JPRS ID: 10493 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10493
5 May 1982
ear East North Africa Re ort
N p
CFOUO 19/82)
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~ JPRS L/104 93
5 1Kay 19 8 2
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(,FOUO 1. 9/ 8 2 )
CONTENTS
INTEEtNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Causes for Worsening Palestinian Relations With Iran Dis~ussed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 15-21 Jan 82) 1
OPEC AFFAIRS
Briefs
Meeting on Nigeria 11
EGYPT
Interview i~'ith Butrus Ghali
(Butrus Ghali Interview; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 7 Apr 82) 12
IRAQ
'Aziz Views Conflict With Iran
(Tariq 'Aziz Interview; AFRIQUF-ASIE, 12-25 Apr 82) 16
SYRIA
'AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI' Interviews Syrian Muslim Leader
(Shaykh 'Ali Sadr al-Din Bayanuni Interview; AL-WA.iAN
AL-'ARABI, 26 Mar 82) 21
TiJNISIA
Impact of Bourguiba's Rule Discussed
(Hedi Dhoukar; AFRIQUF-ASIE, 15 Mar 82) 24
- a - [ III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
CAUSES FOR WOFSENING PALESTINIAN RELATIONS WITH IRAN DISCUSSED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 257, 15-21 Jan 82 pp 23-2b
[Article: "The Story on Palestinian-Iranian Relations"]
[Text] Dialogue, embracement... enmity. That was the course taken by the
Palestinian-Iranian relationship, which ended last Nover~ber with the demand
by demonstrators in Tehran for the return of Yassir 'Arafat to the "House
of Obedience" in the wake or h~s public endorsement of the Fahd Peace Plan
for solving the Middle East crisis.
The Palestinians did not keep silent over the Iranian demonstrations that
called 'Arafat a traitor and demanded l~is overthrow. They responded to the
mass outcry in Tehran with a niunber o~ statements expressing disappointment
in the Iranian revolution.
It was admitted by Khaled al-Fahum, sp~aker of the Palestine National Coun-
cil, that relations with Iran are indee~: "de~eriorating." He at~tributed this
to whathas been publicized concerning a meeting of a ntnnber of officials of
the PLO with the former Iranian president, Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr, and Mas'ud
Rajavi, head of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization, in their exile in Paris.
Hani al-Hass~n, the PLO representative in Tehran, criticized the position
taken by the Iranian revolutionand its attack on Chairman 'Arafat. His
brother, Khalid al-Hassan., member of the Central Committee of Fatah, the larg-
est of the Palestinian organizations, conf irmed that relations with Iran were
"not good" and that his organization had cautioned the Iranians against attempt-
ing to export their revolution abroad and against creating problems for their
~rab neighbors. He then displayed bitterness over the Ayatollahs and the "Wise
men of Islam" who have denounced 'Arafat as a blasphemer, to be denied entry
to paradise, because of hys endorsement of the Fahd Plan just before he left
for the Arab summit meeting at Fez.
However little the Palestinians may be saying publicly, it is clear that
much more is being discussed privately among themselves and in their own
councils. Moreover, everything stated so far, both publicly and privately,
may be included within a wider framework of self-criticism of the Palestinian
position towards Iraq at the outbreak of its war with Iran in September 1980.
_ �
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H~~~K Ur h ~~~~n?. l/iV LY
This new Pales tinian view theref ore represents a retreat f rom the rash accu-
sations directed at Iraq at the beginning of the war and expresses the new
Palestinian conviction (explicit or not) that "Iraq was right all along" and
that "it's not easy to get along with the Ayatollahs of Qom and Tehran,"
according to one Palestinian official in a conversation with a correspondent
of AL-WATAN AL'ARABI.
The truth demands that it be revsaled that Palestir~ian-Iranian relations,
though not yet broken, have entered a not inconsiderable phase of coldness
that may yet prove to be the beginning of a complete break.
At any rate, it is impossible for any observer of the ups and downs of this
relationship not to conclude that most of the Palestinian leadership, along
with most other Arab leaders and politicians, were premature in their outpour-
ing of praise for the revolution of the mullahs in Iran and in their efforts
to identify with and embrace this revolution. It was this prematurity that
was responsible for the degree of censure that Iraq encountered for its "coun-
terproductive" position towards Iran. Indeed, some Arabs ignored entirely
their historical, geographical and fraternal ties with Iraq and inst~ad er.-
tended material and moral support to Iran in this war.
The disappointment of Palestinians and Arabs in the positions taken by the
Iranian revolution is a hard lesson for all Arabs: the need for restraint in
taking political positions and in passing judgment based on excessive zeal
and emotion. Perhaps those Arabs who put the blame on Iraq at the beginning
of.the war realize now the extent of the jolt suffered by the Iraqi spirit
as a result; perhaps they realize now that the Iraqis felt that their brethren
either misunderstood or ignored the reasons and justif ications that led Iraq
to confront the Persian attack on the Arab identity of Iraq and the Gulf.
Palestinians Trained Hundreds of Iranians
But what exactly happened to cause this Palestinian bitterness toward the
Iranian revolution, and what is leading their bilateral relations to coolness
or breakup?
The correspondent of AL-~dATAN AL-'ARABI in Beirut, who prepared this report,
' tried to trace the Palestinian-Iranian relationship from its inception, rely-
ing on the information and statements of a nLUnber of Palestinian officials
who had witnessed the birth of that relationship and the stages it went
througli up to its present crisis.
~ Tt~e Iranian-Palestinian relationship dates back to 1968. It was then that
tlie various Palestinian organizations opened their training camps in Syria,
I,ebanon and Iraq to hundreds of Iranians. Fatah undertook the largest role
in training these Iranians. Training was followed by arms supplies, and the
Palestinian resistance helped most of the trainees return to Iran with their
- weapons, where they played a vital role in shaking the shah's rule through
_ guerrilla operations using Palestinian weapons and funds.
After the success of the revolution, the Palestinians trained large numbers
of Iranians who formed the nucleus of the Revolutionary Guards and its
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oL-ficers. The same applied to the leftist Iranian organizations, particularly
the Mojahedin-e Khalq. When Khomeyni took refuge in Paris, 'Arafat sent some
of his men to guard him.
- After the success of the revolution and Khomeyni's victorious return to
Tehran, 'Arafat was the first Arab official to visit Tehran. He flew from
Damascus to the Iranian capital without notifying Khomeyni f irst. Some
Palestinians who accompanied 'Araf at on this trip say that Iranian F-4's
intercepted 'Arafat's plane after it entered Iranian airspace and asked it
to land at the nearest Iranian airport. After much effort, the Iranian for-
mation was told that the plane carried 'Arafat, and then the threat turned
into a welcoming formation accompanying the Palestinian leader. 'Arafat said,
after the trouble was over, "Thank God! This is the first time I saw American
aircraft that did not bomb me."
The Iranians anticipated 'Arafat's visit by changing the name of the street
where the Israeli diplomatic mission was. They called it PLO Street and put
up a huge picture of 'Arafat on the Israeli building. Then they handed the
building to the PLO, giving it f ull diplomatic recognition. Mr Iiani al-Hosseyn,
a political advisor to 'Arafat, was appointed to head the office.
'Arafat descended from the plane and headed towards Khomeyni's residence,
where he gave him one of his famous kisses on the cheek. But AL-WATAN AL-
'ARABI revealed that this meeting in Iran was not the first between the two
men. 'Arafat had established a close personal relationship with Kho:aeyni
since the early 1970's, and he also took the opportunity to meet with him
whenever 'Araf at visited Iraq, as Khomeyni was living in the Shi'ite holy
region of Southern Iraq.
Promises, Promises
Informed Palestinians say that `Araf at's visit was not only for congratula-
tions,that he in fact wanted to build bridges between the Iran of Khomeyni and
the Arab Gulf states. Apparently Khomeyni responded, telling him that Iran
had decided to stop playing the~role of policeman tnat the shah played in the
Gulf, and that it had withdrawn its forces from Oman to emphasize this..
Khomeyni also said that Iran was willing to discuss the case of the three
islands in the Hurmuz Strait, which belonged to the United Arab Emirates and
which the shah had taken by force in 1979, when the UAE declared its indepen-
dence.
'AraFat placed another kiss on Khomeyni's cheek, said goodbye and took ~~is
plane to the Gulf, where he landed in Abu Dhabi. He met with the country's
president, Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan al-Nuhayyan, and recounted what Khomeyni
' V~ad to:Ld him, saying that all the problems pending between Iran and the Gulf
states would be solved amicably and that the ayatollahs had stressed to him
that Iran had no ambitions in Arab lands. 'Arafat's visit to Tehran was
followed by a visit by Mr hhalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), Fatah's military
commander.
The relations between Iran and the Palestinian revolution reached their peak
at that stage. Palestinians here say that 'Arafat went to Baghdad to mediate
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so that the reopening of the case of the three islands would be postponed un-
til Khomeyni's revolution completely sorted out its mess and that Iran was
ready to discuss the matter in a positive spirit.
'Araf at was hardly back in Beirut, relieved, when Ayatollah Sadeq Ruhani, one
of Khomeyni's men, issued a strange statement in which he said that Bahrain
was part of Iran. This was followed with a series of contradicto~y state-
ments from the men of the revolution, all of which brought to mind the Iranian
ambitions vis-a-vis the Gulf states. Something more serious followed; a flood
of propaganda provocation against Iraq and the other Gulf states started over
the air, all of it directed at casting doubts around these states and around
Arabism, calling on the people of the region to revolt and proclaim Khomeyni
as the leader of Islam and declaring that the Iranian revolution was made to be
exported.
This was soon followed by suspicious moves in Iraq and the Gulf sta'tes. Iran-
ian voices inside the region were raised in warnings and threats. Everything
indicated that the ayatollahs were behind the whole thing.
That was the first cloud in the sky of Iranian-Palestinian relations.
Khomeyni Wastes a Golden Opportunity for the Palestinians
Then came the crisis of the American hostages, and the Palestinian revolutior
tried to mediate between Iran and the United States late in 1979, without
noticeable success. The failure of the mediation efforts led to a new cool-
ness in Iranian-Palestinian relations and erosion of the influence of the
resistance with Khomeyni and his circles.
Palestinians say that Khomeyni wasted a golden opportunity foi t.he PLO to
force the United States to establish a direct dialogue with the PLO, after
Kissinger's pledge to Israel following the 1973 war that Washington would
not talk with the PLO until the latter recognized Israel. But if the hostages
had been handed over to the Palestinian revolution, this would have forced
Washington to overlook this pramise, which is unfair to both Palestinians
and Americans.
'Arafat firmly believed that the attack on the American Embassy was a big
mistake by the Iranians. But he continued to issue statements attacking the
United States, paving the way for his mediation with Khomeyni. The Palestin-
ian leader took heart when Congressman Paul Findley came to t?im once asking
I~im, in one way or another, to intercede with Khomeyni on behalf of the
American Government.
'Arafat accepted and sent his military operations leader, Abu Walid, to Teh-
ran for this purpose. Abu Walid is an experienced and respected Palestinian
leader whotiad supervise~Stof thelrevolutionawhonnownheldalead ng.p stsain
knows many of the leade
the state and the revolutionary guards.
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AUu Walid was surprised to find that in Tehran t:ie young nien who held the
hostages were proud of the operation and c~nsidered it a great victory over
the United States. Their leaders, wY~o had been his students, treated him with
obvious coolnPss, voicing their anger at the statements issued by Zuhdi Taxaze,
the PLO representative at the United Nations, in which he expressed the w~ii-
ingness of the Palestinians to mediate.
It was a strong shock to Abu Walid when Khomeyni himself refused to receive
him. Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr, then acting foreign minister, came to him to
complain about the Palestinian mediation efforts, telling him they were
expected to side with Iran against the United States, not act as mediators.
Abu Walid then answered that he came to Tehran driven by his support and love
of the revolution and of Khomeyni, to address everybody with the candidness of
the military and the devotion of the revolutionary, and to tell them all that
breaking into the e.*nbassy and holding the hostages would not serve Iran's
caus e.
The Palestinian version goes on to say that Abu Walid expressed to the Iran-
ian leaders his fear that the United States might exploit the hostage crisis
to send its forces to occupy the Gulf and the oil fields. He pleaded with them
not to become with their rash action a direct or indirect tool of such an
American move.
His warnings were in vain. When he was told that Khomeyni was angry with
the Palestinian mediation effort, he left Tehran for Beirut. And, indeed,
the United States sent its fleet to surround the entrance to the Gulf while
the Soviet Ux~ion pushed into Afghanistan, making use of the world's preoccupa-
tion with the hostage crisis.
Still the Palestinians ignored the Iranian outcries and their range and went
on with their cautions. In fact, Hani al-Hassan told the observer Iranian
- delegation that came to Tunis to attend the Arab simimit there in 1979 that the
Arabs were upset by the hostage crisis, although they did not denounce it
for the sake of the Iranians.
That was a bio dark cloud in the sky of Iranian-Palestinian relations.
Iran's Intransigence Frustrates Palestinian Mediation Efforts
W11en the Iran-Iraq war broke out, many Palestinian politicians blamed Iraq,
proclaiming their unreserved bias toward Iran. The Palestinians then were
stil.l fooled~by the Palestinian slogans that the Khomeyni revolution had
raised, and no great attention was given to the reasons and the circumstances
that led Iraq to confront the Persian attack.
Some Palestinians considered Iraq's defense of its entity, the unity of its
people and the Arabness of the Gulf as an "at~ack" on revolutionary Iran.
_ Some s loganeers even hastened to offer all kinds of interpretations casting
doubts on Iraq's progressive stance, whereas some of them hastened to say
that the war was unjustified because it stole the limelight from the central
' cause of the Arabs--the Palestinian cause.
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rvet vrrQ~.~r+~. ~oa: vivi,i
The Iranians were quick to stop broadcasting Palestinian national songs, and
the Palestinian flag disappeared from the streets, along with the pictures of
'Arafat. Iraq maintained an uncomfortable silence, biding for time to reveal
to the Palestinians the reality of the attitudes of the Khomeyni revolution.
The Palestinians tried their luck again at ~ediation to end the war between
Iraq and Iran. 'Arafat was a member of the Islamic mediation committee
formed by the Islamic Conference; he was also a member in the committee sent
by the nonaligned bloc. He visited Tehran several times with both delegations
and employed his diplomatic sktll in vain to convince the Iranians.
Soon both sides were presented with proposals to end the fiohting in the name
of the Palestinian revolution. Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), a prominent Fatah
leader, summarized them in October 1980 as follows:
Iraq announces its readiness to withdraw its forces.
Iran announces its readiness to enter direct negotiations with Iraq in a
neutral country to be agreed on by both parties.
The Islamic and the nonaligned countries supervise the withdrawal and the
ceasef ire.
It was a severe shock for 'Arafat and the Palestinians, who in the beginning ~
- rushed to support Iran, when the Iranian side refused the proposals of the
Islamic mediators, then the nonaligned mediators and the Palestinian media-
tion efforts. Each time Iran would insist on its impossible conditions to
thwart the mediators. These conditions are:
Withdrawal and a ceasefire.
Revival of the Algiers Agreement of 1975, although it was Iran itself that did ~
. not fulfill it.
Formation of an Islamic committee to study the aggression.
The Iranian conditions were unacceptable and unpalatable to the members of
the two committees and to the Palestinian mediators.
In time, the Iranian deceipt that shrouded the eyes of the Palestinians was
gradually removed, and they found out that the Iranians were the ones re-
sponsible for prolonging the war, that they were the ones who obstructed and
wasted the energies of the Arabs and of Iraq, preventing these energies from
being directed at serving the central Arab cause and at supporting the line
of confrontatior. with Israel. All the Iranian talk about the readiness of
the K1-~omeyni revolution to participate in confronting the ?ionist state began
to appear like e.mpty talk'and verbal maneuvering devoid of any real sense.
The failure of the Palestinian mediation efforts to end the war was also
another big dark cloud that gathered in the sky of Iranian-Palestinian
relations.
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F(3R OFFICIAI. U:
Palestinian Suspicions of Iran Mount
There are other reasons and f actors that also helped bring dark clouds to the
Iranian-Palestinian skies. In addition to the fact that the Palestinians
were more convinced that ever of the justness of Iraqi demands on Iran, so
that they perceived that Iran could respond to them without losing face, there
was a feeling that continuing the Iranian propaganda campaigns against the
Arab regimes in the Gulf, plotting against the;~e regimes and inciting the
minority sects, in the end would not serve the Iranian-Gulf entente that the
Palestinians sought so fervently at the beginning of the Iranian revolution
and therefore would not serve the Palestinian strategy that sees in this
entente a bolstering of the Arab cause and the confrontation of Camp David and
Israel.
Hence came the recurrent Palestinian advice to Iran, about which Khalid al-
Hosseyn has spoken publicly, of the necessity to stop thinking about exporting
the revolution and creating trouble for Iran's neighbors, especially ~ince the
Iraqi stance has proven to the Iranians that the Arabs are ready to resort
even to arms to defend their entities, their national unities and their
national identities.
In f act, the Palestinians began to see in the slogan of exporting the revo-
lution a burden on Iran after its defeat at the hands of the Iraqis, since the
danger of the Iranian call has receded, and the enthusiasm of the minority
sects in the Gulf decreased when it saw the revolution, in its weakness and
deterioration, turn into a bloody and terrorist nightmare that burdens the
Iranian peoples thesnselves.
The Iraqis have often spoken of the Israeli arms that are being showered on ~
Iran. But the Palestinians considered this to be a sort of exaggerated propa-
ganda, necessitated by the war. But Palestinian suspicions of an arms-suppZy
relationship between the Iran of Khomeyni and Israel mounted when the Soviets
last year shot down an aircraft on a mysterious trip between Nicosia, Cyprus,
and Tehran via Turkey, close to the Soviet borders with both Turkey and Iran,
carrying an American arms shipment that was sold by the Zionist state to Iran.
The Iranians sought the help of the Syrians to clear their name vis-a-vis the
Palestinians. But the Palestinians did not need a messager to the Soviets to
verify the incident. Abdul Halim Khaddam strongly defended Iran, stressing
that "it did not and could not deal with Israel," saying that there was no
evidence. But of course the Palestinians, with their close ties to the
Soviets, did not have great difficulty in obtaining this "evidence" from
Soviet intelligence, which proves beyond doubt that Iran bought spare parts
from Israel.
tlmal llisappoints the Palestinians
There is another reason for Palestinian disenchantment with Iran; this reason
is closely connected with what i:~ happening in Lebanon.
Since the 1960's, the Palestinian~. have established close relations with the
Shi'ites, the largest sect in Lebanon numerically and the most disadvantaged.
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H(yR UFI~ICIAL Utir: O`LY
A whole generation of Palestinians and Lebanese Shi'ites lived together in the
camps, the towns of the South, and the misery bel.ts surrounding Reirut,
together undergoing the same bitterness and misery--the Palestinians for
thE world's refusal to acknowledge their rights and the Shi'ites for their
neolect by the state, with its ~PCtarian structure.
- After the defeat of 1967, the Palestinians were armed ~nd grew in strength,
but did not forget their Lebanese Shi'ite brethren. They coale~ced with them
and helped them raise their voices calling for equality; they even trained and
armed them.
The Shi'ites then were fortunate to have a talerited religious leader who
appeared suddenly to guide their march and curb their emorions. The most
glorious success of Mr Musa al-Sadir was in preventing the leitist political
currents from infiltrating the sect, or stopping this infiltration and under-
writing the loyalty of the greatest majority of ttie sect to his moderate
religious-political leadership.
When the Lebanese war broke out in 1975, the Shi'ites fought with the Pales-
tinians and suffered the siege of the Maronite militia in the Karantina and
al-Maslakti slums in the heart of eastern Beirut; they both stood before the
militia of the reneuade major Sa'd Haddad that supports Israel in the South.
Then, suddenly, the unexpected happened. A1-Sadir suddenly disappeared while
visiting Qadtidhafi in 1978, and his disappearance revived the rage and sad-
ness of his followers. The}r were not content to point an accusing finger at
the Libyan regime but also suspected that al-Sadir was a victim of a"wafi.er-
tight plan," in the implementation of which the Libyan regime cooperated with
some of its allies on the Palestinian left to get rid of his strong religious
leadership, which had becom~ 4 stu~bling block against the infiltration of
radical movements into his sect.
Sadness and rage did not last long, for the Iranian revolution soon came, and
a number of its leaders who were trained in the Palestinian camps in the
South came not to return the favor to their Palestinian trainers but to em-
brace the organization Amal that al-Sadir had formed as the military branch
of his religious-political movement.
Amal grew stronger and Iran filled it with sectarian feelings, which were
inf lamed by what happened in the south of Lebanon, where the Shi'ites are
concentrated, throu~h the continuing Palestinian-Israeli war that had destroyed
and depopulated the south. Some Shi'ites blamed the Palestinians for what
bef.ell them at the hands of the Israelis and their client, Ma~or Haddad.
The Palestinians say that ~it is natural under such conditions for hatred
between the parties to grow, fed by parts of the security apparatus in the
Japanese regimes, encouraged by the Maronite "Lebanese Front" that had
suddenly felt Lebanese brotherly love towards these Shi'ites, who have been
dispossessed f or decades.
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Thus, Amal grew more and more, and yesterday's allies turned into enemies.
But this growth, say the Palestinians, did not safeguard the cohesion of the
Shi'ite organizations. The loyalty of its diverse branches spread out between
various sides, starting with Iran and ending with the Lebanese security,
- through Syria and its deterrent and security authorities in Lebanon.
Therefore, Amal became, from the Palestinian point of view, a dire obstacle
facing their free movement in Lebanon. Indeed it was f elt to threaten their
existence in the south and their communication and supply lines going to
either Beirut or Syria.
It is true that Amal fighters number only a few thousand, and their training
and armament is not to be compared with the Palestinian forces that are esti-
mated at 30,000 fighters carrying arms. But Amal has caused severe problems
for the Palestinians and their allies in the National Movement and caused
armed clashes in the south and in Beirut, where many civilian and military
casualties were caused. This is a source of embarrassment to the Palestinian
revolution, especially since the fightin~ takes place in the heart of the
capital or in its southern suburbs where the population density is high.
With every round of fighting, the popularity of the Palestinians and th~~r
leftist allies recedes among their Muslim Lebanese allies who long more and
more for the immbrella of official Lebanese authority and who look across the
dividing line to eastern Beirut where relative calm prevails after Bashir
physically liquidated his allies the Ahrar, leaving a pale shadow in his
region for official authority.
The Iranian Role in Lebanon
Thus, the Iranian role in Lebanon did not please the Palestinians, ~or instead
of having the Khomeyni apparatus help them close ranks with the Lebanese,
they are increasing.the pains and problems of the Palestinian presence in
Lebanon through their support and encouragement of Amal. �
' The Palestinian bitterness towards Iran is expressed on every occasi.on and at
the least negative initiative or mistake by the Iranians, when Hosseyn
Shaykholeslam Zadeh, Iranian assistant foreign minister who headed his coun-
try's delegation to Beirut last November, boasted before journalists that the
Palestinians had told him they considered the Gulf war and "American war
launched against Iran to prevent it from widening the circle of the Islamic
revolution and liberating Jerusalem from Zionism," the PLO hastened a few
hours later to issue a statement denying the alleoations, saying that the re-
_ marks of Shaykholeslarn were not correct and that the PLO continued to~support
the efforts of the nonaligned countries and the Islamic conference to end the
struggle. The I.ebanese National Movement denied that it even discussed the
war with the Iranian delegate.
But tt~at was not the end of it. The ayatollahs were enraged tu hear that some
Palestinian leaders had met last s~nmer with Bani-Sadr and Mas'ud Rajavi in
Paris. They gave free rein to their shameless statements calling the people
involved "hypocrites" of the stripe that support the exiled leaders and that
get executed by the dozen in Tehran daily.
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HaR OFFICIAI. USr: O~LY
The Palestinians were forced to deny that such meetings took place, at a
time when the news agencies were distributing photos of the meetings. What
the Palestinians did not say was that their meetings aimed at containing the
rift in the Iranian revolution, or at least stopping the river of blood on
both sides, that has smeared the reputation of Khomeyni's revolution before
the whole world, and presented it as an example of a revolutionary mob that
ignores all definitions of dignity and the simglest human considerations.
The ayatollahs did not stop there. At the height of the Arab discussion of
the Saudi plan to solve the Middle East crisis, they unleashed the mobs in
the Iranian streets to shout against 'Araf at, calling him a blasphemer and a
traitor. Once again the Palestinians kept silent and let the storm that
accompanied the Fez stunmit pass. Then they expressed their displeasure at
the Iranian stance and noted for the f irst time that the Iranian-Palestinian
relationship is flawed.
- The story is not over yet. There are still so many things the Palestinians
- can say to their "friends" the Iranians.
And in any case, whether the Palestinians speak or not, they inwardly feel
the injustice that befell their Iraqi brothers wYien Arab and Palestinian
voices were raised denouncing their confrontation of the Iranian attack.
And if the Palestinians speak or not, they now know exactly the kind of
personalities and mentalities that rule Iran today. The least that can be
said about them is what the Palestinian official said to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI:
"It is impossible to deal with these Iranians who now rule in Iran and Qom.
Between us there exist mairy years that have to be crossed before Iran can
have a real revolution that believes in a healthy and honest relationship
wi th the Arabs . "
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
CSO: 4404/270
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OPEC AFFAIRS
~
BRIEFS
MEETING ON NIGERIA--Abu Dhabi, 26 Mar (REUTER)--Oil ministers will call an
immediate emergency meeting unless oil companies stop trying to force Nigeria
to cut its prices, OPEC President Mana' Sa'id al-'Utaybah said today.
Dr al-'Utabyah, the United Arab Emirates oil minister, told reporters he had
consulted fellow ministers yesterday and today on Nigeria's situation. He
said that unless the companies changed their stance "we will call for an
extraordinary meeting immediately." OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
- Countries) held emergency talks only last weekend in Vienna and decided to
cut output to defend itself against a world oil glut. [Text] [JN261855
London REUTER in English 1836 GMT 26 Mar 82J
CSO: 4400/220
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EGYPT
INTERVIEW WITH BUTRUS GHALI
PM071135 Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 Apr 82 pp 54-55
[Interview wii:h Eg~ptia:~ Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Butrus Ghali
by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "Self-Confident Egypt"--date and place not given]
[Text] JEUI~IE AFRIQUE: In Addis Ababa at the end of February Egypt strongly
conde~ed the "illegal nature" of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic's [SDAR]
admission and the "illegitimacy" of the session, but it did not join the camp
of 19. That is rather an ambiguous attitude....
Butrus Ghali: At the Monrovia si~.umit in 1979, Egypt abstained on the Sahara
affair. At that time it did not have relations with Algeria or with Morocco.
We adopted a neutral stance. We also abstained at the Freetown summit.
Egypt has not recognized the Saharan Republic. At the Nairobi s~m.it Egypt
agreed to take part in the vote, following the consensus achieved by the heads
of state assembly. When the Addis Ababa incident occurred last February,
Egypt suggested postponing the session in order to hold an informal conference.
Throughout the session we tried to find a compromise to prevent the OAU from
breaking up.
That is why Egypt did not withdraw. On the last day of the session Egypt was
the only state to declare clearly that the meeting had become illegal since
the two-thirds quortun was no longer guaranteed., Thus our attitude is one of
condenming the irregularities which brought the SDAR into the OAU while
continuing our efforts to encourage a rapprochement between the two hostile
blocs. The OAU's imity is much more important than the Saharan conflict.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: How do you hope to find a compromise likely to save the OAU?
' Butrus Ghali: I admit with ail modesty that I do not yet know. Many colleagues
from both sides came to see me in Addis Ababa to ask me in my capacity as
doyen--which annoyed me a great deal, because they know how old I am!--to
find a solution. But I will consult Africa's wise men, visit them and ask
their advice. And on the basis of those contacts, which I hope wil.l take
` place soon, I will propose a compromise solution to President Husni Mut,arak.
If he accepts it, we will then be able to try to find a solution to this very
serious problem.
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J1:UlVE AFRIQUL: If I remember rightly, when he was Vice President Husni
Mutaarak prevented open war between Morocco and Algeria following the battle
of Amgala at the very start of the Sahara conflict....
Butrus Ghali: That is true. He discretely played the role of inediator between
Algiers and Rabat. He did so successfully, since direct war between the two
cotmtries was averted.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Will tY?at kind of initiative be possible once again after
25 April, when Egypt has recovered the whole of Sinai?
Butrus Ghali: Our initiative is not linked with 25 April. It will be taken
in an African framework: We could put solutions to Mr Arap Moi in his
capacity as OAU ch ariman or to the implementation committee which draws its
legitimacy from the last heads of state summit.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Is not the Sahara affair, which has been poisoning inter- ~
African relations for a long time, likely to move from the OAU to ;:he super
powers?
Butrus Ghali: I entirely agree. And that is why we must take action to find
a temporary solution to the Sahara affair. By so doing we will prevent the
OAU from b reaking up. .
JEUNE AFRIQUE: The reply to the boycott by the 19 coimtries which left the
Addis Ababa session is the threat from the 26 countries which have recognized
the SDAR to take similar action if the SDAR's admission is called into ques-
_ tion. What will happen in that case?
Butrus Ghali: We are in danger of returning to the situation which existed
before May 1963, when two blocs confronted each other: The Casablance bloc
and the Monrovia bloc. The most powerful weapon which Africa has is its
unity. The OAU has given the African states a diplomatic strike force in the
international organizations and specialized agencies.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: The states which were formerly calling for Egypt's expulsion
from the OAU now want you to remain. You must be pleased about that....
Butrus Ghali: We should forget about the conflicts which existed at the last
summits and think only of African unity. Egypt fought in Monrovia not oniy
to defend itself against those advocating its expulsion but also to preserve
African unity. And we are continuing the same policy today.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Your country has been invited to attend the forChcoming
nonaligned meetings. Should it be deduced from that that Mubarak's Egypt is
itmnediately rejoining the Nonaligned Movement?
Butrus Ghali: We have never stopped being a full member of it.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: But an attempt was made to expel you from it....
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.Y
Butrus Gha1i: A tiny minority made a great deal of noise about that, but
there was also the silent majority. At the last Nonaligned Conference in
Havana in 1979 there was talk of a protest aglinst the Egyptian presence.
But no mention was made of our fight against the "natural alliance" between
the nonaligned countries and the socialist camp.... And we won in Havana by
prompting several countries to change their attitude. Egypt has always
played a major role in nonalignment. The Camp David agreements concealed that
role somewhat. l3ut the facts are there.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: A new chapter will be opened on 26 April. How would you
react to the pressures already being exerted on a large number of African
states to restore relations with Israel?
Butrus Ghali: We take a neutral stance. It is up to the African states to
shoulder their fuil responsibilities.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Nonetheless there is a strong movement in Egypt for a real
rapprochement with the Arab world....
Butrus Ghali: Continuity will characterize Egyptian policy: Continuation
of our relations with Israel, negot~ations with the United States and Israel
to solve the Palestinian problem. If the Arab states wish to return to Egypt,
great and generous Egypt will welcome them. But Egypt will not take the first
st~p. The Arabs must accept that Egypt will continue to have relations with
Israel. Three Arab states have already set an example: Sudan, Somalia and
Oman.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Is that enough to break your isolation?
B utrus Ghali: It is the others which are isolated. Egypt and Suda~ alone
represent more than half af the Arab world.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: You can talk like that because there has never been a complete
break between EgyPt and the Arab world....
Butrus Ghali: It is true that despite the Arab pseudo, boycott EgypZ has
continued to give aid: 2 million of our technicians are working ir. the Arab
world when we have great need of them in our coimtry. We are still receiving
thousands of Arab students when our own students cannot find places in our
universities. Look at the figures: 17,000 Palestinian students out of a
total of 28,334 Arab students in the universities, not to mention technical
institutes and other schools.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Nonetheless the 2 million technicians in foreign countries
bring you some $3 bill~ion per year.
Butrus Ghali: There are two schools of thought. According to some studies
the $2.6 billion they bring back are less than the loss of earnings caused
by their absence. To give just one example: We brought in South Korean
workers to construct the Salam Hotel in Heliopolis. But the decision to send
workers, technicians~and teachers to the Arab world is primarily a political
decision aimed at maintaining Arab solidarity.
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. I~UR ()HHIC'IAL U5~ UNLY
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Since al-Nasir's days you have c~nstantly given the impression
of wishing to deal with the Arab countries from a dominant position.
Butrus Ghali: That is untrue. For instance, we have never claimed that the
War in which we approach the peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis is
a model for others. If our Arab brothers find an alternative, we will have
- no criticism to make.
~ JEUNE AFRIQUE: And what if that alternative called Camp David into queation?
Butrus Ghali: Don't count on us if we have to hand Sinai back to the Israelis
in order to embrace the Arabs. There can be no question of back-pedaling.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: If Egypt restores relations with the Arab world, will you ask
the League to return to Cairo?
Butrus Ghali: It will be welcome. But we will certainly not go to Tunis.
We still regard the transfer of the Arab League to Tunis as illegal.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Nonetheless it was a unanimous decision by the member states,
aside from Egypt of course....
Butrus Ghali: Under the terms of the League charter, dated 22 March 1945,
the seat of the League is in Cairo. To move it requires amendmment of the
charter. The transfer is therefure illegal, a~ is Egypt's suspension.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: You seem very sure of your rights. According to you it is
always the others who are wrong. Husni Mubarak`s policy was thought to be
more flexible.... ~
Butrus Ghali: We are perfectly within our rights. It is the other Arab
countries which have failed to understand anything. Switch off that tape-
recorder and I will tell you what I think. I will tell some truths, without
being unkind....
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982.
CSO: 4500/149
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IRAQ
'AZIZ VIEWS CONFLICT WITH IRAN
PM191221 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 12-25 Apr 82 pp 8-11
[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz by Simon Malley in Baghdad--
date not givenJ
[TextJ [Questionl, The date of the Nonaligned s~unit is rapidly approaching
and your capital gives the impression of being a real hive of industry.
Construction work is going on everywhere. Nonetheless the atmosphere of war
predominates; the fighting continues and Iraqis are dying on the front every
day....Do you think that the Iranian authorities' warnings, the alerts and
even threats which their leaders are making are serious? Can they paralyze
the summit`s work or even, more especially, prevent it from being held?
Tariq 'Aziz: Of course we are at war with Iran. Of course all our material,
administrative and diplomatic capab ilities are directed toward and mobilized
for that war. But at the same time we are aware of the essential fact that
the overwhelming majority of nonaligned cotmtries want the conference to
take place in the place and at the time appointed. All the contacts we have
had, all Che discussions we have had have convinced us that the state of war
with Iran in no way justified postponing that conference or holding it in
another country. For if that happened, it would be very harmful to the
Nonaligned Movement itself, especially since one of the movement's most
important traditions is that its conferences are always held at the appointed
time and place.
You are aware of the great sacrifices made by Iraq to host such a conference.
More tizan $1 billion has been allocated to the organization of that summit
by our government in order to ensure that the delegations which come and
their leaders have as much comfort and security as possible. In any case,
the main point to remember is that the main lead~rs of the Nonaligned Move-
ment are fully aware of all that and that they have already expressed their
conviction of the need to hold the seventh s~munit in Baghdad next September.
You mentioned the question oP Iranian threats against the holding of that
sLUnmit. In reply to that I would like to say first that the Iranian attitude
is absolutely immoral. Since the sixth Nonaligned summit decided that the
next s~nnmit would be held in Baghdad, and since that decision has since been
confir.med, in other words after the launching of the Iranian aggressions and
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rvK ~rr~~~AL UJIC, VIVLY
of the conflict between us and Tehran, all we can say is that the Iranian
threats are a challenge not to Iraq but to the whole movement, to all the
heads of state and all the delegations which will attend that conference.
Moreover, what contribution has Iran made to the Nonaligned Movement? It
has only been a member since 1979 and has not assumed any responsibility
in it. It has no special activity or role. Still less is it a traditional
participant, whereas Iraq was one of the movement's fotmders since we took
part in the Bandung conference in Indonesia and then in the Belgrade
conference which founded the movement.
To turn to the practical aspects of your question, I would like to tell you,
taking full responsibility~for my words and my pledges, that Iran is incapable
of taking any action against the conference. Some people mention the danger
of the threats of aerial bombardment. But go and put the question to foreign
observers and diplomats posted to Tehran and you will be convinced that the
Iranian Air Force no longer exists on the battlefield. Throughout 1981 and
to this day no Iranian aircraft has been able to enter Iraq's airspace, still
less reach Baghdad. The Iranian threats are therefore both immoral and vain.
They are immoral and vain because they are not based on any tangible facts
and cau in no way jeopardize the holding and course of that conference.
Allow mE~ to assure you that for our part, as host state for that conference,
we feel it?miense responsibility toward the leaders and prominent people who
honor us with their presence, and there could be no question of inviting them
if we were not fully and completely sure and convinced that we are cap able
of providing them with the necessary protection. You know that we have
established excellent relations throughout the world, especially with the Third
World countries. We have a reputation which we are anxious to keep. Do you
think we would risk it is we were not sure of being able to honor our
commitments? When the Iranians make their threats they prove two important
things: Their total lack of responsibility with regard to the international
wishes and their lack of respect for the decisions and opinion of the
nonaligned coimtries' peoples and governments.
[Question] What about the danger of an Israeli attack like the one which
destroyed the Tammuz nuclear power station? Do you not fe~ar that the Tel
Aviv authorities might launch an air attack during the summit, or make
threats against Iraq?
Tariq 'Aziz: First I must say that so far we have not heard of such threats.
In any case if Israel has such intentions--but personally I do not think it
would dare to confront almost 100 heads of state--Iraq is perfectly capable
of defending its airspace. �
Nonetheless allow me to assure you that what happened last June (the attack
on Tammuz) will not happen again. Practical proof of that is given by the
fact that Israeli aircraft have indeed tried to penetrate Iraqi airspace in
the past few months. They were unable to get any further than 60 km inside
our territory--and you know that an aircraft travels 60 km in a few minutes--
because our air force immediately gave chase and forced them to turn back.
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We are sure that the Iraqi forces are strong and powerful enough to protect
our airspace against any kind of threat....The heads of state and top inter-
national figures who have visited our country since the outbreak of hostilities
with Iran 18 months ago can bear witness to the fact that they were able
to land in our country night or day without being troubled in any way ~y any
threats, be they Iranian or Israeli. Moreove r such threats have not prevented
~ur country hosting various Islamic and nonaligned conferences, among ot'.:::;cs.
If the aim of the campaigns launched by Tehran was to create and maintain an
atmosphere of anxiety ov~er the seventh Nonaligned summit then I think it has
completely failed. Moreover most of the coinztries which the Iranian repre-
sentatives have contacted in an attemp~: to c~iscourage them from coming to
Baghdad have replied that the Iranians' attitude was irresponsible and that
it would be preferable for them to end the war before the conference is held.
[Question] You mention the war....Why did your troops cross the Iranian
borders in September 1980?
Tariq `Aziz: We were facing an Iranian aggression which threatened our
national sovereignty and security. Before the war that aggression took various
forn~s: Threats, inte rference in internal Iraqi affairs, calls to overthrow
our country's regime. And when the aggression took a military turn in
, September 1980 with direct attacks on Ir.aqi cities we decided to react, and
our forces then rapidly entered Iranian territory, thus forcing Tehran`s tr~ops
to move away from our borders and our urban centers.
[Question] Some 18 months have already passed since the start of these
hostilities which are causing bloodshed in two neighboring countries. World
opinion is wondering what are the minimal conditions for a final settlement....
What therefore is the Iraqi Government's fundamental position?
Tariq 'Aziz: Iraq's basic demands are known: That Iran recognize the inter-
national borders established by agreements reached between the two countries
and institutionalized by international agreements previously recognized by
Tetiran and Baghdad; that it also recognize Iraq's soverei:gnty over the
Shatt al-Arab which throughout history has always been an Iraqi river.
' Another basic demand is that Iran officially express, in a responsible spirit,
its respect for Iraqi sovereignty, good-neighborly relat3.ons and noninter-
_ vention in the internal affairs of Iraq and the coimtries in the region, so
that the political, economic and social options of all peoples are guaranteed
without the need for anybody's protection. We respect such principles and
are prepared to guarantee them. The Iranians, however, have never expressed
their intention either of respecting them or of working to reach a peace�ul
solution to the conflict ori those bases.
[Question] There is some doubt about the famous Algiers agreement reached
between Ba~hdad and Tehran and which have been repudiated. Do you think those
agreements can form a basis for agreement between the two. countries?
Tariq 'Aziz: Those 1975 agreements were abrogated by the Iraqi Government
for two main reasons: First, they ~ad been imposed on Iraq by force in
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= exceptional circumstances due to the fact that the former shah of Iran
interfered, with Israeli and U.S. support, in internal Iraqi affairs by giving
~ very large-scale support to a reactionary internal revolt. 'TE~at is a perfectly ~
wel.l-known fact which was published by the world press and confirmed by
official U. S. congressional doctunents.
- The second reason is that Iran, im.der the Khomeyni regime, was not wil].ing
- to respect those agreements, which were based on a number of elements: The.
delimitation of territories, sovereignty over the Sha~t al-Arab and the
principles which should govern relations between Iraq and Iran, namely non-
intervention in internal affairs. Now Iran interfered in internal Iraqi
- affairs, did not hand back Iraqi territories as stated in the 1975 agreements
_ and bombarded our border cities with its artillery. Consequently those
agreements became null and void since the other side was not honoring them.
Moreover, how can we ignore the fact that several top Iranian officials
conde~ed them immediately after the shah was overthrown? And how can Iran's
[current] "attachment" to those agreements be explained when they formerly
condemned them? The position now is that we have abrogated them and that we
think that a new agreement should be negotiated if Iran agrees to the conflict
being settled on a peaceful basis.
[Question] What progress has been made by the mediation efforts of Olof
Palme, the UN secretary general's representative, and of the missions sent
by the Islamic conference and the Nonaligned Movement?
Tariq 'Aziz: A11 those initiativ~es have been blocked by Tehran`s insistence
that Iraqi troops be withdrawn from its territories without any precondition.
But it refuses to take part in negotiations once the withdrawal has been
carried out, or to co~nit itself to accpeting principles or bases for settling
the conflict between our two countries. That Iranian position is unacceptable
and we reject it. The various missions which have tried to find a solution
to the conflict understand us well. We are prepared to give all the necessary
guarantees and to make all the necessary primises with a view to our complete
withdrawal from Iranian territories if an all-embracing agreement is reached
between Tehran and us.
We have also explained to those missions that we have no territorial ambit3.ons
regarding Iran. But if there is a conflict it is vital fio find a solution to
its fundamental causes before withdrawing our troops. For if we withdraw
our troops without any reply being given on Che causes of the conflict, the
conflict will remain in full. And it will still be possible for Iran to
attack Iraq later ~rom more secure military positions. No Iraqi will give it
such an advantage....
[Question] The Mojahedin-e Khalq leader recently said he thought that Tehran
did not want an end to the war because it was helping to maintain the regime
in power. What is your view of that?
Tariq 'Aziz: That is perfectly true. Tehran really wants to continue the
war because it thinks it will help it rid itself of internal adversaries but
also because it enables it to keep the army away from Tehran. All international
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diplomatic and political circles think that, if the war ends, the Iranian
Army will have some role to play in the coimtry's future. I do not know what
that role will be, b ut the fact is that it will have a role. It is to
prevent that that Khomeyni is keeping the army occupied with war....
There is another point, and it is a fact which the whole world accepts: The
Iranian regime has failed on the political, economic, social and ideological
planes. Consequently the continuation of the war gives it an excellent
pretext for not tackling the serious problems facing its country. Each time
one of those problems is~raised it merely says that it is necessary to wait
until the war is over. What it fears most is that the end of the war might
lead to the total isolation of its regime....So what does that position
- reflect if not despair and failure? Did you know, for example, that more
than 100,000 Iranians have been killed, 300,000 are wounded and maimed while
2 million Iranians are refugees and 6 million are unemployed? Did you know
that Iran has been exporting no more than 15 percent of its oil since the
start of this conflict?
And yet Iran needs peace. It needs that~ peace more than anything else. If
the present Iranian Government was really patriotic, if it was aware of its
responsibilities, if it intended to shoulder them fully it would first seek
ways of reaching a settlement to its conflict with Iraq. If it really was
revolutionary should it not harness itself, like all revolutions in the world,
to the crucial task of peace in order to be able to devote itself to the tasks
of national rebuilding?
Just ~ook at how true revolutions have behaved throughout the world: In the
Soviet Union, in the PRC and even here in Iraq. When we signed the 1975
agreements--it was President Saddam Husayn himself who signed them--in
particularly difficult conditions it was because we were in the middle of a
revolution and wanted to safeguard our country`s imity and sovereignty....
If the Iranian regime has not followed and is not following that path, is it
not basically because it is engaged in an "adventure" and not a.revolution?
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Afrique-Asie.
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SYRIA
'AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI'INTERVIEWS SYRIAN MUSLIM LEADER
JN281134 Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI i.n Arabic 26 Mar 82 pp 37-38
[Interview with Shaykh 'Ali Sadr al-Din Bayanuni, member of the Mu~.lim
Brothers' Command in Sy~ia by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI--date and place~�not given]
[ExcerptsJ [Question] What is the impact of the historical charter to
liberate Syria on the armed struggle in Syria?
[Answer] We say that the armed revolution against the current regime in
Syria, which was launc:hed by the Muslim Brothers, expresses the aspirations
of the various factions of the people and is a natural result of the regime`s
criminal measures against all the people without exception. In the past,
Hafiz al-Asad sought to restrict the struggle between him and the Muslim
Brothers. But the new national alliance confirms that the Syrian people with
all their political trends, religious affiliation and national figures, are
determined to topple the regime with all available means, particularly by
armed struggle.
The impact of this charter is that it is now possible to mobilize forces
which had not participated in the confrontation of the regime in the past
on the political, military and information level.
[Question] The Syrian media and some Western news agencies speak about
divisions and differences within the Muslim Brothers movement in Syria.
How true is this and have all the groups of the movement signed the charter?
[Answer] We do not need to comment on what the aforementioned media report.
~ It is very well-known that since mid-March 1980, all the groups of the
Muslim Brothers in Syria united in one organization and imder one command which
has and continu~es ta supervise the operations of Jihad against the authorities
in Syria. The field command of these operations is linked to this command
which represents all the parties since that date. These groups have signed
the charter with the exception of some parties which have not signed the
charter as individuals and not as representatives of parties or groups.
[Question] Through the national alliance, you are calling for armed struggle
to topple the regime. Are you optimistic on this level and can it really
be done?
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rvK ~rric.iAL u~r. wv~.r
[Answer] Yes, this can be achieved. The new alliance gives the revolution
in Syria a new momentum and wider support which it needs. A regime which
subsists on shedding blood cannot remain in power for long. We shall not
allow the regime to repeat the Hamah experiment and to single out every city
by itself. If it tries to do so, we shall not remain as bystanders. One
must not forget also that the regime is bankrupt on the domestic level and is
becoming more and more isolated on the Arab and international level. All
these are indicators that the countdown has started.
[Question] How do the Muslim Brothers view the situation in Iran at present?
[AnswerJ At the beginning, the b rothers were optimistic in view of the
principles that the Tehran rulers had proclaimed at the time. Then came the
Irariian regime's practices in Iran, its alliances.with outside forces and its
relations with neighbor cou~tries to have us review our optimistic stand.
The Muslim Brothers contacted the Iranian regime to have it refrain from this
course and avoid any connections with Hafiz al-Asad's regime. The Iranians,
however, insisted on pursuing these practices. We recently attacked Iranian
Foreign Minister Velayati and aC the time that the world was grieving ov~r the
Hamah incidents 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam was in Tehran to conclude more agree-
ments with Iran.
[Question] What type of rule do you want to establish in Syria after this
alliance?
[Answer] We have announced our program and it is clear that the regime we
want will restore to the people their freedom and dignity and not a regime
that will be a dictatorial one in which one commimity, p arty or group will
replace the current regime.
In light of the declared national alliance principles which are meant to
be the basis of the current movement and a framework for Syria's constitu-
tional future and political action, we support a regime which completely
contradicts the practices of the Khomeyni regime and one that stresses that
Islam is a religion of tolerance as evidenced by the fact that the alliance
itself acknowledges the plurality of parties and opinions.
[Question] How was the alliance born?
[AnswerJ Dialogue among the Mu~lim Brothers, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party
and the other sides began more than 2 years ago. The formula of this al.liance
became clear during the past months through 10 principles which were to be
submitted for discussion by the various sides. The Hamah incidents hastened
_ the process after all were convinced of its importance not only to topple the
regime b ut to define the landmarks of the future repub lic in light of the 16
principles which had been made public. '
[Question] Will you broaden the platform of this alliance in future?
[Answer] The door remains open for all the other organizations.
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[Question] I wish to pose a previous question, What substitute do you want?
[AnswerJ We repeat and say that the regime we want will not be a sectarian
regime and will not be directed against the 'Alawite community. It will save
_ the masses of this commimity from the henchmen of the regima. We shall allow
the people to elect their representatives in a free and democratic manner.
In short, the movement took place to eliminate injustice.
[~uestion] What are the groupings which made up the Islamic Front and which
are signatories to the charter?
[Answer] The Islamic Front includes all the Islamic groups, organizations,
parties and figures including the Muslim Brothers. The secretary general of
the front is Shaykh Abu al-Nasr Bayantmi. The activities of this front were
highlighted in particular in Hamah through various Jihad operatiflns.
COPYRIGHT: AL WATAN AL ARABI �
CSO: 4400/220
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TUNISIA
IMPACT OF BOURGUIBA'S RULE DISCUSSED
Pa~is AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 261, 15 Mar 82 pp 25-27
[Article by Hedi Dhoukar: "The Stamp of Bourguiba"]
[Text] Pierre Mauroy, accompanied by, among others, Alain Savary,h is minister
of education and a veteran socialist pioneer, who gained his early experience
in the anticolonial struggle in Tunisia, should not have felt himself too
much of a foreigner in this country to which he paid his first visit as the
head of a French cabinet. This visit was not much different from various
other trips made by the French foreign minister in France itse7.f, when it
came to rallyin g as many as possible of the business leaders displeased with
a political change which did not, unfortunately, please the homeland of the
"supreme combatant" on the other side of the Mediterranean, either.
Thus it was a part of Pierre Mauroy's task to reestablish an atmosphere of
trust between Paris and Tunis. This undertaking seemed moreover to be facili-
tated by recent political developmerits in Tunisia itself. This explains the
warm complicity which characterize.d the meeting between P ierre Mauroy and
a revived and expansive Bourguiba, the key author of "change" in his country.
Would such a meeting have been possible if the leaders of the Tunisian workers'
federation (UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of I~abor]) were still in prison,
where they were hast ily locked up just af ter the bloody events of 26 January
1978, o-r if the monologue of an omnipresent party, the PSD [Destourin ~ocialist
Party] had not yielded to a dialogue with numerous interlocutors, with so
few false notes that some see therein an indication of political "maturity"?
Relations between Tunis and Paris are in any case "privileged" to such an
extent that one even wonders if what happened in Tunisia, which was the product
of specif.ic local evolution, did not after all benefit from the finishing
and accelerating touch of a Bourguiba whose actions are inspired by France--
which "made" him what he is, to use his expression. �
The Tunisian partners in Pierre Mauroy's delegation were therefore only the
more justified in proving exigent. Their desire was to profit from the "spirit
of Cancun" which pervaded Algiers at the time of the signing of a gas contract
with France. Their proposals have to do, among other things, with an increase
in Frer~ch economic aid, French participation in an investment bank in associa-
tion with Tunis (40 percent) and Qatar (30 percent), and the f inancing, under-
taken entirely by Par~s, of a second French-language television network, the
estimated cost of which comes to 105 million francs.
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These are all proposals, the Tunisian leaders stress with s~ttisfaction, which
serve the interests of France as much as, if not more than, Chose of Tunisia.
The economic aid requested, which would come to a billion fr.~ancs (inste~d
of the 230 million granted by the preceding government) would indeed allow
Tunisia to purchase French products (industrial plants, light infrastructure
installations and farm equipment). But it would also contribute to the eco-
nomic recovery sought by the socialists in France. Similarly, French parti-
cipation to the extent of 30 percent- to which it appears agreement has been
obtained--in the tripartite bank, with capital totaling $70 million, wnuld
allow that country to invest in the Arab market. The high-level joint French-
Tunisian commission which will meet during this month is suppo$ed, moreover,
to f ind a solution to the problem of the French assets blocked in Tunisia
(200 million francs), just as ~t will have to decide on the proposed second
French-language television network.
Integrity and Security
The idea is indeed attractive to the leaders in Paris. But they are not un-
familiar with the hesitation felt by the majority of Tunisian citizens, con-
cerned about the constant and debilitating deterioration of the national network,
which is now almost entirely discredited in a country the development and
- requirements of which it falls short of reflecting.
Other aspects of the bilateral relations were raised, not the least of which
is that having to do with Tunisia's "security." Pierre Mauroy, as did'Minister
of External Relations Claude Cheysson and Minister of Defense Charles Hernu,
who visited Tunis last stunmer, expressed the interest of FYance in "the ter'ri-
torial integrity" and "the security of Tunisia." The terms used were almost
identical to those which the~French prime minister used in this country, the
headquarters of the Arab League, to defend the right to exist enjoyed by Israel,
a nation which bases its entire policy on a code of aggression.
Be that as it may, there can be no doubt that the Tunisian leaders were sensi-
tive to the renewal of the commitment of the Par is government toward them,
particularly since, unlike the Americans, which subject them to lengthy ideo-
logical-military lectures1 of a sort which plunge Tunisia into the torments
of the East-West conflict, the message of F`rance is accompanied by hard cash.
This e xplains why, in a spectacular culmination of the beginnings of a new
Tunisian-~Yench idyll, President Bourguiba invited Colonel al-Qadhdhafi to
- pay him a visit forthwith, putting an end to 7 years of the tensest relations
between Tripoli and Tunis precisely following the failure of the union, still-
born at the time of its signing on 12 January 1974 in Djerba. Colonel al-
Qadhdhafi's visit, crowning it all, coincided with the publication of the
verdict of the International Court in The Hague in the suit between Tunis
and Tripoli on the subject of the Mediterranean continental shelf. The dividing
li.ne on this shelf--thought to be rich in oil--established by the Internati.onal
Court is more or less the same as that which had been agreed upon by France
and Italy in the colonial days. Although not satisfactory to Tunisia, the
settlement of this dispute without a doubt offered the advantage of enabling
it to embark, on a calmer basis, upon a process of complementary economic
and cultural exchange with Libya, whose leader showed surprising understanding
in this connection.
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Not only did the chief of state of the Jamahiriya abandon his peremptory de-
mands for immediate unity to endorse economic and social integration of the
two countries by "stages," but he is even reported to have said, following
the three talks he had with the Tunisian president, that he has decided not
to boycott Arab sununit meetings any longer and to honor that which is to be
held again in Fes to discuss the Fahd plan2 with his presence.
Minimum Conceded
This will without a doubt considerably facilitate the task of Prime Minister
Mohamed Mzali in Saudi Arabia, where he went in the hope of obtaining Riyad's
financial participation in the achievement of the 1982-1986 Sixth Plan. If
this effort is successful, as the very close bilateral relations between
Tunisia and the Wahhabite monarchy suggests that it will be, this Sixth Develop-
ment Plan, based mainly on i.mprovement of the farm sector, may benefit from
the cornucopia of this double dialogue established by Bourguiba between his
country and ~Yance, on the one hand, and with Libya and Saudi Arabia, on the
other. Still with the launching of the Sixth Plan in mind, the agreement
reached on 18 February, the day Pierre Mauroy arrived in Tunisia, by the govern-
ment, the employers and the UGTT was signed within a rather discouraging do-
mestic context.
Coming af ter spectacular increases in the price of a number of foodstuffs
(butter, milk, meat), the strikes called throughout the country several weeks
prior to the signing of the government-employers-UGTT agreement occasioned
a government attitude very similar to that adopted just prior to the events,
so sadly remembered, of 26 January 1978. The UGTT was subjected to concealed
threats and blaclanail! The government allowed hundreds of enterprises to
shut down in order to break the strikes and itself had recourse to the army
to break the strike of the transport workers. In this test of strength imposed
upon it, the trade union federation found itself, just as it did prior to
26 January 1978, alone against the state, that is to say the PSD, as Mohamed
Mzali made a point of proclaiming loud and clear. This is a state which is,
moreover, the chief employer in the country, in which it holds 60 percent
of the industrial, agricultural and financial stocks.3
In relation to the wage demands of the UGTT, the agreement signed by the "so-
cial partners" conceded the minim~n imder these circtunstances: the Inter-
occupational Guaranteed Minimum Wage for a 48-hour week was increased by 30
percent. It was established at 85 dinars, instead of the 120 initially de-
manded by the UGTT. The agricultural guaranteed minim~n wage was established
at 2.4 dinars per labor day, and an increase in the form of premiums and in-
demnities ranging between 27 and 35 dinars was granted workers and government
employees.
Now even those tempted to be content with such an agreement, but unable to
ignore the parasitic and anarchic nature of the country's economy, particu-
larly its private sector, know perfectly well that these gains are likely
to be eaten up soon by inflation.4 This is the more inevitable since, their
bad faith contributing, the emp loyers will find themselves tempted to inflate
their pr o f i t s, even if it means pursuing a policy courting disaster by
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profiting from the increase in purchasing power to which these measures lead.
For it falls within the logic of the balance of forces which prevails in the
country today that the upper and petite bourgeoisie will seek to exploit this
balance to their advantage. The. state-PSD, which cannot abandon support of
it, can only place reliance once again on the signing of a new "social pact"5
which will allow it, among other things, to play the role of an arbiter raCheY`
than a representative of certain social categories.
Bipolarization
This is well and truly what it attempted to do by submitting a first "social
pact" of "limited duration" to the UGTT. The nature of the exchange which
the regime proposed to the representatives of the unions says a great deal,
moreover, about the real role of the state-PSD. It wants in fact to effect
a price increase on a very broad range of products, foodstuffs in particular,
without UGTT support of any strike for higher wages. In exchange, the regime
undertook to guarantee that plants would not be shut down because of strikes
(lockout) and that the prices on certain goods of first necessity will not
be increased (bread, oil, grain).
Although the trade union officials rejected it, this social pact will nonethe-
less be the subject of further negotiations. It is a harsh test for the trade
union federation, which finds itself in a position almost identical to its .
situation just prior to 26 January 1978. With the difference, however, that
its legitimate leadership, back in the same position, derives new strength
from the experience it has accumulated since, which cannot fail to contribute
to the combativity of its base levels. But what purpose, then, was served
by the "opposition" which developed after that bloodbath? It certainly did
not serve to tip the balance of forces somewhat in favor of the representatives
of the workers class. The "consensus" its me~nbers claim (social democrats
in the MDS [Socialist Democratic Movement], the socialists in the MUP [Popular
Unity Movement] and Mohamed Harmel's Communist Party) is certainly built on
converting analyses of the lessons to be drawn from the events of January
1978 and January 1980 (Gafsa) which are blamed on the PSD policy. But this
criticism has given rise to nothing but appeals for "democracy," which care-
f ully refrain from offering concrete proposals, which would, it is true, pre-
suppose an otherwise more profound challen ge to the regime.
There can be no doubt, on the other hand, the regi.me is utilizing thi~ "oppo-
sition" as a buffer between itself and the other main organized force in the
country--the UGTT.
What is more remarkablt~ is that the basic characteristic of the Bourguiba
policy as it marked the Destour, in which two poles have always coexisted,
thus allowing the "supreme combatant" to pl.ay one against the other alternately,
is found within the "opposition," in which the social democrats split into
two factions (Mestiri, Hassib ben Ammar), as well as the MUP, the division
of which into two movements is confirmed by the facts. This is also the case,
if less well known, with the PCT [Tunisian Communist Party], wherei.n, one of
the members of the Politburo, Noureddine Bouarrouj, along with other members
of the expanded Central Committee, is sponsoring the Communist Party-Seventh
Congress organization.
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lluring the sixth and seventh congresses (1958 and 1962), the PCT underwent
a corrective sweep which destroyed the compromise policy of the colonial era,
characterized in part by evasion of the national question in the direction
of a so-called sor.ialist revolution without which, it was claimed, Tunisian
independence would have no meaning, and on the other hand, by opportunism
involving compromise with the French authorities and the protectorate, agains~
which it scarcely waged any seriuus battle. Following this courageous cor-
rection, late though it was in some respects, the comm~ists supporting the
seventh congress line believe that there has been regression. They say that
just as the PCT chose legality within the colonial framework, it has today
swung back toward legaliat opportunism within the framework imposed by Bour-
guiba, and has opted for a policy they say is based on democracy and a"con-
sensus," as well, they claim, as fidelity to the fatherland of socialism.
However, these breaks are but a pale reflection of the Bourguiba policy, marked
at birth by a major and bloody split.
A Senseless Myth
If it is not possible to expand here on the cultural nature and extroversion
of the Bourguiba ideology in comparison to what that of Youssef was in its
time,6 since having undergone another development, it must be recognized that
it was we 11 and truly into the breach created by this first break that the
voices stifled by history tried to plunge in January 1978 and January 1980,
only to be met immediately by a hail of bullets and to be drowned in blood.
And it is this same break which projects its threatening shadow today over
the PSM-UGTT confrontation, while the "opposition," which one could situate
without risk of error around rather than face to face with the regime, is
not even able to examine this schizophrenic split nor to grasp the meaning
of the historic ferment for which iC is the privileged site, where cultural
repression and class struggles clash and merge.
Those who reduce the matter of the "pro-Islam trend" to an "extremist" phe-
nomenon or~a problem pertaining to the "rights of man" no longer have much
of an alternative, under these conditions, to nurturing, for their part, the
senseless myth of the Bourguiba faction, that is to say the myth of a man
who has emptied the concept of class struggle of its entire content in order
to rally a whole peop le around himself as a single individual. This myth,
like that of Ataturk in Turkey, will certainly not survive him, even if, as
can be predicted, the "consensus" carries over to the successor he chooses..
FOOTNOTES
1. The Reagan administration gave Tunis $95 million ~in military aid (instead
of 15 million) for the 1982 f iscal year.
2. Colonel al-Qadhdhafi nonetheless was quick to go back on these statements
in a violent indictment of Saudi Arabia and the Fahd pl.an.
3. LE MAGHREB, 20 February 1982.
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4. It is expected to be about 15 percent in 1982.
S. See AFRIQUE-ASIE, No 253, 23 November-6 December 1982, "The Destour Lock."
6. This break within the Destour occurred in 1955, during the bloody clash
between the supporters of "independence by stages, whose ranks were led
by Bourguiba, and supporters of the pursuit of the"war within the North
African context, with the goal of liberating the three countries simul-
� taneously. This strategic line--defended in Tunisia by the FLN in Algeria
and by the radical wing of the Moroccan movement, headed by Mohamed
el-Basri--came within the context of the planned construction within the
Greater Maghreb s~.:rup,gle. Salah ben Youssef was assassinated in Frankfurt
in October 1961. Tne leadership of the faction he headed (called the
Tunisian National Opposition Movement at that ti.me) was later taken over
by Ibrahim Tobal--editor's note).
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Afrique-Asie
5157
CSO: 4519/154 E~
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