progress everywhere. A delegation
from the people has come to us asking for assistance. Request your permission
to send a detachment to assist the iasurgent people of Khiva."17b
The united forces of the Khiva revolutionary detachmeat and Red Army units in-
flicted a number of defeats on Dzhunaid-khan, who was being actively assiste~
by r.emnants of the White Cossack forces.
At the end of January 1920 Dzhunaid was defeated and fled into the desert.
Bedirkent, his official residence, fell on 23 January. Revolutionary detach-
ments entered the khan's capital on 1 February.
The victory of the revolution in Khiva was, to quote V. V. Kuybyshev, "the
first link in a chain of revolutions and uprisings in the East which will in-
evitably bring all the countries of the East which are today oppressed and
enslaved by British imperialism to complete liberation from bondage.... Hezoic
little Khiva was the first to embark upon the path of struggle. It was the
first to rise up in rebellion. It was the first to gain liberation from
despotism."177
The First All-Khorezm Kurultay of People's Representatives conv~ned in Khiva
on 26 April 1920. It proclaimed the establishment of a people`s Soviet
Republic and adopted its first constitution.
The "Preamble" to the constitution stai,ed that it was solely due to the victory
of the socialist revolution in Rurssia that the Khivan people had been able to
gain their freedom and independ,:mce. "...The Russian workers and peasants,"
it stated further, "who have helped liberate the people of Khiva and the
proletariat of the entire world... are the very best friends of the entire
Khivan people." The Khorezm Peoplers Soviet Republic (KPSR) arose on the ruins
of the despotic Khiva regime.
Immediate following Khiva, the revolution was victorious in Bukhara as well.
Fearing the growing disconteat of the people, the emir stepped up repressive
measures and was more and more obviously turning the country into an anti-
Soviet bridgehead. He was operating in close contact with the British mili-
tary command in Mashhad. Dozens of British and White Guard officers were ac-
ting as instructors training the emir's troops. As V. V. Kuybyshev stated,
the Bukhara emirate had once and for all become a caravanserai for counter-
revolutionaries, White Guardists, and world imperialism.l~$
In t}~e meantime the resentment of the toilers, who had been suffering from
poverty and the arbitrary rule of the emirate authorities, reached the boiling
point. On 28 August an uprising erupted in Charjui. This was follawed by
actions by revolutionary forces in other parts of the emirate. "On 28 August
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1920," M. V. Frunze later wrote, "the Bukhara abscess finally burst." M. V.
Frunze further noted that the Soviet authorities were faced with a dilemma:
"Either to assist the insurgent Bukhaxan peoPle and help them cast off the age-
old chains of bondage and denial of civil rights or to remai.n spectators to
the incipient struggle and allow the emir to extinguish the gleams of freedom
in Bukhara. The Red troops of Turkestan marche179houlder to shoulder with
the people of Bukhara against their oppressor.
Red Army units, together with Bukharai revolutionary forces, crushed the
resistance of the emir's troops. Bukhara was liberated on 2 September follow-
ing a f ierce battle. M. V. Frunze telegraphed V. I. Lenin: "The last strong-
hold of Bukhar~ obscurantism and reactionary extremism has fallen. The Red
Banner of the world revolution is waving victoriously over the Registan."180
Emir Seyid Alim-khan ~and most of his dignitaries fled iato Eastern Bukhara.
On S October 1920 the summer palace of the emir witnzssed an unprecedented
event. Within its walls gathered the 1950 delegates to the First All-Bukhara
Kurultay of People's Representatives. The Kurultay proclained establishment
of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic (BPSR).
The revolutions in Khorezm and Bukhara were of great historic significance.
Having destroyed the last refuges of obscurantism and despotism, they
brought the toiler masses onto the path of socialist development.
The revolutions in Khorezm and Bukhara were not socialist revolutia~~icular
economic and social backwardness of Khorezm and Bukhara demanded p
flexibility and gradualism in effecting revolutionary reforms and in accom-
plishing first of all tasles of an antifeudal and antiimperialist character.
Therefore the Khorezm and Bukhara republics did not arise as socialist but
rather as people's Soviet republics. Subsequently, as the Soviet system
became consolidated, Khore~m (in 1923) and Bukhara (in 1924) were transformed
into Soviet socialist republics. The KPSR and the BPSR entered into a
fraternal union with Soviet Russia, which had given them comprehensive as-
sistance.
The building ofiaaiesocioeconomiciandusociopoliticalereformseweresbeingd been
liberated. Rad c
carried out.
The onward march of the revolution, however, encountered fierce resistance on
the part of reactiveameasureentA~ firstather~ wereemanygbourgeoistnationalistsn
to every progress
occupying high posts in the young republics.
Tlie basmachi became the main instrument of counterrevolution in Khorezm and
Bukhara.
A tenacious, protracted struggle against the basmachi of Dzhunaid-kh athered
taking place in Khorezm. The dictator, strippEd of his authority, g
together substantial forces with the generous and active assistance of British
intelligence. Dzhunaid's army was made up for the most part of inembers of the
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families of feudal lords, former fuuctionaries of the Rhiva khanate, reac-
tionary clergy, and diehard White Guardists. The bands of Dzhunaid-khan
totaled up to 10,000 men.181
Combat operations by Red Army units in August 1920 were unsuccessful as a
result of treachery on the part of the Khivaa Jadids.182
On 27 October Dzhunaid-khan captured Kungrad and exacted savage reprisals on
party and Soviet activists. Liquidating agencies of popular rule, he placed
the former bek Balabiy in charge of the occupied city.
There was no li.mit to the atrocities perpetrated by Dzhunaid-khan. Bakir
Belousov, former military commissar of the lst Volga-Tatar Brigade, who had
come to Khorezm, was murdered. The men of the Tu=kmen volunteer detachments
were villainously put to death.
At the end of 1920 Nukus was surrounded by basmachi. Fighting at the city
walls continued unabated for 14 days. As frequently occurred in those years,
there was only a few days supply of food and ammunition. It was necessary to
husband each and every cartridge, every gram of bread. But the men of the
garrison and the people's volu~eers withstood the siege. When supplies were
. running out, Red Armyman P. Ruzmetov volunteered to take a message to the Red
Army command authorities in Petro-Aleksandrovsk. Under cover of darkness he
stealthily evaded the basmachi patrols, made his way past the ring of en-
circlement, and reached Petro-Aleksandrovsk. A Red Army detachment speedily
came to the rescue. The basmachi withdrew.
An RSFSR plenipotentiary delegation headed by M. V. Safonov arrived in
Khorezm and went to work. It was able to expose the counterrevolutionary
activities of a substantial portion of the Jadid party leadership who had close
ties with the basmachi.
The defeat of the supporters of Dzhunaid-khaa was a result not only of a
heroic struggle on the part of the voluc~teer detachments and Red Army units
which had come to assist them, but was also a result of consolidation of
Soviet autho rity, increased activeness on the part of the Khorezm toilers and
strengthening of the ranks of the Khorezm Co~?unist Party vanguard of the
toiler masses Khorezm,established at the First All-Khorezm Party Conference
in May 1920.
Of enormous importance in the defeat of the basmachi was strengthening of the
Khorezm Red Army, which was formed in the course of the struggle for victory of
the popular Soviet revolution. It consisted of dekhkans, artisans, small
merchants and traders. The political directorate of the Khorezm (Khiva) Red
Army ~urkhiv), headed by Communist Makhmud Musayev, was established ~in
November 1920. Purkhiv took over direction of all party work in the republic,
since at this time the bourgeois-nationalist Jadid group controlled the Central
Committee of the Khiva Communist Party.183
Extrer~ely close ties between the republic and Soviet Russia were a most impor-
tant condition for strengthening the people's rule in the KPSR.
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rvn vrra~..na. .J.~a. v..i.�
On 13 September 1920 a treaty of alliance and e~onomic agreement between the
RSFSR and KPSR were signed, providing for military-political and econo~ic co-
operation; also signed was an agreement to provide assistance to the Rhorezm
Republic in the development of cotton growi.ng, irrigation, co~unications,
etc.184
The struggle agains~ the basmachi in the Bukhara Republic was of a no less com-
_ plex and difficult nature.
Long before the collapse of the emirate, basmachi bands were active in the
mountainous areas of Eastern Bukhara. Alongside common criminals, they were
frequently led by mullahs, high officials of the emirate, beks, and tribal
chieftains. The basmachi bands stepped up their activities in the spring of
1919, when many basmachi from the Fergana Valley crossed over onto the ter-
ritory of Eastern Bukhara. Making preparations for the struggle against
Soviet Turkestan, the emir of Bukhara, who had entreated the King of England to
take Bukhara into the British empire,18S sought to utilize the basmachi. He
dispatched messengers carrying letters in which he proposed the establishment
of armed detachments.
The Lokay area, situated to the southwest of Dushanbe between the Kafirnigan
and Vakhsh rivers, became a focal area of basmachi activity. Basmachi had long
been active in this area, in conditions of extreme economic and sociocultura].
backwardness and prevalence of clan-tribal relations. Persons fleeing the
blood vengeance of felloaa tribesmen had traditionally settled in that part of
the Lokay situated beyond the Vakhsh. Many of these people readily joined the
ranks of the basmachi.
One Ibragim-bek, who had close ties with the leadership elite of the two
- largest Lokay tribes, became chieftain of the Lokay basmachi.
On 21 March 1920 the emir of Bukhara sent Ibragim-bek a letter containing an
appeal to enter into'~truggle against the infidels."186 Ibragim-bek was happy
to come to the defense of the emir. Not all the Lokay tribes, however, sup-
ported Ibragim-bek. The common working people and even entire tribes had no
desire to join bands. Hostility between tribes grew more intense on these
grounds. One of the tribes joined the basmachi only under threat ~f severe
reprisals, and then only after Ibragim-bek executed the tribe's chief mullah,
who had been opposed to the basmachi.
In the meantime the former emir and his retainers, who had fled the capital,
arrived in Eastern Bukhara. It was not mere happenstance Lhat they chose
Eastern Bukhara as their base. Seyid A1 im-khan and the ~ukhara counter-
revolutionaries place3 high hopes on this region. Massive mountain ranges
and the nearby frontier would enable them, when it became necessary, to take
refuge in rugged mountain gorges or across the border. Ibragim-bek's large
basmachi bands were operating precisely in this area.
The emir settled in Dushanbe for a short period of time and set about to con-
solidate his authority in Eastern Bukhara. In the latter half of September 1920
Seyid Alim-khan convened a kurultay in Dushanbe, which was attended by the
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leaders of the Bukhara, Fergana, Khorezm, and Samarkand basmachi, Russian
White Guardists, British and Afghan advisers. Ttiey adopted a ~~mmon nlan of
action against Soviet rule. Soon several caravans delivered British rifles
and cartridges to Eastern Bukhara.
' Assisted by the British, Seyid Alim-khan organized large bands, which he con-
centrated in the Kulyab, Gissar and Dushanbe areas. By mid-November 1920 his
detachments had seiaed Baysun and Sherabad. The former emir announced com-
pulsory mobilization of the dekhkans. By the beginning of December 1920 his
army totaled 7000 men. It acquired artillery 30 guns. Five hundred camels
were loaded with bales carrying ammunition. The emir's troops included
soldiers sent by Afghan feudal lords. Capturing Shakhrisyabz, Kitab, and
Yakkobag by the end of December 1920 and carrying out a new mobilization in
these towns, the emir enlarged his army to 15,000 men.
The basmachi dealt brutally with the civilian population. Townspeople would be
killed even for going out into the street, contrary to prohibit ion, when the
former er~ir was riding along it. During the single night spent in Karatag,
Seyid alim-khan's retinue of of dignitaries and basmachi hacked several persons
to death with sabers, for the most part persons who resisted the looting and
violence.
The Lokay band, prominent among which was the large band of Ibragim-bek's
father-in-law, played an appreciable role in Eastern Bukhara during the former
emir's sojourn thsre.187
The acts of violence by the basmachi aroused the people's wrath. On 16 Decm~ber
1920 the dekhkans Qf Karategin viloyst [province] rose up in rebeliion against
the emir. The uprising was mercilessly crushed. The residents of Sherabad,
who had sent delegates to Termez requesting that Red askers [soldiers] be sent
to their aid as quickly as possible, also rose up in rebellion.
The difficult situation in Eastern Bukhara demanded immediate measures.
_ The struggle against the basmachi in Eastern Bukhara and the northern areas of
pre~ent-day Tajikistan would not be ~n easy one. The soldiers of the Red Army
and the volunteer detachments had to fight fierce engagements against large
bands which had wel.l eq~z~pped bases. In the mountains the basmachi con-
structed unique fortresses with secret passageways and laid in large stores of
provisions, feed and equipment. There was also a shop for the manufacture of
cartridges.
T'tie Central Committee of the Bukhara Communist Party (BCP) and the Bukhara
- Revolutionary Ccmmittee initiated an extensive political campaign among the
public. Prominent FiCP leader Alimdzhan Akchurin went to the Gissar and Karshi
areas, while Fayzulla Khodzhayev, chairman of the Sovnarkom of the BPSR, went
wit}~ 15 po.litical workers to the Shakhrisyabz area. A"political assault
gruup" under the leadership of Sagdulla Tursunkhodzhayev was dispatched to
Uustianbe for this purpose. Uek:ikan kurultays were held in a number of viloyats
of the BPSR, at which the dekhkans discussed matters connected with forming
people's s21f-defense detachments and assisting Red Army units.
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rvn vrra~.ir~~ ..or. .~.~i.~
Political expeditions were sent into many areas to conduct agitation-ex-
planatory work.
RSFSR envoy plenipotentiary V. V. Kuybyshev did a~reat deal of work in the
Bukhara Republic. On 17 October 1920, in a telegiam to the co~ander of the
Turkestan Front, he requested that Soviet ~iukhara be given fraternal assistance,
- stepping u the pace of operations by the front`s forces against the
basmachi.l~8 At the end of October, at a joint meeting of inembers of the
Turkkomissiya and the front's command authorities, with the participation of
, the RSFSR ~nvoy plenipotentiary to Bukhara, V. V. Kuybyshev's proposals er-
taining to the struggle against the basmachi were discussed in detail.18~
tinits of the Turkestan Front raere being concentrated to engage the army of the
former emir and the basmachi. In November 1920, by order of G. V. Zinov'yev,
commander of the ?.st Army, all Soviet troops in the BPSR were consolidated in-
to the Bukhara Group of Forces, with the objective of conducting a Gissar ex-
pedition. By ,Tanuary 1921 five Red Army brigades, including 2 rifle and
3 cavalry brigades, had arrived in the Bukhara Republic.
At the end of 1920 the Bukhara Military Commissariat, under the leadership
of Bolshevik B. Shegabutdinov, began the job of forming a Bukhara People's Army,
and subsequently a Red Army. The co~and authorities of the Turkestan Front
sent commanders and political workers to assist him.
A specially formed detachment mounted the first operation in the Gissar
sector. Its mission was to mop up remnants of the emir's forces, to clear the
Gissar Valley of these troops and b~smachi bands, and to create conditions
there f.or the establishment of Soviet rule.
By the end of December 1920 units of the Termez garrison had liberated
Sherabad, the Samarkand group had captured Kitab, while another group had taken
lakkobag. On 20 February 1921 R~d Army detachments reached Gissar. A battle
ensu~d, in which the enemy was defeated and fled. By the end of February 1921
tenacious fighting had resulted in the liberation of Dushanbe, Kulyab and Garm,
wh~re the basmachi had long been entrenched. By the end of February the 3d
Border Squadron, under the command of A. Ya. Pankeyev, was the first unit to
reach the Soviet-Afghan border. The shattered basmachi groups scattered and
dissipated in the vicinity of Karategin and in the valley of the Vakhsh.
The rout of the remnants of the emir's forces and the large basmachi bands
bruugYit 5eyid Alim-khan's plans to naught. No longer hopeful of success and
i~aring capture, on S March 1921 the former emir of Bukhara, protected by a
s~curity guard of basmachi, crossed the Afghan border. A heavily-laden
caravan of 300 camels hauled away plundered gold, precious stones and other
valuables. Ibragim-bek and Davlyatman-biy fled across the border with the
- former emir.
The ls[ Brigade, under the command of Ya. Mel'kumov, was puIIaneling the bands
or Kurshirmat (who had come over from the F,ergana) and Fuzayl Maksum. Unable
to witlistand the offensive pressure of the Red Army units and volunteer
detachments, Kurshirmat retreated to the refuge of the Alay 7alley.
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By the end of March the l~t Cavalry Regiment, under the command of D. Ye.
Krasil'nikov, maintaining relentless pursuit of Fuzayl Maksum, delivered
damaging attacks in the Katta Karamyk urochishche. In the course of the fight-
ing the following were seized: approximately 5000 sheep, goods plundered from
the population, and 40 leather trunks filled with valuables. Fuzayl Maksum's
main forces (more than 800 men), however, headed for the refuge of the Darvaz,
where the Darvaz bek Ishan Sultan was operating.
The men of the Red Army met sympathy and support on the part of th~ Bukhara
toilers. In December 1921 a dekhkata uprising, under the leadership of Usman
~fukhamadinov, erupted to the rear c~~ ehe emir's forces. The insurgents cap-
tured Garm and forced the Karategin bek to flee. In spite of the fact that
this uprising was soon crushed, it attested to the fact that the counter-
revolutionary forces lacked a mass base.
The Gissar Expeditionary Detachment of the Red Army displayed great courage and
heroism in liberating the toilers of the BPSR, a fact which was noted in a
Rewoyensovet order. The lst and 2d Cavalry regiments, the 8th Rifle Regiment
and the lst Mountain Battery of the lst Independent Turkestan Cavalry Brigade,
outstanding commanders and political workers were awarded decorations.190
Conducting aggressive actions against the basmachi, the Bukhara Communist Party
and the government of Bukhara continued revolutionary reforms and strengthened
the edifice of government. Measures taken by them consolidated the people's
rule.
At this time an endeavor was made to define the essence and character of the
revolution in Bukhara, in order to be able to take appropriate measures to ac-
complish its further development and deepening. The initiator in this en-
deavor was V. V. Kuybyshev, whose report on this subject was presented in
November 1920 at a joint session of the BKP Central Committee, Revolutionary
Committee and the BPSR Council of Nazirs [inspectors, supervisors]. Prominent
Bukhara Republic leaders took part in the discussion of this retart, ir.cluding
Fayzulla Khodzhayev and Sadriddin Ayni. A letter entitled "To the Bukhara Com-
munists" was published on 7 January 1921, in which the Turkbyuro of the
Comintern mapped out a program for mobilization of all the republic's re-
sources to consolidate the achievements of the revolution and for defeating the
basmachi.
The 5th Congress of the Bukhara Communist Party was held in February 1921,
which was of great significance for the republic's progressive development.
Ttie congress resolution on the military question, the principal content of
which was "Everything for the Red Army," played an important role in the suc-
ces5ful struggle against [he basmachi.
t\ Suvie[-Afghan treaty was signed in Moscow on 28 February 1921. ~ong other
points, the parties to the treaty agreed "to the genuine independence and
fr~edom of Bukhara and Khiva, whatever form of government shall exist there in
contormity with the wishes of their peoples."191 ~e treaty struck a blow
agains[ the intrigues of reactionary circles in Afghanistan, which were actively
supporting the basmachi.
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A treaty of alliance and an economic agreement bet~reen the BSFSR and the
BPSR were signed on 4 March 1921. The 8ussian Soviet Republic recogaized the
independence of the BPSR, pledged to give it economic and other assistance and
gave it a~n outright monetary assistance grant of 500,000 rubles.192
I
I
~
~
. f
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ENEMIES OF PEACEFUL LABOR
Successes and Achievements of the Toilers of Central Asia
In November 1920 the troops of the Southern Front stormed across the Perekop
Isthmus and liberated the Crimea, pushing into the Black Sea the remnants of
the defeated army of Baron Wrangel'. M. V. Frunze, commander of the Southern
Front, sent a telegram to Moscow, addressed to V. I. Lenin and the party
Central Committee: "The armies of the front have carried out their duty to the
republic. The final nest of Russian counterrevolution has been smashed...."1
The appea~ of the 8th All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which convened in Moscow
in December 1920, rang out across the land: "The toilers of Russia have
earned the right to commence peaceful labor, a right earned by these three
years of great deprivations and bloody sacrifices. We shall devate all our
energies to this lab~~r. Let there not be a single person in our Soviet land
whu is capable of i.~nor and is not working. Let there not be a single machine
tool standing idle. Let there not remain unplanted a single desyatina of
" arable land....
"The victors over Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich and Wrangel', this country's
highest agency of authority, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, call upon us
to engage in new struggle and achieve new victories.
"Long live our victory on the labor frontl"2
The lOth Congress of the RKP(b), held in March 1921, spelled out a campaign to
rebuild and boost the economy. The coagress adopted a resolution in response to
the report of V. I. Lenin, calling for transition to a new economic policy (NEP).
The changeover to NEP strengthened the alliance between workers and peasants on
a solid economic foundation and created the requisite preconditions for suc-
cessful reconstruction and development of the nation's economy.
In Central Asia the toilers were faced with great difficulties. The postwar
economic chaos which was enormous throughout the country was particularly
burdensome in Turkestan. By the beginning of 1921 agricultural output had
declined to one third the prewar level. Total head of livestock had also
diminished to one third. Half of the irrigation systems had become unfit for
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FUIt Ut'tl(.IAL L~~ UtiLI"
service during the war years. In 1915 the cotton harvest totaled 20 million
poods, while in 1920 only 650,000 poods were harvested.
Industrial production, which had been modest to begin with, declined to one
fifth its previous level. Transportation was in a disastrous state.
The toilers of Central Asia rolled up their sleeves and proceeded to rebuild
the economy. Initially proceeding more slowly than in Russia's central regions,
rebuilding of Turkestan's economy subsequently assumed an increasingly more
rapid pace. In 1924-1925 gross industrial output reached almost four fifths
the prewar level.
The irrigation network was being restored to working order, and acreage
planted to cotton was increasing. In 1923 7 million poods of cotton were
harvested. The economy of the Bukhara and Khorezm republics was gradually
reviving.
The government of the RSFSR gave comprehensive assistance to the toilers of
Central Asia. Manufactured goods, medicines, and equipment for restoring
irrigation systems to service were sent into the region. The RSFSR provided
the republics of Central Asia with substantial funds. Specialists en-
gineers and doctors, scientific workers and teachers came to Tashkent,
Samarkand, Ashkhabad, Khodzhent, and Bukhara from Moscow, Leningrad and other
cities of the central region.
Of particular significance was the relocation of industrial enterprises to
Central Asia. For example, the Zaraysk Weaving and Spinning Mill and equipment
for textile, papermaking,tanning, and soapmaking enterprises were transferred
free of charge to the Bukhara Republic.
Implementation of socioeconomic reforns in the Turkestan Republic continued.
In 1921-1922 a land and water reform was carried out in Semirechenskaya,
Syrdar'inskaya, Ferganskaya, and Samarkandskaya oblasts, and revolutionary
transformations in Bukhara and Khorezm were expanded and deepened. Kazakh,
Kara-I~alpak, Kirghiz, Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek toilers were becoming in-
creasingly involved in building a new life.
The "Koshchi" union, a mass organization of dekhkan toilers,was growing rapid-
ly. By the end of 1921 its ranks contained approximately 100,000 peasants of
indigenous nationalities throughout Turkestan, while by 1924 the union had
grown to a membership of 200,000.
Cultural development was advancing increasingly more broadly: schools were
~stablished with pupils taught in their native language, new cadres were
trained, and enormous cultural-educational work was being done. The great
Uzbek educa[or Khamza Khakim-zade Niyazi participated actively in organizing
5chools, children's homes, musical and dramatic trouFes, libraries, "red
cha: .ii~a.i
A DYING ENEMY IS DANGEROUS
Incursion by Ibragim-Bek
A last flareup of basmachi act3vities began in 1929. Why did basmachi ac-
tivities resume precisely in this year? It is du~ to maay factor~. In the
broad historical overview, 1929 was marked by inteasification of anti-Soviet
activities on the part of iaternatioaal imperialism. Varioua interventionist
schemes were carried out in 1929-1930.
Successful progress in building socialism was evoking growing concera on the
part of the captains of the capitali,st world. Their calculations that the
Soviet people would be unable with their own resources to overcome the
devastation and develop industrq and agriculture proved e~roneous. This
country was moving forward, boosting the economq, picking up speed. New
factories, industrial plants and electric power sfations were coming on-stream
the process of socialist industrializatioa was advancing on an increasingly
broader front.
Our enemies' expectations of a bourgeois regeneration of th~ Soviet State also
failed to pan out, expectations which appeared following the traasition to
NEP. The party set a course toward building socialism, toward squeezing out
capitalist elements in the city and village, and toward ending man's exploita-
tion of man. And this Leninist course of policy was being implemented.
World imperialist reactionary forces sought to strangle the USSR the bulwark
of peace and socialism before it could build a powerful iadustry and
transform the village according to socialist principles, and if they could not
strangle it, they sought at least to impede the building of socialism and once
again to cast the country into the abyss of destruction. Considerable hopes
were placed on internal counterrevolutionarq forces. The inevitable aggrava-
tion of the class struggle caused by a course of poltcy aimed at liquidating
capitalist elements in the city and village presented the opportunity to
utilize remnants of the domestic couaterrevolution in the anti-Sbviet struggle.
The forming of deliberate wrecking orgaaizations in industry ("Shakhtintsy"),
the activities of remnants of the Socialist Revolutionary-Menshevik mderground,
attempts to utilize the armed forces of the White Guard emigre community,
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diplomatic pressure brought to bear by the European imperialist nations,
threatening a new interventioa, and orgaaization of acte of armed provocation
in the Far East (Chinese militarists attacked Soviet territory in 1929) were
all elements of a unified anti-Soviet front at the end of the 1920's.
They were unable to carry out these plans on a full-scale basis. The wise and
flexible policy of the Soviet State kaocked links out of this chain one after
the other. Uaderground anti-Soviet organizations were neutralized. The
swift defeat of the Chinese militarists in the Far East demonstrated the
growing might of the Soviet Armed Fnrces. -
Nevertheless the international situation at the end of the 1920's and begin-
ning of the 1930's remained tense. The world economic crisis which began at
the end of 1929 intensified the imperialists' desire to resolve their dif-
ficulties at the expense of the USSx. Once again attempts were undertakea to
blockade the USSR politically and economically9 anti-Soviet intervention
schemes were hatched, the propaganda campaiga intensified, and appeals to
organize a"crusade" against the Soviet Un~on, an idea conceived by the
reactionary Catholic elite, were conetazitl;y carried by the newspapers.
An important role in the overall plaa of anti-So:{et struggle was assigned to
the basmachi of ~entral Asia. Exerting considerabl~~ effort to step up basmachi
activities, imperialist agents were countiag on basmachi actions paralyzing
economic life in the young republics of the East, on generating chaos and
thwarting the implementation of socialiat reforme. If succeasful, the
basmachi could prepare the soil, create a bridgehead for the invasion of large
interventionist forces, with the ob~ective of detaching Central Asia from the
Soviet Union and traasforming it into a coloay of the Western powers.
A number of circumstances made these anti-Soviet plans especially dangerous.
The proximity of the border and ita great leagth made it possible for im-
perialist agents to give meaningful assistance to the basmachi detachments.
Considerable emigre forces were conceatrated in the border areas of
neighboring countries. Defeated in preceding years, counterrevolutionary
groups which had fled from the Soviet Republic were anaious to continue the
fight.
In many areas of Central Asia (in coatrast to Central Russia, the Ukraine, and
Belorussia), the revolution and civil war had not led to a cardinal change in
socioeconomic relations. In the 1920's the feudal-bai strata retained their
economic positioas in some measure: they possessed a large part of the land,
water, and liveatock, thus retaiaiag control of important levers of influence
on the dekhkans.
As long as exploiter strata continued to exiet, the clas~a foundation of the
basmachi also continued to enist. At the same time measures to restrict,
squeeze out and liquidate f~eudal-bai elemente inevitably would cause
resistance on their part and lead to aggra�vation of the class struggle. But
resistance by feudal-bai elements in conditions of Central Asia sigaified
strengthening of the basmachi, for the activities of the basmachi constituted
a specific form of the class struggle.
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l~V~~ V~'~II.~AL ~..ia~ J1~L1
Mass socioeconomic measures were carried out in Central Asia and Kazakhstan
in the latter half of the 1920's.
Land-water and livestock reforms were carried out during these years in
Southern Kirghizia, Tajikistan, Uzbelcistaa, and Turkmenistan. Landholdings
of the feudal service tenant type were eliminated, excessive acreage was
removed from large landholdings, and land was distributed among the laadless
peasants and those with insufficient land. More than 123,000 poor and
middle peasants received land in the republics of Central Asia. In
Kazakhstan the first /mass/ redivision of land took pla.ce in 1926-1928, with
arable land and hayland acreage talcen away from the feudal lords-bai. Follow-
ing this, in 1928 livestock and equipment were confiscated from the bai (they
comprised 6 percent of landholding units but owaed 33.8 percent of the live-
stock).
All these measures improved the situation of the toiler masses and created con-
ditions for proceeding along the road of building socialism. At the same time
the class struggle was becoming m~re aggravated.
It reached an e~en greater degree of acuteness with the beginning of mass
collectivization. Since the ob~ective was now the total liquidation of
exploiter elements, their resistance became particularly fierce. Supported
by the assistance of reactionaries abroad, ranked solidly with the anti-
Soviet emigre co~unity, and exploiting the not yet eradicated ignorance and
backwardness of the dekhkans, clan-tribal remnants and the influence of the
reactionary clergy, feudal-bai elements engaged in a tenacious struggle against
Soviet rule. These elements comprised a nutrient medium for basmachi ac-
tivities, and the basmachi became their shock-force detachments, the ma3.n force
, in the anti-Soviet, counterrevolutionary struggle.
Our enemies also utilized for their own ends the fact that in the course of
collectivizat:Lon the pace of collectivization was unwarrantedly accelerated
and Leninist principles of voluntary participation were violated in a number
of areas. Ttu Coimnv_^.ist Party corrected mistakes in a prompt and timely
manner and eliminated cases of going too far. On 20 February 1930 the VKP(b)
Central Committee issued a decree entitled "On Collectivization and the
Struggle Against Kulaks in Economically Backward Ethnic Areas." This decree
leveled sharp criticism at distortions of the party line which had oncurred
~ locally. The Central Committee demanded that in economically backward areas
the focus be shifted to /preparations/ for total collectivization and to
creation of the organizational-political and economic preconditions for its
accomplishment. On 25 February the Central Committee again leveled criticism
against those methods of collectivization which were being practiced in cer-
tain ~reas of Uzbekistan and in the Northern Caucasus. The Central Committee
stressed the necessity of carrying out collectivization at a slower pace in
these areas.l
The kolkhoz movement, overcoming difficulties, and taking position on a firm,
healthy foundation, was growing and expanding. By the fall of 1931 64.1 per-
cent of all peasant households in Kazakhstan had ~oined into kolkhozes. In
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1931 kolkhozes produced 52.1 percent of Uzbekistan's total agricultural output.
In Kirghizia the percentage of collectivization reached 53.4 by the ead of 1931,
and 62.2 percent in Turkmenia. Collectivization was proceeding more slowly in
- Tajikistan in 1932 approximately 42 percent of all dekhkan households had
joined kolkhozes (although this perceatage was substaatially higher in the
republic's cotton growing areas).
The building of a new life was proceeding successfully in all the rEpublics of
Central Asia, and socialism was advancing on all fronts.
Deep in the steppe construction workers were selflessly laying the bteel ~ails
of the Turksib the Turkestan-Siberia Mainline. In July 1929 the tracks
reached Alma-Ata, and the southern and northern sections were 3oined on 2.5 April
1930. The Turksib was opened to through traffic 17 months ahead of schedule.
In th2 fall of 1928 the Karsakpay CopP~r Smelting Combine came on-stream.
New coal mines were being constructed ia Karaganda it was becoming the
country's third largest coal producing base aad large enterprises were
being built in Ridder, Aktyubinsk, Chimkent, and Dzhezkazgan. Heavy-industry
enterprises, cotton processing mills and canneries, textile mills and food
processing combines were going up in Uzbekistan and Kirghizia, in Ta~ikistan and
Turkmenistan. The power industiy was growing rapidly new electric power
stations were appearing everwhere. In Uzbekistan groes industrial output in-
creased by 130 percent and generation of electric power by 270 percent in
_ the first five-year plan.
Soviet national statehood of the peoples of the East was consolidating suc-
_ cessfully. As already stated, in 1926 the Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast became the
Kirghiz ASSR. At the end of 1929 Ta~ikistaa, which had previously been an
autonomous republic within the Uzbek SSR, was transformed into a union
republic.
The rapid advance of socialism was spreading across Central Asia, powerfully
makin~ its way into lush oases and distant mountain kishlaks. In the meantime,
however, new basmachi detachments were being formed along the borders of the
Soviet Central Asian republice, arms were being brought in, and forces were
regrouping....
Baginning in the first weeks of 1929, increased activeness was noted on the
part of basmachi bands frnm across the border. On 24 January 1929 more than
20 basmachi appeared on the road leading from Kushka to Merv. Spotting a
border guard detail, the basmachi attacked it. After a brief exchange of fire
they turned back in the direction from which they had come and took refuge in
thickets of rushes.
In February 1929 two basmachi bands invaded Soviet territory in the vicinity
of the kishlak of Nizhnyaya Chaaga. Isolated small bands also crossed or
attempted to cross the border in other areas.
This was merely reconnaissance in force. The main basmachi organizers were
making preparations for a large-scale venture.
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~-Vn V~ ~ ~V~AV ~?u ~a+~
In March 1929 British intelligence officers, the former em~r of Bukhara,
leaders of the Uzbek and Tajik emigre communities, and basmachi leaders held a
secret conference, at which they hammered out an agreement on the invasio~
1 of Tajikistan. Ibragim-bek was to command the united Taj ik and Uzbek emigre
armed �:,rces. Soon anot,her secret meeting was held under the direction of
British agents.
At both meetings representatives of British intelligence sought to unite all
emigre forces for joint operations against Soviet rule in Central Asia.
Nationalistic conflicts within the counterrevolutionary emigre commwnity, how-
ever, and personal animosity between leaders hindered accomplishment of this
, effort. They did succeed, however, in concentrating counterrevolutionary forces
in two important sectors. One force, led by Ibragim-bek, was to operate
against Soviet Tajikistan, while another force, led by Dzhnna~d-khan, ~as
targeted at Soviet Turkmenia. The bands of Fuzayl Maksum, Ab~ugaor.~r, Davliya
- Sardar, Utan-bek, and several others were sent into the areas of forthcoming
, combat operations as an advance guard.
At the beginning of March 1929 Utan-bek crossed the border with 50 horsemen and
attacked the supply train of a cavalry regiment escorted by three Red Armymen
under the command of platoon leader Artemov. The unequal battle lasted about
an hour. The handful of Red Armymen succeeded in fighting off all basmachi
attacks and reached base safely.
Three parties of border guards, totaling 35 men, under the comr~and of
Maslennikov, Ryumin, and Dauksh, were sent out to destroy the. band. The
basmachi, avoiding engagement, fled into Afghanistan.
That same day approximately 100 basmachi led by Kerim Berda twice attempted to
cr.oss the border. Both attempts to invade Soviet territc~ry, however, were
thwarted by resolute actions on th~e part of border guards.
In the first half of March 1929 unusual activity was observed on the other side
of the border. Armed horsemen were galloping along the border, and parties of
mounted men were arriving in the kishlaks. At night large campfires were ob-
served. Soon the answer came: foreign-based basmachi kurbashi began arriving
in the border zone.
By the middle of March 1929 app~oximately 600 well-armed basmachi, led by
' Ibragim-bek, had massed by the Soviet border.
"tn addition to direc.t military preparations, Ibragim-bek and the former emir of
Bukhara, with the active participattion of the reactionary clergy, conducted
anti-Soviet agitation a~ng the emigres, calling ~or "liberation of noble
Bukhara from the infidels." The spiritual mentors promised to absolve all
the sins of those who would take part in an anti-Soviet campaign and that
� those who fell in battle would be ranked among the holy. The organizers of
this counterrevolutionary plot did not restrict themselves to exerting moral
influence on emigres. Those who joined the bands were given a monthly salary:
foot soldiers received 43 rupees and cavalrymen were paid 46 rupees. Special
compensation was specified for kurbashi who organized bands numbering 100
basmachi or more.
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- By the end of March lai~ge ne~ basmach~~ detachments had been formed in various
locations in Afghanistan: a 300-basmachi detachment in Imamseyid, an_d a 400-
man unit in Khanabad. Large forces were formed in Rustak, Talikan, Faizabad,
and in several other localities.
- The rapid organization of counterrevolutionary forces on the territory of
Afghanistan was fostered by political events which were taking place there, a
_ change of reg ime in power, a situation which the reactionaries utilized.
Reactionary circles in Afghanistan were exerting pressure on the new Afghan
Government of Nadir-khan, attempting, in concerr. with agents of Western
powers, to give its policies an anti-Soviet thrust. They conducted anti-Soviet
propaganda and demanded that open assistance be given to the basmachi. In
~pite of the official position of the Afghan Government, many clan-tribal
leaders and feudal rulers gave practical assistance to the basmachi leaders in
gathering forces and mounting provocation,al forays on the Soviet border.
In view of the prevailing situation, the Soviet Government took steps to beef
up security aloug the borde:. Border troop strength was increased, and
1 volunteer detachments and militia bodies were also strengthened. This
enabled the border troops to suppress the increased numbers of border viola-
tion attempts.
In March it was learned that the basmachi of Dav]iya Sardar were about to
~ launch an attack on Soviet territory. The command authorities took the
requisite measures. Teams of border guards armed with light machineguns were
sent aut to the possible border crossing points. One 7-man party was led by
border post deputy commander Kirsanov, while the other was led by deputy
platoon commander Romashevskiy. An additional two teams of border guards were
placed on ready status.
~ On 17 March Romashevskiy's party discovered that approximately 70 basmachi had
crossed over onto Soviet territory. Sending a messenger back with a report,
Romashevskiy and the S remaining men engaged the intruders. The basmachi,
avoiding combat, ser. off into the desert at a canter. Six border guards took
up pursuit. They were soon joined by reserve parties under the command of
_ d~puty commandant Kolesniknv and G. Sokolov. The pursuit continued for almost
24 hours, an exhausting 100 kxlometer trek across the sands of the Kara Kum.
Finally a patrol sent out from Kolesnikov`s group overtook the enemy, but the
basmachi hastily broke camp and once again attempted to escape. The groups
led by Sokolov and Kolesnikov resumed pursuit. It took an additional 36 hours
to catch up with the basmachi.
'It~o small parties cf border guards under the command of Kirsanov and Yudin
arrived in time to assist them. Sokulov led his men in an attack, without
pausing to deploy. Bursting into a valley and overwhelming the enemy's
secur~ty o,itposts, Sokolov's men galloped up to the foot of a hill. Here ~he `
border gi~acds dismounted, left two me^ with the horses, and proceeded to ad-
vance up the slope toward the hilltop.
The courageous troopers advance~ under a hail of enemy bullets. They clcsed to
not more than 200 paces from the basmachi. At this moment Sokolov was wounded
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rva~ va rwa~+a. ~..~a. vi.a..
~
for a second time. Yudin took over command. Attacking aggressively, they
dislodged the basmachi from the hslla~~� hadecapturedganother~hill~optand was
ground. By this time Kolesnikov P y ushing the basmachi back from
successfully advancing across the valley, p
their second defensive line.l SaufeWem~ers�of1Davliya Sardar~'s
band succeeded
withstand the onsl~ught. On y
in escaping.
On 12 April 1929 former Karategin bek Fuzayl Maksun? crossed thetherbasmachi a
fairly large force. Sweeping into the kishlak of Kalai-Khumb,
settled accounts with activist dekhkans. The s~ichtwas casturedabydthe band ~
in the border kishlak of Vanch, p
following day
Kurshirmat, former leader of the Fergana basmachi. Soon 12 more bands in-
~ filtrated to the left b~ �frise and possessing goodsfamiliar
tybwith the ter-
utilizing the element of surp roms.
= rain, the basmachi captured a few kishlaks and carried out pog
Fuzayl Maksum was showing the ~reatest aggressiveness. His basmachi mounted .
a bloody foray through thf ~e lbasmachihjoin daforces withehim. Asla result
reactionary mullahs, and
the band swelled to 200 men, By 20 April Fuzayl Maksum had captured Kalai-
Labi-ob and Tavil'-Dara and was advancing on Garm. There were no military
- units stationed in Garm. On 22 Ap_il small detachments of volunteers, led by
Makritskiy and F. F. Gutovskiy, engaged the basmachi, a force exceeding
F. A.
400 men. Gutovskiy's detachment was surrounded in the kishlak of Nimic ,
35 km northeast of Garm. All 18 volus~e~hereewerell2eteachersdintthe detach-
Gutovskiy and several Soviet official , Sa fullo
ment Karimdzhan Khuseynov, Yakh'ye Olimov, Alikbar Khasan��'Abdulakhad
Aliyev, Abduzhabbar Mukhamedov, Nasyr Umarov, Abdullo Kasi.mov,
Rakhimov, Khikmat Gani, Abdusalom Islamov, Ubaydullo Gaynuddinov, and ~
Mummodzha Saidmuradov. The people honor the memory of these fallen heroes. ~
Streets and schools in Garm have been named after them, and a monument was
erected in their honor.
The basmachi detachment sustained tteavy casualties, but nevertheless pushed in-
to Garm and seized part of the town. Volunteers under the command of A. I.
Kravchuk defended the other part of the Y.own in a night battle.
The success of the basmachi was short-lived. ed blrbrigaderco~ander T. T.
Dushanbe and disgorged a small assault force 1 Y a 15-minute
Shapkin and commissar A. T. Fedin. The band withdr~hefvol nteer detachment,
exchange of fire. The Red Armymen, accompanied by
pursued close on the heels ofed acrossathe�borderr losing more than 100 men,
_ Maksum made his way to and fl
Thus the first basmachi raids were unsuccessful. A certain portion of the
- population, however representatives of the exploiter strata and reactionary
clergy continued to support the basmachi. In addition, the savage acts of
terrorism and bloody reprisals perpetraafra d thatbifmthey cameto tCin suprable
influence on many peasants. They were
port of the Soviet authorities the basmachi would take savage revenge on them
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and their families on their next raid. Creation of an atmosphere of uncertain-
ty and fear was one Qf the aims of the March-April basmachi raid into Soviet
territory.
The situation in the frontier zone remained tense. At the end of April and in
May, when the mountain passes began ~o open up, the basmachi made a new at-
tempt to infiltrate into Soviet territory in emall groups. The basmachi main
forces, concentrated in Afghanistan close to the Soviet border, had not yet
been put into action. All this demanded maximum vigilance and constant combat
readiness. Basmachi captured in May told of feverish preparations to invade
Soviet territory with large units. According to their testimony, by mid-May
more tY~an 30 detachments, totaling 2000 men, were organized across the border. .
In June Ibragim-bek held in K'~:anabad a meeting with emigr~ leaders and bas~achi
kurbashi. He ordered reliabl:; protective bases established on Soviet territory.
More than 100 hasmachi were covertly infiltrated into Tajikistan for this pur-
pose. Scatt~ring among their native kishlaks, they were to make contact with
their supporters and ready them for joint actions.
Execution of the plans to invade Soviet territory was complicated, however,
as a consequence of the position taken by official Afghan authorities. Pur-
suant to the terms of the Soviet-Afghan treaties, the Afghan Government forbade
the basmachi from carrying out anti-Soviet raids from Afghan territory.
In connection with this, Ibragim-bek held another meeting, with the participa-
tion of 200 basmachi kurbashi, at which he ir4tructed them henceforth not to
- cross the border without explicit instructions, while continuing secret
preparations for operations on Soviet territory. Letters bearing the
signature of Ibragim-bek began to be sent ta "influential persons" in
~Jzbekistan, containing an appeal for aid and assistance to the basmachi.
In the meanwhile the British, unbeknownst to the Afghan authorities,were con-
tinu.ing to supply arms and ammunition to the basmachi. At 0300 hours on
20 June five trucks, flying Iranian flags and carrying arms and ammunition for
the basmachi, departed from the British consulate in Mashhad with a destination
in Afghanistan and accompanied by two people from the consulate.
Early on the morning of 6 October, 40 basmachi of Utan-bek crossed over into
Soviet territory. This small group contained several kurbashi. This un-
usual makeup of the party indicated plans to form new bands. But the plsns
came to naught. Encountering a hostile attitude on the part of the population
and pursued by a Red Army deCachment, Utan-bek li.mited his activities to
reconnaissance and hastily took refuge across the border in Afghanistan.
Oz~ 24 October a basmachi group totaling 300 men appeared in the foothills of
- the Pamirs. It was immediately spotted by a detachment under the command of
- Communist M. T. Maslov. In the very first engagement the basmachi lost 19
- dead and woun3ed. Thirty-two basmachi, led a by a kurbashi, surrendered. The
survivxng bandits attempted to take refuge in the mountains. But Maslov's
~ detachment again spotted them on 28 October. The enemy was smashed in a
brief but fierce engagement. After several days of continuous pursuit,
remnants of the ba~machi group were captured.
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l'Vn Vl'l/L.aAV VJ~. Vl\L~~
The swift and resolute resistance offered the invading forces prevented
Ibragim-bek and his lofty patrons from putting their main forces into action.
Once more they saw that the bulk of the population did not support them and
that hopes for a popular uprising were entirely without f~undation.
In the meanwhile conflicts between the basmachi and the Afghan authorities
were becoming more frequent. Thin~ were going as far as armed clashes.
All this prevented the basmachi from carrying out their plans of invading
Soviet territory in 1929. Nor were they able to do so in 1930. But com-
parati~ely large, well armed basmachi detachments continued to be based on
Afghan territory. The more successfully the building of socialism progressed
in the Soviet republics of Central Asia, the more illusory the hopes of the
counterrevolutionaries became, the more adventuristic the plans of the
basmachi became and the greater their anger and bitterness.
In the spring of 1931 ~hey undertook a decisive invasion attempt. This time
the basmachi main forces, under the command of Ibragim-bek himself, went into
~ action. On 30 March 1931 several hundred horsemen (600-800 men) invaded the
territory of Soviet Tajikistan.
From the very outset the 'oasmachi resorted to mass terrorism, sabotage, and in-
discriminate pillaging. They sought to preventing the planting of crops,
to disrupt the flow of goods, to destroy kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and to
disable rail lines and enterpri~es.
The emigre and basmachi leaders, conducting aggressive anti-Soviet actions on
the territory of Taj ikistan, were counting on broad support an the part of
counterrevolutionary elements as well as that segment of the population ad-
dicted by the opiate of religion. As soon as he had set foot on Soviet ter-
ritory, Ibragim-bek dispatched his kurbashi to their kindred tribes to en-
list the people into basmarhi detachments and to organize an anti-Soviet up-
- rising.
The hopes of th~ basmachi to gain the support of the population, however, once
again proved erroneous. The years of peaceful labor had made their mark.
_ Socialist transformations had strengthened the prestige of the Soviet authori-
ties and had enabled them to indoctrinate a large and dedicated body of ac-
tivists. They touk the wind out of the sails of exploiter groups and
strengthened the social foundation of the Soviet system.
The population took active part in the struggle against the basmachi. The
public informed Soviet authorities and cou�nand authorities of the Red Army and
border troops when basmachi bands appeared. The dekhkans themselves took part
in pursuit and capture of basmachi. In the Rogatinskiy Soviet, for example,
kolkhoz farmers from the various kishlaks, armed with fowling pieces, pursued
a band for more than 24 hours and captured three basmachi. Elsewhere dekhkans
organized self-protection and thwarted repeated baemachi attempts to
pillage kishiaks.
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When Ibragia~-bek called a political rally ia one of the captured kishlaks and
explained ~th~~ purpose of the invasion retum of the emir to power one
af the dekhk.an women said: "We remember the emir's tyranny with abhorxence and
_ revulsion; we shall not forget the atrocities and pillaging nor the violence
done to women aad even children." At that same political rally an old 3asmachi,
who had once been Ibragim-bek's teacher, also condemned the basmachi, who had
biought people nothing but tears, grief, and death.
At mass political rallies kollchoz farmers pledged the following oath: "We shall
either kill the basmachi or die ourselves, 'uut we shall not allow the kolkhoz
to be plundered." Dekhkaas stated at a meeting in the kishlak of Shura that
the basnachi sought to take power away from the people and restore the hate~i
rule of the wealthy. "The bai owned a great many sheep, while we had nothing
and he gave us nothing. Bu* Soviet rule gives us bread, tea, sugar, and
- cloth. We are provided for on the kolkhoz; we have everything, while on our
own we live fn poverty." In Dzharbashinskiy Dzhamagat the kolkhoz members,
discussing the etruggle against the basmachi, unanimously resolved: "Wherever
the Soviet authorities send us, we shall go, aad whatever the Soviet .
authorities call upon us to do, we shall do."
Ibragim-bek himself subsequently etated at his trial: "During the Rentgantau
campaign I endeavored to enlist all the people of the Lokay into the struggle
against Soviet rule, but the population would not go along. I became convincsd
that the people of the Lokay had become atheists."
At the same time there were cases where individual dekhkane joined bands or
- supported them. The bai and reactionary clergy called upon the population to
join the bands and carry out terrorist actions against party and soviet ac-
tivists. With their participation the basmachi succeeded in capturing some
kishlaks and taking Fodder and food supplies from the population.
A Central Political Commission and local troikas consisting of party rayon
committee secretaries, executive co~ittee chairmen, and OGPU officials were
, formed in Tajikistan to coordinate the struggle against the basmachi. Sixteen
special-purpose companies numbering 3000 men were formed of Communists and
Komsomol members on a volunteer basis. Local party and suviet agencies formed
detachments of "krasnopalochnikov" ["redstavers"], in addition to volunteer
detachments.2
In many kishlaks all adult males sought to enlist in "krasnopalochniki"
detachments. Since it was impossible to accept all volunteers, the most ac-
tive were accepted. 'Jhe people of many kishlaks delegated representatives to
be sent to the bandsto persuade the basmachi to surrender.
Participation by the toiler population of Ta~ikistan in the struggle against
the basmachi was fostered by considerable explanatory work conducted by party
and soviet agencies, as well as the pexsxinel of military units. Political
- workers just of the 83d OGPU battalion held 20 talks in April 1931, which wer.e
attended by more than 4000 persons.
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The basmachi who invaded Soviet territory were met with fire by border
guard details, after which they were relentlessly pursued by Red Army uaits,
border guards, and volunteer detachmants with the active assistance of the
general population. The basmachi bands suffered one defeat after the other.
An Uzbek cavalry brigade (I. Ye. Petrov, co~anding), as well as a Tajik and
Kirghiz cavalry squadrons distinguished themselves in the fighting. In the
vicinity of Dangara the bulk of Ibragim-bek's army (more than 600 basmachi)
attacked a squadron of the 79th Cavalry Begiment on 8 April. The basmachi
surrounded the Red Armymen on all sides. But they were unable to overrun
their position. The soldiers held on until help arrive~d from the 7th In-
dependent Cavalry Brigade. Joint efforts succeeded in inflicting heavy
casualties on the band, and it withdrew.
By mid-April Ibragim-bek's detachments began disintegrating. Some of the
basmachi voluntarily surrendered to the Soviet authorities. The situation im-
_ proved in those areas where the activities of local autharities had temporarily
been paralyzed. On 19 April Ibragim-bek marched into the Lokay Valley, hoping to
find support there. The delchkans of the Lokay, however, fought tt~e basmachie
Ibragim-bek crossed over onto the left bank of the Vakhsh, into Babatag.
Toward the end of Apxil 1931 the foreign gatrons of the basmachi sent in
reinforcements to aid Ibragim-bek a 250-man detachment led by U~ar-bek.
But Utan-bek did not get beyond the Soviet-Afghan border. He was met there
by border guards. The band was routed in a battle while crossing the
_ Pyandzh River. Utan-bek ~returnedinto Afghanistan with the rennants of his
detachment.
The situation of Ibragim-bek's army was catastrophic. Basmachi were voluntari-
ly surrendering to the Soviet authorities, both singly and in groups.
Tashakul', Ibragim-bek's uncle, surrendered on 16 May. By 20 May 1931 12
kurbashi and 653 rank-and-file basmachi had turned themselves in. Ibragim-
bek was down to not more than 250 men. Pursuers close on his heels, he
barely madeit m the Surkhan Darya,from where he intended to escape iato
Afghanistan.
It was essential to take into custody this basmachi leader and dangerous
criminal at all costs, to prevent him from escaping the ~ust verdict of the
people.
A specia~ group led by Abdulla Valishev was formed to capture Ibragim-bek.
On 21 June 1931 Valishev's party see out in the direction of the kishlak of
Isanbay, where Ibragim-bek had repeatedly crossed the border. En route to
Isanbay, they were joined by the volunteer detachment of Mukuan Sultanov. He
was assigned the mission of occupying all croasing points on the Kafirnigan
River and of conducting reconnaissance, with the assistance of the population
and "krasnopalochniki" from kishlaks in the area.
On the morning of 23 June kolkhoz members Yuldash Igamberdyyev and Karim Alim
Alimardanov reported that they had spotted Ibragim-bek on the right bank of the
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_
~
Kafirnigan River near the kishlalc ef Bul'bulon. Ibragim-bek demanded that he be
transported across to the opposite bank. Rolkhoz member Gyul'-Khodzha Nazar was
sent out to the basmachi as ferrymaa. fle succeeded in disarming Ibragim-bek, his
secretary R~khmat-Ali, and the kurbashi Saib, requesting that they secure their
aeapons to the gupsars (speciai ferry equipment) during the crossing. As soon as
the raft reached shore, the basmachi were arrested. Thanks to the leadership of
the Co~unist Party, the extensive participation of the local population, the
courage and heroism of the Bed Armymen and dekhkans, and the bold actions of
local party and soviet officials, the basmachi gange were rapidly eliminated and
cleared out of Tajikistan.
Final liquidation of the basmachi enabled the Soviet authorities to concentrate
their main efforts in Tajikis[an on the peaceful building of socialism. As a
result of implementation of the Leninist nationalities policy, constant solicitude
by the Communist Party and the assistance of the entire Soviet people, Tajikistan
achieved substantial success. Agriculture was developing successfully, rapid
growth of industry was continuing, and the people's living standards had risen.
The dekhkan had firmly taken the path of building socialism. The high degree of
class consciousness on the part of the toilers of Tajikistan and their solidarity
behind the Communist Party was attested by the high degree of organization and
activeness in the struggle against the basmachi. More than 50,000 dekhkans joined
volunteer detachments and detachments of "krasnopalochniki" just in the spring of
1931.
The leaders of the basmachi were forced to acknowledge the strength of Soviet
rule and the socialist system in Tajikistan. Ibragim-bek testified in court:
"When I left for Northern Afghanistan in order to cross over into Soviet ter-
ritory... I was given assurances by Yusufbay Mukumbayev, the former emir's
representative at the League of Nations, that the League of Nations had resolved
to return Bukhara to the former emir. For me this meant that foreign countries
would give armed support in my struggle against Soviet rule. I was also c~unting
on receiving extensive support by the population. I found the opposite to be
the case, however. I received no support from the population in Tajikistan
proper, and I have come to that end which is inescapable for those who fail to
understand the basis of Soviet power which rests on the solid support of the
toiler population...."3
One cf Ibragim-bek's assistants, Suleyman Salakhutdinov, stated: "Out of my
ignorance I failed to grasp the strength of Soviet rule. While engaged in the
struggle I became convinced that our venture, that is, our struggle against
powerful Soviet rule, was foolish."4 Ishan Isakhan Mansurkhanov, another as-
sistant of Ibragim, also acknowledged the atrength of Soviet rule: "Our plans were
not carried out," he stated, "because we had no idea of the strength of Soviet
rule. In the course of. the struggle I became convinced that our undertakings were
absurd."S
The struggle against the basmachi came to an end in Tajikistan with the defeat of
Ibragim-bek. Isolated groups led by Utan-bek, which had fled across the border,
were pursued by detachments of Afghan troops. A few small bands were continuing
_ to undertake attempts to invade Soviet territory, but each time they were fitting-
ly repulsed by Soviet border guards. Utan-bek was roving about the mountains and
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deserts of Northern Afghanistan with a couple of dozea basmachi. Early ia
December he and a small band fled into Iran to the protectioa of the leader of
the ~rkmen emigre co~unity.
The situation on Ybe Soviet-Afghan border became tranquil in the lattex half of
1931. Massive basmachi raids had ended. The main struggle now was being
conducted aga~inst smugglers.
The defeat of the basmachi in Tajilcistan strengthened Soviet rule to aa evea
greater degree aad increased the political activeness of the toilers in the
struggle for socialist transformations in this republic.
Rout of the "Predators of the Desert"
At the end of the 1920's and beginaiag of the 1930's the toilers of Turkmenia weYe
compelled once again to fight the basmachi, who had again become active.
Develop~aent of basmachi activities ia this republic at the beginning of the 193CJs
was promoted by a number of factors. Socialist reforms in Turl~enia were taking
place in the presence of more substantial elements of precapitalist societal
relations than in the other republics of Cr~ntral Asia. In addition, in the
agricultural districts of the Turkmen Republic Chardzhou, Tashauz, and
Kerki there had not been carried out a land reform, which in the other
republics of Central Asia had played an important role in preparing for col-
lectivization. Feudal-patziarchal ralations had in large measure been preserved
in the nomadic and semi-nomadic areas of Turkmenia at the commencement of col-
lectivization. The bai continued to represent a great economic force. The bulx
of the livestock (60 percent) and sources o~ water supply, which were of ex-
ceptional important for the economy of the Turkmens,were ia the possession of
the bai-clan elite; private ownership of wells had been preserved. In 1929 only
2.4 percent of dekhkan households were unified in kolkhozes in the ~urkmen
Republic. In 1929 bai comprised 6.9 percent of the total dekhken population,
but they owned 27 percent of the means of production, 12.5 percent of the
acreage under crops, and 52.7 percent of small livestock. Representatives of
the exploiter elite in Turkmenia included feudal lords and clan leaders. There-
fore they exerted great influence oa the toiler masses of Turkmenia.
The soviet and cooperative edifice was heavily contaminated by class-hostile
elements, and in some localities consisted almost entirely of the feudal-clan
nobility and their henchmen. The worker class was small in numbers. Rural
party and soviet agencies lacked work experience. The situation was aggravated
by a low level of cultural-political development of the poor hired laborer masses
and active resistance to Soviet authority on the part of the clergy. This is
why basmachi bands were joined not only by manifestly counterrevolutionary
elements but also by a certain segment of the toiler pop~lation, especially in
the Kara Kum Desert. Counterrevolutionary elements skillfully utilized toward
their own end isolated extremes to which local agencies of Soviet authority went
in carrying out party policy pertaining to socialist transformation of the aul.
In Turkmenia these extremes were for the most part those which occurred
- throughout the country during collectivization: ~riolation of the principles of
voluntary participation, skipping over the artel to the commune, failure to ob-
serve a correct pace of collectivization, ete. In apite of this, the process of
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building kolkhozes was accelerating in tempo. By 1930 28.9 percent of poor and
middle-peasant landholdings in Turkmenia had beea collectivized.6
T~ne building of socialism in Turkmenist~n was proceeding ia a situatioa of
fierce class struggle. V. I. Lenin wrote with full justificatioa, oa the basis
of experience of the first two years of dictatorship of the proletariat, that
the class struggle, following overthrow of the power of capital,."/does not dis-
appear/... but merely changes its forms, becoming even fiercer in many
respects."~
The main center of leadership of the basmachi in Turl~enia was located across the
border, and was clo~ely linked with British intelligence via its permanent
representative Shukimbayev. It is aot surprising that the struggle against the
basmachi was particularly intense oa the border and in border areas.
Basmachi groups across the border as well as local groups were headed by bai and
reactionary clergy. They were actively supported by bourgeois nationalists, who
preached the idea of bringing Cemtral Asia iato the system of British dominion
countries.8
Groups across the border commenced aggressive aati-Soviet actions in the middle
of June 1929. On 15 June a band 700 man strong, led by Ishik-khan, son of
Dzhunaid, crossed the border into Turl~enia. At dawn of the following day,
basmachi attacked the Ak-Rabat border post, which was defended by only 11 men.
Border post commander Kondratenko and his deputq Rostenko skillfully organized
defense. The basmachi, sustaining substantial losses, fled across the border.9
Some of the basmachi who had previously fled across the border with Dzhunaid-khan
returned to the Tashauz district in October of 1929. At the end of the year a
tattle was fought in the vicinity of Charyehly well with the baad of Shaltay-
Batyr one of Dzhunaid's underlings. Defeated, Shaltay-Batyr fled into the
desert. In January 1930 Shaltay-Batyr's band attacked Geoklen ia l1'yalinskiy
Rayon. The basmachi committed a barbaric crime they slaughtered approximately
200 peaceful dekhkans gathered for a wedding toy [celebrationJ. Shaltay was
killed in an exchange of fire with self-defease detachment members.l0
At the end o� 1929, proceeding on a uaified plan drawn up abroad, feudal-bai
elements in Turkmenia proceeded to form basmachi detachments. At the same time
forays by basmachi across the border against Soviet border guards and the local
population increased in frequency. In February and March 1930, for example, two
large basmachi groups invaded Soviet territory from across the border. Border
guards overtook and totally annihilated them.ll
But armed basmachi forays onto the territory of Turkmenia continued. Anti-Soviet
elements abroad continued to support and encourage them. British intelligence
allocated 30,000 rupees, for example, for training a basmachi group formed in the
fall of 1930. British intelligence established on Iranian soil a number of
special points for organizing crossing of the Soviet border.12
In September 1930 Kerim-khan, one of the clan leaders, organized a large band and
plundered several cooperatives and ~urkmentorg warehouses in Iolotanskiy Rayon.
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On 10 October a Soviet aerial observer spotted a long ribbon extending across the
desert. It was a caravan of 400 camels Kerim-khan was proceeding toward the
border with pluadered loot. 1~,io border guard squads led by Bondarenko and Rorp
were the first to engage Kerim-khan's band. Platoon commaader Tsyplakov and
several soldiers arrived as the battle was in full swing. The basmachi lost
90 men killed and wounded. The survivors fled, abandoning their stolen spoils
and approximately 10,000 head of livestock.
Dav]iya Sardar's force, numbering more than 90 mea, attempted to brealc through
and come to the assistance c,f Rerim-khan. It was met by a detachment of border
guards led by Kotel'nikov and a Red Army squadron under the command of Ayrapetov.
Following a 12-hour battle the basmachi, having sustained heavy casualties, fled
across the border.
On 29 December 1930 another group, 100 mea strong, crossed the border near ~
Kushka. Met by heavy fire delivered by border guards, it fled back across the
border.
- Raids by bands from across the border into Soviet Turl~menistan signaled activa-
tion of domestic counterrevolutionary forces. A tAtal of 11 basmachi groups
were liquidated within Soviet Turkmenistaa in the first half of 1930 aloae.l3
Many bands, having committed criminal offenses, subsequently sought to flee
abroad. On 30 October border guards wiped out a group of 12 men attempting to
flee across the border after plundering villages. In November 1930 a band of
40 basmachi robbed a number of cooperatives and sought to flee into Iraa.. Their
path was blocked by squads of cavalry and a small party of border guards led
by platoon commander Krasnoshchekov. The gang left more thaa half of its
basmachi members and all the plundered groperty and livestock on the field of
battle.l4
In the fall of 1930 and the spring of 1931 Ishik-khan, who maintained ~close
contacts with bai stockmen, was particularly active in forming local bands. He
promised generous assistance to domestic counterrevolutionaries and, in case of
failure, a secure refuge acroes the border.l5
The notorious Oraz Gel'dy T~~,ndzhik was the principal coordinator of basmachi
forces in Turkmenia. In A;~ril 1:~31 he assembled a band of 60 basmachi and
car~ied out a number of pillaging,s, pogroms and murders of soviet officials.
Gathering together representativF~s of the bai, he declared himself khaa and even
formed a "government."16
Ishik-khan sent several kurbashi across the border to assist Oraz Gel'dy.
Murad-Ali, one of the kurbashi taken into custody, told why they had come to
Soviet Turkestan: "Kara Mukht, from Persia, crossed the border onto Soviet ter-
ritory, into Geok-Tepinskiy Rayon.... A few days later Kara Mukht... came to
see me at the Ak-Kuyu well. He told me that under no circumstances should I
accept Soviet rule and I should fight it to the end... that he, Kara Mukht, had
come from Persia for the purpose of joint aggressive actions against Soviet
rule."17
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By June 1931 Oraz Gel'dy had 400 men under his co~and.18 His main force mounted
several raids on small garrisons and villages, after which it moved on to
Tedzhenskiy Rayon. Their it succeeded, carrying out mass terrorist actions, in
thwarting the procurement of grain and in lootiag collection stations.
At the same time a large group of Razakh herdsmen made its way to Krasnovodskiy
Rayon. Follawing the co~tmencemeat of collectivization, these herdsmen had suc-
cumbed to bai agitation and were proceeding across Turkmenia in order to escape
abroad.19 The bai organized several armed detachments of these herdsmen, which
joined together with local basmachi gangs.
_ Resistance by bai-kulak elements in Soviet Turkmeaia to the building of social-
ism had by the beginning of April 1931 assumed the form of an extensive armed
basmachi insurrection against Soviet rule. The basmachi established their base
camp in the Kara Kum Desert. From there they carried the attack to other areas.
In 1931 the Kara Ktmm became the center of basmachi activities not only due to
the geographic features of this desert region but also by virtue of a number of
socioeconomic conditiong: preservation of feudal-clan relations, and little class
differentiation; dominame of claa chiefs, bai and mullahs in the soviets.
In addition, several former basmach~ leaders had found refuge in Chis area, and
all those who were hiding from the Soviet authorities had fled to this area.
At the commencement of coordinated action by domestic and external counterrevolu-
tionary forces, three types of basmachi bands were operatiag on the territory of
Soviet Turkmenistan: foreign, Turlcmea, and consolidated Turkmen-Kazakh, or
Ic~..:~-Kazakh. The bands were divided into five principal groupings on the
basis oi oeographic, ethnic-clan, and to some extent economic criteria: Iomud-
Kazakh, led by Eyli Alchun and operating in Razandzhikskiy and Krasnovodskiy
rayons; a Tekin grouping formed of basmachi from Balchardenslciy aad Geok-Tepinskiy
rayons, led by Murad Ali; a Tekin grouping led by Oraz Gel'dy Kandzhik, operat-
ing in Tedzheno-Mervskiy Rayon; the Dargaa-Ata grouping led by Karadzha
Aksakal; the Tashauz grouping.
Each of these groups had its own specific features, but they were linkad by a
common objective overthrow of Soviet rule in Turl~enia. They also employed
common methods of struggle: mass terrorism, especially against party and soviet
officials, smashing of legitimate agencies of suthority and government es-
tablishments, and plundering of the population.
The basmachi swung into action in Turkmenia in the latter half of March 1931.
The arrival of Khak Murad's group from across the border served as a signal to
go into action. As they proceeded, the basmachi smashed Soviet establishments,
terrorized and robbed the population.
A small detachment (52 mez~ from the 85th battalion of OGPU forces under the
command of Tseytlin was dispatched to Krasnovodskiy Rayon to prevent further
depredations by this group. The arrival of this detachment and the arrest of
several bai evoked alarm among the counterrevolutionaries. At a clandestine
meeting of basmachi leaders, it was decided to destroy the detachment and flee
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across the border. This decision was reported to Dzhunaid-khan, leader of the
basmachi abroad.
On 19 April 400 basmachi attacked members of the Cheka. The detachIDent was fired
on from ambush at a range of 30-40 meters. The commander and two of his men Were
killed, while the remainder established a perimeter defense. The battle con-
tinued for 72 hours. Fifteen wounded soldiers fell into the hands of the
basmachi and were brutally murdered. One of the basmachi who had taken part in
this atrocity acknowledged during interrogation following his capture in 1931:
"Not one of them begged for mercy.~'20
The attack on the Cheka detachment served to activate all the basmachi. At the
end of April small bands plundered several cooperatives, seized grain caravans,
and in some kishlaks murdered party and soviet officials.
The counterrevolution also raised its head in the Rhiva oaii~. With the aid of
basmachi who had arrived from abroad, local couaterrevolutionaries were able to
put together a force of 175 men. But the main events took place on the territory
of Turkmenia, where the principal bai-kulalc and basmachi forces had concentrated.
A band up to 200 ~en in strength was operating in the Rizyl-Arvat area. Dzhunaid
sent Ishik-khan's detachment to this area.
Krasnovodskiy and Kazandzhikskiy rayons became a center of basmachi activities.
The Iomud-Kazakh force, which totaled approximately 1500 men, was concentratecl
there. Mass pogroms and terrorist actioas began. On 22 April the basmachi
destroyed buildings and ~ooted warehouses in Khodzha-Sufi, infl.icting consider-
able financial loss. On 27 April they plundered the sulfate mining operation
of the Kara-Bugaz SL~1'fat Trust.
~he bai were able to swell the ranks of the basmachi as a result of anti-Soviet
ag~tation, blackmail, thre~s and outright coercion. By the beginning of June
- 1931 three large groups totaling 1960 men were operating in Krasnovodskiy Rayon
alon~~. A 60-man band from across the border made its way into this same area.21
The counterrevolutionary elite consolidated all its detachments into a striking
force. By June 1931 a unified central body had been established, which con-
tained, in particular, ~?li-Akhun and Anna Durdy, notorious for their brutality.
The base camp of basmachi headquarters was at the well of Chagyl.
With establishment of the basmachi headquarters, each group was assigned a
specific area, within which it was to carry out acts of sabotage and terrorisn,
break up kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and destroy the soviet machinery of government.
In July alone the basmachi conducted 17 raids, perpetrated 41 acts of terrorism,
and a great many pillagings and acts of violence. On 30 July, during a raid on
hazandzhik, they demolished a stretch of railbed, causing two mail trains to
wreck.22 Basmachi actions paralyzed economic life in certain areas. The
operations of industrial enterprises ground to a halt in the Krasnovodsk area,
while in some kishlaks life came to a stop for a period of three months. In
carrying out mass acts of terrorism, the basmachi leaders explained their actinns
in a simple fashion: a teacher had to be killed for tuming children into
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atheists, dekhkans for symgathizing with the Soviet detachments, aad women for
wanting to leam to read and write.23
Special detachments of border guards, OGPU troops, Red Army troops and
volunteers were formed to combat the basmachi.
On 20 May e~nits of the OGPU 24th Cavalry Reg~ment under .t.he com~and of I. I.
Lamanov were sent into Krasnovodskiy Rayon. ~o other groups were sent to
fight basmachi bands in Kizyl-Arvatskiy, Kazandzhikslciy, Dzhebelskiy, and
Tashauzskiy rayons.
The detachments in t:~e Krasnovodsk sector co~eaced combat operations on the
night of 27 May. By 10 Juae they had cleared basmachi from a vast territory in
the westera part of Turkmeaia. Endeavoring to preserve their forces and gain
time to regroup, the basmachi would agree to negotiations for voluntary sur-
render. And if such a maneuver succeeded, they would once again resume armed
actions after strengthening their detachments.
In view of the situation, the VKP(b) Central Co~ittee Sredazbyuro aad the
T'~rkmen Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Com~ittee made the decision to
mobilize the population, particularly Communiets, Romsomol members and soviet
activists, for the struggle against the basmachi. Al1 military and volunteer
subunits were brought to a state of combat readiness. A specially formed field
headquarters staff drew up a plan for attacking the principal bases of the
basmachi around Orta-Kuyu, Geoklen-Kuyusy, and Kaymat wells.
Prior to commencing the operation, the government of the Turkmen Republic
carried out a number of ineasures of a sociopolitical aature, which undermined
the influence of the counterrevolutionary forces on the toil~r population:
decrees were issued anaouncing nationalizatian of wells and confiscation of
livestock and other property from the b~i elite who had joined the basmachi
bands, and appeals were issued to herdsmea to return to peaceful labor.
Special groups made up of party and soviet activists were formed to conduct
explanatory work, for practical implementation of government decrees, and to
reestablish agencies of authority fn lcishlaks which had been targets of
basmachi pogroms. "Krasaopalochniki" detachments were organized in the
kishlaks to protect the population against basmachi raids. By the fall of 1931
these detachments exceeded 12,000 mea.24
= Preparatory measures made it possible to commence the operation in an organized
manner and to execute it rapidly. Close coordination between party and
soviet agencies and the co~and of military units, active assistance by the
toilers, and the excellent morale and fighting qualities of the soldiers and
their commanders guaranteed success. In Kraenovodskiy Rayon operations were
back to normal in soviet agenciea, at enterprises and mining operations by
23 June.
The Red Armymen and volunteers stauachly endured all difficulties. They
accomplished marches across the waterless desert lasting many days, and they
displayed courage and valor in combat against the basmachi.
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. .
The detachment led by Kobisskiy fought a battle at Tereskay well for 96 hours.
This 90-man detachment defeated a well-armed basmachi band of 200 men.
The successes of the operation were overestimated, however, by field headquarters
Top headquarters officials viewed the defeat of large basmachi units as liquida-
tion of the base proper of the counterrevolutionary forces and halted further
conduct of the operation on 23 June 1'931. And yet the situation remained serious.
By the end of June 14 bands, totaling more than 2000 basmachi,were operating in
Turkmenia. Approximat~ly 1000 basmachi were in the Iomud-Ka~akh force, which .
presented the greatest threat. It is true that there was a lack of unity among
the basmachi. Enlisted into the bands by deception or threat, the poor dekhkans
had no desire to oppose the Soviet authorities. More and more frequently they
were openly expressing their resentment. But the leaders were taking drastic
measures to preserve the bands, insisting on continuing the armed struggle, and
severely punishing the "insubordinate." Under their pressure groups which had
agreed to turn themselves in conducted only partial disarmament. In addition,
the kurbashi who were conducting surrender negotiations began insisting on
postponing the disbanding of their detachments.
In the meantime the OGPU co~and authorities were rashly hastening to deactivate
the Krasnovodsk combat sector. Sector commander I. I. Lamanov sent a report in
which he stated that these actions were premature, and requested that the mili-
tary units deployed in the sector be left in place. But headquarters ignored
this report.
Taking advantage of the breathing space, the basmachf. leaders reorganized their
remaining forces. They again went into action in the latter half of July.25
The basmachi terrorized the population and pillaged. As before, basmachi from II
- across the border hastened to their assistance. '
On 3 August a 40-man group crossed over onto Soviet territory. On 27 August
the Kara Mukht band attempted to rai3 a village near the Kul'-Takir well. The
basmachi raid was repulsed by a Co~unist detachment.
Somewhat earlier, at the beginni.ng of August, the Kakabay band, totaling 350 men,
lai~7 siege to the Erbent well, which was defended by a detachment of militia and
a subunit of the 2d Turkmen Regiment. The fighting went on for 6 days. Sustain-
ing heavy casualties, the basmachi fled into the desert.
The 600 basmachi of Oraz Gel'dy were operating in Geok-Tepinskiy Rayon. They
were robbing grain caravans, killing soviet and party officials and activists,
and even besieged a number of kishlaks. In Tashauzskiy Rayon small basmachi
groups were systematically terrorizing the population. By the beginning of
September 1921 the basmachi had m~,snted 86 forays. Peaceful kishlaks, 3k
kolkhozes and sovkhozes had been pillaged. Thirty-four party and soviet of-
ficials were killed during these raids.
Ln spite of some successes in the struggle against the basmachi, as of 1 Sep-
~ tember there ~ere as many as 3000 armed basmachi in Turkmenia. The Iomud-
Kazakh grouping was still the largest. It was operating in the northern part
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of Krasnovodskiy and Kazandzhikskiy rayons. Its central base was located~in the
vicinity of Chagyl well. The Bakharden grouping, together with the ba~machi of
Murad Ali, totaled more than 40Q men. The Ashkhabad force, led by Rakab~ay and
Akdyr-ichan, totaled as many as 150 men. The Tedzhen force was a cc?nsolidation of
re~nnants of the defe3ted bands of Oraz Geldy (who was killed on 28 August)
375 basmachi. The Bayram-Ali force contained up to 1fi0 men, the Dar~an-Ata
force 120, and the Tashauz force as many as 260 m2n.
The basmachi contro~led practically the entire Kara Kum. This new basmachi
f lare-up was in the final analysis caused by aggravation of the c3.ass strugg'le
in connectior. wbth the offens~ve mounted by the Soviet authorities against
remnants of capitalist elements in the city and village, as well as by attempts
on the part of basmachi-emigre circles to regain the~r lost economic and
political positions. In these conditions the party Central Committee, VTsIK and
iJSSR Sovnarkom instructed the Central As3an Military District to clear bandit
gangs from the Kara Kum as quickly as possible.26
Party-soviet agencies of Central Asia and Turicmenia and the command authoriti~s
of the Central Asian Military District decided to conduct in Turkmenia and
Khorezm a new, moxe powerful combined operation to wipe out the bands and
protect the population. The main objective of the operation was to destroy large
basmachi detachments, return the dekhkans to peaceful labor, given them requisite
_ assistance, improve their cultural and Iiying conditions, and strengthen Soviet
authorities in those areas stricken by banditry.
~ In;r;allv four composite detachments were formed to execute this plan. The
Western (main) Fo~ce was tu mount a drive in the direction ~ the Dzhurkul'-Chapan
- and Kyuy-Kun frontier area; the Southern Force was to launch a secvr_dary attack
in the direction of Busag well and the Az-Kum frontier area; t~:e Eastern Force
was to perform a bloc~Cing function in the viciniCy of Kin-Tychke spring and was
simultaneously to mount short thrusts in the Osmantay-Matay area; the Northern
Force was to perform conbined missions of destroying basmachi. Just as during
the first operation, activists, Communist~ and IComsomol members were to take
part in the fighting. A group of ~arty and soviet offi.cials was assigned to
conduct mass political work among the population in each of the four sectors.
The operation was scheduled to commence on 9 September 1931. In view of
heightened basmachi ~ctivit.ies, however, the operation began ahead cf schedule,
on S September.
Overall direction of the operation was assigned to the commande~ oi the Central
Asi~ Military Dis[rict (CAMD), P. Ye. Dybenko, G. Yastrebov, member of the
- front Rewoyensovet, and G. G. Yevdokimov, official representative of OGPU. They
set up an OGPU central command group and CAI~ field headquarters, located at
Kizyl-Arvat station. Assigned to field headquarters were representatives of the
VKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro (Zaytsev), the Turkmenistan S;ommunist Party
~ (of Bolsheviks) Central Co~nittee (Ya. A. Popok, Central Co~ittee first secretary,
and Central ~o~nittee Secretary Ch. Vellekov), and the Turkmen SSR Sov.~arkom
(Sovnarkom Chairman K. S. Atabayev).
Larger Red Army forces and volunteer detachments proceeded to take up their
_ attack po~irions. In Krasnovodsk cadets from the Tashicent Military School imeni
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rvn vrr~~,.na. .....a..~
V. I. Lenin, led by A. K. ,ialyshev, nr:.pared for the operation. Also in
Krasnovodsk was a mechanize~ detachment under the co~and of I. I. Lamanov,
chief of border and internal security troops of the Central Asian Directorate
of OGPU; N. Aytakov and S. Ungalbayev served as representatives of the KPT
Central Committee in the detachment. A cava~ry brigade under the command of Ya.
A. Mel`kumov moved out from Kazandzhik Station; A. Muradov was the KPT Central
Committee representative. The Uzbek Cavalry Regiment, under the command of
Mirkamil' Mirsharapov, proceeded from Kizyl- Arv~at; KPT Central Commit:ee
representative Annamukh~dov. Another Uzbek cavalry regiment, under the
command of I. P. Bikzhanov, proceeded from Bakharden; B. Atayev and 0.
Tachmamedov were representatives of the KPT Central Committee in this regiment.
A detachment of border troops, with M. S. Kadzharov representing the KPT Cantral
Committee, moved out from Artyk Station. The Thrice Red-Banner 82d Aktyubinsk
~ Cavalry Regiment, under tha command of A. I. Bats:calevich, with th~ I'.PT Central
' Committee regresented by A. Kurdov, advanced from Tedzhen. The 83d Baglinskiy
- Cavalry Regiment, under the command of M. V. Samokrutov, proceeded from Merv.
The 84th Red-Sanner Cavairy Regiment, under the command of I. I. Khryukin, and
a regiment of OGPU troops under the command af Konstantinov proceeded from
Khiva and Tashauz. The lst Communist Company, under the command of T. Chaykazin,
was forming in Ashkhabad.z~
The operation was conducted in two s~ages. At the first stage, which ran to
19 September 1931, an attack was mounted on the principal basmachi base camps.
The first clash between the mechanized detachment under the command of I. I.
Lamanov and the outposts of th~ Iomud�Kazakh force took place on ~2 September.
On 13 Septemoer the 2d Turkmen Regiment and Lamanov's detachment attacked the
main forces of the Iomud-Kazakh group. Occupying well-fortified positions
(the fortifications ran 3 km in frontage and 4 1~ in depth) and with a considerable
superiority in manpower, the band offered fierce resistance. The battle went
on for 14 hours. The basmachi were unable to withstand thc offensive pressure of
our units. A total of 198 bandits were killed or woundgd; the kurbashi Khak
Murad, who had been acting as liaison with representatives of British intel-
ligence, was killed. I. I. Lamanov and Cheka member Chary Muradov died the death
of the brave in battle at Chagyl well. At the most critical moment in the
battle, both led attacking lines of Red Armymen, ensuring penetration of the
enemy's defense. Heroism was displayed by cadet N. G. Lyashchenko.
- Remnants of the Iomud-Kazakh force fought their way n~rtheastward. On 17 Sep-
- tember they ~rere overtaken at the Dakhly well by a composite cavalry battalion
under the command of Malyshev. Battle was engaged the fiercest and bloodiest
of the en~ire operation. For a pera.od of 10 hours the bandits resisted with
the fury of the doumed. Soon a detachment of cadets under the command of
Yakub Kuliyev arrived on the scene. The basmachi were totally routed. Only a
_ few made good their escape.
On 17 September Red Army units encountered the Tashauz force, which was at-
temp[ing to link up with the bands operating in the Kara Kum. Of the 250
basmachi, 90 were killed, wounded, or captured.
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In this phase of the operation six basmachi forces were defeated in detail,
' 1037 enemy were killed or captured, and the major base camps of the bands were
seized. "Defeat in detail of the basmachi forces and capture of their bases at
- these centers (at the Charyshly, Dakhly, Tuar, and Chagyl wells)," stated the
repQrt of the field political directorate of the Central Asian Military District,
"ended the first phase of the operation against the basmachi bands."28
The Red Armymen, commanders and fighting men of the volunteer detachments had
withstood a severe tESt. Acting in a united front and inspired by a common
cause, Co~unists, Komsomol members and non-party people, Russians and
Ukrainians, Belorussians, Turkmens, Kazakhs, and representatives of other of our
country's nationalities fought hemica7ly, shoulder to shoulder. Self-defQnse and
"krasnopalochniki" detachments were formed of representatives of indigenous
nationalities. This had become a mass movement by the end of 1931.
The mission in tMe second phase of the opera':ion was to wipe out the remaining
- basmachi groups, to prevent them from escaping across the border, and to dis-
arm them.
This phase began on 22 September 1931. The situation was as follows at that time.
In a number of areas small groups af b3smachi, posing as peaceful inhabitants,
were hiding among nomads in remote encampments. In Bakhardenskiy, Yerbentskiy,
Mervsko-Tedzhenskiy, and certain other rayons in which military operations had
_ not previously been conducted, the basmact~i h3d maintained their forces. Groups
y which had come across the border had also not yet been wiped out.
The second phase of the operation~ contained a number of s~ecific features. First
of ~11, there was increased participation by the general population in the
struggle against the basmachi. Secondly, after the largest forces had been
wiped out, the basmachi no longer offered such stiff ~esistance as previously,
and the pace of their disintegration stepped up significantly. Not only rank
and file basmachi but kurbashi as well were voluntarily surrendering with in-
creasing frequency.
A total of 1043 rank and file basmachi and 17 kurbashi voluntarily surrendersd
in September-October 1931. During this same period of time 84 basmachi were
killed and 98 captured in combat encounters. But some of the leaders still
refused t. lay down their arms. At the beginning of October, for example,
remnants the scattered Kazakh and Turkmen groups in the northern part of the
Kara Kum, .:otaling up to 400 men, once again consolidated into a united force.
- The principal role in this unification was played by Durdy Murt and Bekdzhan-khan
A cavalry regiment and other units were sent against the basmachi. Conducting
- joint actions, they wiped out the basmachi main forces (most were captured,
while only Bekdzhan-khan and Durdy Murt succeeded in escaping). '
The lst Turkmen Regi~aent and a mechanized detachment were operating in Kunya-
_ Urgenchskiy Rayon, the Uzbek Cavalry Regiment and the 2d Battalion of the
lOth Cavalry Regiment in I1'yalinskiy Rayon, while the 84th Cavalry Regiment was
operating in Takhtinskiy Rayon.
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rvn vrr~~~ni, ..~r. .~.~i,ti
A general offensive began on 7 October, in which local residents took extensive
part. They actively assisted in searching out, capturing and disarming basmachi
and in confiscati~ig hidden weapons. As a result of assistance by the local
p~pulation, more than 400G rifles and revolvers were confiscated just between
1 and 10 October 1931.
As a result of the operation in the Kara Kum, 3287 basmachi voluntarily sur-
rend.red, were captured, killed or wounded.
By the fall of 1931 the basmachi main forces in Turkmenia had been eliminated.
The feudal-clan elite had ceased to exist as a socioeconomic stratum. Thus the
basmachi were deprived of a nutrient medium, soil and base. In the course of
the struggle against the basmachi, as many as 50,000 sheep and goats and 10,000
camels were handed over to the poor peasants.
This did not end the struggle against the basmachi in Turkmenia. Thanks to
assistance by the counterrevolutionary emigre comaunity, some kurbashi continued
their banditry activities for quite some time, which was fostered by the
geographic conditions of Turkmenia vast desert expanses in which small
basmachi groups could easily hide.
In 1932 and in the first half of the 1933 Dzhunaid-khan, Akhmed-bek, Durdy Murt
and others sent several dozen basmachi gangs into Soviet Turkmenia. From
1 January through 7 March 1932 alone 32 groups totaling more than 1,430 men
- crossed over into Soviet territory; the majority of these were either taken into
custody or killed by border guards in skirmishes on the border. In July 1932
six small bands were hiding deep in the Kara Kum.
Toward August 1932 Akhmed-bek and Durdy Murt succeeded, for the last time, in
putting to g etl~ e r a fairly large force, which raided Soviet establishments
and kishlaks. This force was subsequently divided into two groups: a central
and a eastern group.29 Avoiding encounters with border guards and volunteer
detachments, the basmachi were able to hold out fcr more than 6 months. In May
1933 the central group was caught up with and defeated i.n detail. Durdy Murt
and Akhmed-bek were killed in the engagement.30 Somewhat later the bands of
the Easbern Force were wiped out or disintegrated. Only a few small groups
were hiding in inaccessible areas and infrequently conducting pillaging forays.
Ttie ground was burning under the feet of the basmachi. A vivid example of this
is the last foray of Utan-bek. On 11 October 1933 this experienced veteran
basmachi, accomplanied by ?.0 horsemen, crossed over into Turkmenia. But the
very first hours of their sojourn on Soviet soil, the very �irst tens of
kilometers became a terrible nighmare for Utan-bek and his associates. Women
gazed at them with hatred and cursed them, "krasnopalochniki" posts guarded the
entrances to kishlak.s, their way was hlocked at crossroads, and they could hear
the relentless clattering of hanves of the approaching pursuit....
Awareness of the inevitability of defeat, fear, and the self-preservation
- instinct this time proved to be stronger than anger, desire for revenge, and the
wish to loot and kil]..
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...Standing up in his stirrups, Utan-bek waved his kamcha [riding whip~, and the
entire band wheeled in the direction of the border. Several days after Utan-bek
had successfully crossed back over the border, he went to Ishan Khalifa,
leader of the Turkmen emigre community, and stated that he would never again
cross the Soviet border.
The basmachi did enormous detrimen: to the Turkmen Republic. The old truism
which states that a dying predator is dangerous was persuasively confirmed.
The basmachi predators of the Kara Kum Desert left behind wounds which took
a long time to heal. How many courageous fighters for socialism fell at the
hands of the basmachi, and how many children became orphans!
The list of fallen heroes includes Berdyyev and Sadykov, rayon officials in
Kunya-Urgench; the Annamuradov brothers, activists from the aul of Mulik-Yazy ~
- (Vekil-Bazarskiy Rayon); Bekmurad Dovletov, Komsomol cell secretary in the
aul of Khodzham-Kala-2 in Kara-Kalinskiy Rayon; Amannepes Ovezov, activist from
Porsinskiy Rayon; activist Keyik Sametova from Karabekaul'skiy Rayon; poor
peasant Nobat Ovezmuradov from Chardzhouskiy Rayon; Rakhman Niyazov, hired �arm
laborer and kolkhoz activist from Bayram-Aliyskiy Rayon; plus many others.
The basmachi did great detra.ment to the economy. The list of warehouses put
to the torch, looted stores, demolished enterprises, sovkhoz buildings and
dwellings is long. And added to this are trampled crops and destroyed farm
equipment!
Stock raising was hit particularly hard. The total number of head of livestock
declined by 19 n?rcent just in the winter of 1930. A total of 375,000 karakul
sheep died, ~~rere stolen or driven abroad. In 1931, when basmachi activities in
Turkmenia re.ached their apogee, the total number of karakul sheep declined by
- 41 percent, cc~r_se-fleeced sheep by 62 percent, and cattle by 52 percent.
Long years and persistent labor by the workers and kolkhoz farmers of Turkmenia
were required in order to heal the wounds inflicted by the "predators of the
desert."
~
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r~in Vf f ~l ~H~. ...,r, v,�i. ~
CONCLUSION
The activities of the basmachi comprised one of the forms of the class
struggle in Central Asia, which assumed an exceptionally savage character.
- It constituted an expression of the class struggle of the bai, the local
bourgeoisie and the reactionary Islamic clergy against the dictatorsriip of
the proletariat. M. V. Frunze correctly noted in a memorandum to V. I. Lenin
that the basmachi represented an "armed protest against the new principles
on which a new life is to be built."1
The feudal lords, clan nobility, former large landholders, emirate and
khanate functionaries constituted the social base of the basmachi. Stripped
of their wealth and privileges by the revolution, they were its sworn enemies.
The majority of basmachi leaders came from this milieu. It was emphasized in
the accountability report of the KPT Central Committee to the 7th KPT Congress
(March 1923) that "all individual kurbashi are great feudal lords, great
oppressors of the broad dekhkan masses."2
The emerging local national bourgeoisie also took active part in development
of the basmachi. Its position was defined by the struggle against the
socialist path of development of Turkestan and the struggle for the capitalist
path.
The bai and the feudal nobility, which were the most numerous exploiter class
in Central Asia, provided the basmachi with cadres. The Karategin bek Fuzayl
_ Maksum and the wealthy Kuvandyk-bai, who owned more than 10,000 karakul sheep;
prominent emir f unctionary and Lokay clan leader Kayum Parvanchi and the power-
ful bai Bayram Molla; Salakhutdin Suleymanov, mullah and son of the head of
the Islamic clergy in the Bukhara emirate, and wealthy stockman Kurartyk
Adirov; powerful Kirghiz manap [privileged class of Kirghiz feudal-clan elite]
~tuetdin, who had in his employ more than 5000 agricultural laborers, chayriker,
and herdsmen; and Turkmen feudal lord Dzhunaid these are social photographs
of the basmachi leaders. Couunon criminals, lumpen and other declasse elements
wtio joined the ranks of the basmachi forces intensified their sinister, bandit,
and briggand-terrorist coloration to an even greater extent.
The 6th Congress of the Turkestan Communist Party (August 1921), defining the
social countenance of the basmachi, stated that "the bai and declasse
professional banditry elements constitute the leaders and organizing force
(of the basmachi Auth.)."3
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Tne counterrevolutionary thrust of the basmachi is also persuasively attested
by numerous facts of basmachi making common cause with blackguard White
c;uardists. It would seem that the basmachi, who claimed to be spokesmen for
tt~e national interests of the peoples of Central Asia, should have seen as
manifest enemies the Russian White Guard, who made no attempt to conceal their
chauvinist views. But the basmachi were not enemies but rather friends and
allies of the Russian White Guard. Admiral Kolchak, General Denikin, and the
White Cossack atamans Dutov, Tolstov, and Annenkov maintained close relations
with and assisrP,a. che basmachi leaders. Basmachi ranks contained many White
Guard officers, serving as military instructors.
Tt~e reactionary Islamic clergy played an imgortant role in organizing the
basmachi. It proclaimed a"gazavat" and declared the basmachi to be "warriors
of Muhamnad" and "fighters for the faith," calling those who would not join
basmachi bands "giaours" and "kafirs." Extensive pan-Islamic and pan-Turkist
propaganda and agitation were conducted with the assistance of the Islamic
clergy.4 The basmachi camps always contained pan-Islamic agitators.
Characterizing the basic nucleus of the basmachi, M. V. Frunze wrote in May
1920 that the ranks of t~e basmachi contained those who were accustomed to
brigandage and violence, who were accustomed to living an idle and un-
tra~eled life at the expense of the ruthlessly fleeced population, those wha,
with the support of a gang collected under their banner, dreamed of becoming
ruler of the region, a new khan.s
Bourgeois nationalists were the ideological leaders of the basmachi. Claiming to
b~ defenders of overall national interests but in actual fact expressing the
interests of the exploiter classes, they kindled interethnic hostility and at-
tempted to use the basmachi to reestablish the domination of the feudal lords
and bai and to detach Central Asia from Soviet Russia. A number of bourgeois
nationalists, holding positions in executive agencies in the Central Asian
republics, were secretly supporting the basmachi and arranging for supply of
arms and ammunition to them.
But the basmachi did not include only representatives of the overthrown ex-
ploiter classes. A certain portion of the toiling dekhkans was also enlisted
into basmachi bands.
This was due to a number of factors. Followictg the victory of the socialist
revolution in Turkestan, just as throughout the country, measures were taken
to implement Lenin's land decree. Success was not achieved in Turkestan,
i~uwever, in imglementing the Land Decree and the 1aw on socialization as was
ti~~ case in tt~e Russian village. The bulk of the land remained in the hands
~~f th~ eKpluiters. The Fourth Regional Conference of Soviets ascertained that
i~~ tipite of the land law, purchase and sale of lano was continuing in the
r~~~;ion. 'I'}~is applied to an ev~n gre~ter degree to Bukhara and Khorezm.
K~tiulucion of the land qu~stion in Turkestan was connected not only with the
~~liminatiun of land ownership by the landed gentry but also to a significant
~i~~y;r~e involved the necessity of eliminating land ownership by Russian kulak
settlers.
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rvw vr r ~~,awa. a.oc v,�a, i
The land question in the conditions of Central Asia had to be resolved in a
' close link with the water question. Central Asia's irrigation system was
little developed, and this was impeding resolution of the agrarian question.
Feudal-Fatriarchal carryovers were strong in the majority of areas in Central
Asia. This was particularly true of the remote areas of Turkmenia, Taj ikistan,
. and the southern part of Kirghizia. The Kirghiz community, for example, con-
sisted of several clans, at the head of which stood the hereditary manap,
who was considered to be the absolute master. His decisions had the force of �
law for all residents of the community. Following the victorious October
Revolution, the manaps sought to remain in control and e~zdeavored to set the
~ members of the commuaity aga~nst ~oviet rule.
The 2d Congress of the Uzbekistan ~ommuaist Party (1925) stated in its
resolutions that the land question had not been resolved in Uzbekistan right up
to 1924. The congress resolution stated: "Vestiges of feudal relations in the
kishlaks, expressed in the existence of private ownership of land and leading
to the concentration of more than one third of cu?tivated land in the har.ds of
a small group of landed gentry and urban and rural bai-kulalc elements, and
bondage of the poor and middle peasant strata of the kishlak, have not yet been
eradicated."6
The conduct of the dekhkans was to a substantial degree determ3aed precisely
by the fact that the agrarian question had not been resolved. Not having
felt through their personal experience the great changes of land ownership,
the dekhkans remained to a substantial degree dependent on and tmder the in-
fluence of the old exploiters and clergy, who were calling upoa them to combat
Soviet rule. At the same time basmachi activities seriously complicated and
impeded the implementation of radical agrarian reforms. The class eaemy was
counting precisely on this: through basmachi activities they hoped to preserve
the old socioecoaomic relations and, preserving them, to leave a base for new
basmachi outbursts.
Distortions of party nationalities policy, committed chiefly by chauvinist,
nationalist and socialist revolutionary elemeats which had infiltrated agencies
of Soviet authority in Central Asia, promoted the enlietment of a certaia
part of the dekhkans into basmachi gangs. Distortir.;; the nationalities
policy of the Soviet authorities, alien elements aroused distrust among the
backward segment of the dekhkans, a fact which was extensively exploited by
the organizers of the basmachi.
The political and cultural backwardness of the dekhk.an masses as well as their
religious prejudices offered a nutrieat medium for agitation by the basmachi
leaders and reactionary clergy. In addition, the basmachi hindered overcoming
this backwardness by thwarting the political-education efforts on the part of
[he Soviet authorities, engaging in terrorist actions not only against Soviet
activists but also against any bearers of progress and culture. Nor should
one underestimate the signiticance ef terrorist activity, with the aid of which
the basmachi kurbashi compelled dekhkans to 3oin their forces. Coercion and
intimidation as well as employment of the method of holding hostiges (persons,
livestock, property) resulted in thousands of persons who hated the basmachi
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enlisting in their ranks against their own will, subsequently having great
difficulty in returning.to a peaceful life.
The organizers of the basmachi took advantage of the difficult economic
situation in Turkestan on the eve of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
A decline in cotton growing led to the impoverishment of hundreds of
thousands of dekhkan families. The basmachi leaders made every effort to en-
list into their bands impoverished dekhkans who could not obtaia wvrk in
agriculture. Aad the basmachi activities in turn were leading to a worsening
of the financial plight, retaining this reserve for replenishing basmachi
forces.
The participation of a certain number of dekhkans in basmachi detachmeats did
not give basmachi activities the character of a popular movemeat. The claim
that the basmachi were supported by the majority of the indigenous popula-
tion of Turkestan throughout the civil war constitutes slander against the
peoples of Ceatral Asia. Let us recal~ that on the eve of the Great October
Socialist Revolution V. I. Lenin wrote: "The broad masses of the oppressed
natioas... have greater trust in the proletariat of Russia than in the
bourgeoisie.... The bourgeoisie has �oully betrayed the cause of freedom of
oppressed na~ions, while the proletariat is faithful to the cause of freedom."~
It is quite natural that the toiler masses of Turkestaa could not support the
basmachi, who were their inveterate class enemies.
The overwhelming maj ority of the toiler population of Central Asia had con-
tempt and hatred for the basmachi. Numerous facts, reflected in archival
documents and in the recollections of the participants in the eveats of those
ye.ars, attest to the negative attitude toward the basmachi on the part of the
majority of residents of the kishlaks and auls a~ attest to the fact that the
toiling Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turl~ens, Kirghiz, Kazakhs, and Rara-Kalpaks fought
against the basmachi. The 6th Congress of the RPT (August 1921), aaalyzing
~he results of the struggle against the basmachi for the preceding years, noted
in its resolution that the majority of the dekhkan toiler masses "do not
sympathize with but oppose this movement (the bas9uachi Auth.), these
sentiments being based on an overmastering desire to liquidate the basmachi at
all costs and as quickly as possible."8
The KPT Central Committee accovntability report to the 7th RPT Congress em-
phasized that the masses were fighting the basmachi. At the same time it was
pointed out that the overthrown exploiter classes '~ere endeavoring to give
the basmachi a political coloration, to pr~vide a specific program, and to
turn it into a broad popular movement."9
Many popular Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen songs from the time of the struggle
against the basmachi have been preserved. All of them speak of the basmachi
as butchers, oppressors, and brigands.
We harvested the grain
The basmachi took it away.
The basmachi left us
Grief, misfortune, and tears.l0
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r~R ~rraa.~~u. a.~c. v..a.~
As has been indicated in this book, the majority of toilers of the indigenous
nationalities did not support the basmachi. This was the main reason for
the defeat of the basmactni, aad this was one of the most important conditions
for the victory of Soviet power over the united forces of the interventioaists
and domestic couaterrevolution in Central Asia.
Basmachi activities, abating and then flaring up once again, continued for a
period of alm4st 15 years in certaia areas. A questioa arises: what is the
reason for the great duration of this struggle? We discussed above the so-
cial roots of the basmachi and the internal factors promoting their spread.
The external factor, however, should be acknowledged as the main factor
causing the vitality of the basmachi. Foreign support, given on a most exten-
sive scale, ensured the initial upsurge on the part of the basmachi, their
subsequent expansion, and galvanized and iaspired subsequent flareups of
basmachi activity. Once can consider to be an absolutely proven fact that the
Anglo-American intelligence services, with the assistance of official represen-
tatives in China, Iran, and Afghanistaa, and supported by the ractionary
circles in those countries, were in constant contact with basmachi leaders and
bourgeois-nationalist orgaaizations and directed their activities. AlI
prominent basmachi leaders were agents in the employ of the U.S. and British
intelligence services. It was precisely foreiga organizers, foreign arms and
gold which ensured the establishment of many basmachi bands large and
small. The significance of this factor was particularly graphically manifested
in the final stages of the basmachi. Throughout the period of a number of
years the principal basmachi cadres, following defeats, were ensconced safely
_ and snugly across the border. There the bands armed, reorganized, added per-
sonnel, and from there invaded Soviet territory, ia order once again to suffer
- defeat and once again to take refuge abroad.
A statement by M. V. Frunze (M~~y 1920) that the basmachi, "lacking support
- among the local population, were. finding support abroad, in British, Afghan
and Bukharan gold and arms,"1~~ excelleatly characterizes the role of foreign
assistance.
Thousands upon thousands of facts confirm that the basmachi were receiving
money, arms, equipment and clothing from abroad and attest to the participa-
tion of foreign military units, instructors, and advisers in combat operations,
and to the infiltration of numerous agents, couriers, and saboteurs. Many of
these facts have been acknowledged and corroboratad by former military
officers, diplomats, and intelligence officers of foreign countries.
Basmachi themselves time and again gave damning testimony on the guiding role
of their foreign masters. Ibragim-bek, one of the most prominent basmachi
leaders, stated to the in~?estigators that when the invasion of Sa~iet
Tajikistan was being planned, persons representing the former Bukharan emir
gave him, Ibragim-bek, detailed instructions "pertaining to the further
struggle against Soviet rule," supplying the basmachi with arms, a~unition,
etc. Ibragim-bek was to "head for the Soviet border, ~ross it and organize an
extensive movement against Soviet rule."12 ?Ior did ~br~b~:n-bek conceal the
following "minor" detai~: a British representative took part in the discussion
of all these matters.
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Analyzing the history of the struggle against the basmachi, one inescapably
reaches the following concl~~ion: without foreign support the basmachi move-
ment could not have assumed such a substantial scale and could not have con-
tinued for such an extended time.
International reaction assigaed to the basmachi an important role in strategic
anti-Soviet plans both during the period of struggle for the victory of the
October Revolution, during ~he years of civil war, and at subsequent historical
stages. At first the objective was to prevent a victory of Soviet power in
_ Central Asia. When this failed, international reaction decided, with the aid
of the basmachi, to impede the building of socialism and to establish a large
anti-Soviet bridgehead. At all stages it was the fervent aim of the foreign
patrons of the basmachi to tum Central Asia into a colony. In case of victory
by the basmachi, the toilers of Central Asia were to pay with their own sweat
and blood, bearing a colonial yoke, for the rifles and machineguns which had
so generously been provided to Dzhunaid-khan, Ibragim-bek and their ilk.
The basmachi were living as parasites on the ignorance of the masses, on the
dominance of religion, and on economic backwardness. The counterrevolution
was attempting to incite a wave of nationalism, seeking to profit from the
hostility of the masses toward the policy of national oppression which had been
conducted by czarism in the preceding years.
Development of the basmachi was fostered by the economic-geographic isolation
- ~f many areas of Central Asia, which was intensified in connection with the
total encirclement of Turkestan by civil war fronts, which took place twice
in the summer of 1918 and in the spring of 1919. The basmachi were not cut
off from the other Turkestan fronts (Transcasp~an, Semirech'ye, Orenburg13) by
a combat zone. The development of fronts in Turkestan pursued a single ob-
jective. They were closely interlinked and in the final analysis guided by a
single conductor Anglo-American imperialism, which was hoping to strangle
Soviet rule throughout Central Asia by launching a combined attack from the
Fergana, Bukhara, the Transcaspian, and the Semirech'ye. One's attention is
also drawn by the fact that subsequently basmachi bands were entrenched in
areas situated in the mountains or in the desert, in areas with an isolated
patriarchal economy, with practically no links with the outside world. This
cultivated Qconomic backwardness and impe3ed sociopolitical development. It
is not surprising that the focal centers of basmachi activity were most per-
sistent precisely in such remote, isolated areas.
~ The basmachi did consi~erable deti�iment to the republics of Central Asia. The
immense economic devastation in ~Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm following the
defeat of the main forces of the interventionists and Waite Guard was to a
substantial degree the i~esult of basmachi actions. But even in the first ha2f
of the 1920's, when the Soviet nation was undertaking peaceful economic con-
struction, in a number of areas of Central Asia fighting was continuing,
people were dying, crops were being trampled, kishlaks were being burnt to the
ground, and livestock was being driven off. The Central Asian republics also
sustained enormous losses during the basmachi raids of 1929-1932. It was not
merely a matter of losses, however. The struggle against the basma~chi was
diverting the people's energies away from accomplishing productive tasks and
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was hindering consolidation of the soviets and cultural development. All
this complicated and to a certain degree impeded the building of socialism.
The struggle against the basmachi demonstrated the invincible p~wer of the
5oviet system. The hroad masses, united under the leadership of the Com~?uaist
" Party, became active fighters and builders ctf a new life. Neither the fn-
vocations of myrmidons of the counterrevolution nor terrorist acts by the
basmachi could force them to turn from their chosea path.
The workers of Central Asia displayed outstanding staunchness and courage.
With the aid of the workers of Central Russia, they became the cementing .
nucleus in the young republics of the East and led the millions of toiling
dekhkans. The dekhlcan masses, the vast majority of whom supported Soviet rule,
subsequently became increasingly more active and resolute in standing to its
defense. Tens of thousands of dekhlcans who fought against the basmachi in
the ranks of the Red Army, in volunteer detachments and self-defense forces
were the genuine spokesmen for the thoughts and feelings of the people.
Liquidation of the basmachi signified victory of the lofty ideals of socialism
and progress. This was a victory over intellectual darkness and ignorance,
over ethnic and religious prejudices, over social, ecoaomic, and political
backwardness, over feudal-bai carryovers, and over the force of clan-Lribal
ties.
The defeat of the basmachi in Central Asia was of significance not only for the
subsequent fate of the peoples of the Soviet East. It also thwarted to a
considerable degree the plans of foreign imperialism to strangle the national
liberation movement in the calonial East, particularly in China and India.
Muscovite and Uzbek workers, the Fergana dekhkan, the Uk.rainian peasant and
Bukharan handicraft worker fought shoulder to shou~der against the basmachi,
and Tajik "krasnopal~chniki" supported the Red Army company in the assault.
The friendship among peoples, sealed by r.ommonly shed blood, became tempered
and strengthened in this struggle. Liquidation of the basmachi would have been
impossible wi~hout a class alliance of the toilers of all nationalities of
Central Asia. A military-political alliance between the worker class and the
toiling dekhkans, which became a decisive social and political force in
achieving victory over the enemy, was created and became strengthened in the
course of the struggle against the basmachi. A most important factor which
ensured strengthening of this alliance in the conditions of Central Asia was
unswerving implementation of Lenin's nationalities policy by the Communist
Party. The ideology of proletarian internationalism gained victory over the
envenomed weapon of nationalism.
T1ie toilers of our entire country rendered frt~temal assistance to the
peoples of Central Asia in the difficult struggle against our enemies. This
assis~ance was a vivid exampte of performance of interaationalist duty.
The Leni.nist nationalities policyimplemented by the Co~unist Party ensured
creation and strengthening of an alliance of peoples, the advance and
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prosperity of the national Soviet socialist republ~cs. The toilers of Central
Asia marched to the victory of socialism as a siagle family, shoulder to
shouldery fighting and buildiag, and together with the entire Soviet people
are successfully advancing along the road of building co~unism.
At the end of the civil war the dekhkaas of Uzbekistan composed a song, which
went as follows:
The sun has risen above the mouatains,
The ice has melted throughout the world.
Our governmeat is with us,
The people have expelled the ba~machi.l4
The words of this popular song speak of the gloxy of the people and the in-
glorious end of the basmachi.
Elimination of the basmachi became possible thanks to the leadership of the
party Central Committee, which attached eaormous importance to preserving and
strengthening Soviet rule in Turkestaa, and subsequently in the Central Asian
~ republics as well, as a beacon of socialism for the entire East. Attesting to
this are repeated discussion in the Central Cou~ittee Politburo of matters per-
taining to the struggle against the basmachi, adoption by the highest party
body of crit~cal decisions which determined the policy of defeating the
basmachi, as well as the fact that it sent to the basmachi fronts such
prestigious party, government and military leaders as M. V. Frunze, V. V.
Kuybyshev, G. K. Ordzhonikidze, Ya. E. Rudzutak, S. I. Gusev, Sh. Z. Eliava,
S. S. Kamenev, and S. M. Budennyye.
The �inest sons of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and promineat
party-government officials led the fight against the basmachi together with
them and under their direction: N. Aytakov, K. S. Atabayev, Yuldash Akhunbabayev,
B. D. Dadabayev, I. A. Zelenslciy, Akmal' Ikramov, Turar Ryskulov, Nazir
Tyurakulov, and Fayzulla Khodzhayev. Prominent military leaders were assigaed
to the Turkestan fronts: K. A. Avksent'yevskiy, I. P. Belov, P. Ye. Dybenko,
A. I. Kork, M. K. Levandovskiy, A. I. Todorskiy, V. D. Sokolovskiy, and V. I.
Shorin. Party-political work among the troops of Turkestan was conducted by
Yu. I. Ibragimov, D. I. Manzhara, N. A. Paskutskiy, Ya. Kh. Peters, D. P.
Salikov, Kh. Sakhatmuradov; S. Tursunktndzhayev, Khamza Khakim-zade, and
Abdulla Yarmukhamedov. Courage and heroism were displayed by front commanders,
commanders of groups of forces, combined unite and units: N. A. Verevkin-
Rokhal'skiy, V. M. Ior.ov, I. S. Kutyakov, I. F. Kuts, I. I. Lamaaov, Ya. A.
Mel'kumov, Mirkamil' Mirsharapov, P. A. Pavlov, I. Ye.Petrov, M. V. Safonov,
A. P. Sokolov, N. D. Tomin, I. F. Fed'ko, Ya. D. Chaayshev, and T. T. Shapkin.
Internationalists from the countries of Europe and Asia who gained fame in-
cluded E. F. Kuzhelo, G. S. Markovich, and Ma Sanchi. The n.ames of Yakub
Kuliyev, A. A. Luchinskiy, N. G. Lyashchenko, Abdulla Nabiyev, A. Osmonbekov,
Sabir Rakhimov, Yuldash Sakhibnazarov, M. Sultanov, and Ye. Khamidov were in-
scribed in the chronicle of the heroic struggle against the basmachi.
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rvn va ~ ~~.~.~a, v.... ..a~a.�
The basmachi suffered a logical, historically dictated defeat. Victory over
- them was o� enormous significance, since the basmachi pursued the aim of
detaching the peoples of Central Asia from Soviet Russia, of overthrowing
- Soviet rule, of restoring the dominion of the khans, beks, bai, and local na-
tianal bourgeoisie, ;and of transforming Cen:ral Asia into a colony of im-
perialism. The basmachi were fighting against the socialist path of develop-
ment of Central Asia and for preservation of the old, prerevolutionary order.
Consequently the struggle of the toiler masses against the basmachi was a
str~ggle to defend the achievements of the Great October Socialist Revolution
and for triumph of the cause of socialism.
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APPENDIX
a
- Histariographic Survey
Profess:Lonal historians, party and soviet officials, military le:aders and ac-
tive participants in the civil war have devoted their research a=.d memoirs to
the history of.. the emergence of the basmachi, their roots, the war against
them, and their final defeat. Extensive literature has been amassed up to the
- present time, which requires synthesis and a historiographic appraisal, not only
to review what has been written but also to determine new horizons of research
- work, which is of great political and theoretical-cognitive significance.l
Formation af the problems examined in this book took place for the most part
within the boundaries of the generally ~ccepted peri~dization of development
of historical science of the Soviet society, since the general patterns of
development of historical science in thc USSR are characteristic of literature
on the baamachi. At the same time certain specific features of study of this
subject have also been observed, which is natural for such a unique
phenamenon ~s the class struggle ~.~hich was fought in the outlying ?.reas of
distant, backward Central Asia.
' The first period formati~n and close examination of the subject of the
emergence and defeat of the basmachi: from the beginning of the 1920's to the
end of the 1950's.
The second, contemporary period, when the most substantial success in research
has been achieved: fr~m the end of the 1950's to the present.
T'here are a~so individual stages within these periods.
' The formation and development of Saviet hist~rical science is closely linked
with the organization and improvement ~f a system of scientific-historical
centers. The heart of their activities, ae of the entire front of Soviet
social sciences inveFttgation, was the campaign for conf~.rmation of Marxism-
Leninism as the iaeological-theoretical and metkodc~l~gical foundation of
; scientific achievement.
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- FOR OFFICIAL Uj~. UyLY
In Turkestan the first scientific centers around which congregated young
cadres of historians, party-soviet and miZitary officials, who on the party's
instructions began synthesizing the experieuce of the October Revolution and
the civil war, included the Turkestan People's (from 1920 State) i1~~iversity,
~ the TurkTslK Commission to Study the History of the Revolutionary Movement,
established at the end of 1921, and the Co~issi~on on History of the Turkestan
Communist Party, formed that same year. In 1922 the Commission on History of
the October Revolution and the Turkestan Communist Party (Turkbyuro Istparta)
began functioning in 1922 under the auspices of the Turkestan Communist Party
Central Committee; this commission was subsequently transformed into the Central
- Central Asian Istpartbyuro (Department of History of the Party and the
October Revolution of the VKP(b) Central Co~ittee Sredazbyuro, ~ahich existed
up to 1930).2 Military-scientific societies were being established at the same
time. Problem topics connected with the basmachi were also being elaborated at
the Turkestan (subsequently the Central Asian) Worker-Peasant Communist
- University, which existed in 1921-1931; this institution r_ratned cadres of
scientific workers from representatives of indigenous nat~onalities. The
Society for the Study of Kirghizstan and the Historical-Regional Studies Com-
- mittee of the Turkmenistan TsIK, plus certain other scientific organizations
dealt with these same problems to a certain degree.
Study of the history of tht Soviet society and the civil war, including the
- basmachi, began during those years when the flame of struggle was still
blazing in Turkestan. The most characteristic feature of the "embryonic"
state of historiography was the fact that those who were beginning to in-
vestigate the history of the formation of the Soviet society were themselves
- actively paYticipating in the struggle for the victory of Soviet power, which
was entirely logical. This was dictated not only by the lack of professional
t~istorians and established archives, but also by the fact that the process
of accumulation of knowledge was only just beginning and that the par-
ticipants in the struggle against the basmachi were endeavoring to make the
amassed experience available to the broad masses. Therefore study of events
took on enormous political and indoctrinational significance from the very
outset.
Personal recollections were extensively utilized in many works written soon
after tiie events themselves. The first works by Marxist historians were
small articles, published chiefly in the journals ZHIZN' NATSIONAL'NOSTEY,
ti0V1~i VOSTOR (1`loscow) , KOMr1UNIST, VOYENNAYA MYSL' , VOYENNYY RABOTNIK
TL~ i:1~E~~C.L~:~. KR.ASNAYA LETOPIS' TURKESTANA (Tashkent) , and others.
A correct understanding of the history of the class struggle in Centra3~ Asia
was conflected first and foremost with publication in periodicals, including
those published in indigenous languages, of the works of V. I. Lenin, and
matitery of the Lenin legacy by historians.
E1i5tory of the struggle against the basmachi, as well as certain other topics
p~rtaining to history of the Soviet society, became an area of knowledge in
wt~ich a fierce ideological struggle developed. Party member-historians, who
w~re still in the military or doing party-soviet work, endeavored to interpret
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the course of historical events which were taking place.before their eyes.
Their attention was focused not only on combat operations on the Turkestan
Front but also on such important problems as the c~ass nature of the basmachi,
their political objectives, and the role of British imperialism in organizing
basmachi forces. At the same time those who were expressing the interests of
the national and the Russian bourgeoisie, feudal-clerical circles and the
former colonial bureaucracy were falsifying the great achievements of the
October Revolution, the nationalities policy of the Communist Party, and the
course of events of the civil war. Thus at the very dawn of existence of the
Soviet State, Soviet historical science entered into an uncompromising
struggle against the ideologues of the opposing clas~ camp. We should note
that not all Communist-historians, and not immediately, were able correctly to
assess the history of the establishment and consolidation of Soviet power in
Turkestan, the history of the Turkestan Communist Party during the civil war
years, and the history of the struggle against the basmachi.
The journals VOYENNAYA MYSL' (published by the Turkestan Front Rewoyensovet)
and ZHIZN' NATSION4L'NOSTEY were among the first to develop the topic of the
basmachi. The two years' issues of VOYENNAYA MYSL' for 1920-1921 contained
several articles, chiefly about the Fergan~ basmachi, including an article by
one of the leaders of the Turkestan Communist Party, Nazir Tyurakulov (T.
Dervish).3 While V. Kuvshinov expressed the idea that it would be useless to
seek the causes behind the emergence of the basmachi "in the conditions of
realities of the revolutionary time," M. Shklyar was one of the first to show
that the basmachi constituted a politically counterrevolutionary phenomenon
which "is nourished primarily by substantive support by the bai and wealthy
profiteers"; as a consequence of this the basmachi were waging a struggle, as
he put it, against the "peaceful villagers," who were "on the side of Soviet
rule."4
An attempt to investigate the class roots of the basmachi was undertaken by
N. Tyurakulov, whom V. V. Kuybyshev called "an outstanding person of natural
gifts, a Marxist-thinking person."5 Opposing the point of view according to
whictx the basmachi constitute "a criminal anthropological atavism," allegedly
characteristic of the inhabitants of Central Asia, N. Tyurakulov defined the
basmachi as "a counterrevolutionary petit-bourgeois element," as a product of
the economic and social conflict~ ~f a transition period, the breaking of the
old, precapitalist native society anc~. the birth of a new society.6 A wlgar-
economic approach could not, however, produce fruitful results in
elucidating the true nature of the analyzed phenomenon.
Some political writers (A. Vinogradova et al) were the first to attempt to
gain an understanding of the distribution of class forces and the social com-
position of the Khorezm basmachi.~ They state questions pertaining to the
place of individual Turkmen tribal leaders in the struggle against the basmachi
and th~ role of British imperialism in organizing the basmachi in the KPSR.
The latte~ question was specifically addressed in an article by V. A. Gurko-
Kryazhin. There was not sufficient data available in the 1920's, however,
fully to reveal the counterXevolutionary activities of imperialism pertaining
[o guiding the basmachi.
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The process of formation of this complex topic took place in a tenacious
struggle. Attempts to falsify the history of the Turkestan Communist Party
were revealed, including its struggle against the basmachi. A vivid example
of this was a book by G. Sa~f-irov.9 Written by a future active participant in
the Trotskyite-Zinov'yev opposition bloc, it contained an antiscientific analysis
, of the main questions pertaining to the history of the first years of Soviet
rule in Turkestan and distorted Communist Party policy in the Soviet East and
the history of the struggle against the basmachi. G. Safarov incorrectly
analyzed the causes behind the emergence of the basmachi and the degree of
participation by the toilers of indigenous nationalities.l~ G. Safarov's
views were uncritically accepted by N. Batmanov, G. Skalov, S. Ginzb~irg, D.
Zuyev, and A. Syrkin.ll
Errors in interpretation of the essence of the basmachi were caused both by the
- inadequate theoretical and methodological training of the first historians and
political writers and by the extremely narrow range of sources utilized in
their scholarship.
Articles by F. Khodz?~ayev and Di-Mur on the basmachi, and books by S. r~yni,
P. Alekseyenkov, N. A. Paskutskiy, and Ye. Kozlovskiy were a certain indicator
of initial successes in investigation of the history of the basmachi.12
Broadening of the territorial and chronological framework of study of this
topic was a nera element.
A book by famed Central Asian writer and historian Sadriddin Ayni gave
historiographers reason to place him among the ranks of the first historians
of the people's revolution who laid down the foundations or study of the
basmachi on the territory of the BPSR.13
In his brief article (four pages of text) Di-Mur correctly stated that the
EaS~n &~~an basmachi had f rom beginning to end deployed "under the banner of
reactionary feuda~ism, which is attempting to unite all anti-Soviet, counter-
revolutionary elements behind a broad pan-Islamic program."14 Developing this
initial thesis, Di-Mur showed khat slogans about the commonality of interests
and goals of the indigenous inhabitants of Central Asia being preached by the
explciter elite and clergy are alien to the toiler masses and "are directed
unly at a narr~-~~ stratum of the Muslim inte113gentsia and merchant class."15
Former beks, mullahs, bureaucrats, and Turkish officers were the leaders of
ttie basmachi, noted Di-Mur.
The ideas stated by Di-Mur, just as prior to that time the ideas presented
by the authors of articles in VOYENNAYA MYSL', were not further developed
initially, however. It is possible that these writings were not even known to
some historians.
P. Alekseyenla~v made an appreciable contribution ta e?sbor~tion of the history
oE the struggle against the basmachi. Studying the question of a"peasant
rebellion" in the Fergana, he succeeded in fairly comrletely showing the
t~istury of Lnif ication of the basmachi and the Russiai? kulaks for a joint
struggle against Soviet rule and in describing the heroic defense of Andizhan
and the defeat of the united kulak-basmachi forces. The author attempted to
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analyze the causes of the victory by the Red Army and the failure of the forces
of the counterrevolution. Many pages in P. Alekseyenkods book, in spite of
the fact that they were written more than SO years ago, have still retained
their scholarly significance and even today are read with great interest.
P. Alekseyenkov also deserves credit for the fact that he was the first to
show the activities of the local party organizations as well as the mobilizing
and guiding role of the uyezd-city committees in the struggle against the
basmachi.
_ While P. Alekseyenkov specifically focused on the history of the struggle
against the basmachi, Ye. Kozlovskiy showed in his book on the Red Army in
Turkestan how the toiler masses of Khorezm Uzbeks and Turkmens or-
ganized for the struggle against the bands of Dzhunaid-khan.
One common shortcoming of the first studies of the basmachi was the fact that
their authors made almost no mention of the link between the facts they were
describing and the events taking place at that time on other fronts in
Turkestan, and particularly throughout the entire Soviet Republic.
At the end of the 1920's and beginning of the 1930's development of historiograp;
of Central Asia was beneficially influenced by celebration af the lOth an-
niversary of the October Revolution and establishment in 1929, at the ini-
tiative of the VKP(b) Cenrral Committee Sredazbyuro, of the Central Asian
Association of Scientific xesearch Establishments (SAANIU),16 which in-
cluded a,farxist historian section, which laid the foundations for the
Central Asian Society of Murxist Histo;.ians (1930-1939). Subsequently his-
torical science in Central Asia developed during a period of 12 years wittr
the assistance of the party Central Gc~mmittee Sredazbyuro (from April 1922
throuah October 1934). In 1930, on ~'~e basis of the 28 May 192~ decree of
the VKP(b) Central Committee entitled "On Reorganization of Istpart," which
called for estabZishment of party-history scientific research institutes based
on local istparts, Sredazistpart was reorganized into the Central Asian
Scientific Research Institute of History of the Revolution (SANIIR). Party
influence on the development of historiography of the civil war in Turkestan
was also exerted by the journals of the Sredazbyuro, other party and sci-
entific organs ZA PARTIYU, PARTRABOTNIi~, KOI~SUNISTICHESKAYA MYSL', and
REVOLYUTSIONNYY VOSTOK. The first reviews of wArks on history of the civil
war in Turkestan appeared ~n these and other journals (including those pub-
lished in Moscow) and publications.l~ A campaign was being waged both against
Trotskyites and nationalists, who were attempting to distort the heroic
struggle with the counterrevolution, as well as against foreign falsifiers of
history, who were seeking to justify British intervention in Turkestan.18
Work was in progress to organize archives and put them in order. Of great
importance was establishment of a unified paxty archives at the Lenin Institute
in 1929, by decision of the lSth Party Congre~ss and taking into account the
recommendations of the VKP(b) Central Co~mmittee. Local party archives were
beinf; made into branches of the Central Party ~srchives. A Unified Party
Archives of the RKP(b) Central Co~mnittee Sredazbyuro was established in 1929.
Documents of party organizations (up to 1924) of Uzbekistan, Ta~ikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Kirghizia were concentrated at this facility. 9
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All these organizational measures promoted the accumulation and assimilation
of a large quantity of factual material on the basmachi, which had an effect
on deepening of investigative research on this topic. A positive role was
also played by further work in the area of study of the common problems of
the history of Soviet Turkestan and the Turkestan Communist Party, as well as
the Khorezm and Bukhara republics and their party organizations.
Development of study of the problem of the basmachi was furthered by books
by D. A. Furmanov, S. Muraveyskiy (V. Lopukhov), T. Ryskulov, and A. Mel'kiunov
(with a preface by I. Vareykis), as well as the three-volu~.e "Grazhdanskaya
voyna 1918-1921gg." [The Civil War, 1918-1921].20 At the same time some
authors, T. Ryskulov and S. Muraveyskiy in particular, did not fully com-
prehend the class nature of the basmachi. T. Ryskulov ignored the processes
of stratification in the kishlak and aul and therefore was unable to show the
class foundations of the basmachi. S. Muraveyskiy saw the roots of the
basmachi chiefly in the economic crisis and economic chaos.
The first major specialized study of the basmachi, written by P. Alekseyenkov,
was published in 1931.21 Since this work determined for a number of years
the directional thrust of research in this area, we shall examine it in greater
detail.
Having formulated the question: "Just what is the basmachestvo?" P.
Alekseyenkov proposed the following definition: basmachestvo is a"form of
struggle by capitalist elements against the socialist developmen[ of Central
Asia." He wrote that the basmachestvo was "antinational in character."22
These theses unquestioaably represented a step forward in study of this prob-
lem, but were not yet adequate for a scientific wccderstanding of it, since one
cannot agree that the basmachestvo is merely "a form of struggle by /capitalist
elements/ (our italics Auth.) against the socialist development of Central
Asia." Bourgeoi~ (Russian and local) strata of the population and representa-
tives of feudal circles also joined the basmachi. The last group were the
predominant force in the basmachi.
P. Alekseyenkov traced in a�air amount of detail the difference between the
prerevolutionary and the post-October basmachi and characterized the process
of class differentiation in the Turkestan kishlak. One can on the whole
agree with the author's following conclusions: the post-October basmachi
"essentially were in no degree whatsoever a continuat~on or development of the
pre-October basmachi"; "th~_ post-0ctober basmachestvo took from the pre-October
basmachestvo in the main only its external form, while in essence it was a
movement independent of it, had absolutely specific socioeconomic causes and
set for itself objectives which were to a significant degree different from
those of the pre-O~tober basmachestvo."23 We shall note that the suthor is in-
correct in considering the basmachi activities to be a'~ovement."
'the author, just as in his preceding work, addressed the role of the subjective
factor in formation of the basmachi. He stood firmly on his position that
E:rrors in the area of nationalities policy could not be the "ca~,se of the
emerge~~ce of the basmachi."24 In his opinion they were merely exploited by
- counterrevolutionary forces for their own purposes. Such a stat,~ment of the
question was an impor~ant contribution by the author.
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P. Alekseyenkov also sought to answer the following question: what was the
attitude of the toiling dekhkans toward the basmachi?
~ule in his preceding book ("The Rokand Autonomy"25) P. Alekseyenkov per-
suasively argued that following the October Revolution the great majority of
the dekhkans were not active supporters of the bourgeois nationalists, in his
book on the basmachi, while correctly noting that the basmachi were diversi-
fied in social structure, he unwarrantedly stated, however, that the dekhkans
supported the basmachi, constituting their principal manpower poo1.26 It is
true that the author did make the reservation that this applies only to the
"first years of the basmachi movement" and by no means signifies that all the
dekhkans of Turkestan supported the basmachi. Even with these stipulatians,
however, his conclusion does not correspond to the historical truth. One's
attention is drawn to the fact that P. Alekseyenlcov stated his conclusion
without any reference to sources.
J Thus although P. Alekseyenkov formulated a large number of questions per-
taining to the struggle against the basmachir he was unable to present an
integral scientific picture.
I. Kutyakov, one of [he milita~-y leaders in the struggle against the basmachi,
addressed the history of the defe,rt of the basmachi at the same time as
P. Alekseyenkov.27 Basing his presentation on his own personal observations
and archival documents, he endeavored to analyze theYeasons for the relative-
ly protracted basmachi operations in Khorezm. The author drew upon a large
quantity of factual material, which serves to clarify the course of combat
operations by the Red Army and military units of the KPSR. The theoretical
value of this book was diminished to a gre~t extent due to the introductory
article by its editor, N. Kakurin, in which the roots of the basmachi are in-
correctly characterized.
For a long period of time following publication of the book by P. Alekseyenkov
and I. Kutyakov, no special studies dealing with the struggle against the
basmachi were published. Individual elements were touched upon in general
works (for example, V. Bozhko, "Grazhdanskaya voyna v Sredney Azii" [The Civil
War in Central Asia], Tashkent, 1930; D. I. Manzhara, "Revolyutsionnoye
dvizheniye v Sredney Azii" [The Revolutionary Movement in Central Asia],
Tashkent, 1934).
Thus the initial stage of accumulation of knowledge on the topic is character-
ized by an intense class and ideological struggle. Questions pertaining to
study of the history of the defeat of the basmachi were defined during this
time. The problem of the social and class essence of the basmachi and the
attitude of the toiling dekhkans toward them was becoming the central focus of
scientific investigation. The topic of the role of British imperialism in
organizing basmachi forces was also specified.
Ln tf~e subsequent period, covering almost 20 years, the historiography of this
pro~lem became enriched with new topics and theoretical points.
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Further development of scholarly work on the problems of the civil war was .
promoted by a VKP(b} Central Committee decree dated 30 July 1931 on publica-
tion of a multivolume history of the civil war in the USSR. A. M. Gor'kiy,
initiator of this publication, met with members of the Bureau of the Central
Asian Association, veterans of the revolution and the civil war A. A.
Kazakov, F. I. Kolesov, and N. A. Paskutskiy for the purpose of activating
efforts in the area of collecting materials and elaboration of the history
of the October Revolution and the civil war. The newspaper KOMSOMOLETS
UZBEKISTAIvA published a telegram from A. M. Gor'kiy to the veterans of the
revolutionary struggle, in which he emphasized that "the history of the civil
war should show the selfless struggle by the toilers of the national republics
for Soviet rule, for the world proletarian revolution, and for socialism."
The telegram ended with the appeal: "Gather in a shock-work manner material
~ on the history of the civil war ia yaur republic."28
Tne job of collecting materials was directed by the VKP(b) Central Committee
Sredazbyuro, the central committees of the Co~unist parties of the union
republics, [he Central Asian Scientific Research Institute of Marxism-Leninism
under the VKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro, established in 1933 on the
_ base of S~?NIIR, and republic institutes of the history of Marxism-Leainism,
history of the revolutionary movement, and history of the party.29 Numerous
get-togethers were held with veterans of the civil war. At the same time the
press began carrying extensive criticism of great-power-chauvinist and
bourgeois-nationalist ideas on history of the party and history of national-
statehood organizational development.
VKP(b) Central Committee and USSR Sovnarkom decrees in 1934-1936 on teaching ~
civil history and the development of historical science, undertakings in the
area of planning scientific research, as well as eszablishment of departments
and faculties of history at the universities and pedagogic higher educational
institutions in the Central Asian repubiics in turn promoted the development
of scientific research work on history of th~ civil war and the defeat of the
basmachi, a component part of civil war history.
Investigators could henceforth be guided by new materials from the Leninist
ideological legacy: the XVIII, XXI and XXIV Lenin collection volumes were pub-
lished in 1931-1933, containing doeuments on the civil war. Individual d.ocu-
ments on the history of the civil war in Turkestan were being published at the
same time.30
at the end of the 1930's and beginning of the 1940's institutes of party his-
tory under the central committee~ of the Communist parties branches of
- I~IEL [CPSU Central Committee ~Iarx-Engels-Lenin InstituteJ were established
in the Central Asian republics.
A notable phenomenon in Central Asian historiography prior to the Great
Pacriotic War was the publication of two small books which, although not
specifically dealing with the basmachi, exerted considerable influence on
studies of this subject.31 K. Zhitov and V. Nepomnin provided for the first
time in the Soviet literature a synthesized sketcr of the history of colonial
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and Soviet Uzbekistan (up to the middle of the 1930's). B. Gafurov and
N. Prokhorov, revealing the reasons for the collapse of the Bukhara emirate,
endeavored to define the character of the revolution and of revolutionary
transformations in the BPSR.
New steps were taken in studying thYS problem in the 1940's and 1950's. 1~ao
books by S. P. Timoshkov and a monograph by A. Kh. Babakhodzhayev dealt with
the role of British imperialism in orgaaizing the basmachi and supplying them
with weapons and ammuniLion.32---~-~a~rs shoved for lthe first time in
Soviet historiography, utilizing a wealth of material, how British imperialism
planned its aggressive policy toward the Soviet East, what aims it pursued,
and by what methods it sought to achieve its objectives. We should note in
passing that the policy of U.S. imperialism in Central Asia and the methods
of its implementation have as yet been little studied.
Another topic which ~attracted the attention of historians was the role of the
Turkkomissiya of the VTsIK and RSFSR Sovnarkom and the RKP(b) Central Com-
mittee Turkbyuro in the struggle against the basmachi following the final
unification of Turkestan with the country's central region (Septemb~r 1919).33
As a result of formulation of this topic and utilization of new sources,
chiefly obtained from central archives, the activities of the party Central
Committee and Soviet Government and their official agencies in Turkestan in
organizing the struggle against the basmachi began to be more thoroughly in-
vestigated. A number of aspects of party-political work among toilers of in-
digenous nationalisties were studied, and a change carried out under the
guidance of M. V. Frunze and V. V. Kuybyshev in the tactics of the struggle
against the basmachi was shown. At the same time new subjects of investiga-
tion were specified: the extensive enlistment of toilers of indigenous nation-
_ alities intu the Red Army and onto the front of the struggle against the
basmachi, activities of local party and Soviet organizations in the kishlak
and aul, etc.
There also appeared books and articles in which an attempt was made, in
parallel with elaboration of the general questions of the civil war in Central
Asia, to treat more thoroughly the history of the basmachi. Kirghizia, and
in part Turkmenia and Tajikistan were particularly "fortunate" in this
regard.34
Baoks by Aziz Niallo and P. P. Nikishov present a general picture of the
struggle against the basmachi in the areas of contemporary Kirghizia. It is
to the credit of P. P. Nikishov that he traces, although within a limited
framework (the southern part of Kirghizia), the struggle against the basmachi
from ~he emergence of the first bands to liquidation of basmachi remnants in
1923. Investigations had not been conducted in the past within such a
chronological framework. At the same time these authors, just as some of
their predecessors, were unable fully to reveal the causes of the emergence of
the basmachi. P. P. I3ikishov, for example, did not see a difference between
bandits of the pre-October period and the basmachi. The bandit gangs operating
in Central Asia prior to [he October Revolution, which were frequently called
basmachi, differed radically in their class origin and political thrust from
ttie basmachi who emerged following the defQat of the "Kokand Autonomy."
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G. ~epesov undertook to shaw the class com~osition of the Khorezm basmachi.
But the author was unable to cope with this task. His book was subjected to
harsh criticism.35 The ensuing debate indicated that extreme views existed
in appraising some of the clan-tribal leaders who fought against Dzhunaid-khan.
At the same time it became clear that further scientific investigation of the
question is necessary, with the employment of archival data.
Tajik historians (M. Irkayev,R. Amanov, and I. T. Yusuf-zade) attempted to in-
vestigate on a comparatively narrow source base (chiefly on the basis of the
reminiscenc~s of participants in the civil war) the struggle against the
basmachi in the central aad southern areas of Tajikistan. They devoted partic-
ular a[tention to the liberation of Eastern Bukhara and the Matchinskoye
Beicstvo from the basmachi.36
D. Fan'yan and M. Zelinskaya, for the first time in a popular scientific
pamphlet, dealt with combat by Red Army ethnic units against largQ basmachi
bands. The authors exaggerated, however, the degree of consciousness and or-
ganization of the toilers of indigenous nationalities in the first year
following overthrow of the emir's rule in Bukhara. Books by M. Irkayev and
Yu. Nikolayev also discuss the organization of volunteer ethnic detachments.3~
Through their efforts the names of Tajik commanders who fought for the
victory of Soviet rule became knawn to scholars.
The shortcomings of the books and articles published up to the end of the
1950's were due in large measure to the fact that they had a fairly narrow
source-material base. Highly valuable materials from central and local
archives were not yet available to scholars. There was extremely little
collecting and publishing of inemoirs of active participants in the civil war,
as a result of which some important aspects of the historical process re-
mai:~ed almost totally uninvestigated.
Addi[ional factors included the negative consequences of the cult of per-
- sonality, as a result of which the decisive role ef the masses was not adequate-
ly revealed, particularly the role of toilers of the indigenous nationalities,
in the struggle against the interventionists, White Guard and basmachi; the
role of V. I. Lenin as organizer and leader of victories in the civil war was
not investigated, and there was little analysis of the activities of local
partv and soviet organizations in the area of leading the toiler masses. The
names oi n;any party, soviet and military officials who played an important
rol~ in the struggle against the basmachi received almoet no mention in these
works.
Tne process of overcoming these and other deficiencies took place in the
productive atmosphere generated following the resolutions of the 20th CPSU
Congress, in the course of assimilating new sources which became available to
scholars after the congress, and as a result of growth in cadres of historians
o~l Central Asia. Of particular importance were new publications of the Lenin-
ist ideological-theoretical legacy ("Voyennaya perepiska" [Military Cor-
respondencej the 3Eth volume of the "Leninskiy Sbornik" [Lenin CollectionJ), and
repu~iication of the records of proceedings of the 8th, 9th, and lOth RKP(b)
congresses. The results of the activities of the institutes of history of the
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union-republic Academies of Sciences and bran_hes of the CPSU Central Committee
Institute of Marxism-Leninism, which had become stronger and were engaged in
_ productive work, gradually had an effect. The latter published collected
volumes of inemoirs and reminiscence of participants in the October Revolution
and the civil war in Central Asia.3~ The CPSU Ceatral Committee Institute of
Marxism-Leninism prepared and published in 196?~-1961 a three-volume collec-
tion of documents entitled "Iz istoYii grazhdanskoq voqny v SSSR" [From the
History of the Civil ~Tar in the USSR]. Som~ of the documents are connected
with the basmachi. The introductions piefacirg each of the volumes were o~
' independent scholarly significance.
The most important feature of development of historical science in Central
Asia at the end of the 1950's was the publicatioa of synthesizing w~orks on
the history of the Central Asian republics, which contain chapters on the
civil war,39 in which questions pertaining to the struggle against the
basmachi are presented in a fair amount of detail. The role of the masses,
especially the toilers of indigenous nationalities, in the events taking place

! in that time is investigated in these studies more extensively than in
preceding works, and an attempt is made to show the activities of the party
Central Co~ittee, headed by V. I. Lenin, pertaining to guiding the local
party organizations and their campaign to defeat the enemy in the Central
Asian republics. The authors endeavored to investigate the civil war in
Turkestan, including the defeat of the basmachi as a component and integral
part of the civil ~ar throughout the country. They stated, although they
did not fully resolve it, the question of the factors which ensured victory
over the united forces of the interventionists, White Guard and basmachi in
the extraordinarily difficult conditioiis prevailing during the civil war
years in Turkestan. Soviet economic and cultural construction are shown fair-
ly completely. The activities of the Turkestan Communist Party in mobilizing
the masses for the struggle against tlie basmachi are reflected. These studies
present for the first time a Marxist definition of the basmachi as an "ex-
pression of the class struggle of the bai and reactionary Muslims against
Soviet rule."40 A shortcoming of these studies was the fact that they took
little account of objective economic processes and the correlation of class
forces at the various stages of the civil war in Central Asia.
In addition to summarizing works on the history of the Soviet society, the
problem topics pertaining to the struggle against the basmachi were also
reflected in special studies.41
Tajik historians M. Irkayev, Yu. Nikolayev, and Ya. Sharapov, in connection
with the fact that the basmachi engaged in their anti-Soviet activities in
Eastern Bukhara following the victorious people's revolution in Bukhara at
the end of 1920, concluded the necessity of changing the chronological frame-
work of the civil war period for the territory of their republic. They hold
that the war began here in 1921 and continued up to and including 1926, when
the basmachi were defeated. A nrominent place i.n their book is given to an
investigation of the methods of fighting the basmachi in conditions where the
process of rebuilding the economy was taking place throughout the country.
The authors failed, however, to show the struggle against the basmachi in the
northern areas of Tajikistan and in the Pamirs.42
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tux urri~~wL ~~c ~~~L~
Books by Sh. Tashliyev and M. Yazykova, as well as a monograph by S. N.
Pokrovskiy help gain an understanding of the specific conditions of the
struggle against the basmachi in ~url~enia, as well r; to gain an understanding
of the mobilizing role of local party organizations.43
K. Malyshev endeavored to presenc a ge,neral picture of the defeat of r.he
basmachi in the southern part uf Kirghizia. He demonstrated that the areas
of present-day Kirghizia and adjacent areas of Turkestan were targets of in-
terest on the part of the British and American imperialists. K. Malyshev's -
thesis about a high degree of social di!~ferentiation in the kisinlak and the
aul is debatable. Drawing attention to only one aspect of this process
the gradual land dispossession of the poor, he failed to consider another
factor; the strong dependence of the dekhkan on the mullahs, the bai, the
manaps, clan and tribal vestiges, etc, mentioned by V. I. Lenin at the 8t:?
Congress of the RKP(b) when discus~ing the party's draft program.
A popular scientific pamphlet by A. Kokanbayev discusses the struggle against
the basmachi in the Fergana Valley. This, as well as the basmachi in
Samarkandskaya Oblast (chiefly on the territory of the present Tajik SSR),
are discussed in a pamphlet by T. Kh. Kel'diyev. A. Kokanbayev specifies the
vanguard role of the worker class of the FErgana and notes its staunchness and
devotion to Soviet rule.
The scholarly level of these pamphlets is diminished to a great extent by the
confused presentation of the question of the social nature and cause~ of
emergence of the basmachi. A. Kokanbayev, for example, correctly stating that
the local exploiters were the class support of the basmachi, subsequently in-
clines to the idea that the roots of the basmachi should be sought in the
colonial policy of Russian czarism in Turkestan. This naturally is incorrect.
Frequently A. Kokanbayev and T. Kh. Kel'diyev forget to link a given stage in
the defeat of the basmachi with the general Turkestan and general Russian
situation, in particular the situation on the civil war fronts.
The role of the Co~aunists in Turkestan, their political and organizational
work during the civil war years, including on the Fergana Front, are discussed
in a monograph by M. Kh. Nazarov.44
~ew data on the struggle against the basmachi at the final stage of their
eaist~nce are contained in a book which discusses the glorious past of the
troops of the Turkestan ~tilitary District.45 Meriting attention is an en
deavor to determine and make available to scholars the names of commanders of
units and combined units who through their skill, experience and valor
contributed to the victorious conclusion of the war against the basmachi. A
~.~orough s[udy of source materials and review of obsolete views and opinions
~nabled G. Nepesov to advance signific~ntly investigation of the problem of
[E~e struggle against the basmachi on the territory of Khorezm. The
author presents interesting material on the contribution of the toilers of
many of our country's nationalities toward the defeat of the basmachi. The
question of dating the emergence of the basmachi on the territory of Khorezm,
tiowever, remains controversia1.46
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llepartures from actiieved positions were also noted alongside substantial
achievements in study of the problem of the basmachi~ This was indica:ed,in
particular, by a book by Sh. A. Shamagdiyev.4~ The author was endeavoring to
~ show more fully the active participation of the toilers of indigenous na-
tionalities under the guidance of local party organizations in the struggle
against basmachi bands. He achieved some success in this as well. But at
the same time he "ignores all standards and demands wh~~ch are generally
accepted in scientific research work in the field oi ~~istory. He... adjusts
and adds to cited sources and documents, ascribes to party and soviet
agencies decisions which they never made, cites sen�3tional 'facts' and new
dates of events while making no reference whatsoever ;.o sources, and con-
fuses names, positions, and party affiliation of some individuals."48
Thus in the first period, in spite of the fact that part of this period falls
within a time when, as a result of the operation of subjective factors, there
was limited source material availability, as well as the operation of certain
adverse f actors in scholarly activity, considerable successes were achieved in
investigation of the history of the defeat of the basmachi.
A number of monographs and books were published on history of Soviet society
in the Central Asian republics, which contained special chapters on the
basmachi in which the authors discussed from a scientific party position
fundamental questions pertaining to history of the struggle against the
basmachi which had previously not been investigated or had not been examined
' in full measure (for example, on the role of the ~aasses in achieving victory
in the civil war and on the social nature of the basmachi). The following
conclusion was a major achievement of historiography: the basmachi represent
one of the forms of the class struggle in the era of dictatorstiip of the
proletariat.
Investigations published after the end of the 1950's, in spite of certain
~ebatable and even erroneous theses, determined a qualitatively new stage in
the development of historiography of this topic.
In the contemporary period new successes have been achieved in investigation
cf history of the struggle against the basmachi. They were dictated by such
an objective factor as the victory of developed socialism in the USSR as well
as by the influence of subjective factors: publication of new materials from
- the Leninist ideological legacy, theoretica] and methodological instructions
of the 22d-24th CPSU Congresses and party Central Committee documents, and
by growth in the professional expertise and maturity of historians.
Ttie appearance of specific-topic collected volumes containing writings of
Lenin pertaining to the history of Central Asia acquired particular importance
fur Central AS'13I1 historiography: "V. I. Lenin o Sredney Azii i Uzbekistane"
[V. I. Lenin on Central Asia and Uzbekistan] (Tashkent, 1957) and "V. I. Lenin
o Sredney Azii i Kazakhstane" [V. I. Lenin on Central Asia and Kazakhstan]
(Tashken[, 1960). Other titles published include "Rezolyutsii i postanovleniya
s"yezdov Kommunisticheskoy partii Turkestana (1918-1924)" [Resolutions and
Decrees of Congresses of the Communist Party of Turkestan (1918-1924)J
(Tashkent, 1958), "Pis'ma trudyashchikhsya V. I. Leninu (1917-1924 gg.)"
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[Letters from Toilers to V. I. Lenin (1917-1924)] (Tashkent, 1964), and
"Trudyashchiyesya Turl~enistana V. I. Leninu" jThe Toilers of Turkmenistan to
V. I. Lenin] (AsY~khabad, 1960).
The Complete Collection of Writings of V. I. Lenin and the Biographical
Chronicle of V. I. Lenin expanded the theoretical and source-material arsenal
of Central Asian bocial scientists.
Characteristic features of the present stage of investigation of the history
of the defeat of the basmachi include detailed specialized study of the
topic, formulation of new questions, and utilization of new sources.
By the beginning of the 1960's books and articles were appearing on problems
which had not been raised in p?-eviously published works. This applies first
and foremost to questions pertaining to the international unity of toilers in
the struggle against the basmachi, as well as certain theoretical aspects of
the role of British imperi.alism in stirring up the basmachi.
I.S. Sologubov, A. M. Matveyev, Ya. M. Seryy, and G. B. Nikol'skaya49
demonstrated for the first time in Central Asian historio~,raphy how during the
difficult years of civil war Czechs, Slovaks, flungarians, .~ustrians, Germans,
Chinese, Indians, Persians and others residing in Central Asia manifested a
feeling of proletarian solidarity upon being given their frc~edom by Soviet
power: with weapon in hand, fighting shoulder ~o shoulder with Russians,
Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tajiks, Turkmens, Kirghiz and representatives of other
peoples, they defended the achivements of the Great October Revolution, taking
part in defeating the basmachi forces.
The role of internationai, particularly British imperialism in the unleashing
and spread of civil war in Central Asia, in organizing and guiding the basmachi
was investigated by A. Kh. Babakhodzhayev.s~ Of particular interest is a
second book, in which the author, on the basis of additional sources, provides
a;iew understanding of a n~unber of fundamental aspects of the foreign policy of
British imperialism.
The cact [hat A. Kh. Babakhodzhayev examines the policies of Briti~:h imper.ial-
ism in Central Asia, Afghanistan and Iran from a single, consistent point of
view is praiseworthy. Such a statement of the question made it possible to
elucidate two most important aspects of the subject: the significance of the
defeat of British intervention and subsequently the basmachi as well in Central
Asia for development of the liberation movement ir, Afghanistan and Iran; the
interrelationship between the ~truggle of the peoples in Centra~ Asia and the
peoples of the Middle East against a common foe. This aspect, as was
persuasively demonstrated by A. Kh. Babakhodzhayev, is aot in conflict with the
facc that the toilers of Central Asia, under the guidance of the Communist
Party, were fighting for socialism, while the peoples of the Middle East were
wa~ing a national liberation struggle.
Kh. Babakhodzhayev extensively utilized party documents, which enabled him
to give a correct political assessment of British policy ai.ms and methods fol-
luwing the victorious conclusion of the civil war in Central Russia. He showed
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' how, having failed with their undisguised intervention, the British i.mperial-
ists shifted ta organization of anti-Soviet conspiracies and insurgencies, to
expanding the basmachi, inciting neighboring countries to anti-Soviet aggres-
sion, and utilizing economic chaos with the aim of penetration by British
capital and restoration of capitalism in our country.
The history of the struggle against the basmachi also found ref lection in the
- five-volume "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v SSSP." [History of the Civil War in
the USSRJ. While the basmachi are only mentioned in the third volume, in the
fourth and especially in the fifth volumesl an attempt is made in the sections
entitled "Decisive Victories of the Red Army Over the United Forces of the
Entente and Domestic Counterrevolution (March 1919-February 1920)" and "The
End of Foreign Military Intervention and Civil War in the USSR. Liquidation of
the Last Focal Areas of Counterrevolution (February 1920-1922)" to reflect some
~ of the most impor~ant events in the history of the struggle against the
b3smachi. The significance of these synthesizing works lies not only in the
factual mat~rial presented but also in a new methodological approach to study
of the history of the civil war, in the endeavor on the part of their authors
to overcome the errors and deficiencies characterizing works written prior to
the 20th CPSU Congress, as well as the extensive preser~tation of the names of
those military leaders and political workers who had not been mentioned
previously in the literature. This could not help but t~ave an effect on sub-
sequent study of the history of the struggle against t}~e basmachi.
A detailed investigation of the history of the basmachi was manifested in
- study of the struggle against them within the framework of the contemporary
Central Asian republics. But the following questions arise: Is it correct for
the struggle against the basmachi within the geographic framework of the con-
temporary Central Asian Soviet republics which were formed in the 1920's to
become the subject of investigation? Is this not an aggravation of the well-
known deficiencies of historiography of the civil war in Central Asia of the
preceding period? M. Irkayev used the example of the Tajik SSR to demonstrate
the possibility of independent investigation of the history of thQ basmachi
within the boundaries of regions which were not independent governmental
entities at the time of the struggle against the basmachi.S2
M. Irkayev rejected the previously adopted chronological framework of the
civil war in the central and southern areas of Tajikistan (1921-1924)53 and
proposed a different dating: 1921-1926. He divided the entire period of the
war into three stages: the first (1921 to the first half of 1923) emergence
of and large-scale basmachi activities; the second (latter half of 1923 to the
end of 1924) loss of power by the basmachi and the changing of basmachi ac-
tivities into banditry; the third (1925-first half of 1926) end of the
civil war in Tajikistan and liquidation of remnants of the basmachi. M. ~
Irkayev points out that at all stages the aims of the basmachi remained un-
changeci, wt~ile the forms of the struggle and its scope changed.54
The periodization advanced and substantiated by the author was in its basic
~ features approved by Tajikistan's schoiars.
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An important place in M. Irkayev's book is devoted to the internal and external
circumstances of the emergence of the basmachi, a description of their social
~ base, and the reasons for a significant intensification of basmachi activities
at a moment when restoration of the economy had begun throughout the country.
The author correctly states that the feudal lords, the clergy, the bureaucracy,
the bai, and emerging bourgeo is elements constituted the social base of the
basmachi.55 Examining the degree of participation of the toiler population in
the basmachi movement, he reaches the general conclusion that "in the initial
period basmachi activities occurred on a significant scale on the territory of
Tajikistan due tc~ the backward and deceived segment of the population. ~6 Par-
ticipation by the toiler masses in the basmachi bands is also traced in this
book at other stages. The author does not hold, however, that all toilers
of indigenous nationalities sided with the basmachi. M. Irkayev writes that
"many dekhkans, from the very first days of the revolution, sided with them
(the new authorities Auth.) and ac.tively struggled for establistement and
strengthening of the power of the Soviets," and that "at the beginning of the
struggle for Soviet rule a substantial segment of the toiling dekhkans taok
a w a it-and-see position, and then quite soon, recognizing the facts of the
revolution and the Soviet system, also began supporting the policy of the So-
viet authorities."57
- M. Irkayev made new party docu~ents available to scholars for the first time,
particularly decisions of the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo pertaining to
the struggle against the basmachi, and a quantity of factual data obtained from
Centiral Asian and central archives.
The civil war on the territory of Soviet Tajikis~[an is also discussed in a
number of other works. Important among these is a monograph by G. Kh.
Khaydarov.58 The author attempted to establish the time of activities by
basmachi bands in the Matcha area5g and combat against them by Red Army
forces.
4lhile M, Irkayev succeeded in making a thorough study of history of the
' struggle against the basmachi on the territory of this republic, which in the
past had belonged to various political entities or administrative units,
S. B. Zhantuarov, the author of a book dealing with the civil war in
Kirghizia,60 did not succeed in this endeavor, and here is why. The following
should definitely be a condition for such an approach: the existence of a
broad general background of class struggle; an investigation of the dialectical
interrelationship of the struggle in different are3s within the region, as well
as the ability objectively to separate the most important from the secondary.
But there is noticeable in S. B. Zhantuarov's book a separation of the events
in Kirghizia from the overall events in Turkestan, of which they were a part,
not to mention operations on the fronts of the entire Soviet republic.
The successes of historiography of the civil war in Central Asia and
Kazakhstan, the amassing of factual material, resolution of a number of
fundamental problems, as well as growth of cadres of historians grouped around
branches of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism atnd history institutes of the
Academies of Sciences of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan promoted
activation of research on the history of party organizations. Publications
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included a~nograph on the history of Turkestan 61 books on the history of in-
dividual republics and their Communist parties,6~, as well as other works on
party history.63
The most important achievements of the authors of thes~e works include investiga-
tion of the struggle against the basmachi as an integral component part of the
struggle against the entire Central Asian counterrevolution, as well as
- examination of the ~istory of the Leninist resolution of the nationalities
question in Turkestan a,~d implementation of a policy of 2nlisting the masses
to defend the republic, which ensured a solid military-political alliance of
- workers and peasants of all the nationa~ities of Central Asia.
The above-mentioned books had overcome a number of deficiencies and short-
comings characteristic of previous publications and stated substantiated "
opinions on certain questions which previously had been considered debatable
or unresolved. In "History of the Kazakh SSR," for example, the author
~emonstrates more solidly, utilizing some new data, the specific features of
the civil war in Kazakhstan and the causes of the victory by the people over
counterrevolutionary forces, and more fully reveals the essence of
- the policy of War Communism. The events on the Semirech'ye Front are more
closaly linked with the events on the ather Turkestan fronts. Certain factual
Prrors occurring in the previous ed ition were also corrected.
In "History of Kirghizia" one can consider as successful the author's
elaboration of questions pertaining to implementation of the policy of War
Communism on the territory of contemporary Kirghizstan and on the combat
operations of local units.
"History of the Tajik People" synthesizes civil war historiographic data on
_ the various areas contained within today's boundaries of the Tajik SSR;
_ Northern Tajikistan and the Pamirs, which were previously a part of the
Turkestan ASSR; Central and Southern Tajikistan, which up to 1920 were under
the authority of the emir of Bukhara. Revelation of some of the specific
features of the class struggle during the first years of Soviet rule is one
of the positive elements of this book. A no less important distinctive
feature of this book is the fact that it closely ties in local events with
events of a determining nature which were taking place in Tashkent, the
central city of Central Asia. The authors discussed the defeat of the basmachi
in Eastern Bukhara in detail, partially on the basis of new material. The
authors sought to reveal the ~ole of the Tajik toilers in defeating the forces
of the couterrevolution and foreign imperialists. Confirmation was presented
for the view that the c~vil war in Eastern Bukhara continued up to mid-1926.
Shortcou~ings of the first edition of the "History of the Taj ik People" in-
cluded the descriptive character of many processes and statement of facts in
the absence of a thorough analysis of the dietribution of class forces and the
causes which ensured victory in the civil war.64
In "History of the Uzbek SSR" (Volume III, Chapter 2), published at the end
of the 1960's, the authors consolidate successes achieved by that time in
studyirfg the history of the defeat of the basmachi. They present nnt only a
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formulation of the basmachi as an expression of the class struggle, a statement
which has become generally accepted, but also make a successful attempt to
elucidate additional reasons for participation by a portion of the dekhkan
toilers in the basmachi bands. Ttie course of progress of the civil war on the
territory of Uzbekistan, including the struggle against the basmachi, is
viewed as a part of the general military offensive against Soviet Russia by
domestic and international reactionaries.65
Historical sketches on local party organizations devote considerable attention,
alongside problems of a party-organizational nature and matters of party-
organizational development, to party activities in the area of mobilizing
the toiler~ to defeat the enemy. The value of these publications lies in the
fact that they cite most important party documents pertaining to the struggle
ngainst the basmachi. They also present for the first time the names of
many active participants in defeating the basmachi. These sketches laid the
groundwork for producing a single synthesizing wo:.k on the history of the
Central Asian party organizations.
Subsequent successes in studying the history of the civil war in Central As~a, in
particular history of the basmachi, as well as discussion of untreated and
debatable questions were i.mpossible wi~hout new documents and sources. In
connection with this, substantial publishing activities were undertaken begin-
ning in the 1960's, activities which far from exhausted all possibilities
existing in this regard. i
The institutes of history of the Academies of Sciences of the Central Asian ~'ii
republics and Kazakhstan, the Kazakh and Kirghiz branches of the CPSU Central
Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, together with the archives ad-
ministrations of the Councils of Ministers and Cent~ral State Archives of the
Kazakh, Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen, and Kirghiz SSRs, published two volumes of
documents on the civil war in Central Asia and Kazakhstan.66 The compilers
discovered a great many new documents and materials in archives in Moscow,
Tashkent, Ashkhabad, Alma-Ata, Frunze, Dushanbe, Orenburg, Astrakhan', and
other cities. A total of 1158 documents were published, some of which were
being made available to the scholarly community for the f irst time; a number
- of these documents were connected with the basmachi. Of great value is the
25 December 1918 Workers' and Peasants' D~fense Council decree calling for a
"more aggressive offensive against Orenburg" with the objective of breaking
Turkestan out of encirclement and linkiug it up with the country's central
region (Volume I, page 279), as well as a direct-wire conversation between
M. V. Frunze and I. P. Belov on 2 October 19Z9 (Volume II, pages 261-263).
These materials shed additional light on the concern of V. I. Lenin, the party
and Soviet State for the peoples of Central Asia during these peoples' dif-
ficult days of existence and ~truggle. A letter from Denikin to British
General Malleson (Volume I, page 363), published for the first time, recon-
firms the conclusion of Soviet historiography that the civil war in Central
Asia and Kazakhstan was a component part of the struggle throughout our
country and reveals a n~w aspect of the role of British imperialism in anti-
Soviet intervention in Turkestan. Aiso attesting to this is a report by
Dzhunkovskiy (one of the leaders of the "Turkestan A lliance for the S truggle
- Against Bolshevism") to Denikin (Volume I, page 341) and the latter's reply
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(Volume I, pp 86-87), as well as a report oa links between the basmachi and
British imperialism (Volume II, pp 415-416).
The history of the struggle against the basmachi in 1918-1923 occupies an im-
portant place in the two-volume "History of ths Civil War in Uzbekistan."67
In this publication the authors endeavor, utilizing preceding advances in
historiography, to resolve a number of theoretical and methodological problems
(periodizati~n of the civil war in Central Asia, patterns and specific
features of ~the policy of War Communism and NEP in Turkestan, etc). The
historiographic introduction presented in the first volume is of definite in-
terest. Its polemical keenness shows the eacistence of debatable and un-
resolved problems in the topic area of investigation.
This two-volume study presents new factual material on the struggle against
the basmachi, especially on the territory of the Bukhara and Khorezm People's
republics and in Kara-Kalpakia. One important virtue of this work is the
profound analysis of the economic and political life of the peoples of the
Turkestan Republic, the Bukhara and Khorezm people's republics, without which
it is impossible to understand the history of the emergence and collapse of
the basmachi. The authors reveal in greater detail than had been done in the p~st
the role of party nationalities policy in briaging the basmachi to an end in
the Fergana and show the economic, food supply and cultural work of party
and governmental agencies.
Published in this work for the first time are basic documents of the RKP(b)
Central Committee and party Central Committee Sredazbyuro in 1921-1922 pertain-
ing to the struggle against the basmachi, and their mobilizing and urganizing
role in defeating the enemy i s shown; the materials of a number of local
party and soviet agencies are analyzed.
In connection with the fact that th~s study is to a certain degree a sum-
marizing work on the problem of the basmachi, we shall examine it in greater
detail.
One of the principal tasks assigned the authors was /"to reveal the class
essence of the basmachi, exgosing the true instigators and leaders of the
counterrevolutionary mavement. /68 This statement of the topic of investiga-
tion would be entirely legitimate if no attempts had been made in this area
prior to that time. In the introduction to the first volume, however, the
au~hors drew attention to the fact that an extensive literature existed, which
has made firm attempts to define the class essence of the basmachi and to
reveal the actual instigators and organizers. We have already discussed in
this survey the fairly successful resolution of these questions.
Also incorrect, as has already been noted, is the stat~ment that the basmachi
constitute a "movement."
One of the major methodological problems of historiography is the problem of
- periodization of the struggle against the baemachi. The authors correctly
bold the view that the civil war in Uzbekistan, fncluding the basmachi, "is
not an isolated phenomenon but a component part of the struggle of all the
people, on a scale of the entire Soviet State."69 This by no means
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signifies, however, that the ~,~neral laws and patterns did not have specific
manifestations in the concrete historical conditions of sucl
esrtosperiodiza-
Fergana, Bukhara, Khiva, and Kara-Kalpakia. This also app
tion. The end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919 ars considered to be the time
of intensification of the civil war in Turkestan. What ccnfirmation is there
for this? The fact that "a plan was drawn up for a joint offensive a ainst
kestan b British troops, White Guard, and basmachi bands."~~ As we
Soviet Tur Y
know, however, this plan was a total failure. The authors also state t a
"at the end of 1918 the civeral ffensiveaon TashkentntenSuchepreparationseweren
with preparations for a gen
indeed being made at that time.
In actual fact, however, intensification of the civil war in Tt?rkestan was
taking place in the spring and summer of 1919. Thie was due to the following
circumstances: in April 1919 Turkestan, following a brief linku~ with the
country's central region via Orenburg, once again found itself encircled by the
enemy, a fact which counterrevolutionary forces on almost all the Turkestan
fronts utilized for an offensive against Soviet rule. The volume`s authors
themselves acknowledged this.1~Tho~ection with Kolchak'sVOffensive.terrevolu-
tionary forces in Turkestan
The authors hold to debatable views on the chronological framework of the con-
cluding stage of the struggle against the basmachi. They claim that the end
of the civil war in Turkestan and, consequently, the end~of the basmachi took
place in 1920, while "liquidation of remnants buttrather
politicalkandaecoin
1921-1923, that in thes.e years "not military, le against remnants of
nomic measures advanced to the forefront in the strugg
the basmachi."71 Standing in conflict with thie view is the actual state of
affairs in the Fergana Valley, and even more so in the Bukhara and Khorezm
People's Saviet Republics,where a stubborn and bloody civil war was in
progress in 1921-1923. This did not mean that the process of rebuilding the ec:on-
omy was not taking place and the New Economic Policy was not being implemented in
a number of areas of Central Asia beginning in 1921. Political and economic
me~sures were taking on increasing significance, but they cauld not yet be
carried out at full effort without resolving the military question.
This was indicated in a number of party documents. The RKP(b) Central Com-
mittee, for example, emphasized in a circular dated 11 January 19272that the
basmachi we~xe "an important factor in the economic disintegration. On
21 A~gust 1922 the RKP(b) Central Committee, in directives to the Central ~om-
mittee Sredazbyuro, the Turkestan Communist Party Central Committin, out the
Bukhara Communist Party Central Committee, stated the task of wip' $
basmachi "as one of the most im ortant," without which restoration of the
economy could not be achieved.~~ The 7th Regional Conference of the Turkestan
Communist Party (October 1922) stated in its resolution on the report of
Ya. E. Rudzutak: "In addition to~wiping out the basmac~~~ ~isrresoluti ntalso
the formidable task of Turkestan s economic recovery. ~ese
noted the role of British ~Per~ni~o~ncorrectlytassesaing the5actual state
documents provide us with a bea g
of affairs in Central Asia.
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The authors of this book themselves state repeatedly the "protracted nature of
the civil war in Uzbekistan,"76 and therefore almost half of the material in
the second volume deals with events which took place in 1921-1923.
W~rks dealing with individual major problems of the history of Central Asia of
the Soviet period help gain a deeper understanding of the objective and sub-
jective reasons for the defeat of the basmachi, thE mobilizing and organizing
role of the party in the struggle against counter~evolutionary forces. Of
particular importance among them are works on history of Soviet organizational
development during the civil war years, and particularly dealing with the role
of the Proletarian Tashkent Soviet in the struggle against the basmachi, as
well as new synthesizing studies on history of the party. Several
monog~aphs deal with the soviets.~~
R. A. Nurullin drew attention to the activities of the soviets pertaining to
enlisting dekhkaas into the Red Army and on disintegration of the basmachi
bands. The role of the Tashkent proletariat in forming units and detachments
sent to the basmachi fronts is given extensive treatment in books by G.
Rashidov and T. Pulatov.
An important event in the ideological-political affairs of the Central Asian
republics was publication of "History of Communist Organizations of Central
Asi~,"78 produced by a team of leading party historians of the Central Asian
and Kazakh branches of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-
Leninism. The significance of this work is determined not only by the fact
- that it cont%~ins chapters, written on a high theoYetical level, which present
the histo*y of party directi.on of the struggle agai:ist the basmachi, but also
and chiefly by the fact that a number of theoretical-methodological problems
are examined in it which are of great importance for an understanding of the
mechanism and specific features of the defeat of the counterrevolution in
Central Asia. These include the following: the international mission of the
Russian revolutionary proletariat the guiding force in the campaign to
liberate the toilers of indigenous nationalities from social and ethnic
. oppression; the character and specific features of the military-political
alliance of workers and peasante and its role in the victory over the basmachi;
the character and aims of the popular revolutions in Bukhara and Khiva and the
process of their gradual development into socialist revolutions; the
- mechanisms of the noncapitalist path of development of the peoples of Central
Asia; the process of consolidation of Bolshevik organizations in conditions of
a former outlying colonial Yegion; the positi.on of the Communist Party
vis-a-vis the various classes, political parties and organizations operating
in Central Asia during the f irst years of Soviet rule.
This work introduces a new element into one's snderstanding of the essence
of the basmachi. In the chapter ent~ttled "The Turkestan Communist Party in
~ the Period of Foreign Military Intervention and Civil War," the authors
present, on the basis of previous scholarly works and the employment of new
material, an objective reply to questions about the social-class nature of the
basmachi and the reasons for their greatest development namely in the Fergana
Valley. Tt states, in particular: "The basmachi represented an armed form of
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- struggle by the overthrown local exploiter classes against the dictatorship of
the proletariat. 79 It further states: "It would not have been particularly
difficult to put down the basmachi if only the exploiter elite and declasse
elements had participa~ed. The situation was in fact much more complicated,
for many toiliag de~chkans joined basmachi bands."$~ This chapter provides
an explanation of the reasons why a portion of the toiling dekhkans joined the
basmachi and indicates the revolutionary forces which came to the defense of
Soviet rule. Precisely this formulation of the problem made it possibl~.e cor-
rectly to analyze the heroic struggle against the basmachi.
The struggle against the basmachi in the BPSR and KPSR is presented in less
detail in "History of Communist Organizations of Central Asia."
This synthesizing work on the history of party organizations of Central Asia
- once again conf irmed that the main thrust of subsequent research on problems
of party history as well as on specific topics pertaining to history of the
civil war lies in the direction o� further thmrough study of the Lenin
ideological-theoretical legacy, Mancist-Leninist methodology, and a Leninist
analysis of factual material.
New themes appeared in historiography in the latter half of the 1960's and in
the 1970's. These include first and foremost studies grouped under the title
"Lenin and the Peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan."81 They show the
essence of the Leninist scientific conception of the history of the peoples
~ of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and disclose the scientific laboratory of its
formation. Particular attention is devoted to Leninist ideas on the nationali-
ties question and their signYficance for the victory over the united forces
of the interventior.ists, White Guard, and the basmachi. At the ~ame time
there remains a great deal to be done in order to achieve further detailed
study of the Leninist ideological-theoretical legacy and methodology of a
� Leninist analysis of factual material. It is also necessary to make
available to the scholarly community new materials from the complete works
of V. I. Lenin, and especially from the biographical chronicle of V. I. Lenin,
including on the history of the class struggle in Central Asia.
Another topic which was also of great methodological significance for studying
the struggle against the basmachi is that of the activities of the VKp(b)
Central Committee Sredazbyuro. Solid, substantial monographs were written
by V. M. Ustinov, S. Nazarov, M. F. Anderson, K. Khasanov, A. T. Azizkhanov,
and A. A. Roslyakov; Ya. M. Seryy published a number of articles.82
These works contain sections or chapter subdivisions with material on party
guidance of the struggle against the basmachi. A. A. Roslyakov holds that
at the first stage of the history of the Sredazbyuro (1922-1924), its main
task was "crushing of the armed r83istance of the feudal-ba~ counterrevolution,
that is, defeat of the t~~~:aachi. He also endeavored to ive a definition
of the social nature of the basmachi at the concluding stage of their
existence. To quote the author, they constituted "a feudal-nationa184t
counterrevolution," "an undisguised aroned feudal counterrevolution. In
our opinion this definition can apply (and even then not fully) only to cer-
tain areas (EaQtern Bukhara, certain areas of Turl~enia). One can hardly
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discount the bai and the emerging national bourgeoisie, which played a decisive
role, together with f eudal cir~les, in promoting the basmachi. The auttior's
theses on the reasons for the participation of certain dekhkan groups in
basmachi forces are not entirely accurate.ss
The third topic is connected ~ith showing the nationalities policy of the
Gommunist Party and its implementation by local party organizations.86 In
monographs by Kh. T. Tursunov, K. A. Gafurova, N. Rakhmanov and other in-
vestigators, the authors show how the party, due zo its internationalist
policy, united peoples for the struggle against +the enemy. K. A. Ginur~he
_ presented new material on the role of British imperialism in supply g
basmachi with arms and on giving them material assistance.
Leninist principles of party nationalities policy were also embodied in a
practical manner in. military organizational development in Central Asia. In-
- vestigators could not help but note this, as a result of which special
studies by V. M. Ku~z'mina, K. Amanzholov, 0. Khudoyberdiyev and others on
Red Army national units and their participation in defeating the counterrevolu-
tion were published.
The fourth topic was history of the popular revolutions in Bukhara and Khiva.
Substantial monographs were written (by A. I. Ishanov, K. Mukhamedberdyyev,
B. I. Iskanderov, and Kh. Inoyatov), and collected volumes of documents and
the proceedings of j ubilee scientific sessions were published.87 It was es-
tablished as a result of debates and exchange of views that the revolutions in
Bukhara and Khiva were popular-democratic, antifeudal and antiimperialist.
They were a consequence of the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolu-
tion and a continuation of this revolution. These conclusions are of great
significance for a correct assessment of the basmachi on the territory of the
BPSR and KPSR.
At the end of the 1960's and in the 1970's the history of the struggle against
the basmachi was reflected in two books on the civil war in Turkestan by
M. Kh. Nazarov and Sh. T. Tashliyev and in a monograph on the period of
_ "War Communism" by R. A. Nurullin.8~ These works, written at a party-history
level, contain a wealth of material on the struggle against the basmachi.
M. Kh. Nazarov in particular demonstrated in greater detail than his
predecessors the role of the Com~unist Party and its political and organiza-
tional work in defeating the basmachi in the Fergana Valley in 1918-1920. The
study by Sh. T. Tashliyev is ~f the greatest interest from the standpoint of
our topic of investigation in its presentation of material dealing with the
history of the emergence and dpfeat of the Khivan basmachi led by Dzhunaid-khan.
In analyzing these questions, the author revealed the great complexity of the
intertribal and and interethnic relations in Turkmenistan and emphasized that
an enormous role in wiping out the local basmachi was played by observance of
the greatest caution by party, government and military agencies and an under-
standing of the way of life of the Turkmens and Uzbeks, thei~r customs,
' religious belief.s and prejudices.
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R. A. Nurullin, while not specifically discussing the history of the
struggle against the basmachi, presented material on the specific features of
implementation of the policy of "War Communism" as a whole in the Turkestan
Republic and in individual areas of this repv~~~c, paiticularly in rural areas,
which fosters an understanding of the reasons for the successful struggle
against the basmachi bands.
An analysis of the develog~ment of scientif ic thought on the topic reflecte3 in
our book enables one to reach the following main conclusions.
As a result of the collective efforts of a large group of historians in the
republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, as well as Moscow scientific
workers, a Marxist-Leninist conception of the essence and class roots of the
counterrevolutionary basmachi has been elaborated. An essentially faithful
picture has been created of the heroic struggle of the peoples of Central
Asia, who were defending the achievememts of the Great October Revolution
against encroachments by the united forces of the White Guard, basmachi and
- interventionists, a struggle which took place under the guidance of the
Communist Party. Many cardinal questions pertaining to history of the
struggle against the basmachi have been resolved on the basis of Marxist-
Leninist methodology.
Special studies have been written on this subject, which is extremely im-
portant for historical science, including monographs, books and articles, as
well as sections, chapters, and chapter subdivisions in synthesizing works on
history of the civil war in Central Asia, history of Central Asian p~rty or-
ganizations, as well as in b~oks on individual theoretical questions co:.~-
nected to one degree or another with the class struggle in the 1920's and
1930's. Investigation of the decisive role played by the toiler masses,
guided by the Communist Party, is occupying the center of attention. It has
been proven that, in waging a struggle to preserve Soviet power in Central
Asia, the Communist Party created and consolidated a military-political
alliance between the worker class and the toiling dek.hkans as a decisive
social and political force which ensured victory over the enemy. The most
important factor which promoted strengthening of this alliance in the condi-
tions of Central Asia was unswerving implementation of a Leninist nationali-
ties policy by the Communist Party.
A no less important condition for organization of a successful struggle against
the counterrevolution in Turkestan was the rendering of daily econamic and
military-political assistance to the peoples of Central Asia by the RKP(b)
Central Committee, the Soviet State, and the Great Russian people. This
assistance cemented the friendship of the peoples of Russia with the peoples
of the Turkestan Republic, the Bukhara and Khorezm People's republics.
As a result of historiography overcoming the consequences of the cult of
personality and related departures from historical truth, the role of the Com-
munist Party and its Central Committee, headed by V. I. Lenin, in defeating
the united forces of the interventionists and domestic counterrevolution in
Turkestan began to be revealed increasingly more fully. Much has been accom-
plished in order fully to show the theoretical and practical assistance
rendered by V. I. Lenin to the party organization af Turkeatan and his
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struggle for ideological-organizational strengthening of the KPT, for victory
of the ideas of Marxism and proletarian internationalism in the young party
organizations which arose following the dctober Revolution in the outlying
regions of the Russian East. Thanks to ekilled leadership by the Central Com-
mittee, headed by V. I. Lenin, and assistance by plenipotentiary agencies of
the Central Committee and Soviet Government, the Tur~ckomissiya, Turkby~~ro and
Sredazbyuro of the Central Co~ittee, the Co~unists of Central Asia, over-
coming enormous difficulties and correcting their own mistakes and shortcomings,
were able to forge out numerous cadres who became the leading detachment of
the worker class and the toiling dekhkans and who led the campaign to
_ strengthen Soviet rule and the building of socialism in this region, and the
struggle for victory in the civil war.
Historians have given essentially correct answers to such complex and im-
_ portant questions as the social and class nature of the basmachi and the
reasons for their relatively prolonged existence in certain areas of Central
Asia; the forms and methods of foreign intervention and the reasons for the
failure of British interveiition in Turkestan.
On the whole a successful endeavor has been made to investigate the na-
tionalities and agrarian policy of the Communist Party and its role in the
struggle against the basmachi. The forms and methods of enlisting the
toiler masses of indigenous nationalities in the business of building socialism
and their unification behind the proletariat and the Communist Party have been
studied and are being studied in connection with this. A number of studies
have shown how an indissoluble alliance of Soviet peoples was forged out and
how proletarian internationalism developed in the struggle against the
basmachi and other counterrevolutionary forces.
The list of treated problem topics has expanded, especially in the last
20 years, which has made it possible to study the history of many important
events which had not been investigated for a protracted period of time. In
the 1920's and 1930's,for example, for the most part only the course of com-
bat events on the civil war fronts Was analyzed, while today studies encom-
pass the situation on the home front, the unity between battle front and home
front, the distrit~ution of class forces and their change at various stages of
the civil war, the establishment and strengthening of the alliance of the
worker class with the dekhkans during the war years and the role of this
alliance in bringing the war to a victorious conclusion, and party na-
tionalities and agrarian policy. Methods of political organization of the
toilers in conditions of a noncapitalist path of development and the forms
~ of their enlistment in politfcal activity, which was one of the important con-
ditions for defeat of the basmachi bands, are revealed at the same time. The
- names of many commanders and political workers as well as civil war heroes who
have beea undeservedly forgotten or who previously hava not been mentioned in
historiography are being awakened in the memory of the people.
There still exists, however, a certain unevenness in investigation of a
number of problems. The military and political history of the struggle against
the basmachi has been more fully studied than the socioeconomic conditions
- of their emergence and defP.at.
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The scholarly level of in.~estigation improved appreciably in the 1960's and
1970's. An important role in this was played bq a broadening of the source
materials base, supplementing archival and ne~spaper materials with the
memoirs of active participants in the civil war, as well as improving the
level of scholarly qualifications of historiaas and strengthening historical
scientific research establishments and departments of social sciences of
higher educational institutions in Ceatral Asia.
The monograph is gradually becoming the principal form of investigation.
One's attent~on is drawn not only by conclusio~s but also observations of a
particular character which have been made during study and comparisoa of
diversified sources.
Thus new qualitative results have been achieved in study of this subject. At
the same time, however, one cannot state that all problems have been resolved
and that investigation of this subject is fully completed. The future sti11
holds the writing of works worthy of the demands impose~ on historical sci-
~ ence by the 21st CPSU Congress.
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FOOTNOTES
Introduction
1. V. I. Lenin, "Speech at a Conference c?f Railway Worlcers of the Moscow Rail C~enter
on 16 April 1919," "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [C~mplete Works], Vol 38, page 315.
2. Lenin, "Speech on 4(17) June 1917 at the First A~1-Russian Congress of Soviets
of Worker and Peasant Deput~es on Positioa Toward the Provisi~nal Govemment,"
"Polnoye...," op. cit., Voi 32, page 27/t.
3. Lenin, "Report of the Commission on the National and Colonial Questions on
26 July 1920 at the Second Congress of the Commuaist International," "Polnoy~...,"
op. cit., Vol 41, page 244; "Report to the 8th Congress of the RRP(b) on 19 March
1919 on the Party Program," Vol 38, pp 158-159.
4. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 41, pa~ge 244.
5. Lenin, "Repart at the Second All-Russiaa Congress of Co~unist Organizations of
the Peoples of the East on 22 November 1919," "Polnoye...," op.
cit., Vol 39, page 329.
~
6. Ibid.
7. Lenin, "Report at the 8th Congress of the RRP(b) on 19 March 1919 on the Party
Program," "Polnoye...," op. cit~., Vol 38, page 159.
_ 8. Lenin, "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 39, page 304.
- 9. Lenin, "On the Food Tax," "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 33, page 228.
10. Lenin, "Report of the Co~ission..., op. cit. page 246.
11. Ibid., pp 244-245.
12. Lenin, "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 42, page 132. ~
13. This was also true of the Khiva People's Soviet Republic.
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rv~c vrr~~~wL uJC, v~~Lt
14. Lenin, "Letter of 7 August 1921 to G. M. Safarov," "PAlnoye...," op. cit.,
Vol 53, gage 105.
15. Lenin, "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 39, page 329.
16. Lenin, "Letter to the Communist Camrades of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia,
Dagestan, an3 the Mountain People's Republic,011Polnoye..," op. cit., Vol 43,
page 198.
17. Ibid., page 200.
18. Ibid., page 199.
19. Lenin, "Report of the Commission..," op. cit., page 244.
20. Lenin, "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 53, page 105.
21. Ibid., Vol 34, page 215.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., Vol 37, pp 7-8. �
24. Ibid., Vol 36, page 8; Vol 37, page 38; Vol 39, pp 141-142; etc. ~
25. Lenin, "Letter to the Workers of Europe and America," "Polnoye...," op. cit.,
Vol 37, pp 455-456.
26. Lenin, "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 39, page 320.
27. Lenin, "Report at the 8th Congress...," op. cit., page 161.
28. Lenin. "Letter to A. A. Ioffe dated 13 September 1921," "Polnoye...," op. cit.,
V~1 53, page 190.
29 . Ib id .
30. Ibid., Vol 41, pp 435-436.
31. Ibid., page 153.
32. Lenin, "Report at the Second All-Russisn...," op. cit., page 321.
33. Lenin, "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 53, page 189.
34. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, lconferentsiy i plenumov TsK
.,(1898-1970)" [The CPSU in Resolutione and Decisions of :,ongresses, Conferences
and Central Committee Plenums (1898-1970)], 8th edition, Vol 1, ~page 448.
35.�Ibid., page 449.
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36. Ibid., Vol 2, page 45.
37. Ibid., pp 246-251. ~ ~
38. Ibid., pp 433-443.
39. Ibid., page 249.
40. Ibid., page 436.
41. These instructions were published in the local press.
42. V. V. Kuybyshev was in Central Asia fram 4 November 1919 to the beginning of
1921; M. V. Frunze from 22 February to September 1920; Ya. E. Rudzutak
fmm 4 November 1919 to May 1920, from April to July 1921, from October 1922 to
April 1923, and from January to May 1924.
43. Writings by M. V. Frunze which deal with 7~rkestan have been published in the
following: "Sobraniye sochineniy" [Collected Writinge] (Vols 1-3, Moscow,
1941); "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Writinge] (Moscow, 1940, 1957);
"M. V. Frunze na frontakh grazhdanskoy voyny v Turkestane" [M. V. Frunze on
the Battle Fronts of the Civil War in Turkestan~ (Moscow, 1941). The writings
of V. V. Kuybyshev and Ya. E. Rudzutak have not been collected and published.
44. Frunze, "Na frontakh...," page 309.
45. See L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [Following a Leninist Course], Vols 1-8,
Moscow, 1970-1981.
46. D. A. Kunayev, "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles],
Moscow, 1978; Sh. R. Rashidov, "V yedinoy~sem'ye narodov SSSR" [In the United
Family of Peoples of the USSR], Tashkent, 1974; Rashidov, "Torzhestvo
Leninskoy natsional'noy politilci" [T~~i~mmph of Lenin's Nationalities Policy],
Tashkent, 1974; Rashidov, "Sovetskiy Uzbekistan" ISoviet Uzbekistan], Moscow,
1978; Rashidov, "Yazyk nashego yedinetva i sotrudnichestva" jLanguage of Our
Unity and Cooperat~~n], Moscow, 1979.
47. I. A. Zelenskiy, "Ub itogakh provedeniya natsional'noy politiki partii v
Sredney Azii" [On the Result of Implementation of Party Nationalities Policy
in Central Asia], Samarkand, 1927; F. Khodzhayev, "Izbrannyye trudy" [Selected
Works], Vols 1-3, ~Tashkent, 1970-1973; A. Ikramov, "Izbrannyye trudy" [Selected
Works], Vols 1-3, Tashkent, 1972-1974.
"Former Slaves Became Free"
1. Takyr a flat clay expanse in the desert, almost totally barren of
vegetation.
_ s~
2. Tlirkestanskiy Kray consisted of Zakaspiyskaya, Samarkandskaya, Semirechen-
skaya, Syrdar'inskaya, and Ferganskaya oblasts and the Amudar'yinskiy Divi-
sion ("Sovetskaya istoricheskaya entsiklopediya" [Soviet flistorical Ency-
clopedia], Vol 14, Moscow, 1973, page 525).
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3. Other population figures for Turkestanskiy Kray are also encountered in
the literature.
4. See "Istoriya Bukharskoy i Khorezmskoy narodnykh s~vetskikh respublik"
[History of the Bukhara and Khorezm People's Soviet Republics], Moscow,
- 1971, pp 13-14.
5. In 1914 Turke~stan contai~ed a total of 856 industrial enterprises, in-
cluding 239 cotton ginning mills. The cotton processing industry ac-
counted for 73 percent of gross industrial output. See "Ocherki
khozyaystvennoy zhizni Turkrespubliki" jEssays on Economic Life in the
- Turkestan Republic], Tashkent, 1921, page 133; "Statisticheskiy yezhegodni.k
- 1917-1923 gg." [Statistical Yearbook, 1917-1923], Vol 2, Tashkent, 1924,
page 42.
6. The average wage per worker in the processing industry in Turkestan in 1908
was 147 rubles per year 98 rubles or 60 percent less than the average
for the Russian empire. On the eve of World War I the degree of exploita-
tion of Turkestan workers was 4.5 times that of Russia as a whole (see
T. S. Mel'nikova, "Formirovaniye proffiyshlennykh kadrov v Uzbekistane"
[Formation of Industrial Cadres in Uzbekistan], Tashkent, 1956, pp 21-22).
7. V. V. Zaorskaya and K. A. Aleksander, "Promyshlennyye zavedeniya
Turkestanskogo kraya" [Industrial Establishments of Tur kestanskiy Kray],
Tashkent, 1915. '
8. Cited in "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh organizatsiy Sredney Azii" [History
- of Communist Organizations of Central Asia], Tashkent, 1967, pp 24-25.
9. S. Ayni, "Bukhara. Vospominaniya" [Bukhara. Reminiscences], Stalinabad,
1954, pp 243, 246, 247, 256, 258.
10. Lenin, The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-
Determination," "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 26, page 62.
11. Kh. Sh. Inoyatov, "Pobeda Sovetskoy vlasti v Turkestane" [The Victory of
Soviet Power in Turkestan], Moscow, 1978, page 41.
12. Cited in T. Ye. Yeleuov, Ustanovleniye i uprocheniye ~ovetskoy vlasti v
Kazakhstane" [Establishment and Consolidation of Soviet Rule in Kazakhstan],
Alma-Ata, 1961, page 161.
. 13. "Dekrety Sovetskoy vlasti" [Soviet Government Decrees], Vol 1, Moscow, 1957,
page 40.
14. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v Uzbekistane" [History of the Civil War in
Uzbekistan], Vol 1, Tashkent, 1964, page 58.
15. NASHA GAZETA, 15 December 1917.
206
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16. "S"yezdy Sovetov Soyuza SSR, soyuznykh i avtonomnykh sovetskikh
sotsialisticheskikh respublik. Sborni.k dokumentov v trekh tomakh" [Con-
gresses of Soviets of the USSR, Union and Autonomous Soviet Socialist
Republics. Collection of Documents in Three oolumesJ, Vol 1, Moscow, 1959,
~ page 254.
17. "Dekrety...," op. cit., Vol 2, Moscow, 1959, pp 274-278.
18. Lenin, "From the Diary of a Political Commentator," Polnoqe..., op. cit.,
Vol 35, page 189.
19. PRAVDA, 15 April 1978.
20. PRAVDA, 10 February 19?4.
21. Leniu, "Oa Revising the Party Program," "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 34,
page 379.
Imperialist Intervention and Civil War
1. V. I. Lenin, "Speech at a Political Rally in Lefortovskiy Rayon on 19 July
1918," "P~lnoye Sobraniye Sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 36, page 528.
2. ZVEZDA VOSTOKA, No 5, 1953, page 103.
3. L. Ya. Eventov, "Inostrannyy kapital v neftyanoy promyshlennosti Rossii"
- [Foreign Capital in Russia's Oil Industry], Moecow-Leningrad, 1925, pp 44,
62, 85, 89.
- 4. See I. F. Gindin, "Russldye ko~ercheskiye banki" [Russisn Commercial Banks],
Moscow, 1948, page 362.
5. See L. M. Landa, "American Imperialism Active Organizer of Anti-Soviet
Intervention in Central Asia (1918-1920)," TRUDY MUZEYA ISTORII UZBEKSKOY
SSR [Works of the Museum of History of the Uzbek SSR], Issue II, Tashkent,
- 1954, page 25.
6. See "Otchet Russko-Aziatskogo banka za 1910 g." [Report of the Russo-Asian
Bank for 1910], Saint Petersburg, 1911, page 2. ~
7. The "government" of Kokand intended to come to an agreement with Dutov on
including Tuxkestan in the "Southeastern Russian Union," in which the
_ Orenburg, Kuban', Urals, and 5emirech'ye Coesack troops, as well as the
population of the Kalmyk, Kazakh, and Kirghiz lands and the Muslim popula-
tion of the Caucasus were to unite against Soviet rule.
8. "Dokumenty po istorii grazhdanskoy voyny v SSSR" [Documents oa History of
the Civil War in the USSRJ, Vol l, Moscow, 1940, page 492.
9. "Arkhiv polkovnika Khauza" [Archives of Colonel House], Vol 4, Moscow,
1944, pp 152-153.
207
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{ Vl~ v~ ~ ~~.~AV ~.~+a. v.~~+�
10. See A. Ye. Kunina, "Pro~ral amerikanskikh planov zavoyevaniya mirovogo
gospodstva v 1917-1920 gg." [Failure of U.S. Plans to Gain World Domina-
tion in 1917:-1920], second, enlarged editioa, Moscow, 1954, page 95.
11. See A. Girshfel'd, "On the U.S. Role in Organizing anti-Soviet Interven-
tion in Siberia and the Far East," VOPROSY ISTORII, No 8, 1948, page ~0.
12. See Kunina, op. cit., pp 95-96.
13. "Arkhiv polkovnika..., op. cit., Vol 3, Moscow, 1930, page 275; Vol 4,
pp 152-153.
14. "General-mayor Denstervil'. Britanskiy imperialism v Baku i Persii. 1917-
1918 gg" [Major General Dunsterville. British Imperialism in Baku and
Persia, 1917-1918], translated from English, Tiflis, 1925, pp 122-123.
15. DIE POST, 6 March 1919.
16. TsGAOR SSSR [USSR Central State Archives of the October Revolution], Fund
1318, List 1, File 627, Sheet 78. From the report of Barakatul~a,head of
an Afghan delegation to Moscow, 1919.
17. TsGAOR UzSSR [Uzbek SSR Central State Archives of the October Revolution],
Fund R-17, List, File 317a, Sheet 80.
18. Photocopy of inessage, see Yu. Aleskerov, "Interventsiya i grazhdanskaya
voyna v Sredney Azii" [Intervention and Civil War in Central Asia],
- Tashkent, 1959, page 31.
19. "Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR" [History of ths Uzbek SSR], Vol 2, Tashkent, 1957,
page 54; see also NASHA GAZETA, 17 Dec 1917 and 1 Jan 1918; EL BAYRAGI,
16 Jan 1918.
20. Ye. A. Babushkin (1880-1927), joined the party in 1902, delegate to the
6th Congress of the RSDRP(b), sent by the party to Turkestan in 1917 to
direct party work. Subsequently served in diplomatic posts.
21. TsGAOR SSSR, Fund 130, List 2, File 1095, Sheet 2, reverse side.
22. Cited in A. I. Zebelev, "Iz istorii grazhdanskoy voyay v Uzbekistane"
[From the History of the Civil War in Uzbekistan], Tashkent, 1959, page 64.
23. NASHA GAZETA, 9 March 1918.
24. "V boyakh za Sovetskuyu vlast' v Ferganskoy doline. Sbornik
vospominaniy" [Fighting for Soviet Rule in the Fergana Valley. Collected
Reminiscences], Tashkent, 1957, page 182.
25. In September 1918 Dzhunaid placed the wealc-willed Seyid Abdulla oa the
khan's throne.
208
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26. U. Cherchill', "Mirovoy krizis" [World Criais], Moscow, 1932, page 105.
27. Lenin, "Speech at Joint Session of VTsIR oa 29 July 1918,1� "Polnoye...,"
op. cit., Vol 37, page 7. '
28. "Smena vekh" [~ange of Landmarks], collected' ~1~ of articles, Prague,
1921, pa~e 125.
29. Cited in R. fl. Ullman, "Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921," Vol II,
"Britain and Russiaa Civil War." Princeto~-0xford, 1966, page 14. �
30. See SOLOVETSKIYE OST~OVA, No 4, 1926, pp 68-69.
31. TsGAOR UzSSR, Fund R-25, List 1, File 27a, Sheet 2. In 1918 there were
approximately 10 misaions, delegations and foreign agencies in Tashkent
alone.
32. A. Niallo, "Ocherki istorii revolyutsii i grazhdanslcoy voyay v Kirgizii i
_ Sredney Azii" [Sketches on History of the Revolution and Civil War in
Kirghizia and Central Asia], Fruaze, 1941, page 64.
33. SOLOVETSKIYE OSTROVA, No 4, 1926, page 62.
34. See K. A. Gafurova, "Bor'ba za internatsional'noye sp].ocheniye
trudyashchikhsya Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana" [Struggle for the Interna-
tfonal Unification of Toilers of Central Aaia and Razakhstan], Moscow,
1972, pp 56-61; Gafurova, "Documents Expose," VOPROSY ISTORII, No 8, 1970,
pp 30-41.
35. Cited in Gafurova, "Bor'ba...," op. cir., page 59.
36. SOLOVETSKIYE OSTROVA, No 5-6, 1926, pag~ 37.
37. Ibid., No 4, page 68.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., page 69.
40. Ibid., No 5-6, page 36.
41. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyne v Uzbekistane" [flietory of the Civil War in
Uzbekistan], Vol 1, Tashkent, 1964, page 238.
42. TsGAOR SSSR, Fund 1334, List 1, File 3, Sheet 41.
43. Party Archives of the Uzbekistan Co~unist Party Central Co~ittee, Fund
60, List 1, File 144, Sheet 3. The precise number of workers sent is not
indicated.
44. Zevelev, "Iz istorii...," op. cit., page 288.
209
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rvn v.�r�~.�t~a. vu~. .i~~a.�
45. "Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR" [History of the Uzbek SSR], Vol 3, Tashlcent,
1967, pp 187-188.
46. "Istoriya grazhaanskoy voynp v SSSR" [History of the Civil War in the
USSR], Vol 4, Moscow, 1959.
47. '~M. V. Frunze aa frontakh grazhdanskoy voyny" [M. V. Frunze oa ~he Civ~l
War Fronts], page 209.
48. "Krasnyy arkhiv" [Red Archive], Vol 3(100), M.aecow, 1940, page 14.
- 49. Zevelev, op. cit., page 416.
50. Lenin, "To the Communist Comrades of Turkestan," "Polnoye...," op. cit.,
Vol 39, page 304.
51. Ibid., page 329.
52. Ferganskaya Oblast consisted of 5 uyezds: Skobelevslciy, Namanganskiy,
Oshskiy, Kokandskiy, and Andizhanskiy. In 1917 Ferganskaya Oblast had a
population of approximately 2.5 million persons.
53. According to the figures of the Kokand Exchange Committee, which conaucted
a Eurvey in 47 volosts in the oblast (out of 84), more than 50 percent of
the area under crops was planted to cotton. In niae volosts cotton ~om-
prised 90 percent of the land under crops, 80 percent in four, and 70 per-
cent in 23 (see A. N. Demidov, "Ekonomi~heskiy ocherk khlopkavodstva,
khlopkotorgovli i khlopkovoy promyshlennosti Turkestana" [Economic Sketch of
Cotton Growing, Cotton Trade and the Cotton Industrq of Turkestan], 1'~sce�,,
1922, page 49). In 1916 Fergana produced 11 million poods of the 16 mil-
linn poods of cotton exported from Turkestan (TsGASA [Central State
Archives of the Soviet Army], Fund 110, List 1, File 163, sheets 156-157).
54. K. K. Palen, "Materialy i~tcharakterietika narodnogo khozyaystva Turkestana"
[Materials and Description of the Economy of Turkestan], Saint Petersburg,
1911 (calculations by A. R. Nezhevenkoj.
S5. "Materialy sel'skokhozyaystvennoy perepisi 1917 g." [ATaterials of the
1917 Agricultural Census], Vol 2.
56. Ibid., page 53.
57. TsGAOR SSSR, Fund 1318, List 1, File 627, sheets 135-136.
58. "Zhizn' natsional'nostey" [Life of the Nationalities], Book 1, 1923,
page 87.
59. From a report of the Syr Darya military governor. See "Zemel'nyy vopros
v Uzbekistane. Materialy ko vtoromu kurultayu Sovetov" [The Laad Question
in Uzbekistan. Materials on the Second Kurultay of Soviets], Samarkand,
1925, page 5.
210
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~ Y
60. In 1917 there were 159 cotton ginning mills operating 3n Ferganskaya
Oblast, comprising 68 percent of the total number of cotton ginning mills
- in Turkestan (26 in Andizhan, 17 in Namangan, 1S. in Margilan, 10 in
Kokand). Seventeen out of a total of 38 oil mills were in Ferganskaya
Oblast (44.7 percent). Tbese were the largest mills (12 presses). Just
as the cotton ginning m.ills, they were concentrated for the most part in
Kokand and Andizhan (see I. Alkin, "Sredayaya.Aziya" [Central Asia], Moscaw,
page 283). Also operating in this oblast were the Chimion oilfield and
oil refinery, the Santo oilfield, as well as the Kyzy1-Kiya and Sulyukta
coal mines.
61. "Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik Rossii za 1913 G." [Ruseia Statistical Year-
book for 1913j, Vol 2, part 1, Saint Petersburg, 1914, page 87.
62. NASHA GAZETA, 24 I~ov 1917.
63. K. Ye. Zhitov, "Establishment of Soviet 8ule in Uzbekistan," "Iz istorii
Sovetskogo Uzbekistaaa" [From the Hiatory of Soviet Uzbekistan], Tashlc.ent,
1956, page 8.
64. NASHA GAZETA, 11 and 30 Nov 1917.
65. TsGAOR UzSSR, Fund 25, List 1, File 15, Sheet 123.
66. Ibid., File 16, Sheet 35.
67. The municipal dumas in Namangan and Osh were dissolved in the summer of
1918, and in Andizhan in October 1918.
58. TsGAOR UzSSR, Fund R 25, List 1, File 80, Sheet 70.
69. Following the February Revolutioa, druzhinas.of the Armenian
Dashnaktsutyun bourgeois natioaalist party were formed in the Fergana. The
Dashnaks, however, did not so much protect the Armenian civilian popula-
tion in Ferganskaya Oblast from pillagers as rob the inhabitants uf kishlaks
and auls under the pretext of fighting the basmachi. The TurkTslK Cheka
for the struggle against the counterrevolution in the Fergana stated in its
order dated 26 May 1919: "In the Fergana detachments of the party
(Dashnaktsutyun Auth.) have displayed ethaic intolerance toward the lacal
population, which has to a substantial degree fostered the development of
an extensive brigand movement" (Zevel~v, op. cit., page 129).
70. V. D. Figel'skiy an outstanding aon of the Polish people and one of the
~ 14 Turkestan commissars killed in January 1919 duriag an anti-Soviet in-
surrection.
71. TsGAOR SSSR, Fund R-25, File 7, Sheet 5.
72. TsGAOR SSSR, Fund 1318, List 1, File 627, Sheet 373.
73. Zevelev, op. cit., page 128.
211
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- 74. Materials of the Turkestan Republic Sovnarkom for January 1918 state that
in the uyezds of F~rganskaya Oblast "there is noted an influx of clergy
from Bukhara..- issuing an appeal to support Irgaslikhan, ~:ho is defending
the interests of the Muslims" [TsGAOR CSSR, Fund 25, List 1; File 80,
Sheet 3].
75. TsGAOR UzSSR, Fund R-25, List 1, File 69-a, sheets 61-62; P~~rty Archives of
the Uzbekistan Co~unist Party Central Committee, Fund 60, I.ist 1, File 205,
Sheet 9, reverse.
76. Party archives of the Uzbek~stan Co~u~ist Party Central Comm.ttitee, Fund 60,
List 1, File 205, Sheet 9.
77. Ibid., Sheet 8, reverse.
78. According to the figures of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the
Turkestan Republic, as a result of looting and plundering by the basmachi,
the indigenous population of Andizhanskiy Uyezd retained no more than 2 per-
cent of their horses.
79. For example, In November 1919 Irgash iseued an order for Naymanskaya Volost,
according to which each pyatidesyatnik [designated eldex of a 50-household
unit?] was to collect from his ~urisdiction 500 rubles for the basmachi,
while every dekhkan who possessed land was obliged to contribute 500 rubles !
per tanap ~50 tanap equal about 37 acres] of land (TsGASA, Fund 149, File i
71, Sheet 229). Another basmachi kurbaehi, Makhk~am-khodzha, levied a tax
in kind clover and oats on the resideats of the lcishlak of Tokachi:
each pyatidesyatnichestvo was to deliver 1 chirik of oats (5 poods ~4
pounds) and 50 sheaves of clov~r (TsGASA, Fund~25859, List 1, File 44,
Sheet 354).
80. TsGASA, Fund 110, L~.st 2, File 409, aheets 35-38.
81. "Inostrannaya voyennaya ~.nterventsiya i grazhda~nskaya voyaa v Sredney
Azii i Kazakhstane. Sb. dokumentov [Foreign Military Intervention and
_ Civil War in Caitral Asia aad Razakhstan. Collsction of Aocuments], Vol 1,
Alma-Ata, 1963, page 422.
82. Ibid., page 4r3.
83~ Ibid., page 443.
84. Ibid., page 449.
85. Ibid., page 450.
86. Ibid., page 455.
87. TsGASA, Fund 149, File 81, Sheet 45.
88. TsGASA, Fund 149, File 187, Sheet 28.
212
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FOR OFF[CiAL USE ON~.Y
89. Initially it was called "Operations Headquarters for the Struggle Against
the Brigands." ~
' 90. TsGASA, Fund 149, File 154, Sheet 14.
91. Party Archives of the Uzbekistan Co~unist Party Central Committee, Fund 60,
List 1, File 210, Sheet lU.
92. NASHA GAZETA, 7 Jan 1919.
93. TsGASA, Fund 149, File 155, sheets 11-12.
94. PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 22 Nov 1957.
95. Party Archives of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee,
Fund 60, List 1, File 41, Sheet 1.
96. TsGASA, Fund 149, File 81, Sheet 26.
97. Throughout 1919 and at the beginning of 1920 one of the principal gather-
ing places of the bas~achi bands operating under the command of Madamin-
bek was the area aound the kishlak of Gorbua, situated 18 ic~ from
Gorchakovo Station and 8 km from Vladykino sidiag. The basmachi were based
not in the kishlak proper but in a Mustim cemetery located in the vicinity,
which was intersected by arylcs and hillocke and containing a large
burial mound in the center.
98. Not far from Rokand, in the vicinity of fihe kiehlak of Bachkyr, Irgash
constructed fortifications, ringing them witi~~ adobe walls.
99. Zevelev, op. cit., page 334.
100. Ibid., page 335:
101. Ibid. ~
102. VOPR~SY ISTORII, No 12, 1980, page 88.
103. TsGASA, Fund 110, List 4, File 275, Sheet 26.
104. A communique issued by the government of the Turkestaa Republic stated that
foreign imperialists were the initiators and inapirers of the conspiracy
and that "it was supported chiefly by foreign capital" (NASHA GAZETA,
29 Oct 1918).
105. TsGAOR UzSSR, Fund R-25, List 1, File 31, Sheet 14; File 120, Sheet 34.
106. Gafurova, op. cit., page 38.
107. THE T~S, confirming the fact that Bailey had gone underground, reported
that he had been operating "undiscovered in Turkestan for more than ~ year."
213
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rvn vr r e..ae~a.
This also inel~ides hxs sojourn in Bukhara (see RSFSR People's Com-
missariat o~ International Affairs telegram sent to the Turkkomissiya
in February 1920). Zevelev, op. cit., page 246.
109. TsGASA, selection, L~st 2, File 835, Sheet 188.
110. According to other information, the mission consisted of three officers,
an interpreter, and sccompanying persons ("Trudy Muzeya istorii AN UzSSR,"
op. cit., Tssue 2, Tashkent, 1954, page 37).
111. "Zhizn' natsioual'nostey," op� cit., Book 1, 1523, page 89.
112. Cited in "Trudy Muzeya...," op. cit., page 38.
113. Party Archives of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee, Fund
60, List 1, File 65, sheets 22-23; TsGAOR SSSR, Fund 1334, List 1, File 6,
Sheet 159.
114. TsGASA, Fund 149, File 51, Sheet 124.
115. Cited in "Bor'ba za ustanovleniye i uprocheniye Sovetskoy vlasti v
Khodzhenskom Uyezde (1917-1920 gg). Sb. dokumentov" [The Struggle for
Establishment and Consolidation of Soviet Authority in Khodzhenskiy Uyezd
(1917-1920). Collection of Documents], Leninabad, 1957, page 107.
116. A privileged stratum of Russian kulak settlers, who had loyally sup-
ported the czarist autocracy in Turkestan, became established in several
uyezds of Ferganskaya Oblast, today situated for the most part on the
territory of the Kirghiz SSR.
117. This exceeded Soviet forces in the Fergana approximately fivefold.
118. TsGASA, Fund 25859, List 1, File 44, Sheet 328.
119. Ibid., Sheet 42.
120. Ibid., Sheet 97. From intelligence obtained by the Fergana Front Special
Branch.
121. Ibid., List 6, File 47, sheets 231-a, 232.
122. PROLETARSKAYA MYSL' (Organ of the Ferganskaya Oblast Committee of the
RKP(b)), 10 Sep 1919.
123. TsGASA, Fund 25859, List 1, File 7, Sheet 352 reverse.
124. Ibid., File 44, Sheet 43.
125. From the memoirs of Mirzo-Kasym Akhmedov, a party member from 1918.
See "Vospominaniya uchastnikov grazhdanskoy voyny v Andizhanskoy Oblasti"
[Reminiscences of Participants in the Civil War in Andizhanskaya Oblast],
2L�4:
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Andizhan, 1957, page 114. No record af proceedings of this meeting has
been found.
126. The ranlcs of the Andizhan party organizatioa contained approximately 300
Comnunists.
127. S. K. Kuzy-Akhmedov one of the orgaaizers of the defense of Andizhan,
in the past had been a Baku oil worker, party member from 1918.
128. From the memoirs of V. N. Sidorov. See "Vospominaaiqa uchastnikov...,"
op. cit., page 103.
129. I. P. Shishkanov states in his memoirs that "letters and proclamations
of surrender began to be sent" into the city and the detachments defend-
ing Andizhan (Ibid., page 39).
130. "V boyakh za Sovetskuyu vlast' v Fergaaskoy doline" jIn the Battles for
Soviet Rul~e in the Fergana Valley], Tashkent, 1957, page 148.
131. "Vospominaniya uchastnik,ov...," op. cit., pp 25-26.
132. TsGASA, Fund 25859, List l, File 44, sheete 109-110.
133. Ibid., File 13, Sheet 454.
134. TsGASA, Fund 110, List 3, File 881, Sheet 77.
135. Ibid., List 2, File 400, Sheet 307.
136. TsGASA, Fund 25859, List 1, File 44, Sheet 193 reverse.
137. TsGASA, Fund 110, List 3, File 84, Sheet 19.
138. A. Middendorf, "Ocherki Ferganslcay doliny" [Fergana Valley Sketches],
St. Petersburg, 1872.
139. M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Writings], Vol 1,
Moscow, 1950, page 102.
- 140. Such activities were conducted for an extended period of time aud
produced positive results.
141. This idea was also expressed in other documents of Fergana party-soviet
organizations.
142. Zevelev, op. cit., page 536.
143. TsGASA, Fund 110, List 3, File 285, Sheet 80 reverse.
144. Ibid., List 1, File 23, Sheet 17. .
215
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~ V~� V~ ~ ~~.lA~. ~..va. VI~VI
145. "M. V. Frunze na frontakh...," op. cit., page 280.
146. Five major basmachi chieftains joined Kurshirmat: Ishmat Baybachi (his
bands operated in Rokandskiq Uyezd), Parpi (in Andizhanskiy Uyezd), Aman-
Palvan (Namanganskiy Uyezd), Rakhmankul (the foothills of the Chatkall~kiy
Range), and Muetdin-yulchi (south of a line running Skobelev-Osh).
147. Sh. Z. Eliava soon left the Fergana for Moscow.
148. Zevelev, op. cit., page 560.
149. "M. V. Frunze na frontakh...," op. cit., page 282.
150. Ibid.
151. Lenin, "Speech at the Fourth Conference of Gubernia Chekas on 6 February
1920," "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 40, page 119.
_ 152. "M. V. Frunze na frontakh...," op. cit., pp 309-311.
153. Ibid., page 312.
154. IZVESTIYA, Tasnkent, 16 June 1920.
155. Zevelev, op. cit., page 582.
156. TsGASA, Fund 110, List 2, File 409, Sheet 153,
157. "Zstoriya Kirgizii" (flistory of Rirghizia], Vol Z, Frunze, 1956, page 106.
158. TsGASA, Fund 110, List 3, File 522, sheets 60-63.
159. Ibid., sheets 43, 47.
160. Ibid., Sheet 64. '
161. Ibid., Sheet 82.
162. TsGASA, Fund 110, List 1, File 29, aheets 230, 257, 261.
163. TsGASA, selection, List 2, File $36, Sheet 254.
164. Zevelev, op. cit., page 588.
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid.
167. Lenin, "Speech at the Fourth Conference...," op. ci~., Vol 40, page 114.
168. Dutov ~ras in Western China at this time.
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169. Zevel~v, op. cit., page 589.
170. P. I. Baranov, an old Bolshevik, served su~sequently as chief of the Air
Forces Directorate of the Red Army and chief of the Aviation Industry Ad-
ministration of the Supreme Council of the National Economy. He was
killed in an airplane crash ia 1933.
_ 171. The Fergana Army Group contained the lst Turkesta:~ Division, the 3d
Turkestan Cavalry Division (Andizhan), the 7th Brigade (Kokand), the 4th
Brigade (Andizhan), the Sth Brigade (Fedchenko), the 6th Brigade
(Namangaa), and certain other units.
172. These measures, however, were not carried out sufficiently consistently in
certain parts of the oblast.
_ 1a3. At this same time uyezd and village conferences of party-unaffiliated
toiling dekhkans were being held.
174. Basmachi forces h~re never exceeded several thousand mea.
175. The history of the struggle against the forcea of Dzhunaid-khan during
this time is presented in detail in the memotrs of B. V. Cheprunov
("Porazheniye Dzhunaid-khana. Za Sovetskiy Turkestan" [~he Defeat of
- Dzhunaid-khan. For Soviet Turkestan], Tashkeat, 1969), and in a work by
T. Gumenyuk ("Bor'ba za Petro-A.leksandrovsk. Pyataya godovshchina
Krasnoy Armii" [The Struggle for Petro-Aleksandrovsk. Fifth Anniversary
of the Red Army], Tashkent, 1923). 1'he following reply by the defenders of
Nukus in the autumn of 1919 attests to the heroism displayed in the
struggle against Dzhunaid's bands: "The Bolsheviks will not lay down their
arms until every last one of them is dea~d" (Gumenyul~, page 93).
176. "Istoriya Bukharslcoy i Khorezmskoy narodaykh respublik" [History of the
- Bukhara and Khorezm People's Republics], Moecow, 1971, page 96.
177. IZVESTIYA, Tashkent, 22 July 1920.
178. Cited in A. Ishanov~ "Bukharskaya Narodnaya Sovetskaya Respubli~Ca" [The
Bukhara People's Soviet Republic], Tashkent, 1969, page 164.
179. Ibid., page 188.
_ 180. "M. V. Frunze na frontakh...," op. cit., page 330.
181. TsGAOR SSSR, Fund 1318, List 1, File 715, Sheet 13.
182. Khivan Jadids petit-bourgeois democrats who init~ally opposed Khiva's
feudal system and who demanded the implementation of reforms limiting the
power of the khan. Their political orientation was extremely indeter-
minate. For this reason they could not lead the revolutionary struggle
of the dekhkan masses. Subsequently some of thean collaborated with the
Soviet authorities, while the reat took the path of struggl,e against the
dictatorship of the proletariat.
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ruK urr~~.in?, u~~ v~~Y
183. See "Istoriya ko~unisticheskikh organizatsiy Sredney Azii...," op. cit.,
page 630.
184. See "Obrazovaniye SSSR. Sb. dokumentov 1917-1924" [Formation of the USSR.
Collected Documents, 1917-1924J, Moscow, 1949, pp 241-247.
185. This is attested by P. E. Etherton, Britlsh consul general in Kashgar, in
~ his book "In the Heart of Asia," I.ondon, Z925.
186. "Pogranichnyye voyslca SSSR. 1918-1928 gg. Sb. Dokumentov" [USSR Border
Troops, 1918-1928. Collected Documents], Moscow, 1973, page 39.
187. "Muzey pogranichnykh voysk" [Border Troops Mus~um], Folder 245, File 3,
Sheet l.
188. TsGASA, Fund 11U, List 3, File 260, Sheet 3.
189. These proposals were of a military-political character.
190. "Boyevyye podvigi chastey Krasnoy Armii. 1918-1922" [Combat Exploits
of Red Army Units, 1918-1922], page 183.
191. "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR" [USSR Foreign Policy DocumentsJ, Vol 3,
Moscow, 1959, page 552.
192. See "Obrazovaniye SSSR...," op. cit., pp 251-257.
Enemies of Peaceful Labor
1. M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye p-oizvedeniya" [Selected Writings], Vol 1,
Moscow, 1950, pag~ 420.
2. "S"yezdy Sovetov Soyuza SSR, soyuznykh i avtonomnykh sovetskikh
sotsialisticheskikh respublik. Sb. dok.imentov v trekh tomakh" [Con-
gresses of Soviets of the USSR, Union and Autonomous Soviet Socialist
Republics. Collected Documents in Three Volumes], Vol 1, Moscow, 1959,
pp 155, 156.
3. K. Yarmatov, "Ribbon of Time," DRUZHBA NARODOV, No 11, 1977, page 212.
4. In 1929 the Tajik ASSR, which had been a component of the Uzbek SSR,
became a union republic. In 1932 the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Oblast
became an autonomous republic. :[n 1936 it became a component of the
Uzbek SSR.
S. In 1925 the Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast was redesignated the Kirghiz
Autonomous Oblast, in 1926 was made an autonomous re~put,lic, and in
1936 a union republic.
6. KRASNAYA KAZARMA (Organ of the Political Directorate of the Turkestan
Front), No 6, 1923.
218
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7. See KO1~AlUNIST (organ of the Central Committee of the Turkestan Communist
Party), No 3-4, 1922.
8. See Sh. M. U1'masbayev, "Promyshlennoye razvitiye Sovetskogo Uzbekistana"
[Industrial Development of Soviet Uzbekistan], Tashkeat, 1958, page 84.
9. Party Archives of.the Uzbekistan Co~unist Party Central Committee, Fund 60,
File 1503, Sheet l.
10. See '~Oct~ki istorii Rommunisticheskoy partii Turkestana" [Sketches From the
History of the Turkestan Co~unist PartyJ, Tashkent, 1960, pp 65-66.
11. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v Uzbekistane" [History of the Civil War in
Uzbekistan], Vol 2, Tashkent, 1970, page 294.
12. TsGASA, Fund 7, List 2, files 38, 230. See also ISTORICIiESKIY ARKHIV, No 1,
1961, page 132.
_ 13. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy...," op. cit., page 294.
14. Turkestan Communist Party Central Committee Party Archives, Fund 60,
Folder 1, b/d, sheets 66-68.
- 15. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy...," op. cit.
16. Uzbekistan Co~unist Party Ceatral Committee Party Archives, Fund 60,
List 1, File 1421, Sheet 34.
17. IZVESTIYA, Tashkent, 4 and 8 July 1922.
18. UzCP CC Party Archives, ~und 60, Folder 2, b/d, 2148.
19. "Byulleten' VII konferentsii KPT" [Bulletin of the 7th Conference of the
Turkestan Communist Party], Tashkent, 1922, page 25.
20. UzCP CC Party Archives, Fund 60, List 1, File 1821, Sheet 5.
21. KRASNAYA KAZARMA, No 1, 1923, page 150.
22. "Boyevyye epizody. Basmachestvo v Fergane i Khorezme. Sb. materialov"
[Combat Episodes. The Bastnachi in the Fergana and Rhorezm. Collected
- Materials], Moscow-Tashkent, 1934, pp 46-47.
23. Abdulla Yarmukhamedov was a hero of the civil war in Turkestan. He was
three times awarded the Order of the Red Banner for courage and heroism
displayed in the struggle against the basmachi.
24. KRASNAYA KAZARMA, No 7, 1923, page 114.
25. Ibid., No 11, 1923, page 58.
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huK ~rr~~,iw~ u~~ ~,~~Y
26. UzCP CC Party Archives, Fund 60, List 1, File 3027, sheets 4-5; File 3030,
sheets 85-86.
27. See A. Niallo, "Ocherki istorii revolyutsii i grazhdanskoy voyay v
Kirgizii i Sredney Azii" [Sketches From the Iiistory of the Revolution and
the Civil War in Kirghizia and Central AsiaJ, Frunze, 1941, pp 158-160. :
28. See IZJESTIYA TsK RKP(b), No 4(52), 1923, page 4.
29. This conclusion was based on factual data.
30. "Rezolyutsii i resheniya s"yezdov KP Uzbekistana" [Resolutions and
Decisions of Uzbekistan Co~unist Party Coagresses], Tashkent, 1957, page
21.
31. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy...," op. cit., page 311.
32. Cited in A. Ishanov, "Bukharskaya Narodnaya Sovetskaya Respublik.a" [The
Bukhara People's Soviet RepublicJ, pp 275-276.
33. V. I. Lenin, "Letter to A. A. Ioffe oa 13 Sept~mber 1921," "Poln. Sobr.
Soch.," op. cit., Vol 53, page 190.
34. Following Turkey's surrender, Enver fled to Germany, after which he speat
some time in Soviet Russia. Failing in his attempt to make his way to
Anatolia and lead the struggle there against Mustafa Kemal, he took active
part in the basmachi insurrection in Central Asia. fle left for Bukhara
allegedly to take a journey through the region (see BSE [Great Soviet
Encyclopedia], Vol 30, Moscow, 1978, page 173; "Iszoriya kommunisticheskikh
organizatsiy Sredney Azii" [History of the Co~uniet Organizations of
Central Asia], Tashkent, 1967, page 676).
35. Cited in A. Kh. Babakhodzhayev, Proval angliyskoy agressiv~cloy politiki v
Sredney Azii" [Collapse of the Aggressive British Policy in Central Asia],
Tashkent, 1955, page 144.
36. TsGASA, Fund 110, List 3, File 577, Sheet 155.
37. Border Troops Museum, Folder 16, File 2, Sheet 5.
38. Ibid,, Sheet 6.
39. Ibid., Folder 245, File 3, Sheet 1.
40. Ibid., Folder 245, File 3, Sheet 1.
41. Ibid., Sheet 3.
42. See "Istoriya grazhdanskoy...," op. cit., page 326.
43. Border Troops Museum, Folder 245, File 3, Sheet 3. ,
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44. Ibid.
- 45. See "Istoriya ko~nunisticheskikh...," op. cit., pp 691-692.
46. Border Troops Museum, Folder 245, File 3, Sheet 3.
47. "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh...," op. cit., page 686.
48. It was formed as a people's army.
49. See "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh...," op. cit., page 563.
_ 50. Ibid.
51. See V. M. Ustinov, "Establishment of the RRP(b) Central Co~ittee
Sredazbyuro and Its R~le in Orgaaizing Econoanic Cooperation Among
Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm," VOPROSY ISI~ORII RPSS, No 7, 1964.
52. See "Istoriya kommunistichesicilch...," op. cit., page 689.
53. KOI~IUNIST TADZHIRISTANA, 15 Juae 1949.
54. "Istoriya kommuaisticheslcikh...," op. cit., page 564.
55. Ibid., page 564-565.
56. Ibid., pp 565-566.
57. ZVEZDA VOSTOKA, No 12, 1951, page 131.
58. Border Troops Museum, Folder 245, File 3, Sheet 3.
59. See IZVESTIYA (organ of the Turkestan Communist Party Central Committee
and TurkTslK), 4 and 8 July 1922.
60. UzSSR TsGA [Uzbek SSR Central State Archives], Fund 47, List l, File 136,
sheets 71-73.
61. "S"yezdy Sovetov...," op. cit., Vol 2, Moscow, 1960, page 588.
62. Cited in D. Fan'yan, "K istorii sovetskogo stroitel'stva v Tadzhikistane"
[On the History of Soviet Organizational Development in Ta~ikistan],
Stalinabad, 1941, page 41.
63. See "Istoriya ko~unisticheskikh...," op. cit., page 692.
64. Ibid.
65. See "Istoriya Sovetskogo gosudarstva i prava Uzbekistana" [Bistory of
Soviet State and Law in Uz6ekistan], Vol 1, Tashkent, 1960, page 173.
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66. Border Troops Museum, Folder 245, File 3, sheets 5, 62.
67. Ibid., Sheet 5.
68. Ibid.
69. Another f igure 120 persons is given in a work M. Irkayev ("Istoriya
grazhdanskoy voyny v Tadzhikistane" [History of the Civil War in
Tadzhikistan], page 400).
70. See R. A. Abdulkhayev, Uprocheniye Sovetskoy vlasti v rayone verkhov'ya
Zeravshana (1918-1923 gg.)" [Consolidation of Soviet Rule on the Upper
Reaches of the Zeravshan (1918-1923)], Dushanbe, 1972, page 121. There are
also other accounts of Kholbuta's fate. In particular, M. Irkayev, op. cit.,
writes that Kholbuta and his band were buried by an avalanche. Documents
preserved in the Central Archives of the Border Troops conoborate the
account given by R. A. Abdulkhayev.
71. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy...," op. cit., page 333.
72. "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh...," op. cit., page 694.
73. Border Troops Museum, Folder 245, File 3, Sheet 5.
74. Ibid., sheets 62-63.
75. Ibid., sheets 5-6, 63.
76. Ibid., Folder 16, File 2, Sheet 10.
77. Ibid., Folder 245, File 3, sheets 5-6.
- 78. "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh...," op. cit., page 698.
79. Ibid.
80. Irkayev, op. cit., pp 451, 452.
81. TsGASA, Fund 110, List 2, File 530, sheets 12-13; File 527, Sheet 18.
82. Ibid., File 531, Sheet 86.
83. Nikolay Dmitriyevich Tomin (1887-1924) fought against Kplchak on the
Eastern Front in 1918-1919. In 1920 he served as commander of the lOth
Cavalry Division. Took part in defeating the White Guard bands on the
Kuban' and putting down the Antonov insurrection in Tambovskaya Guberniya.
Took part in the liberation of Volochayevka and Rhabarovak. Killed in
battle with the basmachi on 12 August 1924.
84. PRAVDA, 18 December 1970.
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85. TsGA UzSSR, Fund 47, Proceedings of the 5th Rurultay of the BPSR. Cited
in t�Istoriya k,ommunisticheskikh...," op. ~it., page 707.
86. Border Troops Muse~, Folder 16, File 2, sheets 12-13.
87. Ibid., sheets 18-19.
88. Ibid., Sheet 28.
89. Ibid., Sheet 20.
90. Ibid., Sheet 12.
91. In effect until 10 July 1925.
92. "Rezolyutsii i reshe~tiya ~"yezdov I~ Uzbekistan~a" [Resolutions and Deci-
- sions of UzbEkistan Communist Party Congreasea], Tashkent, 1957, page 50.
93. "'Rrasnoznamenayy Turkestanskiy" [Red-Baan~r TurkestanJ, page 123.
94. "Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheslcoy partii" [Sketches From the Hisrory of
the Communist PartyJ, Dushanbe, 1964, page 41.
95. See Krasnoznemennyy...," op. cit., page 127.
96. Border Troops Museum, Folder 16, File 5, Sheet 34.
97. Ibid., Sheet 51.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid., sheets 55-56.
100. Ibid., Sheet 47.
101. Ibid., Sheet 44.
102. Ibid., Folder 130, File 3, Sheet 3.
103. Ibid., Folder 16, File 5, Sheet 71.
~ 104. Ibid., Sheet 88.
105. Ibid., Sheet 109.
106. Ibid., Sheet 88.
107. Ibid., Sheet 109.
108. Ibid., Sheet 18.
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109. Ibid.
110. In the su~er of 1926 the Turkestan Front was redesignated the Central
Asiaa Military District. See "Krasaozaameaayy..�,'~ oP� cit., pp 128, 409.
111. Ibid., ~age 129.
112. Ceatral Party Archives of the Institute of Maruism-I.eninism, Fuad 62,
List 1, File 81, Sheet 228. Cited in "Istoriqa kom~uaisticheskikh...,
op. cit., page 650.
113. Ibid., page 651.
114. Ibid., page 653.
115. See "Krasnoznamennyy..�," oP� cit., page 117�
116. Ibid., page 119.
117. See "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh...," op. cit., pp 657-658.
118. Ibid., page 91.
~ 119. "Krasnoznamennyy...," op. cit., page 130.
120. Ibid., pp 131-132.
121. "Na strazhe mirnogo truda" [Guarding Peaceful Labor], page 91.
122. Skirmishes with Dzhunaid's detachmeats took place near Shakh~Iurad Yab,
near the ruins of the fortress of Sakyz-Otlyk, in the viciaity of Lake
Sarylcamysh and Aty Kush Well. See ibid.
123. Ibid., page 92.
124. Border Troops Museum, Folder 16, File 5, Sheet 88.
125. Ibid., Folder 130, File 7, Sheet 3.
~ 126. Ibid.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid. File 9, Sheet 14.
A Dying Enemy Is Dangerous
1. "Istoriya SSSR. Epokha sotsializma" [flistory of the USSR, Era of Social-
ism], Moscaw, 1974, page 261.
2. These detachments were armed with ataves, axes, scythes, knives, and foWl-
ing pieces.
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3. Border Troops Museum, Folder 23, File 9, Sheet 27.
4. Ibid., Sheet 28.
S. Ibid., Sheet 27.
6. TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 12 February 1932. Cited ia N. G. Gurdzhiyants and A. A.
Yes'kov: "Kommunisticheslcaya partiya (bol'shevikov) Turkmenistana
organizator i rukovoditel' razgroma basmacheskoy avantyury 1931 g.
V. I. Lenin i istoricheskiye sud'bq turkmenskogo naroda" [The Communist
Party (of Boleheviks) of Turlcmenistan Organizer and Leader of the
Defeat of the Basmachi Adventure of 1931 V. I. Lenin and the Historic
Destiny of the Turkmea PeopleJ, Ashkhabad, 1976, page 78.
7. V. I. Lenin,"Greetings to the Hungarian Workers," "Poln. Sobr. Soch.,'
op. cit., Vol 38, page 387.
8. Border Troops Museum, Folder 163, File l, Sheet 53.
9. Ibid., sheets 57-59,
10. "Na strazhe mirnogo truda" [Guarding Peaceful Labor], op. cit., page 94.
11. Border Troops Museum, Folder 163, File 1, Sheet 49.
12. "Na strazhe...," op. cit., page 99.
13. Border Troops Museum, Folder 163, File 1, Sheet 49.
14. Ibid., Folder 20, File 2, sheets 1-5.
15. Ibid., Folder 25, File 3, Sheet 86.
16. "Na strazhe...," op. cit., pp 101-102.
- 17. ISTORIYA SSSR, No 2, 1972, pp 101-102.
18. Border Troops Museum, Folder 25, File 3, Sheet 36.
19. A total of 4000 households (22 suls), including 500 bai households, took
part in this move.
20. "Na strazhe...," op. cit. page 103.
21. Border Troops Museum, Folder 25, File 3, Sheet 3.
22. "Na strazhe...," op. cit., page 104.
23. Ibid., page 107.
24. Ibid.
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25. Border Troops Museum, Folder 23, File 3, sheets 1-Z.
26. See Gurdzhiyants and Yes'kov, op. cit., page 85.
27. Ibid., page 86.
28. "Konets basmachestva" [End of the Basmachi], Moscow, 1976, page 161.
29. Border Troops Museum, Folder 23, File 3, Sheet 23.
30. Ibid., Folder 25, File 11, sheeta 1-11.
Conclusion
1. Central State Archives of the Soviet Army, Selection, List 2, Fiie 836,
sheets 286-318.
2. "Otchet TsK KPT c VI po VII s"yezd I~T" [RPT Central Committee Accountabil-
ity Report from the 6th to 7th 1~PT Congress], Tashkent, 1923, page 12.
3. "Rezolyutsii i postanovleniya s"yezdov Kommunisticheskoy partii
Turkestana. 1918-1924 gg." [Resolutions and Decrees of Turkestan Com-
munist Party Congresses, 1918-1924], Tashkent, 1958, page 121.
4. SOLOVETSKIYE OSTROVA, No 5-6, 1926, page 36.
5. M. V. Frunze, "Na frontakh grazhdanskoy voyny. Sb. dokumentov"
On the Civil War Fronts. Collection of Docum~nts], Moscow, 1941, page 308.
6. "Rezalyutsii i postanovleniya II s"yezda RP(b)Uz" [Resolutione and Decrees
of the 2d Congress of the Uzbekistan Communiet Party (of Bolsheviks)],
Samarkand, 1925, page 47.
7. V. I. Lenin, "Will the Bolsheviks Be Able to Hold on to Government Power?"
"Polnoye Sobraniye Sochineniy," op. cit., Vol 34, page 299.
8. "Rezolyutsii i postanovleniya s"yezdov...," op. cit., page 121.
9. 'btchet TsK KPT...," op. cit., page 12.
10. M. Alyaviya, "Uzbeksici~e narodnyye pesai" [Uzbek Folk Songs], ia Uzbek,
Tashkent, 1959, page 124. Translation by Yu. A. Polyakov.
11. Frunze, op. cit., page 308.
12. Border Troops Museum, Folder 23, File 15, Sheet 7.
13. Subsequently Aktyubinak.
14 ..Alyaviya, op . cit page 127.
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Appendix
1. There are no special historiographic studies on defeat of the basmachi.
Separate asgects of this subject are reflected in the following books
- and articles: V. P. Sherstobitov, R. K. Orozaliyev, and D. F. Vinnik,
"Ocherki istorii istoricheskoy nauki v Sovetskom Rirgizstane (1918-1960)"
[Sketches on the Iiistory of Historical Science in Soviet Kirghizstan
(1918-1960)], Frunze, 1961; A. I. Zevelev, "Istoriografiya Sovetskogo
Turkestana (istoriografiya i istochniki po istorii grazhdanskoy voyay v
Turkestane)" jHistoriography of Soviet Turkestan (Historiography and
Sources on History of the Civil War in Turkestan)], Tashkent, 1968;
Kh. Sh. Inoyatov and L. M. Landa, Introductions to Volumes 1 and 2 of
"Istoriya grazhc:anskoy voyay v Uzbekistane" [History of the Civil War in
- Uzbekistan], Vol 1, Tashkent, 1964, pp 5-22; Vol 2, Tashkent, 1970, pp 3-
13; S. Narmetov, "The Civil War in Khorezm (Survey of the Literature),"
ISTORIYA SSSR, No 3, 1970, pp 137-146; Rh. Sh. Inoyatov, "Some Results of
Study of the History of the Military Intervention and Civil War in Central
Asia~" ISTORIYA SSSR~ No 6~ 1974~ Rh. Sh. IIIOyatoV~ "Kratkaya
istoriografiya grazhdanskoy voyny v Sredney Azii" [Concise Historiography
of the Civil War in Central Asia], Tashkent, 1974; R. M. Masov, "Some
Results of Study of the History of the October Revolution and Civil War
in Tajikistan," ISTORIYA SSSR, No 4, 1977; Masov, "Istoriografiya
Sovetskogo Tadzhikistana" [Historiography of Soviet Ta~ikistan], Dushanbe,
1978.
2. Istpart divisions were formed after the national-state demarcation in
Central Asia (1924) under the Communist parties of the national republics
(for example, under the Central Committee of the Communist Party (of
Bolsheviks) of Turl~enistan). A Razakh department of Istpart was es-
tablished in 1922.
3. V. Kuvshinov, "The Fergana area"; M. Shklyar, "Travel Impressions of the
Fergana," VOYENNAYA MYSL', Book 1, September 1920; T. Dervish (N.
Tyurakulov), "Ttte Fergana Problem," VOYEAIldAYA MYSL', Book 2, May-July 1920.
See also: T. Dervish, "The Coatemporary Basmachi," ROI~iUNIST, No 1, 1922.
4. VOYENNAYA MYSL', Book 1, page 278.
5. Zevelev, "Iz istorii...," op. cit., page 456.
6. See VOYENNAYA MYSL', Book 2, page 118.
7. A. Vinogradova, "The Khorezm People's Soviet Republic," ZHIZN'
NATSIONAL'NOSTEY, No 1, 1923, pp 181-194. See also Gumenyuk, "Bor'ba za
Petro-Aleksandrovsk. Pyataya godovshchina Krasnoy Armii" [The~Battle for
Petro-Aleksandrovsk. Fifth Anniversary of the Red Army], Tashkeat, 1923.
8. V. A. Gurko-Kryazhin, "British Intervention in the Transcaspian and
Transcaucasia," ISTORIK-MARKSIST, Vol 2, 1926, pp 115-139.
227
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9. G. Safarov, "Kolonial'naya revolyutsiya (opyt Turkestana)" [The Colonial
Revolution (The Experience of Turkestan)], Moscow, 192I.
10. For more detail see Zevelev, "Istoriografiya...," op. cit., pp 44-48.
11. N. Batmanov, The Basmachi and the Struggle Against Them," KRASNAYA ARMIYA,
No 9, 1921; G. Skalov, "The Social Nature of the Basmachi in Turkestan,"
ZIiIZN' NATSIONAL'NOSTEY, 1923, books 3-4; S. Ginzburg, "The Basmachi in the
Fergana," "Ocherki revolyutsionnogo dvizheniya v Sredney Azii" [Sketches on
the Revolutionary Movement in Central AsiaJ, Moscow, 1926; D. D. Zuyev,
"The Fergana Basmachi," "Grazhdaaskaya voyaa" [The Civil WarJ, Vol 3, M~oscow,
1924; A. Syrkin, "Vostok v og,ne" [The East in Flames], Leningrad, 1925.
n
12. N. Paskutskiy, "K istorii grazhdaaskoy voyny v Turkestane [On the History of
of the Civil War i~n. 'C �,stan] , Tashkeat, 1922; F. Khodzhayev, "Materialy
; k istorii revolyut~:~: v Bukhare" [Materials on Iiistory of the Revolution
= in BukharaJ, Tajikistan-Samarkand-Tashkeat, 1926; IQiodzhayev, "Basmachestvo"
[The Basmachi], Tashkent, 1927; Di-Mur, "The Civil War in Tajikistan,"
"Tadzhikistan. Sb. st." [Taj ikistan. Collected Articles], Tashkent, 1925;
S. Ayni, "Materialy po istorii Bukharskoy revolqutsii" [Materials on the
History of the Bukhara Revolution], M~oscow, 1926 (in Uzbek); P. Alekseyenkov,
"Krest'yanskoye vosstaniye v Fergane" [Peasant Insurrectioa in the Fergana],
Tashkent, 1927; Ye. Kozlovski~, "Krasnaya Armiya v Sredney Azii" [The Red
Army in Central Asia], Tashkent, 1928.
13. See F. Kasymov, On History of the Study of the Bukhara People's Revolu-
tion in the First Period of Soviet Historical Science," "Materialy XXIV
nauchnoy konferentsii professorsko-prepodavatel'skogo sostava SAMGU imeni
Navoi" [Proceedings of the 24th Scientific Conference of Faculty of
Samarkand State University imeni Alisher NavoiJ, Samarkand, 1967, page 46.
14. Di-Mur, "Grazhdanskaya voyna...," op. cit., page 283.
15. Ibid.
16. New history study centers were established at the end of the 1920's in
Central Asian republics: the Institute of Turkmen Culture (1927), the
Kirghiz Scientific Research Institute of Regional Studies (1928), the
Society for Study of Tajikistan and Iranian Nationalities (1925), etc.
17. NOVYY VOSTOK, No 10-11, 1925; ZA PARTIYU, No 3-4, 9-10, 1929, etc.
18. NOVYY VOSTOK, No 2, 1922, No 10-11, 1924; "Revolyutsiya v Sredney Azii"
[The Revolution in Central Asia], Tashkent, 1929; etc.
19. See "Tsentr istoriko-partiynoy nauki v Uzbekistane" [Center of Historical-
Party Science in Uzbekistan], Taehkent, 1972, No 43.
20. D. A. Furmanov, Insurrection in Vernyy on 12-19 June 1920,"
PROLETARSKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA, No 11, 1923; S. Muraveyskiy (V. Lopukhov),
"Ocherki po istorii revolyutsionaogo dvizheniya v Sredney Azii" [Sketches
228
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- on the History of the Revolutionary M~vement in Central AsiaJ, Tashkent,
1922; A. Mel'kumov, "Materialy revolyutaionnogo dvizheniya v Turkmenii"
[Materials on the Revolutionary Movement in Turkamenia], Tashkeat, 1924;
"Grazhdanskaya voyaa 1918-1921 gg." jThe Civi1 War, 1918-1921], in three
volumes, edited by A. S. Bubaov; S. S. Ramenev, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, and
R. P. Eydeman, Mosco~Leningrad, 1928, 1930.
21. P. Alelcseyenkov, "Chto takoye basmachestvo?" jJust What Is the
Basmachestvo?J, Tashkent, 1931.
22. Ibid., pp 6, 48.
23. Ibid., page 38.
24. Ib id., page 14.
25o P. Alekseyenkov, "Kokandskaya avtonomiya" jThe IGokand Autonomy], Tashkent,
1931, page 64.
26. Alekseyenkov, "Chto takoye...," op. cit., page 64.
27. I. Kutyakov, "Krasnaya konnitsa i Vozdushayy flot v pustyae v 1924 godu"
(The Red Cavalry and Air Force ia the Desert in 1924j, N. Rakurin, editor,
with foreword by S. M.~Budennyy, Moscow-Leningrad, 1930.
28. "Vospominaniya uchastnikov Oktyabrya i grazhdanskoy voyay" jReminiscences
of Participants in the October Revolution and the Civil War], Issue 1,
D. I. Maazhar, editor, Moscow-Tashkeat, 1931, page 1.
29. See "Tsentr istoriko...," op. cit., pp 8-9.
30. Of the greatest interest amoag published collections of documents and
- materials were the following: "Materialy i dok~enty II s"qezda Kompartii
Turkestana" [Materials and Documents of the 2d Congrese of the Turkestan
Commuuist PartyJ, M~oscow-Tashkent, 1934; "Voyaa v peskakh. Materialy po
istorii grazhdanslcoy voyay" [War in the Sands. Materials on the flistory of
the Civil War], Vol 12, edited by M. Gor'kiy, S. Ivanov, I, Mints, and
F. Kolesov, Moscaw 1935; "M. V. Frunze na frontakh grazhdaaslcoy voyny"
[M. V. Frunze on the Civil War Fronts], Moscow 1941.
31. K. Zhitov and V. Nepomain, "Ot lcolonial'nogo rabstva k sotsializmu" [From
Colonial Slavery to Socialism], Tashlcent, 1939; B. Gafurov and N. M.
Prokhorov, "Padeniye Bukharskogo emirata" [Fall of the Bu1chara Bmirate],
Stalinabad, 1940.
32. S. P. Timoshkav, "Bor'ba s angliyskoy interventsiyey v Turkestane"
[~ruggle Against British Intervention in Turkestan], Moscow, 1941;
Timoshkov, "Bor'ba s interventami, belogvardeytsami i basmachami v Sredaey
Azii" [Struggle Againat the Interventioniata, White Guard and Basmachi
in Central Asia], VAF, 1941; A. Kh. Babakhodzhayev, "Proval angl.iyskoq
aggressivnoy politiki v Sredney Azii (1917-1920 gg.)" [Collapse of
229
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rvr vra�~~.ana. v-+~-
British Aggressive Policy in Central Asia (1917-192~)], Tashkent,
1955.
33. E. A. Voskoboynikov and A. I. Zevelev, "Turklcomi.ssiya VTsIK and SNK RSFSR
i Turkbyuro Ts RKP(b) v bor'be za ukrepleniye Sovetskoy vlasti v Turkestane"
[The VTsIK and SNK RSFSR Turkkomissiya and RRP(b) Central Co~ittee
Turkbyuro in the Struggle for Consolidation of Sovi~t Power in Turkestan],
Tashkeat, 1951; Klych Kuliyev, "Bor'ba Kommunisticheskoy partii za
uprocheniye Sovetskoy vlasti i osushchestvleniye natsional'noy politiki ,
v Sredney Azii (1917-1925 gg.)" j~e Struggle of the Communist Party to
Consolidate Soviet Power and Implement Nationalities Policy in Central
Asia (1917-1925)J, Ashkhabad, 1956; V. Nikolayeva, "The Turkkami.ssiya
Plenipotentiary Agency of the RKP(b) Central Committee," VOPROSY ISTORII
KPSS, No 2, 1958.
34. Aziz Niallo, "Ocherki istorii revolyutsii i grazhdanskoy voyny v Kirgizii
i Sredaey Azii" [Sketches on History of the Revolution and Civil War in
Kirghizia and Central AsiaJ, Frunze, 1941; V. Ye. Kutareva, "Osnovnyye
etapy grazhdanskoy voyny v Kirgizii" [Principal Stages of the Civil War
in Kirghizia], Frunze, 1947; P. P. Nikishov, "Bor'ba s basmachestvom na
yuge Kirgizii" [Struggle Against the Basmachi in the Southera Part of
Kirghizia], Fruaze, 1957; D. R. Fan'yan and M. Zelinskaya, "Krasnaya
Armiya osvoboditel'nitsa tadzhikskogo naroda" [The Red ~mY~~Pobeda
Liberator of the Tajik People], Stalinabad, 1943; G. Nepeeov,
sovetskogo stroya v Severnom Turl~enistane" [Victory of the Soviet System
in Northern Turkmenistan], Ashkhabad, 1950.
35. See BOL'SHEVIK, No 23, 1951, pp 62-73.
36. A detailed analysis of the collected volume "Materialy po istorii
tadzhikskogo naroda v sovetskiy period" [Materials on flistory of the
Tajik People in the Soviet Periodj, which contains articles by the in-
dicated authors, is given by R. M. Masov in the monograph "Istoriografiya
Sovetskogo Tadzhikistana," op. cit. (pp 25-30).
37. M. Irkayev and Yu. Nikolayev, "V bor'be za Sovetskiy Tadzhikistan" [In
the Struggle for Soviet Tajikistan], Stalinabad, 1956 (in Tajik); M.
Irkayev, Yu. Nikolayev, and Ya. Sharapov, "Ocherk istorii Sovetskogo
Tadzhikistana" [Historical Sketch of Soviet Tajikistan], Stalinabad,
1957.
38. "Oktyabr'skaya sotsialisticheskaya revolyutsiya i grazhdanskaya voyna v
Turkestane. Vospominaniya uchastnikov" [The October Socialist Revolution
and Civil War in Turkestan. Reminiscences of Participants]V $po~
~iya
1957; "V boyakh za Sovetskuyu vlast v Ferganskoy doline.
uchastnikov Oktyabr'skny revolyutsii i grazhdanskoy voyny (1917-1923 gg�)'~
[Fighting for Soviet Power in the Fergana Valley. Reminiscences of
Participants in the October Revolution and Civil (1917-1923)], Tashkent,
1957; "Vospominaniya uchastnikov grazhdansk,oy voyny v Andizhanskoy
oblasti" [Reminiscences of Participants in the Civil War in Andizhanslcaya
Oblast], Andizhan, 1957; "Oktyabr'skaya sotsialisticheskaya revolyutsiya
� i grazhdanskaya voyna v Kirgizii (1917-1920)" [The October Socialist
230
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Revolution and Civil War in Rirghizia (1917-1920)], Frunze, 1957;
"Turkmenistan v period inostrannoy interventsii i grazhdanskoy voyny, 1918-
1920" [Turkmenistan in the Period of Foreign Intervention and Civil War,
1918-1920], Ashkhabad, 1957; "Za Sovetskiy Turkestan" [For Soviet TurkestanJ,
Tashlcent, 1963; "Za Sovetskiy Turkmeaistan" [For Soviet Turmenistan],
Ashkhabad, 1963; "Za vlast' Sovetov v Tadzhilcistane. Vospominaniya
uchastnikov revolyutsii i bor'by s basmachestvom" [For Soviet Power in
Tajikistan. Remiaiscences of Participaate iu the Revolution and the
Struggle Against the Basmachi], Stalinabad, 1958.
39. "Istoriya Kirgizii" [flistory of Rirghizia], Vol 2, Frunze, 1956, pp 68-111
(chapter author P. P. Nikishov); "Istoriya Uzbe&skoy SSR" [History of the
Uzbek SSR], Vol 2, Tashkent, 1957, pp 81-133 (c hapter authors A. I.
Zevelev and M. Kh. Nazarov); Istoriya Turkmenslcoy SSR" jHistory of the
Kuliyev);
Turlm~en SSR], Ashkhabad, 1957,"pp 111-203 (Ehapt~r author 0. K.
"Istoriya Kazakhskoy SSR" [flistory of the Kazakh SSR], Vol 2. Era of
Socialism, Alma-Ata, 1959, pp 75-161 (c hapter author S. N. Pokrovslciy).
40. See "Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR," op. cit., page 83.
41. M. Irkayev, Yu. Nikolayev, and Ya. Sharapov, Ocheric istorii Sovetskogo
gg )[liistorical Sketch of Soviet Tajikistan
Tadzhikistana (1917-1957 . "
(1917-1957)], Stalinabad, 1957; Sh. Tashliyev, "Ustanovleniye i uprocheniye
Sovetskoy vlasti v Turkestane" [Establiahmeat and Consolidation of Soviet
Power in Turkestan], Ashkhabad, 1957; M. Yazykova, "Bor�ba za ustanovleniye
Sovetskoy vlastt v Zapadnom Turkmenistane" [1'he Struggle for Establishment
and Consolidation of Soviet Power in Western Turmenistan], Ashkhabad, 1957;
A. Kokanbayev, "Bor'ba s basmachestvom i uprocheniye Sovetskoy vlasti v
Fergane" [The Struggle Against the Baemachi and Consolidation of Soviet
Power in the Fergaaa], Tashkent, 1956; K. Malyshev, "Bor'ba za Sovety v
Kirgizii i Turkestane" [The Struggle for the Soviets in Kirghizia and
Turkestan], Frunze, 1958; G. Nepesov, "Velikiy Oktyabr' i narodnyye
revolyutsii v 1920 g. v Severnom i Vostochnom Turkmenistane" [The Great
October Revolution and Popular Revolutioas in 1920 in Northern and Eastern
Turkmenistan], Ashkhabad, 1958; T. Rh. Rel'diyev, "Razgrom interventsii v
Fergaaskoy i Samarkandskoy oblastyakh Turkestanskoy ASSR" [Defeat of the
Intervention ia Ferganslcaya and Samarkandskaya Oblasts of the Turkestan
ASSR], Tashkent, 1959.
42. Individual episodes in the struggle against the basmachi in the northem,
central and southern areas of contemporary Ta3ikistan are also reflected
in the following works: A. V. Makashov, "Utverzhdeniye Sovetskoy vlasti
v Tsentral'nom i Yuzhnom Tadzhikistane" [Establishment of Soviet Power in
Central and Southern Ta~ ikistan], Stalinabad, 1957; V. M. Ionova,
"Struggle of the Toiler Masses Under the Guidance of the Counnunist Party
Against Intervention in the First Years of Soviet xule (~mploying
Materials on Northern Taj ikistan)," "Uch. zap. Leninabadskogo
pedinstituta" [Scientific Notes of the Leninabad Pedagogic InstituteJ,
Issue 7, Leninabad, 1958; Ionova, Political Work in the Masses During the
Struggle Against the Basmachi in 1920-1923 (Based on Materials on Northern
- Tajikistan)," Ibid., Issue 9, Leainabad, 1960.
231
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43. S. N. Pokrovskig?, "Pobeda Sovetskoy vlasti v Semirech`ye" [Victory of
Soviet Power in Semirech'yeJ, Alma-Ata, 1961.
44. M. Kh. Nazarov, "Turkestan v period interventsii i grazhdansk.oy voyny
(1918-1920)" jTurkestan in the Period of Interveation and Civil War (1918-
1920)], Tashkent, 1961 (in Uzbek).
45. "Boyevoy put' voysk Turkestanskogo voyennogo okruga" [Combat March of the
Troops of the Turkestan Military District], Moscow, 1959.
- 46. See S. Narmetov, "The Civil War in Khorezm (Survey of the Literature),"
ISTORIYA SSSR, No 3, 1970, page 143. .
47. Sh. A. Shamagdiyev, "Ocherk istorii grazhdanskoy voyny v Ferganskoy doline"
[Historical Sketch, of the Civil War in the Fergana Valley], Tashkent, 1961.
48. V. Mineyev, "Conjecture in Place of Auehenticity," PRAVDA VOSTOKA,
24 August 1961. ~
49. I. S. Sologubov, "Inostrannyye kommunisty v Turkestane (1918-1921 gg.)"
[Foreign Communists in Turkestan (1918-1921)], Tashkent, 1961; A. M.
Matveyev, "Foreign Communists in Turkestan," VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 3,
1962; Matveyev, "Foreign Internationalists on the Ci.vil War Fronts in
Central Asia," NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORII, No 4, 1961; Ya. M. Seryy, ~
"Political Work in Red Army International Units in Turkestan (1918-1920)],
_ "Trudy SAGU" [Works of Central Asian State University~, Issue 170, Tashkent,
1960 (History of the CPSU); G. B. Nikol'skaya, "Some Materials on Immigrants
from China in Turkestan After October 1917," "Trudy SAGU," Issue 151,
Tashkent, 1959 (General History).
50. A. Kh. Babakhodzhayev, "Proval angliyskoy antisovetskoy politiki v Sredney
Azii i na Srednem Vostoke v period priznaniya Sovetskogo gosudarstva
de-fakto and de-yure (1921-1924 gg.)" [Collapse of British anti-Soviet
Policy in Central Asia and the Middle East in the Period of De Facto and
B~ Jure Recognition of the Soviet State (1921-1924)], Tashkent, 1957;
. Babakhodzhayev, "Proval angliyskoy politiki v Sredney Azii i na Srednem
Vostoke (1918-1924 gg.)" [Failure of British Policy in Central Asia and
the Near East (1918-1924)], Moscow, 1962.
51. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v SSSR" [History of the Civil War in the
USSR], Vol 4, Moscow, 1959; Vol 5, Moscow, 1960.
52. M. Irkayev, "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v Tadzhikistane" [History of the
_ Civil War in Tajikistan], Dushanbe, 1963, second, enlarged edition,
Dushanbe, 1971.
53. Incidentally, he followed it in his preceding works.
54. In determining the chronological framework of the civil war in Tajikistan,
M. Irkayev proceeded from the materiale of the debate among social
. sciet~tists (1956), during which a scheme of periodization of the history
of Soviet society in Tajikistan was elaborated.
232
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55. M. Irkayev, "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v Tadzhikistane" [History of the
Civil War in Tajikistan], Moscow, 1963, pp 255, 256.
56. Ibid., page 240.
57. Ibid., page 265.
58. G. Kh. Khaydarov, "Bor`ba za ustanovleniye i uprocheniye Sovetskoy vlasti
v Severnom Tadzhikistane (1917-1923 gg.)" [The Struggle for Establishment
and Consolidation of Soviet Power in Northern Tajikistan (1917-1923)],
Dushanbe, 1966.
59. In counterbalance to the opinion of G. Kh. Khaydarov that basmachi ap-
peared in the Matcha at the end of 1918, R. Abdulkhayev demonstrated that
basmachi bands appeared here at the end of 1918 and beginning of 1919,
following a counterrevolutionary insurrection and overthrow of Soviet
rule (R. A. Abdulkhayev, "Uprocheniye Sovetskoy vlasti v rayonakh
verkhov'yev Zeravshana" [Consolidation of Soviet Power on the Upper
Reaches of the Zeravshan], Dushanbe, 1972). Questions pertaining to the
civil war in Northern Tajikistan were also partially addressed in a
monograph by T. R. Karimov entitled "Pobeda Velikoy Oktyabr'skoy
sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii v Severnom Tadzhikistane" [Victory of the
Great October Socialist Revolution in Northern Tajikistan] (Stalinabad,
1957) and in other works by this author.
60. S. B. Zhantuarov, "Grazhdanskaya voyna v Kirgizskoy SSR" [The Civil War
in the Kirghiz SSR], Frunze, 1963.
61. "Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoy partii Turkestana" [Historical Sketches
on the Communist Party of Turkestan], Part III, "Kommunisticheskaya partiya
Turkestana v period inostrannoy voyennoy interventsii i grazhdanskoy
voyny" [Turkestan Communist Party During Foreign Military Intervention and
the Civil War], Tashkent, 1964.
62. "Ocherki istorii Xommunisticheskoy partii Kazakhstana" [Historical Sketches
on the Communist Party of Kazakhstan], Alma-Ata, 1963 (P. M. Pakhmurnyy,
author of the chapter on the civil war); "Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoy
partii Uzbekistana" [Historical Sketches on the Communist Party of
Uzbekistan], Tashkent, 1964 (author M. Kh. Nazarov); Tashkent, 1974
(author R. A. Nurullin); "Ocherki istorii Ko~munisticheskoy partii
Tadzhikistana" [Historical Sketches on the Communist Party of Tajikistan],
Dushanbe, 1964 (author M. I. Irkayev), second, enlarged edition, ~
Dushanbe, 1969; "Ocherki istorii Kommunis*_icheskoy partii Turkmenistana"
[Historical Sketches on the Communist Party of Turkmenistan], second edition,
Ashkhabad, 1966 (author Sh. Tashliyev); "Ocherki istorii
Ko~unisticheskoy partii Kirgizii" [Historical Sketches on the Communist
Party of KirghiziaJ, Frunze, 1966 (author P. P. Nikishov); Frunze,
1979; "Istoriya Kazakhskoy SSR. Epokha sotsializma" [History of the
Kazakh SSR. Era af Socialism], revised and enlarged edition, Alma-Ata,
1963; "Istoriya Kirgizii" [History of Kirghizia], Vol 2, Frunze, 1963;
"Istoriya tadzhikskogo naroda" [History of the Tajik People], Vol 3, Book 1,
233
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HUR UM'MI(;IAL Uj~ UNLY
Moscow, 1964; "Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR" [History of the Uzbek SSR], Vol 3,
Tashkent, 1967.
63. The following works have been published on Tajikistan, for example: I.
n
Gafurova, K istorii Kommunisticheskoy partii Tadzhikistana (1924-1929)"
[On the History of the Communist Party of Tajikistan (1924-1929)], .
Dushanbe, 1963; A. V. Makashov, "Partiynaya organizatsiya Tadzhikistana v
1924-1926 gg." jThe Tajikistan Party Organization in 1924-1926], Dushanbe,
1964; M. Nazorshoyev, "Partiynaya organizatsiya Pamira v bor'be za
- sotsializm i kommunizm" [The Pamir Party Organization in the Struggle for
Socialism and Communism], Dushanbe, 1970.
64. R. M. Masov correctly noted that in this publication "there is certain
embellishment... of the process of revolutionization of the indigenous
inhabitants of prerevolutionary Taj ikistan." The author pointed out that
the book also contains other shortcomings. This does not, however,
provide justification for a negative assessment of the work as a whole.
The same applies to the group-authored monograph "Istoriya Tadzhikskoy
SSR." See R. M. Masov, "Istoriografiya Sovetskogo Tadzhikistana," op. cit.,
pp 42-43.
65. See also: "Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR s drevaeyshikh vremen do nashikh dney"
[History of the Uzbek SSR From Ancient Times to the Present Day], Tashkent,
1974; "Istoriya Kara-Kalpakskoy ASSR" [History of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR],
Vol 2, Tashkent, 1974.
66. "Inostrannaya voyennaya interventsiya i grazhdanskaya voyna v Sredney Azii
i Kazakhstane. Dokumenty i materialy" [Foreign Military Intervention and
the Civil War in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Documents and Materials],
Vol l. May 1918-September 1919, Alma-Ata, 1963; Vol 2, September 1919-
December 1920, Alma-Ata, 1964.
67. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v Uzbekistane," op. cit., Vol 1, Tashkent,
1964; Vol 2, Tashkent, 1970.
68. Ibid., Vol 1, pp 20-21. Our italics Auth.
69. Ibid., page 20.
70. Ibid., page 201.
71. Ib id., Part II, page 21.
72. "Obrazovaniye SSSR" [Formation of the USSR], Moscow-Leningrad, 1949,
page 228.
73. "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh organizatsiy Sredney Azii" jHistory of Com-
munist Organizations of Central Asia], page 569.
74. "VII krayevaya konferentsiya KPT (Stenograficheskiy otchet)" [Seventh
Regional Conference of the Turkestan Communist Party (Stenographic Record)],
- 234 ~
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Tashkent, 1922; "Bulletin No 5 of the Seventh Regional Conference of the
Turkestan Co~unist Party," page 25.
75. Ibid.
76. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v Uzbekistane," op. cit., Vol 1, page 184.
77. R. A. Nurullin, "Sovety Turkestanskoy ASSR v period inostrannoy voyennoy
interventsii i grazhdanskoy voyny" [The Soviets of the Turkestan ASSR in
the Period of Foreign Military Intervention and Civil War], Tashkent, 1965;
G. Ra~shidov, "Tashkentskiy Sovet v bor'be za uprocheniye Sovetskoy vlasti"
[The Tashkent Soviet in the Struggle for Consolidation of Soviet Power],
Tashkent, 1960; "Istoriya sotsialisticheskago Tashkenta" [flistory of
Socialist Tashkent], Vol 1, Tashkent, 1965; T. Pulatov and G. Rashidov,
"Tastikent v pervyye gody Sovetskoy vlasti" [Taehkent in the First Years of
Soviet Rule], Tashlcent, 1972.
78. "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh organizatsiy..." op. cit.
79. Ibid., page 277.
80. Ibid., page 278.
81. B. V. Lunin, "Lenin i narody Sredney Azii" [Lenin and the Peoples of
Central Asia], Tashkent, 1967; Sh. Sh. Abdullayev, and A. I. Zevelev,
"V. I. Lenin i istoricheskiye sud'by narodav Sredney Azii" [V. I. Lenin
and the Historic Destinies of the Peoples of Central AsiaJ, Moscow, 1968;
same authors, "Lenin i narody Uzbekistana" [Lenin and the Peoples of
Uzbekistan], Tashkent, 1970; K. Khasanov, "V. I. Lenin i Turkbyuro TsK
RKP(b)" [V. I. Lenin and the RKP(b) Central Committee Turkbyuro], Tashkent,
1968; S. Beysembayev, "Lenin i Kazakhstan" [Lenin and Kazakhstan], Alma-
Ata, 1968; G. F. Dakhshleyger, "V. I. Lenin i problemy Kazakhstanskoy
istoriografii" jV. I. Lenin and Problems of Kazakhstan Historiography],
Alma-Ata, 1973; P. U. Khamdamov, "Literatura o Sredney Azii v tvorchestve
V. I. Lenina" [Literature on Central Asia in the Writings of V. I. Lenin],
Tashkent, 1971; same author: "V. I. Lenin o Sredney Azii" [V. I. Lenin on
Central Asia], Tashkent, 1974.
82. V, M. Ustinov, "Leninskaya politika partii na Vostoke" [The Party's
Leninist Policy in the East], Frunze, 1963; same author, "Reshayushchiye
usloviya sotsialisticheskogo stroitel'stva v Sredney Azii" [Decisive Con-
ditions for Building Socialism in Central Asia], Ashkhabad, 1967; S.
Nazarov, "Iz istorii deyatel'nosti Sredazbyuro Ts RKP(b) (1922-1924)"
[From History of the Activities of the RKP(b) Central Committee Sreciazbyuro
(1922-1924)J, Tashkent, 1965; M. F. Anderson, "Iz istorii partiynogo
stroitel'stva v Sredney Azii" [From the History of Party Organizational
Development in Central Asia], Dushanbe, 1966; K. Khasanov, "TsK VKP(b)
v bor'be za postroyeniye sotsializma v Sredney Azii" [The VKP(b) Central
Committee in the Struggle to Build Socialism in Central Asia], Tashkent,
1968; S. A. Nazarov, "Rukovodstvo TsK RKP(b) partiynym stroitel'stvom
v Sredney Azii" [RKP(b) Central Committee Direction of Party Organizational
Development in Central AsiaJ, Tashkent, 1972; A. T. Azizkhanov,
235
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ruK ~rr~~~w~ u~c u~vL~
"Turkbyuro polnomochnyy organ TsK RKP(b)" [The Turlcbyuro Plenipoten-
tiary Agency of the RKP(b) Central Co~ittee], Tashk~nt, 1977; A. A.
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VKP(b) Central Co~ittee Sredazbyuro. Questions of Strategy and Tactics],
Ashkhabad, 1975; Ya. M. Seryy, "From the History of the Formation and Ac-
tivities of the Sredazbyuro of the RRP(b) Central Committee,"
"Istoricheskiye zapiski" jHistorical Notes], Vol 79, Moscow, 196b;
"The Sredazbyuro of the RKP(b) Centrai Co~nittee (From History of Forma-
tion and Activities), May 1922-Beginning of 1923," "Nauchnyye trudy
Tashkentskogo Gosuniversiteta imeni V. I. Lenina" [Scientific Works of
the Tashkent State University imeni V. I. Lenin], Issue 24, "History of the
CPSU," Tashkent, 1964.
83. Roslyakov, "Sredazbyuro...,11 op. cit., page 3.
84. Ibid., pp 21, 22, 47, et al.
85. Ibid., page 22.
86. Kh. Tursunov, "Natsional'naya politika Kom~unisticheskoy partii v
Turkestane (1917-1924 gg.)" [Communist Party Nationalities Policy in
Turkestan (1917-1924)], Tashkent, 1971; K. A. Gafurova, "Bor'ba za
internatsional'noye splocheniye trudyashchikhsya Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana
v pervyye gody Sovetskoy vlasti" [Struggle for International Unity of the
Toilers of Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the First Years of Soviet Rule],
Moscow, 1973; N. Rakhmanov, "Osushchestvleniye Leninskoy natsional'noy
politiki v Sredney Azii" [Implementation of Leninist Nationalities Policy
in Central Asia], Tashkent, 1973; 0. Khudoyberdiyev, "On SAVO National
Units," VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1967 ~sic; actually 1977];
~
V. M. Kuz mina, Brats tvo po oruzhiyu, rozhdennoye Velikim Oktyabrem" [Brother-
hood in Arms Engendered by the Great October Revolution] , Ashkhabad, 1977.
87. K. Mukhamedberdyyev, Kommunisticheslcaya partiya v bor'be za pobedu
sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii v Khorezme" [The Communist Party in the
Struggle for the Victory of the Socialist Revolution in Khorezm], Ashkhabad,
1959; B. I. Iskanderov, "Bukhara (1919-1920)," Dushanbe, i970; A. I.
Ishanov, "Bukharskaya Narodnaya Sovetskaya Respublika" [The Bukhara .People~s
Soviet Republic], Tashkent, 1969; "Istoriya Bukharskoy i Khorezmskoy
narodnykh sovetskikh respublik" [History of the Bukhara and Khorezm
People's Soviet Republics], Moscow, 1971; "Velikiy Oktyabr' i pobeda
narodnoy revolyutsii v Khorezme" [The Great October Revolutinn and the
Victory of the People's Revolution in Khorezm], Tashkent, 1971; "50 let
Bukharskoy Narodnoy Sovetskoy Respubliki. Materialy ob"yedinennoy
nauchnoy sessii" [SOth Anniversary of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic.
Proceedings of a Joint Scientific Session], Tashkent, 1972; "50 let
Khorezmskoy Narodnoy Sovetskoy Respubliki. Materialy ob"yedinennoy
nauchnoy sessii" [50th Anniversary of the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic.
Proceedings of a Joint Scientific Session Tashkent, 1972; N. Kalandarov,
"Obrazovaniye deyatel'nosti Khorezmskoy kommunisticheskoy partii (1920-1924)
- 1924)" jFormation and Activities of the Khorezm Communist Party (1920-
1924)], Tashkent, 1975; "Istori~?a Khoxezmskoy Narodnoy Sovetskoy Respubliki
2 36
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(1920-1924 gg.)" (History of the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic (1920-
1924)], collection of documents, Tashk~.zt, 1976; "Ist~riya Bukharskoy
Narodnoy Sovetskoy Respubliki (1920-1924 gg.)" [History of the Bukhara
Pe4ple`s Soviet Republic (1920-1924)J, collection of documents, Tashkent,
1976. ~
88. M. Kh. Nazarov, "Kommunisticheskaya partiya Turkestana vo glave zashchity
zavoyevaniy Oktyabr'skoy revolyutsii (1918-1920 gg.)" IT1ie Communist Party
of Turkestan, Heading the Defease of the Achievements of the October
Revolution (1918-1920)J, Tashkent, 1969 (the author had previously pub-
lished the following book in Uzbek: "Turkestan v period grazhdanskoy
voyny" [Turkestan in the Period of the Civil War), Tashkent, 1960); Sh. T. -
Tashliyev, "Grazhdanskaya voyna i angliysk.aya voyennaya interventsiya v
Turkmenistane" [The Civil War and British Military Interveation in
Turkmenistan], Vol 1, Ashkhabad, 1974; Vol 2, Ashkhabad, 1975; R. A.
Nurullin, "Kommunisticheskaya partiya Turkestana v bor'be za
osushchestvleniye politiki 'voyennogo kommunizma [The Turkestan Com-
munist Party in the Struggle for Implementation of the policy of "War
Communism"J, Tashkent, 1975.
237
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ABREVIATIOia AND ACRONYMS
BSP = Bukhara Co~uaist Party
6AM0 = Central Asian Military District
ChON = Special Purpose Units
GPU = State Political Administration
IMEL = CPSU Central Conmittee Maru-Engels-Lenia lnstitute
KCP = I~orezm Communist Party
KPT = Turkestan Communist Party
Kraykom = regional or kray co~rmittee
Narkomnats = People's Commissa=iat for Nationalities
OGPU = Unified State Political Directorate
Qrgbyuro = Organization Bureau
Politprosvetotryad = Political Education Detachment
revkom = revolutionary co~ittee
Rewc~yensovet = Revolutionary Military Council
RKKA = Workers' and Peasants' Red Army
_ RKP(b) = Ruesian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)
RKSM = Russian Youmg Communist League
RSDRP(b) = Russiaa Social Democratic Workers' Partq (of Bolsheviks)
Sel'sovet = village soviet
SNK, Sovnarkom = Council of People's Co~issara
Sovdep = Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies
Sredazbyuro = Central Asian Bureau
Turkbyuro = Turkestan Bureau
aurkkomissiya = Turkestan Commission
TurkTsIK = Turkestan Central Executive Committee
238
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~ r
TsIK = Central Eaecutive Co~mittee
~ VRP(b) = All-IInion Comuaist Party (of Bolsheviks)
VTsIR = Al1-Union Central E=ecutive Committee
COPYRIGHTs Glavnaya redalctsipa vostochnay literatury izdatel'stva �'Nauka", 1981.
3024
CS O: 8044/0859
- EPID -
239
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