JPRS ID: 10496 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1
FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY
- JPRS L/ 10496
,
6 May~ 1982
- ~st E u ro e R e o rt ~
~ p ~
cFOUO 2af82~
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST IiVFORiVIATION SERWICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000500460009-1
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foTeign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
' last line of a brief, indicate how the original informa.tion was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
- The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATIOr:
- OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000540060049-1
FOR OFF'ICI.AL USE ONLY
, JPRS L/10496
6 May 1982
~
WEST EUROPE REPORT
l~'OUO 28~82)
~ CONTENTS
ECONOMIC
BELGI~iJM
Journal Accuses USSR of Fraudulent Pipe Salzs
(Steve Polus; POURQUOI PAS?, 28 Jan 82) 1
FRANCE
Economist, Mauroy on Reduced Workweek, Unemployment
(VALEiTRS ACTUELLES, 22-28 Feb 82, LE SOIR, 5 Mar 82).. 4
Sauvy Analyzes 39-Hour Week, by Jean-Francois Gautier
Mauroy Writes to Belgian Paper
Farmers~ Union Leader Interviewed on Agricultural Folicy
- (Florence Portes Interview; PARIS MATCH, 19 Feb 82)... 9
POLTTICAI~
FEDERAI, REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
North Rhine-Westphalia~s ~.au on SPD, Greens, Coalition
~Johannes Rau Interview; STERN, 25 Mar 82) 1!~
Kohl's Choice for a CDU, CSU Czbinet Given
(Martin Bernstorf; CAPITAL, Apr ~32) 17
SPi-.TN
Spaniards~ Allegiance to Democracy Allegedly Increasing
(CAMBIO 16, 29 Mar 82) 20
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
4 ~'1R OFFICiAL liSE ON~.Y ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500060009-1
FOR OFFICIAI. U~N: 01~JI.Y
MILITARY
FRANCE
SNIAS, Thomson-CSF Collaborate on Antimissile Project
(Pierre Langereux; AIR ET COSMOS, 27 Mar 82) 27
_ Euromissile Group Completes Studies on Antitank Missiles
(Yierre Langereux; AIR ET COSMOS, 27 Mar 82) 31
Brief s
Air-to-Air Mi.ssile Tes.t 33
� Antitank Missile Night Zaunches 33
GENERAL
FRANCE
- Japan, South Korea Show Interest in Super Puma, Satellites
(AIR ET COSMOS, 27 Max 82) 34
- Brief s
Second Arian e I,aunch Complex 36
ITALY
Revised National Space Program for 19$2-86 Approved
- (Pierre Langereux; AI~ ET COSMOS, 3 Apr 82) 37
- b -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL~'
ECONOMIC BELGIUM
JOURNAL ACCUSES USSR OF FRAUDULENT PIPE SAI,ES
- Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in F~:Ench 28 Jan 82 pp 12-13
[A.rti~le by Steve Polus: "When Brezhnev Screws the Belgians"]
[Text] At the risk of being very vulgar, one should recall that one can do
anything with pipes, including screw one's neighbor. This is what certain
well-inf.ormed participants at the reception celebrating--all at the same time--
Brezhnev's son, Belgian-Soviet friendship, the excellent Tubemeuse contracts,
and hundreds of jobs created at Flemmale-sur-Cools must have been telling
= themselves the other day. This had nothing to do with the people demonstra-
ti.ng for Polar..d; no, they were quickly silenced. It was a much more pleasant
matter.
The fact is that while the USSR is b uying Tubemeuse pipes from Belgium, it is
floodir~g Belgium--through an intermediary German company--with pip2s sold at
dumping pri~es. Better yet, Belgium has modified its laws in order to allow
these illegal imports to compete better witYi its own producers--in this case,
~ Tubel, a subsidiary of Tubemeuse....
The Russians Are Bringing Down Prices
Of course you don't have to tap your forehead with your finger and open your
eyes wide, but it helps. When one sees this sen.seless movement of pipes
between Flanders, Wallony, and the Gulag, there is in fact good reason to ask
oneself whether the Belgians have become completely demented.
' You don't know Tubel? You can be forgiven for this: the company was created
only last June (retroactive to 1 January 1981) l~y the amalgamation of four
f-actories which represent practically the whole light weight pipe sector of
Belgium.
These four factories--two in Wallony, two in Flanders--used to belong to
Tubemeuse and to the French company Valexy. When the government put Tubemeuse
' back on its feet by purchasing 72 percent of its stock (as against 28 percent
of the German Benteler group's stock), it took adt~antage of this 2 years
later, to put the welded pipe sector back in order. Thus, Tubel came into
being, with, as its shareholders, Tubemeuse (31 percent), the Walloon region
(31 percent). We should mention in passing that we have here, as in the case
of Cockerill-Yards, one of the rare examples in which the Walloon region holds
1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500064409-1
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
shares in factories in Flanders. The Flemish did not believe it necessary to
reciprocate, because it was the Walloon factories that were losing more....
But now things are going much better.
But things would be even better if it were not for the Russians and their pipes
of doubtful quality which are bringing the prices down.
~ Who Profits From the Crime?
As usual,. it took a chance event for the secret affair to be discovered.
Actually, business had been complaining for a long time about a surplus of
welded gas pipes in our market. Naturally, the Germans, who are the best
~ commercial partners of the Soviets, were suspected of lending themselves to
a classic scheme: once in the FGR, t~e goods were "nationalized" ECC and,
thanks to the free circulation of goods, the trick was played. Naturally,
EEC regulations forbid this practice of direct imports, but just try to
- distinguish between goods put into free circulation in Germany and then ~
- reexported and goods in transit.
In Belgium, in any case, the Russian pipes were il~egal, because a decree
fixed the import quota at zero. It is thus with the satisfaction of duty
accomplished that, last May, the customs officials of Lichtenbusch stopped
entire lines of trucks filled with pipes. The documents, which were fake,
indicated that FGR as the country of origin. But everything was so much
under control that the shippers had not even taken the trouble to remove the
labels in Cyrillic script which were on the bundles of pipes. Who were the
shippers? The Sairex company of the Dusseldorf region, which itself is part
of an extremely discreet Swiss company.
The Swiss company is so discreet that critics wonder whether it may not have
among its shareholders the Benteler group, which is itself a shareholder of
Tubemeuse and, indirectly, of Tubel. But people will imagine anything when
foundry owners and great capital are involved.... Besides which, the Board
of Directors of Tubemeuse has vigorously protested.
The Embassy Reacted
Not imaginary were the "significant tonnages" dj~scovered by the airborne
Belgian customs at Huizingen, ~he seat of Tubinaex, subsidiary of Sairex in
Belgium. There were at the very least hundreds of tons, all illPgally imported.
Even less imaginary were the howls of the Soviet representatives in Belgium,
~aho rang every possible doorbell. The~ did this so effectively that as early
as last 3 June, a ministerial decree abolished all quotas for pipes, thus
authorizing their entry. Thus, it w:is not necessary to investigate any
further an embarassing record or to remove seals--which had never been put on,
anyway. The record was in fact apparently in the process of being lost when
the insistent protests of the General Inspector of Economic Affairs, of
Fabrimetal, of the Brussels Chamber of Commerce, and of pipe wholesa]ers help-
ed cause it to reemerge....
Officially, the reason for this extraordinary complacency on the part of
Belgium toward those who are trying to screw it is that Belgian legislation
was in violation of the regulations of the EEC. Thus, Tubimex won a case.
2
,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000500460009-1
And~yet today, our permanent representative reacted only mildly before the
External Relations Division of the EEC, asking for "some degree of inspection"
into the matter--whereas what could have been asked for was "some degree of
protection" against trade dealings that have already made our industries lose
significant tonnage and that threaten employment.
As Brezhnev's was saying the other day at Fleanmal: "We look very favorably
on our relations with Belgium. They will be very conducive to friendship
between the peoples." This refrain is an unbreakable pipe. .
COPYRIGHT: 1982 POURQUOI PAS?
9886
CSO: 3100/325
3
f.'OR OFFICIAL.USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500060009-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE OhLY
ECONOMIC FRANCE
ECONOMIST, MAUROY ON RIDUCED WORKWEEK, UNEMPLOYMENT
- Sauvy Analyzes 39-Hour Week
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 22-28 Feb 82, pp 18-20
[Article by Jean-Francois Gautier: "The Sauvy Laws"1
[Text] "Create jobs"-�-a necessity for Mauroy--a "tragic
naivety," ac~~rding to Alfred Sauvy. Employment cannot
be decreed, it must be won.
"The liberal ty rant was followed by an attempt to have a charity b ureau....
Laxity is increasing, but not G single administration agr~es to recognize
its existence. Francois Mitterr~znd, a general advocate 'cf change,' has not
even deemed it useful to denounc~ it, which would have bEae~~~ easy by attribu-
ting responsibility for it t4 the former administration. Faithfulness, co~
tinuity, cowardice."
More than 80 years old, Alfred Sauvy still says no to early retirement. This
week he is published an essay entitled "Worlds in Motion" (Calmann-Levy), in
which he severely analyzes the social policy of the new administration.
Between his office at the National Institute for Demographic Studies and his
- lecture podiums, he finds the time to create books and articles. For him,
the 39-hour week is not the major worry.
"Rediicing the workweek while maintaining salaries," he stated, "will crea*_e
very few jobs. The reduction will certainly cause some firms to hire, but
the increase in their production costs will have its effect, for example on
consumers through an increase in prices. You have to look at the entire
picture, and at the elimination of possibilities for ~obs elsewhere."
Mr. Sauvy concluded, "The expression 'create ~obs' is tragically naive."
As for the "39 hours with no change in salary," Yvon Gattaz stated last Mon-
day before the executive committee of the CNPF [National Council of French
Employers], "We consider these decisions to be unacceptable and dangerous.
They will cost firms several tens of billions of francs, at a time when one
out of every two is m longer agle to invest. The government decisions are
4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPR~VED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
"the easy ways out and will increase business expenses and eliminate
jobs."
Last Tuesday, Pierre Mauroy and Jean Auroux, minister of labor, decided to
raise the minimum wage 4 to 5 points above inflation in 1982. This measure
provoked a heated reaction in small and medium-size firms because of the
Pffect the minimum wage has on the calculation of other salaries. "Income
cannot be cut up like a cake," Andre Bergeron stated to the FD [Workers'
Force].
At the National Federation of Public Works (FNTP), the additional cost of
Auroux's laws (39-hour week and a fifth week of vacation) ~s estimated to
be 8 percent of the average salary total. This will be the case in other
labor-intensive industries, where "39 hours" will first of all mean the
necessity of paying doubletime for a new supplementary hour.
"Such a surcharge will be intolerable," says the FNTP. "Most contracts are
signed with fixed prices, or cancelled within three months."
Economists present two opposing theses when analyzing employtnent problems.
The first is that adopted by the Mauroy government, in which national employ-
- ment is a fixed quantity which the state must divide equally among all French-
men. The second is that upheld by Sauvy, ~aho believes that only competitive
work creates jobs, because it creates wealth to reinvest.
Sauvy denounces the first opinion as being based on a dangerous dogma. "In
today's state of degradation," he writes, "employment must be provided by
'the lord.' It is a goal in itself, and efficiency is no longer a criterion.
The Prime Minister, Pierre Mauroy, who has decreed a crusade for employment,
has made no mention of this efficiency."
The former colleague of Leon Blum, Paul Reynaud, and Pierre Mendes-France
is also irritated by the false logic of the "sharing of labor" when it
leads, in "solidarity contracts," for example, to exchanging a preretirement
for a first job.
"We cannot say that the ideas on employment are vague," noted Sauvy. "TheY
are opposed to reason, to the extent that they have come to consider the in-
active man as a useful being, almost a benefactor, and the active man, the
producer of wealth, as a bothersome if not dangerous man. After this, any .
action, especially the worst, is allowed. The productive sector is loaded
and overloaded until it folds and sends the creators of wealth to the cate-
gory of inactive benefactors."
The system dismantled by Sauvy has been tested. I~ast week Gattaz recalled,
"In 1981, business finances underwent an historic slump, profits fell 40
percent, one firm out of two can no longer invest, and 20,000 of them have
folded." A fifth week of vacation, which, according to the CNPF, will cost
French businesses 32.5 billion francs, is going to be grafted onto this
f.ragile structure. Who will pay?
5
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540060009-1
FOR OFF'IC'IAL USE ONLY
Several times in his book, Sauvy berates a"general spoile3-child attitude,"
a"laxity," and political "cowardice." He writes: "Struggle itself is bene-
ficial. Unemployment, inflation crisis, deficits, drugs, child neglect,
crime, and terrorism all have the same clear, general cause: weakness....
The spoiled child is, in sum, looking for a completely agreeable, pleasant,
and easy time, in which he is free and helped.
Sauvy concludes on "pleasure and consummation" by citing Paul Valery: "The
mind opens the veins in a dream."
COPYRIGHT: 1982 "Valeurs Actuelles".
Mauroy Writes to Belgian Paper
Brussels LE SOIR in French 5 Mar 82, pp 1, 8
[Text] Invited by the Catholic Conference, where he will
speak this Thursday at 1800 hours at the Beaux-Arts Palace
on the great challenges faced by our societies, Pierre
Mauroy will meet with the King and the head of state,
Wilfried Martens, during his private stay in Brussels.
Friday morning, the Frence Prime Minister will pay an of-
ficial visit to the European Communities. Upon the oc-
casion of his first trip to Belgium since heading the
F`rench Government, Mauroy, herald of the fight against un-
ti ' employment in France, has written an article on this sub-
ject for LE SOIR.
For almest a decade, the world has been going through a new economic crisis
caused originally by the tremendous increase in the cost of energy and raw
materials. Faced with this crisis, most Western democracies have looked for
responses and solutions in deflationary policies--that is, in a massive re-
duction of public expenditures for economic stimulation or social aid, and in
the establishment of interest rates at ridiculous levels.
Today everyone can evaluate the results.
In Great Britain production is declining, there are over 3 million unem-
ployed, and price increases are still above 12 percent. In the United States
production is again declining, over 8 percent of the workforce is unemployed,
and the rate of price increases in 1981 was higher than that of 1980, despite
a 2-percent decrease in the cost of imported raw mate rials.
I myself think that Milton Friedman and his theories are largely responsible
for the crisis which we are undergoing.
I do not in fact believe that the behavior of a modern country's economy can
be reduced to controlling the money supply or sanctifying the unemployment
rate.
6
FOR OFF[C[AL USE G~NLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500060009-1
FOR OFFIt'IAL I:SN: UN1.Y
Of course, I am aware that in the past the left often had real difficulty in
controlling the monetary and financial b alance. But we have the problem of
drawing lessons from history, and today we are fully aware of the fact that
without stable money, controlled inflation, abundant savings, and financial
systems that are in good shape, we will not rea~h our goals--particularly
our employment goals.
, Since 10 May, France has embarked on another path. The victory of the left
is not, as some have dared to say, the sign that the French have relaxed
their efforts. On the contrary, it is a sign of the will of th e majority
- of the country no longer to live passively th rough the crisis, but to attack
the causes and not just limit ourselves to undergoing the effects. I will
add that the political change is also a generational change.
This sign of vitality is one of our deepest reasons for hope. The French
have not turned their backs on effort. They only want, and this is no
small hope, this effort to be distributed differently--for it no longer
The French have therefore said no to a certain way of managing their country.
They have said no to the language of numbers, which has swept away any hint
of humanity, and no to the invitation "to manage the unforeseen. No to this
drought, to this call to [accept; fate, to these calls to resign,ourselves to
an unemployment p rob lem which threatens to sh atter the vital force of the
country, which plunges too many youngsters into despair, and which, if it were
to continue and grow, would sooner or later lead the workers to revolt.
We are not looking f or the road to recovery in an unresponsible France, drown-
ing in subsidies, a France in which corporationism and bureaucracy would im-
pose their laws on the state, a France which would renounce its international
commitments and cut itself off from the world.
We are looking for it in the path of growth, on the one hand, and in a new
divisi.on of labor on the other hand.
~ We want to have the maximum growth possible, which we have set at 3 percent
- this year. But this growth itself will not allow us to absorb more than hali~
of the annual increase of the active population, about 250,000 individuals.
And this does not include women wh o jus tifiably hope to estab lish their in-
dependence through employment.
A new sharing of labor '.s necessary. The fight for employment is based on a
gradual reduction and restructuring of the workweek. We have set 35 hours per
week as the goal to be reached in 1985.
But for such a policy to have maximum effect, it must definitely be imple-
mented on a European level. That is why the President of the Republic and the
� n
FYench government have advocated a European social space. At a time when
the construction of Europe is making no headway, it is looking for a larger
plan, we propose to bring social policies into line. The intertwining of our
7
FOR.OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540060009-1
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
economies demands this. The current adaptation of our means of prodt~ction
~ will permit it. Only the poa.itical will is lacking.
This is what I have come to propose in Brussels, in this European capital.
9720
- CSO: 3100/413
8
FOR ~OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000540060049-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ECONOMIC FRANCE
FARMERS' UNION LEADER INTERVIEWED ON AGRICULTURAL POLICY
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 19 Feb 82 pp 89-91, 108
[Interview by Florence Portes with Francois Guillaume, president of the
National Federation of Farmers Unions, by Florence Portes; date and place
not given]
[ExcerptsJ French farmers, discontent with their lot,
have found in Francois Guillaume, president of the
powerful National Federation of Farmers Unions (FNSEA),
the leader they have been seeking for years. The man
looks good in a three-piece suit in Paris and speaks
well and in a direct way about a little-known profession,
while at the same time he manages a 1:15-hectare farm in
Lorraine. He has taken the lead in a revolt that is
now European in its dimensions. As a matter of fact,
an upcoming event could rekindle the agricultural crisis:
At the end of March, European prices are to be fixed in
Brussels. Guillaume has said that he will be inflexible.
The FNSEA head is demanding a 16-percent increase, while
negotiations are going to revolve around 9 percent.
The relationship between the Socialist government and
the FNSEA has gotten off to a bad start. "They have
- tried to destabilize us," accuses Guillaume, who also
thinks that "Madame the Minister of Agriculture" cannot
hold here own vis-a-vis the British and German negotiators.
[Question] Francois Mitterrand has agreed to meet with you. Does that in
your view represent a"victory" over your "enemy," Edith Cresson?
[Answer] Let's say that it represents a certain retaliation, in light of the
constant, repeated attacks leveled at us for the past 10 months and of the
systematic attempts to destabilize the FNSEA--in vain, I must say.
[QuestionJ Destabilize the FNSEA? How?
[Answer] By saying that the FNSEA's policies and f armers are rightwing, so
~ their arguments are not professional but poli.tical. Our biggest crime in
their opinion is that we are not members of the Socialist Party. But that is
not really true, because in the FNSEA we have people with all different lean-
ings (850,000 farmers out of 1 million pay dues to us) who draw a clear line
_ 9
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500060009-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
between their personal political views and their responsibilities as fariners.
We have socialists and communists. They may criticize the government as
farmers, while for other reasons they continue to vote for the left. The
- opposite was true before.
[Question] In your opinion, why did the President decide to give you this
interv~ew?
[Answer] I am not interested in politics, but the President, who is a sharp
politician, could not have failed to learn from the results of the parliamen-
tary elections right before the cantonal elections. Moreover, the size and
extent of the demonstrations show that it is not just a few leaders, as they
have implied up to now, who are noi~ happy with the current policy. Maybe
the President also wants to reconcile with the farmers before the Brussels
negotiations, which have gotten off to a bad st~rt and are heading toward s
stalemate.
[Question] After this gesture of reconciliation, the demonstrations should
quiet down.
[Answer] Certainly not. Farmers know from experience that it would be to
their disadvantage to let up the pressure on Brussels and Paris. Although
they view the meeting granted as positive, they are waiting for significant
actions--decisions regarding their income and a new attitude toward their
labor union. �
[Question] Could Mme Cresson be your partner in this new policy?
[Answer) She is our minister, and that will not change. It is true that in
all our contacts with her up to now, she has been the one mainly responsible
for the failure to reach any agreement, by behaving more like a missionary
of the Socialist Party than an official of a ministerial department. She
has just changed the staff of her office. This ~s perhaps a psychological
way of giving credence to a shift toward a policy more favorable to us.
[Question] Some farmers criticize her for being incompetent, others because
she is a woman. Which of these "f aults" is most important?
[Answer] Incompetence. Other ministers before her were incompentent when
they arrived in the ministry, but they tried to correct it quickly because
they were responsible. We do not think that the fact that she is a woman is
the least bit negative. Why? Women farmers have for a long time found their
place in managing farms. A better question might be why is it the women who
are most aggressive with her.
[Question] When?
[Answer] At Poitiers, for instance. Wamen led the demonstration there.
They realize perhaps more than men that Edith Cresson is not one of them,
that she neither can nor knows how to take account of their social origin,
of their motivations and mentality. In a word, she does not understand them.
10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1
FOR OFFICIAL USr~ ONLY
[Question] Would you advise her to stop tr~~ing to ra~ly the women?
[Answer] That is her decision, but she doesn't seem to have understood yet....
[Question] Do ,you think she is capable of defei~.ding the French position in
Brussels?
[Answer] She does have a certain tenacity. But just knowing how to say no is
not enough. She has to find the arguments and not let herself get trapped
in a deadlock situation.
_ [Question] There is a crisis situation, an inextricable one. The French
Government cannot ~.ut the Gordian knot all by itself.
[Answer] It has known for months what the problem was. Negotiations are
prepared for well in advance and not "at the last minute," as Edith Cresson
and the Prime Minister say, as they brush aside our suggestions and proposals
with a sweep of the hand, adding that it is none of ou�r business. To negoti-
ate is to gradually bring the adversary over to your side. That is what the
~ English did.
[Question] Have you at least succeeded in working out a satisfactory strategy
for the Brussels negotiations with your German counterpart, Baron von Hermann?
[Answerl The lack of coordination between the government and us has meant
that we have had to try to make our European Colleagues aware of our position
- wit;iout knowing the French Government's intentions! Can you imagine what a
handicap that is? It will be even greater when we meet with our British
colleagues.
[Question] Will there be a clash in Brussels?
[Answer] In view of the statements made by French politicians before they
came to power, it is possible that the French Government will refuse to agree
to continue the famous monetary compensation. What didn't we hear about these
compensatory amounts under Giscard! Since then, we have been told that they
must be abolished! But they have to get the Germans to agree before they
can eliminate them! As for prices, we have an alternative. Either we give
in to the British or we do not. If we don't, it is very likely that there
will be a stalemate.
[Question] And then?
[Answer) Then we are in a deadlock, and in cases such as this, the one who
C~111 hold out the longest wins.
[Question] And what do you think of that?
[Answer) We could do that, but only on condition that it is not the French
farmers who bear the brunt of the consequences. I told the President that
if he ~pted for that tactic, then he must work out some arrangement so that
the price of milk and meat can increase normally on 1 April.
11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1
FOR OFFII::r'::, iJSE ONLY
[Question] You want a French solution outside the rules of the Common Market.
[Answer] That is not my business. You must understand that since we were
not asked to join in the negotiations, and since they rejected our proposals
for a French strategy and sent us back to our desks, thA only position we
can take is to stand by our demand, namely that prices increase by more than
16 percent on 1 April, without invoiving ourselves in how that will be done.
We do not want to be held responsible for a poor strategy. I will play my own
game. I am circulating information among German and British farmers. I am
organizing demonstrations, but I do not want to get involved in the debate.
[Question] Do you regard the Common Market as a necessary evil?
[Answer] I would say instead that the Common Market is positive but that it
is currently letting itself be dominated by the British, with the Germans
as accomplices. ~he others do not count for very much.
[Question] Why are the Germans in collusion?
[Answer] Because the socialists are in power in German.y, and socialists have
never been interested in farming. That is quite clear in all socialist count-
ries, the extreme example being the Eastern [European] countries, where
socialism has completely missed its objectives. It is also true in France,
where only Mitterrand is somewhat interested in farming, while all the members
of his government are interested only in control by the workers. The German
Government is not very concerned with farming, either. If it weren't for
Ertl, the liberal agriculture minister, a man who has been in the business for
15 years and who knows all the ins and outs of the trade, [German] farmers
would be very poorly served. Let's not even talk about England during the
Labor administration.
- [Question] Is there any hope for French farming under a socialist government?
[Answer] There are many different types of socialism. I would be very upset
if it took on a communistic form. If it took a turn as it has in Germany,
that would not be a catastrophe. But in other areas this government has
already gone a great deal fartr,er than the socialist program.
[Question] You are thinking of the property agencies and the commodity
agencies. These projects seem to have reached a standstill, haven't they?
[Answer] StL~ies on the property agency are progressing, since a bill will
be submitted to the spring session, but it will be only a very general
proposal. The initial project has in fact been considerably watered down.
A number of provisions were eliminated, including the commodity agencies.
[Question] Why?
[Ans~aer] They were in complete violation of the provisions of the Rome
Treaty. Moreover, the [government] was forced to see that they were not
tenable because of the Kafkaesque nature of the sy~tem which would have to
be set up for controls. .Finally, with the farmers dissatisfied, perhaps
12
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1
�
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
the government decided that this is not the time. General ideas developed
in vitro and implementation of a project once decided on are two entirely
different things. But I am under the impre4sion that Mme Cresson still
intends to put them into practice, because she has made up her mind to do so.
[Questi~n] So your~ ~nly hope is Mitterrand?
[tl~iswer] Yes. Besides being the chief of state, he is the only one in the
. government who is sensitive to rural issues. He has the good sense of someone
from the countryside, and he has the innate knowledge that nothing should be
done precipitously. I asked clear questions. it is up to him to make the
decisions. We will judge the actions.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 by Cogedipresse S. A.
9805
CSO: 3100/425
13
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504060009-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- POLITICAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA'S RAU ON SPD, GREENS, COALITION
Hamburg STERN in German 25 Mar 82, pp 212-213
[Interview with Johannes Rau, minister-president of the North Rhine West-
phalia, by STERN editors Heiner Bremer, Ulrich Rosenbaum and Felix Schmidt:
"'Should We Decide in Favor of Weeds...?"'; date and place not specified]
[Text] STERN: Herr Rau, when was the last time you talked to the chancel-
lor?
Rau; On 5 March durin g a discussion between minister-presidents and the
chancellor, and at an earlier date when the situation in North Rhine-West-
phalia c~une up for discussion.
STERN: I am sure he took you aside and told you that you should prepare soon
for succeeding him.
Rau: He did not say a word about that. There is no reason why Helmut
Schmidt should think about a successor, and I do not intend to become any-
body's successor.
STERN: But do you not want to succeed yourself--if therF are Landtag elec-
tions in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1985?
Rzu: I think I am capable of that.
STERN: But if the countrywide trend continues in the FRG, one will have to
be prepared for a four-party system--which means including the "Greens."
_ Cor?ld you imagine yourself as minister-president in a coalition with the
"Greens"?
Rau; In my opinion it seems more likely tha~ by 1985 the ~'green" mavement
will have come to a standstill.
STERN: If an SPD mayor would ask your~ advice today, whether he should coop-
erate with the "Greens" to preserve the ma~ority--would you advise him to do
so?
Rau: No. At the present time I could not give him this advice, because in
my opinion the "Greens" are unable to negotiate and operate--because of~their
14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000500460009-1
FOR OFFIC'IAL UtiE ONI.ti'
system of councillors and the basis of their independent democratic setup and
because of their intentian to rotate the leaders of the mandate.
STERN; Apparently not every leading SPD personality sees it the same way.
~ Hans-Jochen Vogel in Berlin, for instance, is betting that the "Greens" or
the Alternatives will adapt themselves to the parliamentary rules and thus
they will become more predictable and will perhaps be able to work in a
coalition.
Rau: As a Social Democrat I am betting on the SPD and I am not speculating
on what the "Greens" will be like when�they will be "green" in a different
manner from what they are today. ~
STERN: But how "green" should the SPD be permitted to be? In particular, we
~ like to call attention to the dispute that arose when Prof Loewenthal brought
up the question, whether the SPD should provide an opening for the "Greens "
or whether it would be preferable for the SPD to rely on industrial workers,
its old base.
Rau; Loewenthal is certainly right when he states that the working class is
the foundation of the SPD. But today these workers are also concerned about
problems such as environmental pollution, ecology and economics. The prob-
' lem is not that one person wants clean air and the other one wants a~ob.
Even the person who is working in the Ruhr area wants quality of life and
clean air. And the issue is not only to preserve beautiful, green residential
~ areas but to introduce green things to those places tha~ are currently gray.
STERN: After all, the SPD and its postwar building policy contributed to
the fact that the cities are so gray....
Rau; ...and now, when the choice is between weeds and concrete, should we
choose weeds? Certainly not.
STE'RN: But these gray concrete cities are the areas where you are losing
your regular voters. What are you doing to reverse the trend?
Rau: As a matter of fact, the SPD wi11 have to start in the cities to make
up for its loss in compentence. I feel, for instance, that we must create
new initiatives to establish new ways of neighborly coexistence. And anyway:
the SPD should not be a debating club engaged in literary criticism, but it
must deal with the realities of life.
STERN: Speaking about enjoying debates, you will have a tough time during
the upcoming federal SPD rally, particularly when the question of counter-
arming comes up for discussion. Will the chancellor be b acked by the party
after all?
Rau; Yes, it will be quite evident.
STERN; How much of a majority--51 to 49 percent?
15
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504060009-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLI'
Rau; No, there will bE a large ma.jority. Because it wi11 not be a matter of
conducting a special ;~minar on counterarming moratoriums--although there
are al;aays many who think so--but of articulating a political will. It means:
promoting the negotiations in Geneva and making very clear that our goal is
' not rearmament but fewer missiles in Europe.
STERN: Erhard Epp7ar, however, is totally opposed to counterarming....
Rau: Erhard Eppler is an important voice wif~hin the SPD....
STERN: ...important enough to be reelected to the presidium?
Rau: During the federal party rally in Munich we will first elect an execu-
tive committee for the party, which will subsequently decide on the compo-
sition of the presidium.
STERN; Will you personally support Eppler?
Rau: As far as I am concerned, Epple~ is part of the spectrum of the party,
and his activities as chairman of th~~ SPD Fundamental Values Commission are
already enough of a reason to reelect him--at least I intend to do that.
STERN; Not only the left wing is putting pressure on the chancellor but also
the win g representing the working class. Worker~ feel that the government is
not doing enough when it comes to its employment policy. What will happen to
the coalition if clear demands are going to be adopted in Munich--for in-
stance, for a labor market or a supplemental levy?
Rau: As f ar as I am concerned, it would not endanger the coalition. If that
were the case, every FDP rally would be endangering the coalition.
STERN: Is it not a fact, however, that for some time now the Bonn coalition
has been maintained not so much because of agreements on certain matters but
rather because the Union and Helmut Kohl have not been able to come up with
an alternative for the FDP?
Rau: In my opinion, the SPD and the F'DP agree no less on matters regarding
foreign policy and detente, domestic and judicial policies as well as educa-
tional policies than they did at the beginning of the coalition. Sometimes
conflicts in the econopolitical realm are clouding this fact.
STERN: The question remains whether the FPD will still be of the same opin-
ion if in the fa1.1 the CDU should come to power in Hesse, and Bonn will sub-
sequently be threat~ened by a policy of blockade pursued by the Union in the
Bundesrat. If this should happen, would it not~be better if the SPD demanded
new elections?
Rau: I see no reason for new elections before 1984. I think, Helmut Schmidt
lrnows that the majority is behind him. But the style that is being used in
Bonn, how they talk and act, must be shaped in such a manner that the ma~ority
of the voters can identify with it.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Gruner + Jahr AG & Coo
~997-
CSO: 3103/387 16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000540060009-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
POLITICAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
KOHL'S CHOICE FOR A CDt;CSU CABINET GIVEN
Hamburg CAPITAL in German Apr 82 pp 12-13 ~
' /Report by Martin Bernstorf: "Alternstive List"/
/Text/ If the government should fall overnight, a new chancellor
--in the present situation Helmut Kohl--must immediately present a
new cabinet. The list is fairly solid.
Should the Schmidt-Genscher Government fa11 tomorrow, 16 federal ministers and
20 parliamentary state secretaries or state ministers will become eligible for a
pension, in addition to the present chancellor. Another 24 civil service state se-
cretaries are likely to retire to a government subsidized private life. Also to be ~
added in accordance with long-standing custom are a few dozen ministerial directors
who, as "political officials," may not choose to survive a change in government.
All of them must be replaced. It is therefore not surprising that, the more frequent-. ~
ly the imminent demise of the government is predicted, the more vehemently an entire
horde of pr~umptive successors pushes at the starting gates. After all, many are
ready but few are chosen.
If we assume that the fraction raises him up on the shield and the Bundestag elects
him, Chancellor Kohl will try for a broad government majority. In other words he
will invite the FDP to coalition negotiations, even though the liberals--rent by
internal dissensions--seem to be capable of no more than toleration for a minority
Union cabinet.
Should the FDP join in after all, the Union will have to leave it its current proper-
ty, that is the foreigro interior, economics and agriculture ministries. Maintained
in their offices will be the current office holders Hans-Dietrich Genscher (foreign
affairs) and Gerhart Rudolf Baum (interior). Agriculture Minister Josef Ertl, on
the other hand, is likely to take the opportunity to retire to private life, as he
has often indicated the wish to do so. Otto Graf Lambsdorff would also have the un-
expected chance of leaving the political arena without this appearing to be in
direct connection with the allegations raised against him ~n the party donation
scandal by the public prosecutor's office.
Many Free Democrats are resdy to assume Lambsdorff's mantle (CAPITAL 2/1982), but
party chief Genscher has so far refrained from naming his candidate for the job. .
17
' CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1
N0~2 OFFICIAL USF: ONI.Y
"lirother Josef" Ertl's job might be inherited by Rhineland-Palatinate deputy Dr Wolf-
gang Rumpf who is a forester and adequately experienred in ~farming matters too.
Moreover he has gained quite a reputation in the fraction and elsewhere.
The other government personnel would come from the CDU and CSU. CSU chairman and
unsuccessful chancellor candidate of 1980, Franz Josef Strauss, still claims the most
important department: He aspires unce more to become federal finance minister, a
post he held in the grand coalition of 1966-1969. Should, against all expectations,
Strauss prefer to remain mini~er president of Bavaria, the alternative generally
menticned has been Schleswig-Holstein Minister President Gerhard Stoltenberg. In
fact the tall and cool man from the north has steadily pursued federal politics from
his stronghold in Kiel. Following the CDU's electoral success in the municipal elec-
tions, Sbltenberg now aims for a matching victory in next year's Landtag election.
That is oue of the reasons why his name is more and more frequently mentioned as a
future CDU federal chancellor.
After all, something is quite certain: No later than the fall of next year (as-
suming the Union is then still in opposition), the party will have to settle on a
top candidate for the 1984 Bundestag election. In that event Stoltenberg must de-
finitely be given a chance against Helmut Kohl, although it would hardly be possible
to pass over the latter in case of a sudden change in government between elections
seeing that he is indeed the current head of the party and fraction.
There is some doubt at the moment whether, in case of a government upheaval,
Stoltenberg would be willing to serve under Kohl in Bonn. The th ird choice for the
ministry for finance would then be Svabian Dr Hansjoerg Haefele.
The defense ministry has long been disputed between two aspirants: Svabian Dr Man-
fred Woerner, a dashing offier of the reserve and jet pilot, and Strauss' steward
in Bonn, CSU Land group chief Dr Friedrich (Fritz) ~immermann. The latter is over-
due for a government job but cannot be considered for the ministry of justice (which
he would like to have), because there are some unexplained questions about his past.
He has been suspected of perjury. Kohl is said to be rea3y, as a favor to Strauss,
to give preference to Zimmermann and rebu~f 'long-standing defense expert Woerner.
'I~ao more CSU seniors would move into the cabinet alongside Friedrich Zimmermann:
Nuremberg's Dr Oscar Schneider, for many years chairman of the Bundestag committee
on regional planning, construction and urban construction, to be minister for con-
struction, and Bavarian education minister Pr~f Hans Maier to be minister for educa-
tion and science. In Munich Maier fearlessly deals with all-powerful Franz Josef
Strauss; he may well consider advancement in Bonn as a general promotion.
' One problem remaining is th~a ministry of justice. Kohl would like to recruit former
judge Walter Wallmann. Ho~aever, Wallmann has become well-nigh indispensable as
. chief mayor of Frankfurt, Moreover, should the CDU once again fail to gain power in
this fall's Hesse election, Wallmann is supposed to replace CDU Land chairman Alfred
Dregger. Consequently Dr Carl--Otto Lenz, son of deceased Adenauer state secretary
Otto Lenz and long-standing chairman of the Bundestag judiciary committee, has hopes
of obtaining the appointment. ~
Dr Rainer Barzel, 1972 chanceilor candidate, is also to be given cabinet rank again.
As a young man Barzel was Adenauer's minister for a11-German affairs but not long
18
FOR OFF[C[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000540060009-1
FOR OFFICIAI. USE OhLY
enough to lay claim to a ministerial pension. He would once again be given the de-
partment for inner-German relations.
Some other appointments are virtually certain from the aspect of technical expertise:
Dr Norbert Bluem, currently Berlin federal senator and chairman of the CDU social
committee, is set ~o be appointed minister for labor and social affairs, media expert
Christian Schwarz-Schilling minister for posts and telecommunications, traffic e~ert
Dr Dieter Schulte minister for transport. Dr Helga Wex, chairwoman of the CDU
women's federation, is to take the helm at the ministry for youth, family and health
--the only concession to women.
Kohl will take his confidant and parliamentary manager Dr Philipp Jenninger along to
be state minister at the chancellery, The question remains whom Helmut Kohl is goiig
to appoint government spokesman and champion of his policies vis-a-vis the public.
We may assume that he will not choose a journalist but prefer to appoint a colleague
- from the fraction, who has ambitions in this field.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co
11698
CSO: 3103/408
19
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONtY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SPAIN
POLITICAL
SPANIA~DS' ALLEGIANCE TO DEMOCRACY ALI.EGEDLY INCREASING
Madrid, CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 29 Mar 82 pp 24, 2~
[Article by J. M. A.: "What You Would Do in Case of a Coup--Overwhelming
Majority of Spaniards in Favor of Democracy"]
[Te~t] More than half of the Spaniards would now. even be prepared to defend
democracy in case ofanother survey�institutepputeth t~samesquestionhthroughstha.s
Exactly a year ago,
magazine.
The comparison of both opinion studies, today's study and the one 12 months ago,
offers a very clear result which reveals the maturity and responsibility of the
Spaniards. The citizen increasingly feels inclined to defend dunchanced a~ nly
other hand, the population's pro-coupist sector has remain~d g
3 percent.
A few days after the failed coup d'etat of 23 February, 47 percent of those
questioned replied that they would do nothing in case of a new attempt. Today,
this passive sector has shrunk to 29 percent. Democracy consequently has more
active support. Looking at the sex breakdown, men proved to be more committed
to legality. Women on~th~hetotherhandentheiripassivity increases with 33hper-
percentages than men,
cent who "would do nothing.
The enormous rejection of coupism by a portion of the civilian population seems
to spring from the conviction that it is expressed in the answer to another
question� Except for S percent, nobody believes that a hy~othetical triumph of
the seditionists would help settle tWOUld~beeworse off andn9apercenBethought
63 percent replied that the country
that the situation would be the same.
No Social Base
The survey by the Emopublica Institute, one of the biggest and therefore one with
- the highest index of reliability conducted so far, was carried out several days
before the start of the trial hearing. One of the questions was as follows:
"The prosecutor has asked for 30 years imprisonment for generals Milans del
Bosch and Armada and LieuDoesnthis1soundTveryoharshttoiyouarfairpaor~non thee
23 February coup d'etat.
contrary, light?"
20
F'OR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540060009-1
FOR OFF(CIAL USE ONLY
One out of every foiir men questioned thought that the punishment was light and one
out of every six thuught that it was very harsh; 39 percent thought that the
request was fair. Women proved to be more benevolent but there were also more of
them who thought that the prosecutor`s request was light, rather than. very harsh.
For 40 percent of the women, it was fair to ask for 30 years of imprisonment.
In the table analyzing the attitudes of the various job categories toward the
coup d'etat, we must stress some facts which however are simple to list: (1) If
we apply a social evaluation to the various job categories, there are no dif-
ferences by social classes and democracy and liberty are defended equally while
sedition is condemned with the same unanimity; (2) among industrial workers, the
skilled worker teels much more disposed to defend democracy than the poor peasant;
(3) entrepreneurs and manufacturers are mostly with the Constitution. Although
their percentages are the highest, only 10 percent think that they would be better
off in case of a coupist success; (4) executives, self-employed persons, and
medium-level managerial personnel most clearly line up in defense of democracy,
giving us the highest percentages regarding their behavior against the coup and
their belief that a victorious coup would mean that the Spaniards would be worse
off; (S) farmers are most inhibited with 37 percent saying that they "would do
nothing."
While, judging by the variations among job categories it seems evident that there
is not slightest social base that would support a coup d'etat, the same is true
concerning the population groups, according to the number of inhabitants of the
cities. Here there are likewise no major differences between rural and urban
Spain. Coupist support does not exceed 3 percent. In small towns, what increases
is the percentage of "don't know, no response" compared t~ the big cities.
Cities with more than half a million inhabitants exceed the percentage average
in answering the key questions: they will defend democracy,the prosecutor's re-
quest for punishment for the coup leaders is light, and if a coup were to be
victorious, the Spanish people would be worse off.
From a comparison of data among job categories and population size categories,
one might deduce--apart from the previous~y mentioned findings as to tlie absence
of a civilian base for coupism--that the higher the citizen's cultural level, the
greater his ability to ge~ information and the lesser his isolation in the area
in which he lives, the more does Y?e reject involutionism and the end of demo-
cracy.
Another important~ sector of the population, likewise represented in the survey,
expresses behavior and attitudes very similar to the preceding ones. Here we have
thosE people who do not participate actively. They include the retirees, house-
wives, students, and unemployed.
Ho~tsewives and retirees come up with very similar responses, with a high index of
passivity to a coup and one-fourth came up with "no response" or "don't know" on
other questions. Unemployed answered in a manner similar to the national averagP,
stressing their be?~ef that the penal ty asked by the prosecutor is "light."
Students proved to be more determined in replyi.ng--to the tune of 73 percent--
that they think that everything would get worse in case of a coupist success
and 65 percent a.re ready to defend democracy as against 4 percent who would sup-
port the coup.
21
,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1
_ FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
Technical Survey Data
Universe: In~dividual5 of 18 years or older. Area: Persons living on peninsula
and islands. Sample size: 10,362 personal interviews in homes. Sampli.ng error:
+1 percent in the most unfavorable case of 50 percent [replies] and with a
degree of confidence of 95.5 percent. Number of sampling points: Approximately
700. Date of field work: January-February 1982. Conducted by: Instituto
Emopublica y Saltes, S. A. Consultores.
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500460009-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
m
_
~
'o 0 0
a~ a
p, ~n a a
a~i~ a`~i 1 a~icn~
~ ~
~ai~'~O~a
-~e~'VI.-~ -rcx~-oowno~vr -rrv~n~n oo~n�-r- 1 ~1 t t3~N {
I j~/ : rt ~ ~I N N ~ ~1 r~l 1~ r N M ~I N.. ~I .r N ~ 4-1 ~ 01 ~
i ' U~ r'~ r~ ~i ^ r~
~ O ~M
= i s ~ I~ ~ 'b ~ cud
~ r7 OC C C~ '1 'T '.T T'! N P o0 f7 M 00
i M~ ~o v: r r,o ~ a~n -r r~o r ~n ~n ~o ~o r ~~o r~n cd I O O! O 0-I }a
i r-~ b0 O�~'i O cd
s
M; U� ~ ~ a~y a a~ ~i
I ; M a yaooo-aoo-~a.ooor ^yaaoo ^aao V] N~r1 N OI ~ ~
s � ^ I ~ cC ~ M Q~
i ~ N, ~ U~( N 4-~ .~i
~ c,1i v~ r-r ~n -r -r o r~ o~n r-r ,o ~n ~n ~n t ~o ~n r~n cQ Q+ 00 N U1
~d - ~ ~ ~ p0,, ~ Faj ~ /
~ ~
~ � Sa cd I ~ ~ u1
~ c~ `f OOPN V~OO~N7ry.`~. NNNN~ 1`NO~N O~j O N~
^ I j-7. ~ .'.I N ~ ~NNN ~r'Ir'1~+ ~y ~ r'~ �1"~ 'T~
~ ' ~ ^ ~
J r_ I
_ I i_ N~r--i~ ~
, ~ ~ o cd i
_ ~ eaon~+ron--NO ..~.~NNf~1 i-~=n~ r1 ~ P. U 4-~ O~
~ ~ N N NNNN ~ N NP7 ~
- M i ?G N O G. 4a 'O N
~ i
Y`I ~
, = p a -rora,o~�r~nxaa ~oooa--o or-ro f~4 LL 3 ~
- ~ n -r -r n M ~ N -r n n n r~ -r -r -r
, i
- i ri U U N p.
~ ~ , rn cd cd $ tn
" I O~ ~^N~T~070M00 d N~D ~�~~v' ~ �ri G ~ N
' . N' ~ N ~rNNN ~ N.. N.+ ~ .w ~1 H 'rI ~ S~1
NI ; N~ 00 ~ N~ O
I , ~i N R1 t~ O O �
~d G G' rl ~~i �ri O
~~~~g~;r avrN00N~ON^vN ~oaNra r~or~uoo d] N Rf ~'J 3-i ^H
- I , - I i-+ Fa ^ ~ 1~.i O 1
: c
1 N rl O~ U~ cd
N ta N O f~ �rl
~ r-roxrr+r.�orrv N ro~o ~ov~ov W~~ O I~~ ~
/ i PI PI ~I''1 r~l N N N1 ~'1 N N N ~"I i"1 N/'1 N r~ M ri ~
~ N W ~-iON O
~
~ y I I ~ vl N.0 O f~ v
= c i ~
W : - ~ p~p ~ c~0 m .~u ~I I
- - - ~T~'1Nr1~IN~TN"1M~'1 hr~nry~~ ~h~t r+ ~r
b. z i ~ ~ � w b'++ ~ ~ ~
Rf 'L.'' ~ i-~ N ~
a=- u cd i a~ 3 a~
O = ~na-rr~rN-r,o c-r aroorv ~nr~n~n .C I i-i N',3 N
U : _ - - _ _ ~n ~n ~n -r v, ~n -r -r v, ~o ~t -t ~n ~n ~o -r ,e -r ~ M O fA bD fA
' O 'Ci rl ~ ~
~ ~ ~ . . . . . . F7 ~-1 I O R1 �rl O
~n ' ' : : : : : : : p . . . . : : : j ~ tn ~ ]I al u `I
ti N ~ : : : : : : : . = : y : : : : ; ~ N F~ ~ rl I - O I
: . . . ~ O rl 'U C'+
~ ' : : � : : : ' : ' N n : : . : : : I ~ ^ N r1
~ ~ ~ . . ~ o : : : ~ : ~ W a ~ ' . . . r-i ~ o ~n a o
i L:J : ~ ~ ~ G . . . ~ . . Z o7 5~ $ � ~ . . . fU Ci iJ . n ~ ~j . ~
G O ~ ~ = n ; ' : a ' ~ L 25 ~ ~ ' : : : a.~ O ~ tn O ~
; O . ~ N'n ~ . : . v : o U ~ o ~ g ~ ~ ' : : N O 3-i t~ td i.~ U 'L7
'b ~ J W ' - ? v ' . . y y ~ ~f c7 r~ Fr � . ~n m ~ .Y+ Q~i 't~ Ul R~ ~
~ I'~ u- � n o c'n o - o E m N~5~5~ S~:,~ ' rl I.fl 'd O f
p, I~ O c.~, o~ o~ ~ E �~8 25 25 v~ o cti o I cif ~ 4a 3 I
~ I"1 a' ~ O L O~ ~u 7 ~ C~ C- vi O O O.~ Z.~ N;~ C+ 3 CV .f+ ~ H I C'~l
41 v a`, i~ ` ~ a�~~'= v~ c ~ cn M O r-I ~ r1~ I I C'1
R'., N�'- D ~ E m~�>> ~L ~ v u e, .~y O~a E �rl 'U �rl I I n
C 'L D
~ r- .~>O~n'O �cu~ ~n.~tU .~~OC~~.e .~n.-,wQ c~d r~-I O O N N H
z o c~ � ~ N
~U
~ O rl cV M ~t ~1 ~o t~ 00 O~OrI I O^ � ^ ~ ~ ~
~ e--I NC'1d u'1~Ot~ 00 0~ r-~ rl rl rl rl ri r-I rl r-I rINN r-I fA N N fA IA O N
R'i ~'i N U 0.'1
~
ro
~ Ql I ~ .C ~rl 41 .C cV
',~l. ~O 1~ F+ 1~ M
23
~ ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500060009-1
FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONLY
0 30 a~'ws de prisibr+ ~
E] f iscdl hQ ~~~citcad ,
dans del Bosch, ~
para los 9e^erales M coronei Tejero ~ .
_
~ , i ~
? ~
i i
~ ~ :
I , + ~
:r' ~ , ~ . i
. I .
~ i LE PARECE UNA PENA MUY DLIRA+
I 1U57A O POR EL CON7R RIO LEVE? ~
i~. , EN i~~ I~ brosl~ines,
'L ~ydura. ~ ~ ~
~.r ' ~
3 ~,s~e ~ ~ '
4 ~ Yss' * (
5 _ , v:~ � ~ t~
No sabe nocoMesm 'K
i i tiuni~~i ii~
- The prosecutor has asked for 30 years imprisonment for Generals r'Iilans del Bosch
and Armada and for Lieutenant Colonel Tejero. Does this appear to be a very harsh,
a fair, or a light penalty? Key: 1--In percentages; 2--Very harsh; 3--Fair;
4--Light; S--Don`t know, no response; 6--Men; 7--Women.
24
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500060009-1
FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY
t
~Que haria usted en caso de goipe de
Sz Estado? -
47 47
:
~ ~~'1
~t� ~
~ i2�. 'r .y~ ; ~9
; i~.: ~a~'t'~
~ ~
~ e ~1'y . ~'~J ~ 17
~ 'u,~,�
~ ' .
2 3 3 ~ . ~
I Ano ~ ~ . , - � � `a.�
c`a~, ~ d4c caaa~ ~ai
x ae,~% `a~ 3 a``ae~0 ra`~a~ 5~% cfi
o~~ ~ne.,
e`~~~ PQ, o .
Qe~eca/ E~~~ a Data, marzo 81
, ~ ~
Encueste Emopublica lebrero82~ J.I tiU~I~iLKS
What would you do in case of a coup d'etat? Key: 1--Year; 2--Defend democracy;
3--Support the coup; 4--Would do nothing; S--Don't know, no response; 6--Survey
date, March 1981; 7--Emopublica survey, February 1982.
- 25
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1
~ / . r. _ . Y1' ~
~ 1
- I~
� , l~
. 1
~ ~
. - . ~
- ~ ~�'/i ,
~ ~ ~ ~
Tp?o�
' ~
~5~
IU
1. H~~ VSTE~ EN ~ 9~~5 ~R
i.aUE ~_p ESTA~ ~ R+
I~
~ N~_ 2 Torar ~m Mul~res 2EN Tani h.~~res
3 peiendar n dcmoc.ecfe `~Z 'i.: S7 ; 47. ; Meiw 'r Sc . S s
4 ~ na ~e ~ ,'~~9'; ~s ~ ~3 'g~'�r '~9~ q ~ .
, ~ ~a.. 12 ~ 39
_ ~ APoyar el 9dPe Z' ~ '1 Peor
. ' -n'' ~ ' .'E6
F No seba. no corNesta 1S+ ( Nb sebe, no oaMesta ,
Key: 1--What would you do in case of a coup d'etat? 2--In percentages; 3--Defend
democracy; 4--Would do n~~thing; S--Support the coup; 6--Don't know, no response;
7--Men; 8--Women; 9--If a coup d'etat were to be victorious, would we be faring
better, same, or worse? 10--Better; 11--Same; 12--Worse.
COPYRIGHT: 1982, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
505 8 -
CSO: 3110/113
, 26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500060009-1
FOR OFFIClAL USE ONLY
MILITARY FRANCE
SNIAS, THf1MSON-CSF COLLABORATE ON ANTIMISSILE PROJECT
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 27 Mar pp 42, 48
[Article by Pierre Langereux: "SNIAS and Thomson-CSF Cooperation on SAN Naval
Surface-to-Air Antimissile Missile"]
[TextJ Aerospatiale (SNIAS) is collaborating with Thomson-CSF on the AMSA-SAN
(Surface-to-Air Antimissile-Naval Surface-to-Air Missile) project. SAN is a
vertical-launched missile designed for the point defense of surface ships.
It is being developed under the French-British AMSA program, the successor to
the "6S" program which t~as now been abandoned.
Feasibility studies of the 6S--an antiaircraft and antimissile point defense
system for surface ships of the French, German, and British navies--had been
initiated in 1975 within the NATO framework. For budgetary reasons, however,
Germany withdrew from what had all the prospects of becoming a truly European
cooperative program. Instead the FRG chose to join with the U.S.A. in
developing a less ambitious naval surface-to-air missile, the General Dynamics
RAM system which is to be installed on German Navy patrol ships. Germany's
withdrawal from the 6S program led the other partners to terminate the program,
at least in its initial form.
Approximately a year ago, the French and British navies initiated a similar
project designated AMSA. This pro~ect still calls for a shipborne antiaircraft
defense system but with the addition of an enhanced antimissile capability
designed to cope with antiship missiles of the coming decade.
In mid-1981, British and French manufacturers initiated ~oint studies which by
year's end led to the submission of various proposals to interested agencies
of both governments, proposals complete with development plans and cost
estimates.
Four proposals were submitted by different industrial consortiums whose
members include Thomson-CSF, Matra, Aerospatiale, and British Aerospace.
The proposal selected would in all cases call for equitable sharing of all
work by industries of both countries.
One of these proposals is the AMSA-SAN project submitted by Thomson-CSF and
Aerospatiale. It calls for use of a new missile whereas the other proposals
remain based on a more conventional missile.
, 27
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1
NOR ONFICIAL USE ON1.1'
French and British authorities are expected to decide this year on whether
to continue the AMSA program, and if so, announce their choice of one of the
four proposals along with terms and conditions of the nera French-British
cooperation agreement on development and production of the future missile
system.
Both navies, especially the French Navy, are highly interested in this new
AMSA system which would be scheduled to become operational by 1992.
= In the AMSA-SAN project, Thomson-CSF is responsible for the "system" part and
particularly the major electronic components--surveillance and target
acquisition radars, fire control system and command data link-~ahich are an
important element of the missile system. Aerospatiale's Tactical Missiles
Division handles the missile proper and the launch equipment.
The AMSA-SAN weapon system is designed to intercept aircraft and especially
antiship missiles of the 1990's. The threat at that time will markedly
consist of very high-speed (clearly supersonic), highly maneuverable, and
hardened missiles capable of operating in an electronic countermeasures
environment.
According to Aerospatiale officials, the SAN missile is of "revolutionary"
design and, therefore, has new capabilities in comparison with standard
present-day missiles:
a. Very short reaction time;
b. High maneuverability (more than SO gs);
c. Very high peak speed (supersonic). Thus for a given target detection
- range, the intercept range is greater than Lhe one at~3ine3 by a standard
missile, or inversely, for a given intercept range, the SAN can accept a
lower detection range, a capability which is a definite tactical advantage.
Simulations have shown that these two characteristics are those having the
main impact on the flyby distance from rapid-flying and maneuvering targets.
Consequently under the most difficult defense conditions, the SAN, with its
shorter flyby distance capability, has greater effectiveness than other
missiles. In particular, it has a very high probability of "structurally"
destroying the target, in other words, of literally stopping the attacking
missile, and no longer of inerely damaging one of its components, damage
that would not be enough to prevent it from staying on course and hitting
its target in spite of everything.
This essential characteristic of the SAN missile, namely that of having a
very short flyby�distance, is obtained by equipping the missile with a
sustainer rocket motor whose thrust can be directed around its own center of
gravity at the proper time. It is thus possible to maintain trajectory
speed and accomplish an extremely rapid "power steering maneuver" (by thrust
deflection) which combines with the action of conventional aerodynamic
flight controls--control surfaces driven by pneumatic actuators--and
considerably enhances their pPrformance.
28
,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1
FOR OFFIClAL USE ONLY
This composite flight control system, called PIF-PAF by Aerospatiale, is the
new missile's main innovation. It enables the missile to maneuver under high
load factors without thereby requiring added disadvantageous miss ile weight,
and while stiTl having a very rap~ci reaction time. ~This thrust deflection
applied to the missile at the moment of intercept thus ensures a very short
flyby distance in the terminal phase of flight. The missile can, therefore,
intercept the target by scoring a direct hit or approach close enough to destroy
it. The SAN missile is designed, in fact, to have a high single shot kill
probability against a high-performance antiship missile. Although the SAN's
range is classified, it may be assumed that it will be a short-range missile,
the detection capability of radars mounted on antiship missiles being limited
in such case because of the small equivalent radar area and low-level
flight (clutter).
This same thrust deflection capability also serves to pitch the missile over onto
its sustainer flight path after its vertical launch by a jettisonable booster
which accelerates the missile to flight speed. In addition, during the
missile's low-speed phase of flight, thrust deflection is used to slew the
' missile rapidly onto its target intercept course.
'I'he SAN missile thus derives full advantage from its vertical launch capability
which gives it the 360-degree free-fire zone needed to counter the threat of
future supersonic antiship missiles of the 1990's in a saturation attack
situation.
The SAN will, therefore, be a small supersonic missile with a thrust-deflection
sustainer motor designed by Thomson-Brandt and derived from a motor which that
company had proposed for its Brandon very short-range surface-to-air missile.
The SAN missile will be equipped with an active radar homing guidance system
developed from preliminary design studies conducted for other programs.
In France, Thomson-CSF has designed a solid-state homing guidance system and ESD
[Serge Dassault Electronics] has designed an active antiaircraft homing guidance
system (4A) whose development is supported by government technical services.
The command-data link's receiver and its associated antennas will be haused in
the wings. The missile wi11 be armed with a warhead whose explosive charge
sprays highly focalized fragments and is detonated by an electromagnetic
proximity fuse. The navigation system will use a strapTdown inertial platform.
The SAN will be delivered as a complete missile round, the missile with its
folded wing and stabilizer being housed in a cylindrical storage and launch
canister.
Land-Based Version
Aerospatiale is also planning to apply the same missile concept (PIF-PAF flight
control system) to other air defense versions, including a future land-based
surface-to-air missile capable of intercepting aircraft and tactical missiles.
29
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000500460009-1
~OR OFFICIAL USE ON1.1'
This missilea which t~~.ght also be developed ~oiz~tly w~.th. Thomson-CSF~ would
succeed the TRISAM surface-to-air missile pxo~ect, a collaborative Eurapean'-
France, Germany, and Great Sritain--~roject wh.ich had been under study for
several years but met a fate similar to that of the 6S project.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982
8041
CSO: 3100/528
~
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI.Y
MILITARY FRANCE
EUROMISSILE GROUP COMPLETES STUDIES ON ANTITANK MISSILES
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 27 Mar 82 p 43
[Article by Pierre Langereux: "ErIDG Completes Feasibility Studies on Third-
Generation Antitank Missiles"]
fText] Feasib ility studies on future third-generation medium-and long-range
antitank missiles have been completed. In mid-1981, the Euromissile
Dynamics Group (EMDG) formed by Aerospatiale (France), Messerschmitt-Boelkow-
Blohm (Germany), and British Aerospace Dynamics Group (Great Britain), submitted
the results of their 2 years of studies to official agencies in their three
respective countries. ~
In late 1981, these agencies approved the development of two new third-generation
antitank missile systems. One is a medium-range missile designed to replace
the Milan system, the other a long-range missile to replace the HOT and
Swingfire systems. EDMG is now awaiting finalization of a new memorandum
of understanding between its three partners before beginning the developr~ent
program's definition phase. These new antitank missile systems are expected
to become operational in the early 1990's.
�These missiles will be developed according to specifications ~ointly
formulated by military staffs of the three countries. The new systems will
have ranges comparable to those of the French-German Milan--2,000 meters--and
HOT--4,000 meters--systems which they will replace about the middle of tYte
next decade. These ranges are based on the dimensions of European terrsin
compartmentation wliich will not have greatly varied by that time.
On the other hand, the third-generation missiles will have to take into account
the threat of the 1990's which, unlike the terrain, will have changed with the
appearance of new and better protected tanks~-low profiles, composite armor,
etc.--as will be the case with the Soviet T-80 tank's successor.
The rate of fire will likewise l~ave to be considerably increased over that of
current missiles which must keep their launch and fire control units occupied
during the missile's entire time of flight: 13 seconds for the Milan, 18 seconds
for the HOT. Consequently the new missiles will have a fire-and-forget
capability and/or increased speed (supersonic).
31
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1
F'OR OFFICIAL USE ON1.1r
To achieve this goal, ErIDG proposes two diffex'ent design concepts for the two
systems: a fire-and--forget long range missile and a supersonic medium~-range
missile. This approach wi11 also avoid pernicious standardization of.
European weapons.
Two guidance systems have also been chosen for each of the two missiles: a
10-12 micron infrared homing seeker or an active radar homing seeker especially
for the fire-and~-forget missile. A choice will eventually have to be made
between these two guidance systems on the basis of effectiveness and
self-containment criteria.
Studies of these d.ifferent guidance systems are being conducted concurrently in
the three countri.es. In France, Thomson-CSF and SAT [Telecommunications
Corporation] are studying the infrared guidance system while ESD and Thomson-CSF
are working on the radar guidance system. In Germany, AEG-Telefunken is
studying the radar system and BGT [Bodenseewerk Geraetetechnik] the infrared
system. In Great Britain, British Aerospace is handling the infrared system
and Marconi (and Plessey) the radar system.
Development and production of the approved system or systems will then be
apportioned among industries in the three countries.
Similarly, development and production tasks for the two missile systems will
be distributed among industrial firms in the three countries, with a small
central project management organization, DEMG at this juncture, being
responsible for ma,jor decisions and courses of action. Under this plan,
Aerospatiale will handle the medium-range missile and missiie system while
British Aerospace and Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB) will be responsible
for the long-range system, with British Aerospace being responsible
specifically for the surface-to-surface version and the missile, and MBB for
the helicopter-borne version.
The cost of the new third-generation antitank missiles should not exceed the
cost of the present Milan and HOT missiles.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982
8041
CSO: 3100/528
32
' )FFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1
MILITARY FRANCE
BRIEFS
AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE TEST--The official review L'ARMAMENT revealed this week
that Matra's new air-to-air missile Magic 2 had successfully completed its
first in-flight test firing at the Landes Test Center (CEL) on 18 November
1981. The missile was launched from a Mirage 3 aircraft assigned to the
Cazeaux Flight Test Center. The test was conducted as part of the Magic 2
deve7apment program begun in 1978. The new missile is designed to arm the
Mirage 2000, Dassault Breguet's new combat aircraft. [Text] [Paris AIR ET
COSMOS in French 27 Mar 82 p 41] [COPYRIGHT: A. ~ C. 1982] 8041
ANTITANK MISSILE NIGHT LAUNCHES--Euromissile announced that to date it had
conducted 25 night firings of HOT antitank missiles from a light Dauphin
combat helicopter, and that 22 of the 25 missiles fired had scored target
hits. Euromissile officials said these results demonstrated a mastery of
thermal imaging ar.d stabilized platform technologies. The missiles were
launched from a Dauphin helicopter equipped with a thermal imaging unit
(infrared 10-12 microns) mounted on a Venus stabilized platform. The first
f.irings--at ranges of from 1,700 to 3,000 meters--were conducted at the
Bourges firing range and in connection with the Satory [French Army weapons]
show. Another series of firings were conducted in 1982, but this time at
the Cazeaux Test Center in the Landes region. Eight AOT missiles were fired
on dark nights under conditions of high humidity and as part of the
quaiification program for pre-production missiles. Seven target hits were
made. The helicopter flew at altitudes of from 10 to 100 meters either in
hover flight, or in for~ard flight at 70 to 150 kilometers per hour, or
while performing an evasive maneuver. The missiles were fired at ranges of
2,500 to 3,700 meters. The two firings at the latter range were target hits.
The French-German HOT is an antitank missile with a daytime range of 4,000
meters. It is produced jointly by Aerospatiale and Messerschmitt-Boelkow-
Blohm. [Text] [Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 3 Apr 82 p 57] [COPYRIGHT:
A. & C. 1982] 8041
cso: 3100/527
,
33
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500060009-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
GENERAL FRANCE
JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA SHOW INTEREST IN SUPER PUMA, SATELLITES
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 27 Mar 82 pp 9, 48
[Article: "Japan Interested In the Transall and the Super Puma"]
[Text] Our Tokyo correspondent informs us that as a result of a visit to
Japan by Jacques Mitterrand, president of Aerospatiale and the GIFAS
[Association of French Aeronautical and Space Industries], the Transall
[military transport] is in favorable position in its open competition with the
[Lockheed] Hercules for selection as Japan's maritime reconnaissance aircraft.
The 1983 budget could include the initial funds for three such aircraft.
The Super Puma [military transport helicopter] is under consideration for two
programs. One is a Maritime Self-Defense Force program calling for deliveries
of helicopters over a 10-year period. Super Puma's rival in this program is
- the Bell 214 [super transport helicopter]. The second is an Air Self~-Defense
Force long-range search and rescue helicopter program. In addition to the
usual American competitors, the Super Puma also faces competition in this
second program from the Boeing Vertol-Kawasaki 107-X whose conversion would
be very expensive. Also noteworthy is the fact that the first Ecureuil
365N [helicopter] ordered by the Tokyo fire department is now in the process
of assembly and certification.
In contrast, the Airbus was mentioned only by the French s3~3e. This commercial
transport is used by the Japanese regional airline TDA which has purchased
nine and already received six. Yet TDA has still not obtained the corresponding
traffic rights from Japanese authorities. This accounts for the low
utilization--4 hours per day--of these aircraft. Nevertheless, TDA is highly
satisfied with its Airbus transports. All Nippon appears to be interested
in the A 320. Japan Air Lines is simultaneously studying the Boeing 767, the
A 310, with perhaps a possibility of acquiring A 300's.
During his 3 days in Tokyo, Jacques Mitterrand met with five cabinet ministers,
the three major Japanese aircraft manufacturers, and top executives of the
three ma~or airlines. This visit was preliminary to the one made by Michel
Jobert, the foreign trade minister, and which itself preceded the visit by
President of the Republic Francois Mitterrand.
In South Korea, Jacques Mitterrand received a welcome comparable to the one
given him in Japan. Talks on arms purchases were conducted in great secrecy.
34
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504060009-1
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
We do note that South Korea recently received Harpocn missiles and that F--S
fighters are going to be assembled in Korea. Northrop has awarded contracts
for production of F-5 components to four local manufacturers. In the civil
aviation field, nothing is expected from Korean Air Lines which already has a
surplus capacity, particularly in Boeing 747's. South Korea did show interest
in communications satellites.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982
8041
CSO: 3100/527
35
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540060009-1
GENERAL FRANCE
BRIEFS
SECOND ARIANE LAUNCH COMPLEX--The National Center for Space Studies has
designated Comsip Enterprise as prime contractor for equipment and installation
work on the ELA 2(Launch Complex 2) for the European Ariane launcher, at
Kourou, French Guiana. Comsip will be assisted in this contract by Air
Liquide, Simca, and Siged. This group will install facilities and equipment
for handling toxic, conventional, and cryogenic fluids, plus equipment for
the administrative and operations buildings. It will also instal? control
equipment for ground systems and the Ariane launch vehicle checkaut stand.
Comsip's share of the contract is valued at 60 million francs. Comsip officials
stated that the ELA 2 complex is scheduled to become operational in 1984.
They also pointed out that their firm currently has 180 specialists
operating tracking equipment and fueling launch vehicles at the Guiana Space
Center. [Text] [Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 3 Apr 82 p 59] [COPYRIGHT:
A. & C. 1982] 8041
CSO: 3100/527
36
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060009-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
GENERAL ITALY
REVISEU NATIONAL SPACE PROGRAM FOR 1932-86 APPROVED
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 3 Apr 82 pp 53-57
[Arti^le by special correspondent in Rome, Pierre Langereux: "First Revision
of the Italian Space Program for 1982-1986"; passages enclosed in slantlines
printed in boldface]
(Text] Over a period of 6 years, Ita1y will devote 1,100
billion lire to space, half of which for the national program.
- /The first revision of the Italian space program,/ approved on 23 March 1982
by the Interrninisterial. Committee for Economic Planning (CIPE), was presented
the next day by Prof /Luciano Guerriero,/ director of the program, to the
National Council for Research (CNR), at the opening session of the 22nd Inter-
national Scientific Convention on Space which took place in Rome (Italy), on
25-26 March.
The national Italian program has therefore been revised as planned, although
with a slight delay (March 1982 instead of December 1981). It is nevertheless
an important step for the Italian space industry which had been waiting im-
patiently for the CIPE decision, since this decision /ensures thE: continuity
of the space program/ as far as the development of the new Italian space pro-
grams is concerned. The National Space Program covers in fact only /national/
programs, i.e. those carried out by Italy alone or, in some cases, in bilateral
- cooperation. The Italian participation to the European space programs is
decided elsewhere within the European Space Agency, of which Italy is one of
the main members.
`Chis first revision of the National Space Program led to the presentation of a
/second space program covering the period 1982-86/ and continuing the first pro-
gram (1979-83) which tiad been approved by CIPE only in October 1979 and conse-
quently started late (in 1980 only). The National Space Program is managed by
the CNR and was supposed to be revised every other year, according to a
"sliding program" formula which made it possible to adjust the objectives and
the means as a function of economic conditions.
The revision of the initial program, which started at the end of 1981, has thus
led to a new five-year program (1982-86) replacing and completing the previous
program (1979-83). In particular, the first two years (1982-83) of the new
program are also the last two years of the initial program. The second progr